The Role of Civilian Police in Peacekeeping 1999-2007

7/30/2019 The Role of Civilian Police in Peacekeeping 1999-2007

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T he R ole of

Civilian PoliCe in PeacekeePing 1999–

2007

POLICEFOUNDATION



The Role o Civilian Police inPeacekeeping: 1999–2007

by Garth den Heyer

Washington, DC



Te Police Foundaion is a naional, nonparisan, nonpro organizaion dedicaed o advancing policing hrough inno- vaion and science. Esablished in 1970, he oundaion has conduced seminal research in police behavior, policy, andprocedure, and i works o ranser o local agencies he bes new inormaion abou pracices or dealing eecively wiha range o imporan police operaional and adminisraive concerns. Moivaing all o he oundaion’s eors is he goal

o ecien, humane policing ha operaes wihin he ramework o he democraic principles and he highes ideals o he naion.

© 2012 by he Police Foundaion. All righs, including ranslaion ino oher languages, reserved under he Universal Copyrigh Convenion, he BerneConvenion or he Proecion o Lierary and Arisic Works, and he Inernaional and Pan American Copyrigh Con-

venions. Permission o quoe readily graned.

For inormaion abou using Police Foundaion copyrighed maerial, please visi htp://www.policeoundaion.org/

conen/copyrigh-inormaion.

Police Foundaion1201 Connecicu Avenue NW

Washingon, DC 20036-2636(202) 833-1460(202) 659-9149 ax [email protected]

www.policeoundaion.org

ISBN 978-1-884614-09-5 (paper)

ISBN 978-1-884614-13-2 (mobi)ISBN 978-1-884614-15-6 (epub)

Library o Congress Conrol Number: 2012947130

Tis research was unded by he Unied Saes Insiue o Peace gran number USIP-074-09F. Te opinions, ndings,and conclusions or recommendaions expressed in his publicaion are hose o he auhor(s) and do no necessarily re-ec he views o he Unied Saes Insiue o Peace.

Te Role o Civilian Police in Peacekeeping: 1999–2007 is available a www.policeoundaion.org.

COVE PHOOS: Couresy o he Unied Naions by phoographers (in descending phoo order) Marco Dormino,Marco Dormino, Fred Noy, Marine Perre, Marine Perre, and Logan Abassi. BACK COVE: Fred Noy.



For Neville Bradbury Mathews (1952–2011)





Contents

v

F o r e w o r d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Acknowledgmens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Abbreviaions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x v

Part I. IntroductIon

chp 1. cpi S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Inroducion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Is Tere a Need o Undersand he Civilian Police ole in Peacekeeping Missions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Te Teory o Measuring Capaciy Developmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Evaluaion o he Civilian Police ole in Peacekeeping Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Overview o he Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

chp 2. Pli i Pkpig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Police Involvemen in Peacekeeping Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Te Changing Police ole in Peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Police eorm in Posconic Naions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Policing and Securiy Secor eorm (SS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Part II. MISSIon caSe StudIeS

chp 3. ovviw cs Sis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Inroducing he Case Sudies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Exploring he Analysis o he Case Sudy Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24chp 4. aghis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Case Sudy: European Union Police Mission in Aghanisan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28



vi

Police Foundation—The Role of Civilian Police in Peacekeeping: 1999–2007

chp 5. Bsi Hzgvi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Case Sudy: European Union Police Mission o Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

chp 6. rpbli Bi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Operaion in Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

chp 7. rpbli cô ’Ivi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Operaion in Côe d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

chp 8. dmi rpbli h cg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission in he Democraic epublic o he Congo(Mission de l’Organisaion des Naions Unies en épublique démocraique du Congo) . . . . . . . . . . 60

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Case Sudy: European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Case Sudy: European Union Police Mission o he Democraic epublic o he Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

chp 9. Fm Ygslv rpbli Mi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Case Sudy: European Union Police Mission o he Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia . . . . . . . . . 72Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74Case Sudy: European Union Police Advisory eam in he Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia . . . 74Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

chp 10. Hii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Police Missions in Haii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Case Sudy: Unied Naions Sabilizaion Mission in Haii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

chp 11. Ksv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Inerim Adminisraion Mission in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

chp 12. Libi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission in Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

chp 13. Plsii tiis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Case Sudy: European Union Police Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Suppor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

chp 14. Si L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Observers Mission in Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission in Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121



Contents

vii

chp 15. S d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130Case Sudy: Unied Naions and Arican Union Mission in Darur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Case Sudy: European Union Suppor o he Arican Union Mission o Sudan and Darur . . . . . . . . . . . . 135Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

chp 16. tim-Ls (es tim) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission in Eas imor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Case Sudy: Unied Naions Mission o Suppor in Eas imor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Case Sudy: Unied Naions Inegraed Mission in imor-Lese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Part III. anaLYSIS and StePS For tHe Future

chp 17. alysis h 23 Missis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Inroducion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Police Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Te Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Local Police Capaciy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Policing Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164Program Evaluaion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Te Curren Police Peacekeeping Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

chp 18. Iifi nw Pli Pkpig Ml . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Inroducion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Proessional Approach o Police Peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Foundaion o a New Police Peacekeeping Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

A New Police Peacekeeping Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174Summary o a New Police Peacekeeping Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

chp 19. clsi Impliis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

appix a

Lis o 23 Missions, Shor ile, Counry o Inervenion, and Sar and Finish Daes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

ab h ah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207



viii


Figs

17.1 Sar and Finish Daes or 23 Mission Case Sudies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15418.1 Proposed eorm Program Planning Process or he Mission’s Civilian Police Componen . . . . . . . . 17619.1 Proposed Planning Process or he Civilian Police Componen o he Mission Program . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Mps

4.1 Aghanisan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316.1 Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477.1 Côe d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538.1 Democraic epublic o he Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599.1 Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

10.1 Haii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7711.1 Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8912.1 Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

13.1 Palesinian erriories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10914.1 Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11315.1 Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12316.1 imor-Lese (Eas imor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

tbls

1.1 Dieren ypes and Forms o Peacekeeping Operaions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2 Suggesed Mehods or Measuring Peacekeeping Mission Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.3 Capaciy Developmen Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.4 Te Five Sages o he Projec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.5 Pracical and Poliical Problems in Previous Peacekeeping Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.6 Projec esearch Quesions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.1 Analysis o he 15 UN Missions rom 1999 o 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145.1 UNMIBH Civilian Police Sa Numbers, March 1995 o May 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355.2 UNMIBH Police eorm and esrucure Marix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385.3 Six Core Programs o he Implemenaion Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397.1 Composiion o oal Number o UNOCI Civilian Police Ocers, May 2004 o

December 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578.1 MONUC Civilian Police Sa Numbers, February 2002 o Ocober 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

10.1 Composiion o oal Number o MIPONUH Civilian Police Ocers,Ocober 1997 o February 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

10.2 Composiion o MINUSAH Civilian Police Ocers, May 2005 o Augus 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8511.1 UNMIK Civilian Police Sa Numbers, Sepember 1999 o March 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

11.2 Composiion o Kosovo Police Service, Ocober 2002 o March 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9411.3 Number o eurning Inernally and Exernally Displaced Persons o Kosovo, 2000 o 2007 . . . . . . 9612.1 UNMIL Civilian Police Sa Numbers, December 2003 o February 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10414.1 UNAMSIL Civilian Police Sa Numbers, November 1999 o November 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11814.2 oal Number o SLPF Ocers, Number o New SLPF ecruis rained,

and Number o Serving Ocers rained, December 2000 o December 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12015.1 UNMIS Civilian Police Sa Numbers, Sepember 2005 o January 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128



Contents

ix

15.2 UNAMID Civilian Police Sa Numbers, July 2007 o Ocober 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13416.1 UNMISE Civilian Police Sa Numbers, May 2002 o May 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14416.2 UNMI Civilian Police Sa Numbers, Augus 2006 o Augus 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14817.1 Duraion o he Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

17.2 eason or, Form o, and Funcion o he Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15517.3 Predeploymen Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15617.4 eorms, Achievemens, and asks Idenied in he Mission Mandae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15617.5 Furher Direcions o Mission Police Componen Idenied in Mandae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15717.6 Sraegic Plans, Aims, and Objecives o he Missions, plus Perormance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15817.7 Summary o Missions’ Sraegic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15917.8 Sage o Police Deploymen, Original Auhorized Srengh, and Increase in Numbers

o Police Ocers aer Mission Mandae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16017.9 Classicaion o Police Ocers’ Counry o Origin, plus Miliary’s Mandaed ole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16117.10 einegraion o Local Police and Miliary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16217.11 Inormaion abou Mission Police Componens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

17.12 ime Frame or Implemening he Mission Police Componen eorm, Capaciy Developmen,or Projec Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

17.13 Change Models and Change Mehods Used by Mission Police Componens,plus Comprehensive eorms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

17.14 Addiional Inormaion abou Police Componens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16517.15 Evaluaion and Assessmen o Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16517.16 Principal Problem Idenied by Police Componen in Implemening Mandae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16617.17 Componens Ta Achieved Mandaes or Were Idenied as Successul,

plus Mehod o Deermine Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16617.18 Curren Police Peacekeeping Model, 1999 o 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16718.1 Average Years o Schooling or Aduls or Specic Counries in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

18.2 Componens o a New Police Peacekeeping Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180





xi

Foreword

Te role o police ocers in peacekeeping missions hasexpanded considerably since heir inclusion in he rsUnied Naions mission o he Congo in July 1960. Terole o he police in ha deploymen was o assis heCongo governmen in mainaining law and order whilehe Belgian miliary wihdrew rom he counry.

Since ha mission, he role o police has evolved—in unison wih he evoluion o peacekeeping—rom oneo monioring he democraic elecion process o one o providing law enorcemen services and o assising wih

reorm and reorganizaion o police services in pos-con-ic counries. wo o he bigges changes or police inpeacekeeping occurred in he lae 1990s wih he adveno execuive policing, which involved inernaional police

being responsible or local policing and or underakingcapaciy developmen o indigenous police services.

Coinciding wih hose changes, academics and praci-ioners have conrmed ha he pos-conic role o po-lice is o grea imporance and ha police are necessary o provide he undamenals or naion building. In paral-lel, he complexiy o peacekeeping missions has changed

he role ha police play rom one o menoring he pos-conic naion’s police service o one o (a) developinginsiuional police capaciy, (b) supporing reorm, and(c) resrucuring and rebuilding local police (Hills, 2009;Muraugh, 2010). Te Unied Naions and he EuropeanUnion have had o ensure ha hey had he adminisra-ive, sraegic, and poliical srucures in place o plan, de-

ploy, suppor, and manage large comprehensive missionsha comprise boh police and miliary goals and objec-ives ha address such changes.

Te Unied Naions recognized he change in he policepeacekeeping environmen when i creaed a police adviserposiion in he mid-1990s. Te posiion included responsi-

biliy or advising he Deparmen o Peacekeeping Opera-ions abou police-relaed maters. Te signicance o hepolice adviser was increased urher on May 15, 2000, wihhe esablishmen o he Civilian Police Uni wihin he

Deparmen’s Miliary and Civilian Police Division.Te Civilian Police Uni’s core uncions included he

ollowing:

• Prepare plans or he police componens o eldmissions, monior heir implemenaion, and revisehem as necessary.

• Develop civilian police guidelines and sanding op-eraing procedures or eld missions.

• Esablish a liaison wih member saes in regard o(a) he idenicaion and deploymen o civilian

police ocers o eld missions, (b) he operaionalrequiremens o he mission, and (c) he relaed per-sonnel and adminisraive issues.

As a resul o he change in emphasis and he com-plexiy o missions, he exising insiuional ramework isnow being esed. More han 12,500 Unied Naions po-



xii


lice now exis who are rom more han 90 counries andare deployed on 17 dieren eld missions. New ways o hinking abou how police are deployed, wha heir role isduring deploymen, how hey underake heir duies, and

how heir perormance is measured is needed because o he scale and comprehensiveness o modern missions.

Te rs sep in undersanding how o bes assis pos-conic naions in he rule o law conex is o undersandhe role o police in peacekeeping. Te second sep is oensure ha he service he police are delivering is meeinghe requiremens o he local governmen. Te nal sep isideniying police ocers who have he appropriae levelo skill or he mission and hen ensuring ha hey under-sand wha heir role in he mission is, how he mission is o

be achieved, and how heir perormance will be measured.

Te ndings rom his sudy may assis police plan-ners, praciioners, and researchers who are par o a widening audience ha has an ineres in he role o police in pos-conic or underdeveloped naions. Te

sudy lls a vacuum in previous research abou how peacekeeping missions were planned, managed, andevaluaed rom he police perspecive, and i akes hendings rom 23 peacekeeping missions and developsa dynamic new police peacekeeping model ha may beused in such siuaions.

Te proposed model is comprehensive bu simple andeasily undersood. I is hoped ha his research and hesubsequen model provide mission leaders wih he oolso implemen policies and programs ha will eecively reorm police agencies in pos-conic naions.

— Jim BueermannPresiden

Police Foundaion



xiii

Acknowledgments

Te idea or he research leading o his book was rig-gered by my involvemen or a number o years in hedeploymen o police ocers o pos-conic or ran-siioning naions and by my own experiences “on heground.”

I am indebed o he Unied Saes Insiue o Peaceor unding his projec.

Te developmen o his book beneed grealy romhe suppor and commens received rom he researchqualiy assurance panel: David Bayley, Chris Cooper, Alice

Hills, and Sephen Masroski.

I appreciae he suppor and encouragemen o hePolice Foundaion, especially ormer Presiden Huber

Williams, curren Presiden Jim Bueermann, and Karen Amendola. I am graeul o my Police Foundaion col-leagues, including Earl Hamilon and David Klinger whoprovided helpul commens on an earlier dra o his re-por, and o Mary Malina who oversaw is producion. Fi-nally, I would like o hank my wie, Vicki, or her suppor.

Tis book is dedicaed o Neville Bradbury Mathews(1952–2011) and o he 93 police ocers killed on he

23 missions ha have been included in his research.

— Garh den Heyer





xv

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ad hoc Coordinaion Cell (Darur) ACPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . ani-corrupion prosecuor’s oce AFDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Alliance o he Democraic Forces

or he Liberaion o Congo-Zaire

ANP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aghanisan Naion Police AU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arican Union AUMIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arican Union Mission in Sudan

BINUB. . . Bureau Inégré des Naions Unies au Burundi

BNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Burundi Naional PoliceB P U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b o r d e r p a r o l u n i

CADS . . . .Communiy Assisance or econsrucion,Developmen, and Sabilisaion

CAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . conrac assurance eamsCCSSP . . . . . . . . . . .Commonwealh Communiy Saey

and Securiy Projec

CIVPOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civilian police (par o AUMIS)CMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .crisis managemen concepCNDD–FDD. . . . . . . . . Naional Council or Deense o

Democracy–Forces or he Deenseo Democracy

CNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Congolese Naional PoliceCOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .communiy-oriened policingCPA. . . . . . . . . . .Accra Comprehensive Peace AgreemenCPAK . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Comprehensive Peace Agreemen

CPDF . . . . . . . . . Commonwealh Police Developmenask Force or Sierra Leone

CSP . . . . . . . . . . . . police reorm monioring commitee

DD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . disarmamen, demobilizaion,and re-inegraion

DC .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Democraic epublic o he Congo

ECOMIL. . . . . . . . . . . . .ECOWAS-led mission in Liberia

ECOMOG . . . . . . . . . . . .Miliary Observer Group o heEconomic Communiy o Wes Arican Saes

ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Economic Communiy o Wes Arican Saes

EDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . exernally displaced personsESDP . . . . . . . . . . European Securiy and Deence Policy EPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eas imor Police Ser viceEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . European UnionEU AMIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . .European Union Suppor o he

Arican Union Mission o Sudan and Darur

EU COPPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . European UnionCo-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Suppor

EUPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . European Union Police Advisory eam in he Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia

EUPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . European Union Police Mission oBosnia and Herzegovina

EUPOL Aghanisan . . . . . . . . . . .European Union PoliceMission o Aghanisan



xvi


EUPOL COPPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .European Union PoliceCo-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Suppor

EUPOL Kinshasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa

EUPOL Proxima . . . . . . European Union Police Missiono he Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia

EUPOL D Congo . . . European Union Police Missionin he Democraic epublic o he Congo

EUSEC D Congo . . . . .European Union Advisory and Assisance Mission or

Securiy eorm in he DC

F/FDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Poruguese iniials orimor-Lese Deense Force

FANCI . . . . . Forces Armées Naionales de Côe d’IvoireFADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forces Armées de la épublique

Démocraique du Congo

FDL . . . . . . . . . . . Forces or he Democraic Liberaiono wanda

F P U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o r m e d p o l i c e u n i sFYOM. . . . . . Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia

GFAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Framework Agreemen or Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

HNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Haiian Naional PoliceHNPDP. . . . Haiian Naional Police Developmen Plan

ICFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inerim Co-operaionFramework Secoral ound able on police

ICIAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inernaional CriminalInvesigaive raining Assisance Program (U.S. DOJ)

IDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inernally displaced personsI F O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i m p l e m e n a i o n o r c eIGAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Iner-Governmenal Auhoriy

on Developmen

INPFL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Independen Naional ParioicFron o Liberia

INEFE . . . . . . . Unied Naions Inernaional Forceor Eas imor

Inerpol . . . . Inernaional Criminal Police OrganizaionIPCB . . . . . . . .Inernaional Police Co-ordinaion BoardIPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inegraed police uniIPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inernaional police ask orceISAF . . . . . . . . . . . . inernaional securiy assisance orce

JEUAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Join Council–CommissionEuropean Assessmen Mission

JIAS. . . . . . . . . . . . Join Inerim Adminisraive Srucure JMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Join Mission Analysis Cell

KFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kosovo ForceKL A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kosovo Liberaion Army KPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kosovo Proecion CorpsKPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kosovo Police Service

LIC . . . . . . . . Local Implemenaion Componen ProjecLNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Liber ian Naional PoliceLPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liberian Police Serv iceLUD. . . . .Liberians or econciliaion and Democracy

MICAH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inernaional Civilian SupporMission in Haii

MIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mulinaional Inerim ForceMINUCI . . . . .Unied Naions Mission in Côe d’IvoireMIPONUH . . . . Unied Naions Police Mission in HaiiMINUSAH . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unied Naions Sabilizaion

Mission in Haii

MJP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Movemen or Jusice and PeaceMODEL . . . . . . . . . Movemen or Democracy in LiberiaMONUC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unied Naions Mission

in he Democraic epublic o he Congo(Mission de l’Organisaion des Naions Unies

en épublique démocraique du Congo)MONUSCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Organizaion

Sabilizaion Mission in he Democraicepublic o Congo

MoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minisry o securiy MoU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . memorandum o undersandingMPCI . . . . . . . . . . . . Parioic Movemen o Côe d’IvoireMPIGO .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ivorian Popular Movemen

o he Grea Wes

NAO . . . . . . . . . . . . Norh Alanic reay Organizaion

NCPPM. . . . . . . new civilian police peacekeeping modelNPFL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Naional Parioic Fron o LiberiaNPC. . . . . . . . . . . . Naional Provisional uling CouncilNPSDP . . . Naional Police Sraegic Developmen Plan

OAS ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .Organizaion o American SaesOIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oce o he Inspecor General



Abbreviations and Acronyms

xvii

ONUB . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Operaion in BurundiONUVEH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unied Naions Observer

Group or he Vericaion o he Elecions in Haii

OSCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Organisaion or Securiy

and Co-operaion in Europe

PAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .police assessmen eamsPCP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Palesinian Civil PolicePCPDP . . . . . . . . . Palesinian Civil Police Developmen

Programme 2005–2008

PDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . police developmen commiteePDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . predeploymen planningPIPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . program implemenaion plansPNL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Poruguese iniials or

imorese Naional Police

POP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public Order PolicePoP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .specic police reorm programPP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . indigenous police reorm planPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .provincial reconsrucion eamsPSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . police seering boardPSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . public securiy cenersPSCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Programme Seering Commitee

RMSI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .egional Assisance Missiono Solomon Islands

oP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . indigenous police reorm programUF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . evoluionar y Unied Fron

SAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sabiliy and associaion processSBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sae border serviceSFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sabilizaion orceSIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sraegic implemenaion planSIPA . . . . . . . . . sae invesigaion and proecion agency SLPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sierra Leone Police Force

SMA . . . . Suppor, Monioring, Advising, eporing,and raining

SOPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .sandard operaing proceduresSPLM/A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sudan People’s Liberaion

Movemen/Army SSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Special Secur i y Divis ionS S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s e c u r i y s e c o r r e o r mSSPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Souhern Sudan Police Service

SOP . . . . . . . . . . . special racking operaions program

LPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . imor-Lese Police Ser vice

UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied NaionsUNAME . . . . . Unied Naions Mission in Eas imorUNAMID . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions and Arican Union

Mission in Darur

UNAMIS . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Advance Missionin he Sudan

UNAMSIL . . . . Unied Naions Mission in Sierra LeoneUNDP . . . . . . Unied Naions Developmen ProgrammeUNHC . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Oce o he High

Commissioner or eugees

UNIOSIL . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Inegraed Oceor Sierra Leone

UNJAM . . . . Unied Naions Join Assessmen MissionUNMIBH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unied Naions Mission in

Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Mission in HaiiUNMIK . . . . . . Unied Naions Inerim Adminisraion

Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Mission in LiberiaUNMIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Mission in SudanUNMISE . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Mission o Suppor

in Eas imor

UNMI . . . . . . Unied Naions Mission in imor-LeseUNOCI . . . . Unied Naions Operaion in Côe d’IvoireUNOL . . . . . . . . Unied Naions Peace-Building Suppor

Oce in Liberia

UNOMIL . Unied Naions Observer Mission in LiberiaUNOMSIL . . . . . . . .Unied Naions Observers Mission

in Sierra Leone

UNOIL . . . . . . . Unied Naions Oce in imor-LeseUNPOFO . . . . . . . .Unied Naions Proecion ForceUNSMIH . . . . Unied Naions Suppor Mission in HaiiUNAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Naions ransiional

Adminisraion in Eas imorUNMIH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unied Naions ransiion

Mission in Haii

USIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unied Saes Insiue o Peace





Part I

Introduction





3

Chapter 1

Conception and Structure

Introduction

Civilian police were rs deployed by he Unied Naions(UN) in July 1960 (more han 50 years ago). Following alull o approximaely wo decades, he number o civilianpolice in peacekeeping operaions increased rom 1,677ocers in 1994 o more han 10,000 ocers in 2009(Unied Naions, 2010p). Te role o civilian police hasconinued o broaden rom one o monioring generalelecions and providing raining and basic securiy o one

o parolling and developing he capaciy 1 o local police.Despie he exensive lieraure ha has examined he

role o he miliary in peacekeeping and inervenion oper-aions, litle available lieraure or inormaion invesigaeshe role and he work o he civilian police or he mehodsha hey use o assis in he reormaion o local police.

Te inclusion o civilian police in peacekeeping mis-sions is an acceped pracice by boh academia andpraciioners. However, he role o civilian police inpeacekeeping missions is no sucienly undersood by policy makers and decision makers.

Te purpose o his book is o undersand he roleha civilian police play in he posconic conex, espe-

1 Capaciy developmen is he process or mehod by which “in-dividuals, organizaions, insiuions, and socieies develop (individ-ually and collecively) o perorm uncions, solve problems, and seand achieve objecives” (Unied Naions Developmen Programme,1997, p. 5). See also pages 20–23.

cially wih regard o reorming indigenous police. Tis book will examine 23 UN and European Union (EU)peacekeeping missions ha ook place beween 1999 and2007. Te aim o he research is o develop responsive op-eraional ools and policies ha will suppor he eeciveuse o deployed civilian police in heir delivery o serviceand in heir developmen o he capaciy o indigenouspolice. I is also inended ha his sudy will assis in im-proving peacebuilding oucomes by increasing poscon-ic securiy, sabiliy, and developmen.

Is There a Need to Understand the

Civilian Police Role in Peacekeeping

Missions?

Te deploymen o inernaional civilian police o a pos-conic zone is a undamenal par o peacekeeping and is

vial o commencing he reconsrucion o a sociey. Po-lice play a cenral role in esablishing a sense o securiy and sabiliy in he lives o people living in posconicnaions. According o Schmidl (1998, p. 3), “[p]olice play a crucial role in securing he ranser rom war o peace,enabling he people o reurn o heir ‘normal’ lives.” How-ever, according o Wiarowski and Pino (2008), when po-lice are deployed ino a posconic siuaion, hey musensure ha heir role is consisen wih democraic polic-ing and democraic developmen. Tose auhors claimed



4


Table 1.1. Dierent Types and Forms o Peacekeeping Operations

Fetherston (1994) and Jett (1999) Bellamy, Williams, and Grin (2009)

1. Nascent Period 1946–56 Traditional peacekeeping

2. Assertive Period 1956–67Managing transition3. Dormant Period 1967–73

4. Resurgent Period 1973–78

5. Maintenance Period 1978–81 Wider peacekeeping

6. Expansion Period 1988–93 Peace enorcement

7. Contraction Period 1993–99 Peace support

8. Modern Period 1999–present Sustainable capacity development

Source: Auhor.

in an earlier book (Pino and Wiarowski, 2006) ha wihou democraic orms o securiy, police can oen berepressive.

Despie he increasing level o complexiy o missionsand he good inenions o he people deployed and in-

volved in he planning and implemenaion, he successo pas peacekeeping operaions has been mixed. Tis in-consisency may be atribued o several acors. Linden,Las, and Murphy (2007) claim ha he same ypes o problems have plagued virually all peacekeeping mis-sions since he 1980s. Linden and colleagues also claim

ha some o he major causes o such problems are gov-ernance and operaional issues, mandae problems, andresource limiaions. Tis siuaion is exacerbaed by hediversiy o each mission’s mandae, ask, and conex. Asa resul, i is dicul o apply he lessons learned in onemission o anoher (Jet, 1999).

I can be argued ha he hisory o modern peace-keeping canno be divided ino chronological periods be-cause he ypes o operaions are no muually exclusive(Bellamy, Williams, and Grin, 2009). However, here isa clear evoluion o peacekeeping missions and involve-men o civilian police. According o Feherson (1994)and Jet (1999), seven dieren eras shape he evolvingorm o peacekeeping operaions. able 1.1 comparesFeherson’s and Jet’s chronologically based evoluiono peacekeeping wih ha o Bellamy e al.; he laterpresened ve ypes o operaions ha are based on hemandae and he achievemen o each mission. However,Bellamy e al.’s ve ypes o operaions are idenied by

heir desired oucomes raher han by he mehods hahe mission used o achieve hem.

Since he observaions o Feherson, o Jet, and o Bel-lamy e al., peacekeeping has urher evolved. Te new ypeand orm, known as he modern period and he susainablecapaciy developmen, have been included in able 1.1.

Te mos marked progression in mission ype andorm is beween radiional peacekeeping and managingransiion. Te managing ransiion orm o peacekeep-ing mission is qualiaively and quaniaively disincrom radiional peacekeeping because o is muliaceed

naure (Bellamy e al., 2009) and because he acion o he ransiion is he primary purpose o he mission.Te more modern peacekeeping missions have be-

come broader in scope and longer in duraion (Brzoska,2006) and, as a resul, more complex. Te broadeningscope o peacekeeping missions encompasses laying hegroundwork or susainable social, economic, and polii-cal developmen and he esablishmen o securiy rame-

works (Brzoska, 2006).Te increased level o complexiy o peacekeeping mis-

sions has changed he role ha civilian police play rom oneo menoring he posconic naion’s police o one o devel-oping insiuional police capaciy, supporing reorm, andresrucuring and rebuilding local police (Hills, 2009; Mur-augh, 2010). According o Hills (2009, p. 79), “[E]leven o he welve missions auhorized since 1999 reer o moni-oring, reorming, and rebuilding local police.”

Te major governance problem experienced in peace-keeping missions is he use o Wesern democraic polic-




5

ing models, ideologies, and echnologies by inernaionalpolicing deploymens. When hey use Wesern demo-craic policing models, members o he inernaional po-lice usually ail o ake ino accoun he local conex and

culure. Using Wesern orms o policing raises a number o heoreical and pracical quesions abou impos-ing such models on posconic naions. Te imposiiono Wesern models also raises quesions abou (a) hechanging role o he naion-sae (Garland, 1996), (b)he governance o inervenion or reorm policing, and(c) he growing use o he police as modes and models o social and sae governance (Bayley and Shearing, 2001).

Police reorm is acknowledged as a crucial elemen when esablishing a sense o securiy and when developinga posconic naion. Alhough he principles and pracices

o capaciy developmen can be applied in mos develop-men assisance programs, here are some addiional chal-lenges o developing or rebuilding police capaciy in weak,posconic, and ailed counries. In such siuaions, rapidcapaciy developmen is criical, bu his combinaion isalso where he environmen is leas conducive o successor o he evaluaion o echnical assisance programs.

Deermining how police change during reorm pro-grams can provide subsaniaion and perspecive opolicy deliberaions when ideniying, consrucing, im-plemening, and mainaining orms o policing. Tis sup-

por, in urn, conribues o a naion’s inended objecives(Bayley, 1995, 2006). Examining how police change dur-ing posconic naional sabilizaion provides a beterundersanding o sae and poliical developmen and o he relaionship beween reorm and police insiuions.However, in he pas, police missions have been vague indescribing heir asks, goals, and objecives. Tis lack o clariy has led o divergen inerpreaions o mandaes,insances o mission creep, and an absence o peror-mance measuremen rameworks.

Te UN and he EU have sruggled o develop use-ul indicaors or measuring he progress oward achiev-ing a mission’s shor- and long-erm goals and objecives,

boh in reorming local police and in esablishing a publicsense o securiy. egular progress assessmens and evalu-aions are criical or improving he aciviies o deployedpolice and or guiding sraegic planning and mission di-recion. egular assessmens also provide he lessons o

be learned or uure missions.

Te lack o mission-specic goals and objecives has been urher exacerbaed by he ac ha eors o mea-sure he success o he UN’s long-erm police reorm pro-grams have radiionally been ad hoc and inconsisen

(Smih, Hol, and Durch, 2007). epor wriers’ lack o knowledge o police perormance measuremen com-pounds his issue. Despie he esablishmen o he UNPeacekeeping Bes Pracices Uni, i is unclear o whadegree he UN has been able o develop perormancemeasures and o incorporae he lessons learned romprevious missions ino curren missions.

Alhough he imporance o police reorm has been widely acceped by researchers and planners o peace-keeping missions in recen years, very litle atenionhas been given o he process or achieving reorm or or

measuring is implemenaion. Te mehods ha wo di-eren groups o auhors advocae or measuring he suc-cess or ailure o peacekeeping missions are presened inable 1.2. Unorunaely, boh ses o perormance mea-sures are sraegic, vague, and subjecive, and alhoughhe ses may provide insigh a an academic level, hey dono provide a ramework or a comprehensive evaluaiono he implemenaion o a complex program o indige-nous police reorm.

As Bayley (2006) noes, mos wriing abou peace-keeping ceases a he beginning o he hird sage by Oak-

ley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg (1998), which is when areasonably secure environmen has been creaed or heinernaional communiy. Lieraure relaing o police re-consrucion and reorm in posconic environmensdoes no make any recommendaions abou how o buildreliable rule-o-law securiy insiuions so ha he localpopulaion is proeced. Nor are recommendaions madeabou how he reorms can be implemened. Furher-more, he lieraure does no sae wheher he reormsachieve he objecives o he local governmen and police.

Beyond measuremen, he consrucion o deniionsis he second area o police reorm ha requires urherundersanding and research. A number o missions usesaemens ha may be undersood a a poliical level,

bu generally he saemens are wide ranging and dono comprise any echnical rameworks ha would assispraciioners. For example, he Unied Naions Missionin Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) asked he po-lice componen o he mission o assis wih downsizing



6


he local police orce and o reorganize he orce by us-ing “inernaionally recognised sandards o law enorce-men” (Durch, 2006, p. 72).

Te criical quesion in he posconic environmenconcerns he esablishmen and he implemenaion o pracical service delivery rameworks ha will se up lo-cally eecive securiy and sabiliy. Te implemena-ion o such rameworks “will increase he ecacy andeeciveness o specic inervenions and iniiaives haconribue o susainable reorm and capaciy building”(Grihs, Dandurand, and Chin, 2005, p. 7). Pas expe-rience in assising posconic naions has demonsraedhe benes o deploying civilian police in associaion

wih a coordinaed and coheren jusice and penal reorm

program (Organisaion or Economic Co-operaion andDevelopmen, 2007). Te police play a linking role in hisapproach and, as such, provide a means o developingsecorwide sraegies. Te conribuion o civilian policeis signican in providing sabiliy and allows a dysunc-ional poliical environmen o change by moving hedevasaed counry away rom a miliary regime owarda civilian or democraic poliical sysem (McFarlane andMaley, 2001).

Wih he excepion o miliary researchers, many re-searchers ail o examine he operaional lessons hamay be learned rom democraic police reorm. Tis ail-ure is par o a larger inellecual analysis gap. esearchand debae are required regarding he developmenal as-pecs o securiy insiuions in posconic environ-mens (Bayley, 1985, 2006; Call, 1999; Wul, 2000).

Alhough he UN has published volumes o maerial andgiven ha many analyss around he world have exam-ined a lengh he causes o miliary peacekeeping ailure

and he inadequae perormance o operaions, hose an-alyss have no examined in any deail he civilian policecomponen o such missions. Furhermore, an analysis

on he sraegic planning process o he civilian policingcomponen o he missions has no been underaken.Nor have researchers underaken a gap analysis ha ex-amines (a) he objecives o he police componen o hemissions, (b) wha was achieved, (c) he policing modelsha were used, (d) he achievemens o he missions as a

whole, or (e) he orms o capaciy developmen andechnical assisance ha were used.

The Theory o Measuring Capacity

DevelopmentCapaciy developmen is he process or mehod by which“individuals, organizaions, insiuions and socieies de-

velop abiliies (individually and collecively) o perormuncions, solve problems, and se and achieve objec-ives” (Unied Naions Developmen Programme, 1997,p. 5). Wha diereniaes capaciy developmen in an in-ernaional inervenion posconic siuaion is ha i isplanned, insigaed, and susained by providing resourcesrom ouside he posconic naion.

Capaciy developmen, hough no unique o aidprograms, is he oundaion o he majoriy o curreninernaional developmen assisance and inervenionprograms ollowing inranaional conic. Such inerven-ion programs are based primarily on achieving a level o ransormaion and improvemen o he local sae agen-cies, deparmens, and minisries. However, organiza-ions are made up o a mixure o people and sysems,

Table 1.2. Suggested Methods or Measuring Peacekeeping Mission Success

Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg (1998) Ratner (1995)

a. Military suppression o organized conict

b. Establishment o an interim civilian police orceby the intervening countries to enorce law,prevent crime, and maintain order

c. Creation o a local civilian police institutionthat is both competent and humane

a. Comparison with the mission’s mandate

b. Comparison with the results o other peacekeepingoperationsc. Impact on the states concernedd. Impact on the United Nations or implementing

organization

Source: Auhor.




7

and a capaciy developmen projec should comprise in-ervenion sraegies on several dieren levels.

Te developmen communiy has used a variey o de-iniions o dene capaciy developmen, mos o whichhave been based on he principles and objecives o hemission or he reason or capaciy developmen. Currendeniions o susainable capaciy developmen usually comprise nine major principles, which are presened inable 1.3, and make up he ollowing hree componens:

1. I is a dynamic, coninuous learning process.2. I emphasizes ecacy hrough eecive use and em-

powermen o individuals, resources, and organizaions.3. I requires ha sysemaic and relaionship-building

approaches be considered in ormulaing sraegiesand program developmen (adaped rom UniedNaions Developmen Programme, 1997; CanadianInernaional Developmen Agency, 2000).

Tose oundaion componens ideniy ha capac-iy developmen is no likely o be linear and should be

based on he values held by he posconic naion. Forexample, he approach aken by he egional AssisanceMission o Solomon Islands (RMSI) included he ma-

joriy o hese componens rom he beginning o he in-ervenion program. Te mission relied principally onhe ollowing AusAID (2004) deniion o susainablecapaciy developmen:

Te process o developing compeencies and capa-

biliies in individuals, groups, organizaions, secors,

or counries which will lead o susained and sel-

generaing perormance improvemen.

Tis deniion acknowledges ha here are wo lev-els o capaciy developmen, each o which compose mul-iple enry poins. Any capaciy developmen assisanceprovided should ensure (a) ha i leads o susainable im-

provemen o he perormance o he posconic naionor organizaion and (b) ha he program enables he na-ion or he organizaion o improve isel when he sup-por ceases.

Te implemenaion o capaciy developmen prin-ciples underlines he imporance o a comprehensivesysems approach ha will be suppored by building long-erm culural and sraegic parnerships. Any capaciy de-

velopmen program ha alludes o a quick x or o hesearch or shor-erm resuls should include he eecivecoordinaion and coherence o srucural, organizaional,and echnological ransormaion rameworks (Grihse al., 2005). As a resul o he complexiy o capaciy de-

velopmen, mos programs are muliaceed and incorpo-rae a number o dieren approaches. Tose approachesmay include echnical assisance, on-he-job raining,rain-he-rainers, ormal shor courses, and sudy ours(AusAID, 2004). Tey should also be seen as an indig-enous process o change and evoluion (Morgan, 1998).

Table 1.3. Capacity Development Principles

Principle

1. From the start, plan to leave.

2. Be exible and analyze risk.3. Remember that capacity development takes time.

4. Do not overestimate what can be achieved.

5. Manage expectations.

6. Take ownership and provide leadership.

7. Use holistic approaches that are based on sound analysis.

8. Build on what currently exists.

9. Take the cultural environment into account.

Source: Adaped rom AusAID (2004).



8


Several broader conexual and specic local variablesneed o be considered when designing and developingcapaciy developmen programs. Tose variables shouldcener on he capabiliy o he posconic naion’s polii-

cal and physical inrasrucure and on he commimeno he leaders or he naion’s elie o reorm. I he naion’sleadership is no moivaed o ully paricipae or i hecounry and is insiuions are unable o absorb he ca-paciy developmen eecively, hen any “benes inro-duced by he programme will no survive he wihdrawalo [ha] aid” (AusAID, 2004, p. 4). However, he exeno which hose issues apply will depend on he level o social disrupion ha has occurred or is occurring (Au-sAID, 2004).

Te approach aken by planners o assis wih he

capaciy developmen in a posconic naion is key o wheher he eors will be successul (AusAID, 2004).Te design o any implemenaion approach o capac-iy developmen programs should allow susainable im-provemens o be achieved and should ake ino accounhe consrains o underlying weak governance. Tisperspecive will increase he abiliy o he people o heposconic naion o improve and will allow heir orga-nizaions o absorb assisance producively.

Furhermore, he measuremen o capaciy devel-opmen is an inernal validiy process ha provides re-

rospecive inormaion abou a specic program orinervenion. Capaciy developmen programs are indis-puably dicul o measure. However, i is easier o mea-sure exernal raher han inernal ransormaive changes,and here is a endency or evaluaions o ocus on suchpercepions raher han examine inernal perormancemeasures. Developing appropriae perormance manage-men rameworks, indicaors, and measures o achieve-men in he developmen program is essenial because iinuences he implemenaion o specic projecs wihinhe acual program.

According o Eck (2006), here are wo objecivesin evaluaing inervenion programs. Te rs is o pro-duce he maximum amoun o inormaion wih heleas amoun o uncerainy abou he ecacy o he in-ervenion program. Te second is o provide guidanceabou wha should be achieved subsequenly. Tis objec-ive is imporan because capaciy developmen plannersand implemeners need such inormaion o deermine

wheher he program should be coninued, repeaed, ormodied in some way (Eck, 2006).

Te diculy in implemening and evaluaing moscapaciy developmen programs is ha here is usually no

underlying mehod or measuring improvemen in hereceiving individual, organizaion, or governmen. Nor isi easy o measure wheher any improvemen is susain-able. Tose gaps mean ha mos capaciy developmenprogram evaluaions are no comprehensive sraegicassessmens. Insead, such assessmens look or an im-provemen in “an aspec o organizaional perormance

judged o be imporan o he abiliy o he organizaiono ull is mission” (Wing, 2004, p. 155).

Te success o a capaciy developmen program should be measured by using he program’s original goals, objec-

ives, and planned achievemens. Poorly designed peror-mance indicaors can challenge he process o capaciy developmen implemenaion because such measurescan reduce local ownership, can encourage incorrec be-havior, and can wase resources. Measures o evaluae hecapaciy-building inervenion program should be de-signed o include ideniying where changes are required,he naure o he changes, and how o bes eec hosechanges wih he available resources and wihin any oherconsrains. Ideniying such perormance measures is acomplex ask and will require a sysemaic approach o

he reorm o an organizaion or an individual.Te process o ideniying program perormancemeasuremen sars (a) wih he receiving organizaion’sprioriies and objecives and (b) by examining wha hasoccurred in ha organizaion ha has indicaed a need ochange individual or group perormance (Harris, 2005).Te process hen moves on o ideniy wha has causedhe gap beween he desired perormance and he acualperormance; hen i designs a capaciy-building projeco close he gap.

In he case o police reorm, a measurable sysemaicapproach could include he ollowing six seps, adapedrom Harris (2005):

• Esablish capaciy-building prioriies.• Analyze police asks, and ideniy perormance

sandards.• Ideniy curren gaps in police perormance.• Creae capaciy-building program specicaions.




9

• Selec capaciy-building program design and deliv-

ery sysems.• Design an evaluaion and monioring plan.

Such a comprehensive, sysemaic approach shouldinclude a coninuous assessmen loop ha links he re-ceiving organizaion’s objecives o he perormance gapidenicaion process. Using his procedure will esablisha program o specic measurable projecs ha will enable anal evaluaion o he capaciy-building program o be un-deraken. Wheher or no he original goals and objeciveso he program have been achieved can hen be assessed.

However, he major issue when measuring an individ-ual or organizaional capaciy developmen program isha i is no uncommon o nd ha he projec has mul-iple goals and objecives. Tis comprehensive invenory o goals and objecives may encompass he goals and ob-

jecives o he capaciy developmen provider and hoseo he capaciy developmen receiver. Te objecives o he provider and receiver may no be aligned. A lack o alignmen in he developmen program complicaes heprojec perormance evaluaion and raises he quesiono whose goals are being measured.

Evaluation o the Civilian Police Rolein Peacekeeping Missions

Tis book is based on an exensive lieraure search andreview o specic UN and EU ocial documens andcovers he ve sages summarized in able 1.4.

Te rs sage o he research provided he basis or

developing a 39-quesion emplae ha is used in par III,chaper 17, o analyze wha he civilian police role wasin posconic capaciy developmen, wha mehods andservice delivery models were used, and how he programs

were evaluaed. Te primary lieraure review compleedduring his sage also enabled he idenicaion o many pracical and poliical problems experienced during pre-

vious peacekeeping missions.Te pracical and poliical problems rom previous

peacekeeping missions are presened in able 1.5 and arelised under ve major peacekeeping opics ha have been

idenied rom he lieraure: Police Mission Planning,Te Mission, Local Police Capaciy, Policing Approach,and Program Evaluaion. Included under each o he opicsare he opic’s respecive Mission Componen problemsand he issue ha caused he Componen Problem.

Te primary lieraure search and review also enabledhe developmen o a series o research quesions, which

were grouped ino wo logical and analyical phases aspresened in able 1.6. Te quesions conained in phase 1compose he rs sep in reviewing he role o he civil-ian police componen in he 23 case sudy missions. Teinormaion obained in phase 1 is subsequenly used oorm he basis or developing new rameworks in phase 2.Te rameworks are used o examine:

• Te appropriae role(s) or civilian police in inervenion or posconic missions

• Te appropriae policing service delivery and he re-orm or capaciy developmen model(s) or civilian

Table 1.4. The Five Stages o the Project

Stage Description

1. Primary literature search and review Document review and construction o database

2. Primary Internet search and review Document fndings

3.Secondary literature and Internet search andreview

Completion o phase 1 research questions anddocumentation

4.Analysis o primary and secondary literature andInternet searches and reviews

Completion o phase 2 research questions anddocumentation

5. Development o conceptual rameworks Completion o research goals

Source: Auhor.



10


police o use in inervenion and posconicenvironmens

• A perormance managemen mehodology or civil-ian police posconic missions

Te applied goal o his research was o use his evi-dence and he resuling analysis o devise responsive op-eraional ools and policies ha will suppor he eeciveuse o deployed civilian police in heir delivery o serviceand heir provision o capaciy developmen assisance.Tis research will resul in beter peacebuilding oucomes

by increasing he securiy, sabiliy, and developmen o he posconic naion.

Tis projec comprised reviewing and analyzing hemandaes, deploymen processes, sraegic perormance,and achievemens o 15 UN and 8 EU peacekeeping mis-sions ha eiher commenced or were compleed beween1999 and 2007 and in which he principal ask o he ci-

vilian police componen o he mission was o reorm helocal police. Te lis o he missions, each counr y ha hepeacekeepers were deployed o, and he dae o he de-ploymen are presened in appendix A.

Table 1.5. Practical and Political Problems in Previous Peacekeeping Missions

Police Mission Planning

Mission Component Component Problem

Premission planning•

Failure to match ends (desired outcomes) with means (inputs)Personnel • Inconsistent quality and skills

Mission mandate• Unrealistic• Vague

The Mission

Deploymenta• Not timely• Completed in stages

Securitya• Failure to establish a sense o security

Local Police Capacity

Training• Inadequate planning, management, and support• Lack o qualifed sta members

Mentoring and monitoring • Poor training standards• Western curriculum

Policing Approach

Reorm program plan• Nonexistent• Inappropriate doctrines• No perormance measures or evaluation process

All-o-government • Failure to include comprehensive approach

Policing approach • Use o Western models

Modernization plan• Nonexistent• No strategic vision

Program Evaluation

Program assessment•

Hal-hearted attempt• No best practice process

Program evaluation • Not undertaken

Sources: Bayley (2006); Bayley and Perio (2010); Durch (1993, 2006); Greener (2009); Hills (2009); Jakobsen (2006).

Noe: a. From auhor.




11

Te 23 peacekeeping missions included in he sudy represen a rich and disparae sample o cases. O hemissions, 11 ook place in Arica, 5 in Europe, 3 in Souh

Asia, 2 in he Caribbean, and 2 in he Middle Eas. Tesample includes many o he bes-known and devasaingexamples o inrasae conic and perperaed civilianarociies. Given he geographical array and operaionaldeph o he 23 case sudy missions, i should be possibleo develop general conclusions abou police reorm ol-lowing conic.

Te projec was composed o a srucured and ocusedcomparison o 23 case sudies ha enabled a commonorma or discussion and analysis o ake place. Tis ormo case sudy invesigaion has been called “conrolledcomparison” (George, 1979) and was aken because o he small sample size and because i provides a ounda-ion or measuring he change in missions over ime. Te

small sample size o his projec does no enable in-dephsaisical analysis o be compleed. Furhermore, heprojec is based on he exracion o qualiaive inorma-ion raher han quaniaive daa.

Druckman and Sern (1997) claim ha a case sudy approach allows he rs sep o be aken in collecinga qualiaive daa se wih explici, sysemaic crieria,

which hus enables analyical models o be consruced.Te alernaive approach o developing an analysis rame-

work rom each o he mission mandaes was no aken because o he conex-specic naure o each o he mis-sion mandaes.

Te mehodical process used in he case sudy ap-proach ensures ha any model developed is robus andshould, as Druckman and Sern (1997, p. 160) empha-size, “allow policy makers o evaluae precisely he impaco individual variables on success and, hrough sensiiviy

Table 1.6. Project Research Questions

Phase 1

What was the role o police in the mission: security and stabilization or security sector reorm (SSR)?

At what stage were police deployed?What were the strategic goals or objectives o the police mission or deployment? Were they ormulated in con- junction with the postconict nation?

What were the perormance measures and evaluation procedures in each intervention?

What policing service delivery model was used?

Did the police undertake capacity development o the local police?

Was there a capacity development plan? What were the goals and objectives?

Was the capacity development program evaluated? What were the capacity development evaluation methods?

What did the police mission achieve? How did the evaluators know that the objectives o the intervention wereachieved? How were the results measured?

Phase 2

What are the roles or civilian police in peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions? What are the scope and theparameters?

Can police fll the “security gap”?

Can police be used more eectively in the nation-building or governance-building process postconict?

Can police reorm measures rom Western democracies be used in postconict nations?

Is there an appropriate model o police service delivery in a postconict environment?

Is there an eective civilian police process or capacity development planning and implementation?

What should an appropriate civilian police program or capacity development include?

What should be included in a civilian police process or strategic planning?

Source: Auhor.



12


analysis, deermine wha he impac would be o aleringhese variables.”

Each o he 23 case sudies is examined by using heollowing seven headings:

1. Background o he mission2. Mandae o he mission3. Mission deploymen environmen4. Acions o he mission (oupu)5. Mission implemenaion (model)6. Mission achievemens (oucomes)7. Ways he mission was evaluaed

Te headings used in his research have been designedo provide a ramework or eliciing and summarizing he

inormaion obained rom he lieraure search em-plaes, and he summaries consider he inpus, oupus,and he oucomes o each mission. Te headings also o-er a logical presenaion srucure and a consruc orensuring ha no poenially valuable qualiaive daa arepassed over (Druckman and Sern, 1997).

Te projec was more abou analyzing he dierencesin he approaches aken over ime across he aggregaemissions raher han a comparison across he cases. A comparison o he 23 missions would no have providedany inormaion abou he improvemens or any deerio-

raion in he local police reorm programs (Jones, Wil-son, ahmell, and iley, 2005). Tis approach was aken because he posconic counries suered dierenorms o unres and because hey were a dieren sageso reconsrucion when he missions began.

Overview o the Book

Tis book will examine he mehods and procedures used by 23 peacekeeping missions, which included he reormo he local police wihin heir mandae over an eigh-yearperiod. I is argued ha by using a common emplae ap-proach in analyzing he 23 missions as individual casesudies, he role o he civilian police mission componencan be invesigaed and a generic, culurally based policereorm model can be developed. Te developed or pro-posed reorm model would be adapable or use in uurepeacekeeping missions.

Te developmen o he civilian police reorm modelis premised on several assumpions, which include heollowing:

• Te reorm o local police in a posconic siuaionis dicul.

• Tere is no “one size s all” answer or model.• Many acors inuence he oucome o reorm pro-

grams, acors ha are beyond he conrol o he advising insiuion involved.

• Police reorm is a long-erm commimen.• Police reorm on is own will no creae a secure

environmen.• Police reorm needs o be par o a comprehensive

governmen and poliical reorm program ha in-

cludes oher jusice secor agencies, inelligenceagencies, and he miliary.

Te goal o his research was o ideniy a new reormmodel or civilian police peacekeeping. Te model wasdesigned by examining he ocial documenaion o

boh he UN and he EU ha perained o he 23 mis-sions. In his process, in-deph inormaion was gaheredor some missions, bu in he case o oher missions, in-ormaion was no ound because he ocial documen-aion did no provide even he mos basic o reporing

daa. Te lack o available inormaion in some documen-aion is a weakness o his research.Moreover, acceping ha he deciency o inorma-

ion wihin he ocial documens is a weakness o hisresearch also highlighs a weakness in he reporing pro-cesses o he UN and he EU. When analyzing he 23missions and when developing a new reorm model orcivilian police peacekeeping, he auhor drew no only onocial documens and records bu also on gahered in-ormaion rom a wide variey o sources, including in-erviews wih peacekeeping praciioners, governmenocials, and individuals specializing in inernaionalpolice issues. Tis addiional research was necessary be-cause o he gaps in daa rom he ocial documenaion.

Te sudy comprises hree pars. Par I ses he scene orhe sudy by discussing he role o civilian police in peace-keeping missions. Par II presens he 23 case sudies. Par IIIanalyzes he inormaion obained and covers he develop-men o a new reorm model or civilian police peacekeeping.



13

Chapter 2

Police in Peacekeeping

Police Involvement in Peacekeeping

Missions

Te rs deploymen o police ocers in a Unied Naions(UN) peacekeeping mission occurred in 1960, when a ci-

vilian police coningen was included in he UN orcesha were sen o suppress violence in he Congo. In heensuing 50 or so years, mos UN peacekeeping missionshave included civilian police ocers. As ime passed, he

role o civilian police in UN peacekeeping missions haschanged subsanially. In early missions, ha role wasypically limied o monioring general elecions, rain-ing local police, and providing securiy. In recen years,civilian police aciviies have included underaking pa-rols and developing he capaciy o he local police. Tis

broadening o he police peacekeeping role akes he po-lice ino unamiliar areas o sae building such as provid-ing assisance o develop sound governance, srenghendemocraic insiuions, and build governmen capaciy (Linden, Las, and Murphy, 2007).

Changes o peacekeeping missions began in he early 1990s, when he number and complexiy o asks as-signed o police grew dramaically. Tose changes can

be atribued o earlier police involvemen in peacekeep-ing or peacebuilding, which revealed he need or moremuliaceed and inrusive police componens in missionmandaes. Te signicance o eecively esablishing asense o public securiy and o developing local police

capabiliies was increasingly recognized wih each subse-quen policing mission.

Te bigges changes o ake place in recen imes oc-curred in 1999 wih he deploymen o police o wo new complex peacekeeping missions wih “execuive” man-daes: he Unied Naions Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)and he Unied Naions ransiional Adminisraion inEas imor (UNAE). Te police no only were di-recly responsible or public securiy wihin mission areas,

bu also became exensively involved in local governance.

As Cheserman (2004) noes, his new direcion meanha peacebuilding was saring o resemble saebuilding.

Tese progressive changes have culminaed (a) in ev-ery UN mission since 2003, including police aspecs hahave “ransormaional” mandaes o varying scope, and(b) in a number o laer missions ha give direc oper-aional assisance o police orces o mainain law andorder. Tis evoluion o UN policing in peace missionscan be described in erms o hree caegories o missionypes: radiional, ransormaional, and execuive. Tehree caegories are no muually exclusive, bu he com-

posiion caegories are useul or undersanding he di-eren roles perormed by civilian police in posconicsiuaions as well as undersanding he evoluion o po-lice involvemen in peacekeeping missions.

An analysis o he hree caegory mission ypes wasapplied o he 23 missions included in his research. Teidenicaion o he caegory o each mission was basedon he inormaion conained in he original mandae



14


and akes ino accoun any subsequen sraegic direc-ional change. able 2.1 presens an analysis o he ca-egories, he areas o responsibiliy, and he specic askso he 15 UN missions ha are included in his research.

All 8 o he European Union (EU) missions included inhis research are idenied as ransormaional.

Te UN has underaken many peacekeeping missions,alhough peacekeeping per se was no originally envis-aged as a uncion o he UN. Te UN Charer “does noexplicily menion he concep [n]or does i conain spe-cic provisions or peacekeeping operaions” (Bellamy,

Williams, and Grin, 2009, p. 46). A large number o ra-

diional peacekeeping missions ha were underaken by he UN beween 1948 and 1991 were esablished wih-ou reerence o Chaper VII o is Charer1 (Durch, Hol,Earle, and Shanahan, 2003). Since 1999, all complex op-eraions have been esablished in whole or in par underChaper VII (Durch e al., 2003).

1 Chaper VII o he UN Charer ses ou he UN Securiy Coun-cil’s powers o mainain peace. Te chaper allows he Council o “de-ermine he exisence o any hrea o he peace, breach o he peace,or ac o aggression” and o ake miliary and nonmiliary acion o“resore inernaional peace and securiy.”

Table 2.1. Analysis o the 15 UN Missions rom 1999 to 2007

Type o PolicingMission Category

Area o Responsibility Specic TasksNumber o UNDeployments

Traditional

Monitoring police or preparingor elections and limited train-ing, or providing guidance anddevelopment to local police,or both

Monitoring local police toensure compliance with peaceagreements and human rights

Reporting violations o peaceagreement

Providing limited training, guid-ance, and development to localpolice

0

Transormational

Reorming, restructuring, re-building, and developing localpolice

Knowing that more missionsinclude capacity developmento local police (may includesecurity or law enorcement)

Developing training material

Establishing police trainingacademies

Vetting prospective police

Designing internal processesand checks or police

Providing security

MIPONUH,MINUSTAH (Haiti)

UNMIBH (BiH)

UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL(Sierra Leone)

MONUC (DRC)

UNMIL (Liberia)

UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire)

ONUB (Burundi)

UNMIS, UNAMID(Sudan and Darur)

Executive

Providing primary law enorce-

ment (“Executive Authority”)Developing local law enorce-ment capacity and institutions

Providing law-and-order services

Conducting investigations andarresting oenders

Managing local police organiza-tional reorm and restructure

UNMIK (Kosovo)

UNTAET, UNMISET,UNMIT (Timor-Leste)

Source: Adaped rom Smih, Hol, and Durch (2007).




15

Te exclusion o peacekeeping rom he Charer hashad several dieren bu inerrelaed eecs on he devel-opmen o peacekeeping:

1. Peacekeeping has developed in response o paricu-lar crises in an ad hoc ashion.

2. Te key conceps o radiional peacekeeping—con-sen, imparialiy, and minimum use o orce—weredeveloped hrough pracice. As a resul, heir mean-ing is conesed and oen inerpreed dierenly inconemporaneous missions (Bellamy e al., 2009).

3. Member saes have reinerpreed he Charer’s provisions o sui he siuaion over ime (Bellamy e al.,2009).

4. Te srucure o he UN Deparmen o Peacekeep-

ing Operaions has evolved o mee he undamenalchanges in missions.

5. Te Peacekeeping Bes Pracices Uni was esab-lished in 2001 by merging he Lessons Learned andhe Policy Planning Unis.

Te developmen in he role o peacekeeping can also be seen in he change o orm and in he deail o he mis-sion’s mandae. Early mission mandaes were principally miliary ocused, and civilian police were minor acors.

When civilian policing was included in early UN mis-

sions, he Suppor, Monioring, Advising, eporing,and raining (SMA) concep was used in he mandaeimplemenaion process.

In comparison, civilian police in EU-auhorized peace-keeping operaions have always underaken a signicanrole. Te inclusion o civilian policing in UN missions

was seen as a v ial componen and signied a concepualchange in a mission’s sraegic srucure as compared ohe hisoric siuaion in which “civilian police issues wereypically more o an aerhough” (Greener, 2009, p. 2).

Te role o civilian police changed undamenally when police were graned execuive auhoriy duringUNMIK and UNAE in he lae 1990s. Tis sep wassignican because civilian police wihin a mission be-came responsible or local law enorcemen. However,since 1999, civilian police execuive auhoriy has be-come he sandard in mos UN missions.

Te role o civilian police peacekeeping missionschanged again in 2003 when hey increased in com-

plexiy. Te reason or he increased complexiy was heinclusion o rebuilding he capaciy o local criminal jus-ice secors as par o mission mandaes (Smih e al.,2007).

According o Holm and Eide (2000, p. 3), he new generaion o “peace operaions [is] more abou man-aging change han abou reurning o some saus quo.”Such operaions are no longer only abou miliary in-ervenion and he esablishmen o public securiy, buare also abou poliical engineering and sae building(Durch, 2006), which can include police reorm.

Te reorm o indigenous police has been included inhe sae-building componen o missions since he mid-1990s. However, here is litle empirical undersanding o

wha he appropriae applicaion (Druckman and Sern,

1997) o police reorm is, wha i should include, andhow i should be underaken. Tere is also litle under-sanding abou wha a mission can accomplish or how oassess wheher a mission has achieved is goals (Druck-man and Sern, 1997).

The Changing Police Role

in Peacekeeping

In he radiional or rs generaion (Broer and Emery,

2002) peacekeeping missions, UN civilian police per-sonnel were resriced o he provision o SMA asks wih he role cenering primarily on relaionships wihhe local police and populaion. Following he conu-sion in he 1990s and as inrasae conics became morecomplex, he value o including civilian police as a un-damenal componen o peacekeeping missions began o

be recognized (Greener, 2009) and was increasingly seenas an essenial componen in he reconsrucion o pos-conic naions.

As he peacekeeping environmen changed, he role o he police also changed. Te role o civi lian police in mod-ern peacekeeping missions evolved rom one o providingpublic securiy and condence building—alhough hoseremain primary goals—o one o providing an environ-men ha enables he communiy o commence rebuild-ing. Te manner in which inernaional civilian policeprovide assisance o local police has also evolved “rom

being a echnical issue o an ideologically specic se o



16


objecives and aciviies: namely, police reorm” (Hills,2009, p. 74) ha was based on heir experience in peace-keeping operaions during he lae 1980s and early 1990s.

I was during his period ha civilian police ougrew

he SMA concep and ha peacekeeping operaionsrevealed he need or more muliaceed police compo-nens wihin mission mandaes (Smih e al., 2007). Inmany siuaions, civilian police were already pushing he

boundaries o he SMA concep and were blurring hedisincions beween monioring and perorming law en-orcemen. Tose are he reasons ha execuive policingemerged in 1999 (Dwan, 2002).

Te SMA concep had been applied during he1990s wihou signican rehinking (Dwan, 2002) indiverse peace missions in Arica, Asia, Europe, and Lain

America. Alhough SMA sill ormed he core asksor civilian police, he role o he civilian police was ex-panded in he hree UN ransiional missions o UN-MIBH, UNMIK, and UNAE o include he sevencriical roles as noed by McFarlane and Maley (2001)and Bellamy e al. (2009):

1. Esablish a sable and secure environmen.2. Dismanle he ormer srucures o oppression and

violen conic.3. Build and mainain an eecive apparaus o law en-

orcemen and criminal invesigaion.4. Selec and rain new members o an indigenous po-lice orce.

5. Invesigae and prosecue alleged human righsabuses.

6. Assis he cours in reesablishing a criminal jusicesysem.

7. Build condence hrough communiy involvemen.

All hose acions aken by civilian police culminaedin creaing a secure environmen and providing a ounda-ion or he public o resume normalcy. I is his view haplaces he reorm o he local police ollowing conic asa par o he securiy secor reorm (SS) approach osabilizaion.

A suble change in police involvemen in modernpeacekeeping has occurred, principally in he orm o de-ploymen since UNMIK and UNAE. Alhough civil-ian police, who underake general policing duies, sill

orm a signican number o he police deployed on amission, hey are rapidly being overaken by ormed po-lice unis (FPUs). FPUs are dened as “cohesive mobilepolice unis” (Bruno, 2007). Tose unis are civilian po-

lice in mos insances, bu unis o a semimiliary ori-gin have oen been deployed as conained, sel-reliancompanies, and hey are capable o lling he securiy gap wihin deploymens (Bruno, 2007; Deparmen o Peacekeeping Operaions, 2010). However, here is dis-sen abou wheher FPUs porray a democraic image and

wheher hey are able o underake communiy-policingduies (Pino and Wiarowski, 2006).

Alhough he role o police wihin peacekeeping mis-sions appears o be mauring, here is very litle under-sanding o wha policing enails, wha he role o police

should be, or wha inuence police have in posconicnaions. Mos available lieraure concenraes on hemiliary role in peacekeeping and posconic siuaions,

while litle lieraure is available on he role o police andpolicing in posconic naions.

According o Greener (2009, p. 112), he miliary prevalence in peacekeeping has arisen simply becausepeacekeeping missions have hisorically been miliary missions and “emphasis has ended o res wih planninghe miliary par o peace missions, [and] no enoughhough [has been] given o wha will happen aer he

immediae securiy pause.” Whaever civilian policepeacekeeping lieraure is available ocuses on he use o Wesern policing models, while indigenous orms o po-licing are oally ignored (Hills, 2009).

Te ailure o undersand he role o he police inposconic siuaions canno be remedied by examin-ing exising deniions o peacekeeping operaions. As

Jet (1999) noes, he majoriy o published deniionsare broad and could be applied o any conic. Nor dohe deniions ideniy wha is o be accomplished. How-ever, in 1992, he hen-UN Secreary-General BourosBouros-Ghali atemped o sandardize he sraegicramework o peacekeeping missions by describing ourdieren ypes o peace-associaed operaions: preven-ive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-

building (Durch e al., 2003; Jet, 1999).Lewis (1994) laer exended his ramework o in-

clude ve disinc ypes o operaions: peacemaking,peacekeeping, peace enorcemen, peacebuilding, and





18


lihood ha police may have been involved in or were oneo he causes o he conic.

Police reorm is imporan in a posconic sociey. I reorm is no underaken, he police could become a li-

abiliy and an obsacle o rebuilding civil sociey eorsand o democraic governance. Furhermore, “police ac-iviy can have a proound inuence on he vialiy o heprocesses ha are essenial o democraic poliical lie”(Bayley, 2006, p. 18). Srenghening he rule o law andreducing crime “are muli-aceed endeavours ha go

well beyond he capabiliies o police orces o inuence”(Call, 2003, p. 4). Police are only one agency wihin hecriminal jusice secor, and improving he perormance o he police will require esablishing relaionships and en-hancing he capabiliies o oher sae insiuions.

Inernaional police reorm or capaciy developmenin posconic naions usually evolves rom peacekeepingoperaions (as in he Democraic epublic o Congo andimor-Lese) or as par o a broader naionbuilding orsaebuilding program, which may include “agency-specicand secor-wide insiuional srenghening aciviies ha[have been] collecively designed o srenghen he sae”(McLeod, 2009, p. 149) as in Iraq and Aghanisan. Po-lice reorm programs are exernally applied iniiaives harange rom projecs o resoring ailed or dysuncionallocal policing insiuions (Sierra Leone, imor-Lese) o

less comprehensive programs ha arge he develop-men o specic skills, such as criminal invesigaions andraining (EUPOL COPPS) (McLeod, 2009).

Alhough policy and academic communiies havesough o dene police reorm, litle heory has been de-

veloped wih respec o reorming he roles o police andheir uncions in posconic naions and even less onhow o implemen any proposed reorm program (Call,2003; Pino and Wiarowski, 2006). Te majoriy o liera-ure ha examines police capaciy developmen discusseshe issue in general erms and is characerized by universalpercepions abou bes pracice and lessons learned raherhan being based on acceped heory and processes.

As Bayley (1995, 2006) discussed, here is much debae, enerprise, diculy, and uncerainy abou how oreorm and democraize police in counries ha have ex-perienced ransiions rom auhoriarian, oaliarian, andoppressive orms o governance o democracy. Te lack o a shared deniion and undersanding means ha plan-

ners, policy makers, and praciioners have no expliciknowledge on how o reorm police agencies or how omeasure he success o he reorm programs ha have

been implemened. Because o his lack o knowledge, po-

lice reorms in posconic naions are based on oreignpolicing models and experiences ha do no usually akeino accoun he local culure and conex. Tis problemis exacerbaed by he number o naional police ocers

who are deployed o posconic naions o assis wihhe reorm o he police and who ineviably replicae heirown undersanding and use o Wesern policing models.

Te evaluaion o specic police reorm programs re-quires diereniaion beween a number o alernaiveperspecives, including human righs, miliary, law en-orcemen, economic, and democraizaion (Call, 2003).

Te wo main goals o police reorm in posconic na-ions are eeciveness and accounabiliy o he local po-lice orces (Call, 2003). Anoher major goal is capaciy developmen, bu i is only one aspec o posconic po-lice reorm. An inervenion program requires a hor-oughly sysemaic approach o he capaciy-buildinginiiaive o ensure ha a desired and susainable individ-ual and organizaional change akes place. Te capaciy-

building program should provide a ramework o assis inhe reorm o he police o enhance heir accounabiliy and ransparency. Tis ramework will enable he local po-

lice o achieve heir goals ecienly and eecively. Suchan approach exends beyond providing echnical assis-ance direcly o he police and mus be rmly connecedo he whole ramework process or governmen reorm.

Te problem o measuring police perormance in aposconic siuaion is inherenly dicul because o poorqualiy daa and insucien resources. Tose decienciesrender impossible mos saisical echniques or evalu-aing organizaional perormance (Bajrakari, Bouellis,Gunja, Harris, Kapsis, Kaye, and hee, 2006). Frameworksshould be designed o deliver eecive reorm and develop-men programs ha will assis he police in increasing heecacy and eeciveness o specic program inervenionsand iniiaives ha conribue o susainable capaciy de-

velopmen (Wing, 2004).Given he uncerainies in designing, implemening,

and measuring police reorm and capaciy developmenprograms in a posconic siuaion, i would be errone-ous o recommend only one evaluaion ramework or




19

model. Te ransormaional period during he police re-orm posconic provides a unique opporuniy or re-searchers o examine wha he role o police ocers is,how he agency changes wihin such siuaions, and how

police ransorm during democraic consolidaion. Tissudy will allow he heory o be expanded.

Tis projec will atemp o ll he vacuum ha cur-renly exiss in relaion o he role o civilian police de-ployed on assisance missions, and i will build on he

body o knowledge abou reorming and democraizingpolice in posconic counries or counries ha are inransiion rom auhoriarian governance. Te link be-ween he reorms and he service delivery o he police

will also be examined as a pracical model ha will assisin dening ways o rebuild racured police agencies pos-

conic and in highlighing how police services should bedelivered in hose naions.

Policing and Security Sector Reorm

SS is a concep ha was developed in Europe in he1990s and is used o reorm or rebuild a sae’s securiy secor. SS can also be viewed as a branch o human orpersonal securiy, which is he reason civilian police re-orm has been included wihin is parameers. However,

viewing posconic police reorms wihin he conex o SS porrays “he diculies and opporuniies or re-orms in a dieren ligh raher han [wha a] ocus on hepolice alone provides” (Marenin, 2005, p. 17). SS iden-ies civilian police as a componen o he wider securiy secor and considers police reorm as a process raherhan an oucome.

Wheher indigenous police reorm and developmenshould be included in an SS program is quesionable.Civilian police reorm has been viewed rom wo perspec-ives: wheher civilian police are par o he securiy sec-or or par o he jusice secor. Whaever perspecive isaken can inuence he sraegic dimension and approach

o he proposed reorm program. Te SS perspecive isa more bureaucraic or insiuional approach, while he

jusice secor perspecive is more communiy ocused.Te consrucs o SS mean ha i canno become

he caalys or democraic change, bu i can aec heprocesses ha are adoped posconic o reorm he lo-cal police. Te reorm o he indigenous police will beincluded in he wider reorm o he local securiy secor.Tis inclusion means ha he role o inernaional civilianpolice will expand o reec he broader noion o secu-riy, and he role o he local police will also expand.

Including police wihin he scope o SS means hapolicing is viewed a he “high end” and ha i is accepedha policing is more abou law enorcemen han abouproviding services or mainaining public order. Alhough

policing is par o he governance o securiy (Marenin,2005), i is more abou he promoion o he communiy and o democraic values. Te debae abou wheher po-lice or policing is par o SS will no be deermined by urher explanaion o SS , because i requires a more in-deph undersanding o police, police reorms, and heprocesses ha he police use in boh a Wesern naionand a posconic naion conex.

Tere is no universal undersanding o he purpose o he police as an insiuion, and as a resul, “[a]mbiiousclaims are regularly made on behal o police reorm”

(Hills, 2009, p. 64). Because o his misundersandingabou he role o police and policing, he curren reormprocesses and models o local police in posconic na-ions are in conusion. Policy makers and praciionershave misconcepions abou wha is required posconico develop and implemen susainable police reorms inlocal police.

Par II conains case sudies ha place an emphasison he process o evaluaing civilian police involvemenin 23 peacekeeping missions in ragile, ransiional, orposconic siuaions. I is hoped ha he process will beone sep closer o esablishing a mehodology or under-sanding police reorm in posconic naions.





Part II

Mission Case Studies







24


1. Background o he mission2. Mandae o he mission3. Mission deploymen environmen4. Acions o he mission (oupu)

5. Mission implemenaion (model)6. Mission achievemens (oucomes)7. Ways he mission was evaluaed

Exploring the Analysis o the Case

Study Missions

Te examinaion o he 23 mission case sudies ideniesa number o similariies beween and across he missionsrom 1999 o 2007. Te similariies include he ollowing:

• Many posconic counries had more han one ailedpeace agreemen beore he mission was deployed.

• Excep or he European Union Police Advisor y eamin he Former Yugoslav epublic o Macedonia, all o he missions’ mandaes were exended.

• All missions included some orm o raining.• Governing bodies, oen comprising local ocials,

were esablished o oversee he reorm program.• Local governmen or police displayed passive resis-

ance in implemening reorms.

Te brie analysis o he case sudies highlighs ha—alhough here are a number o similariies in missionapproaches and heir mandaes—here is signican vari-aion in he abiliy o he inernaional communiy o de-sign and implemen eecive reorm programs. As will bediscussed in par II, his mission variaion is compounded

by he signican variaion in he indigenous police’s abil-iy o absorb raining and o reorm.

Wha does he analysis o each o he case sudies sug-

ges abou overall eors o reconsruc or reorm he lo-cal police? In paricular, which counries experienced animprovemen in he perormance o he local police ol-lowing he reconsrucion eors? By analyzing he casesudies in more deph, we atemp o answer hose ques-ions in par III, chaper 17.



25

Chapter 4

Aghanistan

Map 4.1. AghanistanSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.







28


European Union, 2007e). However, he number o mis-sion personnel doubled progressively rom December2008 o approximaely 400 sa members o allow hemission, on he basis o a renewed mandae, o reinorce is

aciviies in suppor o he Aghan naional police (Com-mon Securiy and Deence Policy European Union, 2010).

Te mission relied exensively on he creaion o par-nerships, especially wih he inernaional communiy, oenhance Aghan ownership o reorms. In conjuncion

wih he Inernaional Police Co-ordinaion Board(IPCB), he mission consolidaed is sraegic prioriiesalong hese six objecives: inelligence-led policing; policechain o command, conrol, and communicaion; criminalinvesigaion; anicorrupion; police–prosecuor links;and human righs and gender mainsreaming wihin he

Aghan police orce (Council o he European Union,2007a). Implemenaion o hose objecives ensured heconinuing progress o he mission a he sraegic, opera-ional, and acical levels (Council o he EuropeanUnion, 2009d).

Mission Achievements (Outcomes)

Alhough progress has been made in some areas o policereorm, reconsrucion eors have no minimized secu-

riy hreas o he counry. Jones e al. (2005) noe hawo o he reasons or he coninuing securiy hrea areha he police-o-populaion raio is low and ha he re-consrucion o he jusice secor has aken place only inhe capial region. Te oher reasons noed by Greener(2009) include conicing approaches o reorm by do-nor counries, lack o reorm eors direced a he judi-cial secor, and ehical and proessional issues wihin he

Aghanisan Naion Police (ANP).Te mission provided he environmen or he reorm

o he local police, which would ensure ha he police were progressing oward respecing human righs and de-livering heir services wihin he ramework o he rule o law. Te mission was pivoal in he provision o supporo he Aghan jusice secor by (a) srenghening hecriminal invesigaion sysem, (b) esablishing inelligence-led policing, (c) implemening an anicorrupion sraegy,and (d) improving he role o police in securing Kabuland Hera. Tis model o securiy policing was also o be

inroduced in oher key ciies, such as Kandahar andMazar-e-Shari (Common Securiy and Deence Policy European Union, 2010).

EUPOL Aghanisan is inuenial in developing rela-

ionships wih he wider rule o law secor and in conducingseveral “rain-he-rainers” raining programs hroughou

Aghanisan. Te mission also provided criminal invesi-gaion services and delivered raining on he handling o acrime scene o Aghan Police Invesigaors (Common Se-curiy and Deence Policy European Union, 2010).

Ways the Mission Was Evaluated

Te Council o he European Union noed during is Ex-

ernal elaions Council Meeing in 2008 ha alhoughhe EUPOL Aghanisan had experienced a number o achievemens, challenges sill remained. Te challengesha remained were mainly in he “areas o developmenand governance, and he underlying acors, noably cor-rupion and a lack o securiy—wih narcoics beinglinked o boh—coninue o undermine he uncioningo he Governmen o Aghanisan” (Council o he Euro-pean Union, 2008a).

Te EU approach o hose challenges was o doublehe original number o expers working in he mission

wih he view ha his approach would provide an impor-an addiional capaciy o assis wih key police reorm is-sues (Council o he European Union, 2008a). However,he mission emphasized ha reorming a police orce a asraegic and operaional level required long-erm plan-ning and communicaion beween sakeholders, wih allparies paricipaing in a phased implemenaion (Euro-pean Mission in Aghanisan, 2008). As a resul o heserequiremens, and “due o he challenging operaionalenvironmen, horough preparaion, imely planning,prior ull operaional capabiliy and coninued conribu-ion o high-calibre sa are essenial” (Council o he Eu-ropean Union, 2008a).

Conclusion

Te mission was esablished aer six years o war, which was he resul o a U.S.-led invasion ollowing he 9/11 er-







31

Chapter 5


Map 5.1. Bosnia and HerzegovinaSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.



32


Case Study: United Nations Mission

in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Background to the Mission

Te breakup o Yugoslavia and he end o he Cold War were he major acors leading o he war in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Tere is some debae as o wheher he warin 1992–95 was inersae or inrasae. Te war was ex-remely violen and principally argeed civilians. Morehan 200,000 people were esimaed o have been killedand more han 1.2 million people displaced (UniedNaions, 2010d). Te conic was also very complex as

i involved a number o dieren acors who requenly changed heir objecives and heir allegiances, leaving alegacy o hared and widespread ear o reribuion.

Fighing ceased on Ocober 11, 1995, and war was brough o a ormal end aer he General Framework Agreemen or Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP) was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Tis agree-men was made up o 11 annexes and covered a broadrange o issues including he esablishmen o an inerna-ional police ask orce (IPF). Following he signing o he GFAP, peace negoiaions were held in Dayon, Ohio,

and were made nal on December 21, 1995 (Unied Na-ions, 2010d). Tose accords laer became known as heDayon Agreemen.

Te Unied Naions Proecion Force (UNPOFO) was deployed rom Ocober 11 o December 20, 1995,o monior he cease-re agreemen. A Unied Naions(UN) police reconnaissance mission, which was madeup o he curren and wo previous UN police orce com-missioners and a member o he UN Deparmen o Peacekeeping Operaions, raveled o Bosnia and Her-zegovina o plan or he proposed civilian police deploy-men (Unied Naions, 2010d).

On December 15, 1995, he Norh Alanic reay Organizaion (NAO), on he basis o he UN Secu-riy Council esoluion 1031 (Unied Naions, 1995a),

was given he mandae o implemen he miliary as-pecs o GFAP and o endorse he esablishmen o hemulinaional implemenaion orce (IFO) or abou12 monhs. IFO was he larges miliary mission un-

deraken by he Wesern Naions Alliance and replacedUNPOFO on December 20, 1995, as Operaion JoinEndeavour (NAO, 2010a). IFO was isel replaced by he mulinaional sabilizaion orce (SFO) in Decem-

ber 1996.

Mandate o the Mission

Te UN Securiy Council adoped wo resoluions haesablished he Unied Naions Mission in Bosnia andHerzegovina (UNMIBH), iniially or one year. Te rs,esoluion 1031 (Unied Naions, 1995a) was passedDecember 13, 1995, and he second, esoluion 1035(Unied Naions, 1995b) was passed December 21, 1995.

Tis mission comprised wo principal componens:he IPF and he UN civilian oce (Unied Naions,2010a), which exercised a wide range o uncions harelaed o law enorcemen and police reorm (UniedNaions, 1995b). Te mission was nonexecuive and waso have an auhorized srengh o 1,721 unarmed civilianpolice ocers and 5 miliary liaison ocers. Te mission

was o have a naionwide presence. I was o esablish re-gional headquarers in Banja Luka, Bihać, Doboj, Mosar,Sarajevo, and uzla and a disric headquarers in Brčko(Unied Naions, 2010a).

UNMIBH’s mandae was airly generic and relaed ohe welare o reugees, humaniarian relie, demining,human righs, elecions and rehabiliaion o inrasruc-ure, and economic reconsrucion. Te mission was oconribue o esablishing he rule o law in Bosnia andHerzegovina by helping reorm and resrucure he lo-cal police. Tis goal was o be achieved by assessing how he exising judicial sysem uncioned and by monior-ing and audiing he perormance o he police and oheragencies ha were involved in he mainenance o law and order (Unied Naions, 2010a).

As suggesed by he Unied Naions (1995a), heIPF’s asks, in accordance wih he GFAP, were morespecic and included he ollowing:

• Monior, observe, and inspec law enorcemen ac-iviies and aciliies, including associaed judicial or-ganizaions, srucures, and proceedings.

• Advise law enorcemen personnel and orces.




33

• rain law enorcemen personnel.• Faciliae law enorcemen aciviies.• Assess hreas o public order and advise on he capa-

biliy o law enorcemen agencies o deal wih such

hreas.• Advise governmen auhoriies abou he organiza-

ion o eecive civilian law enorcemen agencies.• Assis by accompanying law enorcemen personnel

as hey carry ou heir responsibiliies.• Consider requess or assisance rom local law en-

orcemen agencies, wih prioriy given o agenciesha need o ensure ree and air elecions and haneed o proec inernaional personnel presen be-cause o he elecions.

Over ime, as he mission evolved and he counry became more sable, he UN Securiy Council added anumber o specic asks and responsibiliies o he orig-inal mandae o UNMIBH. Tose asks included heollowing:

• Underake invesigaions o allegaions o humanrighs abuses by police (Unied Naions, 1996e).

• Increase he mission by 186 civilian police who would specically assis wih he monioring, re-srucuring, and reraining o he police in he Brčko

area (Unied Naions, 1997e).• Increase he mission by 120 civilian police ha would

increase he mission’s capabiliy in invesigaing hu-man righs, monioring local police, srengheningpolice raining, resrucuring police adminisraion,and developing guidelines or democraic principles(Unied Naions, 1997).

• Creae specialized raining unis o (a) address key public securiy issues such as reugee reurns; orga-nized crime, drugs, corrupion, and errorism; andpublic securiy crisis managemen (including crowdconrol); (b) deec nancial crime and smuggling;and (c) assis in a program o judicial and legal re-orms, including assessing and monioring he coursysem, developing and raining legal proessionals,and resrucuring insiuions in he judicial sysem(Unied Naions, 1997i).

• Increase he mission by 30 civilian police person-nel o carry ou new inensive programs or he local

police in a number o specialized elds (Unied Na-ions, 1998k).

• Assis in a program o monior and assess he coursysem as par o an overall program o legal reorm

(Unied Naions, 1998n).

Mission Deployment Environment

When he war ended, hree issues o concern or hemission were creaed. Te rs area o concern was henumber o demobilized soldiers who would become un-employed and migh urn o crime or seek revenge orlos amily members and propery. Te second area o concern was he large number o highly powered weap-

ons ha would be available a he end o he hosiliies because o he demobilizaion o he miliary.

Te hird issue perained o he Bosnia and Herzegov-ina police. As a resul o he war, he number o policeocers in he counry was more han 44,000, which washree imes he prewar srengh. O ha number, morehan 32,000 were deployed in he Federaion o Bosniaand Herzegovina (he Federaion) and 12,000 in he e-publika Srpska–conrolled area (Unied Naions, 1995a).

Te Bosnia and Herzegovina police orce was nosuied o underake civilian law enorcemen duies be-

cause i was poliically dominaed and had a hisory o corrupion. Te police orce consised o a single ehnic-iy and was organized along paramiliary lines in hreeparallel srucures (Unied Naions, 1995a). Tis nega-ive securiy siuaion was reinorced by members o hepolice harassing and inimidaing ciizens no o heirown ehniciy and by he esablishmen o checkpoinsha resriced ravel beween communiies. As a resul,he police ailed o provide he populaion wih any senseo securiy.

Actions o the Mission (Output)

Wihin he highly volaile seting o Bosnia and Herze-govina, he UNMIBH’s main objecive was o providecivilians wih a sense o securiy by creaing a sable en-

vironmen. Sabiliy was o be achieved hrough he pres-ence and he join parolling o local police wih IPF



34


ocers and by changing he primary ocus o he localpolice rom he securiy o he sae o he securiy o heindividual (Unied Naions, 2010a).

Te IPF was charged wih monioring all o he ac-

iviies o he Federaion Police Force and he epublikaSrpska Police. Te IPF was o inroduce he principleso democraic policing o hese police orces by leading

by example (Unied Naions, 1996c). Iniially, he IPF’smajor responsibiliy was o help plan he reducion o,he resrucuring o, and he raining o local police. Tecomposiion o he police orce needed o be changedrom he overrepresened ehnic groups and war-periodnumbers o he maximum numbers se by he resrucur-ing agreemens wih he Federaion and he epublikaSrpska. Tis process was o be achieved by he IPF in

cooperaion wih he Federaion wihin a imeline ha was agreed o on April 26, 1996. I provided he guidanceo reduce he number o uniormed ocers rom morehan 20,000 o a maximum o 11,500. During his period,he epublika Srpska’s governmen agreed o (a) heIPF saemen o inernaionally acceped principles orpolicing in a democraic sae, (b) he relaed operaionalsandards o policing, and (c) a new code o conduc orpolice ocers. However, he governmen did no agree odownsize is own police orce (Unied Naions, 1996b).No unil 1998 did he epublika Srpska agree o resruc-

ure and downsize he police (Unied Naions, 2010a). As he immediae posconic crisis began o dimin-ish, he IPF sared o address he broader issues o hemandae, which would lay he oundaions or uure po-lice reorm in boh eniies. Te IPF began a compre-hensive raining, resrucuring, and veting program orselecion and recruimen, and i inroduced communiy policing ino a number o areas. Te IPF also inroduceda program ino schools ha was designed o educae su-dens a all levels in heir civic duies and he principles o democraic policing (Unied Naions, 1996c).

Tis approach was suppored by placing IPF advis-ers in he canonal and eniy inerior minisries, publicsecuriy ceners, and police saions, which enabled closermonioring o he aciviies o local bureaucras. IPF ad-

visers were deployed o 5 regional police headquarers,17 cenral police disrics, and 109 police saions. Tisarrangemen permited monioring, observing, and in-specing law enorcemen aciviies and aciliies and

resuled in a raio o 1 IPF ocer o 30 local police o-cers (Unied Naions, 2010a). Te deploymen o IPFadvisers wihin he canonal and eniy inerior minisriesalso allowed or progress in inegraing he Federaion’s

Minisry o Inerior ino he new police srucure, and inesablishing he Federaion Police Academy in Sarajevo.Tis change creaed he environmen o complee he ne-goiaions and o reach an agreemen on he insallaiono a ully unied Federaion police organizaion on June6, 1997 (Unied Naions, 1997a).

Te IPF was exensively involved in recruiing, se-lecing, raining, and deploying police cades rom un-derrepresened ehnic and gender groups, as well as inencouraging he reurn and he ranser o experienced o-cers. Te ask orce provided basic raining, ransiional

raining, and advanced raining courses or command andsenior ocers o he Federaion and he epublika Srpska.

Aer he UN Securiy Council esoluion 1144 (UniedNaions, 1997i), he IPF also provided specic special-ized raining in organized crime, drugs and crowd conrol,and major inciden managemen (Unied Naions, 2010a).

Te IPF provided operaional and acical advice olocal police, which included advice on invesigaing spe-cial cases and improving he day-o-day lives o residens.For example, he IPF advised he local police on how oesablish road checkpoins ha would ease civilian move-

men. I also aced as liaison beween he populaion andhe police orces o he Federaion and he epublikaSrpska (Unied Naions, 1997a).

o ensure ha he IPF approach creaed a muliehnic,proessional, and eecive police orce, he role o he ask orce expanded rom resrucuring and reorming he min-isries o inerior and he police orces o he wo eniieso providing advice on esablishing and raining he courpolice and he Sae Border Service (SBS). However, heIPF acceped he reorm program more slowly han had

been iniially anicipaed. Tis delay was mainly caused by poliical dispues beween he eniies and disagreemensabou, or example, he ype and design o police idenica-ion cards ha would be issued o he resrucured Federa-ion police orce (Unied Naions, 1996c).

By lae 1999, he securiy environmen had sabilized,and displaced persons were able o reurn o heir prewarhomes. A his ime, he IPF realized ha esablishingsusainable police reorm and resrucuring he police




















43

in is aciviies o address “he whole range o ule o Law aspecs, including insiuion building programmes andpolice aciviies which should be muually supporive andreinorcing” (Council o he European Union, 2002).

Te mission was based on he general objecives o Annex 11 o he Dayon Agreemen. Ta agreemen wasdesigned o esablish susainable policing arrangemensunder Bosnia and Herzegovina ownership in accor-dance wih bes European and inernaional pracice andhereby raise he curren sandards o he Bosnia and Her-zegovina police. Te council envisaged ha he EUPM

would no hold execuive powers or deploy an armedcomponen. Insead, he EUPM would be enrused wihhe necessary auhoriy o monior, menor, and inspeche indigenous police, and i should achieve is goals by

he end o 2005 (Council o he European Union, 2002).o ensure ha here was a seamless ransiion rom

he IPF o he proposed EUPM, he council auho-rized a planning eam o be esablished o develop hemission rom April 1 o December 31, 2002. Te councilalso proposed ha he EUPM’s headquarers would bein Sarajevo and ha an iniial 24 monioring unis would

be co-locaed wihin he “[p]olice srucures a [he]medium-high level, including wihin eniies, Public Se-curiy Cenres, canons, [he] Sae Inelligence Proec-ion Agency, [he] Sae Border Services and wihin he

Brčko disric” (Council o he European Union, 2002).Te EUPM mission saemen deailed he objeciveso he mission. According o he Council o he EuropeanUnion (2002), he EUPM was o do he ollowing:

• Preserve, hrough coninuiy wih he achievemenso he IPF mission, he exising levels o insiu-ional and personal prociency.

• Enhance, hrough monioring, menoring, and in-specing, he police managerial and operaional ca-paciies hrough specic ocus o delegaion o powerand qualiy-oriened managemen principles, as wellas improving he operaional planning capaciy hais based on analysis.

• Srenghen proessionalism a he sraegic and se-nior ocer level wihin he minisry o ineriorhrough advisory and inspecion uncions.

• Monior he exercise o appropriae poliical conrolover he police.

Te Council o he European Union (2002) describeshe objecives o he mission saemen ha esablishedhe operaional-level ramework by which he EUPM waso ensure ha members o he Bosnia and Herzegovina

police orce would do he ollowing:

• Ac in a proessional manner and in accordance wihrelevan legislaion and regulaions.

• Be ree o naional governmen poliical inererenceand be led by apoliical, qualied, and accounablepersonnel.

• Possess he inegriy, knowledge, and means o perormheir duies in a ransparen and objecive manner.

• Adop a proessional culure a minisries and a hesenior police ocer level ha would be based on a air,

ransparen, and accounable sysem o inernal man-agemen, including he exercise o inernal conrolsand disciplinary procedures o he highes sandard.

• Ensure ha managemen pracices are carried ouhrough air and imparial personnel policies or re-cruimen, raining, specializaion, promoion, anddiscipline.

• Be based on a ransparen srucure ha considershe muliple ehnic composiion o he sociey andha deals saisacorily wih gender-relaed issues.

• Manage personnel and resources eecively wihin an

aordable and appropriae insiuional ramework.• Sandardize daa recording and analysis sysems o a-

ciliae inormaion sharing or operaional planningand invesigaions wih a view o promoing a crimesaisics sysem or all o Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• Develop police cooperaion among all Bosnia andHerzegovina police orces, including a inereniy and inercanon levels (or example, building sruc-ures or coordinaion, exchange o inormaion, andcondence building).

• Underake criminal invesigaions o major corrup-ion cases regardless o poliical implicaions and heperson involved.

• Be capable o invesigaing and counering he ullrange o criminal aciviies, including organizedcrime and errorism wih a sae-level capabiliy ororming an eecive par o he adminisraion o jus-ice, cooperaing closely wih he prosecuion, andoperaing wihin a reormed criminal jusice sysem.







46


kaie, 2006, p. 63). Furhermore, he aim o he EUPM in-ervenions was o achieve he our sraegic objecives ha

were saed earlier. Tose our sraegic objecives were developed ino seven program implemenaion plans (PIPs),

which were subsequenly used o orm he basis or heramework o monior and menor he SIPA.

Mission Achievements (Outcome)

Te EUPM made considerable achievemens in develop-ing susainable policing arrangemens in Bosnia and Herze-govina, including he ollowing (Unied Naions, 2005a):

• ransormaion o he SIPA ino an operaional po-

lice agency wih enhanced execuive powers o ghorganized crime and corrupion

• Solid developmen o oher sae-level insiuions,in paricular he MoS and he SBS


Te mission made measurable progress in srengheninghe sae-level law enorcemen agencies o Bosnia andHerzegovina. Te mission achieved a susainable level

o delivering local police services, and i successully en-couraged local ownership o he reorm process. As hemission enered he nal sages o is mandae, i was wellplaced in parnership wih he local auhoriies “o com-plee is prime direcive and o leave in place susainable

and eecive policing arrangemens in Bosnia and Herze-govina ha are in line wih he bes European pracices.”Te proessionalizaion o he Bosnia and Herzegovinapolice orces will ake several years o complee. Wih he

mandae o EUPM ending on December 31, 2005, con-sideraion should be given as o how bes suppor heurher developmen o he local police o Bosnia andHerzegovina (Unied Naions, 2005a).

Conclusion

Tere has been a series o EUPM missions since Janu-ary 1, 2003. Te rs EUPM, reerred o as EUPM I,

was auhorized or an iniial period o hree years and

was he rs mission launched under he European Secu-riy and Deence Policy. Following an inviaion by heBosnia and Herzegovina auhoriies on he expiry o EUPM’s mandae in December 2005, he EU decided oconinue he mission wih a modied mandae and wiha reduced number o police ocers. Te laes EUPMmandae was exended unil December 31, 2011.

Te EUPM was a higher-level mission han ha un-deraken by he UNMIBH. Te EUPM ocused primar-ily on medium-erm capaciy-building projecs. As noed

by J. J. D. (Paddy) Ashdown, he ormer high represen-

aive o Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003), he EUPMpeacebuilding aciviies were possibly more shaped by he prospec o Bosnia’s inegraion ino he EU (and heNorh Alana reay Organizaion) han by he risk o descen back ino civil war.



47

Chapter 6

Republic o Burundi

Map 6.1. BurundiSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.



48


Case Study: United Nations

Operation in Burundi


Te Burundi Civil War, an armed conic ha lased or13 years (beween 1993 and 2005), was based on long-sanding ehnic divisions beween he Huu and usiribes. Te conic began Ocober 21, 1993, when mem-

bers o he usi ribe assassinaed he rs democrai-cally eleced presiden since independence was gainedrom Belgium in 1962 (Unied Naions, 2004ac). As aresul o he assassinaion, violence broke ou beweenhe wo ribes, leading o an esimaed 300,000 aaliies

in Burundi and o he 1994 mass murder o an esimaed800,000 people in he neighboring naion o wanda.

Te conic coninued unil Nelson Mandela, hepresiden o Souh Arica, aciliaed cease-re alks inanzania in 2000. Ta meeing, known as he Arushaalks, closed on November 30, 2000, wih litle progressmade (Unied Naions, 2004ab). A a summi o Aricanleaders in anzania in November 2003, he presideno Burundi signed a cease-re agreemen wih he mainHuu rebel group, which was known as he NaionalCouncil or Deense o Democracy–Forces or he De-

ense o Democracy (CNDD–FDD) (Unied Naions,2004o). Te CNDD–FDD became a poliical pary aersigning he agreemen, and he rebel Huu miliia becameinegraed ino he predominanly usi armed orces(Unied Naions, 2004ac).

By early 2005, many developmens had been made inhe peace process. Te Burundi presiden agreed o esab-lish a new army, and voers approved a new consiuionin a naional reerendum (Unied Naions, 2010k).

Mandate o the Mission Aer deermining ha he siuaion in Burundi conin-ued o consiue a hrea o inernaional peace and se-curiy in he region, he Unied Naions (UN) Securiy Council adoped esoluion 1545, which esablishedhe Unied Naions Operaion in Burundi (ONUB) oran iniial period o six monhs (Unied Naions, 2004ac).

Te mission was esablished o “suppor and help o im-plemen he eors underaken by Burundians o resorelasing peace and bring abou naional reconciliaion,as provided under he Arusha Agreemen” (Unied Na-

ions, 2010k).Te UN Securiy Council auhorized he mission

“o use all necessary means o ensure respec or cease-re agreemens hrough monioring heir implemena-ion and invesigaing heir violaions” (Unied Naions,2004ac; 2010n). Te mission’s auhorized srengh was5,560 miliary personnel and 120 civilian police person-nel (Unied Naions, 2004e; 2004ac; 2010n).

As described by he Unied Naions (2004ac; 2010n),he ONUB was mandaed o provide advice and assis-ance and o conribue o he eors o he ransiional

governmen as ollows:

• Monior he implemenaion o cease-re agree-mens and invesigae any violaions.

• Promoe he reesablishmen o condence beweenhe Burundian orces.

• Carry ou he disarmamen and demobilizaion por-ions o he naional program o disarmamen, de-mobilizaion, and reinegraion o combaans.

• Conribue o he creaion o he necessary securiy condiions so ha humaniarian assisance could be

provided and aciliae he volunary reurn o reu-gees and inernally displaced persons.• Conribue o he successul compleion o he elec-

oral process ha had been sipulaed in he Arusha Agreemen by ensuring a secure environmen orree, ransparen, and peaceul elecions o ake place.

• Carry ou insiuional reorms, including he inegra-ion o naional deense and inernal securiy orces.

• rain and monior he police o ensure compliance wih acceped sandards o democracy and humanrighs.

• Implemen he reorm o he judiciary and correcionsysem, in accordance wih he Arusha Agreemen.

• Exend sae auhoriy and uiliies hroughou heerriory, including police and judicial insiuions.

Te main ask o he ONUB civilian police was o provide suppor o he ransiional governmen so i couldprepare a comprehensive plan o inegrae and o develop







Republic of Burundi

51

invesigaions, parols, repor wriing, and supervision”and provided “suppor o he Burundi Naional Policein logisics planning, human resources, raining, andhe developmen o legal rameworks” (Unied Naions,

2006g).From March 2006, he remaining 15 ONUB po-

lice advisers assised he BNP in developing core polic-ing skills ha included leadership raining, specializedraining, and reconciliaion raining. Te developmenprogram delivered courses and seminars in criminal in-

vesigaion, public order policing, parol procedures,human righs, sexual exploiaion and gender-based vio-lence, communiy policing, rac managemen, borderconrol, jail procedures, rapid reacion, communicaions,and airpor securiy (Unied Naions, 2006g).

In lae 2006, he ONUB civilian police assised heMinisry o Inerior and Public Securiy o develop andesablish operaion ceners ha linked he various policecomponens o provide swi and eecive responses osecuriy siuaions. Te ceners were o manage he po-lice operaional inervenion on he ground (Unied Na-ions, 2006x).


Te mission had made progress in sabilizing he securiy siuaion alhough he siuaion remained enuous. Teincidence o crime, including murder, he, and rape,remained high. Many o he crimes commited were a-ribued o boh police and miliary elemens, hus com-pounding he eec o human righs violaions.

Te police componen o he mission assised heMinisry o Inerior and Public Securiy o esablish amore ransparen human resource managemen sysemor he BNP. Ta componen also planned he resourcesand he capaciies required by he BNP (Unied Naions,2006z). Te police componen assised he BNP in es-ablishing a special uni o deal wih cases o sexual andgender-based violence.


In lae 2006, he UN secreary-general noed ha alhoughhe ONUB had made progress in he Burundi securiy

secor reorm, his reorm was limied by he BNP’s op-eraional experience, he large number o new personnel,and he limied delivery o raining (Unied Naions,2006x; 2006z). Te secreary-general also idenied hahe BNP proessionalizaion was impeded by is limiedlogisic ramework, is low proessional sandards, and aculure o use o excessive orce and corrupion (UniedNaions, 2006g).

Conclusion

Te ONUB civilian police successully compleed is man-dae on December 31, 2006. Te mission was succeeded

by he Unied Naions Inegraed Oce in Burundi, which was esablished by UN Securiy Council esoluion 1719(Unied Naions, 2006a) on Ocober 25, 2006. Te new mission, known as BINUB (Bureau Inégré des NaionsUnies au Burundi), began on January 1, 2007, or an iniialperiod o 12 monhs (Unied Naions, 2010k).

Te mandae o BINUB exended he programs o heONUB and included suppor o he governmen in he

ollowing six areas (Unied Naions, 2010k):

1. Srenghen he capaciy o naional insiuions oaddress he roo causes o conic.

2. Develop a comprehensive plan or securiy secor re-orm (involving he BNP and he naional army andcombaing he prolieraion o small and ligh weapons).

3. Complee he program or he demobilizaion andreinegraion o ormer combaans.

4. Faciliae he reinegraion o reurnees and iner-nally displaced persons ino heir communiies.

5. Esablish a naional human righs commission, andesablish ransiional jusice mechanisms.

6. Promoe reedom o he press.









Republic of Côte d’Ivoire

55

men o a small civilian police planning eam o Abidjan.Te planning eam was o provide suppor or he gov-ernmen and or he deploymen o he UNOCI (UniedNaions, 2004a).

Te objecive o he UNOCI mandae was primarily o assis he governmen o Côe d’Ivoire—in conjunc-ion wih ECOWAS—o resore a civilian policing pres-ence hroughou Côe d’Ivoire. Te mission was o advisehe Côe d’Ivoire governmen abou reesablishing he au-horiy o he judiciary and he rule o law hroughou hecounry and abou resrucuring he inernal securiy ser-

vices (Unied Naions, 2004z; 2010e). Te UNOCI po-lice advisers provided “a key role in insilling condencein he populaion so as o aciliae he resoraion o apolice presence and o srenghen he judiciary in norh-

ern Côe d’Ivoire” (Unied Naions, 2004a). Te UNOCIpolice were o “advise he Governmen on resrucuringhe [Côe d’Ivoire] Gendarmerie and he Naional Police[FANCI, or Forces Armées Naionales de Côe d’Ivoire]”(Unied Naions, 2004a).

In he souhern par o he counry, he UNOCI po-lice advisers were o ocus on advising and observing heoperaions o law enorcemen auhoriies. Tis approach

was adoped o ensure ha police abuse was repored ando srenghen he proessionalism in FANCI and he gen-darmerie (Unied Naions, 2004a).

In March 2005, he mandae o he UNOCI was ex-ended or 12 monhs unil April 4, 2006, (Unied Na-ions, 2005k) and was exended again or 12-monhperiods when he mandae expired. As o June 2010, hemission was ongoing.

On November 1, 2006, he UN Securiy Council ad-oped esoluion 1721 (Unied Naions, 2006ag), whichamended he UNOCI mandae o include he design anddevelopmen o a plan o resrucure he Côe d’IvoireDeense and Securiy Forces (Unied Naions, 2010b).


Te implemenaion o he Linas-Marcoussis Agreemenencounered a number o serious obsacles, which in-cluded massive and violen demonsraions in Abidjanand in oher owns. Proesers demonsraed agains heallocaion o he Minisries o Deense and Inerior o he

rebel movemens. During hose demonsraions, Frenchineress and insallaions in Abidjan were argeed anddeliberaely atacked (Unied Naions, 2010b).

Following a speech rom he presiden, he sree dem-

onsraions in Abidjan ceased. Te presiden’s speech andhe accepance o he rebel leaders ino a new governmenhad a calming eec on he volaile securiy siuaion.

Te Côe d’Ivoire FANCI and he gendarmerie hadhe responsibiliy or he counry’s inernal securiy. Tosewo law enorcemen agencies were adminisered by wodieren minisries. Te FANCI was made up o approxi-maely 12,000 ocers and was adminisered by he Minis-ry o Inernal Securiy. Te gendarmerie, which was madeup o approximaely 8,522 ocers, was adminisered by he Minisry o Deense (Unied Naions, 2004a).


Te UNOCI police advisers iniially ocused on provid-ing echnical assisance or he reorm and resrucuringand on he raining o he Ivorian police and gendarmerie.By March 2005, he UNOCI developed raining modulesor courses abou mainaining public law and order, pro-ecing human righs, policing he communiy, and in-

vesigaing crimes (Unied Naions, 2005k). However,

because o he prevailing poliical salemae, he UNOCI was no able o complee some o he core elemens inis mandae (Unied Naions, 2005a). Te UNOCI couldno resore a civilian police presence hroughou hecounry, and neiher was i able o provide advice abouresrucuring he inernal securiy services (Unied Na-ions, 2005k).

Te main reason he UNOCI had no been able oprovide advice abou resrucuring he inernal securiy services was he violen demonsraions in Abidjan inNovember 2004. Following hose demonsraions, heUNOCI changed is assisance rom developing capaciy in he inernal securiy services o advising abou he po-lice response o he securiy siuaion and o “improvingpublic condence in he Ivorian law enorcemen insiu-ions hrough communiy policing aciviies” in key Abi-djan neighborhoods (Unied Naions, 2005k).

In December 2004, he UNOCI assised he FANCI inesablishing he Common Securiy Co-ordinaion Cenre.







58


• Sorage o weapons by he inegraed command cen-er under he supervision o he imparial orces

• Proling and dismanling o miliia groups• einserion o demobilized combaans and miliias• Eecive and complee redeploymen o he corps

préecoral (local auhoriies)• ranser o auhoriy rom zone commanders o he

corps préecoral• Deploymen o mixed police and gendarmerie unis

in he norh• Deploymen o magisraes and cour clerks sup-

pored by he judicial police expeced o play a rolein adjudicaing elecoral dispues

• Deploymen o correcion ocers and prison direcors


Securiy was sabilized by he mission, bu in mid-2010,here was an upsurge in armed robberies and oher criminalaciviies, paricularly in he wes o he counry. Te missionalso had assised in he demobilizaion o more han 16,000Forces Nouvelles members (Unied Naions, 2009e).

More han 526 microprojecs were implemened haoered reinserion assisance o ormer combaans, mi-liias, youhs, and women aeced by he conic. Tose

programs provided opporuniies or 3,483 beneciariesand conribued o creaing a generally sable environ-men (Unied Naions, 2009e).

Te UNOCI conribued o he developmen and im-plemenaion o capaciy-building projecs abou areassuch as orensics and crowd conrol. Te mission also de-livered crowd-conrol raining o he Ivorian gendarmerieand police unis. Tis raining was o equip he ocers

wih he skills ha were required o conduc law enorce-men duies in line wih inernaional human righs san-dards (Unied Naions, 2009e).


By mid-2006, he norh o he counry remained inse-cure (Unied Naions, 2006h), principally because o he “coninued absence o he naional law enorcemenagencies and a uncioning jusice sysem” (Unied Na-ions, 2006g). Tis siuaion remained even hough heUNOCI police componen had delivered basic policeraining o “600 police personnel operaing in he norh”(Unied Naions, 2006h).

Te major challenge acing he FANCI was he lim-ied capaciy o he key naional insiuions ha were oimplemen he asks in he Ouagadougou Agreemen andhe consrains on he capaciy o he inegraed commandcener and he mixed police unis (Unied Naions, 2007g).

Conclusion

Te hisory o Côe d’Ivoire and he poliical inerer-ence o is neighboring saes were wo major issues ha

he mission aced. Weak and corrup governmens com-pounded he siuaion. Alhough he mission has been reasonably successul in

assising ECOWAS in resoring a civilian police presence,an overall improvemen in he securiy siuaion would no

be compleed quickly. ecruiing and raining new ocerscould no be compleed wihin a shor ime rame.

Te mission was ongoing as o June 2010.



Chapter 8

Democratic Republic of the Congo

59

Map 8.1. Democratic Republic o the CongoSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.







62


orcemen agencies “in accordance wih inernaionally recognized human righs and criminal jusice norms andsandards” in he ollowing ways:

• A he command and eld levels,a. Provide policy advice, echnical assisance, and

raining. b. Supply menoring and on-he-job raining by

co-locaion o MONUC police advisers.• A he naional provincial levels,

a. Provide on-he-job raining in operaional andresource planning.

b. Creae coordinaion mechanisms.c. Esablish proessional sandards and disciplin-

ary unis.


Te need o esablish a civilian police componen inMONUC was rs idenied in he secreary-general’seighh repor o he UN Securiy Council on June 8, 2001(Unied Naions, 2001n).

Te secreary-general proposed ha civilian policeshould be deployed wihin MONUC o assis memberso he local police o enhance heir capaciy o mainain

law and order. Te MONUC civilian police would be de-ployed o areas rom which oreign miliary orces could wihdraw. Ta wihdrawal would allow he disarmamen,demobilizaion, repariaion, resetlemen, and reinegra-ion process o ake place (Unied Naions, 2001n).

Te UN Securiy Council approved he esablishmeno a civilian police componen in MONUC on June 15,2001, wih he adopion o esoluion 1355 (Unied Na-ions, 2001m). Te iniial civilian police componen o he mission conduced an in-deph assessmen o po-licing insiuions, needs, and capabiliies. Ulimaely, iprepared recommendaions or an expanded MONUCcivilian police componen. Te UN Securiy Councilenvisioned ha he MONUC police would “advise andassis he local auhoriies in he discharge o heir respon-sibiliies o ensure he securiy o he local populaion,paricularly in regard o he inernal securiy siuaion ol-lowing he wihdrawal o he oreign orces” (Unied Na-ions, 2002i).

Te secreary-general presened an organizaionalplan and ocus or he proposed police componen o MONUC in his second special repor o he UN Securiy Council on May 27, 2003. As described by he Unied

Naions (2003g), he police componen would ocus ondoing he ollowing:

• Assis in he securiy arrangemens in Kinshasa.• Conribue o he raining o an inegraed police

uni.• Coninue he assessmen and planning o is uure

role in key sraegic geographical areas.• Coninue he assessmen and planning o is uure

role in key sraegic areas, such as Iuri and some lo-caions in he Kivus.

Te repor envisioned an organizaional srucure ha would serve as a headquarers ha included a rainingand a planning police sa. Te deploymen o MONUC

would allow or a mulilayer mission securiy sysem(Unied Naions, 2003g). Te repor also proposed heollowing:

• Te exising Congolese police srucure (naionalpolice, including rapid inervenion police, ra-c police, and erriorial police unis) would con-inue o carry ou normal law and order uncions inKinshasa.

• Te close proecion corps, made up o personal bodyguards, would be reinorced by a newly ormedinegraed police uni.

• Te mission would also conain a miliary conin-gen consising o approximaely 740 personnel.


Te securiy environmen wihin he DC was exremely volaile, wih numerous oubreaks o violence occurring inKinshasa. Tereore, he iniial deploymen o MONUCpolice in 2002 provided echnical advice and liaison wihCongolese counerpars abou he securiy zone a heNdjili airpor and he en roue securiy beween he airporand he Gombe disric, beween he airpor and he ciy cener, and in he Gombe disric isel. As a resul o hesecuriy assessmen, MONUC police advised, moniored,and repored on he conduc o he various Congolese en-





64


According o he Unied Naions (2004n), he par-nerships creaed an environmen ha would advance hesraegy o he “criical pah o he ransiion” in he ol-lowing ways:

• Improve securiy in Kinshasa or he ransiional in-siuions and processes.

• Esablish a join police reorm planning mechanism.• ehabiliae police raining ceners.• Begin raining new police ocers.• esrucure he CNP.

MONUC implemened he UN Securiy Council res-oluion in hree phases. Te rs, he preelecion phase,lased or approximaely eigh monhs. Te primary goalso his phase were (a) o prepare and o begin implemen-

ing a ve-year naional police reorm plan and (b) o es-ablish a coordinaion ramework o rain and deploy 6,000 police ocers in conjuncion wih he Minisry o Inerior. Te deploymen would include 3,000 rapidinervenion police ocers who would provide secu-riy services during he ransiion and elecion phase in2004–05 (Unied Naions, 2004n).

During he our-monh elecoral or second phase,he MONUC police provided addiional on-he-groundraining, as well as on-he-job monioring and menor-ing o he CNP. In he hird, poselecoral phase o six

monhs, MONUC coninued “o suppor local policecrowd-managemen unis [and] rain addiional policereserve unis and unis o police d’inervenion rapide.”

A he conclusion o his phase, MONUC ocused on border conrol and provided he necessary suppor orull implemenaion o he ve-year police reorm pro-gram (Unied Naions, 2004n).

o suppor his srucured approach, MONUC sa members were co-locaed, and seminars, workshops, andrain-he-rainers programs were held o increase he se-nior CNP ocers’ awareness and knowledge o demo-craic policing (Unied Naions, 2004x; 2005i). Suchprograms were delivered a ve locaions hroughou heDC and included he raining o 250 CNP insrucors(Unied Naions, 2005i).

During 2005, MONUC revised is concep o opera-ions as i developed a new concep ha would enhance herole o he CNP in he elecoral process and would addresshe CNP’s long-erm insiuional and capaciy develop-

men. Tis concep enailed “a wo-pronged approach haincluded he co-locaion o MONUC senior police o-cers a general and provincial inspecor level.” Tose o-cers advised abou “operaions planning and managemen,

while a he same ime building capaciy rom he botomup.” Te revised approach included deploying MONUCpolice ocers o 16 major ciies including Bukavu, Bunia,Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kindu, Kinshasa, Kisangani,Lubumbashi, Mahagi, Maadi, and Mbandaka, and o nineprovinces so ha pracical advice could be provided oCNP ocers (Unied Naions, 2005i).

Te mission, in conjuncion wih he Minisry o In-erior, developed a plan ha oulined nancial, logisic,and human resources ha were necessary or he naionalpolice o mainain securiy during he elecoral process.

Te plan included raining 9,000 police ocers in publicsecuriy and crowd conrol and providing or 18,500 o-cers in saic securiy duies a he regisraion and pollingceners (Unied Naions, 2005i).

During 2006, MONUC compleed an evaluaion o heCNP’s operaional, echnical, and adminisraive require-mens and capabiliies and draed a reorm plan or com-prehensive insiuional capaciy developmen (UniedNaions, 2006m). As par o he reorm plan, MONUCconduced a census o CNP, veted and ceried ocers,implemened a salary paymen process, and esablished an

eecive paymen sysem (Unied Naions, 2006u).Following he implemenaion o he reorm plan,MONUC, in conjuncion wih a echnical assessmeneam rom he UN Deparmen o Peacekeeping Oper-aions, developed a new concep o operaions or im-plemening is new mandae, esoluion 1756 (UniedNaions, 2007u), and i se benchmarks and an indica-ive imeline or he gradual drawdown o he mission(Unied Naions, 2007q).


Te esablishmen and deploymen o MONUC helped bring peace o mos o he DC. As described by heUnied Naions (2009m), he mission achieved he ol-lowing rom February 1999 o December 2007:

• Overseeing implemenaion o he Lusaka Ceasere Agreemen (1999)




65

• Monioring cease-res beween oreign and Congo-lese orces

• Brokering local ruces• Disarming and repariaing housands o oreign

armed combaans• Creaing an environmen conducive or he naional

dialogue in Sun Ciy, Souh Arica, which was heproposed locaion or he peace conerence

• Assising he ransiion o democraic rule• During 2006, aciliaing he rs democraic elec-

ions in 40 years• Helping he governmen dismanle remaining armed

groups in Iuri and he Kivus• Supporing regional reconciliaion• Dismanling he Forces or he Democraic Libera-

ion o wanda (FDL)• Proecing vulnerable communiies rom rebel violence• Helping esablish sae auhoriy and he rule o law

In June 2004, despie he lack o securiy and he levelo violence ha was perpeuaed in he DC, progress

was made in he reorm o he 80,000-member CNP by he appoinmen o a number o execuive and seniorocers (Unied Naions, 2004n). MONUC also devel-oped a rain-he-rainers program, hrough which 446 na-ional police became ceried rainers (Unied Naions,

2005o). A ramework was esablished o rain and deploy 9,000 police and rapid inervenion ocers who were oprovide securiy during he 2004–05 ransiion and elec-ion (Unied Naions, 2004n).

Despie he achievemens o he MONUC, a numbero areas wihin he CNP required developmen and com-pleion. Te CNP lacked equipmen, logisics, and rainingand did no have a personnel managemen record sysem(Unied Naions, 2005o). Te diculies aced by he ad-minisraive, logisical, and operaional srucures o henaional police aeced he envisaged muliplicaion o pro-grams such as rain-he-rainers. Te diculies also limiedhe achievemens o he mission (Unied Naions, 2005o).


In 2007, a echnical assessmen eam rom he UN reviewed MONUC and surveyed ocers o he CNP. Te

review idenied wo sraegic level benchmarks hameasured MONUC’s progress oward achieving is man-dae: (a) he esablishmen o an overall sable securiy environmen and (b) he consolidaion o he counry’s

democraic insiuions. As described by he Unied Na-ions (2007q), he assessmen eam deermined ha any downsizing plan o he mission and evenual wihdrawalshould be based on hese hree key precondiions:

1. Ta he Congolese and oreign armed groups aredisarmed and demobilized or repariaed, and hahey no longer pose a hrea o peace and sabiliy inhe DC or neighboring counries

2. Ta FADC and he CNP have achieved levels o capaciy ha would enable hem o assume responsi-

biliy or he counry’s securiy, including duies now perormed by MONUC

3. Ta MONUC remain deployed a is curren srengha leas hrough he compleion o he local elecions

Ideniying he sraegic perormance benchmarks o he mission enabled MONUC o develop operaionalperormance measures. Te idenicaion also enabledprogress in achieving and measuring he principal objec-ives o he mandae o be made and or a sable securiy environmen o be esablished (Unied Naions, 2007q).

Te operaional benchmarks described by he UniedNaions (2007q) included he ollowing:

• Sabilize sensiive areas.• Complee disarmamen and demobilizaion o or-

mer combaans and disarmamen and repariaiono oreign armed groups.

• Exend sae auhoriy hroughou he erriory o he DC.

• eorm he securiy secor by developing a uniednaional police ha was enrused wih public secu-riy and ha was capable o proecing he peopleand heir propery while mainaining law and orderand respec or human righs.

MONUC observed in 2008 ha alhough he missionhad been in he counry or nearly 10 years, progress inhe reorm o he securiy secor had been modes. Li-le progress had been made oward achieving he secu-






67

Iniially, he Join Acion 847 (Council o he Euro-pean Union, 2004b) was o las or 12 monhs and waso expire on December 31, 2005. Te developmen o he IPU coninued o ensure ha he uni inegraed cor-

recly wih he CNP. Te mission was exended a numbero imes by he council, wih approval or a nal exen-sion unil June 2007 (Council o he European Union,2006a). Te mission’s mandae was amended during heexension o include providing advice o he CNP abouaciliaing he securiy secor reorm process in he DC(Council o he European Union, 2006b).


In response o an inviaion by he DC governmen,he EUPOL Kinshasa was he rs civil mission or cri-sis managemen esablished in Arica wihin he ESDPramework (European Union Council Secrearia,2005c). Te ocus o he mission was o consolidae he

volaile securiy siuaion in Kinshasa.ensions were high in Kinshasa because o he pres-

ence o several poliically based miliias in he ciy cener. Excep or hose who could aord o pay orsecuriy, policing was nonexisen. Miliias had a reehand, and poliical acions could easily mobilize he

populaion o launch large demonsraions ha couldlead o violen rios and civil disorder. Tis highly vola-ile siuaion had he poenial o jeopardize elecions(Vircoulon, 2009).


Te role o he mission was (a) o provide advice direcly o he command elemen o he CNP IPU and (b) o en-sure ha he uni underook is duies in accordance wihhe bes inernaional police pracices and human righsdocrine.

Te mission’s objecives were o improve and aciliaeuni communicaion and managemen decision making.Te objecives also included applying operaional direc-ives and supervising maneuvers o he unis in chargeo mainaining order in he capial (EUPOL Kinshasa,2006).

o achieve hose objecives, he mission’s aciviies,as described by EUPOL Kinshasa (2006), covered hesehree areas:

• Esablish a coninuous raining program or heCNP IPU.

• Srenghen he operaional capaciies o he uni o-cers and he planning and leadership capaciies o he headquarers sa managers and o he basic unicommanders hrough heoreical lessons and praci-cal exercises.

• rain ocers on how o proec human righs.

Te mission iniially comprised 30 EUPOL ocersand was emporarily reinorced by he deploymen o a

“police co-ordinaion suppor elemen” during he elec-oral process. Te increase in auhorized ocer srengh

was o ensure ha here would be an “enhanced and coor-dinaed response o he CNP crowd conrol unis in Kin-shasa in case o disurbances during he elecoral period”(Council o he European Union, 2006b).

Mission Implementation (Model)

Te mission deployed 30 EUPOL ocers as a headquar-

ers elemen and as police moniors. Te headquarerssa had one ocer who aced as he head o missionand who provided adminisraion suppor o he mis-sion (Council o he European Union, 2006a). Te policemoniors, who were also menors, advisers, and rainers,

were co-locaed in he CNP IPU operaional base. Beorehe elecion, he mission esablished “a dedicaed co-or-dinaion elemen in charge o specic asks assigned ohe mission during his period” (Council o he EuropeanUnion, 2006b).

EUPOL Kinshasa ocers were deployed wihin he1,008-ocer CNP IPU in dieren levels o he Con-golese police chain o command (EUPOL Kinshasa,2006). Tis approach was aken “in order o moni-or, menor, and advise heir Congolese counerpars

wih he aim o ensuring ha he CNP IPU me iner-naional bes pracice” (European Union Council Sec-rearia, 2005c) and o advise he CNP on reorm andreorganizaion.






69

lished EUPOL D Congo. As par o he preparaory mission process, he head o he mission prepared an op-eraional plan ha was or he mission and ha was o besubmited o he council or approval (Council o he Eu-

ropean Union, 2007c). As described by he council, he mission sraegy was

o “suppor SS in he eld o policing and is inerace wih he jusice sysem” (Council o he European Union,2009a). Tis objecive was o be achieved by monioring,menoring, and providing advice o he CNP wih anemphasis on he sraegic dimension. Specically, as de-scribed by he Council o he European Union (2007c;2009a), he mission was o do he ollowing:

• Conribue o he reorm and he resrucuring o he

CNP hrough suppor or he esablishmen o a vi-able, proessional, and muliehnic police orce. Taorce accouned or proximiy policing hroughouhe whole counry wih he direc involvemen o heCongolese auhoriies in ha process.

• Conribue o improving he ineracion beween hepolice and he criminal jusice sysem in he broadersense.

• Conribue o ensuring he consisency o all SS eors.

• Operae in close ineracion wih he projecs o he

commission, and coordinae is acion wih he oherinernaional eors in he eld o reorm o he po-lice and he criminal jusice sysem.

Te mission was required by he council o design andimplemen policies ha are ounded on human righs andinernaional humaniarian law; democraic sandards;and principles o good governance, ransparency, andrespec or he rule o law. Te mission would provideadvice and suppor a he governmenal level o he Con-golese auhoriies and hrough he police reorm moni-oring commitee (CSP) and he join commitee on

jusice (Council o he European Union, 2007c).


In he mid- o lae-1990s, ollowing he 1994 genocide inwanda, he DC underwen wo successive wars: he

rs in 1996 and he second in 1998. Tose wars nearly enguled he Arican coninen, killing millions o peo-ple and desroying “decades o developmen” (EuropeanUnion Police Mission or he DC, 2006).

Tere were wo earlier missions in he DC beorehe cease-re agreemen was signed in Preoria on De-cember 17, 2002. Te rs was he Unied Naions Mis-sion in he Democraic epublic o Congo (MONUC),and he second was EUPOL Kinshasa. During June 2003,he EU deployed a emporary mulinaional orce, knownas Operaion Aremis, o he DC. Te aim o Operaion

Aremis was o reinorce MONUC because he securiy siuaion in he Iuri region was deerioraing. Tis opera-ion was launched on June 12 and was compleed in hree

weeks upon he arrival o he Unied Naions Mulina-

ional Emergency Force o Bunia (European Union Po-lice Mission or he DC, 2006).

Boh MONUC and EUPOL Kinshasa were designedo suppor he sabilizaion and he ransiion in heDC and played an imporan par in achieving peacein he region (European Union Police Mission or heDC, 2006).


Te mission was primarily based in Kinshasa, alhoughsa members delivered advice o police in oher geo-graphic regions o he DC (Council o he EuropeanUnion, 2007c). Te mission provided advice and sup-por abou he reormaion and he resrucuring o hepolice secor hrough he CSP. Te CSP was a joinconsulaive body comprising he minisries ha were in-

volved wih he police reorm, he CNP, and he inerna-ional parners (European Union Police Mission or heDC, 2006).

Te mission’s specic asks, as described by heCouncil o he European Union (2008b), included heollowing:

• Form working paries on police reorm.• Assign sa o he CNP.• Provide an inerace wih oher jusice secor

agencies.• Provide experise on police SS.





71

Chapter 9

Former Yugoslav Republico Macedonia

Map 9.1. Former Yugoslav Republic o MacedoniaSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.





Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

73


Following he cease-re, here were wo inervenionsin FYOM. Te rs was he NAO operaion, Allied

Harmony, which deployed approximaely 300 roops oprovide securiy o EU moniors ha were overseeing heimplemenaion o he Ohrid Framework Agreemen. Tesecond inervenion, which ollowed Allied Harmony, washe EU mission, Concordia. Tis mission deployed EUroops o wach over he growing civil unres in FYOM be-cause o he ehnic ensions beween he Macedonian ma-

joriy and he Albanian minoriy in he eas o he counry.Despie hose wo inervenions, he poliical and securiy siuaion in lae 2002 was sable bu was capable o deeri-oraing, wih poenially serious repercussions o inerna-

ional securiy (Council o he European Union, 2003).Te ragile securiy siuaion was exacerbaed by he

prolieraion o privae rearms possession, he weak gov-ernmen, and he nonexisence o law enorcemen in eh-nic Albanian-dominaed areas (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane,2009). Te Council o he European Union (2003) noedha he commimen o he EU poliical eor and is re-sources could assis in embedding sabiliy in he region.


Te EUPOL Proxima police advisers were co-locaed andsuppored he local police in ull parnership a he cen-ral, regional, and police saion level (European UnionPolice Mission Proxima, 2003). By monioring, menor-ing, and advising he local police, EUPOL Proxima advis-ers assised in increasing heir “level o prociency” andsuppored “he developmen o an ecien and proes-sional police service” (European Union Police MissionProxima, 2003).

Te mission mandae was renewed in 2004 andchanged he ocus o he EUPOL Proxima. Te missionconinued o give paricular atenion o police seniorand middle managemen bu ocused mainly on he po-lice reorm process and on organized crime, public peaceand order, and border police (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane,2009). During his sage, he mission expanded is geo-graphical coverage while i mainained a presence in heormer crisis areas.


Te EUPOL Proxima mission comprised approximaely 200 uniormed and civilian police personnel. Senior ad-

visers were deployed o he cenral headquarers o heminisry o inernal aairs in Skopje, and police advisers

were deployed o regional headquarers (Skopje, eovo,Kumanovo, and Gosivar), o subregional headquarers(Debar, Sruga, and Kicevo), and o he police saionlevel (European Union Police Mission Proxima, 2003).

Te mission developed ve programs ha included28 aciviies rom he asks lised in he mission mandae.Te ve programs included (a) uniorm police, (b) crim-inal police, (c) deparmen or sae securiy and coun-erinelligence, (d) inernal conrol, and (e) border police

(Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, 2009). Te mission also de-ployed police advisers o border crossings and o he Sko-pje and Ohrid inernaional airpors. Tose acions weredesigned o suppor and srenghen regional cooperaionand o assis wih resrucuring he border police.

Te mission provided assisance o increase he levelo cooperaion beween he agencies in he criminal jus-ice secor and wih he esablishmen o an inernal con-rol and proessional sandards uni in he Minisry o Inerior (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, 2009). In he laersages o he mission, police advisers ocused on improv-

ing he leadership capabiliy, crime scene managemen, border policing, and capaciy o he deparmen o saesecuriy and counerinelligence o plan and manage op-eraions o gh errorism and organized crime.

o achieve he objecives o he mandae, he missiondeveloped a resuls-based aciviy plan ha was ied o amoniored weekly ime rame. Tis benchmarking sys-em enabled he mission o ackle very specic projecsaccording o a process endorsed by he Minisry o Ine-rior (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, 2009).


In line wih he objecives o he Ohrid Framework Agreemen and he sabiliy and associaion process(SAP), EUPOL Proxima’s objecive was o promoe hegradual sabilizaion o he counry (Grevi, Helly, andKeohane, 2009).



74


Te mission was successul in (a) implemening acomprehensive reorm o he Minisry o Inerior, (b)creaing a border police, and (c) increasing he level o condence beween he local police and he populaion.

I also enhanced police cooperaion wih neighboringsaes (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, 2009).


Tere were no ormal EU documens relaing o how hemission was evaluaed. However, Merlingen and Osraus-kaie (2006) noe ha alhough he mission had ideni-ed ve hemaic reorm prioriies, hose hemes wereno iniially developed ino broad objecives or ino de-

ailed projec plans. Tis lack o developmen culminaedin a lack o sraegic direcion and in an uncoordinaednoncoheren reorm eor.

By June 2004, he EUPOL Proxima began o reor-ganize he mission o enhance is eeciveness (Merlin-gen and Osrauskaie, 2006). Overall eeciveness wasachieved by producing a “programme-driven reormagenda” ha cenered resources on hree clearly denedprioriies: enorcing he law, policing he border, and in-creasing condence and rus beween he police and hepublic. Te hree prioriies comprised ve programs and

28 projecs (Merlingen and Osrauskaie, 2006).

Conclusion

Te mission was erminaed on December 14, 2005, evenhough many programs were no compleed. Te mission

was no able o complee is mandae because i lackeda common EU view abou policing and because i washampered by he slow pace in which he FYOM au-horiies adoped legal changes (Grevi, Helly, and Keo-hane, 2009).

EUPOL Proxima was a complex mission, and hedevelopmen o a programmaic approach proved sig-nicanly more dicul han he EUPM expeced (Mer-lingen and Osrauskaie, 2006). Te mission ailed ocreae projecs ha generaed added value, and diculiesarose because many o he asks included in he missionmandae were underaken by oher inernaional donors.

As wih EUPM, here was a series o shor EUPOLProxima missions. When each mandae expired, a new mis-sion was esablished ha usually adoped is predecessor’sreorm agenda bu had a revised operaion plan. Each new

mission also had a leaner deploymen sraegy and a moreocused approach (Merlingen and Osrauskaie, 2006).

Case Study: European Union Police

Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav

Republic o Macedonia


In lae 2005, he governmen o he Former Yugoslav e-public o Macedonia (FYOM) indicaed o he Euro-pean Union (EU) ha i would approve he deploymeno a European Union Police Advisory eam (EUPA).Te eam would bridge he gap beween he EUPOLProxima, which was compleing is mandae on Decem-

ber 14, 2005, and he sar o he planned projec o prac-ical echnical assisance ha would be unded by he EUprogram iled Communiy Assisance or econsruc-ion, Developmen, and Sabilisaion (CADS) (Coun-

cil o he European Union, 2005).Te governmen o FYOM was concerned abouconsolidaing he securiy siuaion and waned o ensureha police reorm was coninued and susainable.


On November 24, 2005, he Council o he EuropeanUnion adoped Join Acion 2005/826/CFSP, which es-ablished EUPA in FYOM or six monhs rom De-cember 15, 2005, o June 14, 2006 (European UnionCouncil Secrearia, 2005b). Te mission was o beginaer he erminaion o he European Union Police Mis-sion o he Former Yugoslavia epublic o Macedonia(EUPOL Proxima) on December 14, 2005 (EuropeanUnion Council Secrearia, 2005b).

Te sraegic objecive o EUPA was “o urher sup-por he developmen o an ecien and proessional po-







77

Chapter 10

Haiti

Map 10.1. HaitiSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.





Haiti

79

mandae should be exended or anoher year unil No- vember 30, 1999. Te proposed exension was o broadenhe mandae o include he provision o raining o mid-dle and senior cadres o he HNP. I was also o provide

advice abou he creaion o a “proper command sruc-ure and adminisraion” and he concep o communiy policing (Unied Naions, 1998j).

Te mission’s mandae was exended on Novem- ber 25, 1998, unil November 30, 1999, wih he adop-ion o esoluion 1212 (1998o). Te exension was osrenghen “he capabiliy o he cenral direcorae o hepolice orce o manage aid provided o i rom bilaeraland mulilaeral sources” (Unied Naions, 1999a).


During he 1990s, he UN underook a number o rans-ormaional missions, including hose o Haii and he Bal-kans. In 1994, he UN Securiy Council auhorized UNpolice o assis Haii creae a separae police orce (UniedNaions, 1994). Te mission, UNMIH, in conjuncion

wih he Unied Saes Deparmen o Jusice’s Inerna-ional Criminal Invesigaive raining Assisance Program(ICIAP), advised and assised wih recruiing, veting,and raining a new HNP orce. Te wo successive UN

missions, UNSMIH and UNMIH, were o provide ech-nical advice and were o proessionalize he HNP by ocus-ing primarily on raining and menoring HNP specializedunis and supervisors (Smih, Hol, and Durch, 2007).Tose missions concenraed primarily on reorming heHNP and did no include he coordinaion o he acivi-ies underaken by he cours and he prisons. As a resul,he missions did no succeed in ullling heir mandaes.

Haii had aced poliical urmoil and civil unressince Presiden Ariside was overhrown by a miliary coup d’éa in Sepember 1991. Te coup placed Gen-eral aoul Cedras in power and orced Presiden Arisideino exile. During he period o miliary rule rom 1991o 1994, an esimaed 3,000–5,000 Haiians were killed.Beween 1991 and 1992, more han 40,000 reugees wereinerdiced in he Unied Saes.

In mid-Sepember 1994, he Unied Saes preparedo ener Haii by orce, bu Presiden Cedras seppeddown and Presiden Ariside reurned o power.

Te poliical siuaion rom he lae 1980s unil hemid-1990s saw public condence in he HNP depreci-ae and saw an increase in rampan crime, popular jusice,and mob and gang violence. Te HNP was oen impli-

caed in his violence and in a number o media-ueledhuman righs violaions.

Because o he poliical insabiliy and he miliary involvemen in he HNP in he early 1980s, he HNP su-ered rom mismanagemen, rom corrupion, and rom alack o unding.


Te MIPONUH police componen moniored he HNP

daily and provided operaional echnical assisance, in par-icular o specialis unis in relaion o crowd conrol, rapidreacion, presidenial palace securiy, and invesigaions.Police advisers accompanied HNP ocers and providedassisance and ongoing raining during heir daily duies.Te mission also provided assisance o he direcorae-general, he inspecor-general, and he naional policesa a each o he deparmenal headquarers. Tis acion

was o esablish a ramework o proessionalize he orcein is operaional developmen as well as in is insiu-ional developmen (Unied Naions, 1997c).

In he early phase o he mission, he MIPONUH as-sised he HNP o implemen a uniorm in-service rain-ing program or all HNP ocers. “Te pracices o herapid inervenion eam [were reviewed] o ensure is ad-herence o Haiian law and [o] he spiri o civilian polic-ing” (Unied Naions, 1997c).

In February 1998, he MIPONUH rained 500 HNPrecruis and implemened a recruiing and raining pro-gram ha enabled he HNP “o grow rom under 5,000 in1997 o is argeed srengh o 6,726” (Unied Naions,1998a). Tis program allowed he MIPONUH o pro-

vide in-service raining o an average o 400 HNP ocersevery week (Unied Naions, 1998j).


Te MIPONUH was designed o be a echnical assis-ance program ha would provide he HNP wih op-



80


level law enorcemen experise over he nex hree years.Te mission was based on a number o diagnosic sud-ies ha were conduced in July 1996 and in January and

July 1997. Tese sudies covered he hree areas o jus-ice, police, and prisons. Te sudies also aimed o rack progress in developing and consolidaing he HNP ando pinpoin problem areas ha hen became he ocus o concered atenion (Unied Naions, 1997c).

Te adopion o esoluion 1141 (Unied Naions,

1997h) by he UN Securiy Council auhorized hemaximum srengh o 300 civilian police ocers in heMIPONUH. Despie he early deploymen o he mission’scivilian police componen and he adopion o he resolu-ion, he mission never reached is auhorized srengh.able 10.1 illusraes ha civilian police numbers reached amaximum o 285 ocers and remained around ha num-

ber unil he mission was compleed in March 2000.Te MIPONUH assised he HNP in designing and

implemening a command cener a he HNP headquar-ers and in redeploying HNP ocers on he basis o pop-ulaion paterns and he incidence o crime. However,allocaing resources in his manner gave prioriy o ciiesover rural areas (Unied Naions, 1997c).

By February 1998, he HNP had become less de-penden on MIPONUH because HNP had improvedmanagemen capabiliy and srenghened reporing re-laionships by building an eecive cadre o commissari-as and inspecors. Tis organizaional improvemen was

suppored by redeploying HNP ocers across he coun-ry o improve he balance in police coverage beween hecapial and he provinces. However, during his period,he MIPONUH idenied recurring human righs abuses

by operaional HNP ocers and showed ha a numbero commissarias displayed poor leadership qualiies(Unied Naions, 1998a).

Also during his period, he MIPONUH assised heHNP in appoining a number o senior ocers, reur-

bishing accommodaion and communicaion aciliies,and developing a number o quaniaive perormance benchmarks (Unied Naions, 1998a).

In Augus 1998, in conjuncion wih he MIPONUH,he HNP compleed a qualiaive sudy o examine isperormance. Te sudy idenied consisen progressha had been made in cerain areas and, in paricular,some progress in he area o communiy policing a herank-and-le level (Unied Naions, 1998g).

In February 1999, in conjuncion wih he UniedNaions Developmen Programme (UNDP), heMIPONUH developed a sraegy paper or he Haiiangovernmen or 1999–2001. Ta paper oulined he ob-

jecives relaing o governance and he rule o law. Tesraegy paper ormed he basis or he MIPONUH andhe HNP o develop a wo-year program ha was orechnical assisance and ha was designed o provide heedgling police service wih he experise or raining andinsiuion building. Te approach was o ensure ha he

Table 10.1. Composition o Total Number o MIPONUH Civilian Police Ocers,October 1997 to February 2000

Date Special Police Units Civilian Police Ocers Total Civilian Police

October 1997 N/K N/K 242February 1998 139 146 285

May 1998 140 145 285

August 1998 140 144 284

November 1998 140 145 285

February 1999 140 142 282

May 1999 130 147 277

February 2000 110 109 219

Source: Auhor (rom Unied Naions documens). Noe: N/K = no known.



Haiti

81

HNP had he capabiliy o underake basic policing aerhe MIPONUH was erminaed (Unied Naions, 1999a).


In November 1997, he secreary-general o he UN noedha alhough he HNP had “made subsanial srides or-

ward [since he deploymen o he rs UN mission inSepember 1993], is developmen ino a proessionalorce coninues o be slow and uneven” (Unied Naions,1997c). Te HNP was developing a greaer capaciy omainain law and order, and is ocers had a visible pres-ence on he roads and in various communiies (UniedNaions, 1998j). Te secreary-general also noed ha

he HNP had “diculy in dealing eecively” wih ban-diry and drug racking (Unied Naions, 1997c).

By lae 1998, he HNP had made considerable prog-ress in improving is organizaional and operaional ca-pabiliy and had improved in respecing he legal righso deainees in police saions. Wih assisance rom heMIPONUH, he HNP leadership had displayed a com-mimen o developing and srenghening he orce andhad updaed he ocial police developmen plan or he

years 1998–2003 (Unied Naions, 1998j).Te HNP’s capabiliy o implemen public works sig-

nicanly improved. Te HNP was able o underakelogisics operaions and had successully “planned andimplemened a number o inrasrucure projecs,” in-cluding he rehabiliaion and consrucion o eigh po-lice saions in 1998 (Unied Naions, 1998j).

Te UN repored ha he HNP was “exremely rag-ile.” Te HNP had a weak invesigaive capaciy, and policeocer abseneeism was an exensive problem. Te HNPdid no have he “experience, proessional skills, resources,and cohesion” o a “well-esablished police orce” and sillhad a number o “insances o crime, corrupion, and drugracking wihin he ranks” (Unied Naions, 1998j).

In November 1998, a “US Inormaion Agency pollshowed ha 70% o hose polled had condence in heHNP as an insiuion—a ruly exraordinary gure ora counry wih no radiion o civilian policing. By heirpresence and daily example, UN civilian police ocershave had a posiive eec on he conduc o police work in Haii” (Unied Naions, 1998j).

Te HNP also made progress in he respec or hu-man righs, and here had been “a noiceable reducion inrepors o ill reamen during arress and inerrogaions”in early 1999 (Unied Naions, 1999a).


In July 1998, a eam o inernaional consulans or-mally evaluaed he UNDP echnical Assisance Proj-ec. Alhough criical in some areas, he repor waslargely posiive. I concluded ha “i is rue boh hahe progress made in building he HNP over he pashree years has been exraordinary bu also ha heHNP as an insiuion remains exremely ragile and

wihou urher developmen will collapse” (Unied Na-ions, 1998g).

Te secreary-general noed in lae 1998, ha alhoughhe HNP’s perormance had improved and ha rainingprovided by he MIPONUH had been appropriae, “hedevelopmen o an eecive police orce is a complex andlenghy ask” and ha “here will be a coninuing need orinernaional raining o he HNP o srenghen he ca-paciy o he orce and consolidae he gains i has already achieved” (Unied Naions, 1998g).

Conclusion

Te main ask o MIPONUH was o assis he govern-men o Haii in proessionalizing he HNP (Unied Na-ions, 2009d). In his regard, he mission “had placedspecial emphasis on assisance a he supervisory leveland on raining specialized police unis” (Unied Na-ions, 2009o). Te approach made limied progress in de-

veloping HNP’s insiuional capaciy.MIPONUH was succeeded by he new Inernaional

Civilian Suppor Mission in Haii (MICAH) on March 16,2000. Te esablishmen o MICAH was approved by he UN General Assembly in esoluion A/54/193 o December 17, 1999. Te new mission’s mandae was oconsolidae he resuls achieved by MIPONUH and ourher promoe human righs and reinorce he insiu-ional eeciveness o he Haiian police and he judiciary (Unied Naions, 2009o).



82


Case Study: United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti


Te Unied Naions (UN) involvemen in Haii beganin 1990 wih he deploymen o he Unied Naions Ob-server Group or he Vericaion o he Elecions in Haii(ONUVEH). Te group observed he preparaion or andhe holding o elecions in Haii (Unied Naions, 2010d).

A number o successive missions ollowed o develop hegovernance and he capaciy o he Haiian Naional Police(HNP). Te nal mission, he Unied Naions Police Mis-

sion in Haii (MIPONUH), was compleed in March 2000. A number o posiive developmens occurred during

he successive missions, including he reurn o a level o democracy and some growh o civil sociey (Unied Na-ions, 2010d). However, “owing o he coninuing polii-cal crisis and concomian lack o sabiliy in he counry,serious reorms never” were accomplished leading o anarmed conic in February 2004 in he ciy o Gonaives(Unied Naions, 2010d).

Fighing quickly spread o oher ciies and “he insur-gens ook conrol o much o he norhern par o he

counry” (Unied Naions, 2010d). Following he hosil-iies, he presiden o Haii, Berrand Ariside, deparedHaii or exile, and he UN Securiy Council declared hahe “siuaion in Haii consiued a hrea o inernaionalpeace and securiy” (Unied Naions, 2010d). On Febru-ary 29, 2004, he UN Securiy Council adoped esolu-ion 1529 (Unied Naions, 2004ag), which esablishedhe Mulinaional Inerim Force (MIF) and conrmed is“readiness o esablish a ollow-on Unied Naions sabili-zaion orce o suppor [he] coninuaion o a peaceul andconsiuional poliical process and he mainenance o asecure and sable environmen” (Unied Naions, 2010d).

During his “unres, he HNP almos compleely collapsed” (Unied Naions, 2004h). A large numbero police saions were vandalized, burned, or seriously damaged, and equipmen, records, and archives werelooed or desroyed. Despie hose problems, he HNPmainained a minimal law enorcemen capabiliy. A number o ocers reurned o work aer several monhs

o reduced or no aciviy, and hey conribued o a pro-ecive deail or he inerim presiden and prime min-iser. Te HNP also mainained elemens o an aniriooperaional uni and a 250-srong judiciary police capac-

iy (Unied Naions, 2004h).


On April 30, 2004, he UN Securiy Council adoped eso-luion 1542 (Unied Naions, 2004ab), which esablishedhe Unied Naions Sabilizaion Mission in Haii on June1, 2004 (MINUSAH) (Unied Naions, 2004z). Te mis-sion had an auhorized srengh o 1,622 civilian police,

which included 872 advisers and six ormed police unis

(FPUs) o 125 ocers each (Unied Naions, 2004h). Po-lice advisers were co-locaed wih heir HNP equivalen andprovided advice and menoring abou managemen, rain-ing, and proessional sandards (Unied Naions, 2004h).

Te mission’s iniial mandae was as ollows:

• Provide suppor o he ransiional governmenand o ensure a secure and sable environmen ha

would allow he consiuional and poliical processin Haii o ake place.

• Assis he ransiional governmen monior, resruc-

ure, and reorm he HNP o conorm wih demo-craic policing sandards, including veting andceriying is personnel, providing advice on rainingincluding gender raining, and monioring and men-oring members o he HNP.

• Assis he HNP wih comprehensive and susain-able disarmamen, demobilizaion, and reinegraion(DD) programs or all armed groups, including

women and children associaed wih such groups, as well as weapons conrol and public securiy measures.

• Help resore and mainain he rule o law, publicsaey, and public order in Haii by providing oper-aional suppor o he HNP and he Haiian CoasGuard (Unied Naions, 2004aa; 2010d).

• Proec civilians under imminen hrea o physical violence, wihin is capabiliies and areas o deploy-men, wihou prejudice o he responsibiliies o heransiional governmen and o police auhoriies(Unied Naions, 2004h; 2004ab).



Haiti

83

Te UN Securiy Council recommended ha he mis-sion be esablished iniially or 24 monhs, during whichime he mission would provide regular progress repors(Unied Naions, 2004h). Following he compleion o

his deploymen, he Securiy Council “recommendedha he Mission be auhorised or subsequen periodso 12 monhs, wih periodic reviews wih respec o heappropriae mix o is dieren componens and he pri-oriy assigned o is muliple areas o aciviy” (UniedNaions, 2004h).

By doing he ollowing, he mission was o “assis indeveloping and enhancing in a susainable ashion heoverall law enorcemen capaciy o he HNP” (UniedNaions, 2004h):

• Assis he HNP academy o implemen rainingprograms.

• Menor and provide on-he-job raining a he mainoperaional levels o he HNP.

• ranser skills and proacively assis muli-ier man-agemen uncions wihin he HNP.

• Develop and implemen an eecive, ransparen,and accounable HNP oversigh mechanism.

• Develop and implemen veting and cericaionprograms in accordance wih inernaional sandards.

• Suppor he implemenaion o a communiy-based

policing program hroughou he counry.

Te mission was o “build he public’s condence inhe criminal jusice secor by observing he HNP andadvising and reporing on is aciviies regarding com-pliance wih proessional sandards and human righs.”Te police componen o he mission was also o assis in“civil disurbance managemen, land and marine borderpolicing, judiciary, inormaion gahering, immigraion,cusoms, por auhoriy, and relaed secors o inernal se-curiy, and in deermining relaed inrasrucure and lo-gisical requiremens” (Unied Naions, 2004h).

On June 22, 2005, he UN Securiy Council agreedo increase he auhorized srengh o he civilian policecomponen o he mission by 275 personnel o a oal o 1,897. Te increase in he number o civilian police was oprovide securiy “during he elecoral period and subse-quen poliical ransiion” (Unied Naions, 2005ac). On

July 28, 2006, he auhorized srengh o he civilian police

was increased again o 1,951 personnel (Unied Naions,2006q). Finally, he auhorizaion increased o 2,091 per-sonnel (which included 1,140 ocers in nine FPUs) on

Augus 22, 2007 (Unied Naions, 2007l; 2007w).

Aer he compleion o he rs wo years, he mis-sion was exended or 12 monhs every subsequen year(Unied Naions, 2006q; 2007l; 2009h). As o mid-2012,i coninues.


Te HNP was he only ocial securiy agency in Haii a-er he armed orces were disbanded by he Unied NaionsMission in Haii (UNMIH) in 1995. In April 2004, he

HNP comprised approximaely 2,500 ocers, while is au-horized srengh was 6,367. However, he secreary-generalesimaed “ha he HNP would need a minimum o 10,000ocers, or [one] police ocer or every 800 ciizens, in or-der o mee Haii’s basic law-and-order requiremens” or is8.5 million inhabians (Unied Naions, 2004h).

Te HNP organizaion, as described by he UniedNaions (2004h), incorporaed 189 counrywide op-eraional police deparmens ha were made up o heollowing:

•

10 commissarias de deparmen• 46 commissarias d’arrondissemen• 133 commissarias de commune

Te HNP suered rom demoralizaion, erosion o proessional sandards, and a lack o resources. I was“plagued by heavy poliicisaion, corrupion, and mis-managemen,” and he organizaion had los is “credibil-iy in he eyes o he Haiian populaion” because o isinvolvemen in abuse, rape, and drug racking (UniedNaions, 2004h).

By April 2004, general police and rac parols werepracically nonexisen. Tis siuaion was expeced o im-prove wih he deploymen o he MIF and by he eorso he HNP leadership “o bring back more HNP ocersand o recrui new ocers” (Unied Naions, 2004h).

A mission predeploymen eam consising o eigh civilian police ocers arrived in Por-au-Prince o esablisha headquarers; o conduc an assessmen o he curren









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87

give direcion o developmen iniiaives, and o promoeheir implemenaion.” Te planning eam also developeda model police saion so ha he projec could esablish apolice presence in negleced areas and could renovae and

equip police saions naionwide. Tis projec included heco-locaion o MINUSAH police advisers in 50 main po-lice saions hroughou Haii (Unied Naions, 2006d).

In early 2007, he MINUSAH provided he ollow-ing operaional suppor o he Naional Commissionor Disarmamen, Dismanlemen, and einegraion odevelop and implemen a number o communiy-basedprojecs (Unied Naions, 2007l):

• Faciliae he reurn o ormer gang members o heircommuniies.

• einorce he capaciy o local communiies o re-solve conics peaceully.

• Promoe a culure o peace.• Assis vicims o violence.• Suppor he creaion o emporary employmen.

o provide a measurable implemenaion ramework or he NPSDP, he MINUSAH developed benchmarksand acion plans or compeency and perormance evalua-ions, or sang, or reallocaion o oce space and equip-men, or echnological improvemens, and or echnicaland ehical raining. Te criical milesone or MINUSAH

in implemening he NPSDP was esablishing a susainablesecuriy srucure ha would le Haii “respond eecively o poenial hreas wihin he counry and along is landand mariime borders while respecing inernaional san-dards and individual reedoms” (Unied Naions, 2008d).

o suppor he implemenaion ramework over hewo 12-monh periods, Ocober 2009 o Ocober 2010and Ocober 2010 o Ocober 2011, he MINUSAHand he HNP developed hese wo comprehensive seso Year Indicaors o Progress (Unied Naions, 2009h):

October 2009 to October 2010• Coninue advances in mainaining securiy and sabil-

iy in urban and rural areas, drawing on collaboraion beween inernaional and Haiian securiy orces.

• Coninue srenghening he HNP presence, wihMINUSAH suppor, along land and mariime bor-ders and hroughou he counry.

• Coninue progress in reaching he objecives ha were esablished by he HNP reorm plan by doinghe ollowing: – Graduae addiional HNP members hrough pro-

moions, permiting coninued increase o overallsang in accordance wih reorm plan imelines.

– Coninue veting and cericaion. – Coninue srenghening echnical capabiliies o

Haiian judicial police. – Progress in developing coas guard capabiliy. – Srenghen HNP adminisraive capaciy and

progress in raining mid- and upper-level man-agemen.

– Coninue developing HNP inrasrucures. – Prepare a ollow-on developmen plan o he

curren HNP reorm plan.• Give ull and expediious consideraion o he Presi-

denial Commission on Securiy recommendaions,and reach broad agreemen on ollow-up acion.

• Progress in he public weapons regisraion program.

October 2010 to October 2011

• Make urher progress in all areas ha were oulined by he Haiian Naional Police eorm Plan, so ha by he end o 2011, mos key objecives o he HNP

eorm Plan would be atained or wihin reach asollows: – HNP srengh a 14,000 adequaely rained and

proessional ocers – HNP cericaion process complee – HNP capaciy able o provide essenial police

services hroughou he counry • Provide susainable securiy along he land and mar-

iime borders, drawing on inernaional assisanceand complemenary bilaeral aciviies as necessary.

• Approve urher developmen planning or he HNP.

• Complee regisraion or approximaely 31,000 weapons.


By February 2006, condence had increased in he HNPo he level ha 38,836 Haiian ciizens had applied or







90


Case Study: United Nations Interim

Administration Mission in Kosovo


Kosovo, because o is geographical locaion beweenSerbia and Albania, has a long hisory o being invadedand o occupaion. Kosovo was invaded in World WarsI and II and has had is borders revised on several occa-sions. As a resul o hose hisorical acions, inerehnicensions worsened hroughou he 1980s (SANU, 1986).

Following he disinegraion o Yugoslavia and he sign-ing o he Dayon Agreemen in 1995 ha ended he war inBosnia, he Kosovo Liberaion Army (KLA), an ehnic Al-

banian guerrilla group, conroned he Serbian and Yugoslav securiy orces, which resuled in conic and he beginningo he Kosovo War (ogel, 2003). Te nearly wo-year warresuled in more han 1 million ehnic Albanians eeing or

being driven rom Kosovo, wih more han 11,000 peoplekilled and 3,000 idenied as missing (BBC News, 1999).

Te Kosovo War was brough o an end in Febru-ary 1999 wih he draing o he ambouille Accords.However, he Serbs ound he erms o his accord unac-cepable, and hey reused o sign he dra. Tis acionresuled in (a) an exensive Norh Alanic reay Or-

ganizaion (NAO) bombing campaign o Yugoslavia,(b) he agreemen by he Serbians o a oreign miliary presence wihin Kosovo, and (c) a wihdrawal o Serbianroops (NAO, 2010c).

Te Kosovo Force (KFO), a NAO-led inernaionalmiliary peacekeeping orce responsible or esablishingsecuriy in Kosovo, enered he counry on June 12, 1999.

Alhough KFO comprised only miliary personnel, ismandae was o esablish and mainain public saey andcivil order (NAO, 2010b). However, KFO’s abiliy omainain public saey and civil law and order was limied

because o is concenraion on esablishing he missionand deploying personnel (Unied Naions, 1999h).


Parallel o he NAO esablishmen o KFO, he UniedNaions (UN) adoped esoluion 1244 on June 10, 1999.

Tis resoluion esablished he civilian Unied NaionsInerim Adminisraion Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)or an iniial period o 12 monhs (Unied Naions,1999e). Te resoluion idenied ha an advance eam

would be deployed o Kosovo o develop and plan hemission. Te rs police ocers wihin UNMIK were de-ployed on July 3, 1999, as liaisons o ve locaions inKosovo (Unied Naions, 1999h).

Te mission was o be comprehensive, involvingno only police reorm, bu also governmen insiuion

building. I included esablishing an inerim civilian ad-minisraion led by he UN (Unied Naions, 2010l). Temandae adoped by he UN Securiy Council (2010l)asked he UNMIK o do he ollowing:

• Perorm basic civilian adminisraive uncions.• Promoe he esablishmen o subsanial auonomy

and sel-governmen.• Faciliae a poliical process o deermine Kosovo’s

uure saus.• Coordinae humaniarian and disaser relie o all in-

ernaional agencies.• Suppor he reconsrucion o key inrasrucure.• Mainain civil law and order.• Promoe human righs.• Ensure he sae and unimpeded reurn o all reugees

and displaced persons o heir homes in Kosovo.

Alhough UNMIK was led by he UN, he missioncomprised individual sraegic pillars, each led by a di-eren insiuion (Unied Naions, 2010l). Te our pil-lars were as ollows:

• Pillar 1—Humaniarian assisance led by he UniedNaions Oce o he High Commissioner or eugees

• Pillar 2—Civil adminisraion led by he UN• Pillar 3—Democraizaion and insiuional building

led by he Organisaion or Securiy and Co-operaionin Europe (OSCE)

• Pillar 4—econsrucion and economic develop-men led by he European Union (EU)

Pillar 1 included he conrol and oversigh o policeand jusice aciviies. Te UNMIK advisers were o in-crease police eors o mainain law and order. Tey were







Kosovo

93

able 11.1 presens he oal number o UNMIK civilian police ocers deployed rom Sepember 1999 oMarch 2009. Te able shows how he police componeno he mission changed since he reorm o he local po-

lice began in 1999. Te numbers o personnel deployedin he police componen o he mission remained reason-ably consan rom lae-2000 unil mid-2003 and henagain in early 2004 unil lae 2005. Te number o o-cers began o decrease aer 2005.

o implemen he mandae as described by he UniedNaions (1999e), he police componen o he UNMIK comprised hree inegraed phases:

• Phase I—KFO is responsible or public saey andorder unil he civilian police presence is able o ake

over he responsibiliy.• Phase II—UNMIK civilian police underake normal

police duies wih execuive auhoriy.• Phase III—Law enorcemen and border policing

uncions are ranserred o he KPS.

Te UNMIK began developing and reorming heKPS immediaely upon deploymen. Te KPS was re-srucured in accord wih inernaional sandards o dem-ocraic policing, and recruis were screened and heir

backgrounds checked. Te KPS was o be ehnically rep-

resenaive o he populaion. o achieve his goal, heUNMIK underook background screening o recrui ap-plicans and assessing he perormance o he applicans(Unied Naions, 1999e). able 11.2 presens he com-posiion o he KPS rom Ocober 2002 o March 2009and demonsraes ha alhough here had been an in-crease in he oal number o KPS ocers, he percen-age o Kosovo Serbians deployed remained sable, andhe percenage o oher ehniciies and women employeddecreased.

UNMIK developed and implemened an insiuion- building componen o he KPS, which included deliver-ing on-he-job raining, providing advice and monioring(Unied Naions, 1999e), and improving he awarenesso human righs (Unied Naions, 2000i). o ensure haan inerace was developed beween he UNMIK policeand he public, he UNMIK rained a cadre o local com-muniy liaison ocers (Unied Naions, 1999a), who

would be based a every police saion in Kosovo and

Table 11.1. UNMIK Civilian Police Sta Numbers, September 1999 to March 2009

Year MonthUNMIK Civilian Police

Ocersa

1999 September 1,100

December 1,817

2000 March 2,361

May 3,626

September 4,000

December 4,400

2001 March 4,445

June 4,387

October 4,375

December 4,465

2002 June 4,524

October 4,274

2003 March 4,389

June 4,067

September 3,727

December 3,735

2004 March 3,248

June 3,524

October 3,611

2005 January 3,451

December 2,143

2006 May 2,106

August 1,990

October 1,895

2007 February 1,984

June 1,997

August 1,993

November 2,011

2008 March 2,006

June 2,056

October 1,8802009 March 49

Source: Auhor (rom Unied Naions documens). Noe: a. From Sepember 2000 hrough March 2009, he gurescomprise advisers and members o ormed police unis (FPUs).



94


who would concenrae on building links wih vulnerableminoriy communiies (Unied Naions, 2000i).

Under he mandae, KFO was responsible or demili-arizing he Kosovo orces. Te major iniiaive o he de-mobilizaion was o incorporae suiably qualied KLA members ino he proposed Kosovo Proecion Corps(KPC). In ac, he KPC was o consis o up o 3,000 aciveand 2,000 reserve members and was no o have any role inlaw enorcemen or he mainenance o law and order. TeKPC was o be used only or civil emergencies, or search-and-rescue missions, or demining projecs, and or rebuild-ing inrasrucure and housing (Unied Naions, 1999j).

In mid-2000, UNMIK developed a sraegic plan oocus on he mission’s planning. Te resuling plan pro-

vided a ramework o ideniy orhcoming asks ha would ensure eecive coordinaion beween he mis-

sion’s componens (and wih KFO) and he proceduresha had been developed o address key policy and opera-ional issues (Unied Naions, 2000d).

Te UNMIK also esablished a special ask orce hadesigned a number o programs o arge ehnic violence.Te ask orce comprised sa members rom UNMIK and KFO who implemened he program in conjuncion

wih he inormaion coordinaion group (Unied Naions,2000g). Te ask orce’s responses included “he provisiono miliary and police parols” and “personal proecion orhigh-risk individuals” (Unied Naions, 2000i).

In Sepember 2000, he UNMIK esablished hreenew regional police raining ceners and developed araining program or uure KPS supervisors. A proce-dure was also designed o ranser he responsibiliies o he KPS academy o he KPS (Unied Naions, 2000i).

Table 11.2. Composition o Kosovo Police Service, October 2002 to March 2009

DateTotal

KosovoAlbanians

KosovoSerbians

OtherEthnicity

Men Women

Year Month % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.2002 October 5,240 85.23 4,184 8.11 498 6.67 558 84.34 4,419 15.66 821

2003 March 5,247 84.09 4,407 9.20 473 6.67 367 84.60 4,460 15.00 787

June 5,207 84.26 4,387 9.51 495 6.24 325 84.71 4,411 15.29 796

October 5,769 84.36 4,867 9.41 543 6.23 359 82.40 4,904 17.60 865

December 5,704 84.60 4,823 9.30 529 6.20 352 85.20 4,860 14.80 844

2004 June 5,983 84.50 5,054 9.50 567 6.00 362 85.20 5,100 14.80 883

October 6,282 84.50 5,309 9.40 593 6.00 380 85.60 5,382 14.30 900

2005 January 6,254 84.60 5,290 9.40 585 6.00 379 85.80 5,365 14.20 889

December 6,864 84.50 5,800 9.67 664 5.83 400 86.10 5,910 13.90 954

2006 May 6,826 84.52 5,769 9.65 659 5.83 398 86.21 5,885 13.90 941

August 7,249 84.05 6,093 10.17 737 5.78 419 86.33 6,258 13.67 991

October 7,185 83.94 6,031 10.30 740 5.76 414 86.40 6,208 13.60 977

2007 February 7,215 83.99 6,060 10.31 744 5.70 411 86.44 6,237 13.56 978

August 7,200 84.31 6,070 10.04 723 5.65 407 86.36 6,218 13.64 982

November 7,160 84.37 6,041 10.00 716 5.63 403 86.41 6,187 13.59 973

2008 March 7,106 84.45 6,001 9.96 708 5.59 397 86.48 6,145 13.52 961

June 7,076 84.51 5,980 9.92 702 5.57 394 86.48 6,119 13.52 957

October 7,043 84.48 5,950 10.00 704 5.52 389 86.57 6,097 13.43 946

2009 March 7,070 84.60 5,981 9.92 701 5.49 388 86.66 6,127 13.34 943

Source: Auhor (rom various Unied Naions documens).





96


Inernal Aairs (Unied Naions, 2006b). Te UNMIK also provided assisance in draing he regulaion hacodied he ramework and he guiding principles o heKPS, hus esablishing “concree guaranees or minori-

ies” (Unied Naions, 2006j).Te KPS esablished municipal and local public saey

commitees in 13 o he 17 communiies (Unied Na-ions, 2007d) ha were o work alongside he police. A number o police subsaions were opened o increase helevel o decenralizaion ha would creae sronger rela-ions wih local communiies (Unied Naions, 2006j).Te esablishmen o he communiy liaison ramework

was suppored by he implemenaion o he Kosovo policeinspecorae in lae 2006 (Unied Naions, 2006y), whichassumed responsibiliy or he audi and inspecion ele-

mens o he KPS and “or invesigaing all complains”agains he service (Unied Naions, 2007s).In lae 2006, he KPS, in conjuncion wih he Minisry

o Inernal Aairs and he Minisry o Jusice, docu-mened is sraegic acion and nancial managemenplans or 2007–11 (Unied Naions, 2006y). Tis movecreaed a sable managemen environmen or he ser-

vice. A his ime, he KPS nalized is chain o com-mand or civil emergencies, changed he name o heKosovo Police Service School o he Kosovo Cenre orPublic Saey Educaion and Developmen, and creaedan independen proessional sandards board (UniedNaions, 2007i).

eorming he KPS creaed a sable environmenha allowed democraic insiuions o be developed,helped naional elecions o be held, and enabled iner-nally (IDP) and exernally (EDP) displaced persons oreurn o heir respecive communiies (Unied Naions,2008r). able 11.3 idenies he number o reurning

IDPs and EDPs or each year rom 2000 o 2007, as wellas he oal number or he enire period.


Te rs evaluaion o he KPS reorm was underaken inMay 2004 ollowing he violence ha occurred in Marcho he same year. Te evaluaion ocused “on he scheduleor ransiion o saion command rom UNMIK policeo [he] KPS, he increase in he nal arge number o KPS special police unis rom hree o ve, he procure-men o basic ani-rio equipmen or all police saions,and he provision o ani-rio raining or all KPS mem-

bers” (Unied Naions, 2004m).

Following he evaluaion, he UNMIK revised heranser o police saions o he KPS, a change ha wasincluded in he ransiion plan o “ensure ha saionsha perormed well would ransiion o KPS conrol ear-lier han hose where signican problems were [being]experienced.” Te plan reained he exising ransiionprocess and ensured ha all saions and regional head-quarers were ranserred o KPS conrol by mid-2006(Unied Naions, 2004m).

In June 2008, he secreary-general noed ha hemission had made progress in compleing he asks con-ained in he mandae, “since he incepion o he Missionin 1999, he scope o aciviies ha i has perormed has

been reduced signicanly.” Te secreary-general alsonoed ha “wihou careul managemen, recen develop-mens and uure emerging realiies on he ground couldlead o increasing ension beween he Kosovo communi-ies and [could] conribue o ricion beween UNMIK and oher acors, local and inernaional, in Kosovo.” For

Table 11.3. Number o Returning Internally and Externally Displaced Persons to Kosovo,2000 to 2007

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total

Number 1,906 1,453 2,754 3,801 2,469 2,126 1,627 1,685 17,821

Source: Adaped rom Unied Naions (2008r).



Kosovo

97

hose reasons, a review o he mission was underakeno ensure ha i was suiably srucured o address cur-ren and emerging operaional requiremens in Kosovo(Unied Naions, 2008h).

Conclusion

Te UNMIK was signicanly dieren rom previousUN civilian police missions (Jones e al., 2005; Greener,2009; Bayley and Perio, 2010). Te police componeno he mission was o provide emporary policing ser-

vices and o esablish and develop a proessional, impar-ial, and independen local police. UNMIK was he rsUN mission o include an armed execuive police com-

ponen in a region where here was no hos governmen(Dwan, 2002; Bayley and Perio, 2010). Furhermore,

he UN had aced a sweeping underaking ha was un-precedened in boh scope and srucural complexiy.No oher mission had invied oher mulilaeral orga-nizaions o become ull parners under UN leadership

(Unied Naions, 2010l).Te slow arrival o UN police coningens a he be-

ginning o he mission creaed a siuaion where he UN was unable o resore order and esablish he rule o law.Te siuaion iniially undermined he inernaional mis-sion and encouraged exremiss o engage in ehnic vio-lence (Bayley and Perio, 2010).

Bayley and Perio (2010) claim ha lessons can belearned rom he mission o Kosovo. Fuure missions needo be comprehensive and o include police, cours, and pris-ons. Tose hree componens o he jusice secor should

be esablished a he beginning o he mission o ensureha order is resored and ha public securiy is creaed.







100



in Liberia

Background to the MissionLiberia has suered wo disinc and dieren civil wars:he rs rom 1989 o 1996 and he second rom 1997 o2003, which led o 200,000 civilian deahs, o 1 millionreugees, and o a complee breakdown o law and order(Unied Naions Mission in Liberia, 2010).

1989 to 1996

On December 24, 1989, a miliia group, he Naional Pa-

rioic Fron o Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles aylor, anex-Liberian governmen miniser who was accused o em-

bezzlemen, invaded Liberia and conroned governmenorces (Unied Naions Mission in Liberia, 2010). TeNPFL laer spli ino wo groups: he original NPFL anda second group, he Independen Naional Parioic Frono Liberia (INPFL), which was led by Prince Johnson.

Te Liberian Army realiaed severely agains he Libe-rian civilian populaion, “atacking unarmed civilians and

burning villages” (Unied Naions Mission in Liberia, 2010), which caused a large number o persons o be displaced,

wih many leaving he counry or Guinea and Côe d’Ivoire.By lae 1990, he INPFL conrolled he capial ciy o Monrovia, and he NPFL conrolled he remainder o hecounry (Unied Naions Mission in Liberia, 2010).

Te civil war coninued unil he Economic Commu-niy o Wes Arican Saes (ECOWAS) brokered a peaceagreemen in Coonou, Benin, on July 25, 1993. Tisagreemen ollowed a number o unsuccessul peace agree-mens. Following he signing o he Coonou Agreemen,he Unied Naions (UN) esablished he Observer Mis-sion in Liberia (UNOMIL), whose mandae i was o assis

wih he implemenaion and compliance o he agreemen by all paries (Unied Naions Mission in Liberia, 2010).

Te Coonou Agreemen broke down because o de-lays in is implemenaion, and ghing resumed beweenhe NPFL and he INPFL. In lae 1995, a supplemenary agreemen was negoiaed, which led o a cease-re ando Charles aylor’s being eleced presiden (Unied Na-ions Mission in Liberia, 2010).

1997 to 2003

Following he elecion o Charles aylor as presiden in July 1997, he civil war slowed bu did no end. Violence

and ghing coninued and a new miliia was ormed: heLiberians or econciliaion and Democracy (LUD).Teir aim was o desabilize he governmen and o gainconrol o he local diamond elds. Tose conronaionsled o he Second Liberian Civil War (Unied NaionsMission in Liberia, 2010).

In November 1997, he UN esablished he Peace-Building Suppor Oce in Liberia (UNOL). Is ask

was o help he Liberian governmen consolidae peaceollowing he July 1997 elecions. However, he UNOL

was no able o achieve is mandae because o he gh-

ing and “he inabiliy o he Governmen and opposiionpary leaders o resolve heir dierences over key issues o governance” (Unied Naions Mission in Liberia, 2010).

Te Second Liberian Civil War evenually ended in July 2003 when he Unied Saes inervened by sendingin he U.S. Marines.

During he period o 1989–2003, he Liberian Na-ional Police (LNP) was alleged “o have uncionedmore as an insrumen o repression han as an enorcero law and order” (Unied Naions, 2003c). Furhermore,he LNP was idenied as being corrup and incompe-

en, and i did no have he condence o he public. Tesiuaion was compounded by he aylor governmen’sdisregard or he rule o law and by he breakdown o sup-poring judicial insiuions (Unied Naions, 2003c).

Te signing o he Accra Comprehensive Peace Agree-men (CPA) in 2003 called or reorming and resrucur-ing he LNP, having an inerim police orce mainain law and order, and evenually deploying a newly rained na-ional police orce. Te CPA also idenied ha he UN

was “o monior he aciviies o he inerim police orce,assis in he mainenance o law and order, and help odevelop and implemen police raining programmes, in-cluding gender raining” (Unied Naions, 2003c).


Te Unied Naions Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was es-ablished by UN Securiy Council esoluion 1509, which



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was adoped on Sepember 19, 2003. Te mission was osuppor he implemenaion o a cease-re agreemen andhe peace process and o assis “in naional securiy reorm”(Unied Naions, 2003r). Te reorm would include moni-

oring and resrucuring he police orce o Liberia o en-sure ha i complied wih democraic policing principlesand developed a police raining program (Unied Naions,2003r; 2010p). Te resoluion auhorized “he deploy-men o a Unied Naions peacekeeping operaion wiha roop srengh o up o 15,000, including 250 miliary observers, 160 sa ocers, up o 875 UN police ocers,and an addiional ve armed ormed unis each compris-ing 120 ocers” (Unied Naions, 2003c; 2003r).

Te mission was esablished under Chaper VII o heCharer o he Unied Naions and was auhorized or an

iniial period o 12 monhs rom Ocober 1, 2003, ollow-ing he ranser o auhoriy rom he orces o heECOWAS-led mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) o UNMIL(Unied Naions, 2003r). Te ECOMIL mission was oac as liaison wih ECOWAS and was o provide he “main-enance o law and order hroughou Liberia.” I was de-signed o be a “mulidimensional operaion composed o poliical, miliary, civilian police, criminal jusice, civil a-airs, human righs, gender, child proecion, disarmamen,demobilizaion and reinegraion, public inormaion, andsuppor componens, as well as an elecoral componen in

due course” (Unied Naions, 2003c). Mission personnel were o be co-locaed wih heir counerpars in local na-ional insiuions (Unied Naions, 2003c).

o ensure ha he process o reorm he LNP wasransparen, credible, and ecien, UNMIL esablisheda echnical commitee ha was o “develop a plan or re-srucuring and reorganizing he Liberian naional police.”I also was o assis in deermining “he composiion, se-lecion, and veting o would-be members o he inerimpolice orce” (Unied Naions, 2003c). As discussed by he Unied Naions (2003c), he commitee would “o-cus on areas o poenial reorm,” including he ollowing:

• Have he police resrucure and revision he legalramework governing he police.

• Esablish he crieria or he selecion and veting o new and ormer police ocers.

• Assess inrasrucure and logisical needs and plan-ning or renovaions or repairs.

• Develop an oce o coordinae inernaional assis-ance o he police service.

Te deploymen plan or he UNMIL civilian police

componen idenied ha personnel would be “gradu-ally deployed in phases o provide advice and operaionalsuppor o he inerim police orce and o help resrucure,rain, and advise in he developmen o a proessional” LNP(Unied Naions, 2003c). Te concep o operaions orhe civilian police componen, as discussed in he UniedNaions (2003c), consised o he ollowing our phases:

• Phase 1—Ocober o December 2003. Te ocus o his phase was on deermining he mission acionplans and esablishing he oundaions or he deploy-men o he core civilian police componen ha wouldassis he inerim police orce in law-and-order unc-ions. wo ormed police unis (FPUs) were also de-ployed during his phase o sabilize he law-and-ordersiuaion in and around he capial ciy o Monrovia.

• Phase 2—December 2003 o February 2004. Tisphase consised o deploying addiional civilian po-lice advisers, rainers, and an addiional hree FPUsin he remaining hree regional headquarers. econ-siuion and rehabiliaion iniiaives were o beginduring his phase.

• Phase 3—March 2004 o he end o he mission.

Tis phase consised o raining and developing heLNP wih a ocus on coordinaing and inegraing allcapaciy developmen eors.

• Phase 4—Following he end o he mission. UN civil-ian police were o reain a limied number o core ad-

visers during he nal period o help local police carry on he reorm and capaciy enhancemen iniiaives.

Te ve FPUs were o be saioned in Monrovia and were o suppor he LNP in high-end law enorcemen,including crowd conrol. Te deploymen o he FPUs

would allow he LNP o concenrae on as-rack raininginiiaives. As described by he Unied Naions (2003c;2003n), he FPUs were mandaed o do he ollowing:

• Suppor he inerim police orce in is law-and-orderuncions in several major populaion areas.

• Assis he inerim police orce in addressing civil dis-order problems.



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• Assis in developing local srucure and capaciy omee such challenges in he uure.

• Suppor he proecion o civilian lives and propery in areas o deploymen.

Te mandae o he UNMIL idenied he asks ha were o be given prioriy by he civilian police compo-nen. According o Unied Naions (2003c), he asks in-cluded he ollowing:

• Assis in resrucuring he police service, including ve-ing and ceriying inerim law enorcemen ocers.

• eacivae he police academy, and help develop gen-eral and hemaic police raining programs, includingmenoring and on-he-job raining.

• Advise, repor, and ollow up on he aciviies o inerimpolice orce members regarding heir compliance wihproessional sandards and human righs obligaions.

• Assis in he social reinegraion o he disarmed anddemobilized combaans ino civil sociey hroughmuual condence-building iniiaives o commu-niy policing pracices.

• Assis in overall enhancemen o he law enorce-men capaciy, including border policing, cusoms,immigraions, por auhoriy, and oher relaed sec-ors o he inernal securiy.

Te civil aairs componen o UNMIL was o ac asa liaison wih he civilian police componen o he mis-sion. As described by he Unied Naions (2003c), heUNMIL civil aairs componen was o do he ollowing:

• Assis he naional ransiional governmen exend andconsolidae sae auhoriy hroughou he counry.

• Provide advice and assisance o he naional ransi-ional governmen in planning or elecions.

• Assis and build he capaciy o civil sociey organi-zaions.

• Assis in ormulaing programs o reinegrae and oreconcile vicims and perperaors o he war.

• Assis he civilian police in reorming and resrucur-ing he local police and promoing he paricipaiono women in he local police orce and in audiinghe perormance o he police and oher agencies in-

volved in mainaining law and order.

• Coordinae he aciviies o a commitee ha ischarged wih invesigaing and reporing on he con-duc o personnel hroughou he mission area.

• Deliver inducion raining or all civilian and miliary

sa members o he mission.

Te secreary-general o he UN noed ha he po-lice componen o he mission was o be decenralized,

wih civilian police being “saioned in regional o-ces and numerous oher locaions hroughou Libe-ria” (Unied Naions, 2003k) and wih eams o civilianpolice ocers “deployed in all our secors o UNMILand a he Mission’s headquarers in Monrovia” (UniedNaions, 2003n). Te civilian police componen o hemission was o “be responsible or conducing an assess-

men o Liberia’s law enorcemen sysem and is over-all srucure, as well as developing and implemening aprogramme or he resrucuring o he LNP” (UniedNaions, 2003n).

Te UNMIL mandae was renewed annually on heanniversary o is expiraion; as o June 2010, he mission

was ongoing. In mid-2006, he UN Securiy Council reviewed he mission’s mandae by auhorizing an increasein he size o he mission’s police componen by 125 o-cers (Unied Naions, 2006ab) and idenied our new asks ha were o be given prioriy. Te UNMIL civil-

ian police componen, according o he Unied Naions(2006e), was o do he ollowing:

• Mainain a sable and secure environmen.• Assis he governmen o complee he reinegraion

and rehabiliaion program or ex-combaans.• Faciliae he compleion o he reurn and resetle-

men o reugees and inernally displaced persons.• Accelerae he raining and insiuional develop-

men o he LNP and oher securiy agencies, includ-ing demobilizing he ormer police.

A second review o he mission’s mandae was under-aken because o increasing challenges hroughou hecounry ha relaed o he mainenance o law and or-der. In early 2008, he UN Securiy Council auhorizedan increase rom ve o seven FPUs, which represenedan increase rom 605 o 845 personnel (Unied Naions,2008k).





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he oal number o UNMIL civilian police sa membersrom December 2003 o February 2010.

In May 2004, he UNMIL esablished a ule o Law Implemenaion Commitee o “ensure a holisic ap-proach in supporing he reorm o Liberia’s securiy secor” and “o coordinae he reorm o he police, he

judiciary, and correcional insiuions” (Unied Naions,2004j). Te commitee developed a sraegy o reormand resrucure he Liberian police and proposed a new name or he Liberian Police Service (LPS).

Te UNMIL civilian police also esablished a recrui-men drive ha was or he new police service and haemphasized he need or an ehnic and gender balance. Allnew recruis were o complee a hree-monh raining pro-

gram a he Liberian Police Service raining Cenre anda six-monh, on-he-job raining program. Upon comple-ion o on-he-job raining, he candidaes reurned o heacademy or nal esing (Unied Naions, 2004j).

In March 2005, he UNMIL—in conjuncion wihhe UN missions in Sierra Leone and Côe d’Ivoire andhe Unied Naions Oce or Wes Arica—esablishedan iner-mission working group o enhance coopera-ion in sharing inormaion and ormulaing join sra-egies. Te working group ocused on aciliaing lessonslearned, on sharing inormaion, and on “developing

long-erm sraegies in suppor o he peace processes inhe hree regions and [on] coordinaing join aciviies”(Unied Naions, 2005g).

In March 2006, he UNMIL civilian police componenchanged heir exising operaional police reorm approacho he LPS o one o providing menoring, monioring,and echnical advice on general insiuional police devel-opmen and specically on elecion securiy (Unied Na-ions, 2005j, 2006e). UNMIL provided assisance o heLPS and oher naional Liberian securiy agencies in de-

veloping a deploymen plan (Unied Naions, 2005j). Te

deploymen plan covered police parol and assignmeno personal proecion duies (Unied Naions, 2005s).However, he ransiional governmen was slow o imple-men he police reorms (Unied Naions, 2005j).

o assis wih he new LPS, UNMIL advised he gov-ernmen abou he appoinmens o a new direcor o po-lice and a number o depuy and assisan direcors. Teappoinmens o new LPS senior execuives led o rede-ploying several senior police ocials who had been ap-poined under he previous adminisraion and had beenrained by he UN police (Unied Naions, 2006k).

In June 2006, UNMIL developed a number o bench-marks o guide Phase I o he consolidaion, drawdown,and wihdrawal o he UNMIL. Te benchmarks com-prised our major areas and included securiy, gover-nance and he rule o law, economic revializaion, andinrasrucure and basic services. Compleing he bench-marks was criical o deermine wha he pace and im-ing o he mission’s drawdown and evenual wihdrawal

Table 12.1. UNMIL Civilian Police Sta Numbers, December 2003 to February 2010

Year MonthTotal Civilian Police

Ocers2003 December 158a

2004 March 278

May 720

August 1,090

December 1,104

2005 March 1,059

August 1,090

December 1,088

2006 March 1,016

June 1,051

September 1,056

December 1,098

2007 March 1,201

August 1,177

2008 March 1,194

August 1,092

2009 February 1,225b

August 1,343c

2010 February 2,164d

Source: Auhor (rom various Unied Naions documensdaed 2003 o 2010).

Noes: a. Includes 120 ocers in ormed police unis (FPUs).

b. Includes 722 ocers in FPUs.

c. Includes 855 ocers in FPUs.

d. Includes 844 ocers in FPUs.





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he resumpion o he disarmamen, demobilizaion, reine-graion and repariaion process” (Unied Naions, 2004g).

However, even wih hose improvemens, he law andorder and he securiy siuaion remained ragile hrough

early 2006. Exacerbaing he siuaion were he armedrobberies by criminal gangs, he slow reinegraion o ex-combaans, and he slow resrucuring and reorm o hepolice service (Unied Naions, 2006e; 2006).

In early 2007, he governmen o Liberia decided oincrease he size o he Police Quick eacion Force rom500 members o 4,000 members. A larger quick reacionorce ensured ha he police had “he capaciy o respondquickly, ecienly, and robusly o major breaches o in-ernal securiy” (Unied Naions, 2007e).

In mid-2007, he governmen developed a new na-

ional securiy sraegy and archiecure, which denedhe respecive roles o he LPS and oher law enorcemenagencies, including he Armed Forces o Liberia. Te new sraegy included a provision or a naional policymakingand crisis managemen capaciy as well as an inelligencegahering agency. Tis srucure was o ensure ha Libe-ria’s securiy secor could anicipae and address securiy hreas beore hey maerialized (Unied Naions, 2007j).

By mid-2008, UNMIL made appreciable progress inreorming and resrucuring he LNP. UNMIL’s prog-ress included (a) providing he LNP wih equipmen

and inrasrucure and deploying ino he counies and(b) providing basic raining or 3,661 ocers. However,a number o challenges remained in he developmen o he LPS, especially in relaion o he LPS’s operaional ca-paciy (Unied Naions, 2008k).

In early 2009, UNMIL, in conjuncion wih he gov-ernmen, developed a naional securiy sraegy, whichinvolved all securiy and law enorcemen agencies andincluded a deailed implemenaion marix. Te new se-curiy sraegy provided a road map or securiy secorreorm and ormed he basis o a ve-year sraegic planor he LNP. Te police sraegic plan included a compre-hensive developmen ramework and a suppor programo aciliae is implemenaion (Unied Naions, 2009b).


In early 2006, a UN assessmen mission idenied ha i was oo early o draw down UNMIL. Tis view was sup-

pored by he governmen o guaranee peace and sabil-iy in he counry. However, he UN assessmen missionrecognized ha as several o he iniial asks assigned oUNMIL were compleed, he size and conguraion o he

mission needed o be reviewed (Unied Naions, 2006e). A second UN assessmen mission ha visied Liberia

in early 2007 idenied ha any proposed drawdown o UNMIL civilian police should be linked o he progressmade in achieving he mission’s mandae. According ohe Unied Naions (2007j), he assessmen mission pro-posed ha he ollowing ve core benchmarks should beachieved beore a drawdown began:

• Complee he basic raining o 3,500 LPS personnel by July 2007.

• Complee police operaing procedures by December2008.

• Complee he ormaion o he 500-member PoliceQuick eacion Uni by July 2009.

• Equip police personnel and heir deploymen o hecounies, as well as build police inrasrucure by De-cember 2010.

• Finalize he naional securiy sraegy and archiec-ure and is implemenaion hroughou he counry

by December 2008.

Te second assessmen mission also recommendedha he UNMIL civilian police componen gradually re-duce in size rom 498 police advisers in seven sages be-ween April 2008 and December 2010. Te assessmenmission recommended ha police advisers wih special-is policing skills—especially in orensics, criminal inves-igaion, managemen, inelligence, operaions, organizedcrime, proessional sandards, drug enorcemen, airporsecuriy, and proecion o women and children—be de-ployed o he mission. Te deploymen would be dur-ing rouine roaions so as o provide he naional policeorce wih advanced raining and appropriae menoring(Unied Naions, 2007j).

Conclusion

o help wih he implemenaion o a comprehensive se-curiy ramework, he governmen made progress on sev-



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eral reorm agendas, including ghing agains corrupion,reorming public nancial managemen, and developingoverall sraegies or srenghening he LNP and he ruleo law secor (Unied Naions, 2009b). However, as lae

as mid-2008, he LPS coninued o sruggle o achieve alevel o susained operaional eeciveness ha would en-able hem, independenly o UNMIL, o provide a qual-iy and an ecien service (Unied Naions, 2008k).

Alhough he LPS had increased in size and a number o police saions had been reurbished in he counies andheir presence had increased in he counies, he LPS was

weak and lacked capaciy (Unied Naions, 2008k).Te presence o he LPS ouside he capial remained

limied because o severe logisical and inrasrucurelimiaions. Te LPS also remained consrained by in-

dividual compeencies, especially in regard o “manage-men capaciy and specialised skills.” Te siuaion wasexacerbaed by weak LPS “command and conrol sruc-ures, including he capaciy o plan and execue opera-

ional aciviies” and experienced “coninued problemso misconduc and discipline” (Unied Naions, 2009b).

As a resul o hose challenges, he mission’s prelimi-nary assessmen ound ha is police componen neededo remain a is curren srengh or he shor erm. Temission would coninue o provide operaional supporand advice, wih an increased emphasis on parol supervi-sion, saion command, communiy policing, and emer-gency response uni suppor. Te mission would alsogive echnical advice o he leadership o he LNP leader-ship (Unied Naions, 2009b).





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Chapter 13

Palestinian Territories

Map 13.1. Palestinian Territories (Israel)Source: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.



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Case Study: European Union Police

Co-ordinating Oce or Palestinian

Police Support


In April 2005, ollowing a diplomaic exchange beweenhe European Union (EU) and he Palesinian primeminiser, he European Council esablished he EuropeanUnion Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Sup-por (EU COPPS). Te EU COPPS police advisers pro-

vided guidance o he chie o he Palesinian Civil Policeand senior managemen abou organizaional reorm andsrucure and abou operaional issues. Members o he

mission aced as liaisons beween he Palesinians and in-ernaional sakeholders and coordinaed and monioreddonor assisance (European Union Co-ordinaing Oceor Palesinian Police Suppor, 2006).

In July 2005, he EU oreign minisers agreed hahe EU COPPS should ake he orm o a European Se-curiy and Deence Policy (ESDP) mission and buildupon he eors o he European Union Co-ordinaingOce or Palesinian Police Suppor (European UnionCo-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Suppor,2006). Tis agreemen led o he ransiion o EU

COPPS o he European Union Police Co-ordinaingOce or Palesinian Police Suppor (EUPOL COPPS)(European Union Co-ordinaing Oce or PalesinianPolice Suppor, 2006).


On June 18, 2005, he Council o he European Unionadoped Join Acion 2005/797/CFSP, which esab-lished EUPOL COPPS (Council o he European Union,2005d). Te mission was esablished iniially or hree

years rom January 1, 2006, and was o suppor he Pal-esinian Civil Police (PCP) o increase he level o saey and securiy as well as o enorce he rule o law (Councilo he European Union, 2005b). Te mandae o he mis-sion was exended in 2008 or a urher hree years ex-piring on December 31, 2010 (Council o he EuropeanUnion, 2008c).

Te EUPOL COPPS mission was included in heramework o he ESDP (Council o he European Union,2005a) and was o assis “he Palesinian Auhoriy incomplying wih is oad Map obligaions, in paricular,

wih regard o securiy and insiuion building.” Supporincluded providing advice on “consolidaing he Palesin-ian securiy organisaions ino hree services and repor-ing o an empowered Palesinian Miniser o Inerior.” Temission was o be complemenary o he exising inerna-ional developmen eors and was o “seek coherenceand co-ordinaion wih he capaciy-building acions o he Communiy, noably in he domain o criminal jus-ice” (Council o he European Union, 2005d).

Te ocus o EUPOL COPPS was o be long erm, andis aim was o “conribue o he esablishmen o susain-

able and eecive policing arrangemens under Palesin-ian ownership and in accordance wih bes inernaionalsandards. Te Mission was o cooperae wih he Com-muniy’s insiuion building programme as well as oherinernaional eors in he wider conex o he Securiy Secor including Criminal Jusice eorm” (Council o he European Union, 2005a; 2005d). Specically, heCouncil o he European Union (2005a; 2005d) sug-gesed ha he mission was o do he ollowing:

• Assis he PCP in implemening he Police Develop-

men Program by advising and menoring he PCP while ocusing on senior ocials a disric, head-quarers, and miniserial levels.

• Coordinae and aciliae EU and member sae assis-ance and, where requesed, inernaional assisanceo he PCP.

• Advise on police-relaed criminal jusice elemens.

Te mission was based in amallah and was madeup o 33 unarmed ocers and civilian expers who wereseconded rom EU member saes. Tese personnel didno have execuive auhoriy (Council o he EuropeanUnion, 2005a; European Union, 2010a).


In 2002, he Unied Saes, he EU, he ussia Federa-ion, and he Unied Naions (UN) agreed o assis



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111

Israel and he Palesinians in developing a peace agree-men. Te peace agreemen process led o developinga road map o orm an independen Palesinian sae.o help implemen he road map and o help he par-

ies comply wih heir obligaions, he EU esablishedhe European Union Coordinaing Oce or PalesinianPolice Suppor in early 2005 (Council o he EuropeanUnion, 2005a).

Te PCP is he only law enorcemen agency wihinhe Palesinian Auhoriy and consised o 18,700 ocers,12,100 o which were deployed in Gaza and 6,600 in he

Wes Bank (European Union Co-ordinaing Oce orPalesinian Police Suppor, 2006). Tose gures include3,000 Public Order Police (POP) in Gaza and 1,000 POPin he Wes Bank (European Union Co-ordinaing Oce

or Palesinian Police Suppor, 2006). Te PCP sruc-ure comprises 10 disric headquarers, wih amallahserving as he main cenral command, and 78 police a-ciliies in he Wes Bank (Palesine Minisry o Inerior,2008).

Following he deploymen o he EU COPPS in April2005, he mission police advisers in conjuncion wih hePCP developed he Palesinian Civil Police DevelopmenProgramme 2005–08 (PCPDP) (European Union Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Suppor, 2006).Te PCPDP was designed o ac as a blueprin o develop

he PCP over he ollowing hree years, and is primary objecive was o esablish a “ransparen and accounablepolice organisaion wih a clearly idenied role” (Euro-pean Union Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian PoliceSuppor, 2006). Te PCPDP was o operae wihin asound legal ramework, be capable o delivering an eec-ive and robus policing service, and be responsive o heneeds o sociey. I mus also be able o manage is humanand physical resources (European Union Co-ordinaingOce or Palesinian Police Suppor, 2006).

Te PCPDP consised o wo principal componens:a ransormaional plan and an operaional plan. Teransormaional plan presened a reorm o he PCPha included “undamenal organisaional changes” ha

would need o be implemened over he long erm. Teoperaional plan included operaional capaciy and per-ormance measuremens ha could be implemened inhe shor erm (European Union Co-ordinaing Oceor Palesinian Police Suppor, 2006).


Te EUPOL COPPS advisers were saioned in amal-lah and were primarily asked o suppor he Palesinian

Auhoriy o esablish susainable and eecive policingarrangemens (European Union, 2009b).

Te EUPOL COPPS iniially developed and delivered basic and specialis police raining o he PCP (EuropeanUnion, 2009b). Te mission also delivered rehabiliaionor in-service raining and courses o he PCP ha includedadvanced crime scene analysis, aninarcoics raining,managemen raining, and moorcycle echniques (Eu-ropean Union Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Po-lice Suppor, 2009). Te mission’s mandae was exendedunil 2010 and is scope was enlarged o include capaciy

building and ransorming he PCP (European Union Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Suppor, 2008).

Te EUPOL COPPS provided advice o he PCP onoperaional issues and on “longer erm ransormaional[organizaional] change.” Te mission’s approach also in-cluded he menoring o senior PCP ocers a he dis-ric and headquarers levels (European Union, 2009b).


Te EUPOL COPPS consised o 33 civilian police o-cers who advised and menored members o he PCPa all levels (Palesine Minisry o Inerior, 2008). oachieve his assisance, he Council o he EuropeanUnion (2005b) describes he mission as comprising heollowing our elemens:

1. Head o mission or police commissioner2. Advisory secion3. Program coordinaion secion4. Adminisraion secion

Te EUPOL COPPS, in conjuncion wih he PCP,esablished he Programme Seering Commitee (PSCO)ha would provide he ramework “o ransorm he PCPino an eecive, ecien, capable, and credible policeservice wihin hree years” and o implemen he sra-egies idenied in he PCPDP (Palesine Minisry o Inerior, 2008). o provide a srucure or he implemen-



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aion o he PCPDP sraegies, he PCPDP included heollowing seven Foundaions or Police eorm:

1. Criminal invesigaion

2. PCP criminal jusice3. Inormaion echnology and communicaions4. Specialized policing5. ransporaion6. raining and capaciy building7. Inrasrucure

o ensure ha he implemenaion o he PCPDPsraegies and he seven Foundaions or Police eormcould be measured, he Palesine Minisry o he Inerior(2008) described he ollowing objecives ha PSCO de-

veloped or he period rom 2008 o 2010:

• Connec: complee inernal conneciviy and com-muniy access.

• rain: conduc core and specialy raining resulingin a proessional and modern police orce.

• Build: achieve susainable operaional capaciy hrough prioriy inrasrucure.

• Equip: provide he righ ools or basic o complex policing soluions.

• Mobilize: complee mobilizaion ha enables rs-

response capaciy.

In 2009, he EUPOL COPPS reviewed he PCP’sraining program. Ta review ocused on he organiza-ional srucure, processes, equipmen, and inrasruc-ure. Drawing on he resuls o he review, he EUPOLCOPPS in conjuncion wih he PCP developed a rain-ing curriculum, which was based on a communiy civilianpolicing model and on bes inernaional policing san-dards (European Union Co-ordinaing Oce or Pales-inian Police Suppor, 2009).


According o he European Union (2010a), by he end o 2009, he main achievemens o he mission were as ollows:

• Suppor o he PCP or immediae operaional prior-iies and longer-erm ransormaional change as de-scribed in he Palesinian Civil Police DevelopmenProgramme

• Advice o and menoring o he PCP, specically se-nior ocials a disric and headquarers level

• Coordinaion and aciliaion o nancial assisance• Advice, program planning, and projec aciliaion

or he Palesinian Criminal Jusice Secor

As described by he European Union Co-ordinaingOce or Palesinian Police Suppor (2008), he missionalso assised wih he ollowing:

• Purchase equipmen and urniure, and reurbish

38 police saions in he Wes Bank.• Provide PCP raining in public order.• Esablish he Jericho Police raining Cenre.• Esablish he Explosive Ordnance Disposal Uni and

he Criminal Invesigaion Deparmen.


Te mission does no appear o have been evaluaed.However, in November 2009, he Council o he Euro-

pean Union noed ha he mission had provided adviceo he PCP on he civil policing model and on commu-niy policing (European Union, 2010a).

Conclusion

Te approach o he EUPOL COPPS police componen was comprehensive, especially in regard o creaing a se-cure environmen or he Palesinian public. However,he EUPOL COPPS is a police-cenered program anddid no ake ino accoun he complee Palesinian crimi-nal jusice sysem. For his reason, he mission plans oexpand he rule o law secion in he renewed missionmandae wih 20 addiional sa members (EuropeanUnion Co-ordinaing Oce or Palesinian Police Sup-por, 2006).



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Chapter 14

Sierra Leone

Map 14.1. Sierra LeoneSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.





Sierra Leone

115

sulaion wih he relevan UN agencies—assis hegovernmen o Sierra Leone in is eors o addresshe counry’s human righs needs.

Te primary role o he civilian police advisers waso help he governmen resore condence in he Si-erra Leone Police Force (SLPF) and o advise abou po-lice recruimen, pracice, raining, and resources needs(Unied Naions, 1998; 1999b). Te UNOMSIL civil-ian police were o “work closely wih a eam o policeadvisers deployed a he reques o Governmens romCommonwealh counries” (Unied Naions, 1998).

According o he Unied Naions (1999b), he civil-ian police were o also advise he governmen abou heollowing:

• especing inernaionally acceped sandards o po-licing in democraic socieies

• Planning he reorm and resrucuring o he SLPF• Monioring he progress in he SLPF’s reorm and

resrucuring


As a resul o he prolonged civil war, he SLPF was ba-

sically nonexisen. A large number o police had aban-doned heir poss or had been killed, and numerouspolice saions were desroyed or vandalized. Te SLPFdid no have he capaciy o provide any leadership oro plan sraegically, and i had no underaken any ormo raining since he civil war began (Unied Naions,1998i).

Alhough he SLPF had increased in size since 1996,i suered rom “inadequae logisical suppor,” a lack o equipmen, and low morale because o “unatracive sala-ries and poor condiions o service.” Te major problem

was he lack o vehicles ha would ensure mobilizaion(Unied Naions, 1998i).

Te lack o an eecive police organizaion was exac-erbaed by he breakdown in he enire jusice sysem.Cours operaed only in Freeown and in hree oher ci-ies, and he deenion aciliies were in poor condiion(Unied Naions, 1998i).


Te UNOMSIL civilian police advisors aced as liaisons wih he UNOMSIL Human ighs Uni and he Com-

monwealh Police Developmen ask Force or SierraLeone (CPDF) o provide advice and assisance ohe governmen in police raining, in police procedures

wihin a democraic sociey, and in he need or he po-lice o respec inernaionally acceped sandards o polic-ing (Unied Naions, 1998c, 1998d, 1998i).

o assis he mission in ullling is mandae, civil-ian police advisers visied a number o dieren policeregional headquarers, divisional headquarers, depar-mens, cours, police saions, and poss. During hose

visis, police advisers assessed he SLPF’s work meh-

ods and heir logisical and raining needs. Te prelimi-nary ndings and recommendaions rom he visis werepresened in a repor o he Sierra Leone governmen(Unied Naions, 1998i).

o improve he adminisraive eeciveness o heSLPF, he UNOMSIL civilian police resrucured he de-parmens o human resources, personnel developmen,and nance. Te resrucuring was designed o improvehe service and o sreamline “logisical accounabiliy,operaions, and crime managemen”; i also includedproviding assisance wih personnel selecion and rain-

ing (Unied Naions, 1998l).o improve operaional policing, UNOMSIL civil-ian police provided advice on developing and inroduc-ing a decenralized raining program and ocer reresherraining and on documening raining manuals (UniedNaions, 1998l).


Te UNOMSIL was made up o ve civilian police o-cers and, or he erm o he mission, aced as liaisons

wih he CPDF o ensure ha he SLPF’s developmen was coordinaed (Unied Naions, 1998; 1998l). Dur-ing he period rom 1999 o 2001, he mission helpedhe governmen develop principles and prioriies o heSLPF reorm and he sraegic developmen plan (UniedNaions, 1998i).



116


o assis he governmen in implemening he sra-egic developmen plan, he UNOMSIL civilian policeadvisers, in conjuncion wih he CPDF, inroduced anumber o pilo projecs o “improve communicaions

and equipmen and o inroduce eecive and ecienpolicing based on local needs and communiy involve-men” (Unied Naions, 1998l).


Te UNOMSIL police advisers helped he governmenmake considerable progress in he reorm and he recon-siuion o a uncioning police presence in he capial(Unied Naions, 1999c). However, he January 1999

rebel atack on Freeown resuled in he killings o morehan 200 police ocers and in he desrucion o policeequipmen and inrasrucure including he Criminal In-

vesigaion Deparmen Headquarers and all is les, re-cords, and documenaion (Unied Naions, 1999b).


Te secreary-general o he UN noed in mid-1999 haalhough progress in reorming and resrucuring he

SLPF was considerable, “resource consrains presen[ed]serious obsacles o he eecive and as implemenaiono reorm” (Unied Naions, 1998i) and o he reversal o he exensive “damage and he collapse o he police sruc-ure in mos pars” o Sierra Leone, which would “requiresubsanial exernal assisance” (Unied Naions, 1999c).

Conclusion

Alhough UNOMSIL was a small mission wih a spe-cic mandae, i was able o—wih he assisance o heCPDF—lay he groundwork and make signican in-roads ino creaing a srucure or reorming he SLPF.

UNOMSIL was erminaed on Ocober 22, 1999, whenhe UN Securiy Council auhorized deploymen o anew and signicanly larger peacekeeping operaion—he Unied Naions Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).Upon he erminaion o he UNOMSIL mandae, he

UN Securiy Council direced ha UNAMSIL wouldake over he subsanive civilian and miliary compo-nens o ha mission (Unied Naions, 2010h).


in Sierra Leone


On July 13, 1998, he UN Securiy Council esablishedhe Unied Naions Observers Mission in Sierra Leone(UNOMSIL) or an iniial period o six monhs, which

was subsequenly exended unil Ocober 22, 1999(Unied Naions, 2010g). Te primary role o he policecomponen o he mission was o assis he governmenin resoring he public’s condence in he Sierra LeonePolice Force (SLPF) and o advise he governmen aboupolice recruimen, pracice, raining, and resourcingneeds (Unied Naions, 1998; 1999b).

Conic beween he governmen and he rebels con-inued during he presence o UNOMSIL and on July 7,1999, boh sides signed an agreemen in Lomé o endhosiliies and o orm a governmen o naional uniy.Te agreemen expanded he role o he UNOMSIL(Unied Naions, 2010g).


On Ocober 22, 1999, he UN Securiy Council adopedesoluion 1270, which esablished he Unied NaionsMission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) or an iniial pe-riod o six monhs. Te mission was o have an auhorizedsrengh o 6,000 miliary personnel and was o includesix civilian police advisers (Unied Naions, 1999o).

Te mandae o he mission, as described by he UniedNaions (1999o), was o accomplish he ollowing:

• Cooperae wih he governmen o Sierra Leone andhe oher paries regarding he peace agreemen andis implemenaion.

• Assis he governmen o Sierra Leone in implemen-ing he disarmamen, demobilizaion, and reinegra-ion plan.



Sierra Leone

117

• Esablish a presence a key locaions hroughou heerriory o Sierra Leone, including he disarmamenrecepion ceners and demobilizaion ceners.

• Encourage he paries o creae condence-building

mechanisms and o suppor he uncioning o hosemechanisms.

• Faciliae he delivery o humaniarian aid.• Provide suppor, as requesed, o he elecions,

which were o be held in accordance wih he pres-en consiuion o Sierra Leone.

Te mission’s mandae was subsequenly expanded wih he UN Securiy Council’s adopion o esoluion1289 on February 7, 2000. Ta resoluion called or hemission o help coordinae and assis he Sierra Leone

law enorcemen auhoriies in he discharge o heir re-sponsibiliies (Unied Naions, 2000j). Te mandae wasexpanded again in March 2001 o include assising hegovernmen o Sierra Leone exend is auhoriy, resorelaw and order, and sabilize he siuaion progressively hrough he counry (Unied Naions, 2000; 2001l).

As a resul o he lack o sabiliy and he increasingly violen securiy environmen wihin Sierra Leone, onSepember 17, 2004, he mission was o sar he ollow-ing (Unied Naions, 2004ae):

•

Suppor he Sierra Leone armed orces and police(a) in parolling he border and he diamond-miningareas in he norh o he counry, including oeringsuppor in join planning and join operaions, whereappropriae, and (b) in monioring he growing ca-paciy o he Sierra Leone securiy secor.

• Suppor he SLPF in mainaining inernal securiy,including securiy or he Special Cour or SierraLeone.

• Assis he SLPF wih is recruiing, raining, andmenoring program, which was designed o urhersrenghen he capaciy and he resources o he SLPF.

Te UN Securiy Council, in assigning hose asks ohe mission, expressed is inenion o regularly review he UNAMSIL’s presence in Sierra Leone agains he

benchmark o he abiliy o he Sierra Leone armed orcesand police o eecively “mainain securiy and sabiliy”across he counry (Unied Naions, 2004ae).

Te mission’s mandae was exended in six monhly incremens and was nally compleed on December 31,2005 (Unied Naions, 2005l). When each mandae ex-pired, he auhorized srengh o he civilian police com-

ponen was increased; in March 2004, i reached hemaximum number o 80 ocers (Unied Naions,2004z).

On Augus 31, 2005, he UN Securiy Council ad-oped esoluion 1620, which esablished he UniedNaions Inegraed Oce in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)or an iniial period o 12 monhs beginning January 1,2006 (Unied Naions, 2005ae). Te mandae or he ci-

vilian police componen o he mission was o develop“he independence and capaciy o he jusice sysemand he capaciy o he police and correcions sysem”

(Unied Naions, 2005l) and o provide advice ha would srenghen he rule o law. Te mission was o bemade up o 20 civilian police advisers who were o “pro-

vide specialized raining and adv ice o he Sierra Leonepolice, monior he perormance o police personnel,conduc in-service and rain-he-rainers courses, [and]coach senior and mid-level managers” (Unied Naions,2005l).


Te SLPF had been severely shaken during he lae 1998UF oensive, known ominously as “Operaion No Liv-ing Ting” (Dobbins e al., 2005). Hundreds o police o-cers were killed, and a large number o police saions

were desroyed in he course o he January 1999 assaulon Freeown.

Following he ransiion rom UNOMSIL oUNAMSIL, he SLPF sill lacked he necessary per-sonnel, aciliies, and equipmen o ulill essenialasks. he major problem was ha he SLPF did nohave he aciliies o deliver raining or o aciliae re-srucuring, because he naional police rainingschool was desroyed during he rebel oensive in

Januar y 1999 (Unied Naions, 20 00c).Because o he ragile securiy siuaion, progress in

developing and resrucuring he SLPF was slow. Buhe developmen process improved when sable securiy condiions were esablished (Unied Naions, 2000).





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119

In March 2001, he UNAMSIL, wih assisance romhe CCSSP, opened a new regional police raining schoolin Kenema in he Easern Province (Unied Naions,2001a). Te mission police componen also suppored

he SLPF members who were deployed o a number o rural area ciies, including Kambia, Lunsar, Magburaka,and Makeni (Unied Naions, 2001). Te SLPF and heUNAMSIL prepared a deailed deploymen plan o en-sure ha he SLPF members were deployed o every disric by he end o January 2002 (Unied Naions,2001h).

In Sepember 2001, he UNAMSIL helped he gov-ernmen esablish he Naional ecovery Commitee,

which was o “coordinae he exensive aciviies wih allsakeholders and [o] se prioriies or humaniarian ac-

ion and he rehabiliaion o governmen inrasrucurein newly accessible areas” (Unied Naions, 2001g). Tecommitee also developed a benchmark o measure heSierra Leone police’s progress in resoring sae auhoriy in newly accessible areas (Unied Naions, 2001g).

In Sepember 2002, he governmen designed a sra-egic plan o develop he SLPF. Te plan included a num-

ber o specic arge areas including (a) he recruimeno new cades and heir raining, (b) he raining or rain-ers and or serving personnel, (c) he provision o nec-essary equipmen, and (d) he developmen o police

inrasrucure (Unied Naions, 2002h).In lae 2002, he UNAMSIL police advisers—in conjuncion wih he CCSSP—developed and implemenedhe Local Needs Policing Concep (Unied Naions,2003b). During his period, he UNAMSIL provided as-sisance o he SLPF in reviewing is sang levels (UniedNaions, 2002l) and in developing a risk-based deploy-men plan. Ta plan was aimed a reinorcing he SLPFpresence in areas ha would be vacaed by he UNAMSILdrawdown, which was o be “guided by progress in he im-plemenaion o he key securiy benchmark,” all o whichaeced he capaciy developmen o he Sierra Leone po-lice and army (Unied Naions, 2003b).

On Sepember 24, 2002, he UN Securiy Council ad-oped esoluion 1436 (Unied Naions, 2002o), whichauhorized an increase in he civilian police componeno he UNAMSIL o 170 ocers (Unied Naions,2003h). Te increased number o personnel was de-ployed o provide raining o new recruis and o serve

SLPF personnel. UNAMSIL civilian police were alsodeployed o 17 police saions across he counry so hey could provide menoring o he SLPF in basic policingskills (Unied Naions, 2003h).

Te headquarers sa o he civilian police compo-nen was responsible or providing sraegic advice, ordealing wih cross-border issues, or policing diamondmines, and or providing airpor securiy. Te head-quarers sa also provided specialized uni advisers hadeal wih inelligence, he Inernaional Criminal PoliceOrganizaion (Inerpol), communiy policing, amily suppor, and he driving school. In December 2004, heUNAMSIL civilian police componen was decreased by 80 ocers (Unied Naions, 2004l).

By lae 2004, he primary responsibiliy or securiy

was ranserred rom UNAMSIL o he SLPF (UniedNaions, 2004w). Te UNAMSIL aced as a liaison wihhe oher wo UN missions in he region—he UniedNaions Mission in Liberia and he Unied Naions Op-eraion in Côe d’Ivoire—o share inormaion and les-sons learned, as well as “o assis in he reorm and heresrucuring o [heir respecive] naional police ser-

vices” (Unied Naions, 2005g).In early 2005, he UNAMSIL reviewed he progress

ha had been made in reaching he benchmarks ha had been se in he mandae. Te eam noed ha he govern-

men o Sierra Leone had moved oward “accomplish-ing he benchmarks or sabilizaion in he counry andor he wihdrawal o he residual UNAMSIL presence”(Unied Naions, 2005l).


Te UNAMSIL, in conjuncion wih he CCSSP, assisedhe Sierra Leone governmen o increase he size andcapaciy o he SLPF by “recruiing and raining new cades, improving heir policing skills, and planning orheir deploymen, in conjuncion wih he drawdown o UNAMSIL” (Unied Naions, 2003b). able 14.2presens he number o new SLPF recruis rained, henumber o serving ocers rained in basic policing, andhe oal number o ocers deployed beween December2000 and December 2005. Te able idenies he rapidincrease in he oal number o ocers in he SLPF and



120


he large number o serving ocers who compleed basicpolicing skills courses during his period.

By December 2005, he SLPF members were deployedhroughou he counry and had esablished 75 police sa-

ions and 112 police poss (Unied Naions, 2005b). Teesablishmen o hose saions and poss was a criicalelemen in providing securiy or esablishing he groundsor governance and or providing sabilizaion (UniedNaions, 2001).

By he end o 2005, he SLPF had he skills, capaciy,and abiliy o rain he remaining police personnel o bringis srengh o he auhorized arge o 9,500 by 2006. TeSLPF was also able “o deal eecively wih localized in-ernal hreas” (Unied Naions, 2005v). Te SLPF lackeda communicaions and a logisics capabiliy, and i would

be challenged, “paricularly in he disrics, in he even o a counrywide crisis” (Unied Naions, 2005v).


In June 2002, he secreary-general o he UN said hahe SLPF was now a much improved orce as a resul o

he raining provided by he UN civilian police and by he commonwealh police raining eam (Unied Na-ions, 2002g). Te SLPF was able o improve is capa-

biliy because o he leadership and he provision o new

equipmen provided by donors (Unied Naions, 2002h).In March 2004, he secreary-general o he UN noedha he SLPF had been able o build on is skills and haremarkable gains had been made wih he assisance o he UNAMSIL. However, he SLPF was no ye ully ca-pable o handling serious widespread public disurbances,paricularly in Freeown and in he diamond-mining ar-eas where unemployed youhs and ex-combaans wereconcenraed. Te SLPF was also limied in is abiliy osrenghen is inrasrucure and presence in he sraegicareas o he counry, because o a lack o police saions inhose areas (Unied Naions, 2004).

By he end o 2005, public condence in he SLPF hadincreased, and members o he SLPF had he abiliy o“acqui hemselves saisacorily since [he] UNAMSIL[had] ranserred securiy primacy o hem las year”(Unied Naions, 2005v; 2005y). Te secreary-generalo he UN also noed ha “he shor-erm indicaors re-garding inernal securiy are posiive, wih litle probabil-

Table 14.2. Total Number o SLPF Ocers, Number o New SLPF Recruits Trained,and Number o Serving Ocers Trained, December 2000 to December 2005

Year Month

Total Number o SLPF

Ocers in ReportingPeriod

Number o New SLPF

Recruits CompletingTraining

Number o Serving SLPF

Ocers CompletingIn-Service Traininga

2000 December N/K N/K 1,500

2001 January 6,500 N/K N/K

2003 March 6,053 N/K N/K

September 6,241 384 N/K

2004 February 7,115 980 4,000

September 7,903 897 N/K

December 7,700 N/K N/K

2005 April 8,200 N/K N/K

September 8,532 750 3,400

December 9,500 N/K 600

Source: Auhor (rom various Unied Naions documens daed 2000 o 2005). Noes: N/K= no known. a. Number o ocers compleing raining in he reporing period.



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121

iy o a reurn o civil conic, while criminal aciviies[were] expeced o remain a a manageable level” (UniedNaions, 2005y).

Conclusion

According o Dobbins e al. (2005), UNAMSIL wenhrough wo disinc phases. Te rs phase was marked

by ailure, mainly rom reliance on poorly rained, ill-equipped, and unprepared miliary unis. Te secondphase remedied hose deciencies wih limied success.

UNAMSIL has been idenied as a success sory inpeacekeeping and may serve as a prooype or he new emphasis he UN places on building peace. Tis success

sory, as demonsraed by he Unied Naions (2010g),eaures he ollowing accomplishmens.

Over he course o is mandae, he mission disarmedens o housands o ex-ghers, assised in holding na-ional elecions, helped in rebuilding he counry’s po-lice orce, and conribued oward rehabiliaing he

inrasrucure and bringing governmen services o localcommuniies.

UNAMSIL was no always oreseen o succeed. Aone poin in May 2000, he mission nearly collapsed

when he rebel UF kidnapped hundreds o peacekeep-ers and renounced he cease-re in a move ha endan-gered he credibiliy o UN peacekeeping.

UNAMSIL compleed mos o he asks assigned o i by he UN Securiy Council. UNAMSIL helped he gov-ernmen resore is auhoriy and social services in areaspreviously conrolled by rebels, rained housands o po-lice personnel, and consruced or reconsruced dozenso police saions.

Following he compleion o he UNAMSIL man-dae, he UN esablished UNIOSIL, which was o help

consolidae peace in he counry. Is mandae was ocemen UNAMSIL’s gains and o help he govern-men (a) srenghen human righs, (b) realize he UN’sMillennium Developmen Goals, (c) improve ranspar-ency, and (d) hold ree and air elecions in 2007 (UniedNaions, 2010g).





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Chapter 15

Sudan and Darur

Map 15.1. SudanSource: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.



124



in Sudan


Since gaining independence rom he Unied Kingdomand he epublic o Egyp on January 1, 1956, Sudan hasexperienced civil war or more han 43 years (Unied Na-ions, 2010n). Because o he war, he counry is one o he world’s poores and mos deprived naions.

Te curren conic beween he norh and he souh began in 1983, ollowing he breakdown o he 1972 Ad-dis Ababa Agreemen. Since ha ime, he “Governmen

and he Sudan People’s Liberaion Movemen/Army (SPLM/A), he main rebel movemen in he souh, haveough over resources, power, he role o religion in hesae, and sel-deerminaion” (Unied Naions, 2010n).Tose conics have resuled in more han 2 millionpeople being killed, 4 million people being inernally displaced, and more han 600,000 people eeing hecounry as reugees (Unied Naions, 2010n).

In 1993, because o he devasaion caused by he con-ic in Sudan and he possibiliy ha he conic couldspread o neighboring counries, a regional peace iniia-

ive, under he guidance o he Iner-Governmenal Au-horiy on Developmen (IGAD) began. However, hisiniiaive ook unil July 2002 o come o ruiion—whenhe UN secreary-general visied he Sudan. Te Macha-kos Proocol was signed on July 20, 2002, as a resul o he visi. Te paries reached an “agreemen on a broadramework, seting orh he principles o governance, heransiional process, and he srucures o governmen”(Unied Naions, 2010n). Te proocol also claried “herigh o sel-deerminaion or he people o Souh Sudan,and on sae and religion” (Unied Naions, 2010n).

Te Machakos Proocol provided he oundaion orwo agreemens o be reached: he Agreemen on WealhSharing and he Proocol on Power Sharing (Unied Na-ions, 2010n). Te Machakos Proocol enabled he UniedNaions (UN) Securiy Council o adop esoluion 1547(Unied Naions, 2004ad), which esablished he UniedNaions Advance Mission in he Sudan (UNAMIS)(Unied Naions, 2010n). Tis “special poliical mission”

was mandaed o “aciliae conacs wih he paries con-cerned and o prepare or he inroducion o an envisagedUnied Naions peace suppor operaion” (Unied Naions,2010n). Te mandae was exended by UN Securiy Coun-

cil esoluion 1556 (Unied Naions 2004ai) in “responseo he escalaing crisis in Darur” (Unied Naions, 2010n).

Te UNAMIS assered ha he populaion did no rushe Sudanese naional police and ha he police did no un-derake acive parolling. As a resul, here was a “need ora subsanial civilian police componen [o any proposedmission] o assis wih monioring and capaciy-building”o he Sudanese naional police (Unied Naions, 2004r).

Following years o eor o seek a soluion o he Darurissue, he Arican Union (AU) coordinaed peace negoia-ions, known as he Abuja alks, in July 2004. Te alks led

o signing a cease-re agreemen in N’Djamena on April 8,2004, and o deploying “60 AU miliary observers and310 proecion roops in Darur o monior and observehe compliance” o he agreemen (Unied Naions, 2010n).

Te agreemens culminaed in he Sudan governmenand he SPLM/A signing a Comprehensive Peace Agree-men (CPAK) in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005. TeCPAK creaed and included a resoluion process or anumber o ousanding issues relaing o securiy arrange-mens, power sharing in Kharoum, souhern auonomy,and a more equiable disribuion o economic resources

(Unied Naions, 2010n).In March 2005, he UN Securiy Council esablished heUnied Naions Mission in he Sudan (UNMIS). Te mis-sion was based on he UN Secreary-General’s epor ohe council on January 31, 2005, (Unied Naions, 2005c)and recommended he deploymen o a mulidimensionalpeace suppor operaion (Unied Naions, 2010n).

Te Arican Union Mission in he Sudan (AUMIS), inparallel wih he UNMIS, had been deployed o he Su-dan since July 18, 2005. o mainain securiy during heransiion period o he UNMIS, AUMIS required an im-mediae increase in auhorized srengh (Unied Naions,2006p). Te nalizaion o he CPAK creaed new asksor AUMIS ha could no be underaken saely wihin iscurren srengh. Te new asks included he ollowing(Unied Naions, 2006p):

• Te esablishmen and parolling o demiliarizedzones around camps or inernally displaced persons



Sudan and Darfur

125

• Te esablishmen and parolling o buer zones• Te parolling o humaniarian supply roues and no-

madic migraion roues• A rapid cycle o invesigaing and reporing cases o

cease-re violaions• Te deploymen in camps o displaced persons and

in areas o civilian conrol, plus monioring o secu-riy in hose camps

• Te proecion o women and children and he provision o raining and capaciy-building knowledgeo he communiy police

Te AU agreed o an increase in he “auhorisedsrengh o [AUMIS] o 6,171 miliary personnel and1,560 civilian police,” which was o coincide wih he de-

ploymen o UNMIS (Unied Naions, 2010n).Te mandae and he asks o UNMIS were expanded

by he UN Securiy Council esoluion 1706 (UniedNaions, 2006ad) on Augus 31, 2006. Te mandae au-horized an increase in srengh o 17,300 miliary per-sonnel, 3,300 civilian police, and 16 ormed police unis(FPUs). Following he adopion o esoluion 1706,UNMIS could no deploy o Darur because he Sudangovernmen opposed a peacekeeping operaion ha wasunderaken solely by he UN. o resolve his issue, he UN

began o srenghen he AUMIS in phases and esablished

a join AU and UN peacekeeping operaion in Darur. Temission was named he Unied Naions and Arican UnionMission in Darur (UNAMID) (Unied Naions, 2010n).


When he UN Securiy Council esablished UNAMISon June 11, 2004, or an iniial period o hree monhs,he mission, according o he Unied Naions (2004ad),

was o coordinae suppor or capaciy building and waso monior and assis in he ollowing areas:

• Police and rule-o-law insiuions• Human righs and child proecion

Following he deploymen o UNAMIS, he UniedNaions Securiy Council (on March 24, 2005) adopedesoluion 1590, which esablished UNMIS (Unied

Naions, 2005aa). Te mission was or an iniial periodo six monhs and was o consis o 10,000 miliary per-sonnel and up o 715 civilian police personnel. Te mis-sion’s mandae, according o he Unied Naions (2005c;

2005aa), was o include he ollowing:

• Assis he paries o implemen he CPAK.• esrucure he police service in Sudan consisen

wih democraic policing o develop a police rain-ing and evaluaion program and o oherwise assisin raining police.

• Promoe he rule o law, including an independen judiciary, and proec human righs o all people o Sudan hrough a comprehensive and coordinaedsraegy o comba impuniy and o conribue o

long-erm peace and sabiliy.• Assis in developing and consolidaing he naional

legal ramework.

Te asks o he UNMIS, as described by he UniedNaions (2010n), were as ollows:

• Suppor he implemenaion o he CPAK.• Faciliae and coordinae he volunary reurn o re-

ugees and inernally displaced persons.• Provide humaniarian assisance.•

Assis in demining operaions.• Conribue oward inernaional eors o proec

and promoe human righs in he Sudan.

Te principal objecive o he civilian police compo-nen o UNMIS was o help develop a ransparen policeservice, as he Machakos Proocol and oher agreemensdescribe (Unied Naions, 2005c). Te mission was osuppor peace and securiy secor reorm sraegies. More-over, according o he Unied Naions (2005c), i wouldcomprise he ollowing our broad areas o engagemen:

• Good oces o poliical suppor or he peace process, which would be addressed by he special represenaive

• Securiy, which would be addressed by he miliary • Governance and assisance, which would be ad-

dressed by civilian police, rule o law, human righs,civil aairs, elecoral assisance, and gender compo-nens (humaniarian and developmen assisance



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would be addressed by componens or disarma-men, demobilizaion, and reinegraion; humaniar-ian coordinaion; proecion; recovery, reurn, andreinegraion; and mine acion)

• Peace suppor operaion

Te srucure o he mission was o include he ol-lowing (Unied Naions, 2005c):

• Esablish civilian police headquarers in Kharoum,headed by a police commissioner and suppored by a core sa o 34.

• Esablish headquarers in Juba or orward opera-ions, headed by a depuy police commissioner andsuppored by a core sa o 54.

• Esablish secor headquarers ha would be a liaison wih provincial commanders o develop plans ha would deploy addiional advisers and moniors.

• Expand monioring uncions hroughou he mis-sion area o operaions.

• Deploy addiional rainers and menors o expedieraining and o assis local souhern Sudan police inheir recruimen and selecion processes.

Te secreary-general o he UN delivered a repor on AUMIS and he expanded mandae o he AUMIS o he

UN Securiy Council on July 28, 2006. Te mandae wasexpanded o complemen he UNMIS mandae and ohelp implemen he CPAK (Unied Naions, 2006p). Teexpanded mandae consised o he ollowing wo mainpillars (Unied Naions, 2006ad):

1. Assis he Sudanese naional police—in coordina-ion wih bilaeral and mulilaeral assisance pro-grams—in resrucuring reorms and developinginsiuions in raining and building capaciy o hepolice; in implemening communiy policing; andin monioring he Sudanese police perormancehrough menoring, co-locaion, and join parols.

2. Assis he Sudanese naional police in monioringand in veriying he redeploymen and disengage-men provisions o he Darur Peace Agreemen,including acively providing securiy and parols indemiliarized and buer zones, and in deploying po-lice, including FPUs, in areas where inernally dis-

placed persons are concenraed, along key roues o migraion, and oher vial poins.

On Augus 31, 2006, because o he securiy siuaion

in he Sudan, he UN Securiy Council adoped esolu-ion 1706, which expanded he UNMIS mandae o in-clude Darur and o increase he auhorized srengh o UNMIS o 17,300 miliary personnel, 3,300 civilian po-lice, and 16 FPUs. Te council also agreed o regularly review he srengh and srucure o UNMIS (Unied Na-ions, 2006ad).

Te new resoluion expanded he mandae o he mis-sion o help in “resrucuring he police service in he Su-dan consisen wih democraic policing, o develop apolice raining and evaluaion programme, and o oher-

wise assis in he raining o civilian police” (Unied Na-ions, 2006ae). In he Darur, he mission was o do heollowing:

o assis in addressing regional securiy issues in close

liaison wih inernaional eors o improve he secu-

riy siuaion in he neighbouring regions along he

borders beween he Sudan and Chad and beween

he Sudan and he Cenral Arican epublic, includ-

ing hrough he esablishmen o a mulidimensional

presence consising o poliical, humaniarian, mili-

ary, and civilian police liaison ocers in key locaions

in Chad, including in inernally displaced persons andreugee camps and, i necessary, in he Cenral Ari-

can epublic, and o conribue o he implemena-

ion o he Agreemen beween he Sudan and Chad

signed on 26 July 2006 (Unied Naions, 2006ae).

Following he changes in he mandae, he UN Se-curiy Council (on Sepember 22, 2006) adoped es-oluion 1709, which exended he deploymen o heUNMIS unil Ocober 8, 2006, “wih he inenion orenew i or urher periods” (Unied Naions, 2006ae).Te mission was ongoing as o June 2010.

As menioned earlier, he Sudanese governmen op-posed a peacekeeping operaion ha was solely by heUN. Tus, he UN Securiy Council adoped esoluion1769 (Unied Naions 2007v) on July 31, 2007, auho-rizing he esablishmen o he Unied Naions AricanUnion Hybrid Operaion in Darur (UNAMID) (UniedNaions, 2010n).



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In mos o he Sudan, he uncioning police were de-scribed as being paramiliary and hierarchical and as

lacking in ransparency and accounabiliy (Unied Na-ions, 2005c). In January 2005, he Sudanese police werelocaed in ve areas in he souh and comprised approxi-maely 17,000 ormer governmen police and a develop-ing police orce ha had derived rom he Sudan People’sLiberaion Army (Unied Naions, 2005c).

Te secreary-general o he UN noed ha he exis-ing Sudanese police orces needed o be resrucured i hey were o reach inernaional proessional democraicsandards o operaion and o mee he “challenges o hepos-war environmen” (Unied Naions, 2005c). Police

capabiliy could be increased hrough raining and moni-oring, which would also increase securiy in he Darurand would “aciliae he delivery o humaniarian relie”(Unied Naions, 2004r).

o increase he level o securiy in he Darur region,he Sudanese governmen deployed 4,000 police on July 15,2004, o all areas where inernally displaced persons weresuscepible o atacks (Unied Naions, 2004r). Te gov-ernmen advised he Unied Naions abou his changeon Augus 30, 2004. In addiion, he governmen also ad-

vised he Unied Naions ha an addiional 500 police

would be deployed by he end o July and ha a urher2,000 police “would be deployed ino areas idenied inaccordance wih he Plan o Acion” (Unied Naions,2004r). However, local people claimed ha police in Dar-ur lacked discipline and ha Janjaweed (rebels) had beenrecruied ino he police (Unied Naions, 2004r).

Te evens in Darur increased he lack o rus andcondence in he cenral governmen and he police.

Any proposed UN police mission ha would assis in heranser o he Sudanese police needed o be large andneeded o ake a comprehensive change-managemenapproach. Te UN mission would need o be made upo senior police ocers who could eecively commandsel-conained unis and o oher ocers who could dohe majoriy o researching, monioring, menoring, in-specing, and raining, along wih adminisraive duies(Unied Naions, 2005c).

In April 2005, he AUMIS consised o 6,171 mili-ary personnel and 1,560 civilian police. On Ocober 20,

2004, he AU exended he mandae o he AUMIS unilSepember 30, 2006. Te mandae was expanded o in-clude monioring and observing he Sudanese police’scompliance wih he agreemen, which would conribue

o a secure environmen or delivering humaniarian aidand or reurning reugees and inernally displaced per-sons o heir home areas (Unied Naions, 2006p).


Te civilian police componen o he UNMIS provided advice and assisance o he exising police and he SPLM/A police orce in is ransiion rom a miliary-syle policeorce o a more communiy-based model. o achieve his

ransormaion, UNMIS moniored members o he localpolice and gained a “deailed picure o heir aciviies, andesablish[ed] a baseline o available resources and needs.”Tis approach allowed he UNMIS o be direcly involvedin he raining program and in he design o capaciy de-

velopmen programs “wihin he wider conex o securiy secor reorm” (Unied Naions, 2005c).

o achieve he mandae, he UNMIS police sa wasco-locaed wih he Sudanese police in police saions, anda sraegic plan was prepared o develop and rain he po-lice (Unied Naions, 2005z). Te mission osered srong

inernal relaionships ha enabled he mission o ac as aliaison beween he miliary and he police componensand ha provided a managed approach o he reorming,resrucuring, and rebuilding o he local police capaciy (Unied Naions, 2006p). o ensure ha boh o he mis-sions in Sudan were well organized, he UNMIS provided33 police advisers o he AUMIS. Tose advisers assisedhe AUMIS wih “logisics, operaions, invesigaions,personnel, inormaion echnology, command and con-rol, and oher experise” (Unied Naions, 2006v).

Te provision o UNMIS police advisers o he AUMIS became known as he “ligh suppor package” and even-ually culminaed in a hybrid UNAMID, which involved

boh miliary and civilian police personnel. Tis new UNand AU mission designed a wo-phase approach o resolveseveral ousanding issues (Unied Naions, 2007a).

Te rs phase o he new approach was implemeninghe ligh suppor package and deploying he personnel in-

volved. Te second phase involved designing and imple-



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mening he “heavy suppor package.” Tis later phaseconsised o a “range o orce enablers” ha included hedeploymen o hree FPUs (Unied Naions, 2007a).

During his period, UNMIS coninued o make prog-ress on is assigned asks, and i esablished he policedevelopmen commitee (PDC) ha enabled he com-muniy policing raining program o be widened o in-clude he souhern ransi camps or inernally displacedpersons. In norhern Sudan, he UNMIS designed anddelivered a number o raining courses or he local police(Unied Naions, 2007a).

In mid-2008, UNMIS developed he Join InegraedPolice Uni or Abyei. A 10-day, basic police rainingcourse was delivered o boh he regular police rom henorhern and souhern regions and o he governmenpolice personnel as par o his iniiaive. Te mission alsorained 1,700 governmen police ocers in orensics,crime invesigaion, gender issues, compuers, explosivesawareness, and communiy policing. In addiion, hemission rained 100 governmen women police ocersin Kharoum abou issues o gender, child proecion,and domesic violence. UNMIS rained 2,104 SouhernSudan Police Service (SSPS) ocers in airpor securiy,communiy policing, compuers, criminal invesigaion,rac, and special operaions (Unied Naions, 2008n).

Te SSPS was able o nalize is annual budge andsreamline is payroll sysems wih assisance rom heUNMIS. By implemening hose sraegies and develop-ing rain-he-rainers courses, he mission was able o ex-end he communiy police raining program o he Dar

es Salaam, Wad al-Bashir, and Jebel Aulia camps in Khar-oum. “Tis [exension] bridged he gap beween he in-ernally displaced person communiy and he police andpromoed securiy and saey in communiies o iner-nally displaced persons” (Unied Naions, 2009j).


Te auhorized srengh allowed in esoluion 1706(Unied Naions, 2006ad) was a “minimum opion” or

achieving he mandae, according o he secreary-general o he UN. Te auhorized srengh would allow a minimum presence or a “deploymen in more han100 locaions, covering abou 80 percen o hepopulaion” (Unied Naions, 2006p). By Augus 2007,he UNMIS co-locaed a 6 o he 10 sae policecommands and a 36 local police saions, and heUNMIS assised he SSPS in developing is commandand communicaions srucures (Unied Naions, 2007k).

During May 2005, he AUMIS reached a oal srengho 2,674 personnel, which included 460 civilian police.However, he AUMIS civilian police were 355 ocersshor o he auhorized srengh ha was agreed on by he

AU in Ocober 2004 (Unied Naions, 2005q).able 15.1 presens he oal number o UNMIS civil-

ian police deployed and heir gender during Sepember2005 hrough January 2010. Te able illusraes ha hemission did no reach is auhorized srengh o civilianpolice personnel during his period. Te gap in deploy-

Table 15.1. UNMIS Civilian Police Sta Numbers, September 2005 to January 2010

DateNumber o Female Police

OcersNumber o Male Police

OcersTotal Number o Civilian

Police Ocers

September 2005 9 77 86August 2006 41 625 666

December 2006 45 597 642

April 2007 47 606 653

October 2008 46 547 593

January 2010 85 604 689




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men in boh o he missions was mainly because policeocers rom he donor counries were no available and

because o logisics in deploying ocers rom wihin hecounry (Unied Naions, 2005q).

Alhough he UNMIS consised o only 86 civilian po-lice ocers, by Sepember 2005, he coningen had esab-lished a orward headquarers in Juba and a presence in six secors: ori, Aweil, Beniu, Melu, Bor, and Abyei (UniedNaions, 2005aa; 2006). Te mission had also prepared asraegic plan o develop and o rain police ocers o en-sure ha he bilaeral and mulilaeral assisance program

was coordinaed and ha a nework o police saions wasesablished in souhern Sudan (Unied Naions, 2005aa).

In conjuncion wih he Unied Naions Develop-men Programme (UNDP), he mission rained 700 se-

nior ocers in police managemen and held an execuive workshop or 17 ocers o he rank o major-generalor brigadier (Unied Naions, 2006). UNMIS rainedpolice ocers on “rule o law principles and he crimi-nal jusice chain” (Unied Naions, 2006s). UNMIS alsodelivered a new UN police raining package ha wouldimprove local capaciy and compliance wih democraicpolicing principles and inernaional bes pracices. Teraining package ocused on basic police and crisis re-sponse skills and was designed o “srenghen he cred-ibiliy o he police as an alernaive o he miliary in

mainaining law and order” (Unied Naions, 2007k).By mid-2009, UNMIS had rained approximaely 6,500 Sudan governmen police and SSPS ocers in vari-ous aspecs o policing and had prepared 202 SSPS o-cers so ha hey could ake responsibiliy or he delivery o basic police raining. UNMIS, joinly wih he SSPS,developed a basic raining curriculum or in-service per-sonnel and new recruis (Unied Naions, 2009j).

As civilian police sa numbers increased and hemission needed o be capable o providing securiy, heUNMIS needed “o have a mulidimensional presence inkey locaions in Chad, including in he camps or iner-nally displaced persons and reugees and, i necessary, inhe Cenral Arican epublic” (Unied Naions, 2006p).Deploying UNMIS civilian police o hose areas wouldenable he police o ac as liaisons wih he local auhori-ies and would provide an opporuniy o monior “majordevelopmens in he border area and o coordinae acivi-ies where appropriae” (Unied Naions, 2006p).

Wih assisance rom he UNMIS, he SSPS esab-lished he PDC in May 2006 o orm policy and ocoordinae capaciy-building eors. Te PDC, wihUNMIS assisance, draed a plan or communiy polic-

ing in Juba and draed a code o conduc or he Su-dan police. In conjuncion wih he UNMIS, he SSPSdeveloped a police ocer regisraion and an ideniy card sysem ha was implemened in Sepember 2006(Unied Naions, 2006s).

From 2007 o 2010, he mission concenraed onraining he local police. A UN raining package includedraining in he areas o gender and child proecion, hu-man righs, and communiy policing. Tis raining re-suled in improvemens in he Sudanese police’s handlingo public complains and helping vulnerable persons and

juveniles. UNMIS also delivered o local police rain-he-rainers courses and specialis courses on (a) rio andcrowd conrol, (b) VIP and close proecion, (c) oren-sics, (d) communiy policing, (e) crime scene invesiga-ion, () human racking and organized crime, (g) humanrighs, and (h) advanced invesigaion (Unied Naions,2009j).


Te mission iniially aced a major problem: he govern-mens o Naional Uniy and o Souhern Sudan resisedeors o come ogeher o address maters o commonimporance (Unied Naions, 2006). However, heUNMIS was able o implemen is co-locaion program

wih boh he Naional Police and he SSPS and was ableo develop and implemen a program ha regisered andidenied SSPS ocers (Unied Naions, 2007).

Ten he UNMIS assised he SSPS o esablish an or-ganizaional srucure and o design and implemen a rain-ing curriculum and program (Unied Naions, 2007).

By mid-2009, he mission compleed he inegraiono he ormer SPLM/A personnel ino he Naional Po-lice Service o he governmen o he Sudan (Unied Na-ions, 2009j) and esablished an environmen where heSudanese governmen was able o dra and adop legis-laion abou criminal acs, criminal and civil procedure,and human righs. Te Souhern Sudan Land Ac, LocalGovernmen Ac, and Sudan People’s Liberaion Army



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Ac were adoped by he Souhern Sudan Legislaive As-sembly (Unied Naions, 2009g).


In December 2005, he Arican Union conduced an as-sessmen mission o AUMIS wih he inpu o a widerange o parners, including he UN (Unied Naions,2006c). Tis assessmen concluded ha he AUMIS hada posiive eec on he securiy and he humaniarian si-uaions in Darur. Te assessmen concluded ha by ak-ing a number o specic seps, he mission would urherincrease is eeciveness (Unied Naions, 2006c).

Te secreary-general o he UN noed in repors o

he UN Securiy Council in 2007 and in 2010, ha al-hough progress had been achieved in reorming and de-

veloping he Naional Police o Sudan and he SSPS, anumber o geographical areas remained “adminisraively separae, wih heir own educaional and police sysems,

which was in conravenion o he Comprehensive Peace Agreemen” (Unied Naions, 2007 ). Te secreary-general noed ha because o he audacious condiionsin Sudan, he SSPS aced serious challenges o logisicsand communicaions in conducing is policing aciviies(Unied Naions, 2010).

Conclusion

Te mission encounered a number o problems. Te mis-sion was no able o reach is auhorized srengh becausecivilian police ocers were no available rom donorcounries. When he mission did deploy ocers, here

were logisical problems in geting ocers o heir sa-ions because o he harsh and challenging environmen.

As a resul o he deciencies in he skills o hose de-ployed, he mission was no able o implemen a plan-ning, reorm, or raining ramework. Tis siuaion wasexacerbaed by he atiude o he SSPS. Te coninuedabsence o a police raining sraegy policy “or commi-men o he raining programme by he Souhern SudanPolice Service and he Governmen o he Sudan police”posed “challenges o an eecive police presence in heregion” (Unied Naions, 2009j).

Case Study: United Nations and

Arican Union Mission in Darur


Because he governmen o Sudan objeced o a peace-keeping eor in Darur ha would be solely by heUnied Naions (UN), he UN srenghened he AricanUnion Mission in he Sudan (AUMIS) in phases, whichallowed a join Arican Union (AU) and UN peacekeep-ing operaion o be esablished in Darur. Tis operaion,iled he Unied Naions and Arican Union Missionin Darur (UNAMID), ran parallel wih Unied NaionsMission in he Sudan (UNMIS) in he remaining regions

o he Sudan (Unied Naions, 2010n).In February 2007, 33 UNMIS civilian police joined

he AUMIS as par o he rs phase, or “ligh supporpackage,” in Darur. When he second phase, or “heavy suppor package,” was made nal January 21, 2007, in Ad-dis Ababa, he UN provided 721 civilian police personnel,301 police advisers, and 3 ormed police unis (FPUs).Te UN ocers were o suppor he AUMIS by providingsaic securiy proecion in he orm o securiy guards inhe displaced person camps, by assising he implemena-ion o he Darur Peace Agreemen, and by helping in ad-

minisraion and managemen (Unied Naions, 2007c).Te deploymen o he hree UN FPUs were o “com-plemen AUMIS civilian police in perorming” heir asksin he Darur region (Unied Naions, 2007c). Te de-ploymen o he FPUs along wih he ligh suppor pack-age would help AUMIS develop an “inegraed commandand conrol srucure and o increase he eecivenessand co-ordinaion o is operaions” (Unied Naions,2007h). Te asks o his combined operaion includedhe ollowing (Unied Naions, 2007c):

• Proec civilians and vulnerable communiies underhe hrea o violence, as well as UN and AU person-nel and aciliies.

• Mainain a 24-hour presence in inernally displacedperson camps.

• Perorm escor duies (collecion o rewood, grass,and waer).

• Conduc condence-building parols.



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Te ligh suppor package, according o he UniedNaions (2007h), consised o equipmen and person-nel ully dedicaed o AUMIS in he ollowing our areas(Unied Naions, 2007h):

1. Logisical and maerials suppor2. Miliary sa suppor3. Advisory suppor or civilian police, suppor or ci-

vilians in he areas o mine acion, humaniarian liai-son, public inormaion, and suppor or he mission

4. Implemenaion suppor or he Darur Peace Agreemen

Te AU and he UN deployed a join quick review mis-sion in Darur on February 8–19, 2007, o assess how large aorce would be required. Te review suggesed ha because

o emerging securiy rends, he hybrid orce would need o be made up o 19,000–20,000 roops, as well as 3,772 po-lice ocers and 19 FPUs (Unied Naions, 2007h).

o assis wih preparaions or he ranser o auhor-iy rom AUMIS o UNAMID, he UN and he AU esab-lished a mulidisciplinary UNAMID ransiion eam inEl Fasher in Augus 2007. Te planning eam developedand implemened deploymen plans or he ransiion(Unied Naions, 2007n).


On July 31, 2007, he UN Securiy Council adoped eso-luion 1769 esablishing in Darur he AU and UN hybridoperaion, UNAMID, or an iniial period o 12 monhs(Unied Naions, 2007v). Te mission was exended orwo addiional periods o 12 monhs, and is mos recenmandae was due o expire on July 31, 2010 (Unied Na-ions, 2010n).

Te original mandae auhorized he deploymeno 20,000 miliary personnel and 6,000 civilian police,hereby “making i one o he larges UN peacekeeping

operaions in hisory” (Unied Naions, 2010n).Te proecion o civilians and displaced persons was

par o he mandae o he UNAMID. Te mission was odo he ollowing (Unied Naions, 2010n):

• Conribue o securiy or humaniarian assisance.• Monior and veriy he implemenaion o agreemens.• Assis in an inclusive poliical process.

• Conribue o he promoion o human righs andhe rule o law.

• Monior and repor on he siuaion along he bor-ders wih Chad and he Cenral Arican epublic.

Te UN Securiy Council auhorized he mission “oake he necessary acion, in he areas o deploymen o is orces as i deems wihin is capabiliies” in order o dohe ollowing (Unied Naions, 2010n):

• Proec UNAMID’s personnel, aciliies, insalla-ions, and equipmen, and ensure he securiy andhe reedom o movemen o is own personnel andhumaniarian workers.

• Suppor early and eecive implemenaion o heDarur Peace Agreemen, and preven he disrupiono is implemenaion and armed atacks.

• Proec civilians.

Te mission was o do he ollowing (Unied Naions,2010n):

• Conribue o a secure environmen or economicreconsrucion and developmen, as well as he sus-ainable reurn o inernally displaced persons andreugees o heir homes.

• Promoe respec or and proecion o human righs

and undamenal reedoms in Darur.• Promoe he rule o law in Darur by providing sup-

por or srenghening an independen judiciary anda prison sysem and by providing assisance in devel-oping and consolidaing he legal ramework, in con-sulaion wih relevan Sudanese auhoriies.

• Monior and repor on he securiy siuaion a heSudan’s borders wih Chad and he Cenral Aricanepublic.

For he mission o achieve hose operaional asks,UNAMID sa members aced as liaisons wih he na-ional and local auhoriies in regard o he ollowing(Unied Naions, 2007b; 2010q):

1. Securiy a. Promoe he reesablishmen o condence, de-

er violence, and assis in monioring and veriy-ing he implemenaion o he redeploymen and



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disengagemen provisions o he Darur Peace Agreemen, which included acively providingsecuriy and robus parolling o redeploymenand buer zones. Accomplish he securiy by

monioring he wihdrawal o long-range weap-ons and by deploying hybrid police, includingFPUs, in areas where inernally displaced per-sons were concenraed, in he demiliarized and

buer zones, along key roues o migraion, andin oher vial areas, including he provisions seou in he Darur Peace Agreemen.

b. Monior hrough proacive parolling he par-ies’ policing aciviies in camps or inernally displaced persons, demiliarized and buerzones, and areas o conrol.

c. Suppor—in coordinaion wih he paries asoulined in he Darur Peace Agreemen—heesablishmen and he raining o communiy police in camps or inernally displaced persons,suppor he governmen or having he Sudanpolice in Darur learn capaciy-building in ac-cordance wih inernaional sandards o humanrighs and accounabiliy, and suppor he insi-uional developmen o he police.

d. Suppor he eors o he governmen o Sudanand he police so ha public order is mainained,

and suppor eors o increase he capaciy o Sudanese law enorcemen hrough specializedraining and join operaions.

2. ule o law, governance, and human righsa. Suppor he paries ha signed he Darur Peace

Agreemen o resrucure. b. Build he capaciy o he police service in Darur

hrough monioring, raining, menoring, usingco-locaions, and having join parols.

During he iniial planning or UNAMID, he plan-ners proposed ha he civilian police componen con-sis o 3,772 advisers and 19 FPUs and ha he exising

AUMIS civi lian police and he UN ligh and heavy sup-por packages would orm he core o he mission. Temain ask o he FPUs was o help provide “proecion orcivilians and personnel and propery o he operaion, incollaboraion wih he miliary componen o he opera-ion” (Unied Naions, 2007h).

In November 2009, UNAMID developed a sraegic work plan in consulaion wih he AU. Te plan includedprioriy area benchmarks o rack progress and measurehe implemenaion o he mission’s mandae (Unied

Naions, 2009h). Te achievemen o hose our prioriy areas was necessary o realize he goal o a “poliical solu-ion and susained sabiliy in Darur” (Unied Naions,2009 ). Te our prioriy areas are as ollows (Unied Na-ions, 2009k):

• Achievemen o a comprehensive poliical soluion• Achievemen o a secure and sable environmen• Enhancemen o he rule o law, srenghened gover-

nance, and human righs• Achievemen o a sabilized humaniarian siuaion

Te mission was o achieve he ollowing wo prior-iy area benchmarks rom 2009 o 2011 (Unied Naions,2009k):

1. Creae a secure and sable environmen. Te mission will conribue o he resoraion and upholding o a sable and secure environmen hroughou Darur,in which civilians, in paricular vulnerable groups,are proeced and where displaced populaions canchoose wheher hey wished o reurn o heir places

o origin.2. Enhance he rule o law, governance, and humanrighs benchmark. Te mission will conribue onaional and local auhoriies and securiy and jus-ice insiuions, will enorce and mainain he ruleo law, and will govern on a nondiscriminaory basisin accordance wih inernaional human righs san-dards and principles o good governance hroughouDarur.


o ensure ha UNAMID was able o eecively operaeon he day auhoriy was ranserred, a join planningorum was held in Addis Ababa rom July 30 o Augus 2,2007. Te orum agreed o send an advance uni o policeand miliary o Darur beore he ranser o auhoriy



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(Unied Naions, 2007n). Te deploymen would includeone FPU and 40 individual police ocers, as well asmiliary personnel.

Along wih he join planning, UNMIS co-locaed

wih AUMIS counerpars and aced as liaisons wih he AUMIS o ideniy and address all issues relaed o heransiion rom he AUMIS o he UNAMID. o hisend, he ligh suppor and he heavy suppor package o-cers in Darur co-locaed wih heir AUMIS counerparso aciliae he work (Unied Naions, 2007p).


Te mission ook a more proacive posure, which in-

cluded conducing parols, by reaching ou o inernally displaced persons and by supporing he humaniariancommuniy (Unied Naions, 2007r). o ensure ha allmission civilian police ocers undersood he new ap-proach, all personnel ranserring rom he AUMIS andall new UNAMID personnel were rained beore akingup heir posiions (Unied Naions, 2008b).

In January 2008, UNAMID police implemened ahree-phase plan or parolling he camps or inernally displaced persons. Te new plan was designed so haparolling would occur beween 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. daily

in nearly all locaions, which would increase rus andcondence (Unied Naions, 2008). Parols were laerincreased o cover he period rom midnigh o 8 a.m.,

wih a view o exending he coverage o a ull 24 hours(Unied Naions, 2008g).

Te UNAMID rained 277 Sudanese police romsix camps in communiy policing o “suppor he main-enance o law and order” (Unied Naions, 2008g).

A crime prevenion and public relaions iniiaive waslaunched on July 20, 2008, which included “visis wihhe leaders o he displaced and he disribuion o liera-ure o six such camps in Norhern Darur” (Unied Na-ions, 2008l).


Te heavy suppor package provided or 721 civilian po-lice personnel, which consised o 301 police advisers

and 3 FPUs whose ask i was (a) o assis he AUMIS insaic camp securiy proecion or displaced persons,(b) o implemen he Darur Peace Agreemen, and (c) oprovide assisance in adminisraion and managemen

(Unied Naions, 2007c). Because o he change o hehybrid mission (UNAMID) and because o he securiy siuaion, he number o personnel deployed was changedo 3,772 advisers and 19 FPUs (Unied Naions, 2007h).

able 15.2 presens he number o FPUs deployed by UNAMID, he composiion o he FPUs, and he num-

ber o civilian police advisers rom July 2007 o Ocober2009. Te able illusraes ha he mission never reachedis auhorized srengh or he auhorized number o FPUs.

Te iniial UN ransers and deploymens o UNAMID

were deployed o El Fasher, Nyala, and Geneina so hey could assis in he SSPS’s reormaion. UNAMID was osrenghen he SSPS command and conrol srucures,improve he SSPS’s monioring and reporing sysems,and esablish mechanisms or he SSPS o address gender-

based violence (Unied Naions, 2007r).In May 2008, UNAMID began building 82 communiy

policing ceners. Besides serving as local police saions,he ceners were also used as oce space by UNAMID ci-

vilian police advisers (Unied Naions, 2008g).In Augus 2008, UNAMID police advisers “con-

duced a series o raining and capaciy-building work-shops or 119 members o he rebel police orces, 90 sheikhsand umdas (ribal elders), and 295 inernally displacedpersons on he subjecs o human righs, gender, andcommuniy-policing” (Unied Naions, 2008m). Policeadvisers also sared a communiy program or commu-niy policing iniiaives and invesigaions in sexual andgender-based violence in all hree secors. Te program

was developed o oser a closer parnership beween heSudanese police, he rebel movemens, and he commu-niies (Unied Naions, 2008o).

In lae 2008, UNAMID commenced a number o “quick-impac” projecs. Acions ha would improve se-curiy and he lives o displaced persons were included inhose projecs. UNAMID developed sandard operaingprocedures o ensure ha he projecs were successully implemened (Unied Naions, 2009).

o increase he securiy in and around he camps,UNAMID underook condence-building parols, which



134


placed an emphasis on aciliaing humaniarian accessand proecing convoys. UNAMID police advisers under-ook monioring, arming, and rewood parols, and hey

visied communiy policing ceners and governmen po-

lice saions hroughou Darur (Unied Naions, 2008o).


Tis mission aces a number o logisical and poliicalchallenges and has had personnel deployed only since

July 2007. As a resul o he shor ime rame, he missionhas no achieved he majoriy o he asks idenied in ismandae.

Te mission, in he shor ime ha i has been on heground, has esablished some sense o securiy, which hasallowed a orm o normalcy o reurn o he counry.


Te Unied Naions Deparmen o Peacekeeping Opera-ions underook a ormal evaluaion beween April 26

and May 7, 2009. Te evaluaion reviewed he opera-ional objecives o UNAMID’s miliary, civilian police,and civilian componen, and i examined he challengesand consrains o he mission (Arican Press Organiza-

ion, 2009).Te evaluaion was inended o provide bes pracicesand lessons learned in all areas o mission aciviy. Te as-sessmen eam hopes o use hose lessons in uure UNmissions (Arican Press Organizaion, 2009).

Conclusion

UNAMID was a large join UN and AU mission haappears o have made progress in sabilizing Sudan andDarur and in achieving is mandae. Sabilizaion o hecounry has been assised by he opening o 82 commu-niy policing ceners and by he sar o raining he SSPSin policing duies.

UNAMID also appears o have been successul in us-ing large numbers o FPUs o provide high-level policingand o provide a sense o securiy.

Te mission was ongoing as o June 2010.

Table 15.2. UNAMID Civilian Police Sta Numbers, July 2007 to October 2009

DateNumber o Formed

Police UnitsNumber o Sta in Formed

Police UnitsNumber o Civilian Police

Advisersa

July 2007b

N/A N/A 686December 2007c N/A N/A 33

January 2008 1 140 1,510

March 2008 1 140 1,600

July 2008 1 140 1,728

October 2008 1 140 1,948

February 2009 5 699 1,940

May 2009 7 975 1,902

October 2009 11 1,697 2,752


Noes: N/K= no known.a. Does no include number o police ocers in FPUs.b. Number o UNMIS police advisers.c. Te ligh suppor package, which was developed joinly wih he Arican Union.



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135

Case Study: European Union Support

to the Arican Union Mission to

Sudan and Darur


In June 2005, he Arican Union (AU) expanded he au-horized srengh o he Arican Union Mission in Sudan(AUMIS) o 6,171 miliary and 1,560 civilian police per-sonnel. o assis he AU wih managing o he increasednumber o personnel, he European Union (EU) deployeda poliical adviser, a miliary adviser, and a police adviser,“o he ad hoc Co-ordinaion Cell (ACC) esablished in

Addis Ababa” (Council o he European Union, 2005b).Te EU mission was o provide eecive and imely

suppor o AUMIS (Council o he European Union,2006c). Suppor was given o he EU by he police ad-

visers in he ACC on he police componen o he EU’sacion (Council o he European Union, 2005b). TeEU suppor o he civil police componen o AUMIS in-cluded planning and providing echnical assisance o all

AUMIS levels o command. Te suppor included providing miliary observers, raining Arican roops andobservers, and advising abou sraegic and acical rans-

poraion (Council o he European Union, 2006c).


On July 20, 2005, he Council o he European Unionadoped a join acion ha esablished he EU civilian-miliary acion and ha would suppor he AU’s enhancedmission o Sudan and Darur (EU AMIS). Te mandaeo he mission was or wo and a hal years, concludingon December 31, 2007. A he end o he mission, EU

AMIS would hen ranser o he UNAMID (Council o he European Union, 2005c).

Te suppor acion was addressed o he AU and ispoliical, miliary, and police eors o ease he crisis inDarur. Te aim o EU AMIS was o ensure eecive andimely EU assisance o he AU’s enhanced AUMIS mis-sion and o provide police assisance and raining (Coun-cil o he European Union, 2005c).

Te asks o he EU AMIS suppor acion includedhe ollowing (Council o he European Union, 2005c):

• Suppor he AUMIS police chain o command by

providing he AU wih highly experienced senior po-lice advisers a all levels o he chain o command.

• Suppor he raining o UNMIS civilian police(CIVPOL) personnel by providing or in-missioninsrucion by EU rainers.

• Suppor he developmen o a police uni wihin hesecrearia o he AU.


Te AUMIS was rs deployed o Sudan in May 2004 omonior he 2004 humaniarian cease-re agreemen andoher subsequen agreemens. Specically, AUMIS was“o assis in condence-building and o conribue o asecure environmen or he delivery o humaniarian aidand he reurn o reugees and inernally displaced per-sons, hereby conribuing o overall securiy in Darur”(European Union Council Secrearia, 2008).

Te AUMIS was subsequenly expanded, and inOcober 2004, he mandae expanded o include provid-ing assisance o he norhern and he souhern police

(European Union Council Secrearia, 2008). Te presenceo AUMIS brough a sense o securiy o he civilian popu-laion in he camp areas and helped o achieve “a semblanceo sabiliy in pars o Darur” (Appiah-Mensah, 2006,p. 19). However, a combinaion o srucural condiions,a se o misguided poliics, and a lack o AU managemenand pracical peacekeeping experience seriously ham-pered he operaion’s overall eeciveness (Franke, 2009).


Te EU AMIS suppor acion principally provided sup-por and assisance o AUMIS as described in he ollow-ing (European Council Secrearia, 2005a):

• I suppored he CIVPOL componen o AUMISand he AUMIS CIVPOL chain o command. Tisacion was underaken by deploying 16 EU police o-



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cers o all levels hroughou he chain o commando he local police. Te deploymen placed senior po-lice advisers o he AU in Addis Ababa, o he oceo he AUMIS head o mission in Kharoum, o he

oce o he police commissioner in El Fasher, o hehree regional headquarers, and o he eigh secorheadquarers.

• I suppored he raining o CIVPOL personnel.Tree in-mission raining courses were designedand delivered by EU rainers o all caegories o

AUMIS CIVPOL personnel. Te courses argeedsenior command sa managemen, rainers, andposdeploymen CIVPOL personnel.

• I suppored he developmen o a police uni wihinhe secrearia o he AU. Because he EU AMIS pro-

vided suppor o develop a police uni wihin he AUsecrearia, he secrearia, in urn, assised he AU indeveloping is longer-erm capaciy o plan and con-duc police operaions.


Since January 2004, he EU has assised he AU in is en-deavor o help sabilize Darur. Tis assisance included

nancial, personnel, and poliical suppor o he cease-re negoiaions and “planning, echnical, nancial, andequipmen suppor o AUMIS I and AUMIS II” (Euro-pean Union Council Secrearia, 2006).

Te EU AMIS suppor acion was made up o 29 po-lice ocer advisers who were deployed o he AU head-quarers in Addis Ababa, o he AUMIS headquarersin Kharoum, o he AUMIS orward headquarers inEl Fasher, and o several AUMIS secor sies (EuropeanUnion Council Secrearia, 2006). As par o he EUsuppor acion, police advisers suppored he AUMISCIVPOL by advising senior sa, by providing rainingo CIVPOL personnel, and by developing a police uniin he AU Secrearia (European Union Council Secre-aria, 2008).


Despie he decrease in violence, EU AMIS was un-able o bring oal peace o he Darur. Tis nding was

mainly because o he AU’s lack o capaciy and lack o peacekeeping experience (Franke, 2009). EU AMIS alsolacked sraegic coordinaion and was unable o imple-men a program in conjuncion wih he UN and heNorh Alanic reay Organizaion.

Te EU provided a consolidaed package o civilian andmiliary measures o suppor AUMIS. Te supporing ac-ion o he EU coninued unil he end o December 2007

when he mandae o he AU mission ended and AUMIS was handed over o UNAMID, he join AU and UN peace-keeping operaion in Darur. Tis move was in accordance

wih UN Securiy Council esoluion 1769 (Unied Na-ions, 2007v; European Union Council Secrearia, 2008).


AUMIS had a posiive eec on securiy in Darur, bu isabiliy o proec civilians was limied by capaciy, insu-cien resources, and poliical consrains. Te main problem

was ha he EU AMIS was incapable o implemening hemandae (Behrens, 2006). Te AUMIS lacked he logisical

aciliies o deploy roops and basic equipmen ha wouldhave enabled members o he orce o underake heir askseecively. Oher problems included weak command andconrol capabiliies and a lack o experience in dealing wihasymmeric and guerrilla warare (Behrens, 2006).

Conclusion

Te EU AMIS was a successul small bridging mission beween wo very large and challenging missions(UNMIS/AUMIS and UNAMID). Alhough oal peace

was no achieved and he securiy siuaion remains lesshan desirable, he mission was successul in achievinghe asks ha were idenied in is mandae.



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Chapter 16

Timor-Leste (East Timor)

Map 16.1. Timor-Leste (East Timor)Source: Couresy o he Universiy o exas Libraries, Te Universiy o exas a Ausin.



138


Tere have been ve separae Unied Naions (UN)missions o imor-Lese since June 1999. Te rs womissions were beore he imor-Lese Declaraion o In-dependence in May 2002, and he nal hree missions

were subsequen o he counry’s independence. Te vemissions were hese:

1. Te Unied Naions Mission in Eas imor(UNAME) (June o Ocober 1999) was a polii-cal mission ha was mandaed o organize and oconduc a popular consulaion. Te reerendum

would ascerain wheher he Eas imorese people would accep a special auonomy wihin Indonesiaor wheher hey would rejec a proposal ha wouldlead o Eas imor’s separaion rom Indonesia.

2. Te Unied Naions ransiional Adminisraionin Eas imor (UNAE) (Ocober 1999 o May 2002) was a peacekeeping operaion ha was esab-lished aer he Eas imorese rejeced he special au-onomy opion. UNAE exercised adminisraiveauhoriy over Eas imor during he ransiion oindependence.

3. Te Unied Naions Mission o Suppor in Easimor (UNMISE) (May 2002 o May 2005) was

also a peacekeeping mission. I was mandaed o provide assisance o he newly independen Eas imorunil Eas imor auhoriies had aken over all oper-aional responsibiliies. Te mission was also o en-able he new naion o become sel-sucien.

4. When UNMISE compleed is mandae, a new poliical mission, iled he Unied Naions Ocein imor-Lese (UNOIL) (May 2005 o Augus2006), was esablished o suppor he developmeno criical sae insiuions and he police and o pro-

vide raining in democraic governance and humanrighs (Unied Naions, 2010i).

5. Te Unied Naions Inegraed Mission in imor-Lese (UNMI) (Augus 2006 o presen) was es-ablished ollowing he poliical, humaniarian, andsecuriy crisis ha he counry suered in April–

June 2006.


in East Timor


On June 11, 1999, he UN Securiy Council adoped es-oluion 1246, which esablished UNAME (Unied Na-ions, 1999i). UNAME was o be compleed by Augus 31,1999, bu was exended unil November 30, 1999 (UniedNaions, 1999m). Te mission’s mandae was o organizeand o conduc he Eas imor Auonomy eerendumabou he uure o Eas imor, and he mission consisedo 280 police ocer advisers and 50 miliary liaison ocers(Unied Naions, 1999i). UNAME was o oversee he

ransiion period aer he reerendum and beore he ou-come’s implemenaion (Unied Naions, 2010o).

Following he voe or independence in he auonomy reerendum, which was held on Augus 30, 1999, he i-morese pro-Indonesian inegraion miliia launched acampaign o violence. Tis urmoil resuled in esablish-ing and deploying he Unied Naions Inernaional Forceor Eas imor (INEFE), which was a mulinaionalpeacekeeping inervenion ask orce ha was mandaedo address he humaniarian and securiy crisis ollowinghe reerendum. Deployed rom Sepember 20, 1999, un-

il he end o February 2000, he mission was o resorepeace and securiy o Eas imor, o proec and supporhe UN mission, and o aciliae humaniarian assisanceoperaions unil a UN peacekeeping orce could be ap-proved and deployed in he area (Unied Naions, 1999n).


UNAE was esablished on Ocober 12, 1999, whenhe UN Securiy Council adoped esoluion 1272(Unied Naions, 1999p). UNAE had he overall re-

sponsibiliy or he adminisraion o Eas imor and wasempowered o exercise all legislaive and execuive au-horiy, including he adminisraion o jusice (UniedNaions, 1999n). Te mission’s mandae was o do heollowing (Unied Naions, 1999p; 2010r):

• Provide securiy and mainain law and order hrough-ou he erriory o Eas imor.




139

• Esablish an eecive adminisraion.• Assis in he developmen o civil and social services.• Ensure he coordinaion and delivery o humaniarian

assisance, rehabiliaion, and developmen assisance.• Suppor capaciy building or sel-governmen.• Assis in he esablishmen o condiions or susain-

able developmen.

Te UNAE mandae included he provision o gov-ernance and adminisraion and was o include a civilian po-lice elemen o up o 1,640 ocers (Unied Naions, 1999p).Te mission was o be compleed by January 31, 2001(Unied Naions, 1999p), bu was exended by esoluion1338 unil January 31, 2002 (Unied Naions, 2001k).


Following he announcemen o he auonomy reerendum resuls on Augus 30, 1999, he pro-Indonesian miliias, wih suppor rom he Indonesiansecuriy orces, launched a campaign o violence, looing,and arson across he counry. Te Indonesian auhoriiesdid no respond eecively o he violence despie heirclear commimen o he May 5, 1999, agreemen. (Te“Agreemen beween he epublic o Indonesia and hePoruguese epublic on he Quesion o Eas imor”

is available a htp://www.asahi-ne.or.jp/~ak4a-mn/documens/unagreemen99.hml.)

Shorly aer he oubreak o he violence, he Indone-sian Armed Forces and he police began o wihdraw romhe counry, evenually leaving compleely. Te wihdrawalresuled in a large number o Eas imorese being killed andin more han 500,000 people being displaced rom heirhomes. Approximaely hal o he people le he counry;in some cases, hey le by orce. As a consequence o hoseacions, UNAME reesablished is headquarers in Dilion Sepember 28, 1999, and began o resore he mission’s

logisical capaciy and o redeploy sa members.


Te responsibiliy or providing civilian policing inEas imor was ranserred rom he INEFE o heUNAE in February 2000. Te ranser was compleed

by February 28, 2000, and was conduced in our phases(Unied Naions, 2000a):

• Phase 1—he easern secor (Baucau)• Phase 2—he Oecussi secor• Phase 3—he cenral secor (Dili-Same)• Phase 4—he wesern secor

Te UNAE civilian police consised o 1,485 o-cers (Unied Naions, 2001h) who were deployed in all13 disrics (Unied Naions, 2000a). Tis civilian policecomponen included general duies and invesigaion ca-pabiliies, and i had a rapid reacion uni ha was rainedin crowd conrol (Unied Naions, 2001a).

Te UNAE police had he dual role o mainaining

law and order and o raining he Eas imor Police Ser- vice (EPS) (Unied Naions, 2001h). Te UNAE developed a selecion crierion or new recruis o he EPSand developed a basic raining program ha was or new recruis and ha included hree monhs a he academy and six monhs o eld raining (Unied Naions, 2000a).Te UNAE also menored EPS senior ocers anddeveloped specialized and reresher courses ha were ormembers o managemen and ha would enable heirpromoion (Unied Naions, 2001h).


Te execuive law enorcemen powers o he UNAEcivilian police was unprecedened and required diplo-maic command and conrol rameworks. Te UNAEhad ull responsibiliy or an inciden, bu he EPS wouldassume operaional command only upon ranser o heexecuive auhoriy by he UN (Unied Naions, 2001h).

In lae 2001, he role o UNAE civilian policechanged rom one o providing basic parolling and law enorcemen o one o menoring, managing, and admin-isering he EPS. Te change in he role o UNAE

was in response o he EPS’s undeveloped inrasruc-ure and minimum logisical and adminisraive capabil-iy (Unied Naions, 2001h).

Individual ocers, specialized police unis, and policedisrics were veted and ceried as par o he capaciy de-

velopmen approach aken by he UNAE. As each po-



140


lice disric me he cericaion requiremens, execuiveresponsibiliy was ranserred rom he UNAE o heEPS. A imeable or he ranser was developed ha was“based upon a survey o populaion disribuion, crime sa-

isics, complexiy o asks o be perormed, and he level o raining o Eas imorese ocers” (Unied Naions, 2002b).

Te UNAE developed recrui, reresher, and man-agemen raining programs ha included modules in dem-ocraic policing, ehics, human righs, and communiy policing (Unied Naions, 2001b). However, because o he lack o resources (Unied Naions, 2002b), he recrui-men, raining, and capaciy building o he EPS ook much longer han anicipaed (Unied Naions, 2002d).

Te UNAE draed a plan o ranser responsibiliy or developing he EPS rom UNAE o UNMISE

(Unied Naions, 2002d). Four phases were included inhe plan ha would ensure ha he EPS would consiso approximaely 1,800 ocers (Unied Naions, 2002b)and ha ull execuive responsibiliy or policing would

be atained by January 2004 (Unied Naions, 2002d).Te ranser plan also included downsizing he civilianpolice componen o he UNMISE o 100 ocers by

January 2004. UNMISE was he ollow-on mission oUNAE (Unied Naions, 2002d).


Te EPS was ormally esablished on March 27, 2000,(Unied Naions, 2002d) and by early 2002 consised o 1,453 ocers, o which abou 300 were emale (Unied Na-ions, 2002d). Te EPS also included local ocers in mid-dle managemen, adminisraion, and invesigaions and126 ocers a he command level (Unied Naions, 2002b).

Te governmen developed a sraegic vision or heEPS ha would ulimaely consis o 2,600 ocers,including 180 ocers who had specialized raining incrowd managemen (Unied Naions, 2002b) and who

would also have he responsibiliy or border and immi-graion securiy (Unied Naions, 2002d).


In mid-2002, he secreary-general o he UN noed haduring he implemenaion o he mandae o UNAE,signican progress had been made oward esablishing

a proessional, ecien, and susainable EPS ha oper-aed in accordance wih inernaional sandards and hahe police raining college was capable o providing basicraining o cades (Unied Naions, 2002d).

Te secreary-general noed ha he EPS was onrack o achieve is arge number o personnel. He alsonoed ha he EPS would include ocers who would

be deployed o cover border and immigraion securiy (Unied Naions, 2002d).

Conclusion

Te UNAE made progress in achieving is mandae,mainly because i heeded lessons learned rom earliermissions. o ensure success, he police componen wasgiven execuive auhoriy, and disarmamen, demobili-zaion, and re-inegraion were implemened early in hemission. Tere were a number o amiliar shorcomingsin heir perormance. Te mission was slow in deployinghe police componen and ailed o prepare or he ou-

break o violence ollowing he auonomy reerendum. According o Durch (2006) and Greener (2009),

much o he criicism ha UNAE received could bedirecly atribued o he lack o predeploymen planningand mission preparaion. Alhough he lack o planning

was atribuable o inadequae resources wihin he UN

Deparmen o Peacekeeping Operaions, he UN didno prepare an appropriae concep o operaions a heime and ailed o ideniy how he police componen

would cooperae wih oher componens o he mission.Te deciency in planning was carried hrough o he

mission isel. Te mission did no develop perormance benchmarks, had no clear undersanding o an “end sae,”and did no develop a sraegic plan o prepare he naionor independence (Durch, 2006).

Case Study: United Nations Missiono Support in East Timor


Te mandae ha was approved or he Unied Naionsransiional Adminisraion in Eas imor (UNAE)covered he period rom Ocober 12, 1999, o May 20,




141

2002. Te mission was creaed o suppor Eas imorduring and aer he reerendum or independence ando suppor he inerim governmen as i esablished heinsiuions ha would aid he counry’s independence.

Te UNAE’s mandae expired on May 20, 2002, when Eas imor became independen. Te UN Securiy Council idenied ha Eas imor required assisance inhe ransiion o auhoriies and insiuions rom he UniedNaions (UN) o he inerim imor-Lese governmen.


On May 17, 2002, he UN Securiy Council adoped es-oluion 1410, which esablished he Unied Naions Mis-sion o Suppor in Eas imor (UNMISE) or an iniial

period o 12 monhs beginning May 20, 2002 (UniedNaions, 2002l). Te mission was o consis o 1,250 ci-

vilian police ocers, and is mandae comprised he ol-lowing hree pars (Unied Naions, 2002l; 2010):

1. Provide assisance o core adminisraive srucuresha are criical o he viabiliy and poliical sabiliy o Eas imor.

2. Provide inerim law enorcemen and public securiy,and assis in developing a new law enorcemen agency in Eas imor, he Eas imor Police Service (EPS).

3. Conribue o he mainenance o he exernal and

inernal securiy o Eas imor.

Te civilian police componen o he mission was o “begradually reduced and wihdrawn according o he achieve-men o predened condiions” (Unied Naions, 2002l).

Te UN Securiy Council asked UNMISE o develop and complee a mandaed implemenaion planha comprised he ollowing hree programs (UniedNaions, 2002l; 2010):

1. Sabiliy, Democracy, and Jusice2. Public and Inernal Securiy and Law Enorcemen

3. Exernal Securiy and Border Conrol

Te second program, Public and Inernal Securiy and Law Enorcemen, had he ollowing wo objecives(Unied Naions, 2002l):

1. o coninue providing execuive policing aerindependence

2. o suppor he developmen o he EPS hroughraining, co-locaion, and he imely and coordinaedhand-over o responsibiliies

On May 19, 2003, he UN Securiy Council adopedesoluion 1480, which exended UNMISE’s mandaeor anoher 12 monhs, unil May 20, 2004 (Unied Na-ions, 2003q). Te UNMISE’s mandae was exendedagain on May 14, 2004, or six monhs, wih a view o ex-ending he mandae or a nal six monhs, unil May 20,2005 (Unied Naions, 2004ab, 2004a).

On March 28, 2003, he UN Securiy Council adopedesoluion 379, which specied “he composiion andsrengh o he police componen o UNMISE and heschedule or is downsizing” (Unied Naions, 2003d).

Te resoluion also specied ha he mission include heollowing specic measures (Unied Naions, 2003p):

• An inernaionally ormed uni or one year• An addiional raining capaciy in key areas specied

in he special repor o he UN secreary-general• A greaer emphasis on human righs and rule-o-law • Te reenion o a greaer monioring and advisory

presence in disrics where policing auhoriy had beenhanded over o he imor-Lese Police Service (LPS)

• A ollow-up o he recommendaions oulined in he

November 2002 repor o he join assessmen mis-sion on policing• Te adjusmen o planning or he gradual ranser

o policing auhoriy o he LPS

Te UN Securiy Council on May 19, 2003, and on April 29, 2004, “decided o reduce he size o he mis-sion and revise is asks” (Unied Naions, 2010c). TeUNMISE’s key prioriy was changed o include im-proving he overall capabiliies o he LPS. Is mandae

was exended o include he ollowing (Unied Naions,2003q; 2004c; 2004i; 2004ab):

• Suppor or he public adminisraion and jusicesysem o imor-Lese and or jusice in he area o serious crimes

• Suppor or developing law enorcemen in imor-Lese

• Suppor or he securiy and sabiliy o imor-Lese



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On April 28, 2005, he UN Securiy Council adopedesoluion 1599 ha esablished a “one-year ollow-onspecial poliical mission in imor-Lese, he Unied Na-ions Oce in imor-Lese (UNOIL),” which was o

remain in imor-Lese unil May 20, 2006 (Unied Na-ions, 2005ab). UNOIL’s mandae included he ollow-ing (Unied Naions, 2005ab):

• Suppor or developing criical sae insiuionshrough he provision o up o 45 civilian advisers

• Suppor or urher developmen o he policehrough he provision o up o 40 police advisers andsuppor or developing he border parol uni (BPU)hrough he provision o up o 35 addiional advisers,15 o whom may be miliary advisers

• Provision o raining in observance o democraicgovernance and human righs hrough deploying upo 10 human righs ocers


Alhough UNAE had achieved some o he elemensin is mandae, Eas imor was sill a new naion wih

weak insiuions ha required inernaional suppor andassisance. Following he independence o Eas imor

on May 20, 2002, he UN Securiy Council esablishedUNMISE o provide assisance o Eas imor over wo years unil all operaional responsibiliies were ully de- volved o he Eas imor auhoriies.

In May 2002, he emerging insiuions and securiy siuaion were sill ragile, and he LPS was no capa-

ble o mainaining public order. Te EPS reorm proj-ec was o be compleed by UNMISE, which was also oconribue o he mainenance o he counry’s exernaland inernal securiy.


A he ime o imor-Lese’s independence, he LPScomprised 2,258 ocers. Six monhs laer in Novem-

ber 2002, all o hose ocers had compleed he hree-monh basic raining course developed by UNAE and“were on duy, co-locaed wih heir UN counerpars a

appropriae levels o command or on-he-job raining”(Unied Naions, 2002j).

Te UNMISE civilian police menored and monioredhe LPS by “promoing sel-suciency and susainabiliy

o he service [and] by assising i o dene basic policies andsandard operaing procedures” (Unied Naions, 2004c).

By November 2002, “he UN civilian police [had]handed over policing responsibiliies o he LPS inhe disrics o Manauo, Aileu, Manuahi, and Ainaro”(Unied Naions, 2002d). Te LPS, despie is lack o resources, had kep law and order and was wihou ma-

jor incidens in hose disrics. All 13 police disrics wereo be ranserred o LPS responsibiliy by January 2004(Unied Naions, 2002j).

By mid-2003, he LPS was capable o mainaining

he recrui raining program, implemening ocer pro-moion recommendaions, and ullling execuive man-agemen posiions. Te LPS had also developed a rapiddeploymen group, comprising 500 highly rained and well-equipped ocers, who were capable o responding o chal-lenges posed by armed groups (Unied Naions, 2003).

UNMISE assised he LPS by esablishing aninsiuion-srenghening commitee o develop andimprove policing policy and policing adminisraiveand legislaive measures (Unied Naions, 2003c). Tecommitee’s objecives included he ollowing (Unied

Naions, 2003):

• Improve he LPS capaciy in policy and planning.• Improve he relaionships beween he LPS and

oher pars o he governmen.• Implemen sandardizaion o police policies and

procedures.• Develop public recogniion and undersanding o

he role o he LPS.• Expand he basic raining curriculum or he LPS

recruis o six monhs saring in January 2004.• Increase eciency in raining implemenaion.• Inegrae human righs ino all police raining.

In February 2004, UNMISE helped he LPS develop specialis raining courses in surveillance and in-elligence and in supervision and managemen. Tosecourses emphasized respec or human righs and issueso proessional sandards (Unied Naions, 2004c).




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UNMISE developed an in-service raining moduleor all border parol ocers ha ocused on he handlingo rearms and he use o orce (Unied Naions, 2004i).UNMISE also delivered a number o rain-he-rainers

courses (Unied Naions, 2005e). Alhough he BPUcomprised 300 ocers and was responsible or all bor-der poins in he hree border disrics (Unied Naions,2004i), he uni had no reached he “capaciy o perormproessional asks a he desired level o prociency andcompeence” (Unied Naions, 2005e).

During 2004, he governmen adoped legislaionincluding a deense ac, which claried he roles o heLPS and he armed orces (Unied Naions, 2004i). Inlae 2004, he LPS esablished a police reserve uni orcommuniy policing and specialized parols (Unied Na-

ions, 2005e).Te major iniiaive in lae 2004 was o increase LPS’s

accounabiliy. Te iniiaive called or rained proes-sional ehics ocers o help invesigae proessional eh-ics complains in our o he UNMISE disrics. Duringhis period, he UNMISE civilian police began imple-mening is exi sraegy. An increase in he number o liaison meeings wih he LPS and an increase in heranser o policing knowledge were included in he exisraegy (Unied Naions, 2005e).

o help he LPS develop is capabiliy in logisics

and inrasrucure, he UNMISE compleed a needsanalysis in early 2005. Te UNMISE civilian police alsohelped he LPS adminisraion develop a new person-nel daabase and menored he capaciy-building uni.During his period, he capaciy-building uni draed andreviewed he sandard operaing procedures o he LPS(Unied Naions, 2005e).


In November 2002, he Unied Naions Join AssessmenMission (UNJAM) visied imor-Lese o complee anin-counry review o he progress ha had been madesince is independence. Te UNJAM documened a roadmap ha included sraegies ha would be reeced in adevelopmen plan and would be upheld by naional poli-cies o inernal securiy and law and order. Te road mapnoed he “srenghening o he imor-Lese police’s ca-

pabiliy or managemen reorms, as a oundaion or sus-ainable insiuional developmen, which would receivehe earlies atenion” (Unied Naions, 2003a).

In mid-2002, he UNAE, in agreemen wih he

ransiional governmen, designed a developmen planha deailed he ranser o policing rom he UN o heLPS. Te plan included an evaluaed milesone-basedapproach ha reduced he size o he Unied Naionsmission over a wo-year period as he ranser o respon-sibiliy or execuive policing was compleed. Te planalso idenied a number o mechanisms ha would en-sure ha he mission’s aciviies were coordinaed wihhe governmen. Te ranser o responsibiliy was o becompleed only as individual ocers were ceried anddisrics were accredied (Unied Naions, 2002d).

Mobile eams o UNMISE civilian police ocers reviewed he perormance o individual police saions omake sure ha a disric or uni and is sa members mecapaciy and inegriy sandards required o ceriy indi-

vidual ocers and o accredi organizaional srucures.Te developmen plan envisioned ha, aer ranserringall police disrics o he LPS, he role o UNMISE ci-

vilian police would change rom advising abou rainingand operaions o providing echnical advice (Unied Na-ions, 2002d).

During he ranser period, UNMISE coninued o

develop he LPS’s organizaional capaciy and inegriy and o review is organizaional srucure. Te govern-men endorsed his srucure as well as he LPS policecommissioner, who had assumed ull execuive responsi-

biliy over he police (Unied Naions, 2002d). A is deploymen, he UNMISE civilian police

componen consised o personnel rom he compleedUNAE mission. During is mandae, he UNMISEpersonnel decreased rom 1,250 in May 2002 o 134 inMay 2005. Tis gradual decrease in sa members or heperiod o May 2002 o May 2005 is presened in able 16.1.

In mid-2003, he UNMISE noed ha he missionneeded o adjus is downsizing program. Tis adjus-men was necessary because o he local securiy envi-ronmen and he longer-han-expeced process o reormand resrucure he LPS. By adjusing he downsizingprogram, he mission would mainain is operaional ca-paciy o address civil disurbances and o improve iscapabiliy o develop he imor-Lese police’s abiliy o



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respond o emerging weaknesses. Te gradual ransero policing auhoriy o imor-Lese was “adjused oinclude saeguards and arrangemens or command and

conrol” (Unied Naions, 2003a).Te downsizing adjusmen allowed changes o bemade o he mission’s reorm program. Te mission em-phasized human righs and he rule o law in police rain-ing and a “monioring and advisory presence in disrics

where policing auhoriy” had been ranserred o heLPS (Unied Naions, 2003). Te new approach en-abled urher capaciy developmen (Unied Naions,2004i); conribued o srenghening he LPS’s eec-iveness, proessionalism, accounabiliy, and responsive-ness; and provided a oundaion or he organizaion o

beter mee he challenges ha were emerging (UniedNaions, 2003p). Police advisers were co-locaed wihheir LPS counerpars, which ensured a ramework ha would urher suppor he developmen o he LPSoperaional capabiliy (Unied Naions, 2004i).

In mid-2004, UNMISE police advisers urher en-hanced he developmen plan, according o resuls o asurvey o naional police ocers (Unied Naions, 2004s).

Te survey idenied gaps in police capaciy and enabledraining programs o be delivered a he disric and sub-disric levels. Te raining programs would ensure helong-erm susainabiliy o he police. Suppored by Aus-

ralia, China, Malaysia, Tailand, and he Unied King-dom, he programs included specialized and middle- andsenior-managemen courses (Unied Naions, 2004).

By early 2005, 1,700 LPS ocers had compleed henew raining program. However, only hal o hose o-cers achieved he desired level o compeence. o ensureha he LPS ocers were able o reach a level o basiccompeency and o consolidae he acquired skills, UN-MISE police advisers developed a ollow-up course haocused on invesigaion skills and orensic science. By heend o January 2005, 300 LPS ocers compleed ha

course (Unied Naions, 2005e).


UNMISE gradually handed over is execuive auhoriy or securiy o he governmen o imor-Lese during ismandae period. UNMISE concenraed on develop-ing he capaciy o police services, esablishing law andorder and exernal securiy, and developing he skills andknowledge o LPS ocers.

Te mission helped develop he capabiliy o opera-ional line uncions in he areas where a lack o imoreseexperise could have had a serious eec on peace and sa-

biliy in he counry (Unied Naions, 2010c).


In November 2004, he secreary-general o he UNnoed ha “despie noable advances achieved in helas monhs, imor-Lese has no ye reached he crii-cal hreshold o sel-suciency, mainly in key areas suchas public adminisraion, law enorcemen, and securiy”(Unied Naions, 2004ah). Te LPS had made progressin is developmen, wih ocers “gradually improvingheir skills and gaining experience in many areas o po-licing” hrough he raining and menoring provided by UNMISE police advisers, bu a number o problems re-mained (Unied Naions, 2004).

Table 16.1. UNMISET Civilian Police Sta Numbers, May 2002 to May 2005

Year MonthTotal Civilian Police

Ocers2002 May 1,250

June 1,130

July 1,010

September 850

November 800

2003 January 720

May 560

June 500

2004 February 319

April 302

October 150

2005 January 140

May 134





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Te LPS was “capable o carrying ou regular daily policing operaions” bu was resrained by he lack o progress on “he promulgaion o he Organic Law hadenes he role” o he LPS and by “he lack o proes-

sional knowledge and experise, adminisraive manage-men capabiliy, lack o equipmen, inrasrucure, andlogisic suppor” (Unied Naions, 2004).

Te UNMISE police advisers had also received re-pors o LPS “misconduc, including excessive use o orce, assauls, negligen use o rearms, and various hu-man righs abuses” (Unied Naions, 2005e). Te mis-conduc and he LPS’s apparen lack o “criical skillsand prociency, paricularly in he areas o invesigaions,orensics, and logisics,” had conribued o heir lack o accounabiliy and he public’s poor percepion o hose

police ocers (Unied Naions, 2005e).

Conclusion

On May 20, 2005, UNMISE successully concluded ismandae in imor-Lese. I was succeeded by a small polii-cal mission—UNOIL. Tis mission was esablished by heUN Securiy Council o ensure ha he underpinnings o a

viable sae were rmly in place (Unied Naions, 2010c).Inernally, he LPS coninued o ace a lack o re-

spec or discipline and human righs. Te siuaion was

compounded by “he ac ha neiher he Inspecoraenor he Proessional Ehics Oce [was] sucienly re-sourced, and hey [were] hereore no able o underakeinvesigaions ino all repored incidens o violaions”(Unied Naions, 2004). Operaionally, he LPS aceddicul challenges, “including a lack o proessional skillsand values, policing experience, necessary equipmenand inrasrucure, and managemen and co-ordinaioncapabiliies” (Unied Naions, 2004).

Case Study: United NationsIntegrated Mission in Timor-Leste


Te Unied Naions Inegraed Mission in imor-Lese(UNOIL) developed and delivered in-service raining o

he imor-Lese Police Service (LPS) and o he borderparol uni (BPU). Te mission’s civilian police advisersrained 2,556 imorese police ocers in general policingand managemen. Te mission also assised he LPS in

developing raining maerials, rules, guidelines and proce-dures, and several criical operaional and raining manualsor he specialized police unis (Unied Naions, 2006i).

In early 2006, UNOIL deermined ha he LPSdid no have he skills or capabiliy in several operaionalareas. Te wo major reasons ha he LPS was noable o underake urher developmen were as ollows(Unied Naions, 2006i):

1. Te LPS command and conrol srucure had no ye been ully insiuionalized.

2. Tere was an acue shorage o logisical resources,paricularly in ransporaion and communicaion.

Te governmen o imor-Lese realized he chal-lenges ahead or he LPS and requesed ha he UniedNaions (UN), upon compleion o UNOIL’s mandae,esablish a special poliical oce in imor-Lese o assishe governmen o carry ou ree and air elecions. Tisproposal was agreed o by he UN Securiy Council; onMay 21, 2006, a small, inegraed UN oce was esab-lished or 12 monhs. Te oce was o include a small

number o police advisers who were o assis and supporhe leadership o he imorese Naional Police (known by he Poruguese iniials PNL). UNOIL was o as-sis by “planning and preparing elecoral-relaed securiy arrangemens, as well as in he aciliaion and he pro-

vision o raining and providing oher resource require-mens ha would adequaely prepare he naional policeo perorm heir roles and responsibiliies during he con-duc o he 2007 elecions” (Unied Naions, 2006i).

Mandate o the MissionFollowing he poliical, humaniarian, and securiy crisesha broke ou in imor-Lese in April and May 2006,he UN Securiy Council adoped esoluion 1704 on

Augus 25, 2006. Tis resoluion esablished he UniedNaions Inegraed Mission in imor-Lese (UNMI), amulidimensional peacekeeping operaion. Te mission



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was esablished iniially or six monhs, wih inenions orenew i or addiional periods. Also, he mission was o bemade up o a civilian componen ha included up o 1,608police personnel and an iniial componen o up o 34

miliary liaison and sa ocers (Unied Naions, 2006ac).Te mission’s mandae was subsequenly exended

on February 27, 2007, or 12 monhs (Unied Naions,2007b) and again ollowing atacks on he presiden andprime miniser o imor-Lese in Dili on February 11,2008 (Unied Naions, 2008p). Te mandae was ex-ended or a urher 12 monhs on February 26, 2010, by he adopion o esoluion 1916 (Unied Naions, 2010r).

Te UNMI approach was o be underaken wihinhe ramework o an execuive policing mandae. Te mis-sion was o have wo main roles (Unied Naions, 2006i):

1. In he immediae inerim phase, he mission would,as requesed, suppor he governmen by mainaininglaw and order hrough he provision o execuive po-licing as may be necessary hroughou he counry, in-cluding areas o reurn o inernally displaced persons,and by iniiaing a phased reconsiuion o he PNL.

2. Te mission would advise and suppor he govern-men in he reorming, resrucuring, and rebuildingo is police service and he Minisry o Inerior.

Specically, he UNMI was mandaed o supporhe governmen as ollows (Unied Naions, 2006ac):

• Consolidae sabiliy, enhance a culure o demo-craic governance, and aciliae poliical dialogueamong imorese sakeholders in heir eors o

bring abou a process o naional reconciliaion ando oser social cohesion.

• Assis wih securiy asks and esablish a coninuouspresence in hree border disrics alongside armedUN police ocers assigned o disric police saions.

• Ensure he resoraion and mainenance o public se-curiy in imor-Lese hrough he provision o sup-por o he PNL.

• Assis wih urher raining, insiuional develop-men, and srenghening o he PNL as well as heMinisry o Inerior.

• Assis wih he planning and preparaion o elecoral-relaed securiy arrangemens ha would adequaely

prepare he PNL or perorming is roles and re-sponsibiliies during he 2007 elecions.

• Provide suppor o he naional police and assis inconducing a comprehensive review o he role and

needs o he securiy secor.

Te imorese governmen requesed ha he missionimmediaely esablish a UN police orce in imor-Lese omainain law and order in Dili and elsewhere in he coun-ry and o reesablish condence among he people unilhe PNL was reorganized and resrucured o ac inde-pendenly and proessionally (Unied Naions, 2006l).

During he rs sage o he mission, he reormand reorganizaion o he PNL ook prioriy and pro-ceeded simulaneously wih he provision o execuive

policing o bring abou he insiuion’s rapid recov-ery. Te mission’s execuive policing role was o adopa communiy-oriened approach and o engage wih hegovernmen, he civil sociey, and he public a large(Unied Naions, 2006r).

o assis wih developing he operaional and admin-israive capaciy o he PNL, UNMI civilian police

were asked o do he ollowing (Unied Naions, 2006r):

• aionalize he PNL’s organizaional srucure andoperaional capaciy, especially in communicaions

and inormaion sysems, ee managemen andmainenance, budge and nance, power supply sys-ems, and oher criical logisical uncions.

• Design and implemen a comprehensive veting andcericaion program.

• Conribue o specialized raining programs in allrelevan policing hemaic areas, including humanrighs and leadership raining schemes.

• Build a srong, on-he-job menoring program orleadership posiions.

• Promoe he paricipaion o women in he PNL, boh a headquarers and in he disrics.

• Develop a meri-based appoinmen and promoionsysem.

• Srenghen he PNL’s operaional independence,inernal accounabiliy srucures, and proceduresand exernal oversigh mechanisms.

• Esablish insiuional means or coordinaion wihhe deense secor.




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Te UNMI was also o assis he Minisry o Ineriorin developing capaciy in policy analysis, planning, leg-islaive draing, budge developmen, procuremen, in-er-miniserial relaions, and public inormaion (Unied

Naions, 2006r).


Because o a series o evens culminaing in a poliical,humaniarian, and securiy crisis in imor-Lese, heUN Securiy Council exended he UNOIL’s mandaeo Augus 20, 2006. Te insiuional ailures o bohhe PNL and he F-FDL (known by he Porugueseiniials or he imor-Lese Deense Force) were a he

core o his crisis. Te UN Securiy Council noed ha al-hough progress had been made since 2002 in some areaso imorese policing capaciy, he “Minisry o he Ine-rior had no only negleced he insiuional developmeno [he] PNL bu had ailed o build he minisry’s owncapaciy, paricularly in he areas o policy developmen,planning, budge developmen, and legislaive aairs. I

was also noed ha hey regularly inerered in policingaciviies a all levels, including police operaions and inpersonnel decisions” (Unied Naions, 2006r).

Te inererence by he Minisry o Inerior, com-

bined wih he PNL’s adminisraive and organizaional weaknesses, had “seriously aeced he overall eecive-ness, proessionalism and credibiliy o he naional po-lice orce” (Unied Naions, 2006r).

As a resul o he crisis, he incoming inernaional UNorces began securing key insallaions in he counry onMay 26, 2006. From June 26 unil July 9, an assessmeneam was deployed o ideniy he asks required o beunderaken by a pos-UNOIL mission and o developrecommendaions or a uure UN presence (Unied Na-ions, 2010i).


Te assessmen eam’s analysis o he crisis idenied hahe diculies in boh he PNL and F-FDL were in-erconneced. Te analysis called or aking a holisicapproach o he securiy secor o coordinae reorm e-

ors in he areas o policing and deense i he crisis waso be eecively overcome. o assis in his approach, heUNMI esablished a securiy secor suppor uni (a)ha could oer advice abou securiy secor governance,

including police and deense reorm; (b) ha could link aciviies ha were relaed o he mission securiy secor

wih hose o parners; and (c) ha could aciliae iner-naional assisance in his area (Unied Naions, 2006r).Te uni also advised on he reorm and developmen o he Minisry o Inerior, he Minisry o Deense, and heF-FDL (Unied Naions, 2006r).

Te deploymen o UNMI was given prioriy “ohelp resore and mainain public order, paricularly inDili, as a precondiion or he achievemen o he oherkey elemens” o he mission’s mandae (Unied Naions,

2007b). However, he mission experienced challengesrom he sar o is deploymen. Tose challenges camerom wihin he PNL, and he PNL quesioned “heneed or UNMI police, as he naional orce did no dis-inegrae in he disrics as i did in Dili” (Unied Naions,2007m). Tis siuaion resuled in a number o PNL o-cers resising he menoring and supervision given by he UNMI. A revised and sreamlined menoring pro-gram ha ocused on core policing compeencies was de-

veloped by UNMI in conjuncion wih he PNL oovercome he challenges. Individual PNL ocers were

ceried aer hey were veted and compleed he new core program (Unied Naions, 2008j). As he securiy siuaion sabilized, he role o he

UNMI civilian police changed rom one o inerim law enorcemen o one ha provided suppor o he PNL’sreorming, resrucuring, and rebuilding (Unied Na-ions, 2007m). Te mission’s role included “monioringand reporing rom all disrics, while also being availableo provide advice. I oered operaional suppor and, inexremis, assumed inerim law enorcemen responsi-

biliies, when required and requesed” (Unied Naions,2008j). Te UNMI civilian police also underook pro-acive policing parols and implemened a number o communiy policing iniiaives (Unied Naions, 2009a).

In mid-2009, he UNMI developed and deliveredraining in communiy-based policing and assised hePNL in developing plans or special evens such ashe popular consulaion anniversary celebraions. TeUNMI hen implemened he ranser o primary polic-



148


ing responsibiliies o he PNL, and our disrics werehanded over by Sepember 2009 (Unied Naions, 2009i).

On May 13, 2009, he UNMI and he imor-Lesegovernmen esablished a join echnical assessmen

eam. Te eam developed our benchmarks o assessa PNL saion or disric beore he saion or disriccould resume responsibiliy or delivering police services(Unied Naions, 2009i). Te our benchmarks were asollows (Unied Naions, 2009i):

1. Te abiliy o he naional police o respond appro-priaely o he securiy environmen in a given disric

2. Te nal cericaion o a leas 80 percen o eligibleocers in a given disric or uni o resume primary policing responsibiliy

3. Te availabiliy o iniial operaional logisical require-mens involving ransporaion and communicaions

4. Te sabiliy o he insiuion, which includes heabiliy o exercise command and conrol and o gaincommuniy accepance, among oher hings


Te iniial UNMI civilian police componen consisedo 1,108 ocers (Unied Naions, 2006r). Mos ocers

were deployed in he capial, Dili, and he remaining o-cers were deployed a disric headquarer saions andsublevel police saions (Unied Naions, 2006r). able 16.2presens he number o UNMI civilian police ocerson sa rom Augus 2006 o Augus 2009. Te gures dono include police ocers deployed wihin he ormedpolice unis.

In December 2007, he UNMI underook an assess-men o he PNL ha included is 13 police disrics,PNL headquarers and subordinae unis, and PNLspecialized unis. Te assessmen ormed he ounda-ion o develop a plan o reorm, resrucure, and rebuildhe PNL. Te plan would cover he PNL’s capaciy-

building and insiuional developmen needs. Te plan was developed in close consulaion wih he governmenand he PNL, and i was envisioned o be implemenedover ve years. (Unied Naions, 2007b).

Te major issues acing he UNMI were ocer resis-ance o menoring (Unied Naions, 2008a) and he ca-

paciy o he PNL o absorb reorm and developmen.Implemenaion o he cericaion raining program hahad been developed by he UNMI in conjuncion wihhe PNL had a very low pass rae: “only 44 o he rs88 ocers who underwen six-monh menoring” reachedhe pass rae or nal cericaion (Unied Naions, 2007m).

In consulaion wih he governmen, UNMI esab-lished a securiy secor reorm working group. Ta group

was o dra and o oversee implemenaion o he policereorm plan. Te plan idenied he program or “he re-orm, resrucuring, and rebuilding” o he PNL andnoed ha he UNMI “ransiion rom execuive polic-

ing o a sricly menoring and observaion role [would] be phased [in in] accordance wih he regisraion andcericaion programme or he naional police” (UniedNaions, 2007m). Te ranser o execuive responsibiliy o he PNL was o depend on he ollowing hree ac-ors (Unied Naions, 2007m; 2008j):

1. Compleion o he regisraion and cericaion pro-gram or he disric and uni members

2. Achievemen o he benchmarks and atainmen o he perormance arges in he reorm, resrucuring,

and rebuilding plan3. Condiions o he general law-and-order siuaion in

imor-Lese

Te police reorm plan envisioned he ranser o responsibiliy o be a he rae o one disric every womonhs, saring wih he Dili disric . However, a major

weakness slowed he ranser rae. Te process ook longer

Table 16.2. UNMIT Civilian Police Sta Numbers, August 2006 to August 2009

Year MonthNumber o Civilian

Police Ocers2006 August 1,108

2007 February 1,313

August 1,635

2009 January 1,510

August 1,560

Source: Auhor (rom various Unied Naions documensdaed 2006 o 2009).




149

in rural saions and disrics because o he low numbero UNMI police ocers deployed in hose disrics,especially in remoe areas (Unied Naions, 2008j).

In mid-March 2008, an exper assessmen eam vis-

ied he mission. Te eam developed a imeable or henaional police o resume policing responsibiliies, which

was o be implemened in hree phases and based on heollowing ve crieria (Unied Naions, 2008i):

• Te securiy environmen• Te sang levels o ceried ocers• Te availabiliy o iniial operaional logisical require-

mens involving ransporaion and communicaions• Te insiuional sabiliy • Te muual respec beween he F-FDL and he

PNL

Tose medium-erm sraegy and benchmarks wouldcover he ollowing our prioriy areas o he UNMImandae (Unied Naions, 2008i):

1. eview and reorm he securiy secor.2. Srenghen he rule o law.3. Encourage economic and social developmen.4. Promoe a culure o democraic governance.

Furher benchmarks would be developed by UNMIin consulaion wih he governmen “o measure wheher he necessary srucures, insiuions, andprocesses [were] in place o provide a solid basis orachieving susainable sabiliy and prosperiy in imor-Lese” (Unied Naions, 2008i). Tis comprehensivecooperaive approach was o “lay he oundaion or helong-erm developmen o he naional police and somus be approached in a deliberae manner o ensurehe inegriy and eeciveness o he process” (UniedNaions, 2009a).

Te UNMI civilian police moniored and rackedhe progress ha he PNL made in achieving he bench-marks. Te UNMI police remained “available o adviseand provide operaional suppor,” and would reassume“inerim law enorcemen, i required and requesed”(Unied Naions, 2009a). However, in early 2009, in con-sulaion wih he governmen, urher prioriy bench-

marks were added o he process. Te new benchmarks were as ollows (Unied Naions, 2009a):

• Provide adequae capaciy, sysems processes, and

resources wihin securiy secor insiuions or eachpolice uni o ulll is respecive role, including hu-man righs obligaions, wih clear and ransparenmechanisms ha would ensure civil oversigh.

• Conduc a comprehensive review o he uure roleand needs o he securiy secor and develop coordi-naed reorm plans.

• Clearly dene respecive roles or he various insiu-ions o he securiy secor.

• Esablish clear and ransparen mechanisms o en-sure civil oversigh.

• Complee all ousanding invesigaions, and esab-lish eecive mechanisms o enhance he uncion-ing and inegriy o he judiciary.

• Adhere o he rule o law hrough respec or consi-uional righs and guaranees or all ciizens, and ad-here o sric ehical sandards.

• Improve he qualiy o lie; increase he employmenopporuniies, especially in rural areas and or youh;and improve he susainable reurn and reinegraiono inernally displaced persons.

In mid-2009, he UNMI and he PNL developeda sysem o monior he progress o he PNL in he dis-rics and unis where i had resumed primary policingresponsibiliies. Te monioring would susain he con-inual reorm, resrucuring, and rebuilding o he orce.On February 10, 2009, his monioring was suppored

by he announcemen o a new organic or encompassinglaw, which inroduced signican changes in he PNL’sorganizaional srucure (Unied Naions, 2009i).

Mission Achievements (Outcomes)Since is esablishmen, he UNMI has been working wihhe governmen o imor-Lese o develop is insiuionsand o increase is securiy and sabiliy. Te mission im-proved he overall siuaion in imor-Lese, alhough hesecuriy siuaion and he poliical climae remain volaile.



150


Te mission had sabilized he counry o such a levelha hree rounds o presidenial and parliamenary elec-ions were held in June 2007, he resuls o which were

widely acceped by he populaion.

However, here have been a number o atemps o de-sabilize he counry, including an armed atack on hepresiden and on he prime miniser. Tose incidens cre-aed a challenge or he sae insiuions. Ye, parliamen

was sill able o uncion and he atacks did no precipi-ae a crisis ha desabilized he whole counry. Since heatacks, he counry has remained calm, and he missionhas been able o ocus on coordinaing he capaciy devel-opmen o he PNL.


In February 2007, he secreary-general o he UN noedha he UNMI had made subsanial progress owardimplemening is mandaed asks or ransiional law en-orcemen, police reorm, elecions, and good oces.Te mission had ollowed an inegraed approach andhad ocused on he immediae challenges in prioriy-mandaed areas (Unied Naions, 2007b). However, hesecreary-general warned ha he “ulimae success o he police reorm process [would] depend on he com-

mimen o he naional police and he [g]overnmen”(Unied Naions, 2008i).In a laer repor daed Ocober 2, 2009, he secreary-

general saed ha “coninued incremenal progress” had been achieved oward “he prioriy benchmarks [whichhad been] developed o cover he our mandaed prior-iy areas o UNMI: review and reorm o he securiy

secor, srenghening o he rule o law, promoion o aculure o democraic governance and dialogue, and eco-nomic and social developmen” (Unied Naions, 2009i).However, he secreary-general also observed ha “de-

spie he progress made in he resumpion o primary po-licing responsibiliies by he naional police, much moreneeds o be done” (Unied Naions, 2009i).

Conclusion

Te use o civilian police reorm wihin peacekeepingin imor-Lese is an excellen case sudy because heUNMI was he h UN mission o be deployed o hecounry in seven years.

UNMI aced a number o challenges rom he begin-ning, especially rom wihin he PNL. Ye he ac hahere have been our earlier missions in he counry raiseswo quesions. Te rs is ha i he earlier missions achievedheir mandaes, why were subsequen missions required?Moreover, did he rs mission no lay a susainable oun-daion or he PNL o be able o underake policing onis own? Te second quesion raised is his: did subsequenmissions no achieve heir mandaes? Perhaps somehing

was wrong wih each mandae or he mandae’s implemen-aion. Or perhaps somehing was wrong wih he evalua-

ion o each mission. Tese concerns need o be addressed.Te large number o missions o imor-Lese, a coun-ry whose insiuions and securiy remain ragile, begshe quesion o wheher he approach aken was appro-priae in reorming he PNL aer he counry gained in-dependence in 2002.

he mission was ongoing as of June 2010.



Part III

Analysis and Steps or the Future





153

Chapter 17

Analysis o the 23 Missions

Introduction

Te examinaion o he 23 case sudy missions wihinhe 14 chapers in par II has enabled urher inerprea-ion and analysis o ha inormaion. Te nex sage o analysis is o apply he 39-quesion emplae ha was de-

veloped ollowing he iniial lieraure review o he inor-maion ha was presened in par II.

Tis approach does no prescribe mission success bu

allows each mission’s success o be measured on an in-dividual basis, depending on is poliical and operaionalconex (Druckman and Sern, 1997). Te mehod o analysis ormed a basis o comparison or ideniying any dierences beween and among he missions.

Te 39 quesions are aggregaed under he ollowingve main headings ha were presened in able 1.5. Toseheadings ideniy he dieren sages o a mission and heacions aken during a mission:

• Police Mission Planning• Te Mission

• Local Police Capaciy • Policing Approach• Program Evaluaion

Tis process provides a plaorm rom which lessonsmay be learned, and i enables he developmen o a new model or police reorm wihin inervenion missions.


Te research examined 23 peacekeeping missions haincluded a role or civilian police wihin heir mandaeand ha eiher commenced or nished beween 1999and 2007. Te ull and shor ile o he mission, hecounry o he inervenion, and he sar and nishdae or each o he 23 missions are presened in ap-pendix A.

Figure 17.1 and able 17.1 demonsrae ha 1999 o2007 was a busy period or he Unied Naions (UN)and he European Union (EU), wih a number o mis-sions commencing or nishing while ohers were de-ployed or he complee period. Figure 17.1 shows hedieren duraions o he missions and highlighs ha al-hough he research covered an 8-year period, wo mis-sions have been deployed or more han 10 years. Teduraion o each mission and is mandaing council arepresened in able 17.1.

Hal he EU missions were compleed wihin hree years, wih he majoriy nishing wihin six years. How-ever, he UN missions appear o have run or a longerperiod, wih he majoriy o missions aking beweenwo and seven years o complee. From 1999 o 2007,he average lengh o boh UN and EU police missions

was 4.6 years, and he mos common lengh was be-ween 2.0 o 3.0 years.



154


F i g u r e 1 7 . 1 .

S t a r t a n d

F i n i s h D a t e s f o r 2 3 M i s s i o n C

a s e S t u d i e s

M i s s i o n E U P O L A f g h a n i s t a n

U N M I B H

E U P M

O N U B

U N O C I

M O N U C

E U P O L K i n s h a s a

E U P O L R D C o n g o

E U P O L P r o x i m a

E U P A T

M I P O N U H

M I N U S T A H

U N M I K

U N M I L

E U P O L C O P P S

U N O M S I L

U N A M S I L

U N M I S

U N A M I D

E U A M I S

U N T A E T

U N M I S E T

U N M I T

J a n u a r y 1 9 9 5

J u n e 1 9 9 5

D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 5

J a n u a r y 1 9 9 6

J u n e 1 9 9 6

D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 6

J a n u a r y 1 9 9 7

J u n e 1 9 9 7

D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 7

J a n u a r y 1 9 9 8

J u n e 1 9 9 8

D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 8

J a n u a r y 1 9 9 9

J u n e 1 9 9 9

D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0

J u n e 2 0 0 0

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1

J u n e 2 0 0 1

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 1

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 2

J u n e 2 0 0 2

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 2

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 3

J u n e 2 0 0 3

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 3

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 4

J u n e 2 0 0 4

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 5

J u n e 2 0 0 5

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 5

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 6

J u n e 2 0 0 6

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 6

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 7

J u n e 2 0 0 7

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 8

J u n e 2 0 0 8

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8

J a n u a r y 2 0 0 9

J u n e 2 0 0 9

D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 9

J a n u a r y 2 0 1 0

J u n e 2 0 1 0

D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 0

D a t e

S o u r c e :

A u t h o r .



Analysis of the 23 Missions

155

Te mandaes o he 23 missions ouline ve reasons hahe missions were underaken. Te majoriy o boh UNand EU missions were underaken because o civil war or in-ernal conic. Te mission idenied in able 17.2.A as “or-eign invasion” relaes o EUPOL Aghanisan, and he hreemissions idenied as “new sae” all relae o imor-Lese.

O he 23 missions, 15 were mandaed by he UN and8 by he EU. able 17.2.B presens an analysis o he mis-sions by mandaing council and by wheher he missions

were police only or were miliary and police. All he EUmissions were police only excep EU AMIS o Sudan andDarur. Te majoriy o he UN missions were join mili-ary and police, wih only 2 o he 15 being police only:MIPONUH and MINUSAH in Haii.

Te uncion o each mission was specied wihin hemandae. able 17.2.C presens he six dieren missionuncions idenied by he auhorizing council. Te rspoin is ha here are a large number o UN “ollow-on”missions and hal he EU missions are o suppor and as-sis governmen or police or boh. Te second poin ishe dierence in uncion beween he UN and he EUmissions. Hal he uncions o he EU missions were osuppor and assis he governmen and/or police, com-pared wih only wo UN missions naming his uncionas primary. Tis siuaion is reversed or he “reorm insi-uions and/or police” uncion. Four UN missions con-sider his uncion primary, whereas only one EU missionincludes his uncion in is mandae.

Te oher area ha shows a clear dierence beweenhe UN and he EU missions is in heir predeploymenplanning. As presened in able 17.3.A, predeploymenplanning o he mission was unable o be deermined ormos UN missions. Tis is no o say, however, ha pre-

Table 17.1. Duration o the Mission

Duration o Mission

NumberUN

MissionsEU

Missions

Less than 1 year 1 0 11 to 2 years 1 1 0

2 to 3 years 6 3 3

3 to 4 years 3 2 1

4 to 5 years 2 1 1

5 to 6 years 2 1 1

6 to 7 years 3 3 0

7 to 8 years 3 2 1

More than 10 years 2 2 0

Source: Auhor.

Table 17.2. Reason or, Form o, and Functiono the Mission

A. Reason or the Mission

Reason TotalMissions UNMissions EUMissions

Civil war orinternal conict

17 10 7

Foreign invasion 1 0 1

Civil unrest 1 1 0

Weak state orcoup

1 1 0

New state 3 3 0

B. Form o the Mission

Form o Mission NumberUN

Missions

EU

MissionsPolice only 9 2 7

Military andpolice

14 13 1

C. Function o the Mission

IdentiedFunction

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions

Follow-onmission

6 5 1

Supportand assist

government orpolice or both

6 2 4

Rule o law 3 2 1

Reorminstitutions orpolice or both

5 4 1

Monitor, mentor,and advisegovernment orpolice or both

2 1 1

Protect civilians 1 1 0

Source: Auhor.



156


deploymen planning was no underaken; i jus was nospecied in he mandae. Te hree missions in whichhe UN did underake predeploymen planning wereUNAMID, UNMIK, and UNOCI. Boh UNAMID andUNMIK were mulidisciplinary eams, and UNOCI wasa police-only planning eam. Te usual pracice o he EU

was o sae in he mandae ha a predeploymen plan-ning eam would be involved.

Te involvemen o police in he preparaion or devel-opmen o a predeploymen plan claries his issue ur-her. able 17.3.B shows ha 12 UN missions did noideniy police as being involved in he predeploymenplanning. Te number o UN missions ha did no ac-knowledge preparing a predeploymen plan decreasedo 11. Four UN missions—MIPONUH, UNAMID,UNMIK, and UNMISE—prepared or developed pre-deploymen plans. All eigh EU missions excep EU

AMIS prepared predeploymen plans. All 23 missions included civilian police in heir au-

horized srengh. Five missions, our UN and one EU,did no sae he ype or orm o he reorm or capaciy developmen o he local police o be underaken. Temandaes or mos EU missions, in comparison o heUN missions, were specic in he ype o reorm o beunderaken.

able 17.4.A shows ha he UN missions were eihermenoring or monioring or were o a specic idenied

Table 17.3. Predeployment Plans

A. Police Involvement in Predeployment Planning

Total

Missions

UN

Missions

EU

MissionsNotindicated

14 12 2

Police wereinvolved

9 3 6

B. Did Police Prepare a Predeployment Plan?

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions

Notindicated

12 11 1

Yes 11 4 7

Source: Auhor.

Table 17.4. Reorms, Achievements, andTasks Identied in the Mission Mandate

A. Type o Reorm or Capacity Development o LocalPolice Specied in the Mission Mandate

Type o ReormTotal

MissionsUN

MissionsEU

Missions

Not indicated 5 4 1

Mentoring andmonitoring

6 2 4

Specifc identifedarea(s)

7 4 3

Training andrestructuring

4 4 0

Security sector reorm 1 1 0

B. The Mission Principal Achievement Identied inthe Mandate

PrincipalAchievement

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions

Not indicated 1 1 0

Stabilize localsituation or police

3 2 1

Implement specifcagreement or plan

7 3 4

Restructure localpolice

3 2 1

Develop sustainablecapacity o localpolice

3 2 1

Develop local police 4 3 1

Assist local police 2 2 0

C. The Mission Police Component Principal TaskIdentied in the Mandate

Principal TaskTotal

MissionsUN

MissionsEU

Missions

Institution buildingo local police

1 0 1

Mentor, monitor, andadvise local police

2 0 2

Reorm local police 10 7 3

Train local police 6 4 2

Advise or assistlocal police or both

4 4 0

Source: Auhor.




157

area. Te caegory o specic idenied area relaes o anarea o police reorm ha was designaed wihin he man-dae. Mandaes generally become more specic uponrenewal. As he UN underakes new missions and as ex-ising missions progress, he role o he police and wha

hey are o achieve becomes more specic. able 17.4.Bdemonsraes his poin.Te mandaes o all 23 missions indicaed wha he

mission was o achieve, and all excep UNAE iden-ied a primary goal o be achieved. Te mos commongoal was he implemenaion o a specic agreemen orplan, which is no surprising because he majoriy o peacekeeping missions are ounded on he signing o aceasere or peace agreemen. Tose agreemens are usu-ally ollowed by a more specic naional resrucuring ordevelopmen plan.

All he missions’ mandaes included a principal policeask; however, all he idenied goals were general and

vague. Te mos common ask o be achieved by he po-lice componen was o reorm he local police. As shownin able 17.4.C, his achievemen was he principal ask or approximaely hal o boh he UN and EU missions.Some mission mandaes included a principal ask, whileoher mandaes added a second ask.

o assis in he urher inerpreaion o individualmission direcives, he analysis examined he mandaes o he missions o deermine wheher any oher saemensspecied he mission direcion or oundaion. More han

hal he missions did no sae any urher direcion oherhan he principal ask. Tis nding was more requen inUN missions han in EU missions.

A urher ve direcives were included, and hey have been presened in able 17.5. Te EU direcives dierrom he UN direcives in ha he EU direcives appearo be more sraegic bu more general in naure, whereashe UN direcives are specic and ask oriened.

Because all he principal achievemens o he 23missions relaed o improving or developing he localpolice, clariy was sough abou wheher he missions

had sraegic plans ha deailed how he asks were o be achieved. As displayed in able 17.6.A , approximaely hal he missions included sraegic plans ha had beendeveloped by he police componen. Tis gure wassimilar or boh UN and EU missions.

Even i he police componen had developed a srae-gic reorm or capaciy developmen plan in he missions,he analysis did no discoun wheher mission mandaesincluded sraegic aims. able 17.6.B shows ha eighmissions did no ideniy a sraegic aim: seven UN mis-sions and one EU mission. Six o he seven UN missions

had neiher a sraegic plan nor an aim (MINUSAH,MIPONUH, MONUC, UNMISE, UNMI, andUNAE). However, one (UNAMSIL) had a sraegicplan bu did no have an aim.

EUPOL Aghanisan was he only EU mission hahad neiher an aim nor a sraegic plan.

Te number o missions idenied as having sraegicobjecives decreases signicanly rom hose idenied ashaving a sraegic plan or aim. As noed in able 17.6.C,only six missions had sraegic objecives. Tree missions

were UN missions (UNAMID, UNMIS, and UNMI),and hree were EU missions (EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL

Aghanisan, and EUPOL Kinshasa). All hose missions were he las o be deployed in he 23 missions includedin his research. Tis nding would sugges ha boh heUN and he EU are providing a clearer direcion as o

wha hey expec he individual mission o achieve. How-ever, EU AMIS, which was deployed on July 20, 2007, didno sae any specic sraegic objecives.

Table 17.5. Further Directions to MissionPolice Component Identied in Mandate

DirectionTotal

Missions

UN

Missions

EU

MissionsNot indicated 14 10 4

Proessionalizelocal police

2 0 2

Assist withimplementing themission

1 0 1

Focus on humanrights

1 0 1

Include severalspecifc objectives

3 3 0

Advise

government orcoordinate NGOs

2 2 0

Source: Auhor.



158


Te issue o mission objecives is urher clouded when atemping o deermine wheher he missionmandaes included perormance measures or a peror-mance ramework. Only our o he mission mandaesincluded eiher perormance measures or a ramework;hree o hose missions were UN missions (MONUC,UNAMID, and UNMI), and one was an EU mission(EUPOL COPPS). Alhough all our o he missions’perormance measures were sraegic and general in na-ure, none o he mandaes specied how he qualiy o he perormance measures in heir individual mandaes

would be measured (see able 17.6.D).

able 17.7 provides a summary o he our variables—sraegic plan, sraegic aim, objecives, and perormancemeasures (see ables 17.6.A o 17.6.D)—ha combine omake up he sraegic ramework or each o he 23 mis-sions. Only wo missions, EUPOL COPPS and UNAMID,have a comprehensive sraegic ramework comprising allour variables. Approximaely hal he 23 missions had asraegic plan or a sraegic aim, and 8 had boh.

Te bigges deciency in he sraegic ramework o missions is in seting perormance measures and objec-ives. Only ve missions included objecives in heir man-dae, and only our missions had perormance measures.

Table 17.6. Strategic Plans, Aims, and Objectives o the Missions, plus Perormance Measures

A. Missions in which Police Developed a Strategic Plan

Total Missions UN Missions EU Missions

Not indicated 12 7 5Yes 11 8 3

B. Strategic Aims o the Mission

Strategic Aim Total Missions UN Missions EU Missions

Not indicated 8 7 1

Provide assistance and training to local police 3 2 1

Develop local police 2 1 1

Develop sustainable capacity o local police 3 1 2

Support local police 2 1 1

Follow international best practices 1 0 1

Establish rule o law 1 0 1Provide security 1 1 0

Implement a specifc agreement 1 1 0

Monitor and disarm, demobilize, and reinte-grate (DDR)

1 1 0

C. Mission Mandates that Included Strategic Objectives


Not indicated 17 12 5

Yes 6 3 3

D. Mission Mandates that Included Perormance Measures or Framework



Yes 4 3 1

Source: Auhor.




159

All he EU missions have a leas one o he variables, bu 4 o he 15 UN missions did no include any o he variables in heir mandaes.

The MissionOne o he major debaes abou he involvemen o civil-ian police in peacekeeping is he ime ha i akes or po-lice o deploy. I usually akes police more ime o deploy han he miliary. able 17.8.A shows ha more hanhal he 23 missions were deployed wihin one monho he mandae being adoped. O he 15 UN missions,

9 are included in his caegory, which is surprising con-sidering ha he slowness debae ceners on he UN de-ploymen o police. Alhough able 17.8.A idenies hesage o police deploymen, i does no pinpoin whenhe missions achieved heir auhorized srengh. Tis is-sue was discussed wihin each individual case sudy inchapers 3–16.

Te second poin is ha he mandaes o six missionsidenied hemselves as being ollow-on missions. In eacho he cases, he police sa rolled over rom he com-pleed mission ino he new mission. Tis circumsanceaccouns or he large number o missions in which hepolice componen deployed quickly.

Table 17.7. Summary o Missions’ Strategic Framework

Short TitleStrategic

PlanStrategic Aim Objectives

PerormanceMeasures

1. EUPOL Aghanistan Y N Y N2. UNMIBH Y Y N N

3. EUPM Y Y N N

4. ONUB Y Y N N

5. UNOCI N Y N N

6. MONUC N N N Y

7. EUPOL Kinshasa N Y Y N

8. EUPOL RD Congo N Y N N

9. EUPOL Proxima N Y N N

10. EUPAT N Y N N

11. MIPONUH N N N N

12. MINUSTAH N N N N

13. UNMIK Y Y N N

14. UNMIL Y Y N N

15. EUPOL COPPS Y Y Y Y

16. UNOMSIL Y Y N N

17. UNAMSIL Y N N N

18. UNMIS Y Y Y N

19. UNAMID Y Y Y Y

20. EU AMIS N Y N N

21. UNTAET N N N N

22. UNMISET N N N N

23. UNMIT N N Y Y

Source: Auhor.



160


Combining he sage o police deploymen and au-horized srengh o a mission demonsraes ha boh heUN and he EU are logisically and adminisraively e-cien in geting uniorms on he ground.

able 17.8.B presens he size o each mission. Fewerhan 500 civilian police ocers were included in hal hemissions, while approximaely 45 percen o he missionscomprised more han 1,200 ocers. Te larger missions

were all deployed by he UN, he larges being UNAMIDa 4,675 ocers. Te UN also deployed he smalles mis-sion: UNOMSIL wih ve ocers.

Te EU deployed mainly smaller missions, alhoughhe larges, EUPM wih 862 ocers, is o a subsanial size.Te smalles EU mission was EU AMIS wih 16 ocers.

Te complicaing acor is he disconnec beween heauhorized srengh, he acual number o police in siu,and he poin when auhorized srengh is reached. In anumber o missions, he auhorized srengh was neveracually atained, and in ohers, an increase in srengh

was auhorized and adoped beore he previously au-horized srengh was atained or when he mandae wasrenewed. able 17.8.C shows ha in more han hal he

Table 17.8. Stage o Police Deployment, Original Authorized Strength, and Increase inNumbers o Police Ocers ater Mission Mandate

A. Stage at which Police Were Deployed ater Adoption o Mission Mandate

Stage o Police Deployment Total Missions UN Missions EU MissionsDate not indicated 5 4 1

Within 1 month 14 9 5

Between 1 and 2 months 1 1 0



B. Original Authorized Strength o Civilian Police Ocers

Number o Police Ocers Total Missions UN Missions EU Missions

Fewer than 10 1 1 0

Between 10 and 50 5 1 4

Between 50 and 100 3 2 1Between 100 and 200 1 0 1



Between 1,200 and 1,400 5 5 0

Between 1,400 and 2,000 1 1 0

Between 2,000 and 2,200 1 1 0

Between 3,600 and 3,800 1 1 0

Greater than 4,500 2 2 0

C. Missions that Increased the Number o Police Ocers during the Mandate

Total Missions UN Missions EU MissionsNot indicated 13 7 6

Did increase the number o police deployed 10 8 2

Source: Auhor.




161

missions, i could no be deermined wheher he auho-rized srengh was increased during he mandae. Te UNperormed slighly beter han did he EU in his regard.

Te wo EU missions ha had increases in heir auho-rized srengh were EUPM and EUPOL Aghanisan. Teeigh UN missions ha had increases in heir auhorizedsrengh were MINUSAH, MONUC, UNAMID,UNAMSIL, UNMIL, UNMIK, UNMIS, and UNOCI.Increases in he auhorized srengh o UN missions was gen-erally due o a change in he securiy siuaion or a specicreason such as he inroducion o a special raining programduring he ime leading up o local elecions. Te reason orhe increases in wo EU missions could no be idenied.

Te origin o he deployed civilian police is oenanoher poin o conenion wihin missions. Approxi-maely hal (12) he UN missions consised o a mixureo police ocers rom boh developed and developing

naions. Four o he EU missions comprised police o-cers only rom developed naions. wo missions con-ained police ocers rom counries ha had applied o

join he EU. able 17.9.A shows ha wo UN missions were composed principally o police ocers rom devel-oping naions.

Te role o he miliary usually orms he majorpar o any mission’s mandae. Usually he miliary pro-

vides high-level securiy or he mission and is asked wih enorcing he ceasere or peace agreemen. In he23 mission case sudies, 9 did no include he miliary,

and anoher mission operaed separaely rom he mili-ary. Tose 10 missions are indicaed as “no applicable”in able 17.9.B. Ta able also includes he missions in

which he miliary would have had an inuence on hemission environmen or on he success or ailure o hepolice componen wihin he mission. In mos missions,he miliary’s role—alone or in combinaion wih localpolice—was o provide securiy or o monior specicpoliical agreemens.

Local Police CapacityOne o he major asks oulined in mission mandaes washe reinegraion or disbanding o he exising local mili-ary and police orce. able 17.10 shows ha in less hanhal he missions, he opion o reinegraion or disband-ing was eiher no indicaed or no applicable. However,in mos missions where reinegraion was indicaed, bohhe local miliary and police were reinegraed.

einegraion may be a policy more requenly ad-oped by he UN han by he EU. However, a larger num-

ber o UN missions were underaken in Arica ollowingcivil wars, while he majoriy o EU missions were police-only missions ha suppored he local police.

o assis wih he implemenaion o he missions’ prin-cipal achievemen idenied in he mandae, 17 missionsdeveloped a police mission componen reorm, capaciy developmen, or projec plan. able 17.11.A demonsraesha in more han hal he UN missions, a reorm, capaciy

Table 17.9. Classication o Police Ocers’Country o Origin, plus Military’sMandated Role

A. Classication o Country where Deployed PoliceOcers Originated

OriginTotal

MissionsUN

MissionsEU

Missions

Not indicated 3 1 2

Mainly developed 4 0 4

Developed anddeveloping

14 12 2

Mainlydeveloping

2 2 0

B. The Military’s Mandated Role

Military Role TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions

Not applicable 10 3 7

Provide securityto mission orlocal populationor both

5 4 1

Monitor ceasefreor peaceagreement orboth

4 4 0

Undertake local

military reorm2 2 0

DDR 2 2 0

Source: Auhor.



162


developmen, or projec plan was developed wih regardo he reorganizaion o he local police and ha approxi-maely hal he EU missions had developed a plan.

However, only nine o hese plans were developed inconsulaion wih eiher he naional governmen or he localpolice. In he majoriy o cases, i could no be deermined

wheher any orm o consulaion had aken place. In bohhe UN and EU missions, abou one-hird had developedsome orm o specic projec plan (see able 17.11.B.).

able 17.11.C shows ha approximaely hal he mis-sions’ police componen reorm, capaciy developmen,and projec plans conained a principal aim or objecive. De-spie he general wording o all he plans, he UN aims andobjecives appear o provide more operaional direcion.

Alhough 16 missions developed some orm o re-orm, capaciy developmen, or projec plan, only 7 o he 23 missions ha were idenied as having a plan in-cluded benchmarks and perormance measures and im-plemened acion plans. Only one EU mission (EUPOLCOPPS), presened in able 17.11.D, included peror-mance measures and acion plans wihin is projec plan.

Nearly all he EU missions and approximaely one-hird o he UN missions ailed o include a ime rame

wihin heir reorm plan or program. However, one EUmission (EUPOL COPPS) did ouline a hree-year ime

Table 17.10. Reintegration o Local Policeand Military

CategoryTotal

Missions

UN

Missions

EU


Not applicable 4 0 4

Military onlywere reintegrated

2 2 0

Police only werereintegrated

1 0 1

Military andpolice werereintegrated

8 7 1

Military andpolice were

disbanded

2 2 0

Source: Auhor.

Table 17.11. Inormation about MissionPolice Components

A. Mission Police Component that Developed a

Reorm, Capacity Development, or Project Plan

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions

Not indicated 7 3 4

Missions thatdeveloped aplan

16 12 4

B. Mission Police Component that Included LocalParticipation in Developing the Reorm, Capacity

Development, or Project Plan

TotalMissions UNMissions EUMissions


Yes 9 7 2

C. Principal Aim or Objective o the Mission PoliceComponent Reorm, Capacity Development,

or Project Plan

Aim orObjective

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions


Improve local

police 4 2 2Develop localpolice

3 3 0

Reorm localpolice

2 2 0

Developcapacity o localpolice

1 1 0

D. Mission Police Component Reorm, CapacityDevelopment, or Project Plan that Included

Perormance Measures or Framework

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions


Yes 2 1 1

Benchmarks andaction plans

5 5 0

Source: Auhor.




163

rame or he implemenaion o is change program. woo he UN missions (UNMIL and UNAE) did nospeciy a ime rame because he lengh o he programdepended on he achievemen o phases or condiions.

Tere did no appear o be an accepable ime o im-

plemen a police reorm, capaciy developmen, or proj-ec plan across he missions ha did have a ime rame. Aspresened in able 17.12, he ime rame in missions hadid speciy a period varied rom wo o ve years.

Te ollowing ables presen he mehods and acicsadoped by he missions o implemen he ransorma-ion o he local police.

Te model adoped by individual missions o reormhe local police or develop capaciy varied. O he 23 mis-sions, 18 were idenied as having adoped a model oimplemen local police reorm or capaciy developmen.“Menoring, monioring, raining, and advising” was hemos common model adoped by he missions. able17.13.A shows ha alhough his descripion is vagueand encapsulaes a number o individual aspecs, i wasapplied operaionally and was used or all levels o helocal police rom consable o senior execuive. Te woUN missions (UNMIBH and UNMIL) ha adoped he“comprehensive model” had developed very specic and

Table 17.12. Time Frame or Implementingthe Mission Police Component Reorm,Capacity Development, or Project Plan

Time Frame TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions


2 years 2 2 0

3 years 1 0 1

4 years 1 1 0

5 years 2 2 0

Term notspecifed

1 1 0

Varieddepending

on phase orconditions

2 2 0

Source: Auhor.

Table 17.13. Change Models and ChangeMethods Used by Mission PoliceComponents, plus Comprehensive Reorms

A. Model Used by the Mission Police Component inLocal Police Reorm or Capacity Development

Change ModelTotal

MissionsUN

MissionsEU

Missions

Not indicated 5 1 4

Mentoring,monitoring, training,and advising

9 6 3

Training and capacitydevelopment

1 0 1

At the station level 1 1 0

Training only 3 3 0

Vetting, training,and certifcation

2 2 0

Comprehensivemodel

2 2 0

B. Principal Change Management Method Used bythe Mission Police Component in Implementing the

Reorm, Capacity Development, or Project Plan

Change MethodTotal

MissionsUN

MissionsEU

Missions

Not identifed 2 0 2

Mentoring, monitor-

ing, and training 3 2 1Coordinated or inphases or both

8 7 1

Advice and support 2 1 1

Embedding withlocal police

3 1 2

Geographicallybased

2 2 0

Training only 3 2 1

C. Mission Police Component Reorm, CapacityDevelopment, or Project Plans that Were Part o a

Comprehensive Reorm o the Criminal Justice System

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions


Yes 4 3 1

No 2 0 2

Source: Auhor.



164


deailed change programs, which included he phasesand benchmarks o be achieved.

Alhough only 16 missions developed reorm, capac-iy developmen, or projec plans, 21 missions described

he mehods hrough which hey would underake heransormaion o he local police. Using coordinaedsages or phases in which he local police ocers wererequired o achieve a specic benchmark beore movingon o he nex sage was he mos common mehod usedin he change managemen program. Tose mehods arepresened in able 17.13.B.

One o he major ailings when developing insiu-ional capaciy was ha he reorm was conduced inisolaion rom oher governmen agencies. Only ourmissions (EUPOL COPPS, UNMIBH, UNMISE, and

UNMI) included he reorm o he local police wihina coordinaed or comprehensive reorm o he oal crim-inal jusice sysem. Te wo EU missions (EUPM andEUPOL Aghanisan), indicaed as “no” in able 17.13.C,specied in heir respecive mandaes ha he mission

was asked wih police reorm. Te EUPM mission, how-ever, noed ha he mission also included he reorm o he border police and he sae invesigaion and proec-ive agency. Te EUPOL Aghanisan mandae noedha he mission would “suppor jusice hrough improv-ing he Aghan Police.”

Policing Approach

o implemen he mandaed asks and he change model,insiuions embedded he police componen in he lo-cal police in approximaely hal he missions. Embedding

was achieved geographically by deploying ocers andadvisers o saions across he counry and by sharing o-ces a dieren levels rom consable o senior execuive.Te sole EU mission, EUPOL Aghanisan (shown in a-

ble 17.14.A), implemened a srucure ha was parallel oha used by he local police.

One mehod o sharing good pracices and observ-ing change wihin he local police is by join parol. Asable 17.14.B demonsraes, only ve o he missionsunderook join parols, and wo missions (UNMIK and EUPOL Aghanisan) specied ha hey would nounderake such parols. I was no possible o uncover

wheher join parols had been underaken in 16 o hemissions. However, some missions may have underakenhose parols, bu i was no specied wihin he mandaeor noed in he mission repors.

Te mission repors cied wo reasons or he inroduc-ion o new legislaion o assis in reorming he indigenouspolice. Te rs was because he law o he counry had de-preciaed o a sae (a) ha law did no exis anymore or(b) ha corrupion wihin governmen was a such a levelha he counry was undemocraic. Te second reason orhe inroducion o he legislaion was o enable or assishe aciviies o he police componen o he mission.

In nearly all 23 missions, legislaion was inroduced because o he rs reason oulined in he previous para-graph (see able 17.14.C). However, mission-enabling

legislaion was inroduced in only ve missions (EUPM,MONUC, ONUB, UNMIS, and UNMI). In each case,enabling legislaion was inroduced because o (a) helack o cooperaion o local governmens, (b) he absenceo execuive provisions, or (c) he securiy siuaion insome counries. Te deploymen o UNMI o imor-Lese as a resul o he securiy crisis in Augus 2006 isone such example.

o assis in he ransormaion o he local police, in-siuions inroduced Wesern models o policing in ap-proximaely hal he missions. able 17.14.D presens he

wo Wesern models included in he mission mandaes.Mos EU missions ailed o use a policing model, whilealmos hal he UN missions repored ha hey had in-roduced eiher communiy policing, civilian policing, ordemocraic and communiy policing. However, none o 11 missions dened wha communiy policing, civilianpolicing, or democraic policing was; how i was o be in-roduced; or wha i was o achieve.

I appears ha he erm “democraic policing” wasused in earlier missions o describe he police reormapproach and was combined wih or replaced commu-niy policing in he more modern missions. Democraicpolicing was used o describe police reorm in 1998 onUNOMSIL, and in 1999 on UNAMSIL, and was usedogeher wih communiy policing on UNMIBH (1995),UNAE (1999), and UNMIS (2005). Te remainingmissions ha idenied a police reorm or capaciy devel-opmen program all used he erms “communiy policing”or “communiy policing” and “civilian policing.”





166


was idenied in our Arican missions: ONUB, UNMIL,UNOCI, and UNOMSIL. All hose counries sueredhorric conics, and mos cenered on he civil popu-laion and governmen insiuions such as he police.Ideniying he reason or he local police capaciy beingan issue in hose our missions and no in he remaining19 missions requires urher in-deph research.

Te nal hree ables presen dieren aspecs o heevaluaion or assessmen o he mission. Te number o missions idenied as achieving he specic police com-ponen o he mission is indicaed in able 17.17.A. FourEU missions and only hree UN missions did no repor

wheher hey had achieved heir mandaes. Neiher heUN nor he EU missions repored ha heir missions hadailed o achieve heir mandaes. Sixeen missions wereound o have achieved heir mandae under hree di-eren caegories. Tree UN and hree EU missions wereound o have achieved heir mandae, and one each o heUN and EU missions were ound o have parially achievedheir mandaes. Eigh o he UN missions were noed ashaving made progress oward achieving heir mandaes.

Only nine missions were acknowledged by heir re-specive councils as successul, and one o hose missions

was noed as only “condiionally” successul. In hal heEU missions and wo-hirds o he UN missions, successcould no be deermined rom council or mission repors.

Again, i was no indicaed in eiher he UN or EU repors wheher he mission was unsuccessul (see able 17.17.B).

Tree mehods, shown in able 17.17.C, were usedo assess he success o an individual mission. Te mosrequen mehod or deermining a mission’s success washrough he respecive council. Tis approach wouldhave been based on he monhly repor rom he mis-sion’s planning or adminisraion eam. However, in hreemissions, success was based on he resul o an indepen-den assessmen eam deployed rom New York or Brus-

Table 17.16. Principal Problem Identiedby Police Component in ImplementingMandate

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions


Implementationtaking longerthan planned

2 1 1

Corruption 1 0 1

Local policecapability

4 4 0

Logistics 1 1 0

Politics 2 2 0

Source: Auhor.

Table 17.17. Components That AchievedMandates or Were Identied as Successul,plus Method to Determine Success

A. Mission Police Component Identied as AchievingIts Mandate

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions

Not indicated 7 3 4

Yes 6 3 3

Partially 2 1 1

Made progress 8 8 0

B. Mission Police Component Identied by UnitedNations or European Union as Successul

Total

Missions

UN

Missions

EU


Yes 8 5 3

Conditionally 1 0 1

C. Method Used to Determine Success o Mission

TotalMissions

UNMissions

EUMissions


SecurityCouncil/ European

Union Council

8 5 3

Assessmentteam

3 2 1

Missionassessment

2 2 0

Source: Auhor.




167

Table 17.18. Current Police Peacekeeping Model, 1999 to 2007


Model Component Component Requirement

Mission duration Short term (2 to 3 years) or majority o missionsMission orm Combined with military

Mission unction Support or reorm o local police

Predeployment plan Not always developed or police not involved

Reorm specifed in mandate Either mentoring, monitoring, or specifc to the mission

Principal achievement Implementation o a specifc agreement or plan

Principal task Reorm o local police

Further direction Not indicated

Strategic plan Developed on some missions

Strategic aimUsually not included, but some missions stated aim as assisting or developinglocal police

Strategic objective(s) Not developed

Perormance measures Not developedThe Mission

Deployment stage Usually within one month o mandate’s being adopted

Increased police numbersduring mission

An increase o some missions’ police numbers

Police ofcer country o origin Usually rom developed or developing countries

Military’s role Usually provide security or the mission police component


Local police reintegrated A ew missions

Police reorm plan developed Most missions

Local participation involved inplanning

No

Aim o reorm plan Not indicated in reorm planReorm plan perormancemeasures

Not indicated in reorm plan

Reorm time rame Usually short (less than 5 years)

Reorm model Mentoring, monitoring, training, and advising

Reorm change managementmethod

Coordinated or in phases

Police reorm part o government reorm

Not indicated

Policing Approach

Embedded with local police Most missions

Undertook joint patrols Very ew missions

Introduced new legislation Very ew missionsPolice model introduced Usually not identifed; i identifed, community, civilian, or democratic policing

Program Evaluation

Method used to evaluate missionVery ew missions that were evaluated, or evaluations that were undertaken bydeploying institution

Achieved mission mandateSome missions that acknowledged success or stated simply “mandate wasachieved”

Source: Auhor.



168


sels, and wo missions based heir success on an inernalmission assessmen, which, in boh cases, was composedo eams including mission police advisers and indepen-den local and inernaional sa members.

Te nal area examined was mission saey, in paricu-lar, he number o civilian police ocer aaliies. Te UNsuered aaliies in 13 o is missions, and he remaining2 missions (UNMIK and UNOMSIL) did no sae wheherhey had suered any aaliies. Te EU did no sae

wheher any o is eigh missions had suered any aaliies.

The Current Police Peacekeeping

Model

Te applicaion o he 39 quesions has enabled he 23 casesudies o be analyzed individually by he deploymen in-siuion and in aggregae. Te applicaion o he quesionshas idenied gaps in he inormaion obained rom heUN and he EU missions. Tis approach has also high-lighed rends across he missions and idenied he policepeacekeeping model used rom 1999 o 2007, which was

based on he 39 quesions and is presened in able 17.18.Te model highlighs a number o deciencies in he

23 case sudy missions, especially wih regard o he cru-cial areas o predeploymen planning, sraegic direcion

o he mission, perormance measures, local paricipaionin planning, and mission evaluaion.

All 23 missions were based on an adoped mandae, bu very ew developed a sraegic plan or predeploymenplan ha was based on he mandae. Te EU was beterin his regard han was he UN. Tis lack o planning is

where he problems encounered on a mission begin, es-pecially in deciding wha direcion he mission shouldake, how o measure perormance and achievemens,and when he mission is compleed.

Te compleion o a mission sraegic plan would provide he basis or mission planners and managemen odevelop specic, measurable objecives and or he devel-opmen o a local police reorm plan.

Conclusion

Te purpose o he 39 quesions is no o deermine wheher an individual mission was successul or whehera mission was successul in comparison o anoher. Tepurpose o he quesions was o provide a ramework ordeveloping a new civi lian police peacekeeping model haincorporaes he lessons learned rom he 23 case sudies.

Tis sep has been compleed by consrucing he po-lice peacekeeping model ha was used rom 1999 o2007 and ha was rom he individual analysis o he23 missions and he applicaion o he 39-quesion em-plae. Te nex chaper discusses he process o aggrega-

ing he lessons learned so reviewers can develop a new civilian police peacekeeping model.





170


achieve is mandaed objecives. Te susainable capac-iy developmen o he local police may ake decades oachieve, and his possibiliy needs o be considered whenideniying he roles and he domains o individual com-

ponens o he securiy secor.In review o he lieraure, a civilian police componen

o a peacekeeping or inervenion mission has ve dis-inc phases:

1. Sabilizaion o he environmen2. e-creaion o local insiuions o governance (Dob-

bins e al., 2005)3. Susainable developmen o local insiuions4. esponsibiliy or he delivery o police services

handed o he local police as soon as possible (Joul-

wan and Schoonmaker, 1998)5. Compleion and deparure o he mission

From he analysis o he 23 missions in his research,i appears ha he UN and he EU have been reason-ably successul in achieving he rs wo o hose disincphases. However, in many cases, he insiuions have no

been successul in achieving he hird phase. Accordingo Lewis and Marks (1999), six inerrelaed guiding prin-ciples should be considered in reorming local police i amission is o achieve he hird phase:

1. Te mission needs o ocus on elemens criical odemocraic policing.

2. Wesern policing models should no be replicaedmerely because hey work in democraic naions.

3. Posconic police reorm requires local culuralsensiiviy.

4. Advanced echnologies are unlikely o improve in-digenous police service delivery.

5. Police are an imporan aspec o he poliical lie o any sociey.

6. Many paries have a vesed ineres in local police re-orm, and any one o hose paries could subver any aspec o he reorm.

wo nal poins should be highlighed in his discus-sion. Policy makers and academics have sough o denepolice reorm, bu here is no single, widely shared under-sanding o he concep (Call, 2003). Te lack o deni-

ion abou wha police reorm means creaes a siuaionin which here is no undersanding abou he direcionreorm should ake, wha should be achieved, how heprogram is o be achieved, or how he program should

be measured and evaluaed. Te problem wih using he word “reorm” in he posconic conex is ha by is very naure, i presumes ha whaever indigenous policeorganizaion currenly exiss is inadequae and requiresmodicaion (Call, 2003; Hills, 2009).

According o Call (2003), here are ve philosophicalmodes o police reorm. Tose modes are based on he“diereniaion beween alernaive perspecives” (p. 2)and orm he oundaion o he approach involved in hereorm. Te ve modes are as ollows (Call, 2003, pp. 2–3):

1. Human righs perspecive2. Peacekeeping or miliary perspecive3. Law enorcemen perspecive4. Economic-developmen perspecive5. Democraizaion perspecive

Alhough he modes can be individually dened, inpracice, hey are no muually exclusive; moreover, mosreorm programs incorporae more han one mode.

Te second major consideraion in posconic in-digenous police reorm is deermining wha ype o ser-

vice delivery model should be implemened. Are Wesernmodels o policing appropriae or counries ha do noshare similar culural orienaions (Bayley and Perio,2010)? Te problem is ha even Wesern naions do nohave many policing models rom which hey can draw sohey can resrucure he police in a posconic naion.Such models should begin by ocusing on elemens crii-cal o democraic policing (Greener, 2009). However,reormers presume ha he populaion o a posconicnaion values Wesern democraic orms o policing, andas onry (2007) noes, any evidence o a successul in-roducion o Wesern policing models in posconic na-ions is inconclusive.

Te use o Wesern policing models in reorming in-digenous posconic police may mean ha reormersneed o consider he issues more deeply and possibly o reassess democraic policing prioriies (Goldsmih,2009), values, srucures, and sraegies. Te complexiy and he size o modern police reorm missions can, ac-



Identifcation o a New Police Peacekeeping Model

171

cording o Greener (2009), “mean oo much ocus onhe maerial aspecs o policing versus he all-imporanpracice o policing” (p. 116). Te complexiy o a mis-sion is caused by he muliaceed componens wihin he

reorm program. Tis complexiy aecs no only policeadvisers, bu also several oher developmen agencies.Te more reecive he approach o reorm is, he moreemphasis is placed on he skills o he mission plannersand he police advisers on he ground. Police advisersmus be able o adap heir experiences o he poscon-ic environmen and mus be able o consider susain-able srucures ha are more suiable o he conex.

Proessional Approach to PolicePeacekeeping

Te approaches ha underpin curren peacekeeping mis-sions were developed in response o he lessons learnedrom he operaions in Bosnia, wanda, and Somalia(Bellamy, Williams, and Grin, 2009) and were docu-mened in he Augus 2000 Repor o he Panel on Unied Naions Peace Operaions (he “Brahimi epor”). Te re-por noed ha he problems in he civilian policing com-ponen o peacekeeping missions were boh quaniaive

and qualiaive. For example, no enough civilian policeocers were deployed, and o hose deployed, mos wereno appropriaely rained.

Te Brahimi epor idenied a gap beween he he-ory and pracice o peacekeeping, principally because hecurren peacekeeping missions were based on a series o adhoc responses o specic problems wih previous missions.Te repor noed ha uure missions should be based onrobus principles, and i species hree broad componenson which uure peacekeeping missions should be based(adaped rom Bellamy e al., 2009, pp. 172–73):

1. Each mission “should be robus and able o move wih ease beween radiional peacekeeping andpeace enorcemen.”

2. Each mission should be given he resources oachieve is mandae.

3. Te purpose o a mission is o esablish democraicsocieies.

Te evolving role o missions “on he ground” hasproved a challenge or he councils o he UN and he EUand is urher compounded by ever more complex man-daes being assigned o he police componen o he mis-

sions. For example, he Unied Naions Mission in Bosniaand Herzegovina (UNMIBH) successully adoped hehree broad componens idenied in he Brahimi eporino he mission’s role in providing suppor and direcion ohe Inernaional Police ask Force (IPF). Te role o heUNMIBH evolved over ime o include he raining o localpolice in addiion o menoring and monioring. In 1998,

jusice reorm was added o he mission (Durch, 2006).One o he major changes ha are in he mission man-

daes and ha inuence he philosophy o he civilian po-lice approach is he inclusion o civilian police in securiy

secor reorm (SS). Tis inclusion places more emphasison personal and public securiy han on he usual civilianpolice role o communiy-oriened invesigaions and o law and order. Alhough he issue o he rule o law is o-en included in SS, SS perains o he proecion romand prevenion o poliical violence (Brzoska, 2006), andis principal ene is he creaion o new securiy secor in-siuions and he disarmamen, demobilizaion, and re-inegraion o indigenous armed orces and milians.

Tose undamenal changes are he resul o he con-inual evoluion o missions, which means ha he UN

and he EU no only mus plan or missions on a case- by-case basis, bu also mus deermine he civilian polic-ing model o be used and o assess he ime and resourcesneeded o reach he desired end sae (Bailey, Maguire,and Poulio, 2000). A more comprehensive approachshould be considered because he reorm o indigenouscivilian police is no a shor-erm underaking. Neiherdoes one model o policing all posconic siuaionsnor is one model able o be implemened everywhere.

Tere has been a lack o agreemen and coordinaionabou he model o policing ha should be implemened

when planning he civilian police componen o he mis-sion. Boh perormance benchmarks ha measure heimplemenaion o he reorm program and a lis o skillsrequired o achieve he implemenaion are also lacking.Te uncoordinaed approach has resuled in police o-cers rom dieren counries wih dieren operaingsyles atemping o develop and implemen raining andechnical assisance programs wih no sraegic rame-






173

change managemen projec. Te implemenaion process will ensure he building o an eecive police agency.


Police reorm is more han a echnical or mechanical pro-cess. No only does i include philosophical, change, andsraegic managemen elemens, bu also i is heavily in-uenced by organizaional culure and poliics. eormprograms should no be based on piecemeal raining o personnel bu should be underaken in he conex o long-erm susainable developmen and insiuionalsrenghening (Call, 2003).

Te mos undamenal requiremen o police reorm

is ha i is grounded in he local conex in which i will be implemened (Marenin, 2005). Te mandae o hepolice componen o he mission needs o consider heissue o radiional mechanisms and how hey aec locallaw enorcemen (Mobekk, 2005). Any reorm program

will need o be even and counry specic and o com-prise a sequence o phases, milesones, and objecives.

According o Scheye (2002), posconic police re-orm comprises hree elemens:

1. Te individual: developing proessional police ocers

2. Te insiuion: esablishing an accounable, ranspar-en, and righs-respecing law enorcemen insiuion3. Te environmen: inegraing ha insiuion wihin

he larger jusice secor

Te hree-elemen reorm process and he seppedimplemenaion o phases enable planners o reappraiseand reevaluae each compleed phase and o make any required adjusmens o uure phase mehodology orresources. Te reorm program should include he de-sign o a locally consuled and phased implemenaionsraegy. Tis sraegy will comprise a number o pro-gram-specic aspecs and will include an evaluaion oreedback loop.

eormers should have an undersanding o policingand law enorcemen sysems and o why police behaveas hey do. Tey also need o ake a long-erm view be-cause an eecive reorm program may ake longer han10 years. Te lengh o he reorm program depends on

how quickly indigenous police can be esablished and candisplay he capaciy o uncion eecively.

According o Hills (2009), he problem wih policereorm is ha i is no based on any underpinning heory

and ha he eeciveness o reormed police is assumedraher han proven. Te issue is exacerbaed by he use o

Wesern reorm models and principles and he ac ha“here is litle or no inernaional ineres in undersand-ing he uncion, role, and culure o indigenous police”(Hills, 2009, p. 56). For hose reasons, he perormanceo indigenous police is measured “in so ar as i conrib-ues o Wesern [raher han indigenous] noions o goodpolicing” (Hills, 2009, p. 64).

Policing Approach

1. Community-Oriented Policing

Since he lae 1990s, he preerred approach when un-deraking posconic reorm is o ensure ha he indig-enous police agencies resemble police organizaions in

Wesern democracies. Te avored police model used inposconic reorm has been a orm o communiy-basedor communiy-oriened policing (COP) (Souh Easern

and Easern Europe Clearinghouse or he Conrol o Small Arms and Ligh Weapons, 2003). Te populariy o COP is probably due o is wide use in Wesern naionsand is adapabiliy o a number o conexs.

COP is also ideally suied or mos ransiional andposconic saes because i oen very closely resem-

bles radiional jusice and hisoric policing approaches.Furhermore, wih COP’s emphasis on problem solving,parnerships, accounabiliy, and local ownership, mosindigenous police agencies undersand is basic conceps.

However, here are ve major curren problems whendepending on COP as he principal police reorm modelin ransiioning and posconic naions:

1. Previous iniiaives or civilian police reorm haveconcenraed on developing operaional ronlinesa members or senior managers, whereas COP—as wih he majoriy o change managemen pro-grams—places an emphasis on midlevel managers. As






175

and consequen problems o reorm. As Ioannides (2007,p. 372, as quoed in Hills, 2009) noes, police reorm has

become a “piecemeal, incremenal, adminisraive, andechnical exercise” (p. 212).

According o Bayley and Perio (2010, p. 128), i po-lice reorm sops “a he raining and equipping o indig-enous securiy orces, [reorm is] unlikely o succeed.”Civilian police reorm programs do no operae in anenvironmenal vacuum bu are inuenced by he ransi-ioning or posconic naion’s level o economic devel-opmen and is poliical srengh and abiliy. Tis conexmeans ha reorm programs need o be more compre-hensive and o include he creaion o a poliically andeconomically sable environmen ha will allow he pro-gram o be implemened. Te esablishmen o such an

environmen ha will allow or he commencemen o anaion o rebuild ollowing conic can be achieved only

by he deploymen o inernaional civilian police o llhe vacuum unil he indigenous police are capable o providing he appropriae level o securiy.

Te purpose and role o he civilian police compo-nen o he mission mus be idenied beore commenc-ing he police reorm program. Te deph o he reormprogram will depend on he capaciy o he indigenouspolice and heir levels o educaion and lieracy. I localpolice are unable o grasp he imporan undamenals o

he reorm wihin agreed ime rames, he capaciy devel-opmen will no be susainable and he ime period o heprogram will need o be exended. Exending a police re-orm program oo long creaes a climae o dependency on he inervening police. able 18.1 presens he average

years o schooling ha aduls had in 2010 in he 13 coun-ries ha have been included in his research and high-lighs he challenges aced by police reormers.


Iniial planning or he civilian police componen o hemission should commence beore he respecive insiu-ional council approves he mandae. On approval o hemandae, he planning should commence in earnes. Teplan should be comprehensive and should iemize a roadmap o he proposed civilian police mission and he indig-enous police reorm program. Te plan should highligh

he civilian police componen’s proposed achievemens,is aims, or is mission saemen. Moreover, he plan

should include he ollowing:

• An environmenal scan and he sraegy or wha ol-lows aer he reorm program is compleed

• Te compilaion o he marix o hree levels: (a) ac-ical, (b) operaional and sraegic or individual, and(c) insiuional and environmenal

• Te inclusion o an implemenaion process and achange managemen mehodology

• Te idenicaion o measureable phases, milesones,ime rames, benchmarks, goals, and objecives

• Te number o personnel required and liss o per-sonnel skills, resources, and responsibiliies

• An evaluaion ramework, including perormance in-dicaors, and an adapabiliy or reocusing sraegy

• A communicaions sraegy

A comprehensive plan will provide a sraegic visionor he operaion and will provide a basis or all sa

Table 18.1. Average Years o Schooling orAdults or Specic Countries in 2010

Country Years

1. Aghanistan 1.72. Bosnia and Herzegovina <9.0

3. Burundi <3.0

4. Côte d’Ivoire <3.0

5.Democratic Republic o theCongo

<3.0

6.Former Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia

<9.0

7. Haiti 2.8

8. Kosovo 9.0

9. Liberia 2.5

10. Palestinian Territories N/K

11. Sierra Leone 2.4

12. Sudan and Darur 2.1

13. Timor-Leste <5.0

Source: Naionmaser.com, 2011. Noe: N/K = no known.



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members o undersand he direcion o he mission.Te plan mus be compleed beore he deploymen o personnel because once he mission begins, here will

no be ime and he sa may no be inclined o under-ake he required analysis. However, he nal plan mus be designed o be exible in is oundaion o allow orunoreseen evens in he eld and or he phases or proj-ecs o be run in parallel. According o Hills (2009),here is litle undersanding o how he dieren phaseso a reorm program relae o one anoher. Tis is one o he main reasons ha mission planners and evaluaorsneed o criically assess he shor-, medium-, and long-erm implicaions o an indigenous program o policereorm.

Te inelligence picure o he naion and he environ-menal scan are he wo mos imporan predeploymendocumens. Tose documens orm he baselines rom

which he mission and he reorm plan are developed,and hey also orm he basis or deermining he iniialnumber o sa members o be deployed. Te approvedmandae is he hird documen ha will inuence hepreparaion o he mission plan. Te mandae needs o

deermine he poliical objecives and parameers and o be clear bu no overly resricive. Tis speciciy will en-sure ha he likelihood o mission creep or he horizonal

expansion o he mission is kep o a minimum (Smih,Hol, and Durch, 2007).o allow or he dierences in each mission, insiuions

should divide he comprehensive and inormed planningapproach ino hree broad sages (adaped rom UniedNaions Peacekeeping Bes Pracices Secion, 2008):

1. Predeploymen or mission sarup2. Mandae implemenaion3. Mandae compleed (mission handover, wihdrawal,

or liquidaion)

Figure 18.1 presens a comprehensive planning pro-cess or a reorm program or he civilian police compo-nen o a mission. Te process sars wih he draing o apredeploymen plan (PDP), which is based on he inel-ligence rom he conic and he presen siuaion o hecounry involved and rom an environmenal scan o hecounry. Tis predeploymen plan orms he basis or de-

Figure 18.1. Proposed Reorm Program Planning Process or the Mission’sCivilian Police Component

1. Intelligence Pictureand EnvironmentalScan

Council MandateApproved

Evaluation o ReormPhases

4. Police Reorm ProgramImplemented

2.b. Mission Plan2.a. Predeployment Plan

(PDP)

3.a. Police ReormPlanning (PRP)Commences

3.b. Police ReormProgram (PoRP)Developed

Mission Startup Mandate Implementation

Source: Auhor.





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used jus because i is a popular concep or because i wasused in he police advisers’ home counry.

Communiy-oriened policing has become he ac-ceped approach by law enorcemen in Wesern coun-

ries. However, is benes and eeciveness are widely debaed, and here is litle agreemen on is empirical de-iniion. Furhermore, communiy policing can be an elu-sive concep, and litle is known abou is applicabiliy inhe conex o ransiioning or posconic naions. Teapplicaion o communiy policing has no been exam-ined in he posconic conex (Mobekk, 2002).

Te major problem wih dening communiy policingis ha every law enorcemen agency has implemened adieren model o sui is own specic circumsances andenvironmen. However, i could be argued ha adoping

he mos suiable policing approach is one o communiy policing’s srenghs, because many agreed-upon basicprinciples or communiy policing are no conex spe-cic. For example, he principle ha agencies in he com-muniy policing model are decenralized and communiy ocused is no specic o a paricular conex.

Neverheless, several academics “mainain ha [com-muniy policing] is no necessarily as eecive or posi-ive as claimed” (Mobekk, 2002). esearch conduced in

Wesern ciies on he eeciveness o communiy polic-ing in reducing crime or increasing public saisacion is

inconclusive (Bayley, 1994; Brogden, 1999; Bull, 2010;Skogan and Harnet, 1997; Sherman e al., 1998).Te problem o concepualizing communiy policing

is exacerbaed in he posconic siuaion. For example,in he UNAE mission o imor-Lese in 1999, 41 di-eren naions atemped o implemen 41 dieren ver-sions o communiy policing. Such a large number o diering deniions and orms o communiy policingmade he sraegy dicul or he mission o implemenand or he indigenous police o undersand.

Te appropriaeness o inroducing he communiy policing concep in a posconic naion mus be con-sidered and evaluaed, raher han acceping ha i is he

bes soluion (Mobekk, 2002). Communiy policing may no be he bes approach in some posconic counries.Some members o he public in posconic naions may no be comorable wih law enorcemen waning o becloser o he communiy. In some areas, such an approachmay be inerpreed as spying (Mobekk, 2002).

Curren communiy policing or democraic policingapproaches developed in Wesern naions may be seen asan improvemen in providing service and proecion ohe communiy in posconic saes. However, he acual

model mus be based on and adaped o he hisoric andculural parameers o he posconic naion. I hoseconsrains are no included in he developmen o heapproach, he implemenaion o communiy or demo-craic policing in he counry will be dicul, i no im-possible (Bayley and Perio, 2010).

Communiy policing and democraic policing, inheir many orms, are par o a posiive sysem or polic-ing local communiies. However, or hose approacheso be implemened in a posconic naion, he accepedmodel mus do he ollowing:

• Conain an agreed deniion.• Be acceped as appropriae or he specic poscon-

ic naion.• Have subsanial local ownership.• Be implemened in a clearly dened projec rame-

work ha comprises implemenaion sraegies, pol-icy srucures, and phased plans.

• Include a undamenal accounabiliy and ranspar-ency ramework.

• Be included in he inducion or predeploymen

raining o he mission police advisers.• Be par o a comprehensive law-enorcemen-

agency-specic and jusice-secor reorm program.• Be par o an exensive public inormaion and edu-

caion campaign.

Te inroducion and implemenaion o communiy policing wihin a posconic naion’s law enorcemenagency can be successul only i a comprehensive changemanagemen and reorm ramework is developed and in-siued a he same ime. Tis exensive srucure shouldencompass a deailed raining and menoring programor indigenous police ocers, which would orm he ba-sis o susainable capaciy developmen o boh individu-als and organizaions.

Te srucured approach o implemening a com-muniy policing or democraic policing model can alsoorm a par o an SS program. An SS program sharesa number o basic principles wih communiy policing




179

and democraic policing. For example, boh emphasizehuman righs, ransparency, accounabiliy, and demo-craic norms, and boh require exensive coordinaedplanning, implemenaion, and evaluaion (Bayley and

Perio, 2010).

Program Evaluation

Te ools o assess posconic programs o law enorce-men reorm are limied, and i is oen dicul o collecgood social and crime daa or inormaion in ransiion-ing and posconic counries. However, he evaluaionramework should be developed so ha i assesses andmeasures he reorm program oucomes, no jus is ou-

pus. Tis mehod will resul in a more comprehensiveevaluaion o he reorm program and will include heassessmen o boh qualiaive and quaniaive peror-mance measures. According o Jones e al. (2005, p. xxi),one o he advanages o using oucome measures is hahey “encourage experimenaion by local managers.”Such experimenaion will ensure ha he reorm pro-gram can adap o unoreseen changes while implemen-ing he program and o any challenges ha may arise.

Alhough Call (2007) noes ha no “single yardsick”can be used o measure police reorm eors, any program

evaluaion ramework should be developed in parallel wih he iniial mission planning and should be based onhe mission’s sraegic goals, objecives, and implemena-ion. Such a comprehensive evaluaion approach will re-quire he collecion and assessmen o daa during eachphase o implemening he reorm plan and will requirehe creaion o inpu, oupu, and oucome perormancemeasures and benchmarks.

egular progress evaluaions and assessmens o hereorm program will provide inormaion or improvingpracical and operaional aciviies in he eld and willprovide lessons and bes pracices or uure missions(Smih e al., 2007). Te developmen o bes prac-ices is crucial or planning and deciding on uure po-lice reorm sraegies, programs, and aciviies. Such anadapive and exible evaluaion should also provide aoundaion or developing operaional rameworks rom

which an assessmen program or uure missions canalso be developed.

Summary o a New Police

Peacekeeping Model

Te componens o a police peacekeeping model can be developed rom an analysis o he case sudies o he23 missions. Te proposed model will address boh hepracical and poliical problems idenied in he analysis.Te model conains ve main secions (police missionplanning, he mission, local police capaciy, policingapproach, and program evaluaion) and 13 componens.able 18.2 presens he secions and componens o hemodel and he requiremens o each o he 13 componens.

Te proposed new civilian police peacekeeping model(NCPPM), presened in able 18.2, can be adaped o any uure civilian police mission and reorm program. TeNCPPM is comprehensive and is developed o be ex-ible depending on he environmen and siuaion leadingo he inervenion.

Te NCPPM is no based on one principal policingapproach bu is primarily ocused on he culure o henaion receiving he assisance. Te comprehensivenesso he NCPPM will place specic emphasis on he inel-ligence build-up o he mission, he environmenal scan,an enhanced mission planning process, and he imple-menaion o a srucure evaluaion process.

Tis more robus model will require changes in he

mission mandae developmen process and in he con-ens o he documen. Mission mandaes will need o in-clude high-level and sraegic inormaion relaing o heve main secions o he NCPPM lised in able 18.2 oenable he model o be developed and implemened.

Conclusion

Te analysis in his chaper shows ha one size deniely does no all in police reorm programs in posconicnaions. o ensure successul, susainable implemena-ion, any indigenous police reorm program needs o be

based on he makeup o he sae and he naure o heconic ha led o he esablishmen o he peacekeepingmission (Schnabel and Ehrhar, 2005).

Te reorm program will be aeced by a number o acors ouside he conrol o he mission. For example,local accepance, poliics, and “he absorpive capaciy o



180


Table 18.2. Components o a New Police Peacekeeping Model


Model Component Component Requirement

Premissionplanning

•

Includes predeployment plan (PDP)• Is prepared “by police or police”• Is prepared in consultation with the wider mission (mission plan) and indigenous

government or police• Includes concept o operations and strategic plan (vision, aim, objectives)• Includes a perormance measurement ramework• Considers contingencies• Includes exit plan• Provides sustainable plan

Personnel• Proposes training requirements o civilian police advisers• Determines skills and competencies appropriate or mission

Mission mandate• Is realistic and achievable with allocated resources• Is comprehensive but not detailed and inexible• Provides high-level description o mission direction

The Mission

Deployment

• Provides or timely deployment o civilian police• Determines appropriate number o civilian police or situation• Contains appropriate mix o developed- and underdeveloped-origin civil police ofcer

advisers

Security

• Stabilizes the environment• Restores order• Engages in “reassurance” policing and patrols• Establishes rule o law


Training

• Occurs at all levels within the organization (recruit, ofcer, supervisor, middlemanagement, and executive)

• Uses appropriate, culturally based curriculum• Links with culturally based policing approach• Employs appropriately qualifed police trainers

Mentoring andmonitoring

• Includes qualifed, embedded advisers• Contains a maximum 1:5 ratio o civilian police advisers to indigenous police• Uses advisers who are at equivalent or higher rank than indigenous ofcer• Is developed as part o the strategic plan with perormance measures (mentoring program)• Is based on individual development plan

exising insiuions will all aec he success o he pro-gramme” (Jones e al., 2005, p. 214).

wo undamenal issues are pivoal o he success o any police reorm program. Furher research is requiredo recommend ways ha hose issues could be includedin any uure peacekeeping mission or police posconic

reorm program. Te rs undamenal issue is he devel-opmen o docrine and sraegies or he police reormcomponen o a peacekeeping mission. Tis docrine

would orm he basis or planning or, recruiing, and de-ploying police ocers and or measuring he success o he implemenaion o he program in he eld.







183

Chapter 19

Conclusion and Implications

Te ocus o his book is o examine he role ha civilianpolice play in he posconic conex, especially wih re-gard o reorming indigenous police. Despie he impor-ance o he inclusion o civilian police wihin posconicpeacekeeping missions, he Unied Naions (UN) andhe European Union (EU) do no appear o appreciaeor undersand he basics o policing or how police opera-ions are underaken. Te lack o undersanding has beenexacerbaed by UN and EU member saes’ relucance ocommi police personnel o peacekeeping missions.

Tis siuaion has resuled in quaniaive and qualia-ive shoralls in he civilian police peacekeeping missioncomponen. Te shoralls are quaniaive in he cusom-ary small number o civilian police deployed o compleehe comprehensive mission goals and qualiaive in hahose ocers oen do no have he skills and analyicalrameworks needed o underake he sraegic compo-nens o indigenous police reorm as par o he mission.

Te civilian police componen o a peacekeeping mis-sion is, indeed, an imporan par o he inernaionalposconic inervenion. I members o he civilian po-

lice are o provide securiy or hemselves and he publicand o underake he indigenous police reorm program,hey need he personnel and ools o do so. Tis book hasdeveloped a new model or civilian police reorm by us-ing daa rom an analysis o 23 UN and EU peacekeep-ing missions ha eiher commenced or were compleed

beween 1999 and 2007 and in which he principal ask

o he mission’s civilian police componen was o reormhe local police.

Te examinaion o he 23 missions is based on hreeempirical quesions: (a) Wha are he appropriae rolesor civilian police in inervenion or posconic mis-sions? (b) Wha are he appropriae policing service de-livery and he reorm or capaciy developmen modelsor civilian police o use in inervenion and posconicenvironmens? (c) Wha is an appropriae perormancemanagemen mehodology or missions dealing wih ci-

vilian police posconic? Tis chaper summarizes heanswers o hose quesions as i highlighs he implica-ions o he role o civilian police in peacekeeping and as iprovides assisance o decision makers and policy makersin planning and implemening uure assisance missions.

Te 23 missions were analyzed using he seven head-ings oulined in he inroducory chaper. Te sevenheadings provided a ramework o elici and summarizehe inormaion gahered rom each individual case sudy,and hey ormed he basis or developing he 39-quesionemplae reerred o in chaper 17. A model was devel-

oped by examining he conceps o he 23 missions andhe answers o he 39-quesion emplae and by review-ing he idenied componens o he mission. Tis pro-cess enabled a new model or civilian police reorm o beproposed in chaper 18.

Te proposed new civilian police peacekeepingmodel (NCPPM) is a dynamic, exible police reorm



184


ramework ha akes ino accoun he culure o henaion being assised. Te NCPPM relies heavily on agahering o inelligence beore he mission, an environ-menal scan o he counry, and an enhanced mission

planning process. According o Call (2008, p. 380), in-erveners ha overemphasize sae capaciy over saedesign end o implemen reorm programs ha consiso raining and advising. Such a endency enhances he“human and maerial capaciy o sae minisries andagencies” while aking “or graned he prevailing designo sae insiuions.” Acceping he exising uncions o an indigenous civilian police organizaion will “diminishhe chances o a culurally or socially ill-ting model”(Call, 2008, p. 380) ha is being promoed by reormers.Te proposed model will reduce he endency o boh

academics and praciioners o approach police reormas a echnical exercise devoid o local hisory, culure,and poliical risk.

Te analyses o he case sudies sugges hree ndingsregarding indigenous civilian police reorm. Firs, hecomprehensiveness o an approach ha may be adopedin reorm programs will be consrained by hisorical prec-eden. Second, indigenous poliical leaders conrol hedesign and he implemenaion o he reorm program.Tird, he reorm process is as imporan as he programoucomes and achievemens.

Te case sudies provide vivid presenaions o losopporuniies and examples o dieren reorm ap-proaches ha did no esablish susainable develop-men o he indigenous police. Tree main conclusionssand ou rom he research and serve o organize hischaper:

1. Te reorm o indigenous police is no simply a ma-er o implemening Wesern policing models orraining ocers in Wesern police pracices. Eorso consolidae Wesern policing pracices in poscon-ic socieies—no mater how well inenioned—can be harmul in a number o ways, especially i helocal culure is no aken ino consideraion.

2. Legiimae indigenous civilian police remain crucialor he susainabiliy o securiy.

3. eesablishing indigenous civilian police organiza-ions is a deeply poliical process ha creaes winnersand losers (Call, 2008). Tis conclusion has implica-

ions or wo aspecs o police reorm: (a) assisingindigenous police when implemening democraicprocedures and (b) ensuring organizaional capaciy.

Tose hree conclusions rame he main challenges inmanaging he complex process o esablishing susainablesecuriy and in rebuilding local police organizaions.

One o he mos lasing impressions le by he re-search o he case sudies is ha he eors o reorm in-digenous police are raugh wih problems ha leave localorganizaions weak and vulnerable o collapse and cor-rupion. Te reormaion o indigenous police organiza-ions ha have ollowed conics has been disappoiningon all levels (Dobbins e al., 2005; Hills, 2009; Jet, 1999;Sromseh, Wippman, and Brooks, 2006). Te resul has

been caused no by a lack o eor by all involved, bu be-cause he reorm program has been generally “based onsimplisic assumpions abou he relaionship beweenormal legal insiuions and durable culural change”(Sromseh e al., 2006, p. 369). As highlighed hrough-ou his book, boh he UN and he EU have ended oignore he undamenals o acceped pracices o policereorm (e.g., consulaion and he inclusion o a sraegic

vision). As a resul, many posconic programs o civilianpolice reorm have concenraed primarily on raining po-lice and on reurbishing or opening new police saions.

Concenraing on hose orms o echnical assisance can-no alone produce police reorm (Sromseh e al., 2006). Analysis o he 23 missions uncovered a number o

shorcomings wih premission planning, program manage-men, perormance measuremen, and mission evaluaion.Tere was no deniion o success or ailure in any o hedocumenaion o he 23 missions nor did he documena-ion deermine how success or ailure would be measured.Some auhors sugges ha he measure o success or ailureo a mission should be described in he mission mandae(Diehl, 1993; Jones, Wilson, ahmell, and iley, 2005),

bu i would be impossible o evaluae he 23 case sudy missions included in his book on ha basis because noperormance rameworks or measures ha could be usedo assess he missions were oulined in any o he docu-menaion. Furhermore, relying on he ulllmen o amission mandae disregards he principal purpose o apeacekeeping mission and limis he comparison o suchmissions. Tose shorcomings dier rom Jet’s observa-



Conclusion and Implications

185

ions ha “[]he success or ailure o a peacekeeping op-eraion can be preordained even beore he arrival o he

blue helmes on he scene o he conic” (Jet, 1999).Te quesion o preordained success or ailure hinges

on wo acors: (a) he inervening insiuion’s capabil-iy and procedures and (b) he basis and reasons or heconic. An inervening insiuion can quickly become

bound by bureaucraic process and procedures and by a lack o echnical capabiliy. Mos missions are under-saed and are usually sized and deployed on he basiso weak inelligence, bes case assumpions, and insigni-ican planning. Te qualiy o police personnel is oenuneven and o mixed compeence, and hose personnelare usually oally relian on he pracices o heir homecounry.

Te rs sep o improve he siuaion is o acknowl-edge ha he curren approach used o reorm civilianpolice in posconic naions is no reaching is ull poen-ial: a new approach o civilian police reorm is needed.Tis research has enabled a new, comprehensive, sraegic,and culurally based model o be developed. A broaderapproach should be aken when planning and develop-ing he missions’ implemenaion ramework and he per-ormance measuremen processes. Operaional, poliical,culural, and environmenal issues—which are criical ohe success o narrower, more ocused reorms—should

be aken ino accoun (Sromseh e al., 2006).Measuring an individual mission’s success or ailureis problemaic because o he mulipliciy o he condi-ions and challenges on he ground ha boh missionplanners and praciioners ace. Te very diversiy andad hoc naure o police missions increases he diculy in implemening programs o indigenous police reorm(Hills, 2009). For example, he requiremens and needso he indigenous police reorm program in Aghanisanare similar in some ways bu dieren in oher ways romhose idenied in imor-Lese. Tis problem is exacer-

baed by he vagueness o mission mandaes and by hemuliple goals o modern, mulidimensional peacekeep-ing missions.

According o Gunnar Billinger (2002, p. 498), man-daes “are poliical compromises which are oen o a gen-eral naure” and are designed o cover siuaions ha aredicul o predic. Gunner Billinger also noes ha mosmandaes are designed principally or he miliary com-

ponen o a peace mission. Te vagueness and miliary-oriened design o mission mandaes creae a vacuum orhe civilian police componen o a peacekeeping missionand raise he quesion o wheher he curren mandae

developmen process should be redesigned o specically include he civilian police componen.

However, mission mandaes are sraegic, high-leveldocumens, and i is appropriae ha hey provide direc-ion raher han individual, mission-componen peror-mance goals, objecives, and arges. Te curren approachenables mandaes o be compared raher han he mis-sions per se, bu he mandaes need o be expanded o in-clude he vision and he direcion required o enable hepolice componen o underake and complee is mission.

Te curren mission adopion rameworks o he UN

and EU councils allow a mission o speciy he asks andhe guidelines or he civilian police as long as hey are

wihin he mandae. Tis research acceps ha he cur-ren approach is appropriae bu recommends ha a seprocedure and process or developing predeploymen,operaional, and reorm plans and perormance measuresare implemened.

One opion o srenghen he curren mandae and civilian police deploymen process is o develop a specicplanning process or he police componen o he mis-sion. Figure 19.1, which is a limied version o gure 18.1,

presens a proposed planning process or he civilian po-lice componen o he mission program. Tis proposedprocess would ensure ha a comprehensive picure o heenvironmen and he issues acing police in he poscon-ic naion are obained and ha his inormaion inormshe mission mandae, he predeploymen plan, and hemission plan. Such an approach will make police plannersaware o he objecives when developing a mission and willensure ha he appropriae echnical skills and resourcesare idenied o design a phased measurable reorm pro-gram. Boh imor-Lese (UNAE and UNMISE) andBosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) illusrae he dan-gers o launching civilian police reorm programs wihousucien planning and sraegic direcion.

Te proposed planning process would also provide aramework or he developmen o guidelines or docrine

when police reorm is underaken in posconic siua-ions and would minimize he recurring problems haare creaed by inernaional inervenion and ha were



186


uncovered in he 23 case sudies. Te recurring problems(adaped rom Call, 2008, p. 375–76) include hese:

• Inervening civilian police mission componens ignoreor dismiss he preexising indigenous police organiza-ion’s auhoriy, prior achievemens, and capabiliy.

• Tose componens do no prioriize elemens o hereorm program.

•

Tey do no appreciae ha ransiional or shor-erm measures have negaive side eecs.• Tey do no recognize ha inervenion and assisance

missions can leave he indigenous police organizaion weak.

Tis book has sough o criically examine he role o civilian police in peacekeeping and he police’s approacho reorming indigenous police organizaions. Pas schol-arship abou peacekeeping has ended o ignore memberso he civilian police and heir capabiliy wihin missions.Moreover, where scholarship has menioned members o

he civilian police, he complexiy and diculy o heirrole has been undersaed.

Te ndings o his book do no oer any sraigh-orward answers o he challenges o reorming indige-nous civilian police organizaions in posconic naions.However, deploying insiuions and academics need oaccep ha he emphasis o peacekeeping missions haschanged and ha he prole and he role o civilian police

need o increase o a miliary equivalen.Te proposed model developed by his research isone sep in ha direcion. Alhough each mission is a re-sponse o a dieren siuaion in a culural, poliical, andpracical sense, he new model or civilian police reormakes his condiion ino accoun and oers a exible andgeneric ramework ha appears o be applicable o a wide

variey o posconic siuaions. Te new model also al-lows boh insiuions and praciioners o hink aboupolice reorm more holisically and is one aspec in pro-

viding a oundaion or he susainable capaciy develop-men o he posconic naion.

Figure 19.1. Proposed Planning Process or the Civilian Police Component o theMission Program

1.a. Intelligence Pictureand EnvironmentalScan

1.b. Council MandateApproved

Mission EvaluationFramework

2.b. Mission Plan2.a. Predeployment Plan

(PDP)

Mission Startup Mandate Implementation

Source: Auhor.



187

Appendix A

List o 23 Case Study Missions, Short Title, Country o Intervention,and Start and Finish Dates

Mission Full Title Short Title Country Mission Dates*

1European Union Police Mission toAghanistan

EUPOLAghanistan

Aghanistan 30/05/07 to present

2United Nations Mission in Bosnia andHerzegovina

UNMIBHBosnia andHerzegovina

21/12/95 to 31/12/02

3European Union Police Mission toBosnia and Herzegovina

EUPMBosnia andHerzegovina

01/01/03 to present

4 United Nations Operation in Burundi ONUB Burundi 21/05/04 to 31/12/06

5United Nations Operation in Côted’Ivoire

UNOCI Cote d’Ivoire 27/02/04 to present

6United Nations Mission in theDemocratic Republic o the Congo

MONUCDemocratic Republico the Congo

24/02/99 to 30/06/10

7European Union Police Mission inKinshasa

EUPOL KinshasaDemocratic Republico the Congo

09/12/04 to 30/06/07

8European Union Police Mission in theDemocratic Republic o the Congo

EUPOL RDCongo

Democratic Republico the Congo

12/06/07 to present

9European Union Police Mission tothe Former Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia

EUPOL ProximaFormer YugoslavRepublic o Macedonia (FYROM)

29/09/03 to 14/12/05

10European Union Police Advisory Teamin the Former Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia

EUPATFormer YugoslavRepublic o Macedonia (FYROM)

24/11/05 to 14/06/06

11 United Nations Police Mission in Haiti MIPONUH Haiti 20/11/97 to 15/03/00

12United Nations Stabilization Missionin Haiti

MINUSTAH Haiti 30/04/04 to present



188


Mission Full Title Short Title Country Mission Dates*

13United Nations Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo

UNMIK Kosovo 10/06/99 to present

14 United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIL Liberia 19/09/03 to present15

European Union Police Co-ordinatingOfce or Palestinian Police Support

EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories 18/06/05 to present

16United Nations Observers Mission inSierra Leone

UNOMSIL Sierra Leone 13/07/98 to 22/10/99

17United Nations Mission in SierraLeone

UNAMSIL Sierra Leone 22/10/99 to 31/12/05

18 United Nations Mission in Sudan UNMIS Sudan 24/03/05 to present

19United Nations and Arican UnionMission in Darur

UNAMID Sudan 31/07/07 to present

20European Union Support to the AricanUnion Mission to Sudan and Darur

EU AMIS Sudan 20/07/05 to 31/12/07

21United Nations Mission o Support inEast Timor

UNMISET Timor-Leste 20/05/02 to 20/05/05

22 United Nations Ofce in Timor-Leste UNOTIL Timor-Leste 20/05/05 to 20/08/06

23 United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste UNMIT Timor-Leste 25/08/06 to present

*Presen = As o 15 June 2010.



189

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Unied Naions. (2005l, April 26). weny-h repor on he

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Unied Naions. (2005m, May 6). Repor o he Securiy Coun-

cil mission o Haii, 13 o 16 April 2005 (S/2005/302). e-rieved rom htp://www.undemocracy.com/S-2005-302.

Unied Naions. (2005n, May 13). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2005o, May 26). Special repor o he secreary-

general on elecions in he Democraic Republic o he Congo(S/2005/320). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005p, May 19). Fourh repor o he



Unied Naions. (2005q, June 9). Monhly repor o he secreary-

general on Darur (S/2005/378). erieved rom htp:// www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005r, June 17). Fih progress repor o he

secreary-general on he Unied Naions operaion in Côe

d’Ivoire (S/2005/398). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005s, Sepember 1). Eighh progress repor o he secreary-general on he Unied Naions mission in Liberia(S/2005/560). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005, Sepember 12). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Sudan(S/2005/579). erieved rom htp:// www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005u, Sepember 14). Special repor o he



Unied Naions. (2005v, Sepember 20). weny-sixh repor on

he Unied Naions mission in Sierra Leone (S/2005/596).erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.Unied Naions. (2005w, Ocober 6). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2005x, November 21). Fih repor o he

secreary-general on he Unied Naions operaion in Burundi(S/2005/728). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005y, December 12). weny-sevenh repor

on he Unied Naions mission in Sierra Leone (S/2005/777).erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005z, December 21). Repor o he secreary-


Unied Naions. (2005aa). Securiy Council Resoluion 1590 (S/ES/1590). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005ab). Securiy Council Resoluion 1599 (S/ES/1599). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005ac). Securiy Council Resoluion 1608 (S/ES/1608). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005ad). Securiy Council Resoluion 1609 (S/ES/1609). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions05.hm.

Unied Naions. (2005ae). Securiy Council Resoluion 1620 (S/ES/1620). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions05.hm.



Reerences

201

Unied Naions. (2006a, January 3). Sevenh progress repor o

he secreary-general on he Unied Naions operaion in Côe

d’Ivoire (S/2006/2). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006b, January 25). Repor o he secreary- general on he Unied Naions inerim adminisraion mis-


Unied Naions. (2006c, January 30). Monhly repor o he

secreary-general on Darur (S/2006/59). erieved romhtp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006d, February 2). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2006e, March 14). enh progress repor o

he secreary-general on he Unied Naions mission in Liberia(S/2006/159). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006, March 14). Repor o he secreary-general

on he Sudan (S/2006/160). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006g, March 14). Sixh repor o he secreary-

general on he Unied Naions operaion in Burundi(S/2006/163). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006h, April 11). Sevenh progress repor



Unied Naions. (2006i, April 20). End o mandae repor o

he secreary-general on he Unied Naions Ofce in imor-

Lese (or he period rom 14 January o 12 April 2006)(S/2006/251). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006j, June 5). Repor o he secreary-


in Kosovo (S/2006/361). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006k, June 9). Elevenh progress repor o



Unied Naions. (2006l, June 13). Leter daed 13 June 2006

om he secreary-general addressed o he presiden o he Se-

curiy Council (S/2006/383). erieved rom htp://www .undemocracy.com/S-2006-383.

Unied Naions. (2006m, June 13). weny-rs repor o he

secreary-general on he Unied Naions organizaion mission

in he Democraic Republic o he Congo (S/2006/390). e-rieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006n, June 21). Sixh repor o he secreary- general on he Unied Naions operaion in Burundi(S/2006/429). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006o, July 17). Sevenh progress repor o

he secreary-general on he Unied Naions operaion in


Unied Naions. (2006p, July 28). Repor o he secreary-general

on Darur (S/2006/591). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006q, July 28). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Unied Naions sabilizaion mission in Haii(S/2006/592). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006r, Augus 8). Repor o he secreary-

general on imor-Lese pursuan o Securiy Council Resoluion

1690 (S/2006/628). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006s, Sepember 12). Repor o he secreary-


Unied Naions. (2006, Sepember 12). welh progress repor

o he secreary-general on he Unied Naions mission in Li-

beria (S/2006/743). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006u, Sepember 21). weny-rs repor

o he secreary-general on he Unied Naions organizaion

mission in he Democraic Republic o he Congo


Unied Naions. (2006v, Sepember 28). Leter daed 28 Sep-

ember 2006 om he secreary-general addressed o he presi-

den o he Securiy Council (S/2006/779). erieved romhtp://www.undemocracy.com/S-2006-779.

Unied Naions. (2006w, Ocober 17). enh progress repor



Unied Naions. (2006x, Ocober 25). Eighh repor o he





202


Unied Naions. (2006y, November 20). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2006z, December 18). Ninh repor o hesecreary-general on he Unied Naions operaion in Burundi(S/2006/994). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006aa, December 19). Repor o he

secreary-general on he Unied Naions sabilizaion mission

in Haii (S/2006/1003). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006ab). Securiy Council Resoluion 1694 (S/ES/1694). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006ac). Securiy Council Resoluion 1704 (S/

ES/1704). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions06.hm.Unied Naions. (2006ad). Securiy Council Resoluion 1706 (S/

ES/1706). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006ae). Securiy Council Resoluion 1709 (S/ES/1709). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006a). Securiy Council Resoluion 1719 (S/ES/1719). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions06.hm.

Unied Naions. (2006ag). Securiy Council Resoluion 1721 (S/ES/1721). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions06.hm.


general on he Sudan (S/2007/42). erieved rom htp:// www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007b, February 1). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Unied Naions inegraed mission in imor-

Lese (or he period rom 9 Augus 2006 o 26 January 2007) (S/2007/50). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007c, February 23). Monhly repor o he

secreary-general on Darur (S/2007/104). erieved romhtp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007d, March 9). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2007e, March 15). Foureenh progress repor



Unied Naions. (2007, April 13). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Sudan(S/2007/213). erieved rom htp://

www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.Unied Naions. (2007g, May 14). Tireenh progress repor



Unied Naions. (2007h, June 5). Leter daed 5 June 2007 om

he secreary-general o he presiden o he Securiy Council

(epor o he secreary-general and he chairperson o he Arican Union Commission on he hybrid operaionin Darur) (S/2007/307/ev. 1). erieved rom htp://

www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_presandsg_leters07.hm.Unied Naions. (2007i, June 29). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Unied Naions inerim adminisraion missionin Kosovo (S/2007/395). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007j, Augus 8). Fieenh progress repor o

he secreary-general on he Unied Naions mission in Liberia(S/2007/479). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007k, Augus 20). Repor o he secreary-


Unied Naions. (2007l, Augus 22). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2007m, Augus 28). Repor o he secreary-


Lese (or he period rom 27 January o 20 Augus 2007)(S/2007/513). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007n, Augus 30). Repor o he secreary-

general on he deploymen o he Aican Union–Unied

Naions hybrid operaion in Darur (S/2007/517). erievedrom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007o, Ocober 1). Foureenh progress re-

por o he secreary-general on he Unied Naions operaion

in Côe d’Ivoire (S/2007/593). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007p, Ocober 8). Repor o he secreary-





Reerences

203

Unied Naions. (2007q, November 14). weny-ourh re-

por o he secreary-general on he Unied Naions orga-

nizaion mission in he Democraic Republic o he Congo

(S/2007/671). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/

sc/sgrep07.hm.Unied Naions. (2007r, December 24). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2007s). Repor o he secreary-general on he

Unied Naions inerim adminisraion mission in Kosovo


Unied Naions. (2007). Securiy Council Resoluion 1745 (S/ES/1745). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007u). Securiy Council Resoluion 1756 (S/ES/1756). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007v). Securiy Council Resoluion 1769 (S/ES/1769). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions07.hm.

Unied Naions. (2007w). Securiy Council Resoluion 1780 (S/ES/1780). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions07.hm.



Lese (or he period rom 21 Augus 2007 o 7 January 2008) (S/2008/26). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008b, January 3). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2008c, March 19). Sixeenh progress repor o



Unied Naions. (2008d, March 26). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2008e, April 2). weny-h repor o he

secreary-general on he Unied Naions organizaion mission

in he Democraic Republic o he Congo (S/2008/218).erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008, April 14). Repor o he secreary-general

on he deploymen o he Aican Union–Unied Naions

hybrid operaion in Darur (S/2008/249). erieved romhtp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008g, May 9). Repor o he secreary-general


hybrid operaion in Darur (S/2008/304). erieved romhtp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.hm.Unied Naions. (2008h, June 12). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2008i, July 29). Repor o he secreary-general

on he Unied Naions inegraed mission in imor-Lese (orhe period rom 8 January o 8 July 2008) (S/2008/501).erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008j, July 31). Leter daed 30 July 2008 om

he presiden o he Securiy Council addressed o he secreary-

general (Inernaional ribunal or he Prosecuion o Personsesponsible or Serious Violaions o Inernaional Humani-arian Law Commited in he erriory o he Former Yugo-slavia since 1991) (S/2008/508). erieved rom htp://

www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_presandsg_leters08.hm.Unied Naions. (2008k, Augus 15). Sixeenh progress repor



Unied Naions. (2008l, Augus 18). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2008m, Ocober 17). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2008n, Ocober 20). Repor o he secreary-


Unied Naions. (2008o, December 12). Repor o he secreary-

general on he deploymen o he Aican Union–Unied Na-

ions hybrid operaion in Darur (S/2008/781). erievedrom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008p). Securiy Council Resoluion 1802 (S/ES/1802). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008q). Securiy Council Resoluion 1856 (S/ES/1856). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resoluions08.hm.

Unied Naions. (2008r). Unied Naions Inerim Adminisraion

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): Kosovo in June 2008. erieved



204


rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/mandae.shm.



Lese (or he period rom 9 July o 20 January 2008)(S/2009/72). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009b, February 10). Eigheenh progress re-

por o he secreary-general on he Unied Naions mission in

Liberia (S/2009/86). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009c, March 6). Repor o he secreary-


(S/2009/129). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm

Unied Naions. (2009d, April 3). Repor o he Securiy Council

mission o Haii (11 o 14 March 2009) (S/2009/175). e-rieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionrepors.hml.

Unied Naions. (2009e, April 13). wenieh progress repor





hybrid operaion in Darur (S/2009/201). erieved romhtp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009g, July 14). Repor o he secreary-general

on he Unied Naions mission in Sudan (S/2009/357). e-rieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009h, Sepember 1). Repor o he secreary-



Unied Naions. (2009i, Ocober 2). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Unied Naions Inegraed Mission in imor-

Lese (or he period rom 21 January o 23 Sepember2009) (S/2009/504). erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009j, Ocober 21). Repor o he

secreary-general on he Unied Naions mission in Sudan


Unied Naions. (2009k, November 16). Repor o he secreary-

general on he Aican Union–Unied Naions hybrid opera-

ion in Darur (S/2009/592). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009l). Haii: Manda. erieved romhp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/unmihmandae.hml.

Unied Naions. (2009m). Unied Naions Organisaion mission

in he Democraic Republic o Congo (2009) brieng maeri-als. New York, NY: Public Inormaion Division.Unied Naions. (2009n). Unied Naions ransiion mission in

Haii. erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/unmih.hm.

Unied Naions. (2009o). Unied Naions civilian police

mission in Haii. erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/miponuh.hm.

Unied Naions. (2010a). Background. erieved rom htp:// www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missi ons/pas/unmibh/ background.hml.

Unied Naions. (2010b). Côe d’Ivoire: MINUCI—Background.

erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/minuci/background.hml.Unied Naions. (2010c). Eas imor: UNMISE—Mandae.

erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/unmise/mandae.hml.

Unied Naions. (2010d). MINUSAH—Background .erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusah/background.shml.

Unied Naions. (2010e). MONUC—Mandae. erievedrom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandae.shml.


on he Unied Naions mission in Sudan (S/2010/168). e-rieved rom htp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.hm.

Unied Naions. (2010g).Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL—Background.erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/unamsil/background.hml.

Unied Naions. (2010h). Sierra Leone: UNOMSIL—Back-

ground. erieved rom htp://www.un.org/Deps/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/UnomsilB.hm.

Unied Naions. (2010i). UNMI—Background. erievedrom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmi/

background.shml.Unied Naions. (2010j). Unied Naions Inerim Adminisraion

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). erieved rom htp://www .un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.hm.

Unied Naions. (2010k). Unied Naions Operaions in Burundi.erieved rom htp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pas/onub/.

Unied Naions. (2010l). UNMIK—Background. erieved romhtp://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12.hml.







207

About the Author

Garh den Heyer, DPubPol, has served wih he New

Zealand Police or more han 30 years. He holds he rank o inspecor and is manager o he Naional Securiy Uni.

Dr. den Heyer has exensive experience in police andsecuriy secor reorm in posconic naions, includinghe Solomon Islands; imor-Lese; Bougainville, PapuaNew Guinea; and Aghanisan. He has been deployedon a number o occasions or lenghy periods as par o he egional Assisance Mission o he Solomon Islands,

where he advised boh he inernaional police deploy-

men and he local police.In addiion o being a senior research ellow a he Po-

lice Foundaion in Washingon, DC, he is a lecurer aCharles Sur Universiy in Manly, Ausralia. He holds amaser’s in science rom he Universiy o London; a mas-er’s in securiy and inelligence rom Vicoria Universiy,

Wellingon, New Zealand; and a docorae in public pol-icy rom Charles Sur Universiy.





Documents

The Role of Civilian Police in Peacekeeping 1999-2007