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The Sermon in Tristram ShandyAuthor(s): Arthur H. CashSource: ELH, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Dec., 1964), pp. 395-417Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2872354 .

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THE SERMON IN TRISTRAM SHANDY*

BY ARTHUR H. CASH

In hissermons,aurence terne eveloped consistent oralphilosophy hich s wellrepresentedy The Abuses of Con-scienceConsidered, he sermonhe introducednto TristramShandy. t has notbeenpreviouslyecognizedowthispleasantand deceptivelyimple ermon s typical fSterne's thic s awhole. n fact,despite poradic,fprofitable,ippingsntothe

sermons, o scholar as found n them structured oralphi-losophy.WilburCross nd LansingHammond, iscoveringhatSterne ad little f nteresto say aboutreligion,ave up alto-gether n his ideas, as such.' But Sterne'smoraltheory smuchmoremaginativehanhisorthodoxeligionndfarmorecomplete s a philosophy. ts implicationsorhis fiction reprovocative.

Sterne'smoral system becomes speciallymeaningfulhen

seen n relation o other thicalwritingsf his age. AlthoughSterne ppearsto havebeen affectedy several ontemporarymoralists,edoesnotbelong o any inglemid-centuryschool."He has some ffinityith he earlier atitude-Men, ithTillot-son,Stillingfleet,orris,nd Clarke, romwhom eborrowedoliberally. ut themodern pirit fpsychologicalrobingnhissermonss not typical f theirwritings,nd I rather hink heirinfluencesprimarilyndirect. hemostmmediatend powerfulinfluenceponSterne'smoralthought s thatof JohnLocke,

whoseEssay Concerning umanUnderstandingas to Sterne,as he hadTristramay, a historybook,ir, whichmaypossiblyrecommendt to theworld) fwhat asses n a man's wnmind"

* This studywas madepossible y a grant rom olorado tateUniversityesearchFunds.

1Cross, n TheLife and TimesofLaurence terne, rded. (Yale Universityress),1929, makes a very fair appraisal of the style and general tone of the sermons.See pp. 245-249, 372-380, 506-508. Hammond, in Laurence Sterne's 'Sermons of Mr.Yorick' (Yale University Press), 1949, ably defends Sterne against the charge of

dishonest plagiarismin the sermons.

Arthur . Cash 395



(p. 85).2 Ofcourse, ternewasmuch oooriginalo have simplyaped Locke. Nevertheless,ostofthe doctrines f hissermonsareparalleledntheEssay. The Abuses fConscienceonsidered,my central oncernn this study, ports nlyone ill-developed

notionwhich snotLockean.The rest f the deas, fnotexactlytraceableo theEssay,havetheir ounterpartsn thatgreatwork.

I

Conscience,aysSterne,s " unavoidable-that is,everymanhas one. But some re to be trusted,omenot-the central rob-lemofthe ermonn Tristramhandy.

Consciences made up of,first, "knowledge,"which themindhas within erself,"nd, secondly, "judgment,ither fapprobationrcensure which hemind makesuponthesuc-cessive ctionsof our lives (p. 126) 3 Sternedescribes heprocess hrough brief llegory fa court.The udge s Reason.The defendants some particularction. The motives o theactionrerepresentedollectivelyythecharacteralledPassion,or ndividuallys " bias,"" self-love,"littlenterests,"favor,""wit," and a moregeneral principle alled " interest."Though

these ffectionsppear nthecourt s witnessnd advocates fthe accused action, theyare reallyhis accomplices. It is they,representeds "Passion," who cause the failures f conscience.Sometimes assion slips ntothe bench n theplace of Reason inorder o acquit some action which s actually guilty.However,because Passion always favors accused actions,he always pro-nounces hem nnocent. Consequently, clear conscience s sus-pect, for the sentencemay have been pronouncedby Passion

usurpingheplace of Reason. A guilty onscience, n the otherhand,can be trusted, or nly one principle fmindever makesacondemnation-theReason.

Sterne'sallegory tops there. He does tell us, however, hatfalse udgments fconscience refosteredy" longhabitsofsin"

2My referenceso Tristramhandy re to theedition f JamesAikenWork (NewYork: Odyssey ress), 1940.

' My referenceso The Abuses of ConscienceConsideredwill be to the versionpublishedn Tristram handy,the Work edition (above, n. 2). Sternepublishedthe sermon irstn 1750 as a pamphlet, second ime n thenovel, nd a third imeas thefinal ermonn the collection e himselfaw throughhe press The Sermons fMr. Yorick, ol. IV, 1766).

396 The Sermon n " TristramShandy



whichcause the conscience o become" hard and, " like sometenderparts of his body, by much stressand continualhardusage,[to] lose,by degrees, hatnice sense and perceptionwithwhichGod and natureendow'd t" (p. 127).

We see at once that Sternehas thought fthepersonality shavingthreefundamentallements-a set of naturalpassions,temperamentixedbyhabit,and reason-the traditional acultypsychologys old at least as Plato's Republic (Book IV) . Theseradicalelements terneusuallytakesforgranted.All of the ser-monscontainoff-handomments bout reason. He speaks fre-quently nd casually ofparticular ppetites nd specific assions,sometimesn thePauline tradition fcondemning the worstofhuman passions,-pride . . . hypocrisy,self-love,covetousness,extortion,ruelty nd revenge" (Vol. I, p. 99) .4 At other imeshe speakswithgreater aution boutnatural ffectionsf benevo-lence and " a certaingenerositynd tenderness fnaturewhichdisposesus forcompassion, bstracted rom ll considerationsfself (Vol. I, pp. 38-39; also Vol. I, pp. 73,86; Vol. II, pp. 34-39;see especiallySermons II and VII).5 Withoutgoingout ofhiswayto explore hemechanism f habit,Sternefrequentlyttacks" uncontrolledustom that eads to sinfulness Vol. II, pp. 318-

319; also Vol. I, pp. 66, 277; Vol. II, pp. 7, 259); or he suggestswayswe can form a settledprinciple fhumanitynd goodness(Vol. I, p. 45; also Vol. I, pp. 50-51) .'

' My referenceso sermonsther hanThe AbusesofConscience onsideredabove,n. 2) are to the editionof the Sermons, vols., ncluded n the Works, ntro.byWilburCross (New York: J. F. Taylor), 1904. 12 vols. Re-issuedby the ClonmelSociety, 2 vols.boundas 6, the samepagination hroughout.

' Sternemakes twomorepoints bout the naturalpassionswhichhave little o dowithThe Abusesbut are importantor ny evaluation fhis fiction. 1) He followsthe lead of Bishop Butler and, possibly,David Hume in distinguishingetween

particular rives nd appetites,n the onehand,and general rinciplesfbenevolenceand self-love,n theother. (2) He accepts hepopularnotion f the " ruling assion(seeSermons, ol. I, pp. 147-154). For a detaileddiscussionf thesepoints nrelationto theSentimental ourney,eemystudy, terne'sComedyofMoral Sentiments,owinpressfor heModernHumanities esearchAssociationnd the DuquesneUniversityPress.

6The notionof habit as an importantmoral principles commonn almostanyage, including he eighteenth entury.See, for instance,Bishop JosephButler,Analogy fReligion, , ii, 13 (Vol. I, p. 48 of Works, d. W. E. Gladstone,Oxford:Clarendon, 896) or SamuelJohnson's ision fTheodore The Preceptor,d. RobertDodsley,London,1748,Vol. II, pp. 516-526). The concept f habitheldby Butler,

Johnson,nd Sterne shouldnot be confusedwiththe theory f the association fideas. The new association sychology,hich aid the foundation ftwentieth-centurypsychology,onsisted f an involved heory including abit formation)whichpur-

Arthur . Cash 397



TheAbuses fConscienceonsidereds a sermonboutmoralknowledge,ather hanpractice; s such, t is directlyoncernedwith hereason,ndonly ndirectlyith hefacultiesfpassionandtemperament.terne etsouttoexplain owoneknowswhat

heought o do,basing isargumentpona clever daptation ftwoconcepts fLocke-thoseof udgmentnd self-awareness.7" If a man hinkst all,"Sternewritesn the ermon, he must

beprivy ohisownthoughtsnd desires; he must ememberhispastpursuits,ndknow ertainlyhe rue pringsndmotives,which,n general, ave governed he actions f his life" (pp.125-126; epeated n Sermons, ol. I, p. 53). Sternes arguingLocke'swellknown hesis hat"having deas amounts o thesame thingas "perception (II, i, 9) 8 Locke's doctrinewascertainly ot new-except n the sense thathe made of it adoctrine.revious o theEssay mostpeoplehad accommodatedthenotionomfortablyide-by-sideith belief ninnatedeas.Lockepointed ut theconflictetween he two theories. heupshotwas thathe clarifiedhe ssues s to whetherrnotun-conscioushoughts ere ossible,ndthenheflatly eclaredheywerenot. In thisposition terne tandswithhis philosophicmaster,sing heconcept o set up thefundamentalaradox f

his ermon:twould eem ofollow,esays, fromhevery ermsof the proposition,"hat conscience, judgment f perfectlyrememberedctions longwithperfectlynownmotives,mustnecessarilyeaccurate. utnot o.

The difficultyests lsewhere. he problems notwhatthemind anknow, utwhat twillbother o know.Sterne's seofthewordudgmentsnotfortuitous. e is followingocke,whohaddescribedonsciences " ourownopinionr udgmentfthemoralrectituder pravity four ownactions'" Introduction,II, 8). Judgment,hen,wouldseemto be a keynotion. Accord-ported o explain he developmentf the mind. Sternewas not muchaffectedn histhinkingy associationheory,s was not John ocke-muchcriticismo the contrary.See my article,The LockeanPsychology f Tristramhandy,"ELH, XXII (June,1955), pp. 125-135.

7 Sterne'sdaptations re nothighly riginal.He tookthe major theme rom wift'ssermon, On the Testimony f Conscience,"nd he was influencedy Swift's TheDifficultyfKnowingOne's-Self,"s well as by Butler's ermon Upon Self-Deceit."See Hammond, p. 110-111, 51-154.

81. e., Book II, Chapter , Section ofAnEssay ConcerningumanUnderstanding.

Referencesmade in thismanner re to the edition of AlexanderCampbell Fraser(Oxford:Clarendon), 894;re-issuedNew York: Dover) 1959,with hesamepagi-nation hroughout.

398 The Sermon n " Tristram handy



ing to Locke, judgment is one type of rational affirmation-thereason compares ideas to determine probable truth (IV, xiv, 3-4;xvii, 16-17). Judgment, however, is often inaccurate, and thecauses for ts failuresLocke describes entertaininglyn his chapter

called " Wrong Assent, or Error." Some of these fallacious judg-ments closely parallel the failuresofconscience n Sterne's sermon.Although,as Locke explains,we are forced to recognizean agree-ment or disagreement f any ideas whichactually appear togetherin consciousness, till " we can hinderboth knowledge and assent,by stoppingour inquiry,and not employingour faculties n searchof any truth" (IV, xx, 16) .9 In otherwords,one must have thewill to discover the truth-something both men find ll too rarely.Sternemakes the point in Sermon V:

With all the powerwhichGod has givenhim [man]of turninghiseyes inwardupon himself,nd takingnotice of the chainof his ownthoughts nd desires-yet, in fact,he is generally o inattentive, utalways so partial an observer f whatpasses,thathe is as much,nayoften muchgreater tranger o his own disposition nd true char-acter, han all the worldbesides. (Vol. I, p. 54)

This reluctance to judge precisely,as Sterne pointed out in TheAbuses, is broughtabout by competingpassions and desires. The

point had also been made by Locke-who could hardly controlhis indignation.

Let ever so muchprobability tand on one side of a covetousman'sreasoning, nd moneyon the other; t is easy to foreseewhichwilloutweigh. Earthlyminds, ike mud walls, resistthe strongest at-teries. . . Tell a man passionately n love,that he is jilted;bringascore of witnesses f the falsehood fhismistress,t is tento one butthree kind words of hers shall invalidateall theirtestimonies. IV,xx,12)

The notion is a favorite of Sterne, one to which he devotes hisfourteenth ermon," Felix's Behavior towards Paul."

The judgments fthe more disinterestednd impartial f us, receiveno small tincturefrom ur affections . . but in the moreflagrantinstances . . 'tis melancholy o see the office o whichreason,thegreatprerogativefhisnature, s reduced; erving he ower ppetitesin the dishonestdrudgery f finding ut arguments o justifythepresentpursuit. (Vol. I, pp. 313-314)

'Locke appears to distinguishbetween two sorts of errors n judgment-the failureto carry through the reasoning process (IV, xx, 16) and the failure to present to

reason all of the evidence (IV, xx, 6).

Arthur . Cash 399



Althoughn thatsermonheexplanationf such errorss notcast n terms fconscience,hearguments essentiallyhatofTheAbusesof Conscience onsidered.f a man ofquietcon-sciences really nly a bubble o himself,"e simply as not

tried oknow hetruth bouthis ownmoral onduct.Sternenderstoodn mplicationormoralitynthese octrines

ofwhich ockehimselfardly eemed ware.Locke,exploringtheusesand imitationsfreason,awonly n intellectualaultinman'sfailureoknow nd udgehimself.ternemadeof t acentralhemen hismoral eaching.He wrote wosermonsnthe subject, Self-Knowledge(IV) and " Self-Examination(XIV) and devoted o it a considerableart of two others

(XVIII andXIX). His thesiswas quiteclear: completeelf-knowledgeeing vailablewhen iligentlyought,ccurate elf-judgmenteing ossible pondemand,o onecouldbeghismoralfaults pongroundsf gnorance.

At bottomterne's thicwas conservative. is keen nterestinpsychology,xpressedowell nboth hesermonsndnovels,didnot ead him o adoptthatattitudeo familiaro us in thetwentiethentury-psychologicaleterminism.or him self-knowledge,elf-judgment,nd self-correctionere, n the long

run, roductsf hemoralwill.Sterne's utlookbespeaks gap between is books and the

fictionf ourowncentury rittenyauthorswhodo notsharehisview.Todayweadmirehemodernityf terne's orks, rais-ing them s psychologicalictionomparable o the novelsofProust rWoolf.Sternehas this much n commonwith uchwriters-he roke oosefrom hebonds fconventionallot andconcentratedponproblems eneratedromwithin.However,

thefact hatpeople relargely eterminedy inner s well asouter orces,s a truism f noparticularnterestn itself.Whatwe earn romnartists thequality fthese eterminationsndthewayspeoplereact o them.HereSterne'smoral rientationseparates imfrom hetwentieth-centuryovelist.Today theinnerorcesreoften reateds mysteries,obeunderstoodnlywith reat ffortndthen nlymperfectly-ashey re forGer-trude tein's haracter elancthan Three ives. n other ovelstheforcesrenothidden rom iew, utaresopowerfulhat ny

strugglegainsthem s argelyopeless-aswithHumbert um-bert n Vladimir abokov'sLolita. Sternewrites bout inner

400 The Sermonn " Tristram handy"'



forces hich re neithermysteriousoroverpowering-" henmangiveshimselfp to thegovernmentf a ruling assion,-or, notherwords, hen isHOBBY-HORSErows ead-strong,farewellool reason nd fairdiscretion!"p. 93). A man must

" givehimselfp" to such passion;t doesnot overwhelmim.Thedistance etween terne's sychologicalthics nd modernpsychologys most especially pparentwhen we comparehisthought o that of Sigmund reud.'0 To Freud man is tragicbecausehecannot nowhis ownmotiveswithout he great ainand longeffortf analysis. -is inward rives r even his ownpastactions re ostfrom iew n anunconscious ind.To Sterneman is not tragic, ut deplorable r laughable depending n

whetherterne s writingermonsr novels)becausehe willnotlook at his own passions quarely.Yorick n the Journey oesthroughll sorts ftricks o hidefrom imself is desire or hefille e chambre,misnamingisemotions,xcusinghem s be-nevolentoncern,hannelinghemntomoral ectureso thegirl.Buthecannot scape hetruthbouthimself-" felt omethingat first ithinme whichwas not nstrict nisonwith he essonof virtue had givenherthenight efore" p. 169) " This ishardly reudian iction. passage n SermonV comes s close

as anythingnSterne'swritingoa descriptionfwhatwe wouldcalltheunconscious ind. fa manwill earch isown houghts,saysSterne,He will see several rregularitiesnd unsuspectedassionswithinhimwhich e neverwas aware f:-he willdiscovern hisprogressmany ecret urningsndwindingsnhis heart owhich ewas astranger,hich owgraduallypen nd disclose hemselveso himupon neareriew;ntheseabyrinthsewill race ut uchhiddenspringsnd motives. . as willmakehim atherorryndashamed

ofhimself,han roud. Vol. , p.67)12No analyst s required, o couch,no transference,o struggle,nopain. It is a simplematter f" turningiseyes nward ponhimself (Vol. I, p. 54; cf.Essay, V,xx, 6). Around imandwithin imSterne oundn amusing orld fself-deceit,utno-where Freudian nconscious ind.

"0A. R. Towersdirectly hallengesmy view in "Sterne's Cock and Bull Story,"ELH, XXIV (March,1957), pp. 12-29.

"My referenceso A Sentimental ourney hrough rance and Italy are to theWorld'sClassicsedition,ntro.by VirginiaWoolf (OxfordUniversityress;London:HumphreyMilford),19928.

1 Mostofthepassage s plagiarized rom wift.See Hammond, p. 153-154.

Arthur . Cash 401



Wisely, he ruled out of his fictionthose blackguards of hissermons, uch as Herod, who, upon his principles,must inevitablybe uninterestingbecause their sins cannot be extenuated. Anauthor who believes sin is conscious and controllable had best

write about the small faults of people- the hobbies and foiblesrooted in blameless emotions but carelessly grown out of hand,harming at last their "cool reason and fair discretion." WalterShandy, who is not avaricious or slanderous or cruel, discoversthat his love and tenderness for his brother s no match fora pettheoryabout the backsliding ofAunt Dinah in her orbit (p. 68;see also pp. 114-115, 211-212). There is no mysteryhere, nothinguncontrollable. t is onlya failureto communicate ove, a frustra-

tion of sympathyby egoistic concerns, ultimatelya lack of will

to love. Yorick says, afterhe insultstheMonk in the SentimentalJourney, hat he was " predetermined to coldness and rudeness.In retrospect,however,he points out how we use " the ebbs andflows f our humours as handy excuses:

. theymay dependupon the same causes,forought know,whichinfluencehe tides themselves-'twouldoft be no discredit o us tosuppose t was so: I'm sure at least formyself,hat in manya caseI shouldbe morehighly atisfied,o have it said bytheworld, I hadhad an affairwith the moon, in which therewas neither sin norshame," hanhave it pass altogethers myown act and deed,whereintherewas so muchof both. (p. 5)

Yorick's determination is fleeting and superficial and, conse-quently,blamable. " My heart smote me the moment he shutthe door." So he triesthe case at once in the court of conscienceand decides that he was wrong (p. 10). Here is psychologicalfiction fa veryhigh order,and not a whit ess admirable becauseit deals withproblems ess dramatic than murder or sexual aber-

ration. Misleading foibles become moral follies, amusing justbecause, as Sterneargues in The Abuses, theyare knowable, udg-able, and controllableat will.

This is not to say that Sterne is naively optimisticabout prac-tical ethics. On the contrary,he argues very strongly in thesermon that most men disguise their true selfishness,paintingtheirmotives " with all the false beauties, which a soft and flat-teringhand can give them" (p. 131; repeated in Vol. I, pp. 63-64). The first ourexamplesofthe sermon (pp. 128-131) demon-

stratehow themostterrible fsinsneed not disturbthe conscienceof the sinner.

402 The Sermon n " Tristram.handy"



Thus conscience, his once able monitor, placed on high as ajudge withinus, and intendedby our maker as a just and equitableone too,-by an unhappy train of causes and impediments,akesoften uch imperfectognizance fwhat passes, does its office onegligently, sometimes so corruptly, that t is not to be trustedalone. (p. 132)

II

If, as Sternethought, onscienceis not to be trusted alone, manmust look elsewhere for help. At this point Sterne brings intohis ethical system two buttresses to the weak psychologicalstructure-a metaphysics of morality and a dogmatic religiouscreed.

Call in religion nd morality- Look, What is written n thelaw ofGod? -How readestthou? -Consult calm reason and theunchangeable bligations f ustice and truth;- what say they?

Let CONSCIENCE determine he matterupon thesereports;- andthen if thy heart condemn thee not . . . the rule will be infallible;thouwilthave confidenceowardsGod; that is,have just groundsto believe the udgment houhast past upon thyself,s the judgmentofGod; and nothing lse but an anticipation f thatrighteous entence

whichwillbe pronounced ponthee hereafter y thatBeing, o whomthou art finally o give an accountofthyactions. (pp. 132-133;partofthe statement ccurs n SermonXXXIII, Vol. II, p. 205)

Sterne maintains that the duties ofmoralityand religioncannotbe separated without destroying both (cf. Vol. II, p. 1929)-though he adds that "the attempt is often made in practice."We, of course,must divide them forpurposes of our analysis.

As Sir HerbertRead has pointedout, there s a classical element

in the thought of Laurence Sterne which is representedby that"morality" he would have us call into the judgments of con-science. It is not a subjective moral standard, but an objectiveone, somethingdiscoveredfromoutside the mind. The finalpas-sage of the sermon makes the point strongly:

And, in yourown case, rememberhisplain distinction, mistakein which has ruined thousands,- that your conscience s not alaw:- No, God and reasonmade the law, and have placed con-sciencewithinyou to determine;- not likean AsiaticCadi, accord-ing to the ebbs and flows f his ownpassions,- but like a Britishjudge in this and ofliberty nd good sense,who makesno new law,

ArthurH. Cash 403



but faithfullyeclares hat law whichhe knowsalreadywritten.(p. 140)

Herbert Read, commenting pon this passage, says that con-

scienceoperateswithin

fixedworld: "This is anything ut a

romantic octrine; t is, indeed,the essentialclassical doctrine.And that is why, n spiteof his popularity mongsome of theromantics, terne'sgenius s reallyto be reckoned n theside oftheclassical forces n literature."1`3

As wemight xpect, ternediscovers artof this bsolutemoralcode in the Scriptures.No one whoever ooked ntothe sermonscould doubt Sterne'sorthodoxview of divine commands. ButSternemeans more than revealed codes: God and reasonmade

thelaw. That puts a differentlanton things. Our moral dutyis "to governour actions by the eternalmeasuresof right ndwrong,"to " consult calm reason and the unchangeable obliga-tionsof usticeand truth" (pp. 135, 132; italicsmine). All theseterms re traditional nd wouldhave leftno doubtin the mindofan eighteenth-centuryeader-Sterneis advocating he ethicsof" right eason so closely ssociatedwiththe classicalvalues.

The earliest ecords fthedoctrine fright easonare those ofPlato and theStoics. The idea was taken nto Christianheology,playinga major role fromPaul to the CambridgePlatonists.'4DuringSterne's ifetimetwas advocatedby SamuelClarke,Wil-liam Wollaston,JohnBalguy,RichardPrice, and manyothers.

The rationalist ees the world as havinga logical orderandcoherence. ach thinghas its ownessence, nd therelationshipsamong theseessencesare describable n termsof logic. Conse-quently, etween ne manand another, rbetweenmanand God,we can discern uch relationships,mongthem the moral rela-

tions. If oneman benefitsnother, orexample, he recipientsput into a new relation o the benefactorwhich ogically" de-mands" thathe respond n a certainway-that he showgrati-tude. Gratitude s, therefore, moral law which s obligatoryfrom ts verynature. It is understandableo man's reasonandobligeshim rrespectivefanycommand romGod. In fact, s arelation t has nothing o do withthewill of God: it is eternaland immutable ecausethe aw arises ogically romhevery dea

13 Collected ssays n Literary riticismLondon: Faber and Faber), 1938, p. 260.14 See the recent,excellentsurvey by Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the English

Renaissance (Harvard UniversityPress), 1962.

404 The Sermon n " Tristram handy



ofbenefactornd benefitted,egardlessfwhetherrnotGodhas actually reated uman eingswhowillfallunder hisobli-gation.Godmighthoose o create rdestroymen;but fmenaregiven xistence,oddoesnotorcannotmakeorunmakeherelationshipsetweenhem. n thissense, he aw ofgratitudeisnotsubject o thewillofGod.'5Therationalisteferso suchlawsby a variety fterms-"eternal erities,"the fitnessfthings,"eternaltruths"or "ratios,"and mostespeciallyhetraditionalerm,Laws ofNature."Theobligationoobey heselawshe calls" eternalndimmutablebligation."

The difficultyfdistinguishinghissortofPlatonicrational-ismfromthermoral heoriess obviated ycontrastingpriori

anda posteriori eason.A philosopherfthePlatonic radition,seekinguttherelationsmonghe ssences fthings,pproachestheproblem ponan abstract, priori evel-whichforhim sthegreatest eality.Otherphilosophers,hoalso claimto berational,maintainhatone can reason nlyaboutthedata ofexperience;or hem, ensationalr emotionalxperiences theonly eality,ndreasonings entirely posteriori.Thiswas thesort f rgumentdvanced yDavidHume nwhat odays con-sidered hedefinitivenswer o rational riorism. o be sure,thePlatonist oesnotdenythereality f experience;e onlyassumes hierarchynwhichhedictates fabstract eason avea higher lacethanexperience. e tooadmits hevalidity faposterio-rieasoning,nsistingt thesame ime hat hisproblem-solvingpproach o ife snotenough y tself.'6

Paradoxical s itmayappear, aurence terne,hecomic ndsentimentalist,ccepted his lassical iewofthemoral niverse.Heretoforehepointhasnotbeenmadewithvigor ufficiento

impressmostofthosewhoundertakeo explainhisnovels. tis true, s weshallsee,thatSterne ualified isrationalism;heother octrinese held-hisbenevolismndorthodoxeligion-have rrestedhe ttentionf he iteraryistorian. evertheless,

" This particular example of the law of gratitude is traditional, cited by almostevery rationalist. See, for instance,JohnBalguy, The Foundation of Moral Goodness

. (firstpublished 1728), in A Collection of Tracts Moral and Theological . . .(London), 1734, p. 70. Also ArthurAshley Sykes, The True Foundations of Naturaland Reveal'd Religion . . . (London), 1730, pp. 13-14.

16The most instructive rief discussion of the rational theory n comparisonto othercompetingethical systems is that of L. A. Selby-Bigge in the introductionto his

anthologyThe BritishMoralists (Oxford: Clarendon), 1897. 2 vols.

ArthurH. Cash 405



thereanbenodoubt hatSterne elievedntherealityfmoralLawsofNature onceivednthetraditionfPlato.

In The AbusesofConscience onsidered,terne's onfidencein a priori easonappears ide-by-side ithhis common-sense

advocacyof a posteriorieason.The judge whopresides-orrather ught o preside-inthe courtof consciences reasonfunctioningposteriori;t judgesonlyofgivendata,comparingactions nd theirmotives o a set standard.But thatsortofreasons nsufficientn tself. hemoral tandardmust e" calledin -reasonmust perate prioriodiscoverhemoralaw. Theagentmustturnphilosopher;hinkingpeculativelybouttheimplicationsn his acts and thoughts,e mustworkout the

logical rderf hemoralworldndthe bligationsrisingromt.

The arguments no contradictiono Sterne's rthodoxy. eseems o takeforgranted traditionalelief f all ChristianPlatonistshatnoconflictanarisebetweenhese ationallyis-coveredawsandtherevealed ommandsfGod. Sterne's eter-nal obligationsf ustice ndtruth" renot constituteds lawsbythe ommandfGod,butGodcommandedhem ecause heywere bligatoryntecedently.

In the ermonsternepeaks othepoint fobligations hich

areindependentfGod'sword. n discussingaul's EpistletotheRomans,lways favoritemong ationalists,e argues hattheRomanswereblamable or heir insevenduringhe periodbeforehey adreceivedhe eachingsfChrist:

That here asone upremeeingwhomade hisworld,ndwhoought o be worshippedyhis creatures,s the foundationfallreligion,ndso obvious truthn nature, -that eason,s theApostlecknowledges,as lwaysble odiscovert. (Vol. I, p.84)

He explicitlyaysthatreason lonecouldwork ut themorallawsmenneed.AbouttheJewishode,he comments,

Asfor hemoral art f t, houghtwasunexceptionaln tself,yet twas piece f ntelligencehey idnot tandn want f;menhadnaturaleasonlways ohavefoundtout, andwisdomohave racticedt,without oses' ssistance.Vol. , pp.337-338;lsoVol. II, p. 197)

ForLaurence ternehe " weightier attersfthe aw are" of

eternal nd unchangeablebligation (Vol. I, p. 105) quiteasidefromhe ommandsf God. Thus, n TheAbusesheasserts

406 The Sermonn " Tristramhandy



withoutupportingrgumenthatbothGodandreasonmade helaw.

Since the discussionsfrational thical heorywere o wide-spread, t wouldbe idle to insist hatSterne earned t from

Locke.However,heEssaydoescontainmuch ationalistpecu-lation.Lockeannouncedheconcept ramatically,laiminghatmorality ightomedaybecome " science apableofdemon-stration"uch s the cience fmathematics.

For the ideas thatethics re conversant bout,being all real essences,and such as I imaginehave a discoverable onnexion nd agreementone withanother; o faras we can find heirhabitudes nd relations,so farwe shallbe possessedof certain, eal,and general ruths; nd Idoubtnotbut, f a rightmethodweretaken, greatpart ofmorality

might e madeout with hatclearness,hat could eave,to a consider-ingman, no morereason to doubt, than he could have to doubt ofthe truthof propositionsn mathematics,which have been demon-strated o him. (IV, xii, 8; also see III, xi, 16; IV, iii, 18-20; V, iv,7)

It shouldnot surprise s thatLocke,whosefavorite reacherin London was theCambridge latonistBenjaminWhichcote,shouldhave thoughtfmoralityn thisway. Althoughockemaybemost amous orhis" empiricism,"is argumenthatall

ideasderive rom xperiencendcannotbe innate, e intended

this heoryo show nly hat deascome nto hemind s a resultof experiences-eitherhoseofsensation r thoseofreflection.He did nothold, s do modern ositivists,hatno idea is validunless t is directlyerived romense mpressions.n thecon-trary,he explained how one type of knowledgeis found" only inour minds . . . only the examining of our own ideas." Such"c eneral knowedge," as he called it, can be derived only by thecontemplation of "essences," and reveals "eternal" truths be-

longing to those essences (IV, iii, 31; IV, iv, 6). Sterne mighthave found ample grounds in Locke for his own confidenceinrational morality.

Laurence Sternewas an ethical " realist." He believed that thelaws and obligations known to reason (sometimes also revealedbeneficentlyby God) are the highest reality, not figmentsofthe imagination or empty words. Nothing whatsoever in hissermonssuggests any sympathywith the " nominalist (or " vol-untarists"), who brushed aside all Laws of Nature as merely

imaginary. This group had been represented n the fourteenthcentury by William of Ockham, in the Reformation by John

Arthur . Cash 407



Calvin,17nd in the eighteenthentury y DanielWaterland.'8RejectinghePlatonic raditionltogether,hesemen mphasizedtheunlimitedower f thedeity.Moral aws,they rgued, an-notbe discoveredy reason, or heessences f things annot e

scrutinized.f gratitudes an obligation,t is so only becauseGod commandst. Forthatmatter,ll relationshipserive heircharactersrom he fiat fGod. Two plus two may equal four,butonly ecauseGod socommands; e mights easilyhave com-manded hat they equal seventy-eight. oodness s goodnessbecauseGod so orderedt; hemight s easilyhave declaredhoseactswe now call sinful o be virtuous.Reason, consequently,cannotaid man. Faith and unquestioningbedience re hisonlyhope.

Sterne, hevicarofSutton ndStillington,as indubitablyman offaith, ut he feelsno more onflict etween eason ndfaiththan does Locke (IV, xviii). Locke argues that it is amistake o set reason n opposition o faith,whichhe defines s" an assentfounded n thehighest eason (IV, xvi, 14). Sternefollowshis teacherclosely n this point,definingaithas a " ra-tional ssentoftheunderstandingo truthswhich re establishedby indisputable uthority (Vol. II, p. 284; see Vol. II, p. 271).

In The Abuses ofConscienceConsidered terneexpresses hisdoctrine egatively n his castigation f the Inquisition nd mili-tant Papism (pp. 137-139) -" religion without morality." All ofhisscattered ttacks on Methodism,Romanism, nd enthusiasmin general especially ermonsXXV and XXXVIII) are intendedas rebukes f blind,unreasoned aith,whichto Sterne s alwayspernicious. n thesepassages he captures he spirit even at timesthe very words)9 of Locke's chapter on enthusiasm IV, xix)"As expresslys we are toldto prayfor heinspiration f God'sspirit," ternewrites,

there reno boundaries ixed, or can any be ever marked o dis-tinguishhem rom heeffortsnd determinationsf our ownreason.. . . there everwas a Christian f a cool head and sound udgment,that,nany nstance f a change f ife,wouldpresume o say,which

7 See Hoopes (above, n. 14), pp. 88-93, 106-114.1 See Sterne's sly dig at Waterland in Tristram Shandy, p. 427. The best discus-

sion of Waterland's philosophy have discovered s that of William Whewell,Lectures

in the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell; London: Bell andDaldy), 1862, pp. 152-153.19 ee Hammond, pp. 139-140.

408 The Sermon n " TristramShandy



partofhis reformation as owing to divinehelp,- orwhichto theoperations fhis ownmind. (Vol. II, pp. 70-71)

Indeed, or terne easons a divine uality iven omortals.

We . . . wereraisedby the same creatinghand, fromnothing, o thedignity f rationalcreatures,made, withrespectto our reason andunderstanding,fter his own most perfectmage. (Vol. II, p. 339)Man comesforth,aysJob, ike a flower,nd is cutdown;-he is sentinto heworld he fairestnd noblest artofGod'sworks, fashionedafter he image ofhis Creator withrespectto reason and the greatfaculties f themind. (Vol. I, p. 162)

It is time or riticsostopdecryingterne'sackofphilosophy.For nearly centuryhey have beenquoting he passagein

Tristramhandywhich eads, REASON is, halfof t, SENSE," andclaiminghatSternemeant o say thatthebodyor senses reindistinguishableromrhavean authorityqualtoreason.Themost ecent ccurrenceftheargumentppearsnErnestTuve-son's rticle,Locke andSterne."

By showingus how mindand body are one nature,how wordsandgestures, orexample,bringto all mindsassociations upposed to belowerthan the spirit,he uses an old satirical methodto make hispoint. Bodily mpulseshelpthe spirit ealizeman's natural,therefore

divinely urposedend,forthoseimpulsesare themselves art ofthespiritual eing. Swift's catology eems ntended o warnus to be onourguardconstantly gainst thephysical ide,and not to preenour-selves with falseconfidencehat we have everconquered t. Sterne,however, alls for a co-operation f the two; let us, he urges,be' natural.' But opinionhas givenus a fictitiousmpression hat thetwo are enemies,nd thusthe natural' manhas been dividedagainsthimself.REASON s,halfof t, ENSE; and themeasure f heaven tselfis but themeasureofourpresent ppetites nd concoctions .' ' Soulandbodyare joint-sharersn every hing heyget. . 20

In contexthe EASON-SENSEpassage asquite nother eaning.It is madeby Tristram uring is speculationspon an oddopinion eldbyBishopHall about theverse nPsalms, Makethemikeunto wheel (83:13). In theopinion f theBishop,saysTristram,his ine s

one oftheseverestmprecations hichDavid everutter'd gainsttheenemies ftheLord. . . . So muchmotion, ontinueshe, (forhe was

20

Reason and the magination: tudies n theHistory f deas, 1600-1800, d. J. A.Mazzeo (New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress; London: Routledgeand KeganPaul), 1962, p. 261.

ArthurH. Cash 409



very orpulent) is so muchunquietness; nd so much ofrest,by thesame analogy, s so much ofheaven.

But Tristram,beingverythin (likehis author), thinksdifferently,

that so muchof motion, s so muchof ife, nd so muchof oy andthatto standstill,or geton but slowly, s death and the devil

Tristramthen goes on to make his point,which s quite the oppo-site of that which the criticsread into the passage. His point isjust that the body distortsour reason.

I love the Pythagoreans much more than ever I dare tellmy dearJenny)for heir . . " getting ut of the body, n order o thinkwell."No man thinksrightwhilsthe is in it; blinded as he must be, withhiscongenialhumours, nd drawndifferentlyside, as thebishop and

myself ave been, with too lax or too tense a fibre-REASON s, halfof t,SENSE;and themeasure f heaven tself s but the measure f ourpresent ppetitesand concoctions (pp. 493-494)

The passage is of decided importance in TristramShandy: it isthat rare instance when Tristram reveals his moral values bytelling us that he and his family have been the dupes of theirappetites and senses-the verypoint Sternemakes in The Abusesof Conscience Considered when he describes how passions trickthe reason.21

Sterne takes great delight n experiencesofpassion, of course-the delight of a humorist who never forgetsthe fundamentalirony of human nature. Yorick in the Journey cries,

If naturehas so wove her web ofkindness, hat some threadsof oveand desire re entangledwiththepiece,must the wholeweb be rentin drawing hemout?

Yorick constantlydemands that we respect his passions-mostespecially when he has just been teased by a little slut of aservinggirl. The part ofhis speech we cannot ignore s that partwhich reveals the rational man of God, who in the long rungainsthe upperhand.

Whereverhy providence hallplace meforthe trialsofmyvirtue

21The other ine citedby Professor uvesonoccurs n thefollowingassage: " Souland body are joint-sharersn every thing hey get: A man cannot dress,but hisideas get cloath'd at the same time; and if he dresses ike a gentleman, very oneof them tandspresented o his imagination,enteelizedlongwithhim-" (pp. 616-

617). Yorick is here explaining omicallyLocke's empiricism-that ur ideas arebornout of experience.He is not saying hat the body has authority qual to thatofthemind.

410 The Sermonn " Tristramnhandy



whatever s my danger-whateveris my situation-let me feel themovementswhichrise out of it, and whichbelong to me as a man,and if I governthemas a good one, I will trustthe issues to thyjustice-for thou hastmade us, and not we ourselves. (p. 173; italicsmine; in part the passage is taken from he earlierSermonXVIII,Vol. II, p. 290)The court of conscience is ever present n the fictionof LaurenceSterne.

III

Sterne is never an extremist,no more in his rationalismthanin anythingelse. He specificallyqualifies his position on reason.

It can point out the duties ofmorality,but it cannot alone moti-vate them. "We can have no dependence upon morality," hewrites in The Abuses of Conscience Considered, "without re-ligion" (p. 136). He repeats the themefrequently n the sermons(e.g., Vol. I, pp. 175-176) and makes it the thesis of " TheAdvantages of Christianityto the World" (Sermon XXVI) .

Sterne sees the duties of religion very simply-" to have thefear of God before our eyes" (p. 135). In his ethical system itprovides " the strongestof all motives," withoutwhichthe " nextmost powerful motive in the world" would take over-interest.

In the Tristram Shandy sermon, Sterne attempts to explore"morality without religion throughhis examples of a bankerand a physician (pp. 135-136). It is instructive hat Sterne failsmiserably in this attempt. He cannot really conceive men whoare truly moral while they are irreligious. The two charactersnever come alive. They certainly do not represent "moralitywithout religion,"for they are motivated only by the most fla-

grant selfish considerations-" that honesty serves the purposesof life," that "success in the world depends upon the fairnessoftheir characters," or such "capricious" principles as "honour,""pride," cease." Sterne must have meant what he said whenhe commented that morality and religion cannot be separated" even in imagination."

By his admission that moral practice can be effectedonlythrougha fear of God's retribution, terneacknowledgesa funda-mental self-concernn man. The concession sets him apart from

the more sophisticated rationalists of his own generation,whoargued that true moralityhad to be practiced for its own sake.

ArthurH. Cash 411





Sterne's pleasure principle has a philosophic basis in Locke.Consciousness itself,thinks Locke, depends upon pleasure andpain. Contrary to popular opinion, pleasure and pain are notstates of the body (though influenced y body). They are a con-

dition ofmind-the essential of self-awareness, he matter of con-sciousness (Essay, II, xx, 2-3, and editor's footnote 1). As aconsequence of this stand, Locke insists that all good and evilcare nothingbut pleasure and pain, or that which occasions orproduces pleasure or pain to us." He must, then, definemoralgood and evil in these terms-" pleasure or pain, attending ourobservanceor breach ofthe law by the decree of the law-makers(II, xxviii, 5). Given these principles,the notion of intrinsicra-

tional obligations,as theyare understoodby JohnBalguy, wouldbe meaningless. Locke emphasizes instead the pleasure-painmotive: "For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose arule set to the actions of men, without annexing to it some en-forcementof good and evil to determine his will, we must,whereverwe suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punish-ment annexed to that law" (II, xxviii, 6). This holds for alllaws, includingthe divine,

which God has set to the actions of men,-whetherpromulgated othemby the lightof nature,or the voice of revelation. . . This is

theonlytrue touchstone fmoralrectitude; nd, by comparing hemto this aw, it is that men udge ofthemostconsiderablemoralgoodor evil of theiractions;that is, whether, s duties or sins,theyarelike to procurethem happiness or miseryfrom the hand of theALMIGHTY. (xxviii, 8)

The similarity fthis view to that of Sterne is apparent.Locke's concept of a substratumof pleasure and pain which is

the stuff f both consciousness and passion (II, xx, 4-17) musthave led Sterne to his opinion that reason is limited as a motiveforce. Reason might guide the affections,but only by helpingone to supplant another. It cannot destroythem in a directcon-frontation.Yorick, in the Journey,defends his use of literatureto generate feelingsof love in just these terms. A man does not"disquiet himself by such reading,Yorick argues;

. he oftener oes so in trusting he issue of his commotions o

in his sermons uggests he egoist philosophers'ttempt o reduce all psychologicalmotivationso a singleprinciple f self-love. terne pecificallyttacksthe egoisticview of man in SermonVII, " The Vindication f HumanNature."

ArthurH. Cash 413



reasononly.-I can safely ay formyself, was neverable to conquerany one singlebad sensation n my heart so decisively, s by beatingup as fast as I could for ome kindly nd gentlesensation, o fighttupon its own ground. p. 160)

Twice in his letters Sterne comments that " one passion is onlyto be combatted by another."25 In Sermon XX, he maintains,

Lessons ofwisdom have never such a power over us, as whentheyare wroughtntotheheart, hrough heground-workfa storywhichengages the passions: Is it that we are like iron,and must first eheated beforewe can be wrought pon? (Vol. I, p. 319)

Sternebelieves that man must be bamboozled into virtue.It is for thisreason that Sterne, ike Locke, relies upon Heaven

and Hell in his moral teachings. Reason can make all the prepara-tions and furnish he guidance. It can discover the eternal lawsand obligations; it can uncover the internal springs and motives.Still a man will not be virtuous until he is prodded. The reallyimportantprod is the fearof God.

If the hopes or fears, ither he reason or the passions ofmenare tobe wrought ponat all, itmustbe from he force nd influencef thisawakening onsiderationn the text:-" that all these things hallbedissolved" . . . that we who now tread the stage,must shortlybesummonedway. . . . (Vol. II, p. 158)

Although, as Locke says, reason may discover the law, or asSterne puts it, may "make " the law, for both men God's willmakes the obligation to obey the law. Yorick, the author of thesermon n TristramShandy, describes a moralitymade meaning-ful only by "that Being, to whom thou art finallyto give anaccount of thy actions" (p. 133). Yorick, the narrator of theSentimentalJourney,never loses sight of that same Being, " be-

forewhose tribunal must one day come and give an account ofthis work" (p. 18).

IV

In one respect only does Sterne's moral thought differ ignifi-cantlyfromthat of Locke. Sterne has a warm-heartedoptimismabout the goodness of man which seems more a product of tem-

25 Letters, ed. Lewis Perry Curtis (Oxford: Clarendon), 1935, pp. 76, 79.

414 The Sermon n " Tristram handy i



perament than of philosophy. Almost every sermon sounds anote of sympathy and tolerance and faith in man. Sometimes ittakes the form of maintaining that "humane and benevolentinclinations" are somehow "natural to the soil" of humanity

(Vol. II, pp. 313-314). Or Sterne reveals a confidence n naturalreason as well as affection: God's "all-bountiful hand," he saysin Sermon XIX, made man's "judgment like his heart, upright"(Vol. I, pp. 312-313; also Vol. I, p. 144). He writes n SermonV,

Whatdivines ay ofthemind,naturalists ave observedofthebody;that there s no passion so naturalto it as love,which s theprincipleof doing good-and . . . it is not to be doubted,but that everyhard-heartedman has feltmuch nwardoppositionbeforehe couldprevailupon himself o do aught to fix nd deservethe character:and that

what we say of long habits of vice, that theyare hard to be sub-dued,maywith qual truth e said concerninghenatural mpressionsof benevolence, hat a man must do much violence to himself,ndsuffermanya painful truggle, eforehe can tear away so greatandnoblea part ofhis nature. (Vol. I, p. 85; see also Vol. I, pp. 39-41)

This "soft view" of man Sterne expresses only once in TheAbusesof Conscience onsidered: "I make no doubt," he writes," but the knowledge of rightand wrongis truly impressed uponthe mind of man " (p. 127). The comment is made long before

Sterne brings up the matter of calling in " morality as a guide.Unlike that fixedand objective standard, this knowledge is sub-jective, "impressed" upon the mind. What can Sterne mean?Does his remark about " the law written n theirhearts" in Ser-mon XXVI (Vol. II, p. 83) refer to the same knowledge? ForHerbert Read, the comment in The Abuses suggested a moralsense. It may be that Sterne is here bowing to the ethics ofHutcheson or Hume-though both of those philosophers would

surelyhave objected to the word knowledgeo describe a moralawareness they believed was sensed.Or is Sterne returning o theolder view of innate ideas, departing sharply from Locke? I donot findanswers to these questions, for Sterne never attempts tojustifyphilosophicallyhis belief n man's natural goodness.

To a student of the novel, this aspect of Sterne's ethic is verysuggestive. In the sermons,Sterne seems unaware that his un-critical faith n man clashes with his Lockean ideals. In the novels,he appears to have become highlyconscious of the conflict nd to

have made comic capital of it. Sterne does write " sentimentalstorieswhich reveal a pervasive, effortless enevolence in man-

Arthur . Cash 415



the stories f the ass ofLyons,of Maria, and the Moorishgirl.But he insistsover and overthatinner prings f love and sym-pathyare not alone sufficientorvirtue;the result s Sterne'suniquesentimentalomedy. Tristram,t theverymomenthe is

gentle o a donkey, as a pang: "therewas moreofpleasantryntheconceit, fseeinghowan ass would at a macaroon thanofbenevolencengivinghim one " (p. 524). In theJourney,arsonYorick's pityfor Maria is mocked by his rising exual passionfor his ovely mbecile.Andbrother om passesfrom hegentlenegress,who shoos the flies nsteadof swatting hem, nto theback parlorto pursueone of the mostmercenary, ulgar (andfunny)pornographicourtshipsn literature.Without he aid ofreasonand religion,t wouldseem,benevolentman is laughable.

But Sterne'screatures re alwayslovable. His sympathy re-ventsSternefrombecoming rigorous atirist n the greattra-ditionoftheAugustans.He has no strongmpulseto correctfoolish,ut well-intentionednd aimiablemankind. maginewhatSwiftwould do with Susannah,a servantwho,at the death oflittleBobby,can think nlyofthegowns hewillbe givenby amourningmother!But Sternefindsno harm n her. He is onlyamused.

Now love youfor his -and tisthisdeliciousmixture ith-inyouwhichmakesyoudearcreatures hatyouare andhewhohatesyoufor t all I can say ofthematter,s That he haseither pumkin orhis head or a pippinforhis heart,- andwhenever e is dissectedtwill e foundo. (p. 364)

X * X * *

Sterne s themost philosophic f novelists.Though his bookshave alwaysa moraldimension, e willnotbe limited o ethical

problems lone. Many othersorts of intellectualonceptsare

indigenouso Tristram handy-witnesstheplayupontimeandduration.The mindofthenarrators so mercurial,he Shandyfamily s such a machine, set in motionby so manydifferentsprings,nd actedupon ... from ucha variety f strange rin-ciplesand impulses (p. 358), thatone couldhardlyexpectthenovelto correspondoint-by-pointithan abstractethicarticu-lated in a brief ermon.

The AbusesofConscienceConsidereddoes revealthat Sterne

hadassimilatedhemost iberal, nlightenedraditionfChristianphilosophy.The ChristianPlatonist,be it Paul, Aquinas, or

41.6 The Sermon n " Tristram,harndy



Benjamin Whichcote, had always a humanistic element in histhought which freed him fromany stifling ear of Omnipotence.These were the philosophers who discovered a divinity in manwhich allowed him to approach his Maker with dignity,not in

primitive dread. Sterne wrote in this liberal spirit. He neverrobbed his comic creatures of their self-respect.He never deva-stated them. Sterne had no neurotic fear of sin. He was free ofthe Puritan's over-confident ondemnation of others and of theanguishedself-doubtwhich drivesthe Puritan frantically hroughlife. He was trustfulof man's moral capacity and secure in anorderly universe ruled by a just God of reason. Consequently,Sterne glossed no faults, crusaded for no reforms. He delightedin the scatological story or the teasing sensualism, but he wascertain to remind us on the next page of the nearness of deathand the watchfulness of the great Judge. He was the modernDemocritus,the " laughing philosopher." Like that ancientGreekhe admired, Sterne believed in the superiority f mind over body,in natural morality, and in the salubrity of laughter. "Was Ileft ike Sancho Panqa, to chuse my kingdom," says Tristram,

it should be a kingdomof hearty, aughingsubjects: And as thebilious nd more aturnine assions,by creating isorders,n the blood

and humours, ave as bad an influence, see, upon thebody politickas body natural- and as nothingbut a habit of virtuecan fullygovern hosepassions, nd subjectthemto reason I should add tomy prayer that God wouldgive my subjects graceto be as WISE

as theywereMERRY; and then should be thehappiestmonarch, ndtheythehappiestpeopleunder heaven (p. 338)

ColoradoState University

ArthurH. Cash 417

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the sermon in stristram shandy