The role of states

Iosif Botetzagias, Ph.D.Email: iosif@aegean.gr

M.Sc. in Sustainable Development, International Hellenic University Course on “International Environmental Policy, Governance, Institutions and Stakeholders”

The importance of the state

• Since states are THE most important actors in the international arena, then an important question is

“Why do states behave the way they do in the international system?”

System level analysis• Characteristics of the international system cause

states to behave the way they do. Change in the international system will cause change in state behavior. The key variable is the power of a state within the system.

State level analysis• State-level characteristics cause

states to behave the way they do.“In the wars of the European

powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense” (Monroe Doctrine, 1823)

Other levels of analysis• Organizational (intra-

state)

• Individual (leaders)President Wilson & the League of Nations

“Unit” level vs “Systemic” level explanations

• Unit-level explanations refer to elements located at the national or sub-national levels

• Systemic theories suggest that countries with different internal characteristics tend to behave in the same way if they are similarly positioned in the international system (e.g. North-South pro development)

A very old debate… • Agency vs Structure

• Participation, choices, and influence of state and non state actors

• Structural constraints on actors’ choices

The international relations’ system1. International political system is “anarchic”: nation-

states answer to no higher authority than themselves

2. The primary actors in this system are sovereign nation states: external interference is considered an act of war.

3. Three basic theories explaining why states co-operate:

a) Realist/neorealist (system-level)b) Liberal institutionalism (system-level)c) Cognitivism/Constructivism (state-level)

On international cooperation• Traditionally, International Cooperation is defined as occurring

“when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Milner 1992, p. 467 citing Keohane 1984).

• So why do states do it, if they are all-sovereign?1. Since states exist in an anarchic, Hobbesian world, their

prime interest is survival.2. Thus they would co-operate/ally in the short-term, in the

face of external threat (i.e. war). 3. They cannot co-operate in the long term due to Prisoners’

Dilemma considerations (Neo-) Realists theories

Realism/Neorealism• Based on the concept of “power”.

• States rarely co-operate. • They are in permanent antagonism for relative

gains (i.e. Since they focus on power it is a zero-sum game, “I can gain only if YOU loose” in the international power-game)

• They are motivated by rivalry and the pursuit of power in military and/or economic terms in order to safeguard their security.

The busy month of July, 1944

Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA

• 730 delegates from 44 Allied nations• 1-24 July 1944• Aim: to regulate the international postwar

monetary system; currencies exchange rates’ pegged to the US dollar creation of the IMF and the (precursor) of the World Bank

• How did this come about?

A Realist interpretation

• Bretton Woods and Hegemonic stability theory. • The cooperative order was set up and

maintained by a Great Power—in the postwar years, that was the United States of America—which was both willing and able to maintain cooperative economic orders.

New approaches…• As international cooperation became a durable and widespread

phenomenon, new theoretical approaches emerged to explain it, particularly regime theory (Krasner 1983) and neoliberal institutionalism (associated primarily with Keohane 1984, 1986).

• These approaches did not alter the core assumptions of neorealism (state centrism, states as rational unitary actors).

• Instead, they challenged the realists’ claim that states were interested in maximizing their relative gains vis-à-vis another state

• In contrast, states are more interested in maximizing their own absolute gains (i.e. being themselves better off and not paying too much attention on what others achieve)

• This claim opened an opportunity to study cooperation as a common, rather than rare, phenomenon that could transcend states’ narrow concerns with their own relative positions.

Liberal institutionalism• Based on “institutions”.• States are actually interdependent and they have

an incentive to cooperate in order to achieve mutual peace and prosperity.

• In an “anarchic” world it is easy, indeed desirable, for states to ‘free-ride’.

• Thus, setting up successful institutions (e.g. the UN) may result in joint benefits for the international community.

Cognitivism/Constructivism• Based on “ideas”.• Both previous theories assume that states want to maximize

their “gains” which are fixed in advance or determined by internal factors.

• Cognitivism examines how states respond to, and how international cooperation is shaped by, new information and ideas or by international norms (shared conceptions of appropriate behavior).

• Thus it assigns a more influential role to non-state actors.• New ideas/norms may (a) change the way states calculate

costs & benefits or (b) change states’ own perceptions of their interests/roles in the int. system (e.g. slavery/whaling)- mainly through continued international interactions

•Realist: No deal if others get more oranges - they might throw them at me!

•NeoLiberal Institutionalist: I will end up thirsty! Some oranges is better than no oranges - lets find a way of sharing!

Constructivist: Why all that fuss about oranges? Why don’t I focus on lemons instead?

An interest-based approach to IEP negotiations

• States interested in their own vulnerability to pollution.• The worse the national environmental condition, the more

likely the particular state to cooperate.• ‘Victim’ countries are more likely to pursue international

cooperation (i.e. avoiding ‘imported’ pollution)• States more likely to cooperate (i.e. agree to measures) if

compliance/abatement costs are low.• A ‘victim’ country would agree on international co-operation

ALSO for not burdening national industry (as it would be the case with unilateral action)

• Thus, taking measures also depends on the state’s economic and institutional capacities.

Classification of a country's support for international env. regulation (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta 1994:81)

Ecological vulnerability

Low High

Abatement costs

Low (1) Bystanders (2) Pushers

High

(3) Draggers (4) Intermediates

Just that?• Changes in value preferences;• Domestic interest representation of mass political

attitudes (i.e. ENGOs and green parties) (e.g. Germany – CO2 emissions);

• Industry lobbying efforts (Indonesia-logging companies);

• International political and diplomatic considerations (Japan – not vetoing African ivory trade);

could each play an important role.

• Soooo… we have a rule of thumb of ‘what-kind-of-country’ would support international environmental regulation YET ‘what-kind-of-regulation’ would that be?

Law of Least Ambitious Program (LLAP)

“Where international management can be established only through agreement among all significant parties involved, and where such a regulation is considered only on its own merits, collective action will be limited to those measures acceptable to the least enthusiastic party”

Similarities with other theories• VETO PLAYERS & JOINT DECISION TRAP (government

decisions taken at the lowest common denominator in situations a veto ability exists) yet both those theories discuss changes to the status quo and not establishing a new regime.

• Thus JDT theorists have pointed out that in real life it matters whether failure to reach a collective agreement implies either

1. (reversion rule I) maintaining the status quo ante or 2. (reversion rule II) countries revert to individual

decision making (the LLAP assumption).

Yet international cooperation is not always a LAP! Why so?

• The Decision Rule is not always Unanimity

The Alternative to Agreement is not always Individual Decision-Making

• Reversion rule I often makes it easier to retain a measure once it has been introduced, than to have it introduced in the first place.

• Once a regulation has been approved, the “veto power” shifts from the least enthusiastic party (which did not want the regulation introduced in the first place) to the most enthusiastic one (which has pressed for its endorsement).

The Unanimity Rule does not always Favor the Least Ambitious Program

• It can also serve as a preventive check from dropping back to a LAP once a decision has been made (e.g. EU).

• Thus, the effect of the unanimity rule is not so much that it favors the least ambitious program, as that it introduces a strong conservative element.

The Outcome might Depend on the Voting Sequence

• Countries A & B with positions “a” & “b” as compared to the ‘status quo’ (sq)

• Voting order ‘a-b’: State B vetoes proposal “a” so that its (preferred) proposal “b” is endorsed unanimously (since A prefers “a” to sq)

• Voting order ‘b-a’: State A vetoes proposal “b” and “a” could be endorsed (since B prefers “a” to sq). Thus the outcome could be the MOST ambitious program.