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The Roles of Dynamic Simulation in Airliner MANPADS Protection
IDGA MANPADS SeminarMarch 2006
Dr. T.W. TuckerTactical Technologies Inc.
356 Woodroffe Ave. Ottawa, Ontario, K2A 3V6
Tel: (613) 828-0775, e-mail: [email protected] URL: www.tti-ecm.com
3/9/2009 1Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Presentation Outline• Self Protection Evaluation
– Static Analysis of Threat Parameters– Missile Miss Distance as a Primary MOE– Impact of Non-Linear Interactions (Chaotic
Behavior) on Missile Miss Distance• Dynamic Simulation of Tactical
Engagements– Several Classes (Generations) of Missiles– Vs Jammer and Flare Airliner Protection Options
• The Roles of Dynamic Software Simulation
3/9/2009 2Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Evaluation Methodology• Was stimulated by the need to understand the
effectiveness of “off the shelf” self protection (ECM) systems - in relation to specific threat weapons and engagement geometries
• Was stimulated by the high cost of field trials and the availability of airliners
• Was stimulated by the need for a systematic & repeatable analytical approach resulting in a documented self protection effectiveness audit trail
3/9/2009 3Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
SeekerDetector, ECCMs,
Tracker
AirframeMass, Length,Wing Config.Autopilot
PN Coeff.
ECM Effectiveness Evaluation
FlareSignature vs Time
Pos’n vs Time
AircraftSignature vs Aspect
Pos’n vs Time
At End Game:
What is the Miss Distance?
3/9/2009 4Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Focus On Missile Miss Distance• Survivability of the airliner is assured if the miss
distance is sufficiently large that the missile does not impact the target or trigger the fuse - the warhead does not detonate
• Avoids the complex characterization of target hardness and missile warhead fragmentation
• The probability of survival is based on a simple characterization of target hardness and missile warhead as a relative measure only - not an absolute measure
3/9/2009 5Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Miss Distance is determined by integrating incremental flight path
errors over the entire missile’s flight
The Determination Of Miss Distance
Countermeasure MayGenerate Angle Track Error
In Seeker
Angle Track Error MayGenerate Steering Error
In AutopilotSteering Error May
Generate Flight Path Error
In Missile Flight
3/9/2009 6Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Evaluation Methodology• Step 1- Static Analysis:
– Characterize the threat weapon system using a standardized parameter set - EWIRDB
• Step 2 - Static Analysis:– Determine optimum electronic countermeasure
parameters based on weapon system parameters
• Step 3 - Dynamic Engagement Simulation:– Determine over-all effectiveness of the self protection
in tactical engagements - Missile miss distance or probability of survival
3/9/2009 7Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Engagement Characterization• Target Platform - Signature and Maneuver• Threat Weapon - Guidance and Dynamics• Countermeasures - Techniques and Tactics• Propagation - Attenuation vs Wavelength• Background Clutter• Engagement Geometry• Characterizing all systems involves more
than 250 parameters
3/9/2009 8Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Threat Weapon System Analysis• For self protection (ECM) effectiveness
evaluation, the weapon system analysis must focus on the system’s aerodynamic, guidance, tracking & control subsystems
• The most important weapon parameters describe the time response and target discrimination characteristics of various missile subsystems (eg. servo bandwidths and ECCMs)
• Using standardized weapon parameters such as EWIRDB facilitate this process
• Analysis methods are available for computing estimated values for parameters unavailable from EW Databases or exploitation reports
3/9/2009 9Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
IR Seeker Basic Characteristics• Passive infra-red angle only tracking• Many angular scanning/tracking techniques
– Spin scan, conscan, rosette, FPA• Some possible ECCM discrimination techniques
– Narrow optical field-of-view– Spectral filtering (two or more color/bands) – Sudden increase in signal power/intensity– Sudden change in rate of line of sight (angle)
• Angle servo electronics determine tracking and maneuver responsive of threat missile
3/9/2009 10Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Threats Exceed
500,000 Missiles
World-wide
1960sUncooled Spin Scan
2010 2nd Generation
Spectral Imagers
Threat Evolution
1970/80Cooled
Con Scan
1980s/90s Cross Array/Rosette
Flare CCMs
2005 1st Generation
Imagers
Courtesy LAIRCM SPO, AFRL
2000Scanning
Imagers
3/9/2009 11Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Spinning Reticle AM Tracker – 1st GenAKA Spin Scan
Graphic: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt
3/9/2009 12Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Spinning Optics FM Tracker – 2nd GenAKA Con Scan
Graphic: “Surface Based Air Defense System Analysis” By. H.M. Macfadzeqn
3/9/2009 13Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Multiple Spinning Optics - 3rd GenAka Rosette Scans
Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis
3/9/2009 14Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Angle Tracking Servo Loop
• Seeker field-of-view determined by optics and reticule• Tracking (Servo) loop response determined by filter
bandwidths and amplifier gains
Detector PreampBand-PassFilter
AGC DemodBand-PassFilter
PhaseDetector
Error Signal
Scanning Phase Reference
IR RadiationTelescope
PositionDrive
Reticule
LightCollector
Detector
TrackerElectronics
Error Signal
3/9/2009 15Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Sample SA-7 Parameter Data
Data From “Soviet Air Defence Missiles” by S. Zaloga
Track Technique Spin Scan
3/9/2009 16Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Analyzed SA-7 Parameters• Physical Parameters
– Mass: 5.5 to 9.2 kg– Length: 1.42 m– Diameter: 0.07 m– Altitude: 0 to 4.5 km– Velocity: 580 m/sec– Wing Span: 0.14 m– Mean Chord: .08 m– Configuration: Cruciform
• Response Parameters– Airframe Natural Frequency:
14.9 to 21.6 rad/sec– Airframe Damping Coefficient:
.06 to .09– Airframe Maximum Latax:
12.1 to 30.3 g’s– Autopilot PN Constant (Tail-on):
1.7– Seeker Servo Bandwidth:
1.1 to 1.9 Hz
AnalyticModels
Graphic: “High-Tech Warfare”by D. Richardson, et al.
• Other (Zaloga)– Field Of View : 1.9 degrees– Spectral Band : 1.7 to 2.8
microns3/9/2009 17Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright
2009, All Rights Reserved
MANPADS/ECM Expectations• ECM Characteristics - Tactics, Maneuvers and
Timing - will all affect engagement outcomes as measured by missile miss distance
• Virtually an infinite number of threat parameter, ECM parameter and engagement geometry combinations are possible - only select combinations result in aircraft survivability - Miss Distance >> Warhead Fuse Distance
• Threat characterization, parameter certification and data management may have major impact on outcomes
• Management of each engagement’s results, in relation to the associated input parameter combinations, is essential
• Calls for database management
3/9/2009 18Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Data Management Complexity(Seeker Search and Track Parameters)
3/9/2009 19Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Aerodynamic and Autopilot Parameters
Zarchan’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters
Zipfel’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters
3/9/2009 20Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Typical Jet A/C & Flare Signatures
Turbo-Jet Aircraft Radiant Intensity,Military Power, 150 o Aspect at 300 m
Typical Flare Radiant Intensity
From:”Sources Of Radiation” Vol 1IR/EO Systems Handbook, Ed G. Zissis
3/9/2009 21Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Aircraft & Flare SignaturesRadiant Intensityvs Wavelengthvs Aspect Angle
3/9/2009 22Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Target & Flare SignaturesIR Radiant Intensities In 1.7 to 2.8 Micron Band
(dBw/sr)
0
5
10
15
20
25
AircraftFlare Peak
Flare
Radiant
Intensity
(dBw/sr)
10
20
30
1 32 4Time (sec)
vs Aspect Angle
Flare
Radiant Intensity
Vs Time
3/9/2009 23Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Flare Signature Control
The Dark Flare
A Standard Flare
The Dark Flare By Aircraft Protections Systems
3/9/2009 24Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Visible IR IR IR
Atmospheric Transmission
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Wavelength (micrometers)
Att
en
tuati
on
(d
B/K
m)
3/9/2009 25Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Jammer & DIRCM Parameters
Radiant Intensity Vs Wavelength
Modulation Scheme
Time Sequence3/9/2009 26Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright
2009, All Rights Reserved
IR Seeking Missile Reality
AN/AIM 9 Sidewinder Characteristics
Length: 2.89 metersDiameter: 0.13 metersFin Span: 0.63 metersSpeed: SupersonicWarhead: 9.36 kg blast fragmentation Launch Weight: 85.5 kgRange: 16+ kmGuidance System: Solid-state infrared homing
From: “Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability & Design”R. E. Ball, AIAA Press, Second Edition (CD-ROM)
3/9/2009 27Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
26 May 04
Shephard ConferenceShephard Conference
Claimed to be a picture of the actual attack on the DHL ac
taken by French reporters
As Filmed by French Reporters
DHL A300 vs Igla (SA-14) in Baghdad, Nov 22, 2003
3/9/2009 28Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
DHL A300 On Fire
The secondmissile missed
3/9/2009 29Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Key ECM Effectiveness Issues• Countermeasure effectiveness measured by
missile miss distance at end game– Large missile miss distance = effective countermeasure– Successful velocity or range deception does not normally
cause a large missile miss distance– Successful steady angle error deception against
proportional navigation guidance does not normally cause a large missile miss distance
• Missile miss distance measurement requires complete closed-loop dynamic missile fly-out, including:– Missile and target aerodynamics and kinematics– Threat missile guidance and control including non-linearities– Threat radar/seeker and electronic countermeasure
interactions
3/9/2009 31Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Repeat: Miss Distance DeterminationMiss Distance Is Determined By
Integrating Incremental Flight Path
Errors Over Entire Missile Flight
Countermeasure MayGenerate Angle Track Error
In Seeker
Angle Track Error MayGenerate Steering Error
In Autopilot
Steering Error MayGenerate Flight Path
ErrorIn Missile Flight
3/9/2009 32Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Required Simulation Features• Dynamic closed-loop missile fly-out engagements• Various missile seeker tracking types required
– Spin Scan, Con Scan, Rosette, Quadrant, Array
• Various countermeasure types required– On-Board Omni-directional and Directed
(DIRCM)– Off-Board Flares and Towed Decoys
• Non-linear interactions between seeker and ECM • IR signatures vs aspect angle and wavelength• Atmospheric propagation and background• Engagement geometry and target aircraft tactics• Output result includes missile miss distance
3/9/2009 33Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Simulation Engagement Control
Systems’ Data Management
Engagement Scenario Management3/9/2009 34Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright
2009, All Rights Reserved
Miss Distance vs IR Flares
3/9/2009 35Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Non-linear interactions & miss distance
• Missile miss distance occurs after extended dynamic interactions between ECM and Missile’s Seeker
• Seeker contains many non-linear functions and components, such as steering surface limits, saturating amplifiers and S-shaped tracking discriminators
• ECM signals inherently cause seekers to operate in non-linear regions and with non-linear logic and functions
• Extended dynamic interactions between non-linear systems inherently gives rise to chaotic behavior
• Chaotic behavior means a small change in an inputcondition or parameter can lead to a large change in missile miss distance
3/9/2009 36Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
What Is Chaotic Behavior?• Noticed By Lorenz In Weather Prediction Studies
• Plot Trajectory Is Not Repetitive
• May Possess Multiple “Strange Attractors”
• Final Result Depends On Duration Of Interaction
• May Possess “Quasi- Stable Regions
• Caused By Non-Linearities In Extended Dynamic Interactions
• Plot Trajectory Depends On Initial Conditions
3/9/2009 37Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Simulating Chaotic BehaviorFor realistic and valid simulation the threat subsystems must include appropriate non-linearities and narrow threat parameter ranges
Simulation models and input parameter values must be validated to confirm they include key non-linear interactions and models and parameters together generate realistic chaotic behavior
Multiple simulation runs (Batch Runs) of engagements, using Monte Carlo selection of expected threat, ECM and engagement parameter values, should be performed
The chaotic scatter results from individual runs in the batch should be collected to establish statistical distributions
3/9/2009 38Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Sample MANPADS Batch Result:Miss distance scatter vs missile launch azimuth for a particular flare deployment patternMiss Distance vs Missile Launch Azimuth
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Launch Angle (deg)
Mis
s D
ista
nce
Mis
s D
ista
nce
(m)
Missile Launch Angle (deg)
Fixed Parameters
A/C IR Rad Int800 w/str
Flare IR Rad Int4000 w/str
Flare Deployment6 flares
0.5 sec spacing
Random Parameters(Monte Carlo Selection)
Launch Distance2000 to 4000 m
Missile Velocity600 to 1000 m/s
3/9/2009 39Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Probability Miss Exceeds ThresholdProbability Miss Distance Exceeds Indicated Thresholds
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
100 m200 m300 m
Fixed Parameters
A/C IR Rad Int800 w/str
Flare IR Rad Int4000 w/str
Flare Deployment6 flares
0.5 sec spacing
Random Parameters(Monte Carlo Selection)
Launch Distance• 2000 to 4000 m
Missile Velocity• 600 to 1000 m/s
100 m
200 m
300 m
3/9/2009 40Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Plotting CM Effectiveness• Plot miss distance scatter data so that the
probability (Percentage Of Runs) miss distance exceeds pre-selected thresholds as a function of missile azimuth launch angle.
• Provides a means to: Develop Effectiveness Requirements Specifications Develop Equipment Test Procedures Based on
Effectiveness Specifications Develop Countermeasure Deployment Tactics Develop Aircraft Maneuver Timings And Strategies
3/9/2009 41Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
MANPADS/Airliner/CM Engagements• Wide Body Aircraft
– Four Engines– In Take-off, Climbing at 100
– Speed 100 m/sec, – AC Altitude at Missile Launch: 400 m– Demos Of Both Flare and DIRCM Protection
• Missile Launch– Launch Range 1.5 Km– Demos Of First (One Color, Spin Scan Tracking) and
Third Generation (Two Colour, Rosette Tracking) Missiles
3/9/2009 42Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
MANPADS CharacteristicsThreat Wave Band
(microns)Tracking
TechniqueReference
SA-7
Grail
1.9-2.8
(uncooled)
Spin Scan
(AM)
Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04
Zaloga, Janes Pub, 1988
SA-14Gremlin
1.9-4.1(cooled)
Con Scan(FM)
Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/SA-14
SA-18Grouse
2-3 & 3-5(two colour
discrimination)
Con Scan?(FM)
Grossman et al, Rand Study, #1713
Stinger
Post
IR/UV dual
(ECCM - colour
discrimination)
Rosette http://www.redstone.army.mil/
Systems/STINGER.html
3/9/2009 43Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Countering A Spin Scan Tracker
Graphics: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt
Counter-Phase ECM Amplitude Modulation Causes Angle Error Sweeping ECM AM Frequency Can Ensure Counter-Phasing
Spinning ReticleTarget Detection and Tracking
Relative Phase Determines Target Angle
3/9/2009 44Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Directed IR CM Protection
• Miss Distance Created By Anti-Phase Amplitude Modulated Jamming That Introduces:– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout
The Missile’s Flight, Or– Rapid Angle Track Error Sufficiently Large To Cause
Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-Acquisition• Directed Jammer Beam Offers Large Jam to
Signal Ratio and Large Angle Track Error Normally (vs Omni-Directional Shuttered Heat Sources)
• Requires Detection and Closed Loop Tracking Of Attacking Missile Signature (Body/Plume) To Direct The Focused IR Beam
3/9/2009 45Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
DIRCM Simulation Features• Directed Jamming Beam
– Laser or High Intensity Lamp– Radiant Intensity vs Beamwidth & Wavelength– Programmable Amplitude Modulation
Sequences• Closed-loop Servo Controlled Beam
Steering– Quadrant Array, Two Color Missile Tracking
• Missile IR/UV Signatures vs Time, Aspect Angle and Wavelengths
3/9/2009 46Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
DIRCM Swept AM vs Spin Scan
3/9/2009 47Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Role Of Dynamic Simulation
• Provides scopes of primary seeker subsystem responses to ECM stimuli enabling analysts to understand key interactions
• Provides graphics of missile and aircraft trajectories and end-game miss distance
• Batch simulation runs collect statistics of engagement outcomes (miss distance) for a wide range of engagement scenarios
3/9/2009 48Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Swept AM vs Spin ScanBatch Run Effectiveness Results
Average Miss Distance (m)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
3/9/2009 49Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Swept AM vs Spin ScanMiss distance dependence on relative AM & Spin Scan Phase(by varying missile launch range in a tail chase geometry)
Miss Distance Depends Somewhat on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Spin Scan Phase)
Swept AM vs Spin Scan
0.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.090.0
100.0
1200 1250 1300 1350 1400
Missile Launch Range (m)
Mis
sil
e M
iss D
ista
nce (
m)
Miss Distance:Average = 57.9 m
Last Mode:100% In Search
OutboardInboard
3/9/2009 50Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Typical Rosette Scans (Multiple Spinning Optics)
Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis
• Scans While Tracks• Digital Tracking• Spatial Sampling• Quasi-Imaging• ECM Generation Of
Angle Error May Be Difficult
3/9/2009 51Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Swept AM vs Rosette Engagement
3/9/2009 52Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Rosette AM Deception AnalysisRosette Characteristics
• Two Counter-Rotating Mirrors
• Rotation Rates =15 & 27 Hz• Petal Frequency = 42 Hz• Rosette Frequency = 3 Hz• Number of Petals = 14• Sequence As Shown
1
2
3
41
2
3
4
7
1013
5
8
11
14
6
9
12
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
AM ECM Characteristics• AM Center Frequency = 43.5 Hz
3/9/2009 53Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Angle Error vs AM Frequency
-1.000
-0.500
0.000
0.500
1.000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-1.000
-0.500
0.000
0.500
1.000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-1.000
-0.500
0.000
0.500
1.000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
42.0 Hz
43.5 Hz
45.0 Hz
Angle Errors
Time (Sec)
AM Freq
3/9/2009 54Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Swept AM vs RosetteMiss distance dependence on missile launch range in tail chase geometry
Miss Distance Depends Substantially on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Rosette Phase)
Swept AM vs Rosette
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
1200 1250 1300 1350 1400
Missile Launch Range (m)
Mis
sile
Mis
s D
ista
nc
e (
m)
Miss Distance:Average = 27.5 m
Last Mode:50% In Search
OutboardInboard
3/9/2009 55Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Average Missile Miss Distance (m)
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
Swept AM vs Rosette Effectiveness
3/9/2009 56Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
IR Jammer Protection
• Directional AM Jamming Offers Large A Jam to Signal Ratio That Is Normally Required To Generate A Large Angle Track Error
• Anti-Phase Amplitude Modulated Jamming May Create A Large Missile Miss Distance By :– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout
Missile Flight, Or– Introducing a Sufficiently Rapid Large Angle Track
Error Causing Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-Acquisition (ie Missile Flies and Unguided, Ballistic Trajectory for a Portion of Its Flight)
3/9/2009 57Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Flares vs Rosette Engagement
3/9/2009 58Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Flares vs Rosette Effectiveness
3/9/2009 59Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Flares vs Spin Scan Effectiveness
3/9/2009 60Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Flare Protection• Factors Affecting Missile Miss Distance:
– Ejection Time Relative To Missile End Game– Ignition and Burn Out Times– Ejection Velocity, Direction, Kinematics
» Flare Velocity Dynamics Seeker Discrimination
– IR Signature (Radiant Intensity)» Two Colour Seeker Discrimination
– Physical Extent Of Flare Cluster» Spatial Seeker Discrimination (Imaging)
3/9/2009 61Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Airliner MANPADS Protection• On-Board (DIRCM)
– Modulation’s Success Depends on Threat’s Tracking Technique
– Requires Threat Analysis Capabilities
• Defeat of Advanced Trackers May Be Difficult if DIRCM Power Is Not Sufficient to Cause Damage
• Off-Board (Flares)– Deployment Sequence
Relative to End Game (Timing) Is Important For Success
– Success Is Engagement Geometry Dependent
• Success Is Relatively Independent Of Threat’s Tracking Technique
3/9/2009 62Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
The Roles Of Dynamic Simulation In Airliner MANPADS Protection
• Single simulation runs enable the analyst to understand the countermeasure characteristics required to produce large miss distances in various missiles and engagement geometries by viewing embedded seeker scopes
• Batch simulation runs produce operationally significant statistical effectiveness data and plots
• Simulations are critical for planning, conducting and analyzing expensive and limited field trials
3/9/2009 63Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved
Dynamic Simulation Properties Required to Fulfill this Role
• Simulations must be high fidelity and replicate the seeker’s responsiveness and primary non-linearities - tracking discriminators, amplifiers, ECCM logic, and gimbal and control surface limits and physics based interactions with countermeasures
• Simulations must compute miss distance for effectiveness evaluations by integration of incremental flight path errors, including the influence of non-linearities
• Simulations must run batches quickly for efficient statistical data collection • Simulations should possess one-for-one mapping of hardware seeker
subsystems to software subsystems for validation - hierarchical system of systems
• Simulations must possess scopes and graphics embedded at various test points for engineering analysis
3/9/2009 64Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved