The Role of Emotion and Expectations for Emotional Regulati

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Ritu Gill and Kimberly Matheson Responses to Discrimination: The Role of Emotion and Expectations for Emotional Regulation

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10.1177/0146167205279906 ARTICLEPERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETINGill, Matheson / EMOTION AND DISCRIMINATION

Responses to Discrimination: The Role of Emotionand Expectations for Emotional Regulation

Ritu GillKimberly MathesonCarleton University

The present study examined the role of emotion in womens per-ceptions of discrimination and their endorsement of behavioralresponses to change the status quo. In an experimental simula-tion involving a situation of sex discrimination, women (N =108) were primed to experience a particular emotion (sad,angry, control condition) and were subsequently instructed toeither suppress or express (or neither) their emotional responses.Women primed to feel sad and told to suppress their emotionsreported the least discrimination, whereas angered women whowere permitted to express themselves reported the greatest discrim-ination. Furthermore, when encouraged to express their emo-tions, women primed to feel sad were more likely to endorse nor-mative actions to rectify the situation, whereas women inducedto feel angry were more likely to endorse collective actions tochange the status quo. These findings have implications for therole of emotions and expectations regarding their expression oncollective action taking.

Keywords: sex discrimination; anger; sad; social expectations; collec-tive action

Although it is a common belief that women are nolonger at a disadvantage, objective indicators reveal thatNorth American women continue to experience inequi-ties in social, occupational, and educational settings(Baker & Fortin, 2000; Everston, 2004; Roth, 2003; Statis-tics Canada, 2000). Despite evidence of their continueddisadvantaged status, women frequently deny that theyare personally discriminated against, even while recog-nizing that women as a group experience discrimina-tion, a phenomenon known as the personal/group dis-crimination discrepancy (Crosby, 1982, 1984; Dion &Kawakami, 1996; Foster & Matheson, 1998, 1999; Quinn,Roese, Pennington, & Olson, 1999; Taylor, Wright,Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990; Taylor, Wright, & Rug-giero, 1991). Substantial research has examined cogni-tive (Crosby, Cordova, & Jaskar, 1993; Major, Quinton, &

McCoy, 2002; Rutte, Diekmann, & Polzer, 1994; Zanna,Crosby, & Lowenstein, 1987) and motivational (Crosbyet al., 1993; Foster, 2000; Hodson & Esses, 2002; Tayloret al., 1990) bases for the phenomenon. Furthermore, itseems that emotional factors may contribute to thecognitive and motivational processes related to thepersonal/group discrimination discrepancy (Mackie &Smith, 2003). It was the goal of the present investigationto evaluate the extent to which womens perceptions ofdiscrimination may be a function of the qualitativenature of their emotional reactions and to assess theimpacts of such reactions on womens attributions andthe actions they endorse to contend with discrimination.

The Role of Emotion in Responses to Discrimination

Experiencing discrimination may be associated withfeelings of anxiety, depression, hopelessness, and overallreduced psychological well-being (Baumeister & Tice,1990; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Frable,1993; Landrine, Klonoff, Gibbs, Manning, & Lund,1995; Mays & Cochran, 2002; Schmitt, Branscombe, &Postmes, 2003; Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998).Although the distress associated with discriminationmight motivate group members to deny such experi-ences (Foster, 2000; Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997),it is conversely possible that the negative affect inducedis a necessary precursor to motivating actions torespond. For example, women who perceived discrimi-nation but did not report negative affect in relation tothis experience were least likely to engage in collective

149

Authors Note: This research was funded by a grant from the SocialSciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Cana-dian Institutes of Health Research. Correspondence concerning thisarticle should be addressed to Ritu Gill, Department of Psychology,Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1S 5B6; e-mail: [email protected].

PSPB, Vol. 32 No. 2, February 2006 149-161DOI: 10.1177/0146167205279906 2006 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.


action to address it (Foster & Matheson, 1998). In thisinstance, women might have viewed the discriminationas legitimate, unchangeable, or personally irrelevant(i.e., social mobility across barriers was still a possibility),a pattern of perceptions typically associated with accep-tance of the disadvantaged status of ones group(Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Ellemers,Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993).

Interestingly however, those women who perceivedlittle personal discrimination but nonetheless experi-enced affective discontent were most likely to take col-lective action to address discrimination (Foster & Mathe-son, 1998). It has similarly been noted that individualswho perceived their group as strong or effective andexperienced anger regarding their treatment by anoutgroup were more likely to take confrontationalaction (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; van Zomeren,Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Taken together, thesefindings suggest that although the distress associatedwith discrimination experiences may sometimes moti-vate denial of its occurrence, the negative affect elicitedby such experiences might also be integral to takingcollective action.

To some degree, cognitive and behavioral responsesto discrimination may depend on the qualitative natureof the negative affect experienced. It has been suggestedthat anger is the emotion most evident when discrimina-tion is encountered and recognized as unjust (Crocker& Major, 1994; Kappen & Branscombe, 2001; Mackieet al., 2000; Matheson & Cole, 2004; Mikula, Scherer, &Athenstaedt, 1998; Moghaddam, Taylor, Ditto, Jacobs, &Bianchi, 2002; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, &Bylsma, 2003). As anger represents an energizing emo-tion that elicits an active response to a situation (Frijda,1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Larson &Diener, 1992; Lemerise & Dodge, 1993), it is not surpris-ing that when individuals experienced anger in responseto their groups treatment, it served as a catalyst foraction, and particularly confrontational actions on be-half of the group (Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al.,2004; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).

More commonly, responses to discrimination, orrather the lack of response, have been understood interms of patterns of attributions that are typically associ-ated with depressive affect or sadness. Specifically, to theextent that discrimination is associated with perceptionsthat the event is caused by internal characteristics (e.g.,personal deservingness) or is viewed as pervasive (stableand global), feelings of helplessness, self-blame, andpoor psychological well-being, including sadness, maybe elicited (Branscombe et al., 1999; Foster, 2001; Foster,Matheson, & Poole, 1994; Schmitt et al., 2003). In thisregard, sadness may serve two functions (Stearns, 1993).One involves turning attention inward and has been

associated with a perceived lack of control, passivity,withdrawal, and reduced attention to external cues(Cunningham, 1988; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijdaet al., 1989). However, when sadness is expressed, it mayalso serve to signal others that one is experiencing dis-tress and that help is needed (Stearns, 1993). In eithercase, sadness is unlikely to facilitate perceptions of beingable to contend effectively with discrimination, andhence, denial may be the most adaptive response.

Social Expectations Guiding the Expression of Emotions

Although anger or sadness might have a direct impacton womens responses to discrimination, these reactionslikely depend on whether there are situational factorsthat constrain womens ability to act on their emotions(Matheson & Cole, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2004).Indeed, although the dominant emotional response todiscrimination might be anger, actions to overcome thedisadvantaged status of ones group are not common(Foster & Matheson, 1999; Klandermans, 1997; Louis &Taylor, 1999; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Thestrategies perceived as available to contend with discrim-ination may be limited by normative expectations forwhat constitutes socially appropriate behavior, and inparticular, expectations pertaining to the managementor regulation of negative emotions such as anger or sad-ness. For example, the expression of anger may beregarded as less socially appropriate than the expressionof sadness (Lemerise & Dodge, 1993), but the appropri-ateness of expressing either of these emotions may varyacross situations and cultures (Andersen & Guerrero,1998; Trierweiler, Eid, & Lischetzke, 2002). There alsoexist norms dictating who can appropriately expressanger and who can express sadness. In particular, thereare greater pressures to regulate or contain negativeemotions among members of minority groups, espe-cially in the presence of dominant group members whocontrol resources (Gross & John, 2003; Keltner,Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Similarly, there aregender-based social pressures and expectations in thatwomen are more likely than men to be encouraged toexpress sadness and to be discouraged from expressinganger (Brody, 2000; Brody & Hall, 1993; Hess et al., 2000;Kelly & Hutson-Comeaux, 1999). In short, social andcontextual norms that convey the appropriateness ofexpressing or suppressing the expression of ones emo-tions might have implications for individuals ability tocontend with an event.

The cognitive and behavioral effects associated withthe capacity to express ones emotions may be linked tothe nature of the emotions themselves (Trierweiler et al.,2002). Although sadness in itself is not an emotion thatactivates behavior (Larson & Diener, 1992), encourage-ment to express such feelings may elicit the interper-

150 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN


sonal function of sadness that entails signaling that helpis needed. In light of the possibility of acquiring socialsupport (through the expression of sadness), the abilityto diminish the negative factors that elicited the distressmay be viewed as more feasible. Yet, such actions areunlikely to stray from normative behavioral prescrip-tions that are likely to be supported by others (Stearns,1993). In contrast, social pressures to suppress the ex-pression of sadness are consistent with the passive quali-ties of this emotion that might encourage withdrawal oracceptance behaviors. In effect, there is no reason to sup-pose that social expectations regarding emotionalexpression of sadness would alter womens perceptionsof discrimination. However, those women who are per-mitted to express sadness may be unique in their behav-ioral efforts to alter their situation, albeit by adoptingstrategies that are likely to meet with social approval.

When angered, women who are encouraged toexpress their emotions may be less concerned with gain-ing social approval but instead might directly confrontthose who are responsible for the discrimination andcorrect the injustice through collective action (Mackieet al., 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Recall howeverthat although the dominant emotional response to dis-crimination might be anger, actions to overcome dis-crimination are not common (Foster & Matheson, 1999;Klandermans, 1997; Louis & Taylor, 1999; Wright et al.,1990). Indeed, minority group members, includingwomen, are normatively discouraged from expressingnegative affect (Brody, 2000; Keltner et al., 2003). Suchexpectations to suppress the expression of anger mightundermine womens sense of control or efficacy andhence attenuate the likelihood that they would endorseactions to directly contend with the situation, althoughsuch inaction may be associated with some degree ofresentment (Folger, 1987; Louis & Taylor, 1999). More-over, expectations that women suppress the expressionof their anger may have an oppressive effect due to theincongruence between the act of suppression and theactivating properties of anger. This incongruence mayresult in considerable distress (Butler et al., 2003; Gross& John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997). To reduce thisdistress under socially constrained conditions, womenmay be motivated to minimize perceptions of discrimi-nation, thereby alleviating the need to resolve thediscrimination.

The Present Study

The goal of the present study was to examine thepotential role of womens emotional responses to dis-crimination (sadness vs. anger) and the effects of a socialcontext that permitted or discouraged the expression ofthese emotions on womens cognitive and behavioralresponses. As indicated earlier, emotional reactions may

be an integral aspect of responses to discrimination, anddenying personal discrimination may reflect a motivatedresponse to reduce distress. To assess the causal role ofemotions, women were primed to experience either sad-ness or anger in advance of being exposed to a situationof gender-based personal discrimination. This was doneby using a story re-creation task employing affectivelyloaded words that reflected either sadness or anger (vs. acontrol condition in which affect was not primed). Sub-sequently, women were personally targeted in a situationof gender discrimination, after which they were pro-vided with an explicit instruction that it was appropriateto express or suppress their emotional reactions (vs. acontrol condition with no such instructions). The follow-ing were hypothesized:

1. Overall, women primed to feel sad would report dimin-ished perceptions of discrimination and would be morelikely to attribute the cause of the event to internal andpervasive factors than women primed to feel angry. Onthe whole, women who were not emotionally primedwere not expected to differ predictably from eitherwomen who were saddened or angered.

2. The effects of the emotion primed on womens percep-tions of discrimination and attributions would vary de-pending on expectations regarding emotional regula-tion. These expectations were not expected toinfluence the perceptions and attributions of womenprimed to feel sad. However, among women who wereangered, those who were encouraged to express theiremotions were expected to perceive greater discrimina-tion and to be less likely to attribute the cause of theevent to internal or stable factors (the latter reflectinggreater perceived efficacy to alter the situation) relativeto angered women told to suppress their emotions orwhose emotional regulation response was not explicitlyproscribed. Finally, women who were not emotionallyprimed may not be as emotionally focused, and hencesituational norms regarding the expression or suppres-sion of their feelings were not expected to affect theirperceptions.

3. On the whole, women would be more likely to accepttheir discriminatory treatment than to endorse actionsto contend with it.

4. Variations in the extent to which women endorsed spe-cific actions would depend on the emotion they wereprimed to feel and the expectations conveyed regard-ing the regulation of these emotions. Among womenprimed to feel sad, those encouraged to express theiremotions would be more likely to endorse normative re-sponses relative to those expected to suppress their feel-ings or when no regulation expectations were con-veyed. When women were angered, encouragement toexpress their emotions would facilitate the endorse-ment of confrontational and collective responses rela-tive to the other expectations conditions, whereas in-structions to suppress their emotions may result inangered women being more likely to endorse accep-tance of their treatment or an individually based norma-tive response (that would not entail defining the eventas constituting discrimination) than angered womenwho were not expected to suppress their emotions. Fi-

Gill, Matheson / EMOTION AND DISCRIMINATION 151


nally, women in the emotion priming control conditionought to demonstrate the typical pattern of acceptingtheir treatment rather than endorsing strategies to con-tend with it, irrespective of the expectations conveyedconcerning the regulation of their emotions.

METHOD

Participants

For this study, 1st-year female psychology students(N = 108; M age = 24.86 years, SD = 6.48) volunteered toparticipate in a study on creative abilities and story writ-ing. Of those women reporting ethnic/racial group sta-tus, the majority were Euro-Caucasian (n = 55, 51.4%),whereas the remainder were of Asian or Middle Easterndescent (n = 32, 29.9%), African descent (n = 17, 15.9%),or were Native Canadian (n = 3, 2.8%).

Procedure

Women were run individually to ensure independ-ence of responses (particularly in the expressive condi-tions). Following an overview of the procedures and pro-viding informed consent and background demographicinformation, women completed the story-writing task.The purpose of this task was twofold: (a) to prime a par-ticular emotion and (b) to provide the basis for a situa-tion of discrimination. A female experimenter told par-ticipants that we were interested in identifying factorsthat contribute to creativity as this ability was importantto success in many organizational contexts. To this end,we were asking them to complete a story-writing task toevaluate their creative ability; if their stories passed a pre-determined score they would be assigned to the high cre-ativity group (high status), whereas if their stories didnot meet this criterion they would be categorized in thelow creativity group (low status). The experimenter fur-ther explained that the subsequent task of the high cre-ativity group would be to improve the stories created bythe less creative participants, whereas those in the lowcreativity group would perform a second writing task aswell as a number of tedious excercises (alphabetizing,sentence completion) to assess the relation between lackof creativity and poor language and writing skills. Alleg-edly, those who qualified for the high-status group wouldbe eligible to participate in a $100 lottery, whereas thosein the low-status group would participate in a $10 lottery.In reality, all participants participated in the $100 lottery.These manipulations were consistent with past research,and the intent was to provide sufficient incentive tomake the two groups differentially desirable to belong to(Foster & Matheson, 1995; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994;Wright et al., 1990). In addition, creating the expecta-tion that a subsequent task would follow the testingsession provided a basis for anticipating an opportunity

in which womens emotions could be expressed orwould need to be suppressed.

The creativity task consisted of reading a story describ-ing an achievement failure situation in which a studentreceived a poor grade in an important course and visitsthe professor, who has agreed to take a second look at thepaper (from Robins, 1988). The professor discusses theproblems with the paper and concludes that he will notchange the grade. After reading it, participants re-created and extended the story in their own words withthemselves as the protagonist. As they reframed thestory, they were instructed to incorporate a list of 12 tar-get words, 5 of which constituted the mood manipula-tion. Women were randomly assigned to one of threeword-list conditions priming (a) sadness: sad, hopeless,discouraged, helpless, despair; (b) anger: angry, hostile, infu-riated, irritated, resentful; or (c) a control condition inwhich the target words were replaced by 5 adjectives withno specific affective content: grade point average, essay,course, future, office. The remaining 7 words were constantacross condition (e.g., career, grade, student).

After the experimenter collected the stories, she in-formed women that the papers would be scored by apanel of judges, allegedly comprising male engineeringstudents learning about psychology and methods of eval-uation. When the experimenter left to deliver the sto-ries, women completed a second writing task in whichthey wrote about something that had occurred in theirlife or to someone they knew that made them feel verysad, angry, or creative (control), respectively. This taskserved to maintain or enhance the mood manipulation(DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004) while sto-ries were allegedly being scored. Following this secondwriting task, women completed a mood manipulationcheck.

Women were then exposed to the discriminationevent. When the experimenter returned, she reportedthat these men never passed the women into the highcreativity group. She then informed participants thatthey too had been assigned to the low creativity groupand reminded them of what this involved. The instruc-tions constituting the manipulation of social expecta-tions regarding the appropriateness of emotional ex-pression or suppression were then provided. Theseinstructions were developed to reflect the respectiveconceptualizations of emotional expression and sup-pression and also incorporated instructions used infacial feedback studies that might facilitate efforts toexpress or suppress emotional responses (e.g., Gross &Levenson, 1997). To enhance their effectiveness, theseinstructions were framed within the context created bythe cover story of the present study. Participants in theexpression condition were encouraged to



feel free to express any thoughts, feelings, questions, orconcerns you have . . . to openly express your views andshare them in any of the questions we ask you, and inyour responses to the task that well be asking you to do.This is important as it assures that your responses reflecta sense of commitment and professional concernregardless of what group you are placed in.

In the suppression of emotional expression condition,women were told to inhibit their reactions for the re-mainder of the study. Specifically they were told,

If you have any feelings during the remainder of thestudy, do not let those feelings show. Try to act in such away that a person watching you would not know you werefeeling anything. This is important as it assures that youmaintain your composure and act in a professional man-ner regardless of what group you are placed in.

No such instructions were provided to women in the ex-pectations control condition. Women then completed afinal questionnaire assessing their perceptions of dis-crimination, attributions for their group assignment,and actions they would endorse to respond to the situa-tion. Finally, women were informed that the study wouldnot proceed to a second task and were given an oral de-briefing. To alleviate negative mood, a positive mood in-duction procedure was conducted prior to thanking anddismissing participants.

Measures

Mood manipulation check. After writing the two storiesthat served to prime emotion (but prior to the discrimi-nation event), women rated 19 mood adjectives (fromDiener & Emmons, 1984) on 7-point scales ranging fromnot at all (1) to extremely (7). Embedded within theseadjectives were items that assessed sadness (hopeless,sad, unhappy, depressed, helpless, and desolate,Cronbachs = .90) and anger (angry, hostile, and infu-riated, Cronbachs = .89).

Perceived discrimination. The extent to which womenperceived personal and group discrimination was basedon two items from Taylor et al. (1991), namely, To whatextent were you personally discriminated againstbecause you are a woman in the context of this experi-ment and To what extent do you feel that women as agroup were discriminated against in the context of thisexperiment? These items were embedded among sixfiller items. Women rated the items along an 8-point rat-ing scale ranging from not at all (0) to very much (7).

Attributions for group assignment. To elicit womens attri-butions for their low-status group assignment, they wereasked to consider the most important reasons for why

they were assigned to their group. On 7-point ratingscales, women then responded to three questions thatused the same wording as the Attributional Styles Ques-tionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982). Women were askedwhether the cause of their group assignment reflectedsomething about you or something about other peopleor circumstances (internal = 7 vs. external = 1), whetherwhen future decisions are made about you, do youthink that this cause will be present again (stable = 7 vs.unstable = 1), and whether this cause was something thataffects just this type of situation, or does it also influenceother areas of your life (global = 7 vs. specific = 1). Attribu-tions to internal causes were related to perceiving thecause to be relatively stable (r = .27, p < .01) and global(r = .27, p < .01). These two latter dimensions were alsomoderately related (r = .42, p < .001).

Action endorsements. Women indicated the extent towhich they would be willing to participate in each of fiveactions if they had the opportunity to respond to theirtreatment (Wright et al., 1990). These actions includedaccepting the situation, requests for individual or collec-tive retests (normative actions), or confronting the malejudges to demand an explanation, either as an individualor collectively (confrontational actions). Endorsementswere indicated on a scale ranging from not at all likely toparticipate (0) to extremely likely to participate (7).

RESULTS

Mood manipulation check. To evaluate the effectivenessof the emotion priming manipulation, a 2 (self-reportedmood: sad, angry; within-subjects) 3 (emotion primed:sad, angry, control; between-subjects) mixed modelanalysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, revealinga significant interaction, F(2, 105) = 7.61, p < .001, 2 =.127. As expected, follow-up simple effects analyses indi-cated that women primed to feel angry reported greateranger (M = 4.28, SD = 1.85) than did women primed tofeel sad (M = 3.25, SD = 1.61), t(70) = 2.54, p < .01, orwomen in the priming control condition (M = 2.81, SD =1.81), t(70) = 3.42, p < .001. In contrast, women who wereprimed to feel sad tended to report higher levels of sad-ness (M = 4.28, SD = 1.59) than did women who wereprimed to feel angry (M = 3.78, SD = 1.51), t(70) = 1.37,p = .089, or women who were not emotionally primed(M = 3.71, SD = 1.76), t(70) = 1.43, p = .079. Given thatthese latter effects were marginal, it is worth noting thatwomen in the sad priming condition reported signifi-cantly higher levels of sadness than anger, t(35) = 3.48,p < .001. Thus, the mood priming manipulation waseffective, although the strength of this effect may havebeen greater for anger.



Effects of Emotion Primed andExpectations Guiding Expression

Perceived discrimination. To evaluate whether emotionsand expectations regarding the regulation of these emo-tions affected perceptions of discrimination, a 2 (levelof perceived discrimination: personal, group; within-subjects) 3 (emotion primed; between-subjects) 3(expectations: suppression, expression, control;between-subjects) mixed model ANOVA was conductedon ratings of discrimination. The main effect for level ofperceived discrimination was significant, F(1, 99) =10.18, p < .01, 2 = .093, in that women perceived higherlevels of discrimination against women as a group (M =2.77, SD = 2.43) than against themselves personally (M =2.34, SD = 2.40). Neither of the main effects of emotionprimed or expectations was significant, but the interac-tion between these factors was, F(4, 99) = 2.65, p < .05,

2 = .097. Follow-up simple comparisons were conductedto assess whether expectations regarding the regulationof emotions altered perceptions of discriminationamong women in each of the emotion priming groups.Women primed to feel sad reported lower levels of per-ceived discrimination when they were told to suppresstheir feelings in comparison to the expectation controlgroup, although neither group differed from saddenedwomen who were encouraged to express their feelings(see Table 1). Furthermore, among women primed tofeel angry, as expected, those who were encouraged to

express their feelings reported higher levels of discrimi-nation in comparison to the expectation controlcondition, but neither group differed significantly fromwomen told to suppress their feelings. Finally, emotionalregulation expectations did not affect womens percep-tions when mood was not primed. Although the emotionprimed and expectations interacted to influencewomens perceptions of discrimination, they did notmoderate the difference in perceived levels of personalversus group discrimination, Fs < 1. In fact, perceptionsof personal and group discrimination were highly corre-lated, r = .84, p < .001.

Attributions. When womens attributions (internal, sta-ble, global) for their assignment to the low-status groupwere assessed using a 3 (emotion primed) 3 (expecta-tions) between-groups multivariate ANOVA, the two-wayinteraction was found to be significant, Pillais = .227,F(12, 297) = 2.02, p < .05, whereas neither of the maineffects was. The univariate analyses subsumed by thismultivariate effect indicated that the interactionbetween the emotion primed and expectations was sig-nificant for attributions regarding internal, F(4, 99) =2.76, p < .05, 2 = .100, and stable causes, F(4, 99) = 2.99,p < .05, 2 = .108, but not perceptions of whether thecause was global (M = 3.66, SD = 1.82). Follow-up simpleeffects were conducted to assess the effects of emotionalregulation expectations on internal and stable attribu-tions within each of the emotion priming groups. Asindicated in Table 1, when women were primed to feelsad, expectations had no effect on their internal attribu-tions. In line with our hypotheses however, when womenwere angered and encouraged to express their emo-tions, they were less likely to attribute the cause of theirdiscriminatory treatment to internal factors, but only incomparison to the expectation control group (whichalso did not differ from women told to suppress theiremotions). The reverse was true if womens mood hadnot been primed in that these women were more likelyto attribute the event to internal factors when they wereencouraged to express their emotions than in the expec-tations control condition. Perceptions of the cause as sta-ble among women primed to feel sad were greater whenthey were instructed to either express or suppress theiremotions in comparison to when no expectations wereconveyed. However, among women primed to feel angry,they were least likely to view the event as reflecting stablefactors when they were instructed to suppress their emo-tions. There were no differences in attributions of thestability of the cause as a function of expectations amongwomen who were not emotionally primed.

Action endorsements. Of particular interest in the pres-ent study was the role womens emotions and expecta-


TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Perceived Discrimina-tion and Causal Attributions as a Function of EmotionPrimed and Emotional Regulation Expectations

Expectation

Suppress Express Control

M SD M SD M SD

Personal discriminationSad prime 1.42a 2.35 2.25a,b 2.26 3.00b 1.86Angry prime 2.17a,b 2.72 3.58a 2.91 1.50b 1.78Control 3.25 2.77 2.08 2.27 1.83 2.25

Group discriminationSad prime 1.50a 2.20 3.00b 2.30 3.50b 2.07Angry prime 2.42a,b 2.71 4.00a 2.76 2.08b 2.07Control 3.75 2.70 2.33 2.15 2.33 2.39

Internal attributionSad prime 4.75 2.30 4.42 2.07 5.67 1.72Angry prime 4.75a,b 1.91 4.08a 2.39 5.75b 1.29Control 4.83a,b 1.40 6.00a 1.21 4.33b 2.31

Stable attributionSad prime 4.75a 1.23 4.92a 1.38 3.75b 1.66Angry prime 3.00a 1.60 4.25b 1.48 4.83b 1.19Control 4.75 1.29 4.83 1.85 4.42 1.73

NOTE: Different superscripts denote significant differences betweenthe expectation groups within each level of emotion primed at p < .05.


tions regarding the regulation of these emotions playedin relation to their behavioral responses to discrimina-tion. A 5 (action: acceptance, individual retest, individ-ual confrontation, collective retest, collective confronta-tion; within-subjects) 3 (emotion primed) 3(expectations) mixed model ANOVA was performed onaction endorsements. A significant main effect for actionwas observed, F(4, 396) = 40.96, p < .001, 2 = .293, in thatwomen were most likely to endorse acceptance of theirgroup assignment (M = 4.55, SD = 2.05) and least likely toendorse confrontation on behalf of the collective (M =1.44, SD = 2.18), in comparison to all of the other actionalternatives, including an individual retest (M = 2.24,SD = 2.16), or confrontation (M = 1.98, SD = 2.22), or acollective retest (M = 1.97, SD = 2.41), ps < .05.

Importantly, the three-way interaction betweenactions endorsed, emotion primed, and expectationswas also significant, F(16, 396) = 2.07, p < .01, 2 = .077.Simple effects analyses conducted for each of the emo-tion priming groups indicated that the interactionbetween the expectations conveyed to women regardingthe regulation of their emotions and the action beingendorsed was significant when women were primed tofeel sad, F(8, 132) = 2.30, p < .05, or angry, F(8, 132) =2.17, p < .05, but not when no emotion was primed, F(8,132) = 1.07, ns. As seen in Table 2, women primed to feelsad and encouraged to express their emotions were lesslikely to accept their status and demonstrated a higherprobability of endorsing normative (individual or collec-tive retest) actions in comparison to women who werenot provided with explicit expectations (although nei-ther group differed significantly from women instructedto suppress their feelings). In contrast, among womenprimed to feel angry, instructions to express their emo-tions resulted in greater endorsement of collectiveaction taking, either retest or confrontation, in compari-son to those who were told to suppress their emotionsand greater endorsement of normative (retest) collec-tive actions than angered women who were not providedwith explicit regulation instructions (see Table 2). Inaddition, conveying emotional regulation expectations(suppression or expression) to women primed to feelangry increased the likelihood that they endorsed anindividual retest. Emotional regulation expectations didnot influence the action endorsements of women whowere not emotionally primed; these women were mostlikely to accept their status.

The Motivational Effects of Emotions:Exploring a Mediated Model

It was initially argued that womens negative emo-tional responses to discrimination might motivate recog-nition or denial of discrimination, which in turn may

influence their behavioral response to a discriminatoryevent. To explore this possibility, the correlationsbetween womens self-reported mood, perceived dis-crimination (combining personal and group percep-tions), and action endorsements were examined (seeTable 3). Self-reported sadness was not related to percep-tions of discrimination, and hence, these perceptionswere not a viable mediator of the relations between sad-ness and the actions women endorsed. However, consis-tent with Baron and Kennys (1986) considerations for amediated model, womens self-reported anger (predic-tor) was related to perceived discrimination (mediator)as well as their action propensities (outcomes). In addi-tion, perceived discrimination was related to womensaction-taking endorsements. Thus, the mediating role ofperceptions of discrimination on the relation betweenfeelings of anger and actions was assessed.

As seen in Table 4, when the relations between angerand womens action endorsements were examined aftercontrolling for perceptions of discrimination (both themediating and predictor variables were entered in thesame step of the regression), anger was no longer a sig-nificant predictor of womens acceptance of their treat-


TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Action Endorsementsas a Function of Emotion Primed and Emotional Regula-tion Expectations

Expectation

Suppress Express Control

M SD M SD M SD

Sad primeAcceptance 4.67a,b 2.46 3.83a 1.80 5.67b 1.37Individual retest 2.08a,b 2.39 3.00a 1.91 1.33b 1.37Individualconfrontation 2.25 2.49 2.08 2.19 0.83 1.27

Collective retest 1.75a,b 2.34 2.83a 2.86 1.08b 1.73Collectiveconfrontation 1.08 2.07 1.75 2.30 0.92 1.51

Anger primeAcceptance 4.75 2.30 3.50 2.43 4.17 1.47Individual retest 3.58a 2.11 3.00a 2.49 1.41b 2.11Individualconfrontation 2.42 2.81 2.75 2.14 2.25 2.26

Collective retest 1.42a 2.39 3.17b 2.59 1.25a 1.42Collectiveconfrontation 0.50a 1.73 2.50b 2.32 1.50a,b 2.15

No emotion primeAcceptance 4.08 2.43 5.17 1.80 5.08 1.68Individual retest 1.33 2.10 1.83 1.70 2.58 2.39Individualconfrontation 1.75 2.53 1.58 2.11 1.92 2.07

Collective retest 2.83 2.59 1.17 2.37 2.25 2.70Collectiveconfrontation 2.25 2.83 1.17 2.72 1.33 1.61

NOTE: Different superscripts denote significant differences betweenthe expectation groups within each level of emotion primed at p < .05.


ment or their endorsement of individualistic or collec-tive retest actions. Moreover, as indicated by the Sobelsvalues assessing the significance of the mediated paths,the relation between anger and womens willingness toendorse a collective retest to contend with it was fullymediated by perceived discrimination. The relationbetween anger and womens reluctance to accept theirsituation also appeared to be mediated by perceptions ofdiscrimination, although the mediated path was onlymarginally significant in this instance. However, giventhe significant partial correlations between anger andconfrontational actions, the significant Sobels valuessuggest that perceived discrimination was only a partialmediator of these relations. Thus, womens willingnessto endorse confrontational actions, whether individual-istic or collective, appeared to involve both a direct effectof anger as well as an indirect effect emanating fromthe greater perceived discrimination that was associatedwith such anger.

DISCUSSION

The primary goal of the present investigation was toassess the effects of the interaction between the emo-tions experienced and expectations regarding the ex-pression or suppression of these emotions on womensperceptions and responses to a discrimination event.Consistent with past research, women perceived higherlevels of discrimination against women as a group rela-tive to themselves as individuals (Crosby, 1982, 1984; Fos-ter & Matheson, 1995, 1998; Moghaddam et al., 2002;Taylor et al., 1990; Taylor et al., 1991). Moreover, theseperceptions were influenced by the emotions womenwere primed to experience and the expectations thatwere conveyed regarding the appropriateness ofexpressing these emotions. Specifically, among womenprimed to feel sad, those who were told to suppress theirfeelings reported lower levels of discrimination than didwomen for whom expectations regarding the regulationof their emotions were not conveyed. Although we had


TABLE 3: Correlations Among Self-Reported Mood, Perceived Discrimination, Attributions, and Action Endorsements

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Self-reported mood1. Sadness .2. Anger .37***3. Perceived discrimination .13 .27***

Attributions4. Internal .07 .06 .17*5. Stable .14 .05 .02 .27**

Action endorsements6. Acceptance .06 .20*** .26*** .21** .157. Individual retest .18** .20** .20** .19* .16 .26***8. Individual confrontation .14 .36*** .39*** .19** .12 .46**** .55****9. Collective retest .22** .19** .56**** .25*** .11 .42*** .46**** .48****

10. Collective confrontation .21** .30*** .45**** .27*** .06 .50*** .36*** .61**** .67****

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.

TABLE 4: Regression Coefficients Assessing Mediated Model of Relations Between Anger, Perceived Discrimination, and Action Endorsements

b SE Partial r R2 Sobels t

Action endorsed (outcome)Acceptance .087***Discrimination .200** .089 .22** 1.77*Anger .150 .107 .14

Individual retest .063**Discrimination .151 .091 .15 1.44Anger .178 .115 .16

Individual confrontation .222***Discrimination .307**** .086 .33**** 2.24**Anger .324**** .107 .28***

Collective retest .315***Discrimination .571**** .087 .54**** 2.62***Anger .005 .109 .05

Collective confrontation .234***Discrimination .374**** .083 .40**** 2.42**Anger .225** .105 .21**

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.


not anticipated this difference in perceptions as a func-tion of social expectations, it might be that pressures tosuppress sadness were particularly likely to evoke themore inward-looking function of sadness involving self-blame and feelings of helplessness (Stearns, 1993) andhence a reduced likelihood of defining the event as dis-crimination. Moreover, given that the expression of sad-ness is stereotypically encouraged for women relative tomen (Brody, 2000; Hess et al., 2000), it may not be sur-prising that when explicitly discouraged from doing so,womens perceptions were more likely to deviate fromthose reported in the no explicit expectations condition.

As anticipated, among women primed to feel angry,those who were encouraged to express their emotionsperceived the highest levels of discrimination, althoughthe perceptions of women encouraged to express versussuppress their emotions did not differ. On the whole,womens self-reported subjective experience of angerwas related to perceiving greater discrimination, whichis consistent with an accumulating body of researchemphasizing the importance of anger in reactions to dis-crimination (Mackie et al., 2000; Matheson & Cole,2004; Mikula et al., 1998; Swim et al., 2003; van Zomerenet al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).

Womens emotional reactions had further implica-tions for how they explained the discrimination experi-ence (attributions). However, their attributional pat-terns were not entirely consistent with our hypotheses.On average, women who were primed to feel sad orangry did not differ in their attributions for the event. Itis possible that although depressive affect is typicallyassociated with internal attributions, sadness is not.Indeed, it has been argued that sadness is more stronglylinked to a perceived lack of control (internal or exter-nal), whereas shame or guilt are more likely to be associ-ated with the self-blame that is characteristic of depres-sive affect (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004;Stearns, 1993). Alternatively, given that self-reportedfeelings of sadness were not directly related to womensperceptions or attributions in the present study, it is pos-sible that the induction of sadness simultaneouslyprimed other emotions, such as anxiety, that might haveinfluenced womens responses. Indeed, although angerand sadness are regarded as distinct prime emotions,they frequently co-occur, and distinguishing betweentheir antecedent factors and behavioral outcomes maybe difficult (Stearns, 1993). Given that anger is the emo-tion that is most likely to be induced in response to aninjustice (DeSteno et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al.,2004), it is possible that even when induced to feel sad, aconcurrent sense of anger may have been elicited by thediscrimination event itself and hence may have contrib-uted to responses in the intergroup context. Thus,although the present study was designed to elucidate the

effects of specific emotions on responses to discrimina-tion, emotional experiences are dynamic and likelycomprise a complex set of affective qualities that arise inresponse to events as they occur.

Differential effects for sadness versus anger mightalso have been attenuated due to the manipulation itself.Although the manipulations of sadness and angerappeared to be effective in the present study in that thesewere the mood states that were predominant in therespective conditions, the levels of reported sadnessamong women primed to feel sad were only marginallygreater than the levels reported by women primed to feelangry or who were not emotionally primed. It may bethat the sadness word primes were not as powerful asthe anger word primes, although the mean levels of theintensity of sadness and anger reported in the respec-tive priming conditions were identical. As noted earlier,the expression of sad feelings is more normatively appro-priate for women, and hence women may have beenmore likely to self-report some degree of sadness ingeneral.

Although the main effect of the emotion primed onwomens attributions was not evidenced as predicted,when women were angered, the expectations conveyedregarding the regulation of this emotion influencedtheir causal attributions; these expectations did not in-fluence the internal attributions made by women whowere primed to feel sad. When women were angered andencouraged to express their emotions, they were lesslikely to attribute the cause of their discriminatory treat-ment to internal factors in comparison to the expecta-tions control group. Norms encouraging the expressionof anger did not attenuate womens attributions that theevent was due to pervasive (stable and global) factors,although contrary to expectations, angered women whowere instructed to suppress their emotions were morelikely to diminish the stability of the causal factors. In ret-rospect, this likely represented a cognitive coping strat-egy for these women; not only did they regard the experi-ence as rare, but these same women were also less likelyto view the event as reflecting group-based discrimina-tion. Such a pattern of perceptions would minimize theneed to respond to their treatment and the distress asso-ciated with the incongruence between the act of sup-pression and the activating properties of anger (Butleret al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson,1997).

Women whose mood had not been primed were morelikely to attribute the discrimination event to internalfactors when they were encouraged to express their emo-tions (in comparison to the no expectations controlgroup). It is possible that among this group of women,the performance aspects of the experimental task (cre-ative ability) may have been particularly salient, thereby



increasing internal attributions for their failure, particu-larly when instructed to focus on the affect that may haveemanated from the failure experience.

Although the expectations conveyed to womenregarding the regulation of their emotions were not pre-dicted to influence cognitive responses when primed tofeel sad, it was anticipated that behavioral responseswould vary. Indeed, women who were primed to feel sadand to express their feelings were less likely to endorseacceptance of their situation and more likely to endorsenormative (retest) actions to rectify the situation in com-parison to women who were not provided with explicitemotion regulation instructions (but not women whowere instructed to suppress their emotions). As notedpreviously, sadness in itself is not an emotion that acti-vates behavior (Larson & Diener, 1992), but encourage-ment to express sadness may trigger the functional com-ponent that entails signaling others that help is needed(Stearns, 1993). Consequently, these women may havefelt that action to alter their situation was possible, butthey were only willing to endorse normative strategiesthat might receive the approval and support of others.

As previously reported (Mackie et al., 2000; vanZomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003), amongwomen who were primed to feel angry, encouragementto express their emotions heightened the likelihood thatthey endorsed collective actions to contend with the dis-crimination. Anger may facilitate womens recognitionof discrimination, and the outrage associated with thisexperience may motivate action to redress the injustice(Mackie et al., 2000). The psychological mechanismlinking anger to collective action taking was furtherexplored in the present study by assessing the extent towhich this relation was mediated by womens percep-tions of discrimination. These mediational analyses sup-ported the possibility that anger facilitated greater per-ceptions of discrimination, which in turn predictedsomewhat lower acceptance and greater endorsement ofactions to contend with it. Interestingly, confrontationalresponses were only partially mediated by such percep-tions; anger had an additive impact in motivating theseactions. This pattern of findings suggests that anger mayplay a critical motivating role in the endorsement of col-lective actions, and in particular those that are confron-tational. Anger may be associated with perceivinggreater ingroup strength, which may facilitate feelings ofgroup efficacy (Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al.,2004).

The present findings suggest that the qualitativenature of womens emotional reactions to discrimina-tion has implications for both perceptions of discrimina-tion and the actions endorsed to contend with it. Admit-tedly, a limitation of the present research was the use of asimulated experimental context. This may have contrib-

uted to the relatively low levels of perceived discrimina-tion reported. Although womens propensities to denysuch experiences may have attenuated their perceptionsof personal discrimination, it was somewhat surprisingthat the perceived discrimination against women as agroup was not greater. This might also reflect our mea-sure of group discrimination; although this measure typ-ically makes reference to the discrimination experi-enced by women in general, in the present study, theywere asked about the extent to which women in thisstudy were discriminated against. Given that womencould only make such inferences on the basis of theirown experiences, it is likely that perceptions of personaland group discrimination would be highly related (asthey were) and not greatly different from one another.Thus, the present study might best be construed as hav-ing assessed perceptions of personal discriminationrather than tapping into the more general personal/group discrimination discrepancy. This said, our reli-ance on a sample of university students might also havemeant that these women were less cognizant of theiroptions and the implications of discrimination. Indeed,Beaton and Tougas (1997) noted that the more womenexperienced discrimination, the more likely they were toacknowledge that women were discriminated againstand to support actions to counter the discrimination.Thus, even outside the laboratory context, it seems likelythat womens emotional reactions may play a role inmoderating womens responses to discrimination andover time may have a synergistic effect as women gain theresources and experience that facilitate effectiveresponding.

Another limitation of the present investigation con-cerned the lack of a manipulation check for expecta-tions regarding the regulation of womens emotions.Although women verbally reported that they under-stood the instructions prior to proceeding with theremainder of the experimental protocol, the specificeffects of these expectations were not unambiguous. Inparticular, although some of the predicted differences inthe effects of encouraging the expression versus sup-pression of emotions were significant, more often, oneof these groups differed (in the predicted direction)from the control group that was not provided withexplicit expectations, but they did not differ from oneanother. This raises the possibility that these instructionsmay have had multiple effects. For example, both sets ofinstructions may have served to enhance the extent towhich womens emotions were salient to them, and soboth may have facilitated a more emotion-focusedapproach. Although these strategies appear to be con-ceptually bipolar, in fact, the use of emotional expres-sion and containment as coping strategies are often posi-tively conflated (Matheson & Anisman, 2003). Hence,



rather than representing opposing strategies, they mayshare commonalities, with different aspects coming intoplay depending on the nature of the response beingassessed.

Also of question however might be the extent towhich women actually complied with the expectationsconveyed and did so successfully; this too may havediminished the differences between groups whenwomen were cued to emotional regulation norms. Insome instances, women may deliberately choose not tocomply with social expectations, particularly if they per-ceive the situation to be unjust (Mackie et al., 2000; vanZomeren et al., 2004; Wright et al., 1990), and so theirmotivation and effort to do so might uniquely influencetheir responses. Although not the focus of the presentstudy, no doubt there are individual differences thatlikely influence the extent to which group memberschoose to comply with social pressures and expectations,such as perceptions of social support (Foster, 2000;Mackie et al., 2000) and feelings of efficacy (vanZomeren et al., 2004). Even among those who wish tocomply, there might exist individual differences in theirability to express or suppress their emotions. Such differ-ences could be assessed using self-report measures(Gross & John, 1997) or situationally, for example by vid-eotaping participants and coding the emotion-specificcues that reflect expressivity (Gross, 1999; Gross & John,1997). In effect, individuals who are less able or less moti-vated to comply with social expectations may responddifferently despite the situational constraints. Thus,although the present study suggested that the expecta-tions conveyed regarding the expression versus suppres-sion of emotions influenced womens perceptions andaction endorsements in response to a discriminatoryexperience, there may be a number of individualdifferences factors that influence how group memberschoose to respond to those expectations.

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Received June 30, 2004Revision accepted May 24, 2005



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The Role of Emotion and Expectations for Emotional Regulati