McNair Scholars Journal

Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 8

Winter 1998

The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American ForeignAffairs in the Post-Cold War Era (LiteratureReview)Shannon M. IngramGrand Valley State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair

Copyright ©Winter 1998 by the authors. McNair Scholars Journal is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU.http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair?utm_source=scholarworks.gvsu.edu%2Fmcnair%2Fvol2%2Fiss1%2F8&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages

Recommended CitationIngram, Shannon M. (1998) "The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs in the Post-Cold War Era (Literature Review),"McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 8.Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair/vol2/iss1/8

The Role of u.s. Intelligence in American ForeignAffairs in the Post-Cold War Era (Literature Review)

Shannon M. IngramMcNair Scholar

Polly]. Diven, Ph.D.McNair Mentor

Abstract:Theendof theCold War initiated a rev­olutionary erafor theAmerican intelli­gence community. This literature reviewanalyzes theneweraofuncertainty andreform theintelligence community iscurrently facing. First, it presents thebackground andstructure of theintelli­gence community. Next, it presents ananalysis of theintelligence communitydUring the Cold War era. Finally, it ana­lyzes thecontending arguments and the­ories on thefuture of theAmericanintelligence community.

This review takes an in-depth lookat theprinCiple groupings that charac­terize current thought on thefuture roleof intelligence. The two principal schoolsof thought on thefuture role of intelli­gence are (a) those whobelieveintelligence is no longer needed, and (b)those who recognize a continuing needfor intelligence. Thesecond school ofthought is then subdivided into twofields: (b1) literature advocatingreduced spending on intelligence, and(b2) literature advocating reorganiza­tion and restructuring of the intelligencecommunity and its components.

Finally, this literature reviewsuggests avenues for future research.Suggested areas of research include (a)theneed to redefine the term "intelli­gence' " (b) theneed to update themis­sion statements of intelligence agencies,and (c) theneed to increase intelligencegathering andinformation on regionswhich were not emphaSized dUring theCold War.

Historical BackgroundFrom 1940 through 1989, United States'security policy could be summed up inone word: containment. Containment ofSoviet military power and Soviet globalexpansion dominated .L ... .L.1. .L'-'.L.L'-''-'',.L.L

tional relations. poseda military; political, and ideological threatto the United and intelligenceand intelligence moldedaround the single of protectingUS National interest and containingSoviet influence.

In his 1992 article, "Winds ofChange," j.L. Gaddis stated, "During theCold War, the primary purpose of the USintelligence community was clear.American intelligence was the spyglassfocused on the Soviet Union" (p. 102).Keeping track of Soviet military researchand development and watching Sovietactivities throughout the developing worlddominated the intelligence community

Now the Cold War is over. Adversariesof the US are less apparent. There is lessclarity about the purpose of intelligenceand national security The virtual disap­pearance of the Soviet threat, or any othercomparable threat, and the disappearanceof a doctrine to guide American foreignaffairs mean that the intelligence communi­ty must devise a new mission in a nowunstable world. Redefining the purpose ofintelligence and the role intelligence willplay in the now uncertain world hasmoved to the forefront. As American for­eign policy enters a new era, intelligencepolicy is in the spotlight.

This literature review will present thecurrent arguments and theories on intelli­gence reform. First, there will be a defini­tion of intelligence and a brief overview ofthe intelligence community Second willfollow a summary of the role of intelli­gence during the Cold War. Next, the twoprimary schools of thought which struc­ture present-day intelligence theory andits future role in foreign affairs will be pre­sented. Finally; there will be a discussion

of the gaps within the research on intelli.:gence reform, and suggestions for otherfruitful avenues for future research.

The Intelligence CommunityThis section discusses the definitionof and a briefoverview of the .L.L.L\"''-'.L.L.L>'-.'-'.L.L'-''-' r("\1"YYYY11111,lh:T

Defining intelligence will help generateinsight into how to andthe current formation the U.S.gence community

Defining IntelligenceThe definition and scope of intelligencehas been in a state of continuous evolu­tion since its inception. In 1955, intelli­gence' as defined by the j. Edgar Hoover'sFBI administration, "dealt with all thethings which should be known inadvance of initiating a course of action"(Ransom, 1970). This definition wasbroad and idealistic. In the 1960's, seek­ing a more realistic definition of intelli­gence, ex-Director of Central IntelligenceAdmiral William E Raborn defined it as"information which has been carefullyevaluated as to its accuracy and signifi­cance" in terms of national security(Ransom, 1970). In the Dictionary ofUnited States Military Terms for jointUsage, intelligence is defined as:

The product resulting from the col­lection, evaluation, analysis, integra­tion, and interpretation of all avail­able information which concerns oneor more aspects of foreign nations orof areas of operations and which isimmediately of potentially significantto planning.

In spite of the evolution and variation inthe defining of intelligence throughoutthe years, one link is apparent. The defi­nition of intelligence has always varieddepending on one's position and role.

Great diversity is found in thedefinition and application of the term

38 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs

"intelligence" amongst agencies, foreignpolicy elites, and administrators. As aresult, intelligence has been open to per­sonal interpretation, and has been a termused to cover everything from clandestineactivity to espionage. Ultimatel~ the mis­use of the term has resulted in a loss ofprecise meaning. Intelligence inherentlysuggests a foreknowledge of intentionsand information for better decision mak­ing, and most of the definitions in printconcerning intelligence imply this fact.However, the precise definition of intelli­gence has become hazy: The limits andboundaries of the activities and objectiveswhich are included in the bounds ofintelligence have begun to elude thepolitical community:

The haze surrounding the definitionof intelligence becomes important interms of an analysis of the frameworkwithin which the debate on the futurerole of intelligence is occurring. If intelli­gence is not clearly defined, it is,impossi­ble to agree upon which intelligence activ­ities should continue or be classified as"intelligence" in this post-Cold War era.

Overview of the Intelligence CommunityThe actual scope and size of the intelli­gence cornmunitys budget and personnelremains uncertain due to the culture ofsecrecy in which the community and itsactivities are set. However, some infor­mation about the structure and composi­tion of the intelligence community iswell known. The U.S. intelligence com­munity is composed of 13 agencies thatare managed by the Director of CentralIntelligence. The DCI exercises hisauthority through the National ForeignIntelligence Board and the NationalIntelligence Council. The DCI is responsi­ble to the National Security Council and,through this council, to the President.

The Department of Defense (DOD) isthe largest component of the intelligencecommunity: Two-thirds to three-fourths ofthe federal intelligence budget is spent

within this department. Intelligence forbranches of the armed services, theNational Security Agency, the NationalReconaissance Office, Central Imagery;and the Defense Intelligence Agency allfall under DOD intelligence units. Thisinformation is valuable for understandingsome of the schools of thought in the lit­erature on intelligence reform and thedepartments targeted for reform.

Another crucial fact concerns thecreation of agencies within the intelli­gence community: Most of the agencieswithin the intelligence community werecreated by executive directive to countera Soviet initiative during the Cold War.The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)is the only agency created by legislationwith a mission separate from ColdWar objectives.

Intelligence during the Cold WarTo understand why intelligence reform isan issue, one must examine the role ofintelligence during the Cold War. A ColdWar analysis of intelligence will providethe background needed to understand thecontext of current suggestions for reform.

In Abram Schulsky's 1992 essa~

"What Is Intelligence? Secrets andCompetition Among States," he states thatbefore the Cold War the United States didnot have a very extensive and active mili­tary of intelligence establishment. DuringWorld War II, the department of Researchand Analysis within the Office of StrategicServices relied heavily on open sources toaid the war effort. "The United Statesrelied heavily upon social scientists, histo­rians, and other academics to provide for­eign policy information." (p. 19). Thiswealth of human talent provided relevantinformation concerning the war effort.

However, when the Cold War began,a different kind of intelligence problemwas posed to the United States. TheUnited States could no longer rely solelyon academics to serve as open sources toprovide information concerning the Soviet

Union, because the Soviet Union did notprovide open in formation about theinternal workings of the country:"Information that other countries pub­lished as a matter of course (e.g., defensebudget or maps) was regarded as secret inthe Soviet Union, and either was not pub­lished or was published only in a distort­ed fashion" (p. 22). As a result, the UnitedStates was forced to construct specializedmechanisms for researching Russia inorder to address U.S. national securityinterests. The United States began to formand develop an array of technical collec­tion methods to acquire informationabout the Soviet Union. The formation ofthese methods of intelligence gatheringinevitably revolutionized American for­eign policy and historical intelligenceorganizations. "Various sorts of technicalcollection existed previously, but this newtype of intelligence had the importantcharacteristic that it did not totallydepend on the other side not knowingyou were engaged in it" (p. 23). The phe­nomena of technical collection provedvery different from human intelligencegathering, and soon the intelligence com­munity evolved, serving as a countervail­ing force in a then bipolar world. Neworganization were created to sustain theintelligence community "With the excep­tion of the CIA, which was created by leg­islation, the other major communityorganizations were created by executivedirective to cope with requirements gener­ated by the Cold War" (p. 148).

Through the decades of the ColdWar, national funds flowed into the intel­ligence establishment based on publicperception of the Soviet threat. Thebiggest economic boost for the intelli­gence community occurred in the 1980's."There was a broad political consensus inthe early Reagan years that intelligenceneeded to be strengthened with expandedcovert action programs, personnel, andtechnical collection assets" (p. 25). Theearly Reagan years became the "fat years"

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 2. 1997-1998 39

for the intelligence community The resultwas an unprecedented buildup of U.S.intelligence assets: collection and informa­tion procession technologies, personnel,and infrastructure. Although some of thegrowth of the intelligence community wasa result of new requirements, most of theincrease was a product of the emphasisbeing placed on Soviet and East-Westissues by the administration.

Now that the Cold War is over, aca­demics and foreign policy leaders andelites must decide what kind of intelli­gence system will best suit the needs andinterests of the United States in the future.

Literature on the futurerole of intelligence:Two primary schools of thoughtTwo primary schools of thought seem todominate the debate on the kind of intel­ligence system needed by the UnitedStates to meet the challenges of thefuture. The two principal schools consistof the literature by authors who (a)believe that the intelligence community isno longer needed, or (b) believe thatintelligence is still a vital component ofthe American foreign policy system. Theliterature in the second category is furthersubdivided into two subgroups. The firstsubgroup (b1) is comprised of literaturearguing for reduced spending within theintelligence community or reduction ofintelligence as a whole. The second sub­group (b2) is comprised of literatureadvocating a reorganization of the inter­nal dynamics, roles, and purposes of theintelligence community

No needfor intelligenceSome analysts argue that the U.S. intelli­gence community should be abolished.Marcus Raskin, author of the essay "Let'sTerminate the CIA" (1992) andcofounder of the Institute for PolicyStudies, argues that in the post-Cold Warworld, "The CIA and other intelligenceagencies of the United States should be

dismantled or transformed not merelyreorganized." Advocating a cooperationmodel for international relations, Raskinproposes that the CIA and other intelli­gence agencies be abolished or trans­formed because their presence has creat­ed a "culture of suspicion and secrecythat is dangerous to a democratic society"(p. 55). Raskin criticizes the way inwhich the CIA and the intelligence com­munity has an "above the law" status inAmerican society He proposes that abol­ishing the present CIA will further thequest toward a more idealistic Americanforeign policy

Roger Hilsman, in the article, "Doesthe CIA Still have a Role" (1995), con­tends that ever since the demise of theSoviet Union, the CIA has been "scroung­ing to justify its existence," and the moneyit requires as well, which totaled $3.1 bil­lion in its request to Congress late lastyear [which year?] (45). Hilsmans argu­ment attacks two of the main intelligence­gathering roles of the CIA: espionage andcovert action. Hilsman contends that espi­onage (to which he refers as "the stuff ofspy-thriller fiction") makes no significantdifference to foreign policy "its contribu­tion to wise decisions in foreign policyand defense is minimal. But the cost inlives, treasure, and intangibles is high"(1995). To support this idea, Hilsmanuses examples from World War I to theCold War in his effort to prove that espi­onage is difficult to coordinate and main­tain, because the process of espionage isintricate, dangerous, and time-consuming.

Covert action, or, as Hilsman calls it,"cloak and dagger gimmickry;"was "a fad"used to solve every problem during theCold War (p. 45). Covert action, accord­ing to Hilsman, helped the UnitedStates get around the "moral problem ofintervention and the political problemof appearing to be a bully" (p. 46). LikeRaskin, Hilsman believes that covertaction has created an aura of secrecy andsuspicion within the democratic society

of the United States. However, he believesthat the largest issue in discussing covertaction is the manner in which "Covertaction has been overused as an instru­ment of foreign policy," and the conse­quent suffering of the reputation of theUnited States (p. 48).

Hilsman's argument concerning theCIA diverges from Raskin, as Hilsmandoes not believe the CIA should beentirely abolished. Hilsman is a propo­nent of using certain forms of intelli­gence-gathering within the CIA, prioritiz­ing those intelligence-gathering forms,and dismantling those which are ineffec­tive. "The United States should get out ofthe business of both espionage and covertpolitical action. However, the CIA shouldstill have an important role to playas theindependent research and analysis organi­zation contemplated in the 1960s" (p.48). Hilsman believes that implementingthis type of reform in the CIA will resultin the elimination of substantial duplica­tion and substantial savings.

Need for IntelligenceAnother school of thought argues thatintelligence is still needed. Most intelli­gence scholars believe that the end of theCold War is not the end of conflict of ofthreats to American national securityAlthough this category shows diversity inopinion and suggested reform, all of theliterature acknowledges the need forcontinued intelligence and intelligence­gathering. The diversity arises whendiscussing the kind of intelligence systemthe United States will require in order tomeet the challenges of the future.Opinions diverge when discussing thetwo key areas, budget and policy priority

40 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs

Reduction-Based Restructuringof the Intelligence CommunityThe literature in this school of thought isbased on reform aimed at restructuringthe financial and programmatic prioritiesof the intelligence community This litera­ture is founded on the common thread ofthought that the intelligence communityno longer requires the substantive funds itneeded during the Cold War. Conflictingopinions arise in the literature over theextent to which reform needs to occurand what the new priorities should be.One main argument binds the literaturethat supports reduction-based reform: theideal intelligence configuration will beable to provide foreknowledge on adver­sary intent, even in the midst of a stream­lined budget.

Less CapitalThe first subgroup within reduction­based restructuring of intelligence is lit­erature that advocates reduced intelli­gence-gathering capacity and less moneyfor intelligence-gathering. These authorsargue that intelligence is needed, butthey contend that in this time of peace,we do not need to "recklessly use fundson intelligence" or boost the intelligencecommunity with additional funds.Lauren Spain (1995) argues thatalthough the federal government has cutdefense and national security spendingfor the U.S., spending in many areas wasonly 7 percent lower than Cold Warspending levels. In her essay; she discuss­es why she believes deeper budget cutsshould be made.

Other literature suggests diminishedallocations to the intelligence communityand advises against spending money onnew projects. O'Hanlon (1995) discusses"reducing the emphasis on nuclear deter­rence and shaping forces more explicitlyfor multilateral military activities" (1'. 32),in an effort to curtail the U.S. defensebudget to 75 percent of the average ColdWar level. Thomas McNaugher (1996)

also advocates reduction-based reform:"The defense budget cannot afford intelli­gence readiness and new weapons­something has to go." McNaugher con­tends that the Cold War mindset­"excessive money equals the road topower"-will have to go in order to suc­cessfully pursue a post-Cold War foreignpolicy (1'. 27).

Reform of certainintelligence-gathering formsOther literature reflects the increasingskepticism concerning specific forms ofintelligence-gathering. Doherty (1990)examines the broadening skepticism inCongress about covert aid programs. Heanalyzes the consequent change in votingon the budgets of covert aid programs,noting a significant decrease since theend of the Cold War. Schlesinger (1993)also acknowledges domestic political lim­itations on intelligence spending. Henotes, "While America may have thephysical strength to carry on three ofmore discrete operations simultaneously;it is not physical resources that constrainit. Our political capital, both domesticand foreign, is limited and should not bespent recklessly" (1'. 22).

Peace DividendsOthers who favor reductions and reformsof intelligence operations argue that"peace dividends" created from thereduced levels of intelligence and defenseexpenditures should be spent on domes­tic programs such as education, home­lessness, or deficit reduction. For exam­ple, Korb (1996) addresses the need to"decrease defense and intelligence spend­ing to reduce the budget deficit" (1'. 24).Carlucci (1992) advocates spending the"peace dividend" on reduction of theU.S. deficit.

Reform in Foreign Policy ApproachAmong those advocating a reduction inintelligence activities, there are some

analysts who favor reducing intelligencespending and encourage an isolationistforeign policy agenda in the post-ColdWar era. Clarke (1995) states thatAmerica needs to distinguish between"sentimentality and reality" and rediscoverits "duty to itself" (1'. 45). Clarke alsobelieves that if the United States wouldstop acting as a world police force, thesubstantive funds required for intelligencewould not be needed. According to thisview, a more isolationist foreign policywill require less intelligence-gatheringcapacity Others refer to this literature as"backward-looking," since these opinionsaim at trying to avoid the mistakes andfaults the intelligence community madeduring the 19805, instead of necessarilytaking into account the uncertainties ofwhat lies ahead.

Reorganization of IntelligenceThis category of literature advocates areorganization of intelligence capacityusing similar or additional budget allo­cations. The literature promoting reor­ganization within intelligence is basedon reform aimed at altering and revisingthe current intelligence community,using "forward looking" techniques.This literature advocates using formerintelligence structures only as a guidefor what not to do in the future.Focusing on the uncertainty of thechanging world, these authors noteareas in which the intelligence commu­nity is weak. They cite the need to buildupon those weak areas, equipping theintelligence community to deal withpotential future threats. These analystsdiverge when discussing which elementsand agencies of intelligence-gatheringneed to be priorities. However, the argu­ments found in this literature can be clas­sified as advocating changes in the goals,infrastructure, emphasis, and overall pri­orities of the intelligence communities.

GVSU McNair ScholarsJournal VOLUME 2. 1997-1998 41

GoalsSome authors believe that the intelligencecommunity needs to construct a newoverarching purpose to replace the ColdWar purpose of containing Soviet globalexpansion and presence. FormerCongressman Dave McCurdy (1994) con­tends that the Cold War doctrine provid­ed a uniting vision of objective for theintelligence communityr, where everyoneknew their mission and the primary rea­son behind their actions. Therefore, anuncertainty concerning the responsibilitiesand duties of the intelligence communityaccompanied the end of the Cold War.McCurdy believes, "The U.S. intelligencecommunity needs a new defining purposethat serves to focus and justify the com­munitys efforts" (p. 127), a purposewhich will provide "the leaders of U.S.intelligence with a grander notion of whatthey are about and a more sweepingnotion of their job" (p. 129). McCurdysuggests that the following three pointsshould be a part of the new and reformedmission for intelligence: "RevitalizingU.S.economic strength and competitiveness,maintaining a strong defense posture, andpromoting democracy abroad" (p. 129).

In his article, "Intelligence Backinginto the Future," Ernest may (1994) con­tends that in this changed world, weneed an intelligence community that will"serve the needs of the government as awhole in an effective and timely manner"(p. 67). According to May, "serving theneeds of the government as a wholeimplies generating information and analy­sis about new subjects and new things"(p. 68). Therefore, May contends that thegoal of the intelligence communityshould be striving for a higher level ofpreparedness in all areas, especially non­traditional areas.

Godson, May, and Schmitt (1995)believe that the reform debate concern­ing intelligence in the mid-1990'sbecame a dispute over "whether U.S.intelligence had reach a kind of bureau-

cratic 'old age' ... no longer up to its joband incapable of changing its ways" (p.7). However, these authors believe thatthe real question "is not whether intelli­gence will be a factor in the future butwhether the large intelligence bureaucra­cies spawned by World War II and theCold War continue to suit U.S. nationalsecurity needs" (p, 9).

In his article, Intelligence for aNewWorld Order, " Stansfield Turner (1995)argues that information is the key topower. Thus, the goal of U.S. intelli­gence should be obtaining informationthat will boost its hegemonic power and"identifying today exactly what informa­tion will give us the most power adecade or so from now" (p. 153). Turnerbelieves that this goal can be achievedby maintaining and expanding humanintelligence efforts and by building arobust network of satellites with a vari­ety of sensors. Turner suggests that thepreeminent threat to U.S. national secu­rity lies in the economic sphere.

In his 1992 essay, "Thinking AboutReorganization," James Q. Wilson, once amember of the Presidents ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board, believes thatthere are two types of agencies. The firsttype includes the agencies that produceoutcomes that can be specified inadvance. "The State Department, the FBI,the DEA, and the CIA are agencies of thesecond type; we cannot say in advancewhat we want these agencies to produceand we will not find it easy to agree onwhether they have produced it: (p. 30).Wilson believes that the goal of reorganiz­ing type-two agencies should be "decidingwhat operating culture we wish to pro­duce amongst rank-and-file employeesand then designing an organizationalstructure that will increase the chances ofthat culture being created and sustained"(p, 32). From his earlier experience as areorganizer for the Drug EnforcementAgency; he believes that the most unsuc­cessful reorganization ventures have been

those that have sought to alter the outputsof an agency rather than looking inward.Thus, by understanding the daily workand operating culture of the agencieswithin the intelligence community andfinding the breakdown in the linkbetween these routines and the policyobjectives they should fulfill, effectivereorganization can occur. "The reason formy suspicion is that reorganization planstend to be developed by staff people whoare brought in from outside the govern­ment and know little about the agenciesthey propose to change" (p. 32).

InfrastructureDuring the Cold War, the intelligencecommunity acted in secrecyr, with activi­ties hidden from the scrutiny of publicopinion. In this period, there was littlecoordination between intelligence agen­cies, between intelligence agencies andpolicy makers, between intelligence agen­cies and the military, and between theintelligence community and the generalpublic. Some analysts believe that cooper­ation within the infrastructure of intelli­gence will produce a more efficient andthorough intelligence communityr, as wellas erase past Cold War mindsets of intera­gency separation.

In the article, "U.S. Intelligence in anAge of Uncertainty: Refocusing to Meetthe Challenge," Paula Scalingi (1992) pre­dicts that "the effectivenessof U.S. intelli­gence will depend on how well Congress,the executive branch, and the communitycooperate in undertaking the necessaryinitiatives" (p. 148). Scalingi contendsthat the demise of Soviet and other inter­national conflicts has birthed a newdemand for "constant congressional moni­toring" (p. 148). Scalingi implies a needfor reform aimed at restructuring the tra­ditional relationships between the intelli­gence community and its consumers byreducing secrecy:

Bruce Weinrod (1996) agrees withScalingi'sadvocacy of reform aimed at

42 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs

greater communication and more jointcoordination among the intelligence com­munity and other members of the politicalcommunity "The intelligence communityin the post-Cold War era can make itsinformation and reports as user-friendly aspossible" (p. 88). Weinrod and Scalingiboth propose that the United willrequire an intelligence community that isuniformed and networks from within inorder to produce efficient foreknowledgeand maintain its superpower status.

Areas for further researchThe literature indicates a broad range ofopinions as to how intelligence shouldbe defined, structured, and funded in thepost-Cold War era. Much of the diversityfound in the literature can be directlylinked to the fact that what qualifies asintelligence has not been revisited orrevised as the intelligence communityhas evolved.

In the post-Cold War era, theredefining of intelligence is crucial to thelarger debate over the reorientation andrestructuring of the intelligence commu­nity As stated earlier, the definition ofintelligence is outdated, lacking preci­sion and specificity As a result, it hasbeen manipulated and used to cover ahost of activities. The term intelligenceand consequently the application of theterm has been open to individual inter­pretation since the evolution f the intel­ligence community

A definition helps bind and provideceilings and walls within which to containthe concept being defined. Now, as waysof restructuring and reorienting intelli­gence are being discussed, it is also neces­sary to wade through what has been ille­gitimately and what has been justly calledintelligence in the past, and to determinewhich activities will qualify as intelligencein the future. This process of "separatingthe sheep from the wolves" will streamlinemany agencies and rid the intelligencecommunity of financially draining

projects created during the 19805 andmistakenly categorized as intelligence dueto bureaucratic momentum.

It has been often stated, "There can­not be agreement on a solution if there isno agreement on how to prob­lem." Actual implementation of revisionsto the community will be andsparse, until a ror'hr:lrtorlr'1CT

tion of intelligence occurs. Without arechartering of the term and what itentails, the intelligence community willcontinue trying to provide foreknowledgeto its consumers following an outdatedmission encased within an unrestraineddefinition. Wilson (1992) states,"Reorganization is a favorite Washingtonactivity; not because it is a proven methodfor achieving certain policy goals, butbecause it is a strategy that can accommo­date so many motives ... inevitably it's likepushing a wet string" (p. 31). Miles(1977) wrote, "Repetitive reorganizationwithout proper diagnosis is like repetitivesurgery without proper diagnosis; obvi­ously an unsound and unhealthyapproach to the cure of the malaclY" (32).

The United States cannot fight thenon-traditional issues it currently faces inits foreign affairs with Cold War tactics.New mission statements need to be con­structed to increase effectiveness and pre­cision of duty within the intelligencecommunity Modified mission statementswill also cut down on the large amountsof overlap found within the intelligencecommunity Additional research into thetwo subgroups within the literature onintelligence reform is also necessary Acommon suggestion by policymakers andmembers of Congress is for intelligenceinvolving less secrecy and more coopera­tion. Suggestions also include an increasein the 'amount of information being dis­closed to the American public, and agreater check and balance system for theintelligence community There is aninherent conflict between the secrecyinvolved in covert operations and demo-

cratic governance based on an informedpublic. During the Cold War, the needfor secrecy led to intelligence gatheringactivities which were conducted outsidedemocratic controls.

In the post-Cold War era, the chal-lenge of a uniting for theintelligence community that will best pre­pare and gird it against the unknown willbe a continuously evolving effort.

GVSU McNair ScholarsJournal VOLUME 2. 1997-1998 43

References

Carlucci, Frank. (1992). The defense budget debate. Brookings Review (October), 54-58.

Clarke, Jonathan. (1993). America know thyself. Current (Summer), 45-48.

Diebel, Terry L. (1993). Internal and international relations in the post-Cold War world.The Washington Quarterly (Summer),

Doherty; Carroll J. (1990). Intelligence allthorization bill facingCongressiontll Quarterly Weekly Report (October), 3438-3439.

Gaddis, John L. (1990). Toward the post-Cold War world. Foreign Affairs (September),

Glaser, Charles L. (1992). Nuclear policy without an adversary: U.S. planning for the post-Soviet era.International Security (Spring), 34-67.

Godson, Roy: (1989). Intelligence requirements for the 1990's. TheWashington Quarterly (Winter), 47-65.

Godson, Roy; May; Ernest, and Schmitt, Gary: (1995). Intelligence at theCrossroads. City:Lexington Books/DC Heath.

Goodman, Allan. (1987). Intelligence and foreign policy: Reforming U.S. Intelligence.Current (Summer), 34-38.

Hastedt, Glen. (1991). Intelligence studies after the Cold War.International Studies Quarterly (October), 39-41.

Hilsman, Roger. (1995). Does the CIA still have a role? Foreign Affairs, 74,44-49.

Korb, Lawrence]. (1996). America's defense budget: Our overstuffed armed forces.Current (March), 21-26.

Layne, Christopher. (1984). The real conservative agenda. International Security (Summer), 70-81.

May; Ernest. (1992). Intelligence: Backing into the future. Foreign Affairs (Summer), 63-72.

McCurdy; Dave. (1994). Glasnost for the CIA. Foreign Affairs Q"an.lFeb.) , 125-136.

McNaugher, Thomas L. (1996). Planning future defense: Time to confront the Cold mindset.Brookings Review (Summer), 26-29.

Miles, Rufus. (1977). In James Wilson (Ed.), Thinking andReorganization.City: Lexington Books/DC Heath, 28-34.

Miller, Linda. (1990). American foreign policy: Beyond containment?International Affairs (Spring), 313-324.

Nye, Joseph S. (1994). Peering into the future. Foreign Affairs Q"uly/Aug.), 86-96.

O'Hanlon, Michael. (1995). How to be a cheap hawk. Brookings Review (Summer), 32--35.

Roberts, Brad. (1995). 1995 and the end of the post-Cold War era.TheWashington Quarterly (Winter), 5-25.

44 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs

Scalingi, Paula. (1992). U.s. intelligence in an age of uncertainty: Refocusing to meet the challenge.Washington Quarterly (Winter), 147-156.

Schlesinger, James. (1993). Quest for a post-Cold War foreign policy: Foreign Affairs (Summer), 17-28.

Spain, Lauren. (1995). The competition has bowed out. Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists (Sept.), 39.

Turner, Stansfield. (1995). Intelligence for a new world order. Foreign Affairs (Summer), 150--159.

Wallop, Malcolm. (1993). Toward a new foreign policy: A post-containment strategy:Orbis (Spring), 187--203.

Weinrod, Bruce W (1996). U.S. intelligence priorities in the post-Cold War era.World Affairs (Summer), 159.

;VSU McNair Scholars]ournal VOLUME 2. 1997-1998 45