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The Role of Non-State Actors in the International Climate Change Negotiations: Understanding Agency through Functionality Profiles Naghmeh Nasiritousia, Mattias Hjerpea, and Björn-Ola Linnéra a Centre for Climate Science and Policy Research, Linköping University, Nya Kåkenhus, SE-601 74, Norrköping, Sweden
[email protected], + 46 11 36 34 97
[email protected], +46 11 36 34 38
Abstract Globalization processes have rendered non-state actors as an integral part of global governance. The extensive body of literature that has examined non-state actor involvement in global governance has focused mainly on whether and how non-state actors can influence states. Less attention has been paid to the power structures of non-state actors to answer questions about which non-state actors are most successful in exercising authority, and more precisely what governance functions non-state actors are perceived to fulfil. These questions are important in assessing what the efficiency and distributive effects of greater participation by non-state actors in international negotiations are. Using unique survey material from COP-17, we propose that different categories of non-state actors have diverse functionality profiles and that these can vary in strength from strong to weak. We further suggest that the different functionality profiles are derived from particular power sources and that agency is a function of these profiles. The study thereby contributes to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the rise in authority of non-state actors in international climate change governance and the other pertaining to the rather under-researched development of methods to study non-state actor involvement. Key words: non-state actors, climate change, global environmental governance, legitimacy Work in progress, all comments welcome! To be presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, Bremen, Germany, 4th - 6th July 2012.
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1 Introduction
Globalization processes have rendered non-state actors as an integral part of global
governance. As has been witnessed ‒ not least in global climate governance ‒ a
growing number of non-state actors participate at global conferences and authority is
increasingly exercised by non-state actors in the implementation of international treaties
and decisions (Andonova et al 2009; Bäckstrand 2008; Auer 2000). With the
international climate change negotiations continuing to be locked into inadequate levels
of commitments by states (UNEP 2010), non-state actors are expected to play a more
pronounced role. This development has widely been perceived as a way of increasing
not only efficiency, but also legitimacy, in global governance.
However, with non-state actors operating at the domestic, international and
transnational levels, it is important to understand factors that contribute to different
levels of authority for different actors. The extensive body of literature that has
examined non-state actor involvement in global governance has focused mainly on
whether and how non-state actors can influence states (Betsill and Corell 2001; Newell
2000). Less attention has been paid to the power structures of non-state actors to answer
questions about which non-state actors are most successful in exercising authority in
global governance, and more precisely what governance functions non-state actors are
perceived to fulfil.
In this paper we examine the implications of the “participatory turn” in global
environmental governance (Bäckstrand 2006) and argue that greater attention be
directed at the question of who is participating and to what capacity. While
acknowledging that non-state actors are not a homogenous group, many studies either
discuss the role of non-state actors1 in general terms, or generalize based on case studies
of one type of non-state actors (Betsill and Corell 2001; Fisher and Green 2004; Scholte
2002). This implies that systematic comparison of perceptions of the authority and
functions across groups of non-state actors is largely lacking. In addition, the role of
other actor categories – such as local government associations, indigenous groups and
trade unions – has received less attention. This is significant as non-state actors play a
range of roles and, in the words of Keck and Sikkink (1999: 99), “to understand how
change occurs in the world polity we have to unpack the different categories of
1 Other terms used in studies are civil society actors, non-governmental organizations or stakeholders. Here we use the term non-state actor to mean any group that is not a sovereign state, while excluding armed groups.
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transnational actors, and understand the quite different logic and process in these
different categories”. In sum, to date research has not offered a sufficient analysis for
the comparative advantage of certain non-state actors over others in exercising authority
in global governance.
The aim of this paper is to present a more systematic comparison of the
perceived roles of non-state actors in the global climate governance complex and to
elaborate on the images and self-images of the governance functions they potentially
perform. To our knowledge, systematic analysis of the perceptions among policy-
makers and other actors of which governance functions different non-state actors wield
has not been performed. Using unique survey material from COP-17, we explore what
the most important functions different categories of non-state actors are perceived to
perform in international governance of climate change. This question is important in
assessing what the efficiency and distributive effects of greater participation by non-
state actors in international negotiations are. The paper also explores if and how surveys
can be employed to enable such systematic comparisons. The study thereby contributes
to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the rise in authority of non-
state actors in climate change governance and the other pertaining to the rather under-
researched development of methods to study non-state actor involvement.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section surveys the literature on
governance functions of non-state participation in international negotiations, with a
particular focus on climate change governance. We present a theoretical framework for
understanding how functions and authority of non-state actors are interlinked.
Subsequently, section three presents the survey design. Here, the methods and materials
used are described but also, more importantly, a general reflection upon methodological
aspects of non-state involvement in global (environmental) governance is offered.
Findings from the surveys are presented in section four, primarily organized around two
tables: (i) (overall) perceptions on governance functions performed by a cross-section of
non-state actors, and (ii) parties, self/own, other actor perceptions of functions for
specific non-state actors. Lastly section five concludes.
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2 State of the Art and Theory
There is a consensus in the literature that non-state actors play a significant role in
global environmental governance (Andanova et al 2009; Betsill and Corell 2001; Zürn
1998). At the intergovernmental level, non-state actors seek to shape policies and
norms. They can lobby states to ensure either general or specific policy outcomes or
draw attention to particular concerns. They often also seek to raise their own profile by
highlighting specific causes or their constituencies as being important for the
effectiveness of the issue under negotiation. Their activities in and around
intergovernmental negotiations have thus been described as “NGO diplomacy” (Betsill
and Corell 2008). Non-state actors participating in intergovernmental meetings can
therefore be considered both as stakeholders and as international lobby organizations.
At the transnational level, new forms of governance arrangements mean that
non-state actors have new opportunities to exercise authority2 and take on greater
responsibility to manage collective challenges. This type of governance has been called
the “transnational regime complex” (Abbott 2011) or a form of “transnational
neopluralism” (Cerny 2010). The defining feature of this new governance is that it is
decentralized, polycentric and fragmented (Abbott 2011). The lack of centralized
governance arrangements means that non-state actors have taken on new roles and
challenged the monopoly of states in some areas, including establishing policies,
practices and norms. This is manifest in the plethora of experimental initiatives
conducted by private actors in the field of climate change (Hoffman 2011). At the
transnational level, therefore, non-state actors can be considered both as implementers
and governors in their own right.
While much of the early literature was concerned with exploring whether non-
state actors represent a challenge to state power (Mathews 1997), in recent years the
focus has been more on an empirical documentation of their activities and examining
their influence in international governance (Betsill and Corell 2001; Newell 2000).
According to the current literature, these “political entrepreneurs” (Keck and Sikkink
1999) are important players that carry out a multitude of roles, including information-
sharing; capacity-building and implementation; and rule-setting (Andonova et al 2009).
2 Authority is defined as “legitimized power, operating within the international arena” (Hall and Biersteker 2002:3)
5
The literature however suffers from at least two weaknesses. First, studies have
generally been good at mapping the new participatory arrangements in international
environmental governance, but have focused less on explaining the distributive effects
of greater non-state actor involvement. For example, several studies examine non-state
actor initiatives in the field of climate change governance without considering how
authority and power differences amongst groups of non-state actors affect normative
aspects of global democracy. This is particularly noticeable in studies that explore the
influence of non-state actors in international environmental governance, which tend to
focus on the role of influential environmental NGOs (Betsill 2008; Gulbrandsen and
Andresen 2004) or business NGOs (Vormedal 2008 and Falkner 2009) rather than on
marginalized groups. This means that there has been less focus on groups of non-state
actors that may exert little influence in the same structural setting, which implies that
the literature may have produced a distorted picture of the successes of non-state actors
in international negotiations. This also means that while the literature points to the
power of non-state actors in international governance in general, it does not examine the
interplay between actors and which ones are more effective in exercising authority.
Therefore, the literature cannot say whose interests are being voiced in international
fora. This raises questions about the legitimacy of global governance.
This brings us to the second weakness, which is that the literature that does look
at the normative aspects of new types of actors in global governance, tends to focus on
issues of representativeness at the decision-making level rather than participation across
the whole policy cycle. While issues of representativeness are of central concern to
constitutionalist, pluralist and deliberative approaches to democratic governance
(Dingwerth 2007), issues pertaining to the actual governance functions of different
types of non-state actors have received little attention. Not all groups of non-state actors
elect to participate at the inter-governmental policy level, but those that do often use
their participation as a platform for furthering their work outside the intergovernmental
arena. Thus, while procedures for participating in international decision-making are an
important aspect of global democracy, it is also pertinent to examine what outcome this
greater participation has on authority across the whole policy-cycle amongst groups of
non-state actors. We argue that even with equal rules for non-state actor participation in
international negotiations, differences between categories of non-state actors means that
their participation leads to different capacities in exercising authority.
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In sum, we lack frameworks to understand authority across different sets of non-
state actors in a given structural setting and the implications of this participation for
global democracy. In this paper we argue that authority is linked to the different
functions that actors perform. In order to assess authority amongst categories of non-
state actors, we next turn to the issue of differing power sources and functions.
2.1 Understanding Functions of Non-state actors in Global Environmental Governance
Non-state actors represent a range of interests and discourses. Their activities
take place at different levels – from the local to the global. There is by now a broad
literature that looks at how non-state actors are turned into agents by virtue of their
authority.3 The most common analytical perspectives hold that authority is a function of
unequal knowledge of rules and access to resources as well as differing capabilities
(O’Neill et al. 2004; Fisher and Green 2004). We suggest, however, that authority can
also be a function of the role that different non-state actors play.
In this paper, we propose that different categories of non-state actors have
diverse functionality profiles and that these can vary in strength from strong to weak.
By functionality profiles we mean the combination of functions associated with a
category of non-state actor. We further suggest that the different functionality profiles
are derived from particular power sources and that authority is a function of these
profiles. Therefore, in order to obtain a fuller picture of non-state actor authority, it is
necessary to examine factors pertaining to the sources of power and the activities and
roles of non-state actors.
While non-state actors often lack traditional forms of power, the literature has
outlined their alternative sources of power. The key skills and resources that non-state
actors bring to the negotiating table have been identified by Gulbrandsen and Andresen
(2004:58) as being derived from their intellectual base, membership base, political base,
and financial base. More specifically, the different sources of non-state actor power are
believed to include knowledge and information (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Betsill and
Corell 2008); economic resources and structural power (Levy and Newell 2000; Newell
2000; Rowlands 2001; Beck 2005; Falkner 2009); organizational capacity, transnational
3 See for example Dellas et al. 2011
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networking and mobilization capacity (Falkner 2009); and legitimacy (Gough and
Shackley 2001). Concerning the latter factor, the former Secretary-General of the
United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali has expressed that “non-governmental
organizations are a basic form of popular representation in the present day world. Their
participation in international organizations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political
legitimacy of those international organizations” (cited by P. Mucke 1997).
Thus we can identify a number of types of power that non-state actors may
wield to differing degrees. Borrowing from Keck and Sikkink (1999:95) and Boström
and Tamm Hallström (2010:43), we build a typology of power sources used by non-
state actors to gain authority in international politics. These are symbolic (legitimacy),
cognitive (knowledge, expertise), social (access to networks), leverage (access to key
actors) and material/structural (access to resources) power. Different categories of non-
state actors may thus wield these types of power to different strengths and in different
combinations.
Because of their differing power sources, different types of non-state actors can
be expected to place greater emphasis on certain activities and roles. We adapt Albin’s
(1999) typology of NGO activities4 and propose nine key dimensions of non-state actor
activities at international negotiations: Influence the agenda, propose solutions, provide
information and expertise, influence decisions and policy-makers, awareness raising,
implement action on the ground, evaluate consequences of policies and measures,
represent public opinion, represent marginalized voices . This categorization shows that
non-state actors have roles to play throughout the policy cycle. Because the different
activities require different sets of power assets, we expect that diverse categories of non-
state actors will be associated with some of these functions more than others.
Thus, depending on the combination of power sources held by a certain category
of non-state actors, the function they have in environmental governance will differ. For
example, because of the material and leverage powers of business and industry groups,
they can be expected to be particularly strong on influencing decisions and policy
makers. In contrast, environmental NGOs can be considered to draw strength from their
cognitive and social powers because of their usually large membership and mobilization
capacity. These types of membership organizations can also use symbolic power if they
4 Albin (1999) identifies the following activities: problem definition, agenda setting, and goal setting; enforcement of principles and norms; provision of information and expertise; public advocacy and mobilization; lobbying; direct participation in the formulation of international agreements; and monitoring and other assistance with compliance.
8
are seen as representing public opinion that is not represented elsewhere, such as adding
a voice for the environment or future generations. As such, they may raise awareness
and influence policy makers. On the other hand, issues of representativeness means that
their advice may be considered biased at times.
Symbolic and cognitive power may also be the main strengths of indigenous
groups and trade unions. However, as they represent specific communities and possess
knowledge on particular issues, their contribution may be valuable on limited issues.
Other groups where cognitive power is one of the key power sources are academic
NGOs and intergovernmental organizations. These organizations can draw on their
knowledge and skills to introduce new ideas and develop creative policy solutions.
Because of their connections at different levels of governance and their financial
strength, intergovernmental organizations also wield leverage and material powers and
can therefore be expected to be active in implementing decisions in member countries.
Different categories of non-state actors thus have different functions in the
negotiations depending on their power sources. While they may be strong in certain
areas, they may be weaker in others. Because power sources are distributed unequally
across categories of non-state actors and because no actor dominates all types of power
sources, no one group can be expected to have a privileged position across all stages of
the policy process. For example, even though business and industry groups could be
considered to have an advantage over other groups because of their material and
leverage powers, their authority is limited by a number of factors. Boström and Tamm
Hallström (2010: 43) for instance note that “TNCs may have incredible power, but they
are short of the symbolic power that relates to environmental and social responsibility”.
Business and industry groups can therefore be expected to play weaker roles in the
enforcement of principles and norms and in adding legitimacy to the process.
This theoretical framework thus outlines how functionality profiles can be used
to understand how different power sources provide authority to certain categories of
non-state actors across the policy cycle. In other words, it provides a link to understand
how actors come to be perceived as agents for particular governance functions. While
acknowledging that empowerment and disenfranchisement is related to the
characteristics of individual actors as suggested by Fisher and Green (2004), this
framework adds another dimension to the question of how certain actors are perceived
as being authoritative in certain policy functions. This issue is explored below in the
context of climate change governance.
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2.2 Understanding Functions of Non-State Actors in Climate Change Governance
Climate change governance is an issue area that cannot be understood without
examining the role of non-state actors. While the focus of much governance activity in
this field is centred around the international negotiations under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), non-state actors are
instrumental in shaping the contours of climate change governance, including through
private, hybrid, networked and community-based governance (Dellas et al. 2011; Abott
2011; Andonova et al 2009; Corell and Betsill 2001). Climate change governance
therefore offers a rich test-case for our empirical study.
While we do not attempt to systematically explore the authority of non-state
actors in climate change governance, we seek to undertake a first step in the mapping of
perceived functions and influence of different categories of non-state actors.
Specifically, we focus on the official categorization of types of organizations used by
the UNFCCC. In the UNFCCC system non-state actors are divided into constituency
groups, which include Business and industry non-governmental organizations
(BINGO), Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO), Indigenous
peoples organizations (IPO), Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA),
Research and independent non-governmental organizations (RINGO), Trade Unions
non-governmental organizations (TUNGO), and Farmers and agricultural NGOs,
Women and Gender, and Youth (YOUNGO).5 Another group of observer organizations
is constituted by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the World Bank and
UNEP.
The use of this categorization allows us to explore whether the power sources
associated with particular types of non-state actors has additional explanatory power
that goes beyond previous analyses of individual non-state actors. While being well
aware that there are large differences within these categories, organizations align
themselves with a constituency when becoming an observer organization to the
UNFCCC. Constituencies are thus intended to be loose groups, which represent
“diverse but broadly clustered interests or perspectives” (UNFCCC 2011). The different
constituencies can therefore not be considered as monolithic blocks; rather, they
represent a broad spectrum of interests which are often also conflicting. According to
Boström and Tamm Hallström (2010) more divided constituencies could find it more
5 http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_2011_english.pdf
10
difficult to exert social power. Nevertheless, there are typically greater commonalities
within a constituency than between constituencies.
Thus, while non-state actors compete over exerting authority, they have different
power sources and play different roles. The rivalry between different non-state actors
has been particularly stark in the climate change negotiations, which makes it an
interesting test for exploring the different functions played by non-state actors. The
question of which non-state actors have been most successful in advancing their
interests and why in international climate governance remains largely unexplored. This
paper suggests that we cannot fully understand the authority of non-state actors if we do
not consider their distinct roles and functions within environmental governance. This
first step will allow us to see what differences in perception of roles that exists between
these broad interest alignments.
3 Data and Measures
In order to compare the different functions of non-state actors in the climate
change negotiations, this paper uses questionnaire data from COP 17/CMP 7 that took
place in Durban, South Africa, in December 2011. In a second step, we also look at
what roles non-state actors stress in their submissions to the UNFCCC on the matter of
why their participation should be enhanced. These submissions were made to the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) in 2010 as part of an on-going discussion of
how to enhance non-state actor participation in the climate change negotiations.6 Most
of the submissions were made by BINGOs and ENGOs however, which means that
there is little information from the other categories of non-state actors. Nevertheless, the
submissions can provide insights into how these two groups of actors wish to portray
their roles in international climate governance. These self-images will therefore be
compared to the results obtained in the questionnaire to examine their validity.
The paper thereby offers a new approach to the study of non-state actors, which
has thus far been dominated by case studies. While case studies offer detailed analysis
of particular functions of non-state actors, they are limited in scope due to the sheer
6 UNFCCC (2010), paragraph 19
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number cases and wealth of information. For the purposes of mapping functions of a
range of non-state actors, we therefore borrow the methodology used in much of the
good governance literature, where perceptions of experts and public opinion are relied
on to assess degree of corruption, freedom of expression and transparency of countries
around the world (see for example Transparency International and Freedom House).
The questionnaire thus measures perceptions of functions and as Kaufman et al (2008:3)
state, “perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their perceptions,
impression and views”.
The questionnaire was conducted by the International Negotiations Barometer
and surveyed participants in fourteen official side-events during both weeks of the
conference, producing a total of 384 responses. It builds on a pilot study that was
launched at the previous COP/MOP in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010. We decided
to target COP participants with relatively high familiarity of non-state actor activities,
for which the side-events provide a good venue (Lovell 2007, Schroeder and Lovell
2012). The questionnaire, which is undertaken with the agreement of the UNFCCC
Secretariat, has been collected since COP 13 in Bali and has previously been used to
map functions of side events (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010), and a similar survey of COP
participants has been employed to study leadership questions (Karlsson et al 2011), and
individual preferences for principles for effort sharing (Hjerpe et al 2011).
The question that will be analysed here reads: “Which of the following observer
organizations, if any, does in your view play the most significant role in the areas listed
below.” The non-state actor categories were chosen based on the recognized
constituencies, but due to space constraints we did not include women and gender,
youth, or farmers. Thus the categories asked for are the following: Business groups,
research organisations, environmental NGOs, municipalities and local authorities, trade
unions, intergovernmental organizations, and indigenous peoples. There was also a
category for ‘none of these actors’ for respondents who perceived none of the observer
organizations as playing a significant role for particular functions. For the options of
functions performed, we use our nine dimensions of non-state actor activities from
above. In the context of climate change, we distinguish between taking action on
mitigation and taking action on adaptation as these actions differ in their nature and
scope. The survey therefore outlines the following functions: Influence the international
climate change agenda, propose viable solutions to climate change, provide information
and expertise, influence decisions and policy-makers, raise awareness of climate change
12
among the public, take actions on climate change mitigation, take actions on climate
change adaptation, evaluate consequences of policies and measures, represent public
opinion on climate change issues, represent marginalized voices.
We received 276 answers on this question, of which 220 were non-state actors
and 56 were state actors. Geographically the respondents resided in all six major
regions. While not representative for the average COP participant, the responses are
nevertheless heterogeneous enough to capture respondents with different backgrounds
and from most parts of the world.
4 Results
The results show that the non-state actors largely complement each other, with the full
spectrum of activities being covered. The questionnaire data found distinct functionality
profiles for most of the actors. Below, we begin by looking at how participants perceive
the key functions of different categories of non-state actors and, in the case of BINGOs
and ENGOs, comparing them to how they describe themselves in their submissions to
the SBI. Next we divide the respondents into three categories – own, parties, and others
– to see how categories of respondents perceive of functions of different non-state
actors. In particular, it is interesting to examine whether the actors’ self-perceptions of
their constituency match those by parties and other actors since this provides an
indication about the congruence of images held by one group of actors compared to
those held by others..
Table 1 shows COP 17 side event participants’ perceptions of the functions
performed by different categories of non-state actors in global climate governance. The
responses reflect the percentage of respondents who indicated a category of non-state
actor as being most significant for each governance function. A statistical significance
test was carried out to establish whether respondents associated a category of non-state
actors more than (marked with *) or less than (marked with ^) what could be expected
by a random fluctuation of answers at the 1% significance level.
Table 1. COP 17 participant perceptions of the functions performed by various non-state actors in global climate governance (percentages).
Influence Agenda
Propose Solutions
Provide Expertise
Influence Policy‐Makers
Raise Awareness
Take Mitigation Action
Take Adaptation Action
Evaluate Consequences
Represent Public Opinion
Represent Marginalized
Voices ENGO 13% 22%* 11% 16% 77%* 13% 16% 12% 44%* 19%* BINGO 35%* 19%* 6%^ 39%* 1%^ 32%* 9% 4%^ 3%^ 1%^ RINGO 9% 35%* 67%* 10% 3%^ 1%^ 2%^ 55%* 4%^ 1%^ IPO 1%^ 3%^ 2%^ 0%^ 3%^ 2%^ 7%^ 1%^ 9% 61%* LGMA 2%^ 6%^ 0%^ 7%^ 7%^ 25%* 41%* 5%^ 9% 2%^ TUNGO 1%^ 1%^ 1%^ 3%^ 2%^ 0%^ 1%^ 2%^ 5%^ 5%^ IGO 32%* 11% 12% 19%* 3%^ 17% 17% 17% 6%^ 1%^ None 7%^ 4%^ 1%^ 6%^ 3%^ 11% 8% 3%^ 19%* 10%
n= 276 269 268 263 267 264 256 268 267 270
Legend: * (higher) and ^ (lower) symbolize statistical significance at the selected level (1%).
13
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The table shows that different categories of non-state actors are perceived as playing a
more significant role in certain functions than others. BINGOs are viewed as being
particularly strong in influencing the agenda, influencing decisions and policy-makers
(rule-setting) and taking mitigation action. This is an expected result and a logical
function of their power sources, which include material and leverage power. The lowest
rating for BINGOs is the role of raising awareness and representing marginalized
voices. This again reflects their constellation of power sources, or in this case their
perceived low level of symbolic power.
A review of the submissions by several BINGOs to the SBI on how to improve
the participation of business organizations shows that these BINGOs view their roles as
being focused on influencing and implementing decisions. For instance, the
International Chamber of Commerce writes that the role of BINGOs includes the
“creation and deployment of technology, finance, investment, trade and capacity
building, participating in international mechanisms and other approaches to promote
mitigation and adaptation” (ICC 2010). Similarly, the Business Council for Sustainable
Energy proposes the creation of standing mechanisms for greater private sector
engagement in international climate governance, which would consist of a high-level
body for sharing expertise to negotiators to assist in their decision-making and a
consultative body to aid in the implementation phase of the agreement (BCSE 2010).
While BINGOs argue that greater engagement will add to the transparency and
legitimacy of the process, the key focus is nevertheless on providing technical support
and sectoral expertise in the negotiation and implementation phases.
The key roles of ENGOs are on the other hand perceived to be raising awareness
and represent public opinion, which could be an indication of their strong cognitive and
social power as they can draw upon a large membership base. While receiving relatively
high ratings across all governance functions, it is slightly surprising that they are not
perceived as being very influential in setting the agenda or influencing policy-makers.
The larger ENGOs have considerable financial strength and, because they are well-
organized, they could be expected to be perceived as being more influential.
Nevertheless, the financial strength of some NGOs is not of the structural nature of that
of BINGOs, for example, since BINGOs are expected to contribute financial resources
to fight climate change on a scale that is not applicable to ENGOs.
The weakest role of ENGOs is perceived as being to provide expertise, which
could perhaps be considered surprising given ENGOs’ activities to spread knowledge
15
and expertise. Perhaps this reflects a perception that the information that is spread, for
example through the Climate Action Network’s publication ECO, is not adequately
balanced. Another slightly surprising result is that ENGOs are perceived to be relatively
weak in taking mitigation action. By virtue of their extensive networks, ENGOs could
potentially be an important player in the implementation of climate agreements.
This is also highlighted in their submissions to the SBI. For example, according
to the Climate Action Network “civil society not only plays a fundamental role in
shaping policy, but also is critical in ensuring those policies are effectively
implemented” (CAN 2010). Nevertheless, according to the World Wildlife Fund, their
key roles are to provide information to negotiators, increase legitimacy and
transparency, and to “improve the environmental and social qualities of the agreements
reached” (WWF 2010). The main focus of ENGO activities in global environmental
governance is thus perceived as being advocacy rather than implementation.
The RINGOs, in contrast, are perceived as having strong roles in providing
expertise, evaluating consequences, and proposing solutions. This functionality profile
unsurprisingly reflects their cognitive power. Their weak spot is perceived as being
implementation and interestingly also representing marginalized voices. The latter
weakness may thus contradict the traditional “speaking truth to power” model, where
RINGOs are not perceived as voicing marginalized views.
The LGMA category is strongest in taking implementation action, particularly in
the field of adaptation. LGMAs can be viewed as having high symbolic and leverage
powers, and in some cases also material/structural power, and are therefore perceived to
be at the forefront of implementing climate change policy. What is surprising, however,
is that their symbolic power is not reflected in the function of representing public
opinion on climate change, which is relatively low. This may be reflecting the view that
local elections (to the extent there are elections in different countries) do not capture
public opinion on issues to do with climate change, as voters are often more concerned
with more immediate issues such as local jobs.
IGOs’ main roles are perceived to be influencing the agenda, decisions and
policy-makers l. Thus, by virtue of their cognitive, leverage and material powers, IGOs
are perceived as being important in the decision-making processes. This view may
support Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999) thesis that IGOs exercise power independently
of the way anticipated by the states that created them and that environmental
16
bureaucracies are at the helm of managing global change (Biermann and Siebenhüner
2011).
The two remaining categories – TUNGOs and IPOs – are more diffuse
categories that fewer seemed to have informed opinions about. This may either be
because respondents did not know the functions of these constituencies or because they
believe that they do not fill any of these functions. Thus TUNGOs and IPOs are
perceived to be weak in most functions. For IPOs, representing marginalized voices is
highly significant, which is in line with our expectations. IPOs are viewed as being
particularly weak in influencing decisions and policy-makers, reflecting their relatively
low material/structural and leverage power, the latter of which is often hampered by
language barriers.
Thus the results indicate that certain governance functions, such as raising
awareness, providing expertise and representing marginalized voices, are strongly
associated with one particular category of non-state actors. Other functions, such as
influencing the agenda, proposing viable solutions, and taking mitigation action, are less
strongly associated with a particular category of non-state actors. Because the results
present a cross-section of non-state actor functions, the study adds important nuances to
our understanding of the roles of actors in international negotiations.
In order to verify our results, we also follow Arts’ (1998) ego-perceptions and
alter-perceptions and analyse how other actors’ opinions about what function a
particular category of non-state actor performs differ from the category’s own self-
image. We compared the shares indicating significant roles for three categories of
participants: own actor, parties, and rest of observer respondents. A significant party
share would evidently indicate recognition from the formal negotiating community. In
other words, high correspondence between party and own answers may indicate a
higher propensity that the indicated response holds for scrutiny. A large difference
across the perceptions would on the other hand indicate an interesting issue for further
study, that is, whether the self-image or the other image fits best with observed
behavior? If it is the “own” value that differs, it indicates a self-image issue. If it is the
“party” that differs it indicates skewness in relation to the negotiating community. If it
is the “other” value that differs, it may indicate problems with recognition from other
actor categories. For LGMA, TUNGOs and IPOs there were too few respondents in the
“own” category, and, accordingly, only the shares of delegates and observers are
presented.
Table 2. Non-state actors’ roles from different actor perspectives
ENGO BINGO RINGO IGO S P O S P O S P O S P O Influence agenda 15% 13% 11% 21%* 33% 39% 8% 4% 10% 30% 36% 31%
Propose solutions 38%* 15% 18% 55%* 16% 11% 53%* 40% 29% 23%* 11% 9%
Information and expertise 21%* 10% 7% 19%* 2% 4% 85%* 65% 64% 32%* 20% 8%
Influence decisions 19% 10% 16% 36% 37% 41% 22%* 10% 8% 14% 21% 20%
Raise awareness 80% 77% 76% 3% 2% 1% 5% 4% 3% 5% 4% 3%
Mitigation action 24%* 12% 8% 63%* 31% 25% 3% 2% 1% 19% 20% 16%
Adaptation action 25%* 14% 12% 29%* 8% 5% 3% 4% 1% 10% 16% 18%
Evaluate consequences 16% 4% 13% 11% 9% 2% 57% 60% 53% 24% 16% 16%
Represent public opinion 54%* 40% 41% 3% 4% 3% 8% 6% 3% 9% 9% 5%
Represent marginalized 19% 15% 20% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 0% 2% 2%
LGMA TUNGO IPO None P O P O P O P O Influence agenda 2% 2% 4% 1% 0% 1% 9% 6%
Propose solutions 4% 6% 2% 0% 2% 3% 11% 2%
Information and expertise 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 4% 0%
Influence decisions 13% 5% 6% 2% 0% 0% 4% 6%
Raise awareness 6% 7% 2% 2% 4% 3% 2% 3%
Mitigation action 24% 24% 0% 0% 0% 2% 12% 10%
Adaptation action 39% 42% 2% 1% 6% 7% 12% 6%
Evaluate consequences 4% 5% 4% 1% 0% 2% 4% 2%
Represent public opinion 9% 8% 8% 4% 9% 9% 15% 20%
Represent marginalized 4% 1%
4% 5%
60% 61%
11% 9%
Legend: Self (S), Party (P), and Other actor (O) perceptions of
governance functions are given for each category of non-state
actor. The other actor category comprises non-state actor
respondents other than the self column. Star (*) indicates that there
is at least a 10% difference of perceptions between self, party, or
17
18
Table 2 shows non-state actors’ roles from different actor perspectives. We see from the
table that all actors agree with the view that the key role for BINGOs is influencing
decisions, for ENGOs is raising awareness, for RINGOs is providing information and
expertise (although RINGOs themselves overestimate this function in relation to state
and other actors), and for IGOs is influencing the agenda. These functions could
therefore be considered as relatively robust. RINGO is the only category which has a
self-image of influencing decisions that is not matched by others’ perceptions of their
role. Parties view RINGOs more as raising awareness than influencing decisions,
perhaps because academics are not used to the lobbying role to the same extent as other
non-state actors even though they themselves believe that they influence decisions and
policy-makers.
Interesting to note is that perceptions do not markedly differ between state
parties and groups of non-state actors other than on certain self-images. For BINGOs,
they appear to underestimate their influence on the agenda compared to how parties and
other non-state actors perceive BINGOs’ role in influencing the agenda. On the other
hand, BINGOs overestimate their role in proposing viable solutions, providing
information and expertise, and taking action on mitigation and adaptation compared to
parties and other non-state actors’ perceptions of BINGO functions. Similarly, ENGOs
are perceived by parties and other non-state actors as being weaker in proposing viable
solutions, providing information and expertise, taking action on mitigation and
adaptation, and representing public opinion compared to their self-image. These
differences in perceptions reflect the importance that the ENGO and BINGO
constituencies assign to their own roles in international climate governance, as was seen
in the submissions mentioned above.
On the whole however, the results imply that organized interests appear to have
stronger functionality profiles than other more loosely formed non-state actors. As
could perhaps be expected, ‘softer’ governance functions, such as raising awareness and
representing marginalized voices, appear to be associated with groups that possess
symbolic and social power, while ‘harder’ governance functions, such as influencing
and implementing decisions, appear to be associated with groups that possess cognitive,
leverage and material power. This finding also implies that power asymmetries are not
only based on structural inequalities based on gender, class, and race as often
highlighted in the literature (Scholte 2002; Fisher and Green 2004; Young 2001), but
may also be dependent on different functionality profiles.
19
5 Conclusion
Non-state actors perform a number of tasks in environmental governance. The services
that they provide to states range from offering policy advice to assisting in the
monitoring of commitments (Raustiala 1997). In this paper we have used results from a
survey from the Durban climate conference to examine how perceptions about the
functions of non-state actors differ depending on their functionality profiles. We show
that different categories of non-state actors are perceived to play distinct roles in climate
change governance and that these functionality profiles are related to particular power
sources. The results indicate that influencing the agenda and decisions is less associated
with internal financial resources than with structural power that can be employed to
affect change. In addition, cognitive power appears to contribute to a perception of
providing information and expertise when the source appears to be neutral and
balanced.
This has implications for the global democracy thesis, as it implies that
increasing participation by non-state actors may work towards reinforcing, rather than
challenging, strong interests. The results indicate that organized interests have the
stronger functionality profiles and may therefore be more able to participate in different
aspects of climate change governance. On the other hand, the results also show that no
single category of non-state actors is strong across all governance functions, indicating
that there is room for cooperation across the categories in order to achieve greater
impact across the policy cycle. The trend toward partnerships in climate change
governance may reflect this insight.
The paper also has implications for the future research agenda. A next step
would involve looking at the outcomes of participation to understand what characterizes
successful non-state actors. Moreover, does the growing participation by non-state
actors in international negotiations enhance environmental outcomes and lead to the
democratization of international affairs? Or is it possible that there is an uneven playing
field for non-state actors just depending their broadly defined role belonging to an
interest group, such that their participation leads to policy distortions? Future studies
can build further on the results presented in this paper to explore what different
governance functions amongst groups of non-state actors say about how authority shifts
over time and what this means for the democratic potential of global governance.
20
The focus of this study has been on international climate governance.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the results can be applied to other contexts and policy
areas. Future research could therefore establish whether these functionality profiles are
applicable to other settings and other governance levels. It is also possible to explore
roles and interactions of non-state actors over time to develop the analysis beyond one-
time instances. A multitude of methodologies are therefore called for to examine
questions of agency, representativeness and accountability in global governance. This
paper has provided a tentative model to inspire new research in this area.
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