The Rise of ISIS

Colonel (Ret.) Peter R. Mansoor, PhD Gen. Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History

The Ohio State University

What went wrong?

• Key assumptions going into the war:

War of liberation

Government/infrastructure will remain intact

Iraqis would freely support the transition to a

liberal democracy

• Critical errors in the first months:

Extensive de-Ba’athification

Disbanding the Iraqi army

Empowering sectarian politics

• Lack of strategy and coherent operational

approach to the occupation

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."

Carl von Clausewitz, Military Theorist

2006 - Iraq Explodes

• Bombing of the Al-Askari

Shrine in Samarra

• Sectarian cleansing/terrorism

in Baghdad

• By Dec 2006, more than 3,500

Iraqis killed each month to

ethno-sectarian violence

• Multi-National Force-Iraq

failed to adjust strategic

approach

Focused on killing and

capturing insurgent and

terrorist operatives

Rapid transition of security

responsibilities to Iraqi

security forces

Al-Askari Shrine after the bombing

Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.

Sources: SIGACTS III Coalition and Iraqi reports as 09AUG08.

Violent Civilian Deaths in Iraq

Surge Begins

A New Strategy – The Surge

• By late-summer 2006, clear that

United States is headed for

defeat

• Parallel strategic reviews by the

National Security Council, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, State Department

• President Bush made final

decision to surge additional

forces into Iraq

• U.S. forces deployed differently,

in accordance with new

counterinsurgency doctrine

“The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.” U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Ansar

al Sunna

Other

Groups

AQI

AQI NEEDS

Ideology

Weapons

Money

Foreign

Fighters

Safe

Havens Popular

Support

Command

and Control

Conventional

Force Ops

Counter-Terrorist

Force Ops

Iraqi Conventional

& Special Force Ops

Sons of Iraq

Political

Reconciliation

(Laws/policies)

Religious

Engagement

Information

Operations

Jobs Programs

Services

Internet

Armed Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles

Intel, Surveillance

and Recce Platforms Intel Fusion

Education

Border Ports of Entry

Improvements

AQ Senior Leader

Guidance

Tribal

Awakenings

Interagency

Detainee

Releases

Strategic

Communications

Engagement with

Source Countries

Non-kinetics

Detainee

Ops

Kinetics

Intelligence

Politics

Counterinsurgency

in Detention Facilities

Counter Ethno-Sectarian

Pressures

Squeezing Al Qaeda

Baghdad Security Plan, 15 February 2007

Ramadan 16OCT-14NOV04

5OCT-4NOV05

24SEP-23OCT06

13SEP-13OCT07

Constitutional referendum,

15 October 2005

Security Incidents

Chart includes potential attacks (IEDs/mines found and cleared) and executed attacks.

Sources: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 9AUG08; weekly beginning 3JAN04.

Samarra mosque bombing,

22 February 2006

Parliamentary elections,

15 December 2005

Iraqi elections, 30 January 2005

Basrah and Sadr City Operations, 25 March 2008

Surge of Offensives

First Militia Uprising and

Fallujah

Battle of Najaf

Second Fallujah

JUL 08

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

DEC 06 APR 07 SEP 07

Density

Least Most

75% Shi’a 75% Sunni

51% Shi’a / 25% Sunni 51% Sunni / 25% Shi’a

Unknown Mixed - No majority

Neighborhood Sect Legend

Baghdad Baghdad

Baghdad

Baghdad

Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.

. Source: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 09AUG08; weekly beginning 1 May 06.

Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Baghdad

Differing Perspectives

President George W. Bush: Iraq as South Korea

President Barack Obama: Iraq as Vietnam

Winning the War, Losing the Peace

• Election of 2010 – Ayad

Allawi wins, but U.S. and

Iran both back Nouri al-

Maliki as prime minister

• U.S. forces depart from

Iraq in 2011; U.S. loses

leverage

• Maliki governs in a highly

sectarian and devise

manner: jails opponents,

tortures Sunni political

prisoners, attacks protest

camps

• Sunnis once again

alienated from the political

system

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki

The Rise of ISIS

• ISIS is the successor to

al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

• Group metastasized in

Syria

• ISIS allied with

Ba’athists of Saddam

Hussein’s defeated

army

• Tacit alliance with

many Iraqi Sunni Arabs

• Collapse of Iraqi Army

in Mosul due to Maliki’s

political interference

with its leadership

Shi’ite Militias in Control

Turkish Military Action Against PKK

AQI in Control

Sectarian Violence

AQI’s Main Effort

Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)

Special Groups (SG)

Shia Extremists (Jund al Sama, al Yamani, Mahdawiyah)

AQI & Sunni Insurgents

Kurdish Influence

Security Challenges

(2006)

The Danger

• ISIS the largest, most heavily

armed, most combat experienced,

and best financed terrorist group in

the world today

• Regional instability – impact on oil

markets

• Global terrorism – Western security

• Religious Conflict in the Middle East

Strategy to Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIS

• Sunni Arab tribes are key, as they were

during the surge

• Political accommodation (regional

autonomy) necessary to bring the tribes

into a coalition against ISIS

• Wage a hybrid war against a hybrid

force:

Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga

Sunni tribal irregulars

Syrian “moderates” (problematic)

U.S. advisors

• Ramp up the air campaign

• Fight the information war – Islamic world must denounce ISIS

• Pressure (or accommodate) Turkey: stop oil smuggling, inhibit

transit of jihadists, allow use of Incirlik air base