Upload
som-lisa
View
213
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
10/19/12 The Rise of the Middle Powers - NYTimes.com
1/3www.ny times.com/2012/09/11/opinion/the-rise-of -the-middle-powers.htm l?_r=0&pagewanted=print
September 10, 2012
The Rise of the Middle PowersBy BRUCE GILLEY
Portland, Ore.
THE biggest news to emerge from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to Asia last
week came at a news conference with the Indonesian foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa. Mrs.
Clinton acknowledged that Washington accepts Jakarta’s “leadership” in resolving the
territorial disputes over the South China Sea — disputes that have led to bellicose rhetoric from
China, Vietnam and the Philippines in recent months. A State Department official later told
reporters that, in Washington’s v iew, “the leading state in the effort is clearly Indonesia.”
But Mr. Natalegawa emphasized that this leadership role “is not meant to be at the expense of
any other party. It’s not about us rallying around to counter or to put any other country on the
spot or to put them in a corner.”
In short, while Washington has hitched its wagon to Indonesian leadership on the South China
Sea, Jakarta has made it clear that it does not intend to act as a proxy for America or for its
neighbors, including the Philippines and Vietnam, that are more wary of China — or, for that
matter, for China and its allies.
As China’s influence grows, the United States is struggling to come up with an effective strategic
response. Some analysts believe that the only option for the countries of the region is to align
themselves with Washington or Beijing. But Indonesia’s emergence as a key actor on the South
China Sea issue shows that so-called “middle powers” — the 10 to 20 influential states, like
South Africa and Australia, that aren’t permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council or global giants like Japan, India and Germany — can play an outsize role in defining
that response. Through proactive and nonaligned diplomacy, middle powers may be able to
influence the rise of China in ways that the United States cannot.
Indonesia is a classic middle power; it is a newly democratic and rapidly developing country
with significant military and diplomatic capacities. Another clear example is post-Mubarak
Egypt. Its newly elected president, Mohamed Morsi, made a point of heading to China for his
first major foreign visit, in August. As with Indonesia, Washington will have to decide if it is
willing to let Cairo try to reshape Beijing’s policies on issues like the conflict in Syria (an issue
MORE IN O
Op-Edthe SniRead More
10/19/12 The Rise of the Middle Powers - NYTimes.com
2/3www.ny times.com/2012/09/11/opinion/the-rise-of -the-middle-powers.htm l?_r=0&pagewanted=print
where another middle power, Turkey , is playing a leading role).
Pursuing a middle-power option on conflicts like the South China Sea and Syria would mean
allowing friendly countries to take the lead in diplomatic work, because they are less
threatening to China. While this may entail some compromises for Washington, it is more likely
to generate solutions that Beijing will heed.
Last year, Ding Gong, an international relations analyst influential in Communist Party circles,
wrote in the Chinese journal Contemporary International Relations that China should heed
Indonesia’s counsel on the South China Sea dispute because it had proven effective in
restraining the more hawkish demands of the Philippines and Vietnam. The “cautious” and
“balanced” attitude of Jakarta, Mr. Ding wrote, “has ensured that the issue has not become a
common cause among Asean” which “enhances China’s diplomacy in the region.” This “balanced
attitude” is exactly what Mr. Natalegawa pledged as Mrs. Clinton stood beside him last week.
Mr. Morsi made similar noises during his visit to Beijing. He emphasized that Cairo is “not
against anyone” and opined that “international relations between all states are open and the
basis for all relations is balance.” China’s top legislator said his country supported a “bigger role”
for Egypt on the international stage.
Again, the question for Washington is whether hitching its wagon to this newly unaligned and
proactive middle power will advance American interests more than trying to build a pliant
coalition of lesser states under American leadership.
Two reasons suggest the middle power option may work best for many of the knottiest issues
that Washington will face as it deals with a rising China. One is that these states are mostly
democracies and thus are aligned with the principles the United States seeks to advance. (Iran
is a glaring exception but one that tends not to take leadership roles as a result.)
Egypt, for instance, is less likely to espouse the “China model” in the Middle East and Africa
than it is to advance the “Arab Spring model” in China by showing the Chinese that another
great historical civilization is gaining global influence by being democratic.
The other reason is that Washington can win middle powers’ support by using soft power rather
than hard power. Earlier this year, for instance, the United States backed a coalition led by
Canada, Mexico, Bangladesh, Sweden and Ghana on so-called “short-lived climate forcers” —
substances like black carbon, methane and hydrofluorocarbons that are contributing to climate
change — and agreed to pay $12 million of the $15 million project cost. China, however, has so
far refused to join because it is suspicious that the initiative will produce recommendations that
could unduly burden its businesses.
10/19/12 The Rise of the Middle Powers - NYTimes.com
3/3
Other examples where Washington could defer to middle power leadership on issues vital to
American-Chinese relations include a G-20 working group on reforming the international
financial system, led jointly by Australia and Turkey, and South Africa’s role in dampening
China’s support for Robert G. Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe.
By contrast, the American attempt to take the lead in controlling nuclear weapons transfers, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, has failed to win Chinese cooperation.
There are risks, of course. Middle power leadership can sometimes be amateurish or driven by
narrow anti-Americanism. But given the desire of many emerging countries to avoid the
appearance of marching to the American drum, it will in many cases be a better choice for
Washington in the long term.
Bruce Gilley, an associate professor of political science at Portland State University, is the author,
most recently, of “The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.”