The security system at Europeanairports—Tour d’Horizon

Jolanta Rekiel & Jaap de Wit

Received: 15 January 2013 /Accepted: 21 January 2013 /Published online: 2 February 2013# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract This paper aims to provide an analysis of the existing security system atEuropean airports. At first, the security is defined and the considerations of the airpassenger security on the ground and in the air are discussed. Subsequently, currentaspects shaping the European aviation security policy are introduced. The analysis ofstakeholders and their roles in aviation security is presented. The passengers’ per-spective is of special focus. Next, security measures such as physical securitymeasures and personnel are presented while specific issues such as technologydeployment, standards and passenger acceptance are discussed in the Europeancontext. New concept for security is introduced. The analysis conducted leads us tothe conclusions. The existing security system at European airports is rather reactivethan proactive. The new concepts rely heavily on technological developments while itis crucial to increase the focus on intelligence gathering and passenger experience.Based on the identified gaps in the existing literature, further research should focus onCBA of European aviation security system as well as human drivers of (in)security.

Keywords Security . Airport . Passenger . System

Introduction

Since 9/11 the security of air passengers has become a major concern in manycountries, including the European Union Member States. The national governmentsas well as the European Commission have taken a number of steps to ensure

J Transp Secur (2013) 6:89–102DOI 10.1007/s12198-013-0105-3

J. Rekiel (*)Faculty of Economics & Business, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlandse-mail: J.M.Rekiel@uva.nl

J. de WitFaculty of Economics & Business, Department of Business Studies, University of Amsterdam,Amsterdam, The Netherlandse-mail: J.G.deWit@uva.nl

passenger security both at airports and in the sky. Nevertheless, security incidentshappen occasionally. This has significant implications on air traffic, revenues andcosts of airports and airlines, implemented security measures and feelings of(in)security. The regulation is often adapted as a response to the occurring events.The airports implement new measures and take new precautions. They spend millionsof Euros on security equipment and security staff to ensure security at airports and inthe sky. Passengers have to follow the rules and spend more time at security checksthan ever before. With every security incident that receives enough attention from themedia, the passenger traffic drops. After a rather short period of time, however, thepassenger traffic returns to the level reached before the incident. Nevertheless, inorder to prevent future security incidents, the decision makers react strongly to newthreats and impose new rules and security measures only after the incidents take place(reactive policy). These, unlike rather short periods of drop in traffic, are imple-mented for months or years. In other words, the new role of governments is notdesigned to intervene in airline economic decisions but it rather contributes to long-term structural change in the aviation security (Bailey 2002).

Traffic from/to and within Europe concerns the second most important air transportmarket after the US. The European airports handle nowadays approximately 400millionair arrivals per year. This will most probably increase further in the next years. Accord-ing to a number of long term forecasts (Airbus Company 2011; Boeing Company 2011),the passenger air traffic as well as the air cargo traffic are expected to grow in the comingyears. The growth for Europe, as compared to other world destinations, is rathermoderate but steady. This growth might evoke consequences such as inefficiencies(queues, transfer time, lost connections), increased pressure on security staff, overalldeterioration of passengers experience (Boeing Company 2011). Additional challengesmight come not only from the increased passenger demand within Europe but also fromarrivals from rest of the world (RoW). There are more than 300 million passengerscrossing the EU borders via air travel each year (160 EU nationals, 140 third countrynationals - TCN) (Frontex 2011). Top four EU hub airports (Charles de Gaulle, Fraport,Heathrow & Schiphol) handled approximately 90 million transfer passengers in 2011.There are approximately 600 airports in the whole EU. The cargo growth figures havebeen even higher in the last years. It is expected that the freight traffic will nearly tripleover the next 20 years due to international trade expansion and express freight devel-opment in China, India & Brazil (Airbus Company 2011).

Aviation is the most regulated mode of transport. This is also the case from the pointof view of passenger and cargo security. Aviation security is usually broken down intothree main building blocks: technology, process and people. The existing and appliedapproach towards security goes back to the 1970’s. Over the last years the main focuswas put on the technology with less attention on process and people (IATA 2012). Thegovernments as well as the aviation operators underline the need for re-thinking theexisting security approach. Terrorists find more elaborate and unpredictable ways todisrupt aviation operations. There is, therefore, a strong need to ensure a balancedcombination of measures that would include all three elements (IATA 2012). While itcan be observed that security has been strengthened in terms of specific regulation,equipment and procedures, it is important to know whether the existing measures arefocussed on areas most relevant to maintaining high security levels. In order toestablish that, the existing security system in aviation is analysed in this paper.

90 J. Rekiel, J. Wit

Safety vs. security

The term ‘safety’ differs significantly from the term ‘security’. Safety addresses allthe unintentional acts that may result in undesirable situations. These include forexample aircraft deviation from the assigned path resulting from malfunctioning of aspecific part as a result of an unintentional mistake during aircraft maintenance.Safety incorporates a set of regulations, procedures, rules and processes to ensurepassenger safe travel. On the other hand ‘security’ can be associated with intentionalharmful acts against civil aviation or using civil aviation. Detailed statistics onsecurity incidents are rather scarce and, due to the sensitive nature of the subject,they are not publicly available. It is known, however, that the data on securityincidents collected by the airlines and airports includes not only the terrorist actionsbut also incidents related to for example unruly passengers. Terms safety and securitydiffer but, at the same time, are very closely linked. For example, typical radarsystems installed at various airports have the capabilities of detecting the exactposition and altitude of commercial aircraft, general aviation aircraft and helicopters.They are unable, however, to detect small flying objects such as new generationunmanned flying objects. The new generation of radars having such capabilities iscurrently under development for the civil use (Sinbad project 2010). Such new radarswould encompass both safety and security features.

A ‘security accident’ is not equal to a ‘security incident’. A ‘security accident’ isan accident that caused by an act of terrorism, violence or sabotage of civil aircraft. A‘security incident’, however, is a situation in which a ‘security accident’ almosthappened. There are various types of security incidents which depend on theirseriousness and impacts on the involved stakeholders and their operations. It shouldbe noted that the probability of occurrence of security incidents is higher than theprobability of occurrence of security accidents. Additionally, it is important tomention that the number and severity of security accidents is different each yeardue to the low frequency of their occurrence and their specific characteristics. Thismeans that the same number of aircraft movements might result in a different numberand impact of accidents even when the security level remains the same. In a riskassessment approach, the security level is seen as a risk level with a certain proba-bility of accidents.

Air vs. ground

The aviation security does not only include the security checkpoint which all airpassengers are familiar with but it also includes a considerable number of other layers(TSA 2012; IATA 2012). Security layers include a number of measures which areimplemented both on the ground as well as in the air. A passenger traveling frompoint A to point B has to go through a series of steps to get to her or his destination.The United States’ Transport Security Administration (TSA) has developed a layerapproach to aviation security. This approach underlines the variety and unpredict-ability of security measures. TSA Layers of Security include among others intelli-gence gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists,federal air marshals, etc. This list is not exclusive. Each of the layers applied may

The security system at European airports—Tour d’Horizon 91

stop a security incident. In a holistic approach, these security layers combined create astronger system and contribute to higher security levels. The European model is basedon the ‘onion’ approach which defines various security layers encompassing otherlayers. Each of the layers of the ‘onion’ includes a number of security measures.Within the TSA approach the layers are not put on top of one another but ratherimplemented in different configurations in the overall security system. A combinedapproach of these two models is presented at Fig. 1.

The so called ‘Onion’ or ‘Layered Security’ approaches promoted by the aviationstakeholders express their view on the importance of enhanced coordination andinformation sharing between stakeholders. Additionally, airport processes includingsecurity, safety and border control related processes should be better integrated inorder to reach these goals. Abeyratne (2010), Sweet (2008), and Frimpong (2011)research privacy concerns in security. These as well as other issues such as passengername record (PNR),1 biometrics, certification and conformity assessment of technol-ogies (list non exhaustive) should be taken into account.

Quality of security & time

Security can be breached even in the extensively regulated sector such as aviation.Security incidents trigger the policy makers and the industry to develop and imple-ment new security measures and regulations. A very relevant example is the UK/USairline bombing plot in August 2006. A terrorist attempted to get liquids on the planein order to build an improvised explosive device (IED). Only a few days later the EC(and TSA) banned the passengers from taking any liquids, gels and aerosols on boardof aircraft in their carry-on luggage. Shortly afterwards, this ban was lifted andreplaced by a regulation enabling the passengers to enter airports and aircraft withliquids, gels and aerosols in containers of maximum 100 ml and in total not exceeding1,000 ml stored in a plastic bag. The regulation was prepared in a very short period oftime. The airports and security agents were not prepared for this. With its implemen-tation, the duration of the security check process was extended significantly andaffected (in a short term) the operations of many airports. For example in 2006security was a primary departure delay cause in 2–3% of the overall causes in Europewhile for some more busy airports it was the cause of up to 8% of delays (Eurocontrol2007). August was an exceptional month where extended duration of security checkswas a major cause of delays in Europe. The temporary ban on liquids was planned tobe resolved by the new technological inventions enabling to verify the chemicalcomposition of the liquids carried by passengers in an efficient and reliable way. Thetechnological development, driven by such incidents takes time. After the potentialsolution is invented, it has to be tested against strict criteria (that have to bedeveloped). Finally, the equipment needs to get the passenger acceptance. Neverthe-less, despite the technological innovations provided by the industry, the regulation

1 Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA is an agreement between the EU and the US that enables totransfer and process 19 pieces of Passenger Name Record data by air carriers to the US Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) , the information includes for example names, traveldates, full itinerary, billing and baggage data.

92 J. Rekiel, J. Wit

originally designed to be only temporary, is still in place more than 5 years later.There is no comprehensive solution implemented in the whole EU. It proves that a lotof time is needed to develop thorough security measures and adequate legal provi-sions to enable the adequate response to a particular threat. The current securitysystem at European airports is effective but also reactive.

The regulators and manufacturers need to develop smarter and more efficientaviation security devices and measures that can adapt to emerging threats andevolving passenger and cargo volumes. IATA stresses the importance of next-gentechnology and equipment (IATA 2012). The focus, however, should be put not onlyon equipment but on enhancing the flexibility of the overall security system andoperational procedures (Jacobson et al. 2009) and enhanced cooperation of peoplefrom different stakeholder groups (Bemosa project 2011).

The technology deployment differs per country and per airport. As a result, someairports can be the weaker point in the overall European security system. A stream-lined technology deployment should be, therefore, ensured (IATA 2012). Anotheraspect of ensuring the high security levels is the certification and conformity assess-ment of security equipment against common standards. This, however, needs furtherdevelopment (Ecorys 2011; IATA 2012). Producers often have to validate the sameequipment against different standards in different countries. This can effect in delaysin deployment of the new technologies. In some cases, airports cannot fully check theperformance of the equipment as they do not have full access to the testing kits or theclassified annexes of regulations (based on interview conducted with a SecurityBureau Director at one of the European Airports).

Fig. 1 Onion approach to security layers. Source: Based on TSA Layers of Security and IATA, 2011

The security system at European airports—Tour d’Horizon 93

Stakeholders role in security

There are various stakeholders involved in the aviation industry and some playa more important role with respect to maintaining high security levels thanothers. A passenger is one element of this system, it should be, however, themost important one.

Airport and ANSP

The role of the airport and air navigation service providers (ANSPs) is crucial inmaintaining high security levels in aviation. A potential security incident that happensat an airport or affects the air traffic control (ATC) can have disastrous consequencesboth in terms of the number of people potentially affected as well as the impact on theoperations and industry. It is the airport where a potential security threat can bedetected and a person with malicious intentions can be prevented and apprehended. Itis also the airport where an aircraft security breach attempt can be prevented. Due tothe presence of security officers, police forces, border control and other relevantexperts in one place, the airport enables their efficient cooperation and swift reaction.It is also the airport where the overall security of aircraft is maintained, including theground handling operations, safety checks, maintenance and repairs. It is important tonote that in order to maintain high security levels within the European aviationsystem, well-functioning security systems at airports and ATC outside the EU arecrucial. Passengers arriving in Europe from outside the EC need to go through asecurity check at the airport of departure. The European security system is, therefore,highly dependent on the functioning of security systems implemented at airportsoutside the EU. A leakage in the system somewhere at an airport for example inYemen will affect security for example at the airport in Amsterdam. In 2009 a youngpassenger of Nigerian origin, Mr Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, booked a flight fromLagos, Nigeria to Detroit, US with a transfer at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. Hepassed the security check in Lagos and arrived in the Netherlands. Later, he boardedthe plane headed for the US. The passenger had explosives hidden in his underwearand made an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the aircraft with 290 people on board.This horrifying serious security incident shows the importance of security at everyairport being part of the overall aviation network. The airport belongs to a system ofnodes, each of them being the most important place in the overall security system.

Airline and aircraft

Airlines have to follow a number of rules, procedures and agreements including theseon security. Airlines are obliged to prepare security plans which they have to submitto the national civil aviation authorities. They are not obliged, however, to presentthem to the airports. They also implement, according to the regulations or voluntarilyin selected cases, a number of security measures such as hardened cockpit door orflight marshals. The airline personnel is well trained in the matters of security. In caseof the so called “underwear bomber” it was the personnel and passengers that putdown the fire and apprehended the attempted bomber. The airline and the aircraft playan important role in the aviation security system.

94 J. Rekiel, J. Wit

Security agent

Security agent at an airport plays a crucial role in ensuring high levels ofsecurity. Security agents at various airports have a slightly different functionand can be organized differently but they all perform the same role. At manyairports in Europe the airport operators engage in agreements with privatesecurity companies that perform these activities. The examples can be foundin the Netherlands or Spain. On the other hand, the security services can beprovided by the military. The defence and security policies of selectedcountries, including France and Poland clearly indicate that this is the military(or its dedicated units) that perform these tasks. They have specialized militarytraining and experience and, on top of that, they have additional legal power touse weapons or other resources when required. As private security agents havebeen performing their duties in a satisfactory manner at many airports, and, astheir presence at airports is conditionally based on winning a specific tender,they can also be cheaper than the military. It is a reason for selected countriesto reconsider the applicability of the military forces as security agents atairports. For example the Border Guards (part of military forces) are currentlyresponsible for security checks at Polish Airports. It is expected that in the nearfuture private security agents will be responsible for provision of securityservices at airports in Poland. This also concerns the costs of individual airportswhich is a competitive issue in airport benchmarking (see airport chargesbenchmark (SEO Economisch Onderzoek 2008)).

Ground handling

Ground handling services include airport services necessary for handling theaircraft, passengers and baggage. These include aircraft fuelling, catering andcleaning, push back, de-icing, etc. These services are provided by specializedground handling companies. Their personnel and procedures meet varioussecurity standards and their proper and on time functioning is crucial to airlineand airport operations. Baggage handling and cargo handling, however, areservices critical from the point of view of maintaining high security levels inaviation. The passenger baggage handling is integrated with other services forhandling civil passenger flights. The cargo handling, however, is handledseparately (but can be loaded on civil passenger aircraft as well). Passengeraviation security is well organized and regulated. The procedures are wellestablished and used widely. Cargo handling, however, is a relatively newand fast developing market that still requires further development in terms ofsecurity measures applied. It is important to note that these measures andprocedures need not only to be applied at European airports but also at airportsoutside the EU where goods are loaded on board of aircraft in order to bebrought to Europe. Only in October 2010 there was a plot which included twobombs placed on two cargo aircraft headed from Yemen to the US. Fortunately,the bombs were discovered during stopovers in UK and in Dubai and a tragedywas avoided. This shows the importance of ground handling agents in main-taining high security levels in the overall aviation system.

The security system at European airports—Tour d’Horizon 95

Security measures

Security measures deployed and implemented at various airports in Europe includenot only physical security measures visible to the passenger but also security person-nel, specific processes and procedures as well as other measures such as paperlessboarding pass or sniffing dogs (non-exhaustive list).

Physical security measures

Equipment used for maintaining or increasing aviation security levels is part ofphysical security measures. The equipment in place includes technologies used forboth disruptive security and continuous security (Ecorys 2011). The typical examplesof equipment categorized as serving disruptive security in aviation includes X-rays,bottled liquid (and gel) scanners, explosive detection systems, explosives tracedetection, biometrics, imaging technology (so called security scanners or bodyscanners), etc. Some of them, such as X-rays, are relatively well established andcommonly used all over the world. Examples of equipment used for maintainingcontinuous security are camera systems.

Imaging technology (so called security scanners or more often named ‘bodyscanners’ by the media), however, is deployed for tests at selected airports in Europeonly. Formal trials of Security Scanners as a primary method for screening passengerswere done in Finland, UK, in the Netherlands, France and Italy. The use of thistechnology is fragmented in Europe. The technology is capable of detecting a widerange of threats to transportation security. Its usage has been extensively debated inmedia and many issues regarding potential impact on health and privacy issues arestill under discussion. Additionally, the EC expressed its concerns in its Communi-cation from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Useof Security Scanners at EU airports of the 15 June 2010. Currently there are commonrules in the field of aviation security in Europe2 but there are no common Europeanstandards for the use of security scanners at airports. There are two main types ofimaging technology—millimetre wave (passive and active) and backscatter (X-rayand X-ray transmission). There are also a few new technological developments undertests and development. Both millimetre wave and backscatter have been approved assafe for passengers in the USA and meet American health and safety standards (TSA2012). They also form part of the American layered security approach. In Europe,however, after a long period of tests, following the Commission Implementingregulation (EU) No 1147/2011 of 11 November 2011 amending Regulation (EU)No 185/2010 implementing the common basic standards on civil aviation security asregards the use of security scanners at EU airports, the security scanners which do notuse ionising radiation have been accepted to be used at EU airports (in line with theImpact Assessment on the possible use of security scanners at EU airports). The final

2 Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security (OJ L 355, 30.12.2002) lays downEuropean common standards for aviation security. Other relevant documents include the Annex 17 of theChicago Convention. For further harmonization of the European rules, additional acts of implementinglegislation were implemented. The ‘One-stop security’ in the European Union is a result of the commonregulatory framework.

96 J. Rekiel, J. Wit

approval of the X-ray backscatter and X-ray transmission imaging technology in theEU has been postponed until the impacts on human health are researched and thetechnology is confirmed to be safe.

Biometric security measures include retinal scans that enable identification ofpersons based on a unique set of identifiers such as fingerprints and iris scans. Thedevelopment of these technologies is very recent (TSA 2012). This technology is stillunder development and in the testing phase (deployed at a number of UK airports).

Bottled liquid scanner (BLS) screening systems are used for medically necessaryliquids as well as liquids and gels at small quantities transported by passengers(deployed and tested at selected airports). The next generation BLS use light wavesto screen sealed containers for liquid explosives.

Explosive detection systems (EDS) are used for screening passenger checked inand carry-on luggage. EDS equipment captures images of each bag and checks if abaggage contains items that could be a potential threat. In case the system identifiessuch a potential threat, the bag is checked by security officers at the airport at stake. Incase a threat is confirmed, dedicated forces might have to be called in to prevent asecurity accident. At many European airports, especially hubs, these systems areautomated. The industry is working on the development of new more efficienttechnologies having more detecting capabilities.

Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) is technology used in order to detect traces ofexplosives both on baggage as well as on passengers. ETD is extensively used atmany European airports and is part of the security onion approach as well as the layerapproach used in the USA (TSA 2012).

People

Aviation security relies on well trained and thoroughly selected people. Dedicatedsecurity staff working at airports is the selected group that assesses the risks, operatessecurity equipment, etc. The security staff is crucial for maintaining high aviationsecurity levels. It is not, however, the only group upon which the security relies. Allpeople working for various aviation stakeholders are also important part of the securitysystem. The personnel of ground handling agents, the airport services employees, theairline employees have all basic training on security aspects and specific issues relatingto their specific jobs. The Bemosa study aims at optimizing security and saving costs byminimizing false alarms and maximizing continuity of airport operations (Bemosaproject 2011). The preliminary results of the study stress the importance of developmentof realistic training based on the actual behaviour in “normal” and “crisis” situations aswell as better match between procedures and the actual behaviour.

Passengers do not receive any security training. Being alert and resistant, however,can become crucial in preventing a security accident. According to (Smith 2007), thepassenger is the single security layer that is not costly and can prevent a repetition ofevents such as 9/11 accidents.

Other measures

The paperless boarding pass is a pilot project tested by selected major Europeanairports and airlines. The system enables the passengers to use their mobile phones or

The security system at European airports—Tour d’Horizon 97

personal digital assistants (PDAs) to present their boarding pass in an electronic form.This system enables the passengers to save paper and time needed for printing theboarding pass and increases the ability to detect fraudulent boarding passes.

Threat Image Projection (TIP) is used throughout European airports. The securitystaff is tested on a daily basis whether they can detect explosives or weapons with theuse of X-rays. This is done in order to make sure that the security staff is alert anddoes not fall into a routine trap. This provides additional basis for the assessment ofstaff as well as a continuous improvement of the system.

Sniffing dogs are one more element in the overall system that is used to maintainhigh security levels. They are trained to detect not only drugs but also explosivematerials.

Technology deployment & standards

As described above, the security system encompasses a number of advanced securitymeasures. The equipment used for security protection differs significantly fromairport to airport and its deployment depends on many factors. The deployment ofequipment throughout airports in Europe is not even. Some airports use and test themost advanced technologies while others use mainly the well-established ones.Different security measures and procedures apply for example for flights to theUSA or Israel from flights within the Schengen zone. The size of the airports differssignificantly and, the time needed for security checks can differ as well. Someairports, therefore, require more advanced technologies in order to be able to handlethe increased number of passengers more efficiently while maintaining high securitylevels. This is often done with the use of the newest technological developments.According to IATA, the acceleration in the deployment of next generation EDS, ETD,X-ray, and magnetometer equipment is key to maintaining high security levels atEuropean airports (IATA 2012).

The equipment implemented at European airports is certified by certificationbodies selected and appointed by the European Civil Aviation Conference(ECAC). For example X-rays have been in use for many years now andstandards and procedures for their use have been extensively tested and estab-lished. As for the new technological developments, such as the imaging tech-nology, the standards are developed by producers while the certifying andconformity assessment bodies test the equipment and verify it against theproducers criteria. However, the users are often unable to confirm the perfor-mance of the equipment as described by producers. Additionally, due to lack ofuniform standards for different countries, the producers often have to adapteach product to the needs of a specific client and certification body. Thisincreases the costs of the product development.

The level of deployment of the new technological developments differs perMember State while “one stop security check” rule applies in the Schengen area ofthe European Union. This is when other security measures play a bigger role to ensurehigh security levels at all European airports. The new technological developments canhelp in maintaining high security levels, while European wide standardization anddeployment is under development.

98 J. Rekiel, J. Wit

Passenger perspective & acceptance

Over time, the security checks of the passengers have become more complex and insome cases longer. While various stakeholders are involved in maintaining highsecurity levels in aviation, the passenger perspective might impact his or her decisionon which airport or mode of transport to choose. In this way security quality andsecurity costs also touch upon the issue of airport competition.

The goal of the airport security officer should be to maintain high security levels aswell as to enable passenger facilitation. Airport security and facilitation is currentlyone of the main topics addressed by IATA, the syndicate of the airlines via itsPassenger Experience Management Group (PEMG) and Airport Council Internation-al (ACI) via its Security Facilitation Committee (IATA 2012).

The passenger acceptance of aviation security measures as well as the passengerprivacy (Abeyratne 2010; Frimpong 2011), have recently been heavily debated in mediawith respect to the newly developed imaging technology. It resulted in the changes in thetechnology and privacy issues related to this technology. As a consequence, the imagesfrom the equipment are nowadays sent to a separate room where a dedicated person canreview them. The images do not show any intimate body parts but enable the detectionof any materials that are placed on or within the body. Finally, the images are not storedfor longer than for the time needed to assess the image. In Europe, the studies on theacceptance of this technology conducted in the UK, NL and Finland show that securityscanners are regarded to be a less intrusive method than the full hand search (EC 2011).It is important, however, that the passengers are satisfied with the services, including thesecurity related processes. The customer satisfaction has been analysed in the literature.According to (Hunter 2011) “smiling customer service within the airline industry buildscustomer loyalty, fosters profits, and helps reduce air rage”. His conclusions are that theoutcomes of his study could be used to construct training programs that supportdeveloping airline personnel in particular areas of customer service, including frontlinestaff, flight attendants, and security personnel. The subject of the risk perception has alsobeen reviewed extensively by Kaplan et al. (1974), Greco (1989), Yates (1992), Slovic(2000). The subject of the passenger perception of the security measures and proceduresin relation with the actual security levels is addressed in a very limited number ofpublicly available scientific articles. A recent research project conducted for the EC(Brück 2007) identifies a number of substantial gaps in the transport security research.Among others these include the human drivers of insecurity.

New concept—checkpoint of the future by IATA

The current security checkpoint concept relies on a number of different securitymeasures while the passenger has to put the liquids together in a plastic bag, takeout his electronic equipment from his carry-on luggage, take off his jacket, shoes, beltor watch, go through a metal detector or other detectors, etc. This process is lengthyand not very enjoyable to the passengers. IATA is currently developing the so called“Checkpoint of the future”. The new concept is based on a three security lanesconcept that would feature embedded screening technologies defined by the levelof risk associated with the passenger (IATA 2012). The passengers who have

The security system at European airports—Tour d’Horizon 99

registered and completed background checks would have expedited access while forthe passengers for whom there is less information available or are at higher risk orhave been randomly selected would have to go through more detailed screening. Thisconcept relies on technology that is currently under development and which wouldenable the travellers to go through automated corridors without the need of taking anyclothes off or putting their luggage on a separate belt for scanning. This conceptwould heavily rely on technology but should increase the passenger experience.

As described by Jacobson et al. (2009), there is a need for designing more flexibleand agile security screening operations, balancing technology and human approachesto security operations, and using intelligence to focus appropriate levels of securityresources on both stopping terrorists and stopping tactics.

Further research

According to IATA, technology used for maintaining high security levels in aviationmust be cost-effective. There is a small number of studies that analyse the economicimpacts and cost effectiveness of selected aviation security measures in the US (Hobijn2002; Stewart andMueller 2008a; USGovernment Accountability Office 2009; Jacksonet al. 2011) and Australia (Stewart andMueller 2008b). There is, however, a very limitednumber of studies that would analyse the costs and the benefits of the European securitymeasures (Akhtar 2010; UK Department for Transport 2010; EC 2011). Ten years after9/11 the aviation industry is not only impacted by increasing fuel prices and environ-mental compensation but also by the increased costs of security. Before 9/11 the overallsecurity costs borne by the airlines and passengers constituted 5–8% of the operatingcosts of the airlines while nowadays they are at the level of 32–35%. According to(Anderson 2006) we do not know much about the costs and the benefits of security.

There is no Cost Benefit Analysis of the security measures and the overall systemconducted so far for Europe. The detailed costs of security in Europe are alsosomehow neglected in the existing literature.

The aviation security can be broken down into the three I’s of screening: Items(threats), Identity (passengers), and Intent (people) (Jacobson and Lee 2010). TheEuropean wide security approach should focus not only on further technologicalimprovements, but be much more oriented on people and flexibility of procedures.

Finally, little is known on the current perspective of passengers on the existingsecurity measures as well as their perception on the current security levels. It isunclear how security accidents and incidents impact the human drivers of (in)security.It is proposed, therefore, to conduct a survey among passengers at one of theEuropean leading airports to analyse the human drivers of insecurity in aviation.

Conclusion

The aviation security system in Europe has developed over time and a comprehensivedevelopment in the future is important. The new concepts are under development.They are, however, heavily based on the technology rather than on people orinformation. The new technological developments can help in maintaining high

100 J. Rekiel, J. Wit

security levels, but it is crucial to ensure equal focus on intelligence gathering as wellas improved passenger experience. With current crisis and budget tightening everypolicy, including the security policy, will come under increased scrutiny to yieldbenefits for the costs made. It is an issue that will be crucial for many years to come,at least until 2020. The costs made and benefits of the EU aviation security measureshave not been thoroughly analysed so far. Before taking future decisions on makingcapital intensive investments, such an analysis should be done. The passengerexperience as well as the perception of (in)security should be analysed and takeninto account in designing the systems and considered in the CBA research.

The terrorist activities enter new areas and become more challenging. The existingsecurity policy in European aviation is rather reactive than proactive. There is a need forflexibility in designing the systems and operations in order to ensure high security levels.

References

Abeyratne (2010) Full body scanners at airports—the balance between privacy and state responsibility. JTransp Secur 3:73–85

Airbus Company (2011) Global market forecast 2011–2030. Airbus CompanyAkhtar JB (2010) Assessing security measures reducing terrorist risk: inverse ex post cost-benefit and cost-

effectiveness analyses of Norwegian airports and seaports. J Transp Secur 3:179–195Anderson T (2006) Terror may be at bay at port; shipping hubs too vulnerable. The Daily News of Los

Angeles, 18 MayBailey EE (2002) Aviation policy: past and present. South Econ J 69(1)Bemosa project (2011) A behavioral model of security in airports, preliminary results. EC FP7 project

BEMOSA. MadridBoeing Company (2011) Current market outlook 2011–2030. BoeingBrück TE (2007) A survey on the economics of security with particular focus on the possibility to create a

network of experts on the economic analysis of terrorism and anti-terror policies and on the interplaybetween the costs of terrorism and of anti-terror measures. DG Justice, Freedom and Security

EC (2011) Impact assessment on the possible use of security scanners at EU airportsEcorys (2011) Security regulation, conformity assessment and certification. DG Enterprise and Industry,

BrusselsEurocontrol (2007) A matter of time: Air traffic delay in Europe. EUROCONTROL Trends in Air Traffic,

https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/content/documents/official-documents/trends-in-air-traffic/tat2-air-traffic-delay-europe-2007.pdf, pp. 2: 14–42

Frimpong (2011) Introduction of full body image scanners at the airports: a delicate balance of protectingprivacy and ensuring national security. J Transp Secur 4:221–229

Frontex (2011) Annual risk analysis (report). p. 4591Greco T (1989) A cognitive-behavioural approach to fear of flying: a practitioner’s guide. Phobia Pract Res

J 2(1):3–15Hobijn B (2002) What will homeland security cost? Econ Pol Rev 8(2):21–33Hunter (2011) A study of consumer perception of smiling customer service within the airline industry. J

Transp Secur 4:35–56IATA (2012) http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety_security/security/Pages/index.aspx. Last entry 1 March

2012Jackson B, Chan E, LaTourrette T (2011) Assessing the security benefits of a trusted traveler program in the

presence of attempted attacker exploitation and compromise. J Transp SecurJacobson S, Lee A (2010) Aviation security in 2030: a glimpse into the future. ORMS Today 37Jacobson S, Lee A, Nikolaev A (2009) Designing for flexibility in aviation security systems. J Transp Secur

2:1–8Kaplan L, Szybillo G, Jacoby J (1974) Components of perceived risk in product purchase: a cross-

validation. J Appl Psychol 59(2):287–291

The security system at European airports—Tour d’Horizon 101

SEO Economisch Onderzoek (2008) Benchmark for airport charges and governmental taxes. DutchDirectorate General for Transport and Civil Aviation, Amsterdam

Sinbad project (2010) Sinbad. ECSlovic PF (2000) Rating the risk. Perception of risk. Earthscan, LondonSmith P (2007) The airport security follies—opinion. New York TimesStewart M, Mueller J (2008a) A risk and cost-benefit assessment of United States aviation security

measures. J Transp Secur 1(3):143–159Stewart M, Mueller J (2008b) A risk and cost-benefit assessment of Australian aviation security measures.

Secur Challenges 4(3):45–61Sweet K (2008) Aviation security and passenger rights. Vol 2. Praeger Security International, Westport

Connecticut, p 45. Aviation Security ManagementTSA (2012) www.tsa.govUK Department for Transport (2010) Impact Assessment on the use of security scanners at UK airportsUS Government Accountability Office (2009) Aviation security: TSA’s cost and performance study of

private-sector airport screening. GAO, Washington, DCYates JS (1992) The risk construct. Risk taking behavior. Wiley, Hoboken

102 J. Rekiel, J. Wit