The Significance of Semantic Realism - Alexander Miller

7/28/2019 The Significance of Semantic Realism - Alexander Miller

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ALEXANDER MILLER

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEMANTIC REALISM

ABSTRACT. This paper is concerned with the relationship between the metaphysical

doctrine of realism about the external world and semantic realism, as characterised by

Michael Dummett. I argue that Dummetts conception of the relationship is flawed, and

that Crispin Wrights account of the relationship, although designed to avoid the problems

which beset Dummetts, nevertheless fails for similar reasons. I then aim to show that

despite the fact that Dummett and Wright both fail to give a plausible account of the rela-

tionship between semantic realism and the metaphysical doctrine of realism, the semantic

issue and the metaphysical issue are importantly related. I outline the precise sense in

which the evaluation of semantic realism is relevant to the evaluation of realism about theexternal world, a sense overlooked by opponents of Dummett, such as Simon Blackburn

and Michael Devitt. I finish with some brief remarks on metaphysics, semantics, and the

nature of philosophy, and suggest that Dummetts arguments against semantic realism can

retain their relevance to metaphysical debate even if we reject Dummetts idea that the

theory of meaning is the foundation of all philosophy.

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea, deriving from Frege, that a competent speakers understanding

of the declarative sentences of his language consists in his grasp of their

truth-conditions forms the departure point for Michael Dummetts discus-

sion of the debates in metaphysics between realists and their opponents.1

Dummett uses the Fregean idea to formulate a position I shall call se-

mantic realism, and famously develops some arguments which attempt to

establish the unacceptability of semantic realism.2 Those arguments will

not be discussed in this paper. Rather, I shall be concerned with the prior

questions: what is semantic realism?, and what exactly is the relationship

between semantic realism about a particular subject matter and realism per

se about that subject matter? Some philosophers doubt whether Dummetts

discussion of semantic realism has any relevance to metaphysical debates

between realism and anti-realism, properly conceived. Simon Blackburn,

for instance, writes:

There are many [debates between realism and anti-realism], although they each require

their own geography, for the shoe may pinch in different places, in the theory of morals, of

possibility, probability, cause, or mind. The only real villain of the matter is the belief that

Synthese 136: 191217, 2003.

2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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192 ALEXANDER MILLER

the philosophy of language, the imperial taking with full seriousness the view of language

as an instrument of social communication, affords us a new overarching view of the issues,

or even a set of arguments playing any useful role in their solution. (1989, 46)

Other writers are almost equally dismissive. Michael Devitt writes:

Not only are semantic doctrines not constitutive of the metaphysical issue of realism, they

are . . . almost entirely irrelevant to the assessment of realism. (1991a, 50)

The aim of this paper is to investigate these charges, as well as the plausib-

ility of Dummetts own contentions about the relationship between realism

per se and semantic realism. I will argue that semantic realism is relevant

to realism per se, although the precise nature of the relationship has been

misconceived by Dummett and overlooked by those philosophers, such as

Blackburn and Devitt, who oppose him. Inter alia, I argue that Crispin

Wrights conception of the relationship between realism and semantic

realism is inadequate. My strategy will be as follows. I will concentrate

initially on realism about the external world, and I will develop an aus-terely metaphysical characterisation of that realism. I will then investigate

whether, and in what sense, the evaluation of semantic realism is relevant

to the evaluation of realism, thus austerely characterised. I conclude with

some brief general remarks on metaphysics, the theory of meaning, and

the nature of philosophy.

2. REALISM ABOUT THE EXTERNAL WORLD

What is realism about the external world? Michael Devitt suggests the

following characterisation:Common Sense Realism: Tokens of most current observable common-sense and scientific

physical types objectively exist independently of the mental. (1991b, 24)

There are thus two dimensions to realism about the external world: the

existence dimension and the independence dimension. The realist asserts

that tables, chairs, cats, the moons of Jupiter, and so on, exist; and that

these entities exist objectively and independently of the mental. The table

I am writing on exists and is not constituted by our knowledge, by

our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to it, by the synthesizing

power of the mind, by our imposition of concepts, theories, or languages

(1991b, 15). Nor is it made up of sense-data or mental states, whether as

characterised by Descartes or by modern materialism.I am happy to accept this characterisation of realism about the external

world, with one minor qualification. As stated, common sense realism

is consistent with the following scenario: tables, chairs, cats, the moons


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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEMANTIC REALISM 193

of Jupiter and so on, objectively exist independently of the mental; but

in every case, and for every possible property which one of them might

possess, their possessing (or failing to possess) that property is constituted

by our knowledge, by our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer toit, by the synthesizing power of the mind, by our imposition of concepts,

theories, or languages. Thus, the table I am writing on objectively exists

independently of the mental, but its colour, weight, shape, molecular con-

stitution etc. are all in some sense constituted by us. A position such as this

is hardly worth describing as realism about the external world. I suggest

that we need to strengthen Devitts characterisation in order to preclude

this type of scenario. One way to do this would be as follows:

Common Sense Realism: Tokens of most current observable common-sense and scientific

physical types objectively exist independently of the mental, and they possess some of their

properties objectively.

It is an interesting question how many of the properties we could allowto fail to be possessed objectively before realism is compromised: for

instance, is a view which allows that the tables being black, but not its

being square, is constituted by facts about how it strikes humans, worth

describing as realism? I do not need to pursue this question here. Clearly,

the more properties that fail to be possessed objectively, the weaker the

version of realism. So our new characterisation of common sense realism

is the weakest position that anyone worth calling a realist about the external

world is committed to.3 Call this the austere metaphysical characterisation

of realism about the external world.

It is an interesting question whether we can say anything more about

what is involved in an items possessing a property objectively. But

rather than pursue this interesting question here, we can cash out the ideaas follows:


physical types objectively exist independently of the mental; they possess some proper-

ties which may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness; and their innermost

nomological secrets may remain forever hidden from us.4

Note that this formulation of common sense realism is no less austerely

metaphysical than the formulation which led to it. As such, it should be

entirely acceptable to Devitt and those sympathetic to him. Henceforth,

when I refer to the austere metaphysical characterisation of realism about

the external world, it is this final formulation that Ill have in mind. I will

now outline a distinct view, semantic realism, and investigate what Dum-metts discussions of semantic realism can teach us about the plausibility of

realism about the external world characterised in this austere metaphysical

manner.


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3. SEMANTIC REALISM

What is semantic realism? In order to answer this question, we need to

introduce a couple of notions which loom large in Dummetts work: the

notions ofdecidability and undecidability. Dummett writes:

[P is an effectively decidable statement] only when P is a statement of such a kind that we

could in a finite time bring ourselves into a position in which we were justified either in

asserting or denying P. (1978, 16)

An undecidable sentence is simply one whose sense is such that, though in certain

effectively recognizable situations we acknowledge it as true, in others we acknowledge

it as false, and yet in others no decision is possible, we possess no effective means for

bringing about a situation which is one or the other of the first two kinds. (1973, 468)

Following on from this, Ill say that a sentence is undecidable if (a) we

have no evidence either of its truth or its falsity and (b) we do not know

a procedure which, if correctly implemented, is guaranteed after finitely

many steps to put us in a position in which we have evidence that it iseither true or false. Likewise, a sentence is decidable if either (a) we do

have evidence either of its truth or its falsity or (b) we do know a procedure

which, if correctly implemented, is guaranteed after finitely many steps to

put us in a position in which we have evidence that it is either true or false.

These characterisations of decidability and undecidability no doubt stand

in need in clarification and defence, but I shall not digress into that issue

here.5 For the moment, I will merely give some examples of sentences of

each type.

(a) Goldbachs Conjecture: every even number is the sum of two

primes. This is undecidable. In mathematics, the notion of proof plays

the role of evidence, and in this case we have no proof that the conjecture

is true, no proof that there is a counterexample, and we do not know a

procedure the correct implementation of which will guarantee us either a

proof or a counterexample.

(b) Julius Caesar sneezed twice on his nineteenth birthday. This is

undecidable. We have no evidence that he did sneeze twice on the date in

question, no evidence that he did not sneeze twice on the date in question,

and we do not know a procedure the correct implementation of which will

guarantee us evidence one way or the other.

(c) Julius Caesar was murdered in 55 BC. This is decidable. We have

evidence lots of it to the effect that the sentence is true.

(d) 109087655 is prime. This is decidable. Though we do not (we

may suppose) have a proof that it is true, nor a proof that it is false, wedo know a procedure Eratosthenes Sieve the correct implementation of

which will guarantee us a proof that the number in question is prime or a

proof that it is composite.


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(e) There is a malt whisky distillery somewhere in Alpha Centauri.

This is undecidable. We have no evidence that there is such a distillery,

and no evidence that there is not, nor do we know a procedure the correct

implementation of which will guarantee us evidence one way or the other.(f) That lemon is bitter. This is decidable. Even though (we may sup-

pose) I have not tasted the lemon, I do know a procedure put it in your

mouth as taste it the correct implementation of which will guarantee me

evidence one way or the other.

(a), (b), and (e) show that we can have undecidable sentences about,

respectively, the past, and the external world. Well see in a moment that

it is this fact which allows Dummett to formulate semantic realism about

arithmetic, the past, and the external world.

A couple of points about decidability and undecidability are worth

making at this stage. First, note that the notion of evidence that figures

in the definitions does not have to be conclusive. In some cases, such as

mathematics, it will be, since you cannot have a proof of a sentence and yetthat sentence be false; but in other cases, the notion of evidence may be less

than conclusive: we can have evidence that Julius Caesar was murdered

in 54 BC and yet later discover that he in fact died in 55 BC. Second,

note that the claim that, e.g., Goldbachs Conjecture is undecidable entails

only that we do not know a procedure which will guarantee us either a

proof or a counterexample. It does not entail that we know that Goldbachs

Procedure cannot be proved or refuted: it is consistent with our definition

of undecidability that we turn up a proof or a counterexample fortuitously,

as it were. Likewise, the claim that (b) is undecidable does not entail that

we know that we will never have evidence concerning whether Caesar

sneezed twice on his nineteenth birthday: it is consistent with our definitionof undecidability that we stumble across some evidence which points one

way or the other.

I can now characterise semantic realism about the external world. Con-

sider sentences that are intuitively about the external world. Semantic

realism consists of the following claim: our understanding of undecidable

sentences about the external world consists in our grasp of their truth-

conditions. In such a case, the truth-conditions of the relevant sentences are

potentially evidence-transcendent: we do not know a method, the correct

application of which is guaranteed to yield evidence one way or the other,

and for all we know, we may never turn up evidence either way. Semantic

realism about the external world is thus the view that our understanding of

at least some sentences about the external world consists in our grasp oftheir potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions.


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4. SEMANTIC REALISM AND REALISM: DUMMETTS VIEWS

I have now given basic characterisations of both realism about the external

world and semantic realism. How are the two views related? Dummetthimself espouses an extreme view of how they are related. First of all, he

denies that we can even have a literal, austerely metaphysical characterisa-

tion of realism. For example, he writes, of the attempt to give an austere

metaphysical characterisation of realism about mathematics (platonism)

and what stands opposed to it (intuitonism):

How [are] we to decide this dispute over the ontological status of mathematical objects[?]

As I have remarked, we have here two metaphors: the platonist compares the mathem-

atician with the astronomer, the geographer or the explorer, the intuitionist compares him

with the sculptor or the imaginative writer; and neither comparison seems very apt. The

disagreement evidently relates to the amount of freedom that the mathematician has. Put

this way, however, both seem partly right and partly wrong: the mathematician has great

freedom in devising the concepts he introduces and in delineating the structure he choosesto study, but he cannot prove just whatever he decides it would be attractive to prove.

How are we to make the disagreement into a definite one, and how can we then resolve it?

(1978, xxv)

[Any metaphysical view] is a picture which has in itself no substance otherwise than

as a representation of the given conception of meaning. (1977, 383)

Dummett also says that in evaluating realism, the greatest difficulty is

[T]o comprehend the content of the metaphysical doctrine. What does it mean to say that

natural numbers are mental constructions, or that they are independently existing immut-

able and immaterial objects? What does it mean to ask whether or not past or future events

are there? What does it mean to say, or deny, that material objects are logical constructions

out of sense-data? In each case, we are presented with alternative pictures. The need tochoose between these pictures seems very compelling; but the non-pictorial content of the

pictures is unclear (1991, 10).

Dummett thus espouses the metaphor thesis: any attempt to formulate

realism in austerely metaphysical terms results at best in pictures or

metaphors, whose non-pictorial or non-metaphorical content is unclear.

Of course, there is nothing wrong with the use of metaphorical language

as such. Often, the use of metaphor, whether in philosophy, literature, or

ordinary life, can aid the search for insight and understanding. But if two

parties are attempting to engage in an argument, at some point the meta-

phorical elements used in the presentation of their views are going to have

to be replaced by formulations which convey the literal content of thoseviews. Often, in ordinary language, the literal content of metaphors is so

well-understood or so clear that there is no need to do this in practice:

If Jones tells me that the head of department is a man of steel, I can


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argue with him without spelling out the literal content of the metaphor,

but only because the literal content is already well-understood by both of

us. However, if Jones tells me that the head of department is a giant among

men, the literal content of the argument needs to be spelled out before wecan usefully engage in argument: otherwise we may simply find ourselves

at cross purposes (Jones responds to my claims about the heads meagre

accomplishments with a description of his expansive girth).

Dummett believes that to avoid this sort of danger in the case of debates

between realists and their opponents we need a cashing out of the literal

content of the imagery which figures in attempts to give a metaphysical

characterisation of realism. We get this courtesy of a second thesis, what

Ill call the constitution thesis: the literal content of realism consists in the

content of semantic realism. Thus, the literal content of realism about the

external world is constituted by the claim that our understanding of at least

some sentences concerning the external world consists in our grasp of their

potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions:

Realism rests upon or better, consists in an adherence to a truth-conditional semantics

for our language. (1979, 218)

The debate in metaphysics between realism and its opponents can thus

become a debate within the theory of meaning: should we characterise

speakers understanding in terms of their grasp of potentially evidence-

transcendent truth-conditions? The debate thus becomes a debate about

truth, understanding, and meaning:

The dispute [between realism and its opponents] concerns the notion of truth appropriate

for statements of the disputed class; and this means that it is a dispute concerning the kind

ofmeaning which these statements have (1978, 146)

Dummett clearly intends the debate within the theory of meaning to cap-

ture, rather than displace, the metaphysical debate. In his valedictory

lecture he writes:

The opinion is sometimes expressed that I succeeded in opening up a genuine philosophical

problem, or range of problems, but that the resulting topic has little to do with traditional

disputes concerning realism. That was certainly not my intention: I meant to apply a new

technique to such wholly traditional questions as realism about the external world and

about the mental, questions which I continue to believe I characterised correctly. (1993,

468)

Moreover, Dummett sees this as his fundamental contribution to philo-

sophy:

The whole point of my approach to [disputes between realism and its opponents] has been

to show that the theory of meaning underlies metaphysics. If I have made any worthwhile

contribution to philosophy, I think it must lie in having raised this issue in these terms.

(1978, xl)


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Dummetts views on the relationship between realism and semantic real-

ism can be summarised as follows: attempts at purely metaphysical

characterisations of realism result at most in metaphor, and any literal

content which these characterisations possess consists in the claim that ourunderstanding of sentences concerning the disputed subject matter consists

in our grasp of potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions.

5. SEMANTIC REALISM AND REALISM: OBJECTIONS TO DUMMETTS

VIEWS

Objections to Dummetts views on the relationship between realism per se

and semantic realism concern both the metaphor thesis and the constitution

thesis. I shall outline examples of both types of objection in turn.

First, objections to the metaphor thesis. One objection is that Dum-metts arguments for the metaphor thesis are unconvincing. Another

objection is that the metaphor thesis, in its application to realism about

the external world, is simply false.

Dummett argues for the metaphor thesis as follows. Consider pla-

tonism and intuitionism as putative metaphysical positions within the

philosophy of mathematics. According to mathematical platonism, math-

ematical objects, such as numbers, are objects which have no spatial or

temporal location and they would have existed even had there been no

minds to think about them. According to mathematical intuitionism or

constructivism, mathematical objects are rather creations of the human

mind. Dummett thinks that this distinction, between two ontologies ofmathematical objects, makes no literal sense:

[W]e have here two metaphors: the platonist compares the mathematician with the

astronomer, the geographer or the explorer, the intuitionist compares him with the sculptor

or the imaginative writer; and neither comparison seems very apt. (1978, xxv)

We are, after all, being asked to choose between two metaphors, two pictures. The platonist

metaphor assimilates mathematical enquiry to the investigations of the astronomer:

mathematical structures, like galaxies, exist, independently of us, in a realm of reality

which we do not inhabit but which those of us who have the skill are capable of observing

and reporting on. The constructivist metaphor assimilates mathematical activity to that of

the artificer fashioning objects in accordance with the creative power of his imagination.

Neither metaphor seems, at first sight, especially apt, nor one more apt than the other: theactivities of the mathematician seem strikingly unlike those either of the astronomer or the

artist. What basis can exist for deciding which metaphor is to be preferred? How are we to

know in which respects the metaphors are to be taken seriously, how the pictures are to be

used? (1978, 229)


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Dummett provides no argument to the effect that the distinction between

a platonist and a constructivist ontology cannot be drawn in literal terms.

But it is not hard to have some sympathy with this claim. What does a pla-

tonist take the number 17 to be, and what does the constructivist propose inopposition to this? Suppose that Dummett is right, and that these questions

cannot be given literal answers. Would it follow from this that the same is

true of the metaphysical dispute between realism about the external world

and its opponents? Dummett clearly thinks that it does:

The dispute between phenomenalism and realism about the external world would have

been much better conducted if both sides had conformed it more to the model of the dispute

between intuitionism and platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. (1973, 666)

But it is difficult to see how it could: the striking differences between

the mathematical realm and the realm of everyday common-sense and

scientific objects would by themselves suggest the possibility that a non-

metaphorical formulation of realism about the latter could be given eventhough a metaphorical formulation was the best we could get in the case of

the former. At any rate, the metaphor thesis, as applied to realism about the

external world, seems simply false. Recall the formulation from Section 2:


physical types objectively exist independently of the mental; and they possess some prop-

erties which may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness; and their innermost

nomological secrets may remain forever hidden from us.

This is no doubt somewhat vague, but on the face of it there is nothing

metaphorical about it. If Dummett wants to hold on to the metaphor thesis

in the face of this, he faces the following task: show that there is an element

in the formulation of common sense realism the meaning of which resists

literal clarification and which is thus essentially metaphorical. Nothing in

Dummetts writings on the topic goes beyond the bald assertion that this is

the case. In the absence of argument, we are justified in proceeding on the

assumption that the metaphor thesis is false.6

Lets put the metaphor thesis to one side, and move on to consider

the constitution thesis. Recall that according to this thesis the literal

content of realism about the external world is given by the claim that

(some) sentences concerning the external world have potentially evidence-

transcendent truth conditions. Realism about the external world becomes,

in effect, a semantic doctrine. As noted above, this claim has been widely

disputed. Michael Devitt is perhaps Dummetts most vociferous critic in

this respect:

What has truth to do with Realism? On the face of it, nothing at all. Indeed, Realism says

nothing semantic at all beyond, in its use of objective, making the negative point that our

semantic capacities do notconstitute the world (1991b, 39).


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The way that the realism issue is posed by the British School founded by Dummett is

mistaken. The School starts with a properly metaphysical statement of the issue. This is

immediately replaced by a formulation in terms of truth, which is then taken . . . as part of a

theory of meaning. Whatever the merits of the various theories of meaning then proposed,

the theories are [almost] irrelevant . . . to the metaphysical issue which they are alleged tosettle. For the metaphysical issue is not one about meaning. (1991a, 51)

Devitts main criticism of the constitution thesis is this: the literal content

of realism about the external world is not given by semantic realism, since

semantic realism is consistent with an idealistmetaphysics of the external

world. He writes

Does [semantic realism] entail Realism? It does not. Realism . . . requires the objective

independent existence of common-sense physical entities. Semantic Realism concerns

physical statements and has no such requirement: it says nothing about the nature of the

reality that makes those statements true or false, except that it is [at least in part poten-

tially beyond the reach of our best investigative efforts]. An idealist who believed in the

. . . existence of a purely mental realm of sense-data could subscribe to [semantic realism].

He could believe that physical statements are true or false according as they do or do not

correspond to the realm of sense-data, whatever anyones opinion on the matter: we have

no incorrigible knowledge of sense-data. . . . In sum, mere talk of truth will not yield any

particular ontology (1983, 77).7

We can see Devitts point most clearly if we reflect that semantic real-

ism is consistent with Berkeleyan idealism about the external world, the

view that tables, chairs, cats, the moons of Jupiter and so on are nothing

but ideas in the minds of spirits, that all the choir of heaven and furniture

of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame

of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind (Berkeley 1710,

6). It is consistent with even this metaphysics for the external world

that some sentences concerning it have potentially evidence- transcendenttruth-conditions. The point is well made by Brian Loar:

[T]he idealist thesis that reality is entirely mental, non-material, is not in itself incompatible

with [semantic] realism. Consider Berkeleys theory that the truth about ordinary objects

is a matter of perceptions in the mind of God; if it is also held that what occurs in Gods

mind is not dependent on our ability to verify it, then the theory is [semantic] realist in the

relevant sense. (1987, 81)

And indeed, Berkeley is himself quite explicit in his commitment to a form

of semantic realism:

That there is a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties

both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on

me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted,narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may

imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption since there may be,

for aught I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another,

and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. (1710, 81)


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It does not require much licence to see this as expressing a commit-

ment to semantic realism as we have characterised it. Since, for Berkeley,

sentences about external objects are analysed in terms of ideas and

sensations (1710, 3), it follows from the passage just quoted that weunderstand those sentences in such a way that their truth is potentially

evidence-transcendent. In short, we have the following argument against

the constitution thesis. The literal content of a realist metaphysics about

the external world cannot be constituted by a position which is consistent

with Berkeleyan idealism; semantic realism is consistent with Berkeleyan

idealism; therefore, the literal content of a realist metaphysics about the

external world is not constituted by semantic realism.

There are other objections to the constitution thesis (see especially

Wright (1986, 1992)). For example, if the literal content of any realistic

metaphysical position simply consists in the relevant form of semantic

realism, one would expect the canonical form of opposition to realism to be

precisely the denial of semantic realism. That is, one would expect debatesbetween realists and their opponents generally to assume the form of a

debate between those who accept semantic realism and those who reject it.

But this is not in fact the case. Historically, one characteristic form of op-

position to realism about a particular subject matter is the denial that there

are truth-conditions of the appropriate type, whether potentially evidence-

transcendent or not. This type of opposition to realism can take a number of

forms, as can be illustrated by considering realism concerning moral states

of affairs and properties. Is Mad Frankie Frazer a bad man? Does Mad

Frankie Frazer instantiate the property of moral badness? An error theorist

about morals would say that although sentences such as Mad Frankie

Frazer is bad are genuinely truth-conditional, they are uniformly andsystematically false since there are no moral properties corresponding to

predicates like bad (Mackie (1973)). A non-cognitivist (or expressivist)

about morals would say that although there are no moral properties corres-

ponding to predicates like bad, moral discourse avoids the metaphysical

error imputed to it by the error-theorists since moral sentences do not

even have truth-conditions: the function of an utterance of Mad Frankie

Frazer is bad is not to state a fact or claim that a truth-condition ob-

tains, but rather to express an emotion, feeling, or non-cognitive sentiment

(Ayer (1946), Blackburn (1984), Gibbard (1990)). Error-theoretic and non-

cognitivist opposition to realism face many well-known difficulties (see

Wright (1992, chap. 1), but for our present purposes the important point

is this: in neither case is the debate between the realist and her opponenthappily characterised as a debate between an advocate and an opponent of

semantic realism.


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Dummett could respond to the doubt this casts on the constitution thesis

by replying that although historical debates between realists and their op-

ponents are not happily cast as debates between advocates and opponents

of semantic realism, they nevertheless oughtto have been so cast. However,this is not in fact how Dummett responds. He responds rather by conceding

that the debate between advocates and opponents of semantic realism is

less fundamental than that between, e.g., cognitivism and non-cognitivism:

In the disputes about realism that interested me, the opponent of realism did not question

[cognitivism]: it has been common to both disputants that statements of the kind in dispute

can, in favourable circumstances, be objectively established as true. Controversy between

[non-cognitivists] and [cognitivists] in ethics was therefore not an example of that kind of

dispute. . . . [T]he dispute between the [non-cognitivist] and the moral realist is not one

of those to which my comparative method was meant to apply: the issues in that dispute

are different and priorto it. (1993, 467, Dummetts emphasis)

However, this concession has implications for the constitution thesis which

Dummett fails to note. If there is a debate between realism and one style ofopposition which is more fundamental than the debate between advocates

and opponents of semantic realism, it is difficult to see how one could

plausibly hold that the literal content of any realistic metaphysical position

simply consists in the relevant form of semantic realism. Dummetts con-

cession suggests that the relation between realism and semantic realism

must be looser than that postulated in the constitution thesis. If this is the

case, the constitution thesis requires at least some serious modification or

qualification.

Putting the above-noted concession of Dummetts to one side, it is clear

that the response to the effect that realism ought everywhere to be char-

acterised as semantic realism is implausible. Put on one side the worryexpressed above concerning the compatibility of semantic realism with

Berkeleyan idealism concerning the external world. Then, even allowing

that Dummetts way of characterising the metaphysical debate is appropri-

ate in the case of the issue about the external world, there are other cases

where it seems straightforwardly besides the point. Consider the cases of

morals and comedy. It seems that in these cases a moral realist or a realist

about the comic would not have to claim that the truth-conditions of the

relevant sentences are potentially evidence-transcendent. The realist and

her opponent can agree that statements ascribing comic quality or moral

value do not have evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. As Wright puts

it:

There are, no doubt, kinds of moral realism [or realism about comedy] which do have the

consequence that moral [or comic] reality may transcend all possibility of detection. But it

is surely not essential to any view worth regarding as realist about morals [or comedy] that

it incorporate a commitment to that idea. (1992, 9)


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Intuitively, a sensible version of realism about That remark was funny

or That deed was wrong does not have to view facts about funniness

or wrongness as potentially evidence-transcendent. So although semantic

realism may provide a useful vehicle for characterising realism about somesubject matters, there are other subject matters for which this is not a

useful characterisation. The upshot of this is that we need other vehicles

via which realism can be characterised.8 Again, the implication is that the

constitution thesis is unsatisfactory.

This point can be generalised as follows:

[I]t is very far from obvious that . . . only by allowing that truth can transcend evidence

can substance be given to the idea that truth is not in general of our creation but is con-

stituted by correspondence with autonomous states of affairs. That opinion would have

the consequence that, when restricted to the domain of states of affairs over which human

cognitive powers are sovereign, the thesis of realism would have no content. (Wright 1986,

3)

Intuitively, there ought to be scope to debate a realist view of a certain sub-ject matter even when sentences concerning that subject matter are always

decidable. For example, consider elementary arithmetic: the subject matter

of quantifier-free arithmetical statements. These are decidable in the relev-

ant sense, but there should still be scope for the formulation of, and debate

about, both realist and opposing views of the area. But if the constitution

thesis were true, this would seem to be precluded. If the literal content of

any realist view concerning a certain subject matter simply consists in the

relevant form of semantic realism, we could not so much as formulate a

realist view of that subject matter, since semantic realism is a view about

what our understanding of undecidable sentences consists in and there are

no undecidable sentences in the area at hand.9

Likewise, there would beno scope for the formulation of a view opposing semantic realism. Thus, if

the constitution thesis were true, we could not have a metaphysical debate

about the subject matter of, e.g., elementary arithmetic. To the extent that

we think that there should be scope for such a debate, doubt is again cast

on the constitution thesis.

Thus, to summarise our discussion of Dummetts views on the relation-

ship between realism and semantic realism: Dummett adheres both to the

metaphor thesis and the constitution thesis, and there appear to be good

reasons why each of these theses should be doubted.10

6. SEMANTIC REALISM AND REALISM: WRIGHTS VIEWS

In the previous section I argued that Dummetts views on the relation-

ship between semantic realism and realism are unacceptable: the metaphor


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thesis and the constitution thesis are both implausible. In this section, Ill

briefly consider Crispin Wrights account of the relationship.

According to Wright

The fact is that realism, as implicitly characterised by the opinions of writers, in whateverarea of philosophy, who regard themselves as realists, is a syndrome, a loose weave of

separable presuppositions and attitudes. (1993a, 45)

and

[I]f there ever was a consensus of understanding about "realism", as a philosophical term

of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates

- so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science,

for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little

more than to clear her throat. (1992, 1)

Wright thus replaces Dummetts metaphor thesis with the much more

modest assertion that due to the multifarious range of views that would

deem themselves realist, we require some clarification or precisification

of the views held by anyone calling themselves a realist. And it turns out

that semantic realism, as characterised by Dummett, gives us one way of

providing the required clarification or precisification:

Some critics, even if willing to allow that Dummetts debate concerns a fundamental

issue in the philosophy of language, have questioned its connection with any natural or

intuitive understanding of the term realism. But the connection is easy to see. To allow

that the meaning of statements in a certain discourse is fixed, as Dummetts [semantic]

realist suggests, by assigning them conditions of potentially evidence-transcendent truth is

to grant that, depending on the world, the truth or falsity of such statements may be settled

beyond our ken. So Dummetts [semantic] realist is committed to a distinction between

what confers acceptability upon such a statement, in the light of whatever standards inform

the discourse to which it belongs, and what makes it actually true. [Semantic] realism as

Dummett understands it is consequently one natural semantical preparation for the idea

that our thoughts aim to reflect a reality whose character is independent of us. (1993b,

56)11

However, there is no commitment to the idea that semantic realism gives

the only way of providing the required clarification. It turns out that

viewing the sentences of a discourse as having potentially evidence-

transcendent truth-conditions is only one of a number of ways of char-

acterising realism: much of Wrights recent work is devoted to finding

plausible formulations of these other ways in which one might clarify and

precisify ones commitment to a realist view of a subject matter.12 Wrights

approach is thus superior to Dummetts insofar as it does not involve sad-dling the moral realist, for example, with claims about potential evidence-

transcendence which any sensible moral realist would baulk at. Wright

thus weakens Dummetts constitution thesis: the literal content of realism


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is now given by a disjunction of views, only one of which is semantic

realism as formulated by Dummett.

Wrights replacement of the metaphor thesis with a simple call for cla-

rification and precisification is perfectly reasonable, but it seems to me thathis weakening of the constitution thesis does not evade all of the difficulties

faced by the original, stronger version of that thesis. In particular, it does

not evade the first difficulty raised above, that concerning consistency with

Berkeleyan idealism. According to Wright, to be a realist it is not necessary

to be a semantic realist, since we can realize realism in all sorts of other

ways: for instance by arguing that the subject matter satisfies cognitive

command, that it resists a Euthyphronic treatment, or that the states of

affairs in which it trades have wide cosmological role.13 But on the dis-

junctive conception of realism, each of the disjuncts, though not necessary,

is still conceived of as sufficient for the expression of a form of real-

ism. Semantic realism ought therefore to be sufficient for the expression

of realism. But it is precisely this sufficiency claim which the objectionconcerning Berkeleyan idealism jeopardises. If semantic realism is con-

sistent with Berkeleyan idealism, as I claimed above, how can espousing

it possibly be sufficient for the expression of a realist view? The objection

which damaged Dummetts constitution thesis is thus equally damaging to

Wrights weaker conception of the relationship between semantic realism

and realism.

At this point, Wright may object that I have misrepresented his view:

he is not claiming that semantic realism itself is sufficient for realism,

but rather that semantic realism in conjunction with another existence

claim is sufficient for a version of realism. He writes:

Realism about a given discourse . . . is simply the combination of views (a) that the proper

account of our understanding of its statements is evidence-unconstrained truth-conditional,

and (b) that the world on occasion exploits, so to speak, this understanding - does on

occasion deliver up undetectable truth- conferrers for those statements. (1989, 55)

However, it is clear that the addition of (b) introduces nothing that a

Berkeleyan idealist needs to disagree with: on a Berkeleyan account of

the content of statements about the external world, the mind of God may

indeed yield evidence- transcendent truth-conferrers for those statements.

So we could have a Berkeleyan idealist who accepted both (a) and (b). So

semantic realism in conjunction with the existence claim (b) is consistent

with a version of Berkeleyan idealism. Given this, it is again difficult to

see how that conjunction could be sufficient for the expression of a realistview.

Thus, Wright rejects Dummetts metaphor thesis and weakens the

constitution thesis. But the resulting position at least as far as its con-


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ception of the relationship between semantic realism and realism per se is

concerned is no more plausible than Dummetts.

7. SEMANTIC REALISM AND REALISM: THE PROPER CONCEPTION

I have argued that Dummetts metaphor thesis and constitution thesis are

both implausible, and that Wrights account of the relationship between

semantic realism and realism is open to essentially the same central objec-

tion as Dummetts. What, then, is the proper conception of the relationship

between semantic realism and realism about the external world? How ex-

actly does the plausibility or implausibility of semantic realism impact

upon the plausibility or implausibility of realism about the external world?

If we had cogent arguments against semantic realism, what would this

tell us about realism about the external world? In this section, I will at-

tempt to sketch some answers to these questions. In Section 2 I sketcheda metaphysical position, common-sense realism. However, what realists

are ultimately interested in defending is a realistic worldview. What is a

worldview? A worldview consists of at least a metaphysics (an account of

what there is and its nature in general), an epistemology (an account of how

we can possess knowledge of the objects and properties included in the

metaphysics), and a semantics (an account of how we can talk and think

about the objects and properties included in the metaphysics). A plaus-

ible worldview is a worldview in which each of the components is itself

plausible, and in which the components are at least mutually compatible.

A plausible realistic worldview, for our purposes, is a plausible worldview

which has common-sense realism as its metaphysical component.

Plausibly, a realist metaphysics which cannot be integrated into a plaus-

ible realistic worldview is to that extent rendered unattractive. An account

of the nature of the world which renders it difficult to see how we could

think, talk, or acquire knowledge about that world is to that extent less

than fully satisfactory. There are thus two ways in which a realist meta-

physics can be attacked: directly, via pointing out some inadequacy within

the metaphysics itself, or indirectly, via an argument that it cannot be

integrated into a plausible realistic worldview. A successful argument

that a realist metaphysics cannot be integrated into a plausible realistic

worldview would thus establish that that metaphysics was unsatisfactory. I

suggest that we view Dummetts arguments against semantic realism along

these lines.To elaborate. Take common-sense realism, as I defined it in Section 2,

to constitute the metaphysical component of a realistic worldview. What

about the semantic component? What constitutes the fact that a certain


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sentence means what it does, or that a certain speaker understands that

sentence in the way that he does? One influential type of answer to these

questions is given by the Truth-Conditional Conception (TCC) of mean-

ing and understanding. According to the TCC, a sentences having themeaning that it has consists in its having a certain truth- condition, and

a speakers understanding that sentence in a particular way consists in his

having grasped the relevant truth-condition.14 I suggest that Dummetts ar-

guments against semantic realism can be viewed as attempting to establish

that common-sense realism cannot be conjoined with the TCC to form a

plausible realistic worldview.

How so? Recall that we settled in Section 2 on the following character-

isation of realism about the external world:


physical types objectively exist independently of the mental; and they possess some prop-

erties which may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness; and their innermost

nomological secrets may remain forever hidden from us.

Suppose that Alpha Centauri is one of the tokens covered in the first part

of the characterisation, and suppose that the property of containing a malt

whisky distillery is one of the properties Alpha Centauris having or failing

to have may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness. Accord-

ing to the TCC, our grasp of the sentence There is a whisky distillery

somewhere on Alpha Centauri consists in our grasp of its truth-condition.

But, as we have just seen, this truth-condition there being a malt whisky

distillery somewhere on Alpha Centauri is one whose obtaining, or fail-

ing to obtain, may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness.

Thus, it follows that our understanding of the sentence There is a whisky

distillery somewhere on Alpha Centauri consists in grasp of a potentially

evidence-transcendent truth-condition. In general, common-sense realism

in combination with the TCC yields semantic realism. Thus, a cogent argu-

ment against semantic realism would establish that common-sense realism

could not be combined with the TCC to form (part of) a realistic worldview.

What would follow if Dummetts arguments against semantic realism

turned out to be compelling? In order to have a plausible worldview, we

would have to either give up common-sense realism, or give up the TCC.

Thus, if Dummetts arguments against semantic realism appeared to be

successful, the realist about the external world would face the challenge of

embracing one of the following options:

(a) Defuse Dummetts arguments against semantic realism: argue, in other

words, that common-sense realism can in fact mesh with TCC to form (part

of) a plausible realistic worldview (McDowell (1981, 1987)).


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(b) Find an alternative semantic theory to TCC, and show that Dummetts

arguments against semantic realism do not challenge the idea that the al-

ternative theory can mesh with common-sense realism to form (part of) a

realistic worldview (Devitt (1991b), Edgington (1981)).

15

Of course, Dummett himself is inclined towards the following, antirealist,

option:

(c) Give up common-sense realism, but hold on to TCC subject to the

condition that the notion of truth which it takes as central is not potentially

evidence-transcendent (see in particular the preface to Dummett (1978);

also Wright (1993a), passim).

This taxonomy of the options perhaps sounds strange: how could find-

ing an alternative to the TCC be a task for the realist, given Dummetts

numerous claims in his early work that opposition to realism takes theform of proposing an assertibility-conditional alternative to TCC?16 But

there is actually nothing strange here. The alternative taxonomy suggested

by Dummetts early work is tied up with the idea that realism is to be

identified with the TCC, an idea which we have good reason, as we saw,

to reject. And the taxonomy I have proposed sits better with Dummetts

considered opinion (and Wrights view) to the effect that it is the anti-

realist who has the best claim to the TCC: according to Wright and the

later Dummett there is nothing wrong with the TCC as such, it is just that

the realist misconceives the notion of truth which figures therein.

It is worthwhile pausing to reflect on the limited significance of

Dummetts arguments against semantic realism. On my construal of the

situation, Dummetts arguments against semantic realism, even if com-

pletely successful, would not establish the unacceptability of realism about

the external world. They could do so only in conjunction with a cogent

argument to the effect that there could be no alternative to the TCC.

Dummett nowhere attempts to provide such an argument, although he does

attempt to rebut objections to the TCC and to raise objections for altern-

ative semantic views such as causal theories of reference (e.g., Dummett

(1973), appendix to chapter 5). So the most that Dummetts arguments

against semantic realism can establish is that the common-sense realist

requires an alternative theory of meaning to the TCC in order to have a

plausible realistic worldview. Dummetts arguments, even if successful,

simply leave the common-sense realist with the challenge of finding suchan alternative. Again, in the absence of a general argument to the effect that

such an alternative is impossible, even if Dummetts arguments against

semantic realism are cogent there is simply no refutation of realism as


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such, merely the provision of a challenge which the realist is obliged to

meet.

This, then, is the proper conception of the relationship between realism

about the external world and semantic realism. Realism about the externalworld together with the truth-conditional conception of understanding

yield semantic realism, so if semantic realism is unacceptable, the realist

about the external world faces the challenge of finding an alternative to the

truth-conditional conception if he is to have a plausible realistic worldview.

Dummetts arguments against semantic realism thus have genuine signi-

ficance, albeit limited, for the metaphysical debate between realism about

the external world and its opponents, and, importantly, this significance is

independent of the metaphor thesis and the constitution thesis. The falsity

of those theses thus does not endanger the importance of Dummetts argu-

ments against semantic realism for the issue of realism about the external

world.

8. LIMITATIONS AND GENERALISATIONS OF THE PROPER

CONCEPTION

My conception of the relationship between semantic realism and realism

about the external world is thus free from whatever objections beset the

metaphor or constitution theses, or Wrights disjunctive conception of the

nature of realism. But it may also appear to have some damaging lim-

itations. Because on my conception the significance of semantic realism

derives from the implications of its evaluation for the attempt to combine a

metaphysical theory with a semantic theory in a plausible realistic world-view, it follows that we cannot apply that conception unless we have an

austerely metaphysical characterisation of the realism which is at issue.

And in some cases an austerely metaphysical characterisation may appear

hard to come by. We have already seen that Dummett has doubts as to

whether such a characterisation can be provided for realism in mathemat-

ics, and he also has doubts as to whether it can be provided for realisms

concerning the past and future. In giving an austerely metaphysical charac-

terisation of a realist view in a particular area, our inclination is to attempt

to frame it as we did in the case of realism about the external world as

a thesis concerning the existence and nature of a range of entities. But

In some cases e.g., the dispute over realism concerning the future and that over realism

concerning the past there did not seem to be any objects in question (1993, 465).

If Dummett were right about this, and if it precluded an austerely meta-

physical characterisation of, e.g., realism concerning the past, it would


20/28


follow that my story about the relevance of semantic realism to the plaus-

ibility of a realistic worldview concerning the past simply could not be

applied. Thus, my account of the relationship between semantic realism

and realism about the external world can only be applied to the caseof some other sort of realism if (a) we are able to provide an austerely

metaphysical characterisation of that sort of realism and (b) the austere

characterisation together with the TCC leads to semantic realism. Whereas

Dummetts account of the relationship between semantic realism and

realism about the external world is straightforwardly generalisable, my

account cannot be generalised in the absence of either (a) or (b).

How damaging is this limitation? The failure of (b) in the case of moral

realism shows that evaluating semantic realism is likely to be of little help

in evaluating the plausibility of a realistic worldview about morals which

includes the TCC. And the failure of (a) in cases where we cannot provide

an austere metaphysical characterisation of realism would ensure that my

story about the relevance of semantic realism simply could not be told. Butthe limits imposed by these considerations should not be overestimated.

The fact remains that that type of story can be told - as it was in the case

of realism about the external world - in any case where we do have an

austerely metaphysical characterisation of the realist view and where that

characterisation, in conjunction with the TCC, yields semantic realism.

And it is plausible that these features are present in many areas in which

disputes have traditionally arisen between realists and their opponents.

Consider again the case of realism about arithmetic, and in particular

what we might call platonic realism about mathematics: mathematical ob-

jects, such as natural numbers and sets, exist, are non-spatiotemporal, and

some of their properties may pass altogether unnoticed by human investig-ative activity. Thus, the set of even numbers exists, is non-spatiotemporal,

and some of its properties e.g., having a member which is not the sum of

two of its prime predecessors may pass altogether unnoticed by human

investigative activity. Now, just as in the case of common sense realism

about the external world, platonic realism, when conjoined to the truth-

conditional conception of our understanding of mathematical statements,

leads to semantic realism. It follows from platonic realism together with

the TCC that our grasp of Every even number is the sum of two primes

consists in grasp of a potentially evidence-transcendent truth-condition.

Thus, if Dummetts arguments against semantic realism are sound, the

platonic realist, in order to have a plausible realistic worldview, must find

some alternative theory of meaning to the TCC. Thus, my conception of therelationship between realism and semantic realism can be applied in such


21/28


a way that the entitlement of platonic realism concerning mathematics to a

certain sort of realistic worldview is challenged.17

Similar considerations apply to realism about the past. One form of

realism about the past might be:

Common Sense Realism about the Past: Tokens of some current observable common-sense

and scientific physical types objectively existed independently of the mental a billion years

ago; and they possessed some properties the fact of whose past obtaining may pass alto-

gether unnoticed by human consciousness; and their innermost nomological secrets may

remain forever hidden from us.

This is no doubt not the only shape which realism about the past could

assume, but it is one such shape, and an intuitively attractive one. And

again, in conjunction with the truth-conditional conception of our un-

derstanding of statements about the past, it yields semantic realism:

according to this conjunction our understanding of, e.g., There was in-

telligent life on Alpha Centauri a billion years ago consists in grasp ofa potentially evidence-transcendent truth-condition. Thus, if Dummetts

arguments against semantic realism are sound, the common-sense realist

about the past, in order to have a plausible realistic worldview, must find

some alternative theory of meaning to the TCC. Thus, my conception of

the relationship between realism and semantic realism can be applied in

such a way that the entitlement of common-sense realism concerning the

past to a certain sort of realistic worldview is challenged.

So, despite the potential limitations of my conception of the relation-

ship between realism and semantic realism, it can be applied to at least

some important cases of realist views. It is worth noting, too, that my

approach to the relationship between realism and semantic realism in a

sense has wider application than Dummetts. To see this, recall that I ar-

gued above that Berkeleyan idealism is consistent with semantic realism.

In addition to this, it is relatively easy to see that Berkeleyan idealism, in

conjunction with the truth-conditional conception of our understanding of

statements about material objects, yields semantic realism. If facts about

material objects far distant in space just are facts about perceptions in the

mind of a spirit to which we have no guaranteed access, then given the

TCC, our understanding of statements concerning those objects will con-

sist in grasp of potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. Thus,

if Dummetts arguments against semantic realism are sound, Berkeleyan

idealism, in order to have a plausible idealistic worldview, must find some

alternative theory of meaning to the TCC. Thus, my conception of therelationship between realism and semantic realism can be reapplied in

such a way that the entitlement of Berkeleyan idealism to a certain sort

of idealistic worldview is challenged.


22/28


Likewise, in the case of mathematics consider the analogue of idealism

about the external world, constructivism. Dummett writes:

[A] Dedekindian who maintained that mathematical objects are free creations of the human

mind might nevertheless insist that, once created, they have properties independently of ourcapacity to recognize them. (1993, 465)

According to such a view, although the set of even numbers is a free cre-

ation of the human mind, whether that set has a member which is not the

sum of two of its prime predecessors is something that might elude our best

investigative efforts. It is clear that this type of view, in conjunction with

the truth-conditional conception of our understanding of mathematical

statements, yields semantic realism. On this type of view, just as on the pla-

tonic realist view, our understanding of Every even number is the sum of

two primes consists in our grasp of its potentially evidence-transcendent

truth-condition. Thus, if Dummetts arguments against semantic realism

are sound, a Dedekindian view of the nature of mathematical objects, inorder to have a plausible constructivist worldview, must find some altern-

ative theory of meaning to the TCC. So my conception of the relationship

between realism and semantic realism can be reapplied in such a way

that the entitlement of a Dedekindian view of the nature of mathematical

objects to a certain sort of constructivist worldview is challenged.

So, Dummetts conception of the relationship encapsulated in the

metaphor and constitution theses is unacceptable, and Wrights looser

conception of the relationship fails for similar reasons. On my conception

of the relationship, the evaluation of semantic realism is relevant to the

evaluation of a number of forms of realism, those which in conjunction

with the TCC yield semantic realism. What is evaluated is the capacity of

these types of realism to form part of a certain sort of realistic worldview.

Although this approach is more limited in some respects than Dummetts,

it also admits of applications which are wider than Dummetts, insofar as it

can also be used to argue against certain sorts of worldviews which include

idealistic or constructivist metaphysics.18

9. METAPHYSICS, THEORY OF MEANING, AND THE NATURE OF

PHILOSOPHY

Dummett famously espouses a picture of philosophy in which its various

branches are subordinate to the theory of meaning:

[T]he theory of meaning is the fundamental part of philosophy which underlies all the

others. Because philosophy has, as its first if not its only task, the analysis of meanings,

and because, the deeper such analysis goes, the more it is dependent upon a correct general


23/28


account of meaning, a model for what the understanding of an expression consists in,

the theory of meaning, which is the search for such a model, is the foundation for all

philosophy, and not epistemology as Descartes misled us into believing. (1973, 669)

Dummett thus retains Descartes image of philosophy as a tree with multi-farious branches (Descartes 1637) , but alters the Cartesian picture so that

the theory of meaning, and not epistemology, forms the trunk of the tree.

Dummetts view of the relationship between realism per se and semantic

realism is of a piece with this picture: it follows from the metaphor and

constitution theses that the metaphysical doctrine of realism, insofar as it

makes literal sense, just is a semantic doctrine. I have argued that these

theses, and the view of Dummetts which depends on them, are implaus-

ible. I thus reject the idea that the theory of meaning, or semantics, is prior

to metaphysics. But what is the proper conception of their relationship?

Devitt writes:

It is a mistake to start building a metaphysics from epistemology or semantics. The realismissue should be settled first. Failing to do so is one of the most pervasive and serious

abberations of the realism debate . . . . To suppose that we can derive the right metaphysics

from epistemology or semantics is to put the cart before the horse. (1991a, 5657, emphasis

added).

Is Devitt here suggesting that metaphysics should take the place of the

theory of meaning in the picture of philosophy as a tree-like structure? Is

Devitt suggesting that metaphysics is prior to semantics? The metaphor

of the horse and cart certainly suggests so. But the conception of the

relationship between realism per se and semantic realism which I have

advocated in this paper suggests that neither Descartes tree, nor Devitts

horse and cart, is the appropriate metaphor: there is no simple relation of

priority between metaphysics and semantics. If an image is wanted for the

view of philosophy which goes along with the conception I have advocated

it is rather that of Neuraths boat: metaphysics and semantics are both

planks in the boat, but no one is prior to the other. I cannot defend this

claim here. My purpose in this paper has been to argue merely that even

on this conception of philosophy, a conception which Dummett himself

would no doubt repudiate, Dummetts arguments against semantic realism

still have an important role to play in evaluating the viability of a realistic

worldview.19

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For comments and discussion I am grateful to John Divers, Duncan

McFarland, Christopher Norris, and Joss Walker.


24/28


NOTES

1 See e.g., Dummett (1973), chapter 13; Dummett (1978), chapters 1, 10, 14, 21; Dummett(1991), Introduction; and Dummett 1993, chapters 1, 2, 11, 20.2 Dummetts main arguments against semantic realism are the acquisition argument and

the manifestation argument. For an overview, see the Introduction to Wright (1993a), Hale

(1997), Miller (1998) chapter 9, Miller (2001). For critical discussion of these arguments,

see Miller (2002a,b).3 The point made here should not be confused with that Devitt considers when he says

We have said that the entities must be of common-sense and scientific types; but perhaps

we ought to say also that they must have some of the properties which tokens of that type

are believed to have (1991b, 21). Devitt goes on to reject this addition to his character-

isation of realism, and we can grant him this for the sake of the argument. The point in

the text is not that the realist has to say that the entities have some of the properties which

they are believed to have, bur rather that whateverproperties they have, they have at least

some of them objectively. Note also that the strengthening of Devitts characterisation sug-

gested does not require us to adopt or argue for any particular position on the ontology of

properties. Some of the things Devitt says suggest that he takes my proposed strengthening

to be included tacitly in his characterisation of realism. For example, he writes an object

has objective existence, in some sense, if it exists and has its nature whatever we believe,

think, or can discover (1991b, 15, emphasis added). If the reference to the objects nature

is just a reference to (some of) its properties, then there is no disagreement between us.4 I have deliberately adapted this final formulation of common sense realism to include

Crispin Wrights formulation of what he calls the modest ingredient in realism (Wright

1993a, 1).5 My unwillingness to digress is justified by the fact that the precise characterisation of

the notions of decidability and undecidability does not affect the points I go on to make

concerning the relationship between realism per se and semantic realism. Note that as I am

using the term undecidability, to say that a universally quantified statement is undecidable

is to say that we do not know a procedure, the application of which will in a finite timeyield either a proof or a counterexample. Given this stipulation, Goldbachs Conjecture

is undecidable, since we do not know such a procedure. This is just a terminological

stipulation. If one prefers, the claim that a universally quantified statement is decidable

can be stipulated to mean that there is either a proof or a counterexample. We could not

then say that Goldbachs Conjecture is undecidable: since there is no proof of Goldbachs

Conjecture, it would follow that it is effectively decidable iff false, and the claim that it

is undecidable would imply that it is true. The class of sentences over which, according

to Dummett, the realist and the anti-realist disagree would then have be to characterised,

not as the class of undecidables, but as the class of statements not known to be decidable.

I prefer the former characterisation, but all of the points I make in the paper can be re-

made in terms of the latter characterisation if one prefers. For a good discussion of the

terminological choices, see Shieh (1998).6 I am indebted here to Devitt (1991b), although my disagreements with Devitt will

become apparent as we proceed.7 Devitt actually makes the point with regard to a distinct doctrine which he calls Realist

Truth, but I do not believe my emendation of his argument to apply to semantic realism

as I have characterised it makes any essential difference.


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8 In fact, Wright (1992) is devoted to the search for these other vehicles. Semantic realism

turns out to be one, but not the only way, of characterising realism about a particular

subject matter. Ill argue below that although Wright is justified in attempting to loosen

up the relationship between semantic realism and realism per se, his conception of that

relationship is still ultimately unsatisfactory, for reasons similar to those which undermineDummetts constitution thesis.9 Dummett himself points this out: the dispute [between realism and antirealism] can

arise only for classes of statements for which it is admitted on both sides that there may

not exist evidence either for or against a given statement (1978, 155).10 I have characterised semantic realism about the external world as the view that our

understanding of at least some sentences about the external world consists in our grasp

of their potentially evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. However, Dummett himself

often formulates semantic realism in terms of unrestricted adherence to the principle of

bivalence: semantic realism is the view that all sentences about the external world, regard-

less of whether they are decidable or undecidable, are determinately either true or false.

What is the relationship between these two formulations of semantic realism, and which

is the more fundamental? I cannot pause to discuss this question here. For some excellent

discussion, and arguments to the effect that the characterisation in terms of bivalence is notthe primary one, see the Introduction to Wright (1993a), and Rosen (1995).11 Note that elsewhere (1992, 4) talk of natural semantical preparation is replaced by

talk of essential semantic groundwork.12 The other ways in terms of what Wright calls cognitive command, width of cosmo-

logical role, and the order-of-determination test receive their most sustained development

in Wright (1992). For a briefer overview, see Wright (1993c).13 See note 12.14 There are of course many different forms of the TCC: in addition to the works by

Dummett cited in note 1, see also Davidson (1984), McDowell (1981) and (1987), Wiggins

(1997). For an introduction to Freges foundational version of the TCC, see Miller (1998),

chapters 1 and 2.15 Edgington wishes to identify understanding with grasp of assertibility-conditions,

whilst Devitt is opposed to the idea that understanding is a matter of knowledge of

truth-conditions or any other sort of conditions.16 See, e.g., the much-quoted remarks in the early paper Truth (Dummett 1978, 19).17 Note that, as Wright points out (1983, xx) the platonic and realist elements of platonic

realism are, strictly speaking, independent. But this doesnt affect the point made in the

text about the relevance of arguments against semantic realism to the plausibility of their

amalgam.18 In view of what I have said in this and previous sections, there is a case for not talking

about semantic realism at all, given that the view so christened is just as close to Berkeleyan

idealism as it is to common-sense realism about the external world. Perhaps a more neutral

term such as semantic transcendentalism would be more apt.19 Some of the things Devitt says on these issues suggest that he is confused about how

he pictures philosophy. For example, in response to some criticisms from Anthony Appiah

concerning his views on the relationship between metaphysics and semantics he writes

Knowledge is a seamless web, as Quine told us long ago. Everything in the web can makea difference to everything else (1991c, 75). This is of a piece with the Neurathian image.

But if metaphysics and semantics are part of a web-like structure, they cannot stand in some

linear relationship like that suggested by the metaphor of the horse and cart. So whence


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the claim that metaphysics is prior to semantics? Moreover, Devitt seems at some points

to impose a priori constraints on how results in semantics can influence metaphysical

views: If it proves very difficult to naturalize reference, then perhaps we should seek a

nonreferential theory of mind and language. If we were completely desperate, perhaps we

might contemplate giving up naturalism. What we should nevercountenance for a momentis the idea that we cut the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of

description. To accept that idea is not to rebuild the boat whilst staying afloat, it is to jump

overboard (1993a, 52, Devitts emphasis). But the idea that we are constrained, a priori,

never to end up with an idealist plank in the philosophical boat, or an idealist strand in the

philosophical web, is completely at odds with the Neurathian and Quinean images which

Devitt here avails himself of.

REFERENCES

Ayer, A.: 1946, Language, Truth, and Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Berkeley, G.: 1710, The Principles of Human Knowledge, many editions.

Blackburn, S.: 1989: Manifesting Realism, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, University ofNotre Dame Press, Notre Dame.

Blackburn, S.: 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Davidson, D.: 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press,

Oxford.

Descartes, R.: 1637, Discourse on Method, many editions.

Devitt, M.: 1983, Dummetts Anti-Realism, Journal of Philosophy 80, 7399.

Devitt, M.: 1991a, Aberrations of the Realism Debate, Philosophical Studies 61, 4363.

Devitt, M.: 1991b, Realism and Truth, 2nd edn, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Devitt, M: 1993c, Realism without Representation: A Response to Appiah, Philosophical

Studies 61, 7577.

Dummett, M.: 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duckworth, London.

Dummett, M.: 1977, Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Dummett, M.: 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, Duckworth, London.

Dummett, M.: 1979, Comments, in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Reidel, Boston,pp. 218225.

Dummett, M.: 1991, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Harvard University Press, Cam-

bridge, MA.

Dummett, M.: 1993: The Seas of Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Edgington, D.: 1981, Meaning, Bivalence, and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 81, 153173.

Gibbard, A: 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Hale, B.: 1997, Realism and its Oppositions, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A

Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 271308.

Loar, B.: 1987, Truth Beyond All Verification, in B. Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett:

Contributions to Philosophy, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp. 81116.

Mackie, J.: 1973, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.

McDowell, J.: 1981, Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding, reprinted inhisMeaning, Knowledge and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1998),

pp. 314343.

McDowell, J.: 1987, In Defence of Modesty, reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge and

Reality, op. cit, pp. 87107.


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Miller, A.: 1998, Philosophy of Language, McGill-Queens, Montreal.

Miller, A.: 2001, Michael Dummett, in A. Martinich and D. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to

Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 378392.

Miller, A.: 2002a, What is the Manifestation Argument?, Pacific Philosophical

Quarterly, forthcoming.Miller, A.: 2002b, What is the Acquisition Argument?, in A. Barber (ed.), Epistemology

of Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming.

Rosen, G.: 1995, The Shoals of Language: Critical Notice of Michael Dummett, The Seas

of Language, Mind104, 599609.

Shieh, S.: 1998, Undecidability in Anti-Realism, Philosophia Mathematica (3) 6, 324

333.

Wiggins, D.: 1997, Meaning and Truth-Conditions: From Freges Grand Design to Dav-

idsons, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language,

Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 328.

Wright, C.: 1983, Freges Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen University Press,

Aberdeen.

Wright, C.: 1989, Misconstruals Made Manifest, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIV,

4867.

Wright, C.: 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Wright, C.: 1993a, Realism, Meaning, and Truth, 2nd edn, Blackwell, Oxford.

Wright, C.: 1993b (with John Haldane), Introduction, Reality, Representation, and

Projection, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Wright, C.: 1993c, Realism: The Contemporary Debate W(h)ither Now?, in C. Wright

(1993b), pp. 6364.

A. Miller

Department of Philosophy

Macquarie University

Sydney, NSW 2109

Australia

E-mail: [email protected]


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The Significance of Semantic Realism - Alexander Miller