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ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL RESEARCH The role of moral emotions and individual differences in consumer responses to corporate green and non-green actions Chunyan Xie & Richard P. Bagozzi & Kjell Grønhaug Received: 30 November 2012 /Accepted: 28 May 2014 # Academy of Marketing Science 2014 Abstract We investigate the mediating role of moral emo- tions and their contingency on individual characteristics in consumer responses to corporate green and non-green actions. Two between subjects experiments were conducted to test our hypotheses on samples of adult consumers. The results show that, for corporate non-green actions, various individual dif- ference characteristics (social justice values, empathy, moral identity, self-concept) moderate the elicitation of negative moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust), which, in turn, lead to consumer negative responses (negative word of mouth, complaint behaviors, boycotting). Moreover, for corporate green actions, empathy moderates elicitation of positive emo- tions on gratitude, which, in turn, influences consumer posi- tive responses (positive word of mouth, resistance to negative information, identification with the company, investment). This study adds to extant research by examining understudied hotmoral emotional processes underlying consumer reac- tions toward corporate environmental responsibility and irre- sponsibility. Implications for marketing communication and segmentation decisions are considered. Keywords Moral emotions . Green marketing . Corporate social responsibility . Contempt . Anger . Disgust . Gratitude . Empathy Introduction Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been defined as a companys status and activities with respect to its perceived societal obligations(Brown and Dacin 1997, p. 68), and most firms nowadays participate in CSR initiatives and report their CSR performance to various stakeholders (KPMG 2013). Peloza and Shang (2011) identify 177 studies relating CSR to such consumer stakeholder responses as attitudes toward the company or brand, purchase intentions, product or service evaluations, and word of mouth intentions (see also Vaaland et al. 2008). Two shortcomings of this research can be mentioned. First, most studies to date have not considered the mechanisms transforming perceptions of CSR activities into specific responses. Second, as Peloza and Shang (2011) note, many studies examine a single outcome response and outcomes measured have been varied and inconsistent.The central problem we address is under what conditions perceptions of irresponsible and responsible corporate actions lead to consumer stakeholder responses. Bhattacharya et al. (2009) propose a conceptual model to answer a similar question. They hypothesize that psychological variables mediate the effects of perceptions on outcome responses. Specifically, they posit that perceptions of company CSR initiatives produce benefits for individual stakeholders, the judged benefits influence relationship quality between stakeholder and company, and then this leads to behavioral outcomes. We take a different approach to explaining consumer re- sponses to perceived CSR initiatives than do Bhattacharya et al. (2009). Their model is based strongly on reasoned or C. Xie (*) Stord/Haugesund University College, Klingenbergvegen 8, N-5414 Stord, Norway e-mail: [email protected] R. P. Bagozzi University of Michigan, 701 Tappan St, 48109-1234 Ann Arbor, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] K. Grønhaug Norwegian School of Economics, Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen, Norway e-mail: [email protected] J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. DOI 10.1007/s11747-014-0394-5

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ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The role of moral emotions and individual differencesin consumer responses to corporate green and non-green actions

Chunyan Xie & Richard P. Bagozzi & Kjell Grønhaug

Received: 30 November 2012 /Accepted: 28 May 2014# Academy of Marketing Science 2014

Abstract We investigate the mediating role of moral emo-tions and their contingency on individual characteristics inconsumer responses to corporate green and non-green actions.Two between subjects experiments were conducted to test ourhypotheses on samples of adult consumers. The results showthat, for corporate non-green actions, various individual dif-ference characteristics (social justice values, empathy, moralidentity, self-concept) moderate the elicitation of negativemoral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust), which, in turn,lead to consumer negative responses (negative word ofmouth,complaint behaviors, boycotting). Moreover, for corporategreen actions, empathy moderates elicitation of positive emo-tions on gratitude, which, in turn, influences consumer posi-tive responses (positive word of mouth, resistance to negativeinformation, identification with the company, investment).This study adds to extant research by examining understudied“hot” moral emotional processes underlying consumer reac-tions toward corporate environmental responsibility and irre-sponsibility. Implications for marketing communication andsegmentation decisions are considered.

Keywords Moral emotions . Greenmarketing . Corporatesocial responsibility .Contempt .Anger .Disgust .Gratitude .

Empathy

Introduction

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been defined as acompany’s “status and activities with respect to its perceivedsocietal obligations” (Brown and Dacin 1997, p. 68), andmostfirms nowadays participate in CSR initiatives and report theirCSR performance to various stakeholders (KPMG 2013).Peloza and Shang (2011) identify 177 studies relating CSRto such consumer stakeholder responses as attitudes towardthe company or brand, purchase intentions, product or serviceevaluations, and word of mouth intentions (see also Vaalandet al. 2008). Two shortcomings of this research can bementioned. First, most studies to date have not consideredthe mechanisms transforming perceptions of CSR activitiesinto specific responses. Second, as Peloza and Shang (2011)note, many studies examine a single outcome response andoutcomes measured have been “varied and inconsistent.”

The central problem we address is under what conditionsperceptions of irresponsible and responsible corporate actionslead to consumer stakeholder responses. Bhattacharya et al.(2009) propose a conceptual model to answer a similarquestion. They hypothesize that psychological variablesmediate the effects of perceptions on outcome responses.Specifically, they posit that perceptions of company CSRinitiatives produce benefits for individual stakeholders, thejudged benefits influence relationship quality betweenstakeholder and company, and then this leads to behavioraloutcomes.

We take a different approach to explaining consumer re-sponses to perceived CSR initiatives than do Bhattacharyaet al. (2009). Their model is based strongly on reasoned or

C. Xie (*)Stord/Haugesund University College, Klingenbergvegen 8,N-5414 Stord, Norwaye-mail: [email protected]

R. P. BagozziUniversity of Michigan, 701 Tappan St, 48109-1234 Ann Arbor,MI, USAe-mail: [email protected]

K. GrønhaugNorwegian School of Economics, Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen,Norwaye-mail: [email protected]

J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.DOI 10.1007/s11747-014-0394-5

deliberative processes by decision makers; at the same time,they do not explicitly incorporate judged costs. So in onesense their reasoned approach is incomplete. We feel thatreasoned processes are complex to specify and may not bethe first response decision makers have in moral contexts(Haidt 2012; see below discussion of Haidt’s social intuitionistmodel). A need exists for a more parsimonious approach thatbetter captures consumer responses, which typically occur inunexpected contexts, under low involvement conditions, andwith little time to think deeply. We propose a model that is notpredicated on reasoning, per se, but rather hypothesizes twobroad processes. First, we claim that corporate CSR actionsinduce felt moral emotions, which mediate the effects ofperceptions on consumer responses. Moral emotions are com-binations of inherited and learned reactions to events violatingone’s ethical sensitivities. Although they are not deliberative,Haidt (2012, p. 45) notes that they function as a kind of“information processing” of the moral significance of stimulito which one is exposed. The moral emotions we examine aregratitude, contempt, anger, and disgust. We also complementmoral emotions with attitudes and the basic emotions ofsadness and fear.

The secondmechanismwe propose is also non-deliberativeand rooted in individual characteristics of consumers, whichregulate the moral emotional processes consumers experiencewhen exposed to positive or negative CSR performance. Thatis, we hypothesize that felt moral emotions by themselves willnot channel perceptions into consumer responses. Rather, theextent to whichmoral emotions function will be moderated bysuch individual characteristics as empathy in the case ofperceived corporate responsibility (green actions) and socialjustice values, empathy, moral identity, the relational self, andthe collective self in the case of corporate irresponsibility(non-green actions).

Figure 1 summarizes the two integrative mechanisms wetest for both non-green and green actions by firms. For non-green actions, the effects of perceived environmental irrespon-sibility (X) on consumer responses (Y) pass through the moralemotions (contempt, anger, disgust). The nature of this medi-ation, however, is governed by five moderators (W). We alsotest the mediation with basic emotions (fear, sadness) andattitudes as the mediator. For green actions, the effects ofperceived environmental responsibility on consumer re-sponses pass through the moral emotion of gratitude. Thispathway, however, is regulated by empathic concern of con-sumers. Attitudes are also tested as the mediator betweenperceived environmental responsibility and consumerresponses.

In the rest of the paper, we first briefly review the moralemotion literature, discuss the elicitation of moral emotions inresponse to CSR activities, and explain the moderating effectsof consumer characteristics on the activation of moral emo-tions. Next, we discuss the effects of moral emotions on

consumer responses under non-green and green actions byfirms, establish the mediating role of moral emotions betweencorporate environmental actions and consumer responses, andspecify hypotheses on mediated moderation effects.1

Thereafter, we describe the research method, followed by apresentation of our empirical results. Finally, contributionsand implications of our research are discussed.

Theoretical background

The presentation is divided into two parts: one part concernscorporate environmental irresponsibility, and the other corpo-rate environmental responsibility. Each part is organizedaround the evocation of consumer emotional responses bycorporate non-green or green actions, the theoretical basesfor moderating effects of consumer characteristics on theelicitation of moral emotions, the effects of moral emotionson consumer responses, and presentation of specific hypoth-eses on mediated moderation.

Corporate environmental irresponsibility and the triadof negative moral emotions

Research in psychology has shown that moral transgressionsby others engender negative emotional reactions in peopleexposed to them, and moral emotions link violations ofmoral standards to moral behavior (Haidt 2007; Tangneyet al. 2007). Corporate environmental irresponsible behav-iors can be seen as one type of moral transgression. Thespecific moral transgression studied herein entails irrespon-sible actions taken by an offshore shipping company towardthe environment (see the Method section). The public typi-cally does not perceive firms’ irresponsible environmentalactions as direct actions targeted to the public but rather asmoral transgressions that indirectly affect people and lead usto judge them as morally wrong. To make our study man-ageable, we selected a small number of plausible efficaciousmoral emotions.

Research to date by psychologists on other-related negativemoral emotions has focused primarily on the triad of negativemoral emotions contempt, anger, and disgust (CAD) (Rozinet al. 1999; Haidt 2003). Anger is defined as “a belief that we,or our friends, have been unfairly slighted, which causes in usboth painful feelings and a desire or impulse for revenge”(Aristotle 1941, p. 380). Righteous anger results when webecome aware that the freedom or human dignity of otherpeople has been violated, even when these others are strangers

1 One way to think about conditional indirect effects in the current studyis that the moderation of perceived environmental action by the firm onfelt moral emotions is mediated by the felt emotions in their effects on theoutcome variables (Hayes 2013).

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to us. Disgust refers to “something revolting, primarily inrelation to the sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividlyimagined; and secondly to anything which causes a similarfeeling, through the sense of smell, touch, and even of eye-sight” (Darwin 1872/Darwin 1965, p. 234). Disgust is aresponse to both physical objects and social violations. Herewe focus on social transgressions. Contempt can be argued tobe a blend (Scherer 1984) or joint contribution (Lazarus 1991,p. 229) of anger and disgust. Contempt involves looking downon someone and feeling morally superior (Izard 1977).

Relationships among contempt, anger, and disgustCADemo-tions can be considered distinct or non-distinct. Some researchersclaim that CAD are distinct emotions (Rozin et al. 1999;Hutcherson and Gross 2011). For instance, Rozin et al. (1999)propose that contempt, anger, and disgust are typically elicitedseparately by violations of three moral codes (i.e., community,autonomy, and divinity, respectively) and also find empirical

support for this. That is, they claim that feelings of contempt aredifferentially linked to violations of the ethic of community (e.g.,violations of social hierarchy); feelings of anger are linked toviolations of the ethic of autonomy (i.e., individual rights viola-tions); and feelings of disgust are linked to violations of the ethicof divinity (e.g., actions that remind us of our animal nature orinvolve contamination or impurity). Moreover, Hutcherson andGross (2011) take a social-functionalist perspective and differen-tiated these three emotions in terms of antecedent appraisals andconsequent actions. For instance, anger is evoked by appraisals ofself-relevance and tends to promote approach tendencies, in theform of attack. Disgust is related most strongly to appraisals that aperson is morally untrustworthy and leads to avoidancetendencies. And contempt seems uniquely related to thejudgment that someone is incompetent which leads to anattempt to disassociate from them.

By contrast, other researchers argue for commonalityamong contempt, anger, and disgust. For instance, Izard

Corporate environmental irresponsibility (non-green actions)

Corporate environmental responsibility (green actions)

Note: Sadness, fear, and attitudes are tested as the rival mediators between perceived environmental irresponsibility and consumer responses; attitudes are tested as the mediator between perceived environmental responsibility and consumer responses

Mediators (M)- contempt- anger- disgust(-sadness)(- fear)(-attitudes)

Consumer responses (Y)- negative WOM- complaining- boycott ing 1&2

Moderators (W)- social justice values- empathy- moral identity- relational self- collective self

EnvironmentalIrresponsibility (X)

Mediator (M)- gratitude(- attitudes)

Consumer responses (Y)- positive WOM- resistance to negative information

- identification- investment

Moderator (W)- empathy

Environmental responsibility (X)

H2

H4H3

H1a-1e

a

b

Fig. 1 Theoretical framework.a. Corporate environmentalirresponsibility (non-greenactions) b. Corporateenvironmental responsibility(green actions)

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(1977) terms these emotions the “hostility triad” and proposesthat they occur as a consequence of similar appraisals, such as inresponse to bad things happening to “me andmine” that threatenone’s welfare. He also suggests that “disproval of others” is atypical reaction provoked by feelings of CAD in response toviolation of moral standards. Shaver et al. (1987) likewise findthat all three CAD emotions cluster together empirically withsimilar cognates in a basic emotional category labeled “anger.”Finally, Nabi (2002) claims that CAD emotions are synonymsfor the same underlying negative emotional state evoked byinterpersonal concerns. Recently, a growing body of empiricalevidence also suggests that CADmay define a single underlyingstate (Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Simpson et al. 2006).

The abovementioned interpretations of CAD as either dis-crete or overlapping emotions have important implications formeasurement of CAD. The discrete emotion interpretationimplies the existence of unique variance in the measure ofeach emotion. However, the hostility triad interpretation sup-ports the occurrence of common shared variance in measuresof CAD. Those seemingly incompatible views can be recon-ciled by postulating that measures of CAD exhibit unique aswell as shared variation. For example, Grappi et al. (2013)showed that respective measures of CAD load on distinctfactors, thereby supporting discrete emotion interpretations,but the three emotions also shared considerable commonvariance such that the three factors loaded highly on a singlesecond-order factor, supporting the hostility triad interpreta-tion. In the current study, we take a similar measurementapproach as Grappi et al. (2013) did and construct a second-order factor model with three first-order CAD factors loadingon it (see a more detailed discussion of measurement assess-ment in the Results section).

Corporate environmental irresponsibility, CAD, and moder-ators of CAD Building on basic psychological research, wepropose that irresponsible corporate environmental behaviorsprovoke negative moral emotions (Fig. 1a). For example,corporate environmental irresponsibility involvesdegradation and pollution of the environment and violatesthe ethic of divinity; therefore, consumers should feeldisgust toward the company according to Rozin et al.(1999). Moreover, consistent with Hutcherson and Gross(2011), degradation and pollution of the environment can beconsidered self-relevant by consumers and thus elicit anger,because their own welfare and the survival of others forwhom they care are directly threatened when the environ-ment becomes contaminated. Likewise, damage to the envi-ronment by firms should elicit emotional reactions of con-tempt in the form of scorn or disdain because of the firms’disregard for community and communal values (Hutchersonand Gross 2011).

Therefore, we argue that consumers will feel CAD emo-tions when companies act in environmentally irresponsible

ways. However, the capacity to experience negative and pos-itive moral emotions should vary, depending on certain indi-vidual cognitions and differences. A substantial body ofresearch shows that stable individual characteristics influ-ence moral behaviors. For instance, a variety of individualcharacteristics has been found to be associated with moralbehaviors to varying degrees, including moral reasoning(Kohlberg 1969), moral maturity (Walker and Pitts 1998),moral commitment (Colby and Damon 1992), moral person-ality (Walker and Frimer 2007), and moral character (Blasi2005). In the current study, we expect that moral identitywill influence consumer emotional responses upon corporateenvironmental actions. Moral identity is a specific kind ofidentity that revolves around the ethical aspects of one’s selfand functions to regulate one’s reactions to corporate wrong-doing (Bergman 2002). It has been studied extensively inmoral contexts different than green actions by marketing andbusiness researchers (e.g., Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino andReed 2002).

Moreover, research on CSR shows consumers’ other-orientation is an important factor influencing their reactiontoward CSR activities. For instance, Schuler and Cording(2006) categorize normative frameworks as being either self-oriented (self-enhancement) or other-oriented (self-transcendent). Consumers with self-enhancement goals carrya strong egoistic view of the world, while self-transcendentconsumers are concerned relatively more with the welfare ofothers and nature. Golob et al. (2008) further find that self-transcendent consumers have higher expectations for the le-gal, ethical, and philanthropic dimensions of Carroll’s (1979)CSR typology than self-enhancement consumers do. This isconsistent with recent research that shows other-regardingvirtues (e.g., justice, beneficence, equality, and communalcooperation) moderate elicitation of CAD (Grappi et al.2013); capacity for gratitude is also associated positively withempathy or perspective taking (McCullough et al. 2002) andaltruistic values (Romani et al. 2013). We expect that individ-ual characteristics relating to consumer other-orientation (e.g.,social justice values, empathy, relational self, and collectiveself) will interact with perception of corporate environmentalirresponsibility to impact the extent to which consumers ex-perience CAD.

We chose social justice values because these reflect other-directed moral virtues which should be related to self-regulatory-like responses to moral malfeasance and fit withthe social consequences of non-green actions. Previous stud-ies have employed social justice values as moderators of theeffects of emotions on consumer responses in the CSR litera-ture (Grappi et al. 2013; Romani et al. 2013). Empathy is sucha basic human response making one sensitive to negative andpositive happenings to other persons, and by implication to theenvironment, that we used it as a moderator in both experi-mental conditions. We suggest that people who show more

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versus less concern for others and are motivated to protectothers should experience greater emotional resonance withperceived good or bad green behaviors. To our knowledge,this hypothesis has not been tested before in the CSR context.The relational and collective selves are directly related to feltresponsibility to communal outcomes, so we adapted impli-cations from research on the self-concept to our context in thisrespect (e.g., Johnson et al. 2006). Below we discuss in moredetail the moderating effects of individual characteristics inelicitation of CAD.

We begin with the moderating effect of social justicevalues on elicitation of negative moral emotions CAD. Avalue is “a desirable trans-situational goal varying in impor-tance, which serves as a guiding principle in the life of aperson or other social entity” (Schwartz 1992, p. 21). Socialjustice values emphasize caring for disadvantaged personsand in general correcting social injustice, and they belong tothe category of universalistic values that emphasize under-standing, accepting, and showing concern for the welfare ofall human beings (Schwartz 1992, 1994). Moreover, univer-salistic values are a type of self-transcendence value thatstresses other-regarding social interests (Schwartz 1994).Previous research supports the argument that values serve toregulate ethical behavior (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992).For instance, self-transcendence values have been shown toexplain high levels of engagement in different forms ofcooperative, pro-environmental, and pro-social behaviors(e.g., Fukukawa et al. 2007; Schultz 2001; Stern et al.1995). Grappi et al. (2013) also found that other-regardingvirtues, including social justice, moderate activation of nega-tive moral emotions upon perception of corporate socialtransgressions. This suggests that those who have a strongsense of social justice are more likely to help or protect othersand to try to stop moral violations. Hence, we expect thatthose who are high in social justice values will be more likelyto experience CAD when exposed to corporate environmen-tally irresponsible actions than those who are low in socialjustice values. Thus,

H1a: The perception of a corporate environmental transgres-sion will influence felt contempt, anger, and disgust,the stronger the felt social justice values.

Empathy has at least two aspects: “first, as the cognitiveawareness of another person’s internal states… this awarenessis a hot rather than cold cognition; and second, as a vicariousaffective response to another person, which emphasizes put-ting oneself in the position of another and experiencing thatperson’s emotion” (Lazarus 1991, p. 288). These aspectscorrespond roughly to the two aspects of empathy suggestedby other researchers (Losoya and Eisenberg 2001; Tangneyet al. 2007): cognitive empathy (i.e., perspective taking) andaffective empathy (feelings of compassion or caring). In our

study, because of its motivational implications, we focus onaffective empathy, defined as “a state of emotional arousal thatstems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’saffective state” (Losoya and Eisenberg 2001, p. 22). AsLazarus suggested (1991, p. 288), empathy “is not an emotionbut either an ability or disposition to share another’s emotions,and a process whereby this sharing occurs.” Affective empa-thy has been identified as central to the human moral affectivesystem (Eisenberg et al. 2004), because “empathic reactions toothers’ distress often elicit feelings of concern for the distress-ed other”; such empathic concern often “prompts helpingbehavior aimed at helping the distressed other” (Tangneyet al. 2007, pp. 18–19). Consistent with extant research(Lazarus 1991), we argue that empathy is an important pro-social capability. Since empathy expresses the variable capac-ity to care about other people in distress, we expect that anempathic person will be more likely to understand and feelanticipated distress and suffering of other people caused bycorporate environmental irresponsibility, which, in turn, influ-ences the felt degree of CAD toward the company. Therefore,we hypothesize that affective empathy will interact with per-ception of corporate environmental irresponsibility to elicitCAD emotions:

H1b: The perception of a corporate environmental transgres-sion will influence felt contempt, anger, and disgust,the greater the empathy.

Moral identity is conceptualized as the cognitive schema aperson holds about his or her moral character (Aquino et al.2009). Aquino and Reed (2002) argued from a social-cognitive perspective that a person’s moral identity is storedin memory as a complex knowledge structure consisting ofmoral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts. Sinceknowledge structures are acquired through life experiencesthat vary across persons, the importance of this moral self-schema to one’s overall self-conception also differs acrossindividuals (Aquino and Reed 2002). Moral identity is apowerful source ofmoral motivation because people generallydesire to maintain self-consistency (Blasi 1993, 2004). Thus, aperson who has a highly central moral identity should feelobligated to adhere to the behavioral prescriptions associatedwith his or her moral self-schema to avoid self-condemnationand maintain a consistent self-image. Moreover, Aquino et al.(2009) argue that the greater the centrality of moral identity,the more readily accessible one’s moral identity and the stron-ger its ability to affect information processing and moralbehavior. Because green behavior constitutes a kind of ethicalaction by firms, we think the magnitude of felt moral emotionsby consumers should be conditioned on the strength of theirown moral identity. Motivational qualities of moral identityalso appear tailor-made to our context because CAD re-sponses to negative green behaviors should occur to the extent

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that one desires to maintain self-consistency with one’s moralidentity. Hence,

H1c: The perception of a corporate environmental transgres-sion will influence felt contempt, anger, and disgust,the more central one’s moral identity.

The self-concept is a multifaceted cognitive schema thathouses information relevant to the self (Lord and Brown2004). Recent theory distinguishes among three levels of theself-concept, the individual, relational, and collective levels(Brewer and Gardner 1996; Johnson et al. 2006). There aretheoretical streams dedicated to each level of the self-conceptin the literature (see Johnson et al. 2006). The individual self-concept involves interpersonal comparisons where one’ssense of uniqueness and self-worth are derived from perceivedsimilarities with and differences from other individuals.Because behavior is driven by self-interest at the individuallevel (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Markus and Kitayama1991), people with an individual self-concept will experienceless other-focused emotions. We expect that the individualself-concept will be less relevant in our current context; thuswe focus on communal and relational aspects of the self,hypothesizing that perceptions of non-green behavior willviolate moral sensibilities, and hence felt CAD, to the extentthat a person has a communal and relational self-conception.

At the relational level, individuals are motivated by thewelfare of specific others, and appropriate role behavior de-termines self-worth (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Markus andKitayama 1991). We draw upon Johnson et al. (2006) anddefine relational self-concept as the extent individuals definethemselves in terms of the reactions of others in their dyadicrelationships. People with a strong relational self-concept“have a heightened capacity for the experience and expressionof those emotions that derive primarily from focusing on theother” (Markus and Kitayama 1991, p. 237), such as other-focused CAD. Environmental transgressions by corporationsaffect the health and safety of self and others, and haveimplications for one’s relationships with others. Therefore,

H1d: The perception of a corporate environmental transgres-sion will influence felt contempt, anger, and disgust,the stronger the relational self-concept.

At the collective level of the self-concept, individuals aremotivated by the welfare of the groups to which they belong(Brewer and Gardner 1996; Tajfel and Turner 1979). In thecurrent study, we also adopt Johnson et al.’s (2006) definitionof collective self-concept as a self-definition based on one’ssocial group memberships, where favorable intergroup com-parisons give rise to self-worth. We expect that those withstrong collective self-concepts will be more likely to see allhuman beings as a collective category to which they belong to

one degree or another and will show concern for the welfare ofthis group, which is similar to universalistic values proposedby Schwartz (1992, 1994). Since pollution and damage of theenvironment threaten the welfare of human beings, personswith a strong collective self-concept are more likely to expe-rience negative moral emotions when corporations performirresponsible acts damaging the environment. Thus,

H1e: The perception of a corporate environmental transgres-sion will influence felt contempt, anger, and disgust,the stronger the collective self-concept.

The impact of CAD on consumer responses Corporate envi-ronmental irresponsible behaviors provoke CAD emotions.Such emotional experiences can further lead consumers toact in ways that harm firms, thus functioning as mediators ofthe impact of corporate environmental behavior on consumerresponses. The role of emotions operates as follows.When wefeel an emotion, we are compelled to cope with and dosomething about it. There are two ways that we act in responseto felt emotions: automatically and deliberatively. Automaticreactions to our emotions are sometimes called, “action ten-dencies,” which are “biological urges to act” and are largelynon-deliberative (Lazarus 1991 p. 114; Frijda et al. 1989).Deliberative reactions draw upon explicit appraisals of thesituation and outcomes we find ourselves in when we feelemotional.

Moreover, Haidt (2012) claims that moral emotions reflectautomatic-like moral judgments to perceptions of moral trans-gressions. He contrasts moral emotions with moral reasoningwhich he asserts depends on moral emotions. The origins ofmoral emotions are socially learned in psychological devel-opment processes early in life but at an age later than whenbasic emotions became elaborated. So Haidt claims that formost everyday moral judgments, these are reflected in “gut”feelings. This is not to deny that people sometimes react morecognitively with moral reasoning, but he is clear that this isoften post hoc and involves rationalizations for socially,learned moral emotional reactions. The core of Haidt’s(2012, p. 47) “social intuitionist model” posits the followingsequence of effects: triggering event → intuitive response(moral emotion) → judgment → reasoning. We adaptHaidt’s general moral model to the CSR context in the currentstudy and argue that moral emotions mediate the impact ofconsumer perceptions of triggering events (i.e., corporate non-green/green actions) on their responses toward the company.

In the current study, we argue that exposure to corporateirresponsible environmental actions evokes negative moralemotions of CAD in consumers, and their action tendenciesare urges to attack, reject, or avoid contact (Lazarus 1991).Such negative emotions lead to a focus on punishing theoffender or getting them to change their specific behavior(Fredrickson 1998; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005). We

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suggest that concrete consumer responses to felt negativemoral emotions will include complaining to companies orauthorities, conveying negative word of mouth to family,friends, and relatives, and boycotting behavior in the form of(a) encouraging companies not to do business with theoffending company and (b) putting pressure on the companyto be socially responsible and correct its bad practices(Fig. 1a). Therefore, we propose:

H2: The stronger the felt contempt, anger, and disgust, thegreater the consumers negative responses toward thecompany.

Hypotheses on mediated moderation As discussed above,corporate non-green actions evoke negative moral emotionsCAD in consumers, and felt CAD emotions lead to consumernegative responses toward the company. Thus, CADmediatesthe effect of non-green actions on consumer negative re-sponses. Moreover, elicitation of CAD is contingent on indi-vidual characteristics. Therefore, in the current study, we termsuch conditional indirect effects of non-green actions on con-sumer responses, mediated moderation, where the moderationof non-green actions on felt CAD by individual characteris-tics, is, in turn, mediated by felt CAD emotions in their effectson consumer negative responses.

As shown in Fig. 1a, when we combine hypotheses H1aand H2, this demonstrates the mediated moderation effect ofcorporate environmental irresponsibility on consumer nega-tive responses toward the company, with CAD as the mediatorand social justice values as the moderator. That is, felt CADmediate the impact of corporate environmental transgressionson consumer negative responses, where the degree of feltCAD is contingent on social justice values consumers hold.

Similarly, H1b-1e can also be combined with H2 to test themediatedmoderation effects of corporate environmental trans-gression on consumer negative responses with CAD as themediator and each of the remaining individual characteristicsas the moderator. As summarized under Results and as rec-ommended by the reviewers of our manuscript, we augmentthe above hypotheses with rival mediation hypotheses wheresadness, fear, and attitudes function as co-mediators.

Corporate environmental responsibility and gratitude

By contrast with corporate environmental irresponsibility,corporate environmental responsible behavior is directed toprevention of or relief from, harm to people or the environ-ment. Such behaviors can elicit positive moral emotions thatlead to supportive consumer responses to the company.Research on other-focusedmoral emotions to date has focusedprimarily on negative CAD emotions, and to a lesser extent onpositive moral emotions (e.g., gratitude). The asymmetries infocus have some parallels in general research done in basic

human emotions. For instance, there are more numbers of neg-ative emotions existing than positive ones (e.g., Shaver et al.1987), about three or four negative emotions for every positiveemotion (e.g., Ellsworth and Smith 1988). Similarly, research onCSR has uncovered valence-based asymmetries in the effects ofCSR information on company evaluations (Schuler and Cording2006; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001; Yoon et al. 2003). That is,consumer evaluations of companies are more sensitive to nega-tive CSR information than positive CSR information.

To date, gratitude is the only other-focused positive moralemotion with a body of empirical work in the psychologicalliterature. Brief mention has also been made in the moralemotion literature of the other-focused positive emotions ofelevation, admiration, and awe (e.g., Algoe and Haidt 2009;Keltner and Haidt 2003). For corporate green actions, wefound it difficult to create conditions for the study of elevationand awe and instead focused on gratitude as the positiveemotion for investigation because it seems to fit our contextand consumer reactions well. Admiration seems more like anevaluation than moral emotion. At the suggestion of onereviewer to expand the number of mediators of green con-sumer actions, we introduced attitudes as an additional medi-ator in test of hypotheses (see the section on Test of rivalhypotheses below).

The importance of gratitude for creating and sustainingpositive social relations has been recognized by many re-searchers over the years (e.g., McCullough et al. 2008).Gratitude is defined as “a positive emotion that typically flowsfrom the perception that one has benefited from the costly,intentional, voluntary action of another person” (McCulloughet al. 2008, p. 281). People are most likely to feel gratefulwhen “(a) they have received a particularly valuable benefit;(b) high effort and cost have been expended on their behalf;(c) the expenditure of effort on their behalf seems to have beenintentional rather than accidental; (d) the expenditure of efforton their behalf was gratuitous” (McCullough et al. 2001, p.252). Empirical evidence also supports such elicitation condi-tions of gratitude (Okamoto and Robinson 1997; Tesser et al.1968; Tsang 2006a). Since gratitude is generally triggered by“the perception that one is the beneficiary of another’sintentionally-provided benefit” (Algoe and Haidt 2009; p.106), we argue that consumers should feel grateful uponbecoming aware of environmental responsible behaviors byrecognizing that they, and others they care about, benefit fromsuch actions (Fig. 1b).

Moderator of gratitude Moreover, we also expect thatindividual characteristics will interact with perceived corpo-rate environmental responsibility to influence the extent towhich consumers experience gratitude. Due to consumerasymmetrical reactions to positive and negative CSR infor-mation (e.g., Sen and Bhattacharya 2001) and limited researchon the positive moral emotions, we focus only on empathy

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and expect that it will moderate elicitation of gratitude in thepositive condition. Very little research has been done ongratitude, but we draw upon research on empathy and extendit to explain how it moderates the effect of perception ofenvironmentally responsible corporate behaviors on gratitude(Fig. 1b).

Lazarus (1991, p. 288) claim that “although the emphasisin analyses of empathy tends to be placed on another’s distressor the tragic, empathy could just as easily involve the sharingof another’s positive emotions and the conditions that bringthem about.” This aspect of empathy has been rarely studied.Several researchers have addressed the relationship betweengratitude and empathy. For instance, McCullough et al. (2002)argue for correlation between gratitude and empathy byclaiming “the grateful disposition is rooted in the basic traitsthat orient people toward sensitivity and concern for others…grateful people may tend to be higher in (a) greeableness,which appears to facilitate pro-social and other-oriented be-havior… Moreover, one might expect the disposition towardgratitude to be related to other traits that emerge from (a)greeableness such as a capacity for empathy” (p. 114). Theyalso found that self-report and informant-report measures ofgrateful dispositions were correlated positively with affectiveempathy (McCullough et al. 2002). Moreover, Lazarus andLazarus (1994) argue that gratitude is one of the “empathicemotions” whose roots lie in the capacity to empathize withothers. They further suggest that the core relational themeassociated with gratitude is recognition or appreciation of analtruistic gift; people experience this core relational theme tothe extent that they empathize with the benefactor’s expendi-ture of effort on the beneficiary’s behalf. Following this logic,in our empirical context, the more consumers empathize withthe company’s environmental effort on behalf of those whowill benefit from such actions, the more grateful they will feeltoward the company. Finally, empathy regulates the capacityto feel grateful because it expresses the extent to which peoplefeel the emotions of others.We expect that those who are moreempathic are more likely to anticipate, understand, and expe-rience positive emotions felt by other people elicited by cor-porate green actions. Consequently, we propose that thosewho are high in empathy will be more likely to feel thankfulupon becoming aware of corporate environmental behaviorsthat protect the environment than those who are low inempathy.

H3: The perception of corporate environmental friendly ac-tions will influence felt gratitude, the greater theempathy.

The impact of gratitude on consumer responses With grati-tude, we took a similar perspective in predicting its effects onconsumer responses as we do for CAD emotions. AsMcCullough et al. (2001) suggested, gratitude has three

specific moral functions in that it serves as a moral barometer,a moral motive for beneficiaries, and a moral reinforcementfor benefactors. Herein we focus on its moral motive functionfor beneficiaries in that gratitude motivates beneficiaries toengage in pro-social behavior toward their benefactors andothers (Bartlett and DeSteno 2006; McCullough et al. 2002;Tsang 2006b). In the current study, the exposure to corporateresponsible environmental behaviors evokes gratitude in con-sumers, and their action tendencies are to reward the goodbehaving company and reciprocate positively toward the com-pany with goodwill. More specifically, we suggest that con-crete consumer responses to felt positive moral emotions willentail conveying positive word of mouth to family, friends,and relatives, and resisting negative information heard aboutthe company. Moreover, since positive emotions tend tobroaden consumers’ foci (Fredrickson 1998; Fredricksonand Branigan 2005), identifying with the company andinvesting in the company are also expected to be fostered(Fig. 1b). Therefore,

H4: The stronger the felt gratitude, the greater the consumerspositive responses toward the company.

Hypotheses on mediated moderation Similarly, corporategreen actions elicit gratitude in consumers, and felt gratitudeleads to consumer positive responses toward the company.Therefore, gratitude mediates the impact of green actions onconsumer positive responses. Moreover, consumer empathymoderates the elicitation of gratitude. So, as shown in Fig. 1b,when we combine H3 and H4, we test the mediated modera-tion effects of corporate environmental responsibility on con-sumer positive responses with felt gratitude as the mediatorand consumer empathy as the moderator. That is, consumerempathy moderates the degree of felt gratitude upon becom-ing aware of corporate green actions, and felt gratitude furthermediate such a moderated effect on consumer positive re-sponses toward the company. Analogous reasoning can beused to support the mediating role of attitudes toward thecompany as an additional mediator.

Method

Research design

Corporate environmental irresponsible and responsible ac-tions were manipulated by creating experimental and controlconditions. Two between-subjects manipulations were createdfor environmental responsible and irresponsible actions, re-spectively, and one between-subjects control condition wascreated to produce three questionnaire versions in all. In otherwords, by randomly assigning respondents to experimental

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and control groups, where we created one stimulus group withharmful actions done by the corporation, another stimulusgroup with positive green actions performed, and a controlgroup condition that simply described the corporation, wewere able to hold constant the effects, if any, of otheremotions not studied herein to a certain extent. Themoderating, mediating, and dependent variables weremeasured variables. We followed procedures for conditionalindirect effects proposed by Hayes (2013) to test hypotheses.The variables in our research design are as follows (Fig. 1):

(1) A dichotomous manipulated variable (X), indicatingexposure to either of one of the two experimental conditionsor the control condition, where each experimental condition iscoded +1 and the control condition is coded −1.

(2) Five continuous moderator variables (W) under thecondition of corporate environmental irresponsibility, refer-ring to moderators of moral emotions: social justice values(Schwartz 1992, 1994), empathy (Eisenberg et al. 2004;Lazarus 1991), moral identity (Aquino et al. 2009), and rela-tional and collective self-concepts (Johnson et al. 2006); andone moderator, empathy, under the condition of corporateenvironmental responsibility.

(3) Four continuous meditating variables (M), consisting ofmultiple items for each of the three negative moral emo-tions—anger, disgust, and contempt—under corporate envi-ronmental irresponsibility, and for gratitude under corporateenvironmental responsibility.

(4) Eight continuous outcome variables (Y), reflectingconsumer responses. Under corporate environmental irre-sponsibility, four outcome variables were measured: negativeword of mouth, complaint, and two types of boycott behav-iors. Under corporate environmental responsibility, four out-come variables were measured: positive word of mouth, re-sistance to negative information, identification with the com-pany, and investment in the company.

Stimulus materials

Emotions are difficult to manipulate directly, and in any casedoing so can raise ethical issues. As a consequence, psychol-ogists often use scenarios to manipulate emotions indirectly(e.g., Fischer and Roseman 2007; Roseman 1991). In thecurrent study, narrative versions of the experimental and con-trol conditions were first developed together with the help oftwo professionals with insights into the environmental actionsof firms from the Norwegian offshore industry; then, thenarrative scenarios were pretested and revised after pretesting.In the two experimental conditions, the stimulus narrativesused a fictitious corporate name (“Offshore Shipping ASA”).The narratives began with a description of the company andthen continued with descriptions of the company’s environ-mental responsible or irresponsible behaviors, which werebased on actual corporate positive practices or malfeasances

perpetrated over the years in the Norwegian offshore industry.The narrative for the control condition consists only of neutraldescriptions of the same company and used identical descrip-t ive con ten t as employed in the expe r imen ta lconditions. Appendixes A-C present the full scenarios. Ourobjective was to have stimuli corresponding to real worldconditions. Realistic scenarios are also important for survey-ing actual adult citizens, which is the case in our study. We didnot develop the scenarios to explicitly engender specific moralemotions, per se. However, the focus on corporate good andpoor green behaviors constitutes outcomes of ethical contentthat we argue engender moral emotional content.

We pretested our stimuli among adult consumers from anonline Norwegian consumer panel. A total of 90 consumerswere randomly assigned to the two experimental conditionsand the control condition, with 30 consumers in each pretestgroup. Respondents read through their respective scenariosand responded to the question, “How socially responsible isthe company for being environmental friendly?” on a 1 to 11point scale, where 1 was “extremely irresponsible” and 11 was“extremely responsible”. Those who read the negative scenar-io had a much lower rating (M=2.23, SD=1.68) than thosewho read the neutral scenario (M=6.57, SD=1.48). A t-testindicated a significant difference between the groups (t (58)=10.62, p<.001) and suggests that the manipulation of corpo-rate environmental irresponsibility works. Similarly, thosewho read the positive scenario scored significantly higher(M=8.73, SD=2.24) than those who read the neutral scenario(t (58)=4.42, p<.001).

Respondents and procedures

An online survey was conducted. Respondents, adult con-sumers from a consumer panel in Norway excluding thosewho participated in the pretest, were randomly assigned tothe two experimental conditions and the control condition.The total sample size was 210; there were 70 in the envi-ronmental irresponsibility condition, 70 in the environ-mental responsibility condition, and 70 in the controlcondition.

The sample consisted of 110 men (52%) and 100 women(48%). Of the participants, 17%were between 16 and 24 yearsold, 16% 25 to 34 years old, 12% 35 to 44 years old, 24% 45to 54 years old, and 31% over 55. Undergraduate or highereducation accounted for 74% of the sample, followed byrespondents with a high school education (21%) or less(5%). Our sample is a somewhat older but still relativelyrepresentative of the target population (i.e., the Norwegianpopulation) in gender and age. The target population was50% men and 50% women; 17% between 16 and 24 yearsold, 18% 25 to 34 years old, 21% 35 to 44 years old, 18% 45to 54 years old, and 26% over 55 years; 30% undergraduate orhigher, 42% a high school education or less (28%). Our

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sample is more highly educated than the average Norwegianpopulation, which is common for online consumer panels.

Measures

Measures for mediators, moderators, and outcome variablesare shown in Tables 1 and 2. Factor loadings, reliabilities,critical ratios (CRs), and average variance extracted (AVEs)are presented as well.

Mediating variables Contempt, anger, and disgust were eachmeasured with three 7-point items anchored with “1=veryweak” and “7=very strong.” For instance, respondents wereasked to indicate, “based on the information you just read, wouldyou express the degree of which you feel the following emo-tions?” and contempt was measured by three items: “contemp-tuous,” “scornful,” and “disdainful.” Similarly, anger was mea-sured by “angry,” “mad,” and “very annoyed”; disgust wasmeasured by “disgust,” “feelings of distaste,” and “feelings ofrevulsion.” Two 7-point items were also used to measure grati-tude: “grateful” and “thankful,” with “1=very weak” and “7=very strong”. Fear and sadness were measured by three 7-pointitems each, with “1=very weak” and “7=very strong”. The threeitems for fear were “threatened,” “scared,” and “fearful”; forsadness, “depressed,” “sad,” and “discouraged.”Attitude towardthe companywasmeasured with two evaluative bi-polar, 7-pointitems: “negative–positive” and “unfavorable-favorable.”

Moderator variables Respondents responded to a series ofmulti-item Likert measures on 7-point scales. Social justice valueswere measured by two items, adapted from Romani et al. (2013).Empathy was measured with seven items from a well-knownscale indicating empathic concern and protection motivation(Davis and Oathout 1987). An example item is “When I seesomeone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towardthem.” Moral identity was measured by five items developed byAquino and Reed (2002). An example is “Being someone whohas these characteristics is an important part of who I am.”Relational and collective self-concepts were measured by five-item subscales each from the Levels of Self-Concept Scale(Johnson et al. 2006). An example item for the relational self-concept is “It is important to me that I upholdmy commitments tosignificant people in my life.” This is a relatively new scale thathas three parts (collective, relational, and individual) and has theadvantage of showing strong face-validity, being short (five itemsper sub-part), and has been used successfully in a wide variety ofsocial and group contexts (e.g., Johnson et al. 2006). We includedthe individual items on the scale too as a disguise, but we did nothypothesize any effects for individualistic self-concept attributes(they in fact had no effects in our analyses).

Outcome variables A series of multi-item Likert measures on7-point scales, adopted from established measures, were used

to measure outcome variables (see Tables 1 and 2). Negativeword of mouth was measured by three items; complaint wasmeasured by five items; and two types of boycott behaviorswere measured by one item each. Positive word of mouth wasmeasured by three items; resistance to negative informationwas measured by two items; identification with the companywas measured by two items; and investment in the companywas measured by two items. A number of these items havebeen used before in the CSR literature (e.g., Grappi et al. 2013).

Analytical procedures

We applied the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013) to test ourmediated moderation hypotheses. As shown in Fig. 1, in bothconditions, mediated moderation occurs when the moderator(W) interacts with the experiment treatment (X) to influencethe mediator (M), and the mediator (M) in turn influences theoutcome variable (Y). The mediated moderation effectsshown in Fig. 1 can be expressed in two equations. In thefirst, the mediator variable model, the interaction effects of theexperiment treatment (X) and the moderator (W) on the me-diator (M) can be tested with:

M ¼ β10þβ11X þ β12W þ β13X Wð Þ þ ε1: ð1Þ

The second equation, the outcome variable model, showsthe effects of the mediator (M), and the experiment treatment(X) on the outcome variable (Y):

Y ¼ β20þβ21X þ β22M þ ε2 ð2Þ

We assume that in Eqs 1 and 2 that X is contrast coded (+1,−1), M and W are mean centered, and residuals are normallydistributed, independent, and have a common variance. Formediated moderation to occur, β13 in Eq. 1 and β22 in Eq. 2must be significant.

Results

Measurement assessment

Before testing our hypotheses, we ran confirmatory factoranalyses (CFA) for our measures by use of LISREL 8.8.First, we ran CFAs for the measures of mediators, moderators,and outcome variables in both experimental conditions inLISREL. The model under corporate environmental irrespon-sibility fit well: RMSEA=.066, CFI=.96, NNFI=.95, andSRMR=.057; so did the model under corporate environmen-tal responsibility: RMSEA=.076, CFI=.96, NNFI=.95, andSRMR=.058. Factor loadings, critical ratio (CR), reliability,and average variance extracted (AVE) of measures in bothconditions are presented in Tables 1 and 2. As shown inTables 1 and 2, all constructs have reliability above 0.77,

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Table 1 Measures, item loadings, and reliability in the condition of corporate irresponsibility

Variables Items Factorloadings

CR Reliability(alpha)

AVE

Contempt Contemptuous .98 – .95 .85

Scornful .86 18.24

Disdainful .92 24.51

Anger Angry .97 – .98 .93

Mad .96 30.69

Very annoyed .97 33.35

Disgust Disgust .95 – .98 .95

Feeling of distaste .99 31.10

Felling of revulsion .98 30.97

Social justice values Caring for the poor .93 – .90 .54

Correcting social injustices .87 12.95

Empathy When I see someone being take advantage of, I feel kind of protectivetoward them.

.69 – .88 .53

When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes feel pity for them. .64 7.01

I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. .81 8.69

I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. .69 7.53

Sometimes I feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. .76 8.22

Other people’s misfortunes can disturb me a great deal. .82 8.79

I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. .66 7.23

Moral identity It would make me feel good to be a person who has thesecharacteristics.

.88 – .80 .49

Being someone who has these characteristics is an importantpart of who I am.

.87 12.72

I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. .46 5.46

Having these characteristics is not really important to me. .50 6.09

I strongly desire to have these characteristics. .68 9.05

Relational self-concept

If a friend was having a personal problem, I would help him/hereven if it meant sacrificing my time or money.

.69 – .91 .69

I value friends who are caring, empathic individuals. .89 9.73

It is important to me that I uphold my commitments to significantpeople in my life.

.91 9.88

Caring deeply about another person such as a close friend orrelative is important to me.

.90 9.79

Knowing that a close other acknowledges and values the role thatI play in their life makes me feel like a worthwhile person.

.74 8.20

Collective self-concept

Making a lasting contribution to groups that I belong to, such as my workorganization, is very important to me.

.77 – .82 .52

When I become involved in a group project, I do my best to ensure itssuccess.

.82 10.01

I feel great pride when my team or group does well, even if I’m not themain reason for its success.

.84 10.18

I would be honored if I were chosen by an organization or club that I belongto, to represent them at a conference or meeting.

.55 6.35

When I’m part of a team, I am concerned about the group as a whole insteadof whether individual team members like me or whether I like them.

.55 6.42

Negative word ofmouth

I intend to say negative things about this company to friends, relatives andother people.

.90 – .91 .79

I intend to recommend my friends, relatives and other people not consideringwork for this company.

.89 15.21

I intend to discredit the company to friends, relatives and other people. .87 14.71

Complain I intend to complain directly to the company. .82 – .97 .85

I intend to complain to the news media. .91 14.10

I intend to complain to the minister of oil, environment protection agencies orother relevant governmental departments.

.96 15.60

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which are satisfactory (Nunnally 1978). Convergent validity isestablished by checking that the CFA model fits well andfactor loadings are high. CFA models under both conditionsfit well. Under corporate environmental responsibility, allfactor loadings are high and significant (Table 2). Undercorporate environmental irresponsibility, most factor loadingsare high and significant, except for two items of moral identity(0.46 and 0.50) and two items of collective self-concept (.55and .55) which show moderately high and significant factorloadings (Table 1). We decided to keep these four items to usethe original scales and avoid capitalization on chance.

Discriminant validity is achieved if the correlations betweenfactors are less than 1.00 by amount greater than two standard

errors.We did not use average variance extracted as ourmeasureof discriminant validity, because it is not a statistic and it is notused by psychometricians for this purpose. We also checked fordiscriminant validity by χd

2-tests, which verified discriminantvalidity, but in the interest of brevity the results are not presentedhere but are available on request. As shown in Appendix D1,discriminant validity was achieved for all constructs undercorporate environmental irresponsibility. Discriminant validitywas also achieved for all constructs under corporate environ-mental responsibility, as shown in Appendix D2.

Next, we tested whether measures of contempt, anger, anddisgust can be organized hierarchically in a second-order CFAmodel, given that they are so highly correlated yet are distinct.

Table 2 Measures, item loadings, and reliability in the condition of corporate responsibility

Variables Items Factorloadings

CR Reliability(alpha)

AVE

Gratitude Thankful .82 – .89 .81

Grateful .98 10.80

Empathy When I see someone being take advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. .67 – .88 .53

When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes feel pity for them. .67 7.05

I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. .75 7.78

I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. .73 7.62

Sometimes I feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. .83 8.47

Other people’s misfortunes can disturb me a great deal. .81 8.28

I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. .63 6.71

Positive word ofmouth

I intend to say positive things about this company to friends, relatives and other people. .92 – .94 .84

I intend to recommend my friends, relatives and other people considering work for thiscompany.

.86 15.63

I intend to speak well of the company to friends, relatives and other people. .97 22.11

Resistance tonegativeinformation

I forgive this company when it makes mistakes. .85 – .87 .78

I will forgive this company for unfavorable media specific coverage. .92 11.28

Identification withthe company

How do the characteristics, goals and values, and ethic behaviors of the companycorrespond to your own characteristics, goals and values, and ethic behaviors?

.81 – .77 .65

How strongly do you identify with the company? .80 10.24

Investment in thecompany

How likely would you invest in this company (e.g., buy stock)? .87 – .92 .85

How likely would you encourage other people (e.g., your family members, friends) toinvest in this company (e.g., buy stock)?

.97 13.02

CR critical ratio, AVE average variance extracted

Table 1 (continued)

Variables Items Factorloadings

CR Reliability(alpha)

AVE

I intend to complain to the local county officials. .97 15.81

I intend to complain to the representatives in Parliament. .94 14.95

Boycott 1 I would encourage local suppliers or other companies not to do business with thiscompany

Boycott 2 I would put pressure on this company to be social responsible and correct its badpractices.

CR critical ratio, AVE average variance extracted

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Measures of contempt, anger, and disgust served as indicatorsof the hypothesized first-order factors. The model fit indexeswere the following: χ2 (df)=120.39 (24), p=.00, CFI=.98,NNFI=.96, RMSEA=.16, and SRMR=.019. According toHu and Bentler (1999), it is often sufficient to rely on theSRMR and one of the remaining three indexes. Our findingsshow that the SRMR is excellent, and likewise for NNFI andCFI. Only the RMSEA is above recommended standards. Buton balance, the results are satisfactory under the Hu andBentler (1999) interpretation of fit indexes.

The nine factor loadings on first-order factors ranged from.86 to .99; the 3 factor loadings relating the higher order factorto the 3 first-order factors were .95, .99, and .99, respectively.This indicated that three distinct, first-order factors correspond-ing to contempt, anger, and disgust were found to be explainedby one second-order factor. Thus, such a second-order factorfor CAD is consistent with both research proposing onehostility triad dimension and research hypothesizing threedistinct CAD factors. The common shared variance occurs ata high level of abstraction, which is consistent with researchboth by Izard (1977), who proposed a single underlyingdimension for the three emotions, and by Shaver et al. (1987)who found that the emotions share considerable semantic con-tent (see also Nabi 2002). Recent research also supports highamounts of shared variance for at least pairs of the threeemotions (e.g., Harris and Fiske 2006; Hodson and Costello2007; Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Mackie et al. 2000; Shioiriet al. 1999; Simpson et al. 2006; Wagner 2000,). By contrast,Rozin et al. (1999) argue and present research for distincteffects of contempt, anger, and disgust, although they did notexamine discriminant validity. As the first-order factors loadhighly on the second-order factor, we would expect that distincteffects of the three emotions would be obscured if the depen-dent variables were regressed on all three at once. Therefore,given the satisfactory model fit and very high factor loadings, itis reasonable to create a single CAD variable in tests of hy-potheses by multiple regression models.

Environmental irresponsibility and negative moral emotions

In this section, we present results of conditional indirecteffects (i.e., mediated moderation) of corporate environmentalirresponsibility on consumer negative responses. As shown inFig. 1a, under corporate environmental irresponsibility, theexperimental manipulation (X) is a scenario describing cor-porate irresponsible actions toward the environment, CADemotions are mediators (M), and five individual characteris-tics (i.e., social justice values, empathy, moral identity, rela-tional self, and collective self) are moderators (W). Consumernegative responses toward the company include four outcomevariables (Y): negative word of mouth, complaining, and twotype boycotting behavior. The results from PROCCESS anal-ysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4 and in Fig. 2.

Below we present results of the mediated moderation effectfor each of the five individual characteristics. As shown inFig. 1a, we first check how individual characteristics influenceconsumer emotional response to non-green actions (H1a-1e).Table 3 presents results of the moderating effects of the fiveindividual characteristics on the impact of corporate environmen-tal irresponsibility on consumer felt CAD. Moreover, the firstfive panels in Fig. 2 summarize the findings for thesemoderationeffects in graphical form. Then, we test whether felt CAD hasdirect effects on consumer negative responses (H2). Table 4shows the direct effects of felt CAD on consumer negativeresponses. Finally, we examine whether the condition for medi-ated moderation effect of non-green actions on consumer nega-tive responses is satisfied when CAD is the mediator and each ofthe five individual characteristics is the moderator. In addition,we present results of the bootstrapping bias-corrected confidenceinterval procedure for each moderator, as shown in Table 5.

Results of mediated moderation effect when social justicevalues are the moderator

We begin with results of the first moderator, social justicevalues, and then present results for the remaining four indi-vidual characteristics.

Moderating effect of social justice valuesAs shown in Table 3,corporate non-green actions (X) and social justice values (W)interact significantly to influence consumer felt CAD emo-tions (X*W=β13=.28, t=3.17). That is, social justice valuesmoderate the impact of perception of non-green actions onconsumer emotional responses. In other words, those whohold stronger social justice values are more likely to experi-ence CAD upon perception of corporate non-green actions.Such a moderation effect is also shown in graphic form inFig. 2. Therefore, H1a is supported.

Direct effect of CAD on consumer negative responses Asshown in Table 4, consumer experiences of CAD had signifi-cant influence on their negative responses toward the company.For instance, a significant direct effect was found for CAD onnegative word of mouth (β22=.35, t=4.19), on complaint be-havior (β22=.21, t=2.55), on boycott behavior 1 (β22=.29, t=2.86), and on boycott behavior 2 (β22=.29, t=2.98). Thismeans that felt CAD leads to consumer negative word of mouthcommunication, complaining, and boycotting. Therefore, H2 isalso supported when CAD functions as the mediator.

Mediated moderation As discussed earlier, the condition toestablish the mediated moderation effect is that both β13 in themediator variable model (see Table 3) and β22 in the outcomevariable model (see Table 4) are significant. Because both β13

and β22 were significant, the mediated moderation effect issatisfied for negative word of mouth with CAD as the mediator

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and social justice values as the moderator. That is, social justicevalues consumers hold regulate the extent to which they experi-ence CAD emotions upon perception of corporate non-greenactions; felt CAD further mediates such a moderated effect onconsumer negative word ofmouth. Similarly, when social justicevalues are the moderator, both β13 and β22 were also significantfor consumer complaint and boycott behaviors 1 and 2, as shownin Tables 3 and 4. This means that mediated moderation effectsare also satisfied for consumer complaining and boycotting.

Moreover, the direct effect of corporate non-green actions onconsumer negativeword ofmouthwas also significant (β21=.58,t=3.31), as shown in Table 4; therefore, we have a partialmediation of CADbetween non-green actions and negativewordof mouth. However, the direct effects of non-green actions onconsumer complaint and boycott behavior 1 and 2 were notsignificant (Table 4). So felt CAD fully mediated the influenceof non-green actions on consumer complaining and boycotting.

Finally, given the significant interaction between socialjustice values and corporate non-green actions, we probedfor indirect effects of non-green actions on consumer negativeresponses by estimating conditional indirect effects (i.e., me-diated moderation) at different values of the moderator, socialjustice values. Table 5 displays the conditional indirect effectsat three values of the moderator variable: the mean (0), onestandard deviation above the mean (+1SD), and one standarddeviation below (−1SD), along with bootstrapping. For socialjustice values, the conditional indirect effect on negative wordof mouth is 0.45 at one standard deviation below (−1.26),0.58 at the mean (0), and 0.70 at one standard deviation above

the mean (1.26). All three values are positive and significantlydifferent from zero at α=.05, given the absence of zero fromeach bootstrap 95% confidence interval (95% CI). Thus theindirect effect of corporate non-green actions on negativeword of mouth, via CAD, is greater when social justice valuesare high rather than low (Table 5). Similarly, the conditionalindirect effects were positive and significantly different fromzero at α=.05 for consumer complaint and boycott behaviors1 and 2, as shown in Table 5. This indicates that the indirecteffect of corporate environmental irresponsibility on consum-er complaining and boycotting, via CAD, is greater whensocial justice values are high rather than low.

To sum up, mediated moderation effects of non-green actionson consumer negative responses was established when socialjustice values are the moderator and CAD is the mediator, asshown in Fig. 1a. More specifically, social justice values mod-erate the degree to which corporate non-green actions elicit CADemotions in consumers; then, felt CAD further mediates such amoderated impact on consumer negative responses toward thecompany; finally, felt CAD partially mediated the impact ofcorporate non-green actions on negative word of mouth but fullymediated that impact on consumer complaining and boycotting.

Results of mediated moderation for empathy, moral identity,relational and collective self-concept

Next, we follow the same procedure as above to examineresults of mediated moderation effects for the four remainingindividual characteristics: empathy, moral identity, relational

Table 3 Models for anger, contempt, disgust (CAD) as mediator dependent variables, mediator variable models:M=β10+β11X+β12W+β13X(W)+ε1

Moderator (W) Social justice values Empathy Moral identity

b t b t b t

X: manipulation β11 1.66 15.01*** 1.65 14.76*** 1.64 15.08***

W: moderator β12 .07 .75 -.05 -.45 .12 1.19

X*W: interaction β13 .28 3.17** .27 2.53* .35 3.59***

Relational self-concept Collective self-conceptb t b t

X: manipulation β11 1.65 14.66*** 1.65 15.25***

W: moderator β12 .04 .38 .05 .50

X*W: interaction β13 .24 2.09* .43 3.95***

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; X manipulation, W moderator, M mediator

Table 4 Models for CAD as mediator variables, outcome variable models: Y=β20+β21X+β22M+ε2

Outcome variables (Y) Negative word of mouth Complaint behaviors Boycott behavior1 Boycott behavior2

b t b t b t b t

X: manipulation β21 .58 3.31*** -.02 -.13 .13 .60 -.16 -.79

M: CAD β22 .35 4.19*** .21 2.55* .29 2.86** .29 2.98**

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; X manipulation, M mediator, Y outcome variable

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self-concept, and collective self-concept.

Moderating effect of individual characteristics We firstchecked whether these individual characteristics influence con-sumer emotional response upon perception of corporate non-greenactions. As shown in Table 3, there were significant interactioneffects between non-green actions and empathy (β13=.27, t=2.53), between non-green actions and moral identity (β13=.35,t=3.59), between non-green actions and the relational self-concept(β13=.24, t=2.09), and between non-green actions and the col-lective self-concept (β13=.43, t=3.95) on consumer felt CAD.The moderation effects are also shown in graphic form in Fig. 2.Thus H1b, H1c, H1d, and H1e are supported, respectively.

Direct effect of CAD on consumer negative responses Then,we examined whether the direct effects of CAD on consumernegative responses are significant. Because results in Table 4are the same for all five moderators under environmentalirresponsibility, β22 s were also significant for consumer neg-ative word of mouth, complaint, and boycott behaviors 1 and 2when the moderator is empathy, moral identity, relational self-concept, or collective self-concept, thus supporting H2.

Mediated moderation In a similar way, we checked whether theconditions formediatedmoderation effects are satisfied for each ofthe remaining four individual characteristics. This means that bothβ13 in Table 3 andβ22 in Table 4 should be significant. As shownabove, both β13 and β22 were significant for consumer negativeword of mouth, complaint, and boycott behaviors 1 and 2 whenthe moderator is empathy, moral identity, relational self-concept,or collective self-concept (see Table 3 and 4). Therefore, mediatedmoderation is also satisfied when CAD is the mediator and whenempathy, moral identity, relational self-concept, or collective self-concept is the moderator.

Moreover, since results in Table 4 are the same for all fivemoderators under corporate non-green actions, the direct

impact of non-green actions was significant only for negativeword of mouth, but not for consumer complaint and boycottbehaviors 1 and 2 when the moderator is each of the remainingfour individual characteristics. Therefore, we have also apartial mediation of CAD for negative word of mouth, butfull mediations for consumer complaining and boycottingwhen the moderator is empathy, moral identity, relationalself-concept, or collective self-concept.

Finally, Table 5 also shows the conditional indirect effectsof non-green actions on consumer negative responses at threevalues of the remaining four moderators: the mean (0), +1SD,and -1SD. All conditional indirect effects for these 4 moder-ators were positive and significantly different from zero atα=.05, given the absence of zero from each bootstrap 95%confidence interval (95%CI), as shown in Table 5. Thus theindirect effect of non-green actions on consumer negativeresponses, via CAD, is greater when empathy is high ratherthan low, when moral identity is more central rather than lesscentral, or, when relational self-concept or collective self-concept is strong rather than weak.

Concluding, as shown in Fig. 1a, each of the remainingfour individual characteristics (i.e., empathy, moral identity,relational self-concept, and collective self-concept) moderatedthe impact of corporate environmental irresponsibility on feltCAD, and felt CAD further mediated such a moderated effecton consumer negative responses. The mediation effect ofCAD is partial for consumer negative word of mouth, but fullfor consumer complaining and boycotting.

Environmental responsibility and gratitude

In this section, we present results of mediated moderation effectsof corporate environmental responsibility on consumer positiveresponses toward the company. As shown in Fig. 1b, the exper-imental manipulation (X) is a scenario describing corporateresponsible actions toward the environment, and the positive

Fig. 2 Interaction effects between experiment manipulation and individual differences

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moral emotions of gratitude is the mediator (M). One individualdifference variable, empathy, functions as the moderator (W).Consumer positive responses include four outcome variables(Y): positive word of mouth, resistance to negative information,identification with the company, and investing in the company.In a similar way, as shown in Fig. 1b, we first tested whetherempathy influences consumer’s emotional response to greenactions (H3), then whether gratitude has a direct effect onconsumer positive responses (H4), and finally whether the con-dition formediatedmoderation effects is satisfiedwhen gratitudeis the mediator and empathy is the moderator. We also presentresults of the bootstrapping bias-corrected confidence intervalprocedure for empathy, as shown in Table 7.

Moderating effect of empathy As shown in Table 6, the statis-tically significant interaction between corporate green actionsand empathy (X*W) in the mediator variable model (β 13=.27,t=2.10) shows that the effect of corporate green actions on feltgratitude is moderated by empathy. Such a moderation effect isalso shown in graphic form in Fig. 2. The positive interactioneffect is consistent with H3 in that the influence of consumerperceived environmental responsible activity on felt gratitude islarger for consumers higher than lower in empathy. Note that theresult in Table 6 applies to all 4 outcome variables under corpo-rate environmental responsibility.

Direct impact of gratitude on consumer positive responsesAsshown in Table 7, we find significant direct effects of gratitudeon positive word of mouth (β22=.35, t=4.80), resistance tonegative information (β22=.33, t=5.23), identification with thecompany (β22=.43, t=7.65), and investment in the company(β22=.38, t=5.22), separately. Therefore, H4 is supported.

Mediated moderationBecause bothβ 13 in Table 6 and theβ22sin Table 7 are significant, the conditions formediatedmoderationeffects are satisfied for positive word of mouth, resistance tonegative information, identification with the company, and in-vestment in the company. Moreover, since none of the directeffects of green actions on the four outcome variables is signif-icant, felt gratitude fully mediates the impact of corporate greenactions on consumer positive responses toward the company.

Similarly, we also estimated conditional indirect effects ofcorporate green actions on all four outcome variables at threevalues of the moderator (empathy): the mean (0), 1 standarddeviation above the mean (1.05), and 1 standard deviationbelow (−1.05). As shown in Table 7, all the conditionalindirect effects are positive and different from zero atα=.05, given the absence of zero from each bootstrap 95%confidence interval (95% CI). Thus the indirect effects ofcorporate green actions on consumer positive responses viagratitude, is greater when empathy is high rather than low.

Table 5 Conditional indirect effects for anger, contempt, disgust (CAD) as mediators

Moderators Negative word of mouth Complaint behaviors Boycott behavior1 Boycott behavior 2

Social justice values Effect 95% CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI

W=−1SD (−1.26) .45 (.25, .74) .27 (.08, .52) .37 (.13, .66) .38 (.15, .70)

W=0 .58 (.30, .89) .34 (.08, .62) .48 (.15, .82) .48 (.17, .83)

W=+1SD (1.26) .70 (.34,1.12) .41 (.10, .76) .58 (.18, 1.02) .58 (.21,1.01)

Empathy Effect 95% CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI

W=−1SD (−1.04) .47 (.24, .78) .28 (.09, .55) .39 (.13, .73) .40 (.15, .68)

W=0 .57 (.29, .86) .34 (.11, .64) .47 (.13, .81) .48 (.17, .81)

W=+1SD (1.04) .67 (.35,1.00) .40 (.13, .73) .55 (.15, .93) .56 (.19, .99)

Moral identity Effect 95% CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI

W=−1SD (−1.12) .44 (.20, .70) .26 (.05, .47) .36 (.10, .64) .36 (.10, .62)

W=0 .57 (.28, .89) .34 (.06, .59) .47 (.11, .81) .48 (.13, .78)

W=+1SD (1.12) .71 (.36,1.10) .42 (.07, .75) .58 (.15, 1.03) .59 (.17, .99)

Relational self-concept Effect 95% CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI

W=−1SD (−.99) .49 (.24, .81) .29 (.08, .53) .41 (.16, .77) .41 (.12, .75)

W=0 .57 (.31, .89) .34 (.08, .61) .47 (.16, .85) .48 (.15, .80)

W=+1SD (.99) .66 (.37,1.05) .39 (.09, .72) .54 (.18, .96) .55 (.17, .89)

Collective self-concept Effect 95% CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI

W=−1SD (−.99) .42 (.22, .69) .25 (.09, .51) .35 (.13, .69) .35 (.11, .65)

W=0 .57 (.30, .87) .34 (.09, .62) .47 (.18, .87) .47 (.15, .82)

W=+1SD (.99) .72 (.36,1.09) .43 (.11, .77) .60 (.21, 1.05) .60 (.18,1.04)

Effect- conditional indirect effect, 95% CI- bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for conditional indirect effect

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To sum up, empathy moderates the effect of corporateenvironmental responsibility on felt gratitude, which, in turn,mediates such a moderated effect fully on consumer positiveword of mouth, resistance to negative information, identifica-tion with the company, and investment in the company.

Tests of rival hypotheses

To test for rival mediators between perceptions of corporatenon-green actions and consumer responses, we performedmediation analyses using sadness and fear as mediators.When sadness and fear were separately tested as mediators,they functioned to channel the effects of perceptions on con-sumer outcome reactions. However, when CAD was added tothe analyses, together with sadness or fear, sadness and fearfailed to function as mediators. Thus the hypothesized nega-tive CADmoral emotions, but not the basic negative emotionsof sadness and fear, function to mediate the effects of con-sumer perceptions of corporate non-green actions on the out-come actions. Moreover, we tested for the mediating effect ofattitude. Specifically, upon exposure to corporate non-greenactions, when attitude was included together with CAD asmultiple mediators, both CAD and attitude functioned tochannel the effect of perceptions on consumer responses.This indicates that both affective and cognitive (evaluative)processes are operative asmediators. Similarly, upon exposureto corporate green actions, both gratitude and attitude mediat-ed the impact of perceptions of green actions on consumer

responses. Finally, as suggested by one reviewer, we alsotested whether attitudes function as consumer outcome vari-ables. The results show that CAD influences attitude undercorporate environmental irresponsibility and gratitude affectsattitude under corporate environmental responsibility.

Discussion

Recapping the findings

The results show strong support for the conditional indirecteffect (i.e., mediated moderation) of perception of corporateenvironmental irresponsible/responsible behaviors on con-sumer negative and positive responses toward the company,with moral emotions as the mediator and important individualcharacteristics as the moderator. Specifically, upon exposureto corporate environmental irresponsibility, those who (a) holdstronger social justice values, (b) are more empathetic, (c)have a highly central moral identity, and (d) have a strongrelational or collective self, are more likely to experience thenegative moral emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust.Such felt negative emotions then lead to varied consumernegative responses toward the company, such as negativeword of mouth, consumer complaining, and boycotting.Moreover, the negative moral emotions (CAD) mediate par-tially the effect of perceived corporate environmental irre-sponsibility on negative word of mouth, but they mediatefully the impact of perceived corporate environmental irre-sponsibility on both consumers complaining and boycotting.

For corporate environmental responsibility, those who aremore empathetic are more likely to experience gratitude thanthose who are less empathetic. Gratitude also fully mediatedsuch a moderated impact of perceived corporate environmen-tal responsibility on multiple consumer responses, specifical-ly, positive word of mouth, resistance to negative information,identification with the company, and investment in the com-pany. Likewise attitudes also functioned as a mediator. Onereviewer asked us to test whether attitudes function as

Table 7 Models for gratitude as mediator variable, outcome variable models: Y=β20+β21X+β22M+ε2, with conditional indirect effect

Outcome variables (Y) Positive word of mouth Resistance to negative information Identification with company Investment

b t b t b t b t

X: manipulation β21 .11 .91 .07 .63 .08 .89 -.04 -.32

M: gratitude β22 .35 4.80*** .33 5.23*** .43 7.65*** .38 5.22***

Conditional indirect effect Effect 95% CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI Effect 95%CI

W=−1SD (−1.05) .14 (.02,32) .13 (.02, .30) .17 (.02, .36) .15 (.01, .33)

W=0 .24 (.12,.42) .23 (.12, .38) .29 (.16, .46) .26 (.13, .43)

W=+1SD (1.05) .34 (.16,.57) .32 (.17, .52) .41 (.23, .64) .36 (.19, .59)

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; W moderator, M mediator, Y outcome variable, Effect- conditional indirect effect, 95% CI- bootstrap 95% confidenceintervals for conditional indirect effect

Table 6 Models for gratitude as mediator dependent variables, mediatorvariable models: M=β10+β11X+β12W+β13X(W)+ε

Moderator (W) Empathy

b t

X: manipulation β11 .69 5.16***

W: moderator β12 .25 1.95

X*W: interaction β13 .27 2.10*

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001;Xmanipulation,Wmoderator,Mmediator

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consumer outcome variables. The test of this model discov-ered that attitudes indeed are functions of gratitude.

Theoretical contributions

By investigating the role of emotional processes as instigatorsof consumer responses toward corporate green and non-greenactions and the contingencies governing the functioning of themotivators, our study makes important contributions to CSRresearch in a number of ways. Importantly, it contributes toCSR research by examining “hot”moral emotion processes inconsumer decision making, which complement past researchon “cool” rational processes. We found that both negative andpositive moral emotions enact consumer responses to bad andgood corporate green behavior, respectively. Equally impor-tant, we further hypothesized and showed that individualdifferences of consumers regulate the degree of felt negativeand positive emotions. Research to date has taken a largelycognitude and attitudinal (evaluative) perspective butneglected affective explanations of consumer responses toCSR actions by firms. In other words, our research buildsupon recent basic psychological research and answers thequestion how green and non-green actions by firms influenceconsumer responses as outcomes. We specify and show thatthe effects of perceived corporate responsible and irresponsi-ble action produce their effects through moral emotions,where the latter are conditioned on various individualdifferences.

Our study also deepens and broadens recent research on themediating role of emotional processes (Grappi et al. 2013;Romani et al. 2013) in the CSR literature, as described inmoredetail below. First, we deepen extant CSR research by testingkey moderators of moral emotions. As mentioned earlier,there is a need for more studies to address the functioning ofmoral emotions and its under-researched contingencies.Research to date, which occurred in settings other than greenones, has examined only a single moderator and thereforeprovided only limited explanations. Our study proposed andtested five key moderating variable hypotheses under bothcorporate irresponsibility and responsibility in green contexts.For instance, under corporate environmental irresponsibility,we explored the following moderators on the mediating roleof negative moral emotions (CAD)—empathy, moral identity,and relational- and collective-self—which have not been stud-ied before in the CSR context. We also investigated thepositive moral emotion of gratitude and did so with empathyas a key regulator under corporate environmental responsibil-ity. Very little research has been done with positive emotionsin CSR, and no studies could be found showing that empathymoderates the effects of gratitude. Thus we deepened ourunderstanding of the conditions under which gratitude leadsto positive stakeholder responses to corporate socialresponsibility.

Second, we broadened the study of CSR actions byadapting the framework of moral emotions and their regulat-ing mechanisms to a new and understudied CSR context, thegreen context. Corporate green actions have become increas-ingly important in decision making as companies face“mounting public sensitivity, stricter regulation, and growingstakeholder pressures focused on preserving the natural envi-ronment” (Leonidou et al. 2013, p. 151). There is a need formore research examining consumer perceptions and responsestoward corporate green actions (Cronin et al. 2011). Paststudies have not investigated consumer emotional responsesto CSR activities in the “green” context. Our study shows thatboth corporate green and non-green actions impact consumerresponses toward the company through the influence of feltpositive and negative moral emotions and their contingencies.Therefore, we also add to current CSR research generally byaddressing consumer responses toward CSR activities in theunderstudied domain of corporate green actions (Peloza andShang 2011).

Third, we also broadened extant CSR research on consum-er affective processes by investigating both positive and neg-ative emotional processes in one study for one context.We notonly found that positive and negative moral emotions andtheir moderators channel the impact of corporate green andnon-green actions on consumer responses but also showed anasymmetry between consumer emotional responses towardnegative and positive CSR information. That is, consumershave somewhat stronger emotional responses toward corpo-rate non-green actions than green actions. Their negativeemotional responses are also contingent on more individualcharacteristics than positive emotional responses. Such anasymmetry is compatible with previous findings on the asym-metry between consumer negative and positive cognitive re-sponses (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001).

Fourth, our study extends CSR research by examiningmore varied consumer responses than previous studies.Upon exposure to negative CSR information, individualsreacted not only by engaging in negative word of mouth andcomplaining to the company, but also through protesting todiverse authorities and by boycotting. Regarding corporatepositive CSR activities, individuals responded not only bypositive word of mouth, resisting negative information, andidentifying with the company but also by considering invest-ment in company stock. This shows that consumer felt moralemotions can lead to strong engagement in acting against orsupporting the focal company and across multiple domains,which has important implications for managers, as discussedbelow. For non-green actions, the strongest effects occurredfor negative word of mouth and the weakest for complaintbehavior, with the two boycott behaviors in between (seeTable 4). For green actions, the strongest effects occurred foridentification with the company and the weakest for resistanceto negative information, with positive word of mouth and

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investment with the company in between (see Table 7). Theeffects on consumer outcome responses were actually some-what greater for corporate green than non-green actions. Theopposite were found for effects on moral emotions as pointedout in the paragraph above.

Finally, all hypotheses were tested on actual adult con-sumers rather than the more commonly used practice in mar-keting academic research employing student samples. Thisstrengthens the generalizability of our study.

Managerial implications

Our findings have important implications for the managementof company CSR activities, especially those related to theenvironment. First, the mediating role of moral emotionsbetween corporate non-green/green actions and consumerresponses indicates the importance of emotional processes inconsumers’ interpretation and response to company CSR ac-tivities, to which managers need to pay special attention. It isimportant for managers to understand specific emotions en-gendered in consumers by their non-green/green actions, be-cause these emotions have strong action consequences whichcan be linked to multiple negative and positive outcomeresponses that consumers take toward the firm. For instance,perceptions of corporate environmental irresponsibility en-gender negative moral emotions of contempt, anger, anddisgust in consumers, which lead to strong consumer reactionssuch as negative word of mouth, complaining, and boycottingthat can negatively impact a firm’s reputation and perfor-mance. This suggests that a firm’s first priority should be toprevent the occurrence of irresponsible behaviors to avoidprovoking negative moral emotions in consumers. When irre-sponsible behaviors and negative emotions occur, managersshould try to mitigate their effects on consumers byresponding with appropriate admission of responsibility, apol-ogies, and remedial actions. Such corporate actions not onlymight lessen the magnitude of felt negative moral emotions byconsumers but also could create mixed emotions by generat-ing a certain amount of respect and gratitude toward the firmattempting to make restitution, which may lessen negativeconsumer responses. Future research could examine the sen-sitivity of consumer forgiveness and the persistence of CADto admission of responsibility, apologies, and remedial ac-tions. By contrast, the findings on the role of gratitude suggestthat managers should monitor green actions taken by theirfirms and communicate this effectively to consumers so as toreinforce felt thankfulness and try to “capitalize” on thesepositive feelings. For instance, after conducting positive greenpractices, firms could provide consumers with opportunities toreciprocate with different acts of support of the company thatcould improve firm-consumer relationships. Felt gratitudemight provide a competitive advantage over other firms tothe extent it translates into a favorable company image,

goodwill, positive word of mouth, and other consequences.Therefore, specific emotions can serve as targets in persuasivecommunications and in publicity to mitigate or overcomereactions to bad actions taken by firms or to take advantageand promote reactions to good actions taken by firms. Forinstance, in the case of corporate non-green actions, the con-tent of such communications should target contempt, anger,and disgust, and provide people with coping mechanisms torelieve the tension created in them. It is possible too that somemoral emotions may be easier or more ethical to target thanothers. Also targeting more vulnerable moral emotions maybecome gate-ways for changing others.

Moreover, the asymmetry between consumer emotionalresponses toward negative and positive CSR informationfurther indicates that managers should pay special attentionto prevent the occurrence of irresponsible behaviors or less-en possible damage of negative consequences. It is impor-tant for managers to keep in mind that it may be easier todamage their firms’ reputation and performance by doingbad than to build up and maintain a good image and repu-tation by doing good.

Second, the findings show that specific individual charac-teristics moderate consumer feelings of negative/positive mor-al emotions and consequent behavior, after perceiving envi-ronmental irresponsible/responsible acts. This has importantmanagerial implications as well. For example, for negativemoral emotional reactions to corporate irresponsibility, firmsshould be aware of the importance of individual differencefactors and act so as to minimize their effects on negativeresponses during potential CSR crises. This might mean, forexample, identifying consumers who are especially concernedwith social justice, who are especially high in empathy, whoare strong in moral identity, or who especially appreciatecommunal and relational values, and then targeting commu-nications to these persons, who might be opinion leaders andactive in influencing others. People rating low on these traitsmay need stronger or different communications to lessen theeffects of negative ones. Each of the moderators identified inour research could serve as a segmentation variable to targetdifferent groups of consumers and influence message content.The findings also showed that specific individual differencesin empathy enhance consumer feeling of gratitude and conse-quent behavior, after perception of environmentally responsi-ble acts. This provides managers with tools they can use toleverage their environmental investments. For instance, grat-itude can be increased by associating environmental invest-ment with product lines targeted to the more pro-social ori-ented segments of the market (e.g., Chan 1999).

Third, our findings show that consumers are also willing toengage in varied behaviors in their reactions toward corporategreen or non-green behaviors. For instance, they support thecompany by investing in the company in the case of greenactions, or they act against the company through complaining

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to diverse authorities and boycotting in the case of non-greenactions. This means that managers should understand thepossible actions individuals can take upon exposure to CSRinformation and try to manage the multiple ties betweenconsumers and their firms.

Finally, an important managerial implication to point out isconsumer word of mouth. We found that consumersresponded to non-green/green actions by firms withnegative/positive word of mouth. Berger (2013, pp. 6–7)claims that word of mouth “is the primary factor behind 20percent and 50 percent of all purchasing decisions” and is “atleast ten times more effective” than advertising. Stimulation ofpositive word of mouth in the case of green actions andavoidance or mitigation of negative word of mouth in the caseof non-green actions are promising tactics worth further studyfor influencing consumers. The moral emotions and modera-tors we studied provide promising targets for communicationas vehicles for controlling word of mouth effects.

To sum up, managers should view the emotive and self-regulatory side of consumer stakeholder reactions as opportu-nities for improving communicating with consumers andidentifying sub-segments of their market based on consumercharacteristics and needs. Our study also provides managersinsight into the complexity of consumer responses: for exam-ple, when firms commit actions that are non-green, under-standing how this leads to costs for the firm, and perhaps at thesame time, when consumers have misperceptions, identifyingwhich emotions and arguments should be targeted for changein advertising copy, say.

Limitations and future directions

One of the limitations of our study is the use of narrativedescriptions of a fictitious company to elicit moral emotions.In future studies, use of descriptions or videos of real events ofactual companies may enhance the degree of realism of manip-ulations and elicit stronger moral emotions, especially for pos-itive moral emotions. We suspect that our manipulations werein some ways weaker, however, than that actually experiencedin everyday life. Nevertheless, our particular scenarios, whilefictitious, were constructed along the lines of actual incidents ofcorporate responsible and irresponsible actions done in the past.

Second, we wish to acknowledge that our treatment of mod-erators, which we derived from the basic research literatures,contains elements of speculation and exploration. Our rationalesfor hypotheses perhaps did not do justice to research in the basicfields upon which we drew, and future research is needed. Forexample, investigating of when contempt, anger, and disgust canbe de-coupled and function independently are worthy of study.

Third, moral emotions were measured only by use of alanguage-based method. It would be desirable to measureemotions through a variety of methods in future research(e.g., facial expressions, autonomic or somatic nervous

system responses, fMRI techniques). Likewise, rather thanusing scenarios of the sort we did, future research mightmanipulate emotions directly, if such an approach can beadapted to green marketing contexts (see for example,Raghunathan and Pham 1999).

Fourth, the study of stakeholders beyond consumers de-serves special consideration. Cronin et al. (2011) develop anumber of possibilities in this regard and suggest a number ofrelevant theoretical and managerial directions for futureresearch.

Finally, the theoretical framework could be tested in con-texts other than environmental transgressions. For instance,ethical and social transgressions by managers could be inves-tigated to strengthen the generalizability of the mechanismsdiscovered herein (e.g., Armstong and Green 2013).

Acknowledgments The authors gratefully thank the Norwegian Re-search Council for financial support and thank the editor and two anon-ymous reviewers for their feedback and valuable suggestions.

Appendix A: Narrative scenario of corporateenvironmental irresponsibility

Offshore Shipping ASA is a stock exchange listed company inwestern Norway with 1700 employees, and that owns andoperates 35 special ships within supply activities, subseaconstruction, seismic operations, and tow and anchor handlingoperations. A large part of these are currently under contract tooil and petroleum related companies, both in the Norwegiansector and in foreign waters. Over the last 25 years, OffshoreShipping ASA has, by Norwegian standards, gradually grownto be a large and significant player within offshore shipping.

Compared to other Norwegian offshore shipping compa-nies, Offshore Shipping ASA has generally not replaced agingships with newer ones, and the shipping company thereforehas a fleet with a very high elevated average age. A conse-quence of this has been that the shipping company has repeat-edly received negative feedback from the Norwegian author-ities concerning significant deficiencies and demands for im-provements onmany of its ships. Themost precarious demandincluded deficiencies that in a worst case could have led to alarge spill at sea. By remaining indifferent to such warnings, itwas almost inevitable that one of the company’s ships wouldbe involved in a large oil spill very close to the Norwegiancoast several years ago. The spill occurred at night and lead tothe death of many birds and fish in the area near of the spilland on the nearby beaches, including considerable damages toflora on the coastline. In a desperate attempt to avoid extensiveclean-up costs and negative media attention, the shippingcompany required the ship’s crew to keep the spill a secret.The following morning numerous ships from other companiesin the area reported a large oil spill to the authorities. By using

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vessel traffic data and satellite images, the supervisory author-ities were able to confirm that the spill came from one ofOffshore Shipping ASA’s ships. The resulting inspections ofthe ship confirmed the assumptions of The Norwegian CoastalAdministration, and it was determined that the spill was a resultof both a lack of maintenance and of aging equipment andgeneral negligence of management. The authorities were alsoable to determine that the extent of the oil spill could have beengreatly reduced if the spill had been reported immediately sothat oil booms could have been set out sooner and the spillcontained. Also the company had an inadequate emergencyresponse program for dealing with damage to flora and fauna.

This event later lead to several heavy rounds in court for theshipping company, a loss of reputation, and large financiallosses. Nonetheless, afterwards Offshore Shipping ASA hasshown surprisingly little will in facing the requirements andcriticism from both the authorities and various special interestorganizations. For example, in recent years, Offshore ASAhas had a special focus on expansion in international markets.Through this expansion strategy, a possibility opened up forgradually transferring the company’s aging ships from areaswith strict environmental and safety requirements to areaswith less stringent requirements. This has made it possiblefor the shipping company to continue operating a number ofships that would have represented a large environmental andsafety risk in Norwegian waters. This has led to the shippingcompany consciously operating with a greater environmentalrisk than other comparable Norwegian shipping companies inits worldwide operations.

Appendix B: Narrative scenario of corporateenvironmental responsibility

Offshore Shipping ASA is a stock exchange listed company inwestern Norway with 1700 employees, and that owns andoperates 35 special ships within supply activities, subseaconstruction, seismic operations, and tow and anchor handlingoperations. A large part of these are currently under contract tooil and petroleum related companies, both in the Norwegiansector and in foreign waters. Over the last 25 years, OffshoreShipping ASA has, by Norwegian standards, gradually grownto be a large and significant player within offshore shipping.

Offshore Shipping ASA has customer service and innova-tion as its primary core values, and offers functional and envi-ronmentally friendly shipping solutions with high internationalstandards. Closely following up construction projects, develop-ing new technology, and further developing existing solutionsare important areas of focus for Offshore Shipping ASA.Especially in recent years, the shipping company and its part-ners have invested large resources in developing various envi-ronmentally sound and effective solutions and products.Among other things, the shipping company has employed a

so-called Environment & Development Engineer, whose pri-mary goal is to develop the company’s environmental solutions.As a consequence of such initiatives, Offshore Shipping ASAhas become recognized by both politicians and environmentalorganizations as a pioneer in environmentally friendly shipping,and has been awarded prestigious environmental prizes.

Working closely with a number of technology companies,Offshore Shipping ASA has analyzed, developed, and imple-mented many new and innovative environmental solutions.These include a new system for cleaning ballast water, devel-oping a new anti-fouling bottom paint that will potentiallyimprove a ship’s propulsion and save fuel, installing newcleaning systems on the oldest vessels that will reduce emis-sions to both the air and sea, as well as analyzing andimplementing new routines for ships under way and maneu-vering in ports that will potentially lead to a savings in fuelconsumption by up to 20 percent. An emphasis on routines formaintenance and optimizing engines has also been an impor-tant part of this. Nonetheless, Offshore Shipping ASA wantsto take this development a step further, and has thereforestarted an extensive and ambitious project with the goal ofstudying how to design an entirely new generation ofenvironmentally-friendly ships. In this matter, OffshoreShipping ASA’s General Manager has stated that this will bean important step into the future in shipping, and that thecompany wants to work in a goal-oriented manner to completethis project so that the shipping company can be a worldleader in environmental responsibility and sustainability. Theproject is closely connected to Offshore Shipping ASA’s goalof building up a completely carbon-neutral fleet.

In recent years Offshore Shipping ASA has experiencedstrong international growth. By offering solutions that exceedthe strictest international technical and environmental require-ments, the shipping company has been a driving force forenvironmentally friendly shipping in international markets.An example of this is the use of double hulls around the fueltanks on all of its ships, which is not required by either theclassification societies or the IMO. The United Nation hasrecognized Offshore Shipping ASA as a world leader inenvironmental responsibility.

Appendix C: Narrative scenario of the control condition

Offshore Shipping ASA is a stock exchange listed shippingcompany that currently owns and operates around 35 specialships within the petro-maritime sector. The fleet includes anumber of supply vessels, construction and subsea operationsvessels, seismic vessels, and offshore anchor handling tugvessels. A large part of these are currently under contract tooil and petroleum related companies, both in the Norwegiansector and in foreign waters. At the same time, individualvessels operate on shorter contracts within the so-called spot

J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.

market. Since the company was established, OffshoreShipping ASA’s main office has been located in westernNorway. Over time, a number of foreign agent offices havealso been opened. Over the last 25 years, Offshore ShippingASA has, by Norwegian standards, gradually grown to be alarge and significant player within offshore shipping.

Today, Offshore Shipping ASA employs about 1700 peo-ple, both offshore and onshore. As for the various onshoreoffices, these encompass operations and management, diversepersonnel and offshore support functions, as well as a separatedevelopment division. The development division has focuseson technological refinements as a step towards expanding inexisting and new markets. A large proportion of the em-ployees on Offshore ASA’s ships today are Norwegian citi-

zens. Both the wage conditions and retirement arrangementsthat Offshore Shipping ASA offers are considered competitiveby Norwegian standards.

Like similar companies, Offshore Shipping ASA has pro-gram for customer support and maintaining operations. Theshipping company has been able to offer functional and cost-effective vessel solutions, while maintaining internationalstandards. In recent years, Offshore Shipping ASA has fo-cused on expansion in international markets. This includesareas around Brazil and the Gulf of Mexico. OffshoreShipping ASA’s General Manager has stated that furthergrowth in the company and the continued development oftheir solutions will largely depend on access to new andinternational markets.

Appendix D1

Appendix D2

Table 8 Correlation matrix of latent constructs in the condition of corporate irresponsibility

Social-just Empathy Rela- self Col- self MI NWOM Compl Anger Contempt Disgust

Social-just 1.00

Empathy 0.60 (0.06) 1.00

Rela-self 0.50 (0.07) 0.57 (0.07) 1.00

Col-self 0.65 (0.06) 0.58 (0.07) 0.68 (0.05) 1.00

MI 0.37 (0.08) 0.56 (0.07) 0.71 (0.05) 0.52 (0.07) 1.00

NWOM 0.01 (0.09) −0.06 (0.09) −0.09 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 1.00

Compl −0.01 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09) −0.07 (0.09) −0.04 (0.09) −0.02 (0.09) 0.45 (0.07) 1.00

Anger −0.06 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) −0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09) 0.70 (0.05) 0.33 (0.08) 1.00

Contempt −0.05 (0.09) −0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.66 (0.05) 0.30 (0.08) 0.94 (0.01) 1.00

Disgust 0.01 (0.09) −0.03 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09) 0.69 (0.05) 0.30 (0.08) 0.94 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) 1.00

Values within parentheses are standard errors

Social-just social justice values, Rela-self relational self-concept, Col-self collective self-concept, MI moral identity, NWOM negative word of mouth,Compl complain

Table 9 Correlation matrix of latent constructs in the condition of corporate responsibility

Gratitude Empathy PWOM Resistance Identification Investment

Gratitude 1.00

Empathy 0.14 (0.09) 1.00

PWOM 0.48 (0.07) 0.23 (0.09) 1.00

Resistance 0.49 (0.07) 0.26 (0.09) 0.66 (0.06) 1.00

Identification 0.71 (0.06) 0.34 (0.09) 0.77 (0.05) 0.75 (0.06) 1.00

Investment 0.48 (0.07) 0.28 (0.08) 0.63 (0.06) 0.52 (0.07) 0.63 (0.07) 1.00

Values within parentheses are standard errors

PWOM positive word of mouth, Resistance resistance to negative information, Identification identification with company, Investment investment in thecompany

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