The Schlieffen Plan fails (1)

SOURCE 2 Extract from a letter by the Britishgeneral Sir John French to a friend,10 September 1914

For five solid days we have been pursuing instead

of pursued and the Germans have had simple Hell.

This day we have captured several hundred, cut off

a whole lot of transport and got ten to twelve guns

– and the ground is strewn with dead and wounded

Germans. Something like this happened yesterday,

and the day before … They are indeed fairly on the

run and we are following hard.

Gilbert (1995: 76)

SOURCE 3 Statement by the German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, 6 September 1914

We haven’t succeeded in entrapping and taking prisoner large masses of troops;

in consequence the French army, by means of their network of railways, are constantly

taking up new positions.

Gilbert (1995: 71)

SOURCE 1 Account by historian John Terraine

The Schlieffen Plan … required from the German Army an effort beyond

its strength, as von Schlieffen himself apprehended before he died.

Von Kluck and von Bülow were ill-fitted by temperament to work in double

harness. Von Bülow was slow and cautious … von Kluck was bold but

opinionated, so that his manoeuvres against the British frequently lacked

reality.

… whole divisions of [German] cavalry were immobilised for want of

such a simple commodity as horseshoe nails.

Terraine (1987: 5, 30-1)

SOURCE 4 The Western Front in August–November 1914

The Schlieffen Plan fails (2)SOURCE 1 Account by historian B H Liddell Hart

The German Command lost touch with the advancing armies and the movement of these became disjointed.

This vital breakdown was essentially due to the failure of the German higher command to grasp the importance

of good communication ...

The Germans had advanced so rapidly, outrunning their timetable, that their supplies failed to keep pace,

so that the fatigue of the troops was increased by hunger. Indeed when the chance of battle came, their fighting

power was practically numbed by physical exhaustion ...

Too often in this war did the leaders fight each other while the troops fought the foe ...

Liddell Hart (1973: 56–7)

SOURCE 2 German troops marching through Belgium, 1914

Gilbert (1995: photo 11)

SOURCE 4 Account by historian Marc Ferro

The armies, both inspired by the greatest patriotism, had fought equally well, and had

lost heavily. But the commands had not been equal. On the Allied side, [the leaders]

gave the chance to plan and carry out a manoeuvre that gave the Allies the initiative,

restored their morale and their will to win. On the German side there was by contrast

unceasing discord between Kluck and Bülow, each of them anxious to grab victory for

himself ...

The role of the British ‘contemptible little army’ should not be underestimated.

Kluck himself subsequently declared that he would have taken Paris but for the British.

The victory of the Marne appears to be as much a result of [the French commander]

Joffre’s strategic intelligence as of German blunders ... he had foreseen that his victory,

the Marne, would be won on the French railways.

Ferro (1987: 54-5)

SOURCE 3 Description of German soldiers byone of von Kluck’s officers,4 September 1914

The men stagger forward, their faces coated with

dust, their uniforms in rags, they look like living

scarecrows. They march with their eyes closed,

singing in chorus so that they shall not fall asleep

on the march. The certainty of early victory and

of triumphal entry into Paris keeps them going and

acts as a spur to their enthusiasm. Without this

certainty of victory they would fall exhausted.

Terraine (1987: 33–4)