The schoolboard: Participatory democracy revisited

The Schoolboard: Participatory Democracy Revisited

David E. Kapel and William T. Pink

David E. Kapel is the Associate Dean for Instruction and Re- search at the Uni- versity o f Nebraska at Omaha and Profes- sor in the Depart- ment o f Educational Foundations and Ur- ban Education. His research interests are in the areas o f teacher and student characteristics as related to Urban Edu- cation, In addition, his research is also concerned with school policy development in the f ield o f Urban Education.

William T. Pink is Chairperson and As- sociate Professor o f Educationat Founda- tions and Urban Edu- cation at the Univers- ity o f Nebraska at Omaha. His teaching responsibilities include educational sociology and meth- odology, and his research interests include delinquency, peer subcultures, and school desegre- gation. He is current- ly on loan to NIE in Washington, D. C.

This article is a revi- sion o f a paper presented at the Sec- ond National Confer- ence on Urban Edu- cation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Novem- ber 1976.

z ~ a result of growing widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of education in metropolitan schools, we have heard increasingly louder

calls for one, or a combination of more than one, of the following reforms, (a) decentralization, (b) citizen participation, and (c) community control. The reasons for this dissatisfaction have been detailed else- where (e.g., refs. 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 21, 22, 26, 29) and consequently will not be addressed here. The need for reform of the eduational enterprise is not in question and is, in fact, a given. The focus of this paper will be (a) the delineation of the three popular reform measures (decentralization, citizen participation and community control), (b) an assessment of recent efforts to implement same, and (c) the development of a viable model that realistically combines decentralization with community decision making.

Decentralization is presently a reality, or is under consideration, in most large and medium-sized school systems. Ornstein (25, p. 125), reports that "19 out of 23 (83 percent of the school systems enrolling 100,000 or more students had decentralized or were considering i t . . . (and) . . . 31 of 45 (68 percent) school systems enrolling between 50,000 and 100,000 students had decentralized or were considering it." Stem- ming initially from the efforts in 1966 of parents of Intermediate School 201 in New York, and from the growing belief in many quarters that de- clining educational quality is related to large, impersonal school administration, grew the impetus for this current shift to decentralization. The usual pattern of decentralization is to divide the existing school district into smaller districts or areas averaging between 15,000 and 25,000 students each to create a mechanism to accommodate the concept of local control. Unfortunately, the usual method of dealing with the second ingredient, community control, has been to dilute the involvement until it becomes little more than community participation. Community control requires local decision making. Carried to the limit it requires local control over areas hitherto jealously guarded by central school administra- tions (e.g., curriculum, hiring and firing, and finance). Community participation, on the other hand, usually involves the community in low-profile activities such as parent-teacher organizations or advisory committees. The real power in decision making under such an organizational logic remains firmly in the hands of the professionals. While it is true that decentralization gives these community advisory groups input at the local level as opposed to a more distant central office, thereby

Address reprint requests to Dr. David E. Kapel, Associate Dean of Education, University of Nebraska at Omaha, P.O. Box 688, Omaha, NE 68101.

20

The Schoolboard: Participatory Democracy Revisited 21

creating the possibility that change might more easily be effected, the age-old practice of committee appointments usually takes any real impact out of the move to decentralization. In the majority of cases involving decentralization, local committee membership is controlled either by a principal, a field director, an associate superintendent, or some other member of the central office. In the few cases where local elections have taken place to fill advisory board positions, we find the same political and vested interest hassles surfacing as we have in the traditional schoolboard elections. In short, the very people calling for representation and who need to be heard from most are disproportion- ately underrepresented following a standard election procedure.

While the concept of decentralization has come to be widely accepted by lay and professional people alike for several reasons (provides greater operational efficiency; strengthens school and community rela- tions; brings control down to local level), the professional educator has exhibited an inherent distrust of community control. The issue for the professional is very clear-cut. The direct involvement of the community in decision making is seen by professionals as an erosion of their own power. Conversely, direct involvement in decision making is seen by community members as a right. The issue of who controls the schools, the professional educator or the people, is still a long way from being settled in contemporary society.

TWO WORKING MODELS While several school districts have decentralized and implemented

community participation, only two have decentralized and combined this with what might be called community control. A brief examination of these two districts (New York City and Detroit) will help in illustrating how even these good plans have been subverted.

In November 1967, the Mayor's Advisory Panel (the Bundy Commit- tee) recommended that New York City decentralize from the then existing 30 attendance districts into 30 to 60 community districts that would elect local boards to hold some powers traditionally residing with central administration (e.g., personnel, curriculum, and finances). Not surprisingly, the board did not totally embrace the concept of community control. However, following much unrest and debate, and following on the heels of the Ocean-Hill Brownsville affair, a new bill directed the board to establish 30 to 33 community districts to be headed by locally elected community boards, that were in effect to share responsibility with the central board. The high schools were exempted from this plan. By design, the community gained some ground, but in reality the districts were sufficiently large (from 20,000 to 38,000 students) to ensure that they would continue to be controlled by those sectors of the community presently overrepresented in decision-making positions. In short, the standard elective process remained intact, with the net result not being the redistribution of power previously expected. Fantini and Gittell (10, pp. 40, 50) citing a study conducted by the Institute for Community Studies concerning board membership, report that "the study [of New York City] showed that 63.8 percent of these board members are middle-class professionals. Over 50 percent are Catholic and 36 percent Jewish. And, most importantly, 53.2 percent of these board members have children in parochial and not in public schools.

22 The Urban Review

This in a school system that is 57.2 percent black and Puerto Rican . . . . " Clearly, this is a curious kind of community control.

Detroit has undergone a transition similar to that of New York City. Eight districts were created, ranging in size from 20,000 to 35,000 students. Under a 1971 decentralization plan the hitherto seven member board of education was expanded to thirteen, comprising five members elected city wide and one from each of the eight newly created decentralized districts. The net effect, not surprisingly, was almost identical to the transformation previously detailed for New York City. Specifically, minority persons were considerably underrepresented on the expanded board.

It is worth noting that there have been several key reports issued over the years which have spoken directly to the topic of administrative reorganization. Significantly, while they have all advocated decentralization in one form or another, together with various elements of citizen participation, they have all fallen short of advocating outright communfiy control. The Havighurst report on Chicago (1S), for example, recommended giving principals greater authority over both curriculum and instruction as a means of bringing decision making closer to the local level. Somewhat later, the Bundy report (23) advocated decentralization, the creation of community school boards and the limiting of the powers of the central schoolboard. These recommendations, however, were diluted by a subsequent recommendation that the local sehoolboard be selected in part by the mayor. More recently, an in-house report by a Philadelphia School Committee (1) in rejecting the concept of community control, proposed three alternative governance options that embrace the concept of differential community participation. The options, informal community participation, advisory participation through an elected committee, and shared authority and responsibility, are certainly alternatives in the right direction. However, as outlined, they still retain the power of decision making in the hands of the principal and the board; none of the three options for example, questions the authority of the professional to make the final decision. It should also be noted that none of the three options has even been fully implemented.

TOWARD A RATIONALE FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL At this point we should ask if, aside from the theoretical and ideologi-

cal advantages for decentralization and community control (25), there is any empirical support for such a move. Regrettably, to the extent that there are no community controlled schools the direct answer must be no. Fantini (9, p. 514) has been quick to counter the assumption that a lack of supportive data negates the concept:

The first question (of the skeptic) usually is: What evidence is there that neighborhood control of urban schools improves student achievement? The answer is that if there is no evidence it is because there are really no community controlled urban public school . . . . However, w~at we do have ample evidence of is the massive failure that the standard, centrally controlled urban school has produced.

All is not lost then, for what we do have, in addition to this voluminous catalog of urban school failure, is a wealth of data bearing on such things as (a) parental involvement and student growth, (b) community identity and achievement and (c) organizational size and group satisfaction, that


is all highly supportive of decentralization and community control. A direct examination of these three areas would prove helpful at this time.

Several investigators have reported positive effects on such things as student achievement, attendance, and discipline, following parental involvement in the learning process (16, 20, 30, 32). Brookover (5) for example, found that involving the parents of low-achieving junior high school students in regular meetings with school officials was a better strategy for raising both student achievement and self-concept than involving the students in either counseling sessions or special interest sessions. In another study Rempson (31) reports that an intensive effort to increase involvement among black and Puerto Rican parents resulted not only in a feeling of increased knowledge of the system and a better self-image, but also, perhaps more significantly, in the development of a feeling that they were better able to assist their children's development. In a similar vein, others have reported that the direct involvement of parents was an essential factor impacting on the effectiveness of com- pensatory education programs. (20)

Closely related, and indeed affected directly by involvement in the school, is the connection between individual identity and achievement--more specifically, the interrelationship between cultur- al/personality identity, self-esteem and achievement. Chilman (6) has articulated that too frequently the children of the ilrban poor readily learn from parents a feeling of powerlessness to effect their fate in dealing with the school. It is argued that this leads to a poor self-concept, which in turn can lead to poor performance. Coleman (7) found, for example, that a student's sense of control over his immediate environment may be a more important variable vis-h-vis achievement than school characteristics. This is clearly an important area that has received too little attention in recent years. The evidence tends to suggest, for example, that efforts to involve low-income parents more in the school might positively affect self-concept and subsequently performance.

The third area outlined above is the relationship between organizational size and participant satisfaction. There is a vast body of literature from several disciplines, which indicates a direct relationship between group size, potential for participation and job satisfaction. Perhaps the best-known single study was that undertaken by Barker and Gump (2) who concluded that satisfaction, participation, morale, and productivity were all directly related to the size of the school unit. Similarly, several other investigators have reported inverse relationships between size and workers satisfaction and absenteeism (33), negative relationships between size and individual productivity (24), and positive relationships between size and problematic communications (19). Clearly, these studies in noneducational settings have a tremendous potential for educational reorganization.

In summary of our position to date, it is fair to say that we have found considerable support, both theoretically and empirically, for the concepts of decentralization and citizen involvement in decision making. While it is true that decentralization has become a reality in the educational community, it is also true that the concept of citizen control is less-universally embraced in the same circles. Regretfully, many of the potentially beneficial effects of decentralization are being systematically subverted by the professional educator because of an avoidance of com-

24 The Urban Review

munity involvement in decision making. Too frequently the professional educator sees community control in terms of a zero-sum paradigm, thus viewing the community in adversary terms. In short, the educator senses a loss of power as a result of community input. The view, while popular, is totally dysfunctional because it overlooks the fact that the schools are legally the responsibility of the community; philosophically and legally the school belongs to the people, not the central administration, the principal, or the teachers. What is urgently needed to defuse the contemporary confrontation between the "people" and the "professional educator" is a plan for decentralization that directly involves community decision making within a framework that promotes a shared power base with a viable system of checks and balances.

THE MODEL The model being proposed here is based on several assumptions that need to be listed and considered (see Figure 1). They are:

1. The public schools belong to the community; they do not belong to the professionals. Professionals are hired to implement, in the most pro- fessionally defensible manner, the educational policies of the community.

2. The ultimate policy decision making level is the community; this level is manifested in the schoolboard. Thus the schoolboard is the legal source of decision making for the schools at the local level.

3. Politics and political procedures should not be a part of schoolboard formation. Voting for schoolboard members is not the only procedure that can be used to guarantee the representative nature of the schoolboards.

4. The influence of the home is significant in the educational experiences of children. Thus the success or failure of the school is affected directly by the support, or lack of support, from the home environment.

S. Parents are a major factor in the setting of the home environment and have a direct concern and vested interest in the success of the educational process and experiences offered their children. Consequently, parents should be the members of the schoolboard.

6. The community is defined here as the parents of the children attending the school.

7. Random selection is a viable technique for selection of schoolboard members. Random selection will provide a representative sample of the community (parents) without resorting to political procedures or traditional vested interests or spoils approaches.

8. The closer the representatives (schoolboard members) are to their constituency (community), the greater the likelihood that they will be sensitive to the needs of the constituency, and the more overtly responsive the representatives will be. As a result, the schoolboard will better service its constituency.

9. Regardless o f where they live, parents have a vital and vested interest in developing and maximizing quality educational opportunities in the schools, more than any other group that exists in cities.

10. Parents have the ability to make considered, thoughtful, rational, reasonable, and intelligent policy decisions based on appropriate information supplied them.

11. As a direct result of using parents as the unit of representation,

Pare

nts

of Th

e ch

i~en

,,

s taf~

"I ................. I

Cora

muni

ty (P

aren

ts, No

n-Pa

rent

s)

1 [

Cong

ress

of

Loc

al

| [

city

Wid

e [

Dece

ntra

lize

d Bo

ards

3

V -'~p

£ Sc

hool

Bo

ard I

Loca

l De

cent

rali

zed

l Sc

hool

Bo

ard 2

| 12

-14

Memb

ers

.~ J,~.

.~

I u

I A~

miSt

ast;

ativ

e ......

1

Chil

dren

Se

rved

By

[ Th

e Sc

hool

ii IIllll

ll, lllll

lllllll

I

Cent

ral

Scho

ol Of

fice

-

Mana

ger

Pers

onne

l Bu

dget

an

d "

Gene

ral

] Cur

ricu

lttm

,~ Gra

nts-

Se

rvic

e Op

erat

ions

Ac

coun

ting

[ P

rogr

am

[Federal,

Consultant[State,

Anal

ysis

i

Serv

ice

I Pr

lvat

e .

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

.

|

1 ......

] L_

4,.

_I

1Ele

cted

at

larg

e or

sel

ecte

d by

tra

ditio

nal

proc

edur

es.

2Sel

ecte

d by

ran

dom

sel

ectio

n.

3Rep

rese

ntat

ives

of

loca

l de

cent

raliz

ed s

choo

lboa

rd

sele

cted

by

ranc

lom

sel

ecti

on f

rom

eac

h lo

cal

dece

ntra

lized

sc

hool

boar

d.

0 ~3

<3 0 ¢:

¢%

Figu

re 1

26 The Urban Review

those involved in integration through crosstown busing will be involved in policy decision making (or will be better represented), hence reducing alienation of parents and their children.

12. The reduction of alienation, the reduction of the distance between policy makers (schoolboard) and the immediate community, and the active interest, concern, and participation of parents at the decision making level will have a positive and supporting effect on the children attending the schools.

13. The activity of the parents will be such that they will not "drop out" of the system during the time their children are in attendance, and support of the schools will be carried beyond the time o f " active participation" and school attendance of their children.

The need for a new approach to the restructuring of the policy making procedures in urban schools is signaled by the unrest that is being manifested by urban parents, students, educational professionals, and the public at large. Pressures surrounding school integration in the largest urban districts (particularly in the Northeast) are increasing daily. These pressures are not only coming from the courts, but also from sundry community groups. It is also apparent that the present structure or organization of these districts in many cases prevents or impedes such integration. Even if integration were not a thrust or a factor, the lack of responsiveness to local community wishes is clearly apparent in large school districts. Part of this problem is the size of the district, which prevents responsiveness, even if desired. Another critical component of the problem is the representativeness of the schoolboard. No schoolboard can adequately represent the many and various publics found in a large urban district. The selection, in many cases by election, precludes all but the most sophisticated and/or well-financed or -sup- ported individuals from becoming part of the decision making processes. As outlined earlier, even when larger districts were subdivided (decentralized), the new subdivisions were large enough to be little more than microcosms of the larger or parent district, and the board selections reflected the traditional board membership. In fact, the question of whether these districts were really decentralized is debatable; thus it can be stated the "real" decentralization has yet to be achieved. Decentral- ization of the decision making procedures within the urban community is appropriate and should be implemented immediately. The model being proposed is designed to decentralize urban schools with direct community decision making. The term "community decision making" is used rather than "community control" because the question of community control of schools is no longer a debatable principle. Since the schools belong to the community, the community has the right to control. The specter of conflict between the community and the professionals should not be raised; again, professionals are hired to implement policy developed by the community. While the professionals have every obliga- tion and right to influence community policy and supply valid information and argumerits, they should not make broad policy decisions. This right belongs to the community. One should not confuse decision making (or for that matter control) with management. Management of the schools must and should be in the hands of the professionals. In- struction and all support functions directly and indirectly related to

*This organizational format is not to be confused with the neighborhood school concept. We are not advocating neighborhood schools, but rather proposing a model that encourages parental involvement in decision making regardless of residential location vis-a-vis the school building. The model takes into account the realities of desegre- gation by recruiting parents with children by building rather than by residential proximity. Converse- ly, the model does not preclude the development of neighborhood schools if that is the wish of the community.


instruction must also be in the hands of the professionals. Community decision making, then, is restricted to policy making.

The proposed model further defines the community as those parents whose children attend a particular school. Thus each school is the focus of a decentralized district within the original parent urban school district (See Figure 1). Decentralization is based on each school, hence a decentralized schoolboard makes policy for its own and only its own school.* Each community has its primary vested ~nterest in a particular school, and tangentially to the city-wide schoolboard through a congress of local decentralized boards serving in an advisory capacity. Local decentralized schoolboards will be formed at the school building level. This brings the representatives and the constituency closer together. (In fact, closer together than any urban school district organization yet proposed, and almost to the point of direct democracy as found in the ancient Greek City States--assuming that one exclude the noncitizens, slaves, and helots.) Direct democracy is not feasible because of the size of most urban schools and the complex societal obligations and struggles facing most urban parents.

Contrary to the view held by many critics of decentralization, the adversary conflict between decentralized schoolboards and professionals need not exist. School personnel (professional and nonprofessional) can work and interrelate in a professional manner with parents who are members of a decentralized schoolboard. This interrelationship will build a bridge of respect for each other's problems and views. These same school personnel do recognize the subordinate and superordinate roles inherent in a schoolboard-staff relationship; consequently they will accept evaluation and assessment of their professional worth by the local board. School personnel will be asked to supply educational information needed by the board to make appropriate and defensible decisions on policies, because the school personnel will be: alert to innovations, able to adequately assess these innovations, and able to make appropriate professional recommendations. The school personnel are in a better professional position to prescribe the speofic educational needs and solu- tions (e.g., curriculum, texts methods, etc.) for the children in the school than any other group. School personnel, along with the schoolboard, will place the educe~fional needs of the children and/he community as the first and only priority of the school. Because of these factors, the local schoolboard will have to treat school personnel as professionals--their views, recommendations, and input must be treated with respect (this is not to imply that such views, recommendations, etc. cannot be questioned and/or rejected by the board, for such rejections are within their legal rights and obligations).

The heart of the model is the local decentralized schoolboard (see Figure 1). This board would be made up of 12 to 14 members randomly selected from the parents of the children attending the school. Thus, every school would have its own schoolboard, or more appropriately, each schoolboard would have its own school.

Random selection would insure that each parent would have an equal opportunity to be selected. Politics would not play a part in selection. Becoming a member of the schoolboard would not be a function of political skill or political acumen; vested interest groups could not engineer

*In order to guarantee representation of those who may con- stitute an extremely small minority in any school a stratified random sampling process should be employed to guarantee proportional representation of all subgroups in the building population.

28 The Urban Review

and/or influence the selection process. From the most articulate to the least, each parent could become a part of the decision making process. No longer would those with the most time available dominate the process. If democracy accepts "one person = one vote" as a viable principle, then it also must accept the fact that all people are equal and each person can make valuable contributions. Random selection, like justice, must be blind to intervening factors (e.g., poverty, race, socioeconomic status, sex) that generally influence elections and those who run for of- rice. Random selection will generate a truly representative body.*

Two parents from egch grade would be randomly selected. Parents within a grade are given a number from a table of random numbers, and two are selected. If the parent selected refuses to serve, then the next number is selected. Funding would be made available to pay employers for substitutes to replace workers (board members) who are involved in board meetings (if release time is impossible), although most board business would be transacted during evening meetings. A small stipend would also be paid each board member for active participation in the business of the board.

Recall procedures (to remove members from the local decentralized schoolboard) would be developed for each grade level. Active participation and representation would be generated, for if 40 percent of the parents within a grade petitioned and a total of 80 percent of the parents of the grade then voted for recall, a new representative would be randomly selected.

As stated earlier, 12 to 14 members per local schoolboard would be selected, two from each grade. At the secondary level (e.g., junior high, middle school, senior high, vocational-technical, etc.) there would be equal representation per grade level. Each member will serve three years (or as long as his/her child attends the schools, if less time) and can be reselected by the random procedure. No more than one-third of the board will be selected each year, guaranteeing stability across selection periods for the board.

There may be times when the local schoolboard may have nonparents as members (e.g., local businessmen). This might occur with boards of high schools or vocational schools. However, three-fourths of the parents in the school must vote for such a variation. Then nomination from parents would be forthcoming, and those nominated would be randomly selected. No more than 25 percent of each board should be made up of these individuals. Parents must be the dominant factor in decision making.

The local decentralized schoolboards would have broad decision-making authority as related to (1) policies concerning curricular and program development, (2) school philosophy, (3) budget development (within accounting guidelines set forth by the city-wide schoolboard--see Figure 1) at the local building level, (4) hiring, (5) evaluation and dismissal of staff (but not contract negotiation at the local level), (6) proper utilization of resources at the local level, as well as resources available through the central office, and (7) the development of all policies required for the administration of a school to meet the educational needs of the children and community within its catchment area. The board is to be sensitive to the changing needs and requirements of the


community as related to education (adults, children), and to be able to transfer and translate into action these needs when appropriate and defensible. There needs to be a proper mix between the representative function and the leadership fucntion of the board. To reiterate, the local board will only be involved in policy making, not the administration of the day-to-day operation of the school.

The administration of the school would remain in the hands of the building principaL However, the building principal's role wouId change and become more similar to that of the present rote of the superintendent found in most school districts today. Thus, he/she will have much more administrative authority and leadership than is presently found in the prinicpal's position. The principal would be directly responsible only to the local decentralized schoolboard.

The principal would have a support staff of professionals and an administrative staff (e.g., grade chairpersons), teachers, and nonprofessional staff (see Figure 1). Their entire thrust would be to develop a teaching-learning environment to meet the educational/psychological/ social needs of the children within the broad policies established by the local boards.

Because of the closeness of the board to the community (parents), the school and those within the school, and the children, an almost closed loop (in computer terminology) is developed that will be responsive to the community's educational needs. This loop, however, would not be entirely closed; input to and from other sources has been structured.

A congress of local decentralized boards is to be formed (see Figure 1). This board will be made up of representatives from the local decentralized schoolboards. In large urban areas there would be a single representative; in smaller districts there may be two or more representatives, each selected randomly from the local boards. The congress would advise the city-wide schoolboard on the needs of the local schools as related to: budget development, personnel service, budget and operations analysis, general accounting, and grants. It would also provide a meeting place for the exchange of ideas among local boards as well as establishing an environment in which new approaches and philosophical thrusts are developed and questioned on a city-wide basis. The congress would be a source of new ideas and support for local boards, as well as a place for lobbying to influence the city-wide schoolboard.

A city-wide schoolboard, as presently found in most urban school districts, would be elected or selected. This "parent" board would be made up of parents, nonparents, businessmen, lawyers, etc.--those individuals generally found on schoolboards today. Their primary function would be restricted to: (1) determining a city tax that would be based on city-wide tax rateables, or whatever else is used to raise school support, to insure equal funding for all based on need, (2) establishing or setting a district-wide overall budget that would include "block grants" to local decentralized boards, (3) husbanding the buying power of the entire school district to afford savings, (4) letting contracts, (5) negotiating district-wide teacher contracts and other personnel contracts, and (6) setting policies and funding for a central school office.

The central school office would be headed by an educational manager. His/her role will be to administer the central school office, develop the

30 The Urban Review

city-wide budget, act as a staff consultant to both the city-wide schoolboard and the local decentralized schoolboards, and function in the manner determined by city-wide schoolboard policies. He/she would be directly responsible to the city-wide schoolboard and only to that board. The one exception would be that if 80 percent of the local decentralized board vote to remove the manager for cause, the city-wide schoolboard would be obligated to do so.

Themanager is the chief administrator of the central school office. This office houses an administrative staff that will provide expert advice and input to the professional and nonprofessional staff at the local level (e.g., give advice and consult on administrative procedures and policies, curriculum development, new programs, etc.). Decision-making and administrative power would be limited to overall allocations of funds for local budgets and final approval of the general budget within the guidelines set by the city-wide schoolboard. All contracts (including employee contracts) would be negotiated and let through the general school office; experts in business administration and those with expertise in the technical fields would be on the staff of the central office. All federal, state and private grant funds would flow through the office, although initial proposals would originate, in most cases, with the local boards. All administrative procedures and forms required by such funding would be handled by the central office. Management of such grants would rest with the local boards. The central office would be a consultant source in the development of grant proposals. General accounting procedures and operations would be developed for the local decentralized schoolboards.

To provide those services described above, the central school office would be made up of five units. Three of these units would have direct authority and supervisory functions: oersonnel service, budget and operations analysis; general accounting (although general accounting will also have a consultant thrust). Two units would be consultative in nature: curriculum-and-program and grants (federal-state-private).

Personnel service would deal exclusively with city-wide personnel needs, regulations, contract implementation, transfers, and general manpower needs (both professional and nonprofessional). Budget and operations analysis would focus on the development of budgets and the efficient disbursement of funds, as well as cost accounting and cost efficiency procedures that can be used by local schools. General accounting would include money flow operations and procedures (authority function), as well as student accounting and support (consultant thrust). Within this unit would be the specialists needed in student accounting and support (e.g., psychologists, special education experts, reading and speech specialist, etc.). These specialists would be housed in a sub-unit known as student support. They would be used to reinforce the specialists hired by the local boards.

The central office would supply curriculum and program consultants to the local boards as required by them. They would supply the expert advice needed in the development of educationally defensible curricula and programs. However, curriculum and program must originate with the local boards. (Program evaluators would also be part of this office.) The grants unit would supply consultants in the location, writing, and follow-through of state, federal, and private funding proposals for those local districts that wish to acquire such funds.


It is envisioned that the central school office staffwould be small in number, but of very high quality. The thrust of the central office is service to the local boards while performing staff functions for the city-wide schoolboard. The central office would be able to supply local boards with personnel that they could not afford to hire on a full-time basis. The central office would also have special facilities and equipment for diagnostic testing and treatment for special conditions. However, compared to the large central office found in most cities (e.g., New York, Phiiadelphia, Chicago), the central school office would be extremely small. It would be a center of established and trained experts whose mission is to maximize the educational environment found in each local school building.

In summary, a model is being proposed that will place the locus of authority, control, and decision making in the hands of those who have the most concern and vested interest in the success of the public schools--the parents. Clearly, they, more than any other group, are aware of what the schools are and are not doing for their children. The parents from the inner-city are no less concerned about their children and their children's education than are the more-affluent suburban parents. These parents have too long been used and abused by politi- cians, vested interest groups, and professionals. If the Urban schools are to be turned around, if the urban schools are going to give each child an equal opportunity for the future, if democracy is appropriate for urban parents as well as for suburban parents, if the goals for the urban school is quality education for today and tommorrow, if the schools want to attract and hold children, if the schools want to build a support system in the homes, and if the welfare of the entire community is to be improved in the urban areas, then the school is one of the most important public institutions and is in urgent need of reform. This model is an attempt to reform the urban schools through decentralization and parent participation at a meaningful decision-making level. This proposed model will give all parents an equal opportunity to become a part of the system of education and will reduce the distance between the decision-makers and the parents. Education serves the entire community directly and indirectly; a healthy school feeds a healthy community. This model attempts to build a healthy school through parental participation regardless of race, sex, marital status, socioeconomic status, or education. Dare the present urban schools test the model? Like all models it needs to be tested in the real world. The present urban school district organization leaves a lot to be desired. How long can the urban community watch its schools deteriorate, destroy children, and alienate both parents and nonparents? While the questions just raised are difficult ones to answer, we must find answers to them, and quickly. We need bold new approaches to solve the educational problems of the cities. The urban school is fast becoming an educational wasteland--regrettably, in many cases the city itself is not far behind.

CONCLUSION Our thesis here is straightforward, namely that the present structure

of urban schools does not easily provide for adequate representation of community members, nor does it facilitate responsiveness to particular- istic community needs. Furthermore, we have suggested that such an organizational mechanism may be a critical factor in creating metropol-

*Clearly, this action does not preclude the various political vested interest groups from attempt- ing to influence individual members of the board, this being a legitimate avenue for expressing partic- ularistic views. The proposal does preclude such inter- ference in the initial selection procedure.

32 The Urban Review

itan alienation, disenchantment and outright hostility vis-[-vis the school. Consequently, we have proposed an alternative organizational model intentionally focused on the schoolboard and built on the princi- ples of participatory democracy. This model redefines the community with parents at the building level and encourages their broad-based involvement in decision making. Such a plan, we have argued, would place decision making firmly in the hands of the community, where it belongs, andmake education a more collaborative effort between the professional educator and the community. The net result, we trust, would be quality education for each child regardless of race, sex, creed, etc.

The question of the tactics and strategy for urban school reform looms large indeed. Recently, several reports have appeared in print detailing the battles engaged in by"self-help" groups with the educational bureaucracy (e.g., refs. 14, 27, 28). Not surprisingly, such efforts have been almost without exception reduced to that of an adversary proceed- ing, with t h e " self help" group forced into a seige mentality. With rea- soned discussion seemingly unacceptable to one or both parties, the most fruitful course of action to date has involved the courts. Regretta- bly, however, such action is not only time-consuming, costly, and debili- tating to all concerned, but there seems to be no guarantee that carrying the day in court translates into better education in the classroom. In short, it would appear that the adoption of an adversary role by various groups in the community is largely a losing tactic. A far more-fruitful approach, we are suggesting, is the creation of decentralized districts and the random selection of schoolboard members. Such a tactic would effectively remove the presently heavy-handed involvement of politically powerful vested interest groups in the selection of schoolboard members, thus permitting a truly representative board to act in a manner more sensitive to community needs.* Furthermore, such a plan would effectively defuse the present adversary feelings frequently generated between the community and the professional educator. The plan requires a cooperative effort based on an expanded community role in decision making.

Clearly, the proposed model needs to be examined part by part, eval- uated in depth and, most important, field tested. We are not suggesting that the model is a blueprint for instant educational success or a panacea for the alleviation of current urban ills, but rather that the proposed model has viability theoretically either in part or in total for ameliorating some of our current problems in urban schools. Time will certainly tell, but we must act quickly. Perhaps we can do no better than end by pon- dering the charge made by Donald Campbell(4, p. 409) a few years ago in suggesting a strategy for the systematic experimental evaluation of all proposed social reforms:

The United States and other modern nations should be ready for an experimental approach to social reform, an approach in which we try out new programs designed to cure specific social problems, in which we learn whether or.not these programs are effective, and in which we retain, imitate, modify, or discard them on the basis of apparent effectiveness on the multiple imperfect criteria available.

The Schoolboard: Participatory Democracy Revisited

In short, the t ime is ripe for experimentation. Proposals such as the model outlined here need urgent attention if we are ever to solve the increasingly complex problems daily compounding themselves in the large urban centers of this country.

33

REFERENCES 1. A Multiple Option Approach to School Community Participation Report of

the Commission on Decentralization and Community Participation. Phila- delphia: The Commission, 1970

2. Barker, R.~ and Gump, P. Big School, SmallSchool. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.

3. Bowles, S. and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

4. Campbell, D. Reforms as experiments. American Psychologist 24 (April) pp. 409-429, 1969.

S. Brookover, W. B. et. al. Selfconcept of ability and school achievement (11) East Lansing: Bureau of Educational Research Services, Michigan State University, 1965.

6. Chilman, C. Growing UpPoor. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print- ing Office, 1966.

7. Coleman, J. et. al., Equality of Educational Opportunity. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Educational Statistics, 1966.

8. Dennison, G. TheLives of Children. New York: Random House, 1969. 9. Fantini, M. The Reform of Urban Schools. Washington, D.C.: National

Education Association, 1970. 10. Fantini, M., and Gittell, M. Decentralization: Achieving Reform. New York:

Praeger, 1973. 11. Freire, P. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971. 12. Friedenherg, E. The Vanishing Adolescent. New York: Dell, 1959. 13. Friedenberg, E. The Dignity of Youth and Other Atavisms. Boston:

Beacon. 1965. 14. Goldberg, G. Class action, Community Organization, and School reform.

IRCDBulletin, Vol. XI, No. 2, (1976), pp. 1-12. 15. Havighurst, J. The Public Schools of Chicago. A Survey for the Board of

Education of the City of Chicago. 1976. 16. Hess, R. D., and Shipman, V. C. Maternal Attitude Toward the School and

Role of the Pupil: Some Social Class Comparisons. Paper presented for the FifthWork Conference on Curriculum and Teaching in Depressed Urban Areas. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1966.

17. Holt, J. How Children Fail. New Yorl~: Delta Books, 1964. 18. Illich, I. Deschooling Society. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 19. Indik, B. Organizational Size and Member Participation. Paper presented,

APA, New York, 1961. 20. Jablonsky, A. Some Trends in Education of the Disadvantaged. IRCDBul-

letin 4 (March) 1968) pp. 1-- 11. 21. Jencks, C., et. al., Inequality. New York: Basic Books, 1972. 22. Kozol, J. Death at an EarlyAge. New York: Bantam, 1967. 23. Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools.

Reconnection for Learning: A Community School System for New York City. New York: Praeger, 1967.

24. Marriot, R. Size of working group and output. OccupationalPsychotogy, 23 (1949), pp. 47-57.

25. Ornstein, A. Race and Politics in School/Community Organizations. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1974.

26. Pearl, A. The Atrocity of Education. St. Louis: New Critics Press, 1972. 27. Perlman, J. Grassrooting the system. SocialPolicy. Vol. 7, No. 2 (1976), pp.

4--20. 28. Petrillo, R. Rap room: Self-help at school. SocialPolicy. Vol. 7, No. (1976),

pp. 54--58.

34 The Urban Review

29. Polk, K., and Schafer W. Schools and Delinquency. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972.

30. Rankin, P. The relationship between parent behavior and achievement of inner-city elementary children. Paper presented at Annual Meeting AERA, New York, 1967.

31. Rempson, J. L. The participation of minority group parents in school activities: a study and case-study with guidelines. Paper presented at annual AERA Conference, Chicago, 1972.

32. Schiff, H. J. The effect of personal contractual relationships on parents' attitudes towards participation in local school affairs. Ph.D. Dissertation Northwestern University, 1963.

33. Tallachi, S. Organizationa| size, individual attitudes, and behavior: an empirical study. Administrative Science Quarterly. 5 (1960), pp. 134 ~ 137.

Documents

The schoolboard: Participatory democracy revisited