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The Self in Psychotherapy

William Watson Purkey The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Paula Helen Stanley Radford University

“Man, you’re talking like a fool. You mean to tell me that you’re gonna sit back and let some old blue-haired woman talk you into being a rabbit?” “Not talk me into it, no. I was born a rabbit. Just look at me. I simply need the nurse to make me happy with my role.” “You’re no damned rabbit!” Ken Kesey One flew over the cuckoo’s nest 1962.

Introduction

Of all the perceptions we experience in the course of living, none has more profound significance

than the perceptions we hold regarding our own personal existence - our view of who we are and how we

fit into the world. It now seems clear that many of the successes and failures people experience

throughout their lives are closely connected with the beliefs they hold about their personal existence.

There appears to be a general agreement among psychotherapists that how a person views oneself

has profound effects socially, psychologically, and even biologically. As reported by Hartman and

Blankenstein (1986), self-perceptions are pivotal and are in fact a “necessary prerequisite” for

psychological well-being. A negative self- view has been associated with a host of physical and

psychological problems including alcohol abuse (Hull & Schnurr, 1986), anorexia nervosa and bulimia

(Garner & Garner, 1 986,Garner, Rockert, Davis, Garner, Olmstead & Eagle, 1992) and extreme shyness

(Cheek, Meichoir, & Carpentieri, 1986).

This emphasis on the self differs from older and better known positions of psychoanalysis (built

around unconscious motivations) and behaviorism (emphasizing observable behavior) and even recent

positions of cognitive psychology (focusing on information processing and metacognitive processes) and

neuroscience (linking learning to brain functioning) in that it stresses self-awareness and personal

reflection as active agents in healthy living.

Studying the self has always been a daunting task. As Baldwin and Satir (1987) pointed out, the self

is a very personal matter and can never be known in its entirety (p.7). Because the self is culturally-

bound, primarily implicit, and hypothetical, it is difficult to define. However, an analysis of various

explanations and a review of’ related research provide a host of relatively unexplored avenues to

understanding the self. Among these avenues are “self-efficacy” (Bandura, 1986-1989), and the “possible

self’ (Markus & Wurf, 1987). While contributions differ and variables shift, there are core similarities.

From these a composite definition can be synthesized.

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As constructed here, the self is defined as a totality of a complex, dynamic, and organized system of

learned beliefs that an individual holds to be true about his or her personal existence. It is this self that

provides consistency to the human personality and allows the individual to maintain a reference point for

antecedents and consequences of perceptions and behaviors.

Embedded in the above definition of self are five qualities. The self is (1) organized, (2) dynamic,

(3) consistent, (4) modifiable, and (5) learned. These qualities can be illustrated by a simple drawing.

Figure 1

Self is Organized

Most self theorists agree that the self has a generally stable quality that is characterized by internal

orderliness and harmony. It is not simply a hodge-podge of cognitions and feelings. To picture this

internal symmetry, consider Figure 1 and imagine that the large spiral represents the organized unity of

the “global” self.

The global self is orchestrated and balanced, centered on the “r’, the self-as-subject. This I is the

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living connection with experience. Humans are aware of past, present and future selves. This future self

has been explored by Garcia and Pintrich, 1994; Markus, 1977; Markus and Nurius, 1986 and Markus and

Wurf 1987 in their conceptions of “self schemas and possible selves.”

In addition to the “I” the self also contains smaller units. These can be thought of as “subselves”

and represent the self-as-object, the various me’s that are the objects of self-perceptions. Each of the me

subselves within the global system contains its own balance, and each influences and is influenced by the

global self.

The numerous me subselves can be roughly divided into attributes (strong, tall, loyal, short, bright,

young, friendly, trustworthy, sexy, etc.) and categories (student, husband, mother, Moslem, Jew, atheist,

athlete, homosexual, veteran, lover, etc.). These perceived attributes and categories usually are linked

(good student, loyal American, excellent therapist) amid are positioned in a hierarchical order. This order

is critical, for it gives meaning and stability to the global self.

Each person’s self contains countless me’s, but all are not equally significant Some are highly

important and are positioned close to the center of the self. Other me subselves are less central and are

located toward the periphery. Subselves closest to the I have the most influence on daily functioning; the

individual “hears” these subselves the loudest for they are close to the center. By the same token,

subselves farthest away from the I have the weakest voices and have diminished influence on perceptions

and behavior. For example, perceiving oneself as a Christian may have vastly greater impact than

perceiving oneself as a golfer, and vice versa.

Each subself carries its own plus or minus charge that contributes to the global self. Perceived

success and failure tend to generalize throughout the entire self-system. When one me is important and

highly valued, a failure in that dimension lowers the self-evaluation in other, seemingly unrelated,

abilities. Conversely, success in a highly valued activity tends to raise self-evaluations in other,

apparently unconnected, abilities. This spread-of-effect phenomenon has been documented by Blailiff

(1978), Hattie (1992), Ludwig and Maehr (1967) and Marsh (1993) among others.

Self is dynamic

Combs and associates (1978, 1989, 1994) have postulated that the maintenance, protection, and

enhancement of the perceived self is the basic motivation behind all human behavior. For example, a

corporate executive might be neglecting her official duties (the “executive me”) that she does not see as a

valued and central part of herself while spending many hours on the tennis court improving her already

superior skills and enhancing her “self-as-tennis player.”

It is important to note here that the self is not the cause of the person’s behavior. For example, in

the case of student misbehavior, the student’s self does not cause the misbehavior to occur. A better

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explanation is that the disruptive student has learned to see himself or herself as a troublemaker and is

behaving accordingly. An illustration of this occurred when a school dropout was invited to speak before

several hundred educators at a conference on dropouts. When the dropout arrived, he took one look at the

audience and headed for the door. On the way out he was asked where he was going. He simply replied,

“I’m a dropout and that’s what I’m doing.” The student learned to see himself as a dropout and behaved

accordingly. For him to have acted otherwise would have violated his perception of himself as a dropout.

Bandura (1986, 1989) Seligman (1974, 1990) and others have demonstrated that individuals who view

themselves as inefficacious in coping with environmental demands and expectations tend to dwell on their

perceived deficiencies and view potential challenges and difficulties as far more difficult than they really

are.

To understand the dynamic nature of the self, picture the global spiral (Figure 1) as a sort of

personal gyrocompass: a continuously active system of beliefs that dependably point to the “true north” of

a person’s perceived existence. This guidance system serves to direct actions and enables each individual

to take a consistent stance in life. Rather than being viewed as the cause of behavior, the self is better

understood as the gyrocompass of the human personality, providing cohesion in personality and direction

for behavior.

Self is consistent.

A singular feature of the self is that it requires internal consistency to maintain some degree of

homeostatic autonomy. To maintain this consistency, people act in accordance with the ways they have

learned to view themselves. From a lifetime of studying their own actions and those of others, people

acquire expectations about what things fit and what behaviors are appropriate (Calderhead, 1996; Pajares,

1992; Snow, Comb, 1996). All subselves that exist within the global self are expected by the perceiver to

be congruent with all others, no matter how incongruent they may appear from an external viewpoint.

If a new perception is consistent with those already incorporated into the self, the individual easily

accepts and assimilates that new perception. However, if the new experience is in opposition to those

already incorporated, the person will automatically reject it, no matter how self-enhancing it might appear

to the external observer. People accept and incorporate that which is agreeable and congenial with their

self, and they reject and avoid evidence that is disagreeable and incongruous.

Sometimes the global self consists of contradictory subselves. Yet these various me’s can coexist

happily and may never encounter or challenge one another as long as the individual does not perceive the

contradictions. For example, a father may neglect his own children while working actively with a youth

group. He sees himself as a “good” father. It is only when he becomes aware of the contradictions among

these subselves that resolution of the dissonance is likely to occur. Once the dissonance is perceived, it

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has a good chance of being resolved. If not, the individual is likely to suffer emotional distress.

Psychotherapists who understand the tendency of the self towards consistency do not expect quick

changes in clients. The self is remarkably conservative and cannot easily be modified or shaped into

something more suitable or desirable. Whether a person’s self is healthy or unhealthy, productive or

counterproductive, it strives for consistency.

An example might be useful here. Medical doctors and nurses report that they often find it difficult

to get patients who are diagnosed as diabetic to care for themselves properly. Such patients find it difficult

to accept their new “diabetic me” and the accompanying need to use insulin and follow dietary

requirements. The English language allows the diabetic to reveal his or her innermost self by saying “I am

diabetic.” Certain conditions and diseases are not allowed this same freedom. One almost never hears “I

am cancerous.” Instead, a forced distancing takes place: “I have cancer.”

One final thought on the consistency of self is that being right about one’s beliefs about self has

reward value, even if the belief is negative. A client who has lost both his job and his wife might take

certain pleasure in stating: “See, just as I thought! Nobody cares whether I live or die!” Being right —

even about negative feelings about oneself— can be self-satisfying.

Although the self tends toward consistency, significant changes in the self are possible. Over time

and under certain conditions, one’s self can undergo significant changes. The good news is that the self is

modifiable.

Self is modifiable.

In each reasonably healthy person new perceptions filter into the self throughout life, while old

ones fade away. This continuous flow creates flexibility in the self and allows for infinite modifiability. A

likely ex’planation for the assimilation of new ideas and the expulsion of old ones is the assumption that

each person constantly strives to maintain, protect, and enhance the perceived self. This basic assumption

is a tremendous “given” for the psychotherapist for it means that the self is predisposed towards

development.

Rather than seeking ways to “motivate” clients, humanistic psychotherapy as interpreted here is

based on the assumption that people are always motivated. People may not do what others wish them to

do, but this does not mean that they are unmotivated. Therapists who accept this assumption can shift

their energies away from a “doing to” process of trying to motivate clients, and towards a “doing with”

process of inviting clients to explore their self-perceptions and choose directions for this drive towards

fulfillment to take. According to Combs, Avila & Purkey, 1978, Maslow, 1954 and others, there is only

one kind of human motivation — an internal and continuous incentive that every individual has at all

times, in all places, during all activities. Viewing human motivation from this humanistic perspective

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means that therapists can best use their time and energies to encourage a cooperative spirit of mutual

development, which brings us to a final quality of the self: It is learned.

Self is learned.

Clients change their perceptions of self, for good or ill, in three general ways. The first way is

through an extremely traumatic or ecstatic event. All of us have witnessed how the tragic loss, of a loved

one, or the joyous arrival of a baby, can have such impact that the very structure of a person’s self

undergoes significant change (for example, “I am now a widow,” or “I am now a father!”) The impact of

such momentous events, including religious conversion (“I am now saved!”) abruptly interrupts the

internal balance of the self and tilts it in a new direction. Erikson (1959, 1968) suggested that such abrupt

events force individuals to reevaluate their lives and bring about a renewed struggle with the definition of

self.

A second way that people change their self is through a professional helping relationship, such as

medical treatment, psychotherapy, or spiritual guidance. An abundance of empirical research has

demonstrated that therapeutic approaches can be beneficial in altering the selL In addition, scientific

interventions continue to overcome challenges and help individuals lead long and healthy lives. Various

forms of medical service, including surgery, drug therapy, and dentistry, both separately and in

conjunction with one another, can have powerful effects on the self.

The third and greatest influence on self takes place in everyday experiences. Repeated events, either

positive or negative, have a profound effect on personal awareness. Many people seek professional help

because they have lost the will to challenge the negative messages that may dominate their lives.

Although theoretical concepts of the self focus primarily on individual autonomy, recent developments

reflect the critical importance of interdependence and relationships with others (Holdstock,, 1994).

Asking a client to describe how significant others view him or her reveal much about the client’s self.

In concluding this overview of the qualities of self, it may be helpful to think of the self as a

stabilizing lake. The lake is constantly fed by a river of experience that flows into the lake at on end and

exits at the other. The river can flow rapidly or slowly, depending on life experiences, and can provide

much or little fresh water to the lake. In a healthy personality, the river constantly provides the lake with

fresh concepts about the self, while outmoded ideas are flushed out of the lake and down the river. When

this lifelong process of renewal and development is interrupted, and little water is allowed to enter or

leave the lake, it becomes stagnant. Conversely, if too much enters the lake, it becomes flooded,

unpredictable, and provides too little protection against the vagaries of life. Some clients become so

crowded internally that they experience sensory overload, continually adding me’s without letting go of

any. An essential aspect of humanistic psychotherapy is to invite clients to examine their personal lake

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and explore ways to keep it healthy. A healthy self maintains some congruence with the outer world while

retaining some inner strength and efficacy (Benne, 1984). A healthy self is also one that is continuously

involved in creating new visions of personal growth and development.

Presently, there is a renewed interest in the self. Recent books by Bandura (1998, in press),

Brinthaupt and Lipka (1994), Hattie (1992), Greenberg, Rice and Elliot (1993) Schunk and Zimmerman,

(1994) among many others illustrate this interest. To understand this wellspring of fresh interest, it will

help to take a quick look at the history of the self that underlies many recent developments.

Brief History of Self

Drawings on caves suggest that at some point during the dawn of history, human beings began to

give serious thought to their nonphysical, psychological selves. With the advent of written history, writers

described this awareness of self in terms of spirit, psyche, or soul. Greek philosophers such as Socrates,

Plato, and Aristotle defined the self in terms of the soul, as immaterial and spiritual. Their conception of

an individual’s self as a spiritual entity separate from the physical self formed the foundation for

subsequent conceptions of mind and body duality. During the middle ages the concept was further

developed by theologians, who stressed the immortality and superiority of the soul to the body in which it

dwelled.

A turning point in the thinking about this nonphysical self came in 1659, when Rene Descartes

wrote his Principles of Philosophy. Descartes proposed that doubt was a primary tool of disciplined

inquiry, yet he could not doubt that he doubted! He reasoned that if he doubted, he was thinking and

therefore he must exist. Although the focus on mind and body duality that rationalism came to represent

has largely been discarded, its emphasis on inner processes of self-awareness remains a powerful force in

philosophical and psychological thought. Other philosophers of this general period, among them Spinoza

and Leibnitz, added their ideas about the mystery of the nonphysical aspects of individuals. Terms such as

mind, soul, psyche, consciousness, spirit, and self were often used interchangeably, with scant regard for

invariant vocabulary or scientific experimentation. For the most part, a general state of metaphysical

disorganization regarding self existed well into the present century (and to a large extent continues!) Early

20th Century

A milestone in the quest for understanding internal processes was the voluminous writings of

psychoanalysts such as Sigmund Freud (1915, 1938, 1957). Freud gave attention to the self under the

concepts of id, ego and superego. The concept of ego was given increased attention by his daughter Anna,

who built a respected place in it for therapy. Specifically, her attention to ego development during

adolescence provided the foundation for future explorations by Erikson (1959, 1968). Yet, Freudians and

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neo-Freudians generally hesitated to make the self a primary psychological unit or give it central

prominence in their theoretical formulations. In part, this was due to the psychodynamic emphasis of the

biological processes in human development, hence the oft repeated Freudian maxim that “biology is

destiny.”

At the turn of the present century, when American psychology began to take its place among the

other academic disciplines, there was a great deal of interest in self. For example, when William James

wrote Principles of Psychology (1890), his chapter on the “The Consciousness of Self’ was the longest in

two volumes. He differentiated between the self as knower (the I) and the self as known (the me). He

referred to the “I” as pure ego and suggested that this component of self is consciousness itself. The me

on the other hand, is one of the many things that the I may be conscious of. It consists of three

components, one physical or material, one social, and one spiritual. In addition, James was one of the first

to use the term “self-esteem” which he described as a self-feeling of what we back ourselves to be and do.

Self-esteem may be raised, James argued, either by succeeding in our endeavors, or in the face of

disappointments, by lowering our sights and giving up certain pretensions.

During the early 20 century, Charles Horton Cooley (1902) used the metaphor of the looking-glass

self to suggest that individuals’ self-perceptions are, in part, formed as a result of their perceptions of how

other people perceive them. That is, the perceptions and value judgments of others act as mirrors through

which individuals view and define their own sense of self. This conception of self brought to the forefront

of psychological, sociological, and philosophical thought an emphasis on human interactions and the

importance of social comparisons in the development of self.

Thanks to a hectic period of theory building in the early 20th Century, followed by strongly held

positions on issues, most psychologists rallied around certain systems and organized schools that were

characterized by ardent advocacy of their own theory and unrestrained hostility to opposing ones.

Freudian psychoanalysts emphasized unconscious motivation; introspectionists defined the process of

introspection as a way of exploring the consciousness; gestaltists believed in the value of insight and

stressed the selective perceiver; and behaviorists attempted, with a good deal of success, to cancel out all

other schools by claiming that all systems except their own studied consciousness. According to the early

behaviorists, only a person’s tangible, observable, and measurable behavior was fit for scientific inquiry.

When the smoke cleared, the radical behaviorism of J.B. Watson (1925) carried the day.

Psychology was redirected, attention was turned to observable stimuli and response, and the inner life of

the individual was beyond the scope of “scientific” psychology. Self, self-beliefs, self-esteem, and self-

perception as psychological constructs were pushed into limbo, along with such internal constructs as

mind, consciousness, awareness, and will. From the 1920s through the 1940s, the self received scant

attention from the behavior-oriented psychologists who dominated American psychology.

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Although the decline of interest in the self was encouraged by behavioristic psychologists, all the

fault for its neglect cannot be laid at their door. Very little of the literature on the self during those

decades was based on disciplined inquiry. Rather, it continued to be philosophic or conceptual in nature,

with few studies attempting or reporting empirical findings. Those few who advocated the importance of

the self weakened their position through neglect of rigorous experimentation and scientific inquiry.

Whatever the cause, emphasis on the self declined as a concern of American psychology and

education during the first half of the centwy. But there were some notable exceptions to this general

neglect. George Herbert Mead (1934) made the concept of self a major part of his theoretical writings on

the philosophy of transactions with the environment. Mead argued that self results from an interaction

between the social process and what Lev Vygotsky (1935, 1978) would later call the “psychological

tools” that individuals used to make sense of and share social symbols. The primary tool, language, aids

individuals in making sense of their inner processes and coming to define their sense of self. Mead also

made use of James’ “me” and “I” dichotomy to help explain that “if the I speaks, the me hears.” By

listening and making sense of this linguistic exchange, the self is realized.

Other psychologists were instrumental in keeping alive the study of self. Kurt Lewin (1935) viewed

the self as a central and relatively permanent organization that gave consistency to the entire personality.

Kurt Goldstein (1939) analyzed the process of self-actualization, as contrasted with those of the sick

organism that must constantly worry about self-preservation. This was a forerunner of the comprehensive

works of Abraham Maslow (1954), who was to write so powerfully about self-actualization.

Middle 20th Century

Coinciding with the zenith of behavioristic influence came what is now referred to as the

humanistic revolt in psychology and psychotherapy. Dissatisfied with the direction that psychology was

taking, and apprehensive about what they considered a narrow and passive view of human existence

represented by behaviorism, a group of psychologists and psychotherapists called for renewed attention to

the self. In concert with existential and phenomenological movements of the 1950’s and 1960’s, the

humanistic movement was born. As Diggory noted, “the fact that the new self psychologists were able to

argue substantive matters of learning theory and motivation with the heirs of the behaviorists made the

latter pay attention and finally to agree that there might be something to the idea of self after all” (1966,

p.S’7).

The most eloquent and significant voice in this new humanistic movement was that of Carl Rogers

(1947, 1951, 1958, 1959, 1969). In an influential series of articles, books and lectures, Rogers presented a

system of psychotherapy built around the importance of self in human adjustment. Rogers described the

self as a social product, developing out of interpersonal relationships and striving for consistency. He

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believed that in every human being there is a drive toward self-actualization and growth so long as this is

permitted and nurtured by environmental forces. Rogers’ approach went far toward linking earlier notions

about the self with solid research to support his observations. In fact, his impact was so powerful and

influential that his general approach soon became known as “self theory”.

During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s there was an enthusiastic renaissance of interest in the self. The

research and writing of Brookover (1959) Coopersmnith (1967), Jourard (1971), Snygg and Combs

(1949), among others, provided a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the self. One aspect of this

renewed attention to self was the “human potential” movement that stressed personal growth, often

accompanied by personal excess. As Baldwin (1987) noted, “Unfortunately, proponents of the human

potential movement often carried the idea of personal growth to the limits of personal license and failed to

develop a disciplined and systematic examination of its assumptions and limitations” (1987, p. 28). This

resulted in a backlash against the entire humanistic movement. Once again, interest in the self declined as

a viable topic of research.

Late 20th Centurv

The humanistic movement waned during the 1 980s as psychologists shifted their interest to

cognitive processes and information-processing. This cognitive revolution was heavily influenced by

technological advances and the computer, which became the movement’s signature metaphor. Much like

their humanistic predecessors, the new wave of theorists and researchers emphasized internal, mental

events, but this emphasis was primarily on cognitive tasks such as encoding and decoding human

thinking, information processing strategies, higher-order thinking, memory processes, and problem

solving, rather than on exploring the self.

This is not to say that interest in the self disappeared completely. In fact, it remained prominent,

albeit with a qualitatively different face. In keeping with the “cold cognition” tradition of the cognitive

revolution, research on the self maintained a measure of prominence and respectability by adopting a

strong quantitative flavor. Although contemporary interest in exploring consciousness may appear overly

mechanistic, its findings can provide exciting insights for psychotherapists, including the significance of

self-efficacy and the possible self. For a detailed description of the history and rediscovery of the self,

please see Seeman (1988), Garfield and Bergin (1986) and Bergin and Garfield (1994).

Contemporary Research

The present emphasis on the self is so pervasive that Graham and Bernard, reviewing the state of

knowledge related to theories and principles of motivation for the 1996 Handbook of Educational

Psychology, observed that current research topics such as self-efficacy, learned helplessness, self-worth

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and attributions:

Reflect what is probably the main new direction in the field of motivation — the study of the self. If

we add to this list the constructs of self-concept, self-focus, self-handicapping, self-monitoring, and the

remainder of the “self’ vocabulary then it is evident that the self is on the verge of dominating the field of

motivation. (1996, p. 77).

Self-Efficacy

Indeed, the new resurgence of interest in the self has been so pervasive that it is difficult to identify

a contemporary personality theory that is not centered on the self (Kuhut, 1984). Perhaps the most

prominent self-theorist among contemporary voices is that of Albert Bandura (like Maslow a former

behaviorist). In Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory, (1986), Bandura

wrote that individuals possess beliefs that enable them to exercise a measure of control over their

thoughts, feelings, and actions. These self-beliefs comprise a self-system, and human behavior is the

result of the interplay between this system and external forces of influence. In all, Bandura painted a

portrait of human behavior in which the self is the key element. According to Bandura, how people

behave can often be better predicted by their beliefs about their capabilities than by what they are actually

accomplishing, although this is not meant to imply that they can accomplish tasks beyond their

capabilities simply by believing that they can. (The most powerful method of changing cognitions of self-

efficacy are performance based.) Rather, perceptions of self-efficacy can help determine what individuals

do with the knowledge, skills, and talents they possess. More important, self-efficacy beliefs are critical

determinants of how well knowledge and skills are acquired in the first place.

According to Bandura, the process of creating and using self-beliefs is simple enough: individuals

engage in behaviors, interpret the outcomes of their actions, and use the interpretations to develop beliefs

about their capability to engage in subsequent behaviors in similar domains, and act in concert with the

beliefs created. This view of self as a mediating construct in human behavior is consistent with the views

of numerous psychotherapists who have argued that the potent evaluative nature of the self creates a filter

through which all new phenomena are interpreted and subsequent behavior mediated. Behavior is not

controlled by its consequences (as behaviorists long mnaintained) so much as it is by personal

constructions of its meaning or value in relation to the self.

Bandura’s social-cognitive theory provides a view of human behavior and motivation in which the

beliefs that people have about themselves are key elements in the exercise of control and personal agency.

Individuals are viewed as producers of their own environments and of their social systems. A strong sense

of self-efficacy enhances human accomplishment and personal well-being in countless ways. People with

a strong sense of personal competence approach difficult tasks as challenges to be mastered rather than

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threats to be avoided. They have greater intrinsic interest and deep engrossment in activities, set

themselves challenging goals and maintain strong commitment to them, and heighten and sustain their

efforts in the face of failure. Moreover, they more quickly recover their sense of efficacy after failures or

setbacks, and attribute failure to insufficient effort or deficient knowledge and skills which are acquirable.

Conversely, people with low self-efficacy may believe that things are tougher than they really are, a belief

that fosters stress, depression, and a narrow vision of how best to solve a problem. As a result of these

influences, self-efficacy beliefs are strong determinants and predictors of the level of accomplishment that

individuals finally attain. One’s self-estimated sense of self efficacy is one of the best predictors of

behavior (Bandura, 1986).

Self-Schemas and Possible Selves

Markus and associates (1977, 1987) have offered a perspective on the self that focuses on

individuals’ self-schemas and possible selves. Finding traditional views of the self as too “monolithic,”

Markus argued that an individual’s self-system is composed of self-schemas, which are defined as

“cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the

processing of self-related information contained in the individual’s social experiences.” (1977, p. 64).

Markus agreed that one’s self comprises the totality of information available to an individual as the result

of past experience, but contended that an individual does not make use of this total structure when

undergoing day-to-day activities. Instead, people selectively extract from their vast storehouse of self-

knowledge the information required to deal with specific events or experiences. The information selected

results in the construction of self-schemas that help a person determine the specific stimuli selected for

attention, the information to be remembered and incorporated into the self-system, and the inferences and

decisions to be made in a particular context. Seen this way, the concept of self-schemas is similar to

Freud’s description of the executive function of the ego.

The possible self as a self-schema consists of cognitions of the type of person one can become and

the things one can accomplish. These cognitions also include the type of person one £~i~ becoming. In a

similar view, Erikson earlier observed that one’s self “demands to be synthesized with abandoned and

anticipated selves.” (1959, p.160). Because individuals’ conceptions of their possible selves aid them in

selecting information from the self-system and constructing the self-system necessary to function

adaptively, Markus argued that they provide the essential link between self-concept and motivation.

Self-schemas, then, are parts of the self activated and brought into higher levels of awareness to

deal with specific experiences. Because the self includes all available knowledge, an individual must

carefully and creatively construct the self-schemas most relevant and appropriate to the experience at

hand. In a sense, this is a working self-concept. Markus suggested that seif-schemas are in part

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constructed from information and strategies that have proved effective in past situations of similar nature

and reflect significant and enduring personal concerns. They are also constructed to reflect the

individual’s enduring goals, hopes and aspirations, motives, fears, and threats. In constructing seif-

schemas, individuals are guided by visions of themselves in the future, visions of their possible selves,

positive and negative.

From Research to Practice

Psychotherapy, according to Garfield & Bergin (1986, p. 5) is not a distinctive profession. Rather, it

is an activity performed by members of many different professions. Similarly, using the self in

psychotherapy is not so much a science or technique as it is a way of being with the client. This “being

with” process reflects those attributes of humanistic psychotherapy listed by Rogers as the “characteristics

of the helping relationship” (Rogers, 1958). More specifically, it includes the self of the therapist, the

interdependent relationship, and the therapeutic process.

Self of the therapist

Countless variables have been related to the outcomes of psychotherapy, including counselor traits

(Felker, 1973; Vargas & Borkowski, 1983), counselor behaviors (Dell, 1973), environmental factors

(Chaikin, Derlega, & Miller, 1976; Hasse & DiMatta, 1976), and counseling skills (Ivey & Authier,

1978). Of these, a variable that appears repeatedly in the professional literature is the self of the therapist.

Counselors who accept and reflect accurately their own feelings within themselves are in a favorable

position to encourage these processes in their clients. Conversely, therapists who have difficulty with their

own self-exploration.s severely limit their value as professional helpers. A therapist’s ability and

willingness to self-examine, self-reflect, and self-accept are essential for successful helping.

The primary tool of a humanistically-oriented psychotherapist is one’s own self This concept has

been called the “self as instrument” (Combs, Avila, & Purkey, 1978). The self as instrument concept

requires psychotherapists to be thinking, feeling, problem-solving professionals who combine knowledge,

understanding, and techniques with their own unique ways of putting these qualities into operation.

According to a study by Williams and Chainbless (1990) clients who viewed their therapist as self-

confident tended to benefit the most from therapy. Wiggins and Giles (1984) reported that clients who

had relatively positive levels of self-esteem tended to lose self-confidence when treated by counselors

who had low self-esteem. Clearly, there is a relationship between therapist characteristics and treatment

outcomes. The self as instrument concept helps to explain why the attempt to distinguish between

effective and ineffective helping professionals on the basis of knowledge, methods, or techniques falters.

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Each therapist develops his or her own best ways to use one’s self to forward the therapeutic process. The

value of a particular theoretical position, according to Combs (1989), is that it provides a frame of

reference for the effective use of self Success or failure as therapist is dependent on the use of his or her

self as a catalyst for client change.

Learning to use the self as instrument might be facilitated by accepting the model proposed by

Rogers (1959) which maintains: (1) the communication of congruence, empathic understanding and non-

judgmental respect are necessary and sufficient psychotherapist activities, (2) that self-actualization is the

motivation for human activity, (3) that each individual has the capacity for self-actualization, and (4) each

therapeutic relationship is a creative and unique process. While there are elements beyond these four

assumptions that would necessarily be included in a professional training program for psychotherapists

(ethical practice, social concerns, professional issues, analysis of theories, etc.), the emphasis should be

on the values, attitudes, and self-beliefs of the therapist as reflected in his or her conduct Counselor

training is to be regarded as a continuous, evolving process of self-discovery and self-actualization. The

goal of this training is to develop professional helpers with the strength and maturity to focus on the self

of the client, as opposed to focusing on various techniques or skills. Whatever techniques and skills the

humanistically-oriented therapist chooses to use evolves from his or her personality and are in response to

the particular problems, requests, and style of the client. As Bozarth (1990) cautions, techniques should

emerge in the blending of therapist and client, otherwise they distract attention from the self of the client.

Techniques should occur out of the relationship of the therapist’s self with the client self

The Interdependent Relationship

The goal of the therapist is to form a partnership with the client based on trust. Clients will disclose

their deeper selves only if they are assured that the therapist will use this information for their benefit. It is

this “I-Thou” trusting relationship beautifully described by Martin Buber (1937) that is the heart of

humanistic psychotherapy.

Trust is based on the interdependence of human beings. As Rogers (1958) explained,

psychotherapy based on withholding oneself as a person and dealing with others as objects does not have

a high probability of success. The element of trust is established in an inviting pattern of action, as

opposed to a single act. Establishing this pattern of trust takes time, and so patience is a vital commodity

for therapists.

Trust is established and maintained tlirough sources identified by Arceneaux (1994). These sources

include reliability (consistency, dependability, and predictability), genuineness (authenticity and

congruence), truthfulness (honesty, correctness of opinion, and validity of assertions), intent (good

character, ethical stance, and integrity) and competence (intelligent behavior, expertness, and knowledge).

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The therapist’s self is manifested in each of these sources.

The Therapeutic Process

To date, only a few controlled studies have reported involving the self in psychological disorders

(Emmelkanip, 1994). Studies that looked at such disorders as depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emory,

1979), alcoholism and substance abuse (Hull & Schnurr, 1986), anorexia and bulimia (Garner and Garner

1986) report modest results. While there is no clear evidence that either cognitive, behavioral, or

self-interventions are superior in explaining improvements, there are promising results using multifaceted

self-controlled programs such as self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and self-reinforcing activities. Taken

together, there is growing evidence that self-control programs may be of value in treating psychological

disorders.

What is increasingly clear, as Emmelkamp (1994) noted: “the quality of the therapeutic relationship

may be influential in determining success or failure in behavioral therapies, although well-controlled

studies in this area are rare” (p, 416-417).

Past reviews of research on the therapeutic process report relatively few differences in outcome

variables among various approaches to psychotherapy (Bergin & Garfield, 1994). It now appears that

there are common therapeutic factors in very different forms of psychotherapy that contribute to

comparable outcomes. Among these may be the opportunity to express deep feelings, the creation of

hope, the trying out of new solutions to one’s problems, the modification of cognitions, and a genuine

caring relationship (Sexton & Whiston, 1991.)

As Brodley and Brody (1990) pointed out, skills and techniques of some sort are intrinsic to all

therapy practice. There is evidence that therapists can use interactive teclmiques in empathic, self-

discovery relationships, while demonstrating positive regard and focusing on the client’s concerns, and

can be successful. The skills used by therapists who view the self as the center-piece in professional

helping are in many ways similar to the competencies used in other models. Among these common skills

are listening, paraphrasing, reflecting, focusing, structuring, confronting, interpreting, and summarizing.

However, there are two qualities that are of particular value to the self-therapist in working with clients:

intentionality and empathy.

Intentionality

The concept of intentionality in professional helping was first introduced by Rollo May in 1969. He

viewed intentionality as a major variable related to successful therapy. May described intentionality as the

ability to link inner consciousness with intentions and overt behaviors. By this definition, intentionality:

Page 16 of 26

“is not to be identified with intentions, but it is the dimension which underlies them; it is man’s 224).

Intentionality, as May defined it, has implications for the qualities of caring and empathy as well as for

the qualities of direction and purpose. Intentionality allows therapists to form intentions based on their

self-perceptions.

After a long period of neglect, the construct of intentionality has been rediscovered as a vital

variable in professional functioning (Purkey & Schmidt, 1996). This intentionality enables therapists to

generate alternative helping behaviors in varied situations, have options readily available to respond to the

client’s needs, and to utilize these responses to help clients in their efforts to develop a healthy self (Ivey

& Simek-Downing, 1980; Ivey, 1994).

Empathy

Empathy is the ability to see the world through the eyes of the client. This primary skill is at the

center of the therapeutic process. Empathy is so important that Rogers (1958, 1959)named it first among

his three necessary and sufficient conditions for professional helping. He and others (Greenberg, Rice &

Elliot, 1994; Purkey & Schmidt, 1996) regarded empathy as the basis for everything that happens in

therapy.

To be empathically sensitive to the hidden self of the client is necessary to “read behavior

backwards” (Combs, Avila & Purkey, 1978). By paying close attention to a client’s verbal, paraverbals,

and non-verbal behavior (e.g. mannerisms, expressions), it is possible to construct significant parts of the

client’s self. Developing the ability to read behavior backwards is not a matter or learning a new skill or

technique, but of intentionally striving to do it with greater sensitivity and accuracy. Everyone makes

inferences regarding the self (a yawn indicates the need for sleep, or perhaps the presence of boredom),

but a professional counselor works to do it more effectively, with greater precision.

Reading behavior backwards is based on inference which, in the minds of some scholars, is risky

business. The concern is valid, for reading behavior backwards is subjective and open to distortion. Yet,

there are ways to use the therapist’s self as an instrument for making hypotheses, which can be tested and

refined. (Combs, Avila & Purkey, 1978). In sum, the making of inferences based on careful observation is

scientifically respectable.

Finally, reading behavior backwards has importance beyond its value for understanding the self of

the client. Listening, accepting, and reflecting back to the client his or her personal world is paying the

highest of compliments. The therapist is conveying the message to the client that he or she is important

and significant The therapist is saying “I care about you and your feelings.” In the case of clients

suffering with feelings of worthlessness and self-doubt, the therapist who truly listens, accepts, and

reflects feelings is doing far more than communicating, for empathy itself is a therapeutic experience.

Page 17 of 26

There is widespread belief among many therapists that empathy on the part of the therapist is inherently

curative (Bohart, 1988, 1990; Brodley & Brody, 1990). The process of combining intentionality with

empathy to invite client openness is critical to successful therapy. A way to encourage client openness

through counselor intentionality has been outlined by Gerber (1986) under the title “responsive therapy.”

It has been reduced by Purkey, Mandsager and Shoffner (1998) into the acronym SHARE (Starting,

Hearing, Accepting, Reflecting, Enhancing).

Starting

Starting is essential in structuring the beginning of the SHARE process. Gerber (1986) describes

this as an “indirect lead.” Any statement that invites the client to disclose oneself, such as “Tell me about

yourself’ or “Describe what’s going on inside yourself’ can start the disclosing process. The client talks

and the therapist listens. The client determines the direction, and the therapist follows.

Typically, when a client is invited to disclose, he or she will respond with “What do you want to

know?” In the SHARE approach this is the moment of truth for it determines the role of the client and

therapist in terms of who determines the content, direction, speed, and sequence of the therapeutic

process. This is a critical juncture because it is tempting for the therapist to give direction. When this

happens, the communication has shifted from what the client has to disclose to what the therapist wants to

hear. The danger at this moment is that the client becomes dependent on the therapist to ask questions and

provide direction. Should this happen, the therapy can quickly turn into “20 questions” with the therapist

determining the content of disclosure through considerable (and laborious) effort.

As explained by Greenberg, Elliot and Lietaer (1994), it is important that therapists avoid factors

that hinder the therapeutic process. These factors include therapist intrusiveness or pressure and the

tendency of clients to be deferential to the therapist. To avoid the “20 questions” game, when the therapist

is asked, “What do you want to know?” he or she simply turns the question around with something like,

“You choose” or “I’m not sure, so share whatever you wish.” Although the client selection process will

be accompanied by tentativeness, hesitativeness, and obliqueness, it is likely that the client will select a

topic that is salient and most on his or her mind. This initial self-disclosing process is critical in

determining the remainder of the self-discovery and self-actualizing journey.

At a more general level, sometimes the client will assume that she or he has disclosed enough about

oneself and will stop talking. If the therapist is unsure what is being communicated, it is helpful to invite

further disclosure through an additional indirect lead (“Please tell me more so that I can understand.” Or

“Please say more about that something in you that does not know what to do.”) A useful means of

furthering self-disclosure is to ask for an example (i.e., “Please give me an illustration.”). By eliciting an

example, the therapist receives additional information and has an enhanced opportunity to understand the

Page 18 of 26

self of the client.

The indirect lead also communicates to the client that he or she is one’s highest authority. As

Purkey and Schmidt (1996) noted, each individual is responsible for his or her own existence: No matter

how much a client may want the therapist to take over, and no matter how much the therapist tries to

guide the client’s decisions, the reality is that the client is responsible for his or her life. At the same time,

the therapist has the responsibility for encouraging self-development and autonomy and respecting that

autonomy. Through indirect leads in “Start,” the therapist communicates respect for the client’s self-

directing powers.

Hearing

To listen means to make a conscious and sustained effort to really ~ what the client is

communicating. This includes what he or she is ~ saying. Gerber (1986) wrote of cues which include tone

of voice, facial expressions, sighs, verbal inflection, and body language.

An important part of hearing is the “funneling” process described by Gerber (1986). The larger end

of the funnel represents generally connotative and imprecise sharing that the client uses to keep self-

disclosure at a safe and superficial level. As the therapist implements the skills set forth in SHARE, the

disclosure process becomes more precise, and the therapist’s understanding is increased. The smaller end

of the funnel represents authentic self-disclosure free of superficial content.

Gerber (1986) suggested that the therapeutic process begins at the top of the funnel. As the therapist

practices SHARE, the client expresses more meaningful messages and genuine concerns as pictured by

Figure 2.

Now that the process of Starting and Hearing skills have been presented, progressing down the

funnel involves the remaining SHARE skills of Accepting, Reflecting, and Enhancing. Accenting

Acceptance is a therapeutic stance of genuine, non-judgmental, consistent acceptance and tolerance

for all aspects of the client (Rogers, 1958, 1959).

Accepting what the client is saying is without interrupting, persuading, sympathizing, or expressing

judgment can be a challenge for some therapists. It is tempting to debate a client’s statements that are

self-defeating, self-debasing, and that fly in the face of fact and logic. But this debate threatens self-

disclosure. No matter how much the therapist might disagree with the client, no matter how offensive the

communication might be, the therapist accepts what is being communicated. Acceptance is not the same

as agreement. The therapist can accept the fact that the client maintains that the world is “out to get me,”

that “my life is hopeless” and that “I am worthless,” without agreeing with these self-statements. This

stance of acceptance helps the therapist to further understand the client’s perception of oneself and

enhances the sharing of self. Patterson and Hidore (1997) expressed acceptance of client’s feelings this

way:

Page 19 of 26

The therapist must remember that clients come to therapy because they have problems, negative

feelings such as hate and fear, and to some extent a negative self-concept. Their low opinions of

themselves are not (usually) simply a misperception or unrealistic — there is some basis in reality. They

are failing to be their best selves, to be self actualizing persons. To deny the client’s feelings that this is

the case is not to help clients but to prevent them from going on to recognize the positive aspects of

themselves and their situations. (p. 135).

The role of the therapist is to make the journey with the client, to face the worst, then to begin the

rebuilding of self-understanding and self-worth.

Funneling Process

Authentic Self-disclosure and Exploration

Figure 2

Reflecting

Psychotherapy is an interdependent and interactive process. Connecting listening with caring and

appropriate responding facilitates the therapeutic process by mutually confirming the understanding that

has taken place. At appropriate moments, as the client begins to share, the therapist paraphrases in fewer

and more precise terms. Paraphrasing is a highly effective communication tool, for it lets the client know

that listening has taken place. It also allows the therapist to interrupt the client without generating

resistance.

Page 20 of 26

Two examples of reflection come to mind. The first example is of a young boy undergoing

counseling:

C: My Mom and Dad do everything just right. It’s hard to grow up in a world of perfect people. In response the therapist reflected with: T: Your parents and others are perfect, and you have a hard time measuring up. The second, a

woman in therapy said: C: My brother is smoking pot and I’m afraid what will happen to him. I know he’ll get caught. I

want to tell someone about what he’s doing, but I’m afraid something bad will happen if I tell.

T: You are worried about your brother using drugs and you want to let someone know. This

scares you.

Reflecting is a very popular response mode for client-centered therapists. For example, 72 percent

of all client-centered therapist responses were reflections. (Elliot, Hill, Stiles, Friedlander, Mahrer and

Margison, 1987.) Reflection of feeling is valuable for both conveying empathy and encouraging further

self-exploration. It is also useful in clarifying what the counselor thinks is being communicated.

Enhancing

Enhancing skills are geared toward broadening the client’s frame of reference and are selectively

used by the therapist in responding to the client. Silence is a period of quiet pause implemented for

reflection on the part of both client and therapist. Although verbal communication may not be occurring,

non-verbals are always evident and significant. The presence of silence can cause some tension, which

may summon the client to break the silence and perhaps move further down the funnel of self-disclosure.

For example, the therapist might say: “You are being very quiet.” Or “Tell me what you are feeling.”

Again, the therapist avoids interrogation and allows the client to choose, ~ ~ and ~ she or he will

self-disclose.

A second way of enhancing is through perception checking. As Gerber (1986) explained: Almost

all replies by the client permit the therapist to test, “check,” validate his/her perceptions” (p. 124-125).

This checking might take the form of:

“Let me see if I understand what you’ve told me.”

“Tell me if I am correct in what you’ve shared.”

“Correct me if I am wrong.”

The effect of these and other therapist statements is to let the client know that he or she has been

listened to, and invite the client to hear, evaluate, and respond to the therapist’s statement.

Reflecting through perception checking also assists the therapist to avoid misunderstanding. For

example:

Page 21 of 26

C: My wife is driving me crazy! Sometimes I feel like knocking the hell out of her. T: You get so mad you could kill her. C: No, nothing like that! I love my wife. I would never hurt her, really.

The value of enhancing is to invite the client to go over what he or she has been sharing and to keep

the therapist on track.

The value of the SHARE process is that it simplifies the complexity of therapy into a method for

hearing, accepting, and reflecting the thoughts and feelings of the client It is a greatly simplified version

of “Responsive Therapy” (Gerber, 1986.)

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the notion that the use of self is an essential element in psychotherapy.

The nature of self, a brief history of self, contemporary research, and the use of self in psychotherapy

were outlined.

Future directions in humanistic psychotherapy focusing on the self are difficult to predict. Hutterer,

Pawlowsky, Schmid, and Stipsits (1996) reported an ever increasing diversity of client-centered therapy

and practice, making future developments unpredictable. What is clear is that there is a pressing need for

more research on experiential and related self-oriented therapy. Very little research on humanistic

treatments has been done during the past decade. Meanwhile, the search for self in psychotherapy is a

fragile and delicate adventure, where clients and therapists work together in a voyage to the center of the

self.

With hundreds of studies of entries under the listing of the representative topic “self-concept”

appearing each year, this chapter holds no hope of providing a comprehensive coverage. What does seem

clear from emerging research is the current accuracy and relevance of Seeman’s statement first made in

1957:

Therapy is not only a process of self-discovery, but also one of self definition. A person not lonely learns who he [or she] is like, but also to identify more clearly his [or her] own self boundaries, to differentiate more clearly between self and non-self. (1957, p. 29)

It is now abundantly clear that the self has a primary role to play in humanistic psychotherapy, for it

is this self that guides human conduct.

Page 22 of 26

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