The return of impact assessment: Assessing the impact of Regional Shopping Centre proposals in the United Kingdom

PAPERS OF THE REGIONAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, VOL. 69, 1990, pp. 101-119

THE RETURN OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTRE PROPOSALS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Steven Norris Department of Geography University of Reading Whiteknights Reading, RG6 2AB United Kingdom

ABSTRACT The impact of Regional Shopping Centres upon the retail hierarchy is a major consideration for all those with vested interests in the future of the town centre. However, at a time when the planning and policy system is weak, impact techniques are also ill-equipped to forecast how these new forms of retail development will interact with and impact upon the high street. A review of over fifty impact studies forwarded at the present round of inquiries has highlighted the weaknesses in the methodologies and revealed the need for greater theoretical rigour.

1. INTRODUCTION The retail industry has experienced many radical transformations during

the 1980s and the development of the Regional Shopping Centre (RSC) has been an important part of the so-called 'retail revolution' (Dawson 1982). This 'Third Wave' of retail investment (Schiller 1986a, 1986b, 1988), following on from the decentralisation of food and bulky goods in the 1970s, arose from the unprecedented growth in consumer spending during the mid-1980s. In less than five years some fifty developer-led schemes were proposed, each aimed at replicating the apparent success of the first scheme to be granted planning permission in the 1980s, the Metro Centre (Figure 1).

This flood of proposals has had serious implications for the future vitality and viability of our town centres, and thus impact has emerged as an important issue for planners, retailers, developers and investors alike. However, the techniques used to assess impact have failed to develop in more than two decades. The history of impact assessment has its origins in the 1960s and was then characterised in the 1970s by a saga of planning inquiries aimed at determining the first 'two waves' of retail decentralisation. For more than fifteen years planners opposed first superstore, and then retail warehouse development, on impact grounds. It was only after the accumulation of evidence which illustrated the benefits of decentalising bulky good shopping, that planners dropped their previous interests in impact.

The necessary return of impact assessment in the mid 1980s has meant that these previously discarded techniques are now being reapplied to a radically different retail concept, operating in a radically different retail market. The same consultants who were unable to agree upon the right methodologies for assessing superstore impact (URPI 1983) are now embroiled in similar debates relating to RSC impact. New ways of looking at impact are needed, but few advances are being made.

102 PAPERS OF THE REGIONAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, VOL. 69, 1990

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By way of an introduction to this very important field of research, this paper has been divided into two sections. The first will consider the planning and policy environment in which these RSCs have arisen and illustrate how very few lessons seem to have been learnt from the first two waves of retail decentralisation. The second, and main section, will be based on this author's review of over fifty impact studies forwarded at the current round of planning inquiries and it will highlight the major weaknesses in the methodologies and suggest areas where greater theoretical rigour is needed.

2. THE PLANNING AND POLICY SYSTEM: ITS FAILURE TO COPE WITH THE 'THIRD WAVE' The weaknesses in the methodologies used to assess impact need to be

placed in the context of the weaknesses in the planning and policy guidance relating to RSCs. The guidance has been described by various commentators as being, ' , . . in a state of disarray' (see, for example, Davies 1986, Tate 1988) and ' . . . under siege' (Dawson 1985), with policy only emerging through the Inquiry system (Lee 1989). Whilst on the one hand, schemes of over 250,000 square

NORRIS: ASSESSING SHOPPING CENTRE PROPOSALS 103

feet have to be submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration, and the Government continues to resolutely defend the Green Belt; on the other hand, schemes continue to slip through the Inquiry net and are being developed in the planning 'loopholes' of Enterprise Zones.

Central government is caught between two 'schools' of planning thought. The desire for a market-led economy with competition at the fore and also the need to actively support the existing town centres. These inconsistencies in planning philosophy are readily apparent if one considers PPG6, 'Major Retail Developments' (DoE 1988). Here, the guidance encourages, ' . . . retail developments which extend shopping choice : . . and make shopping more pleasant' (para. 2), but then warns against the ' . . . loss of the vitality and viability of our town centres as a whole' (para. 7) and then concludes that, ' . . . the range and variety of shops and services (in our town centres) will change as they have always done, in response to changing conditions' (para. 7). This ambiguity in policy could be construed as deliberate since it allows each scheme to be assessed on its own merits. However, by failing to set out the criteria by which RSCs should be judged, the guidance fails to clarify policy for planners, developers and retailers alike.

The planning structure within which this policy framework operates is equally unacceptable. RSCs have a strategic significance, with patronage, and hence, an impact extending over wide areas and penetrating many county boundaries. Yet strategic planning has all but disappeared in the U.K. The Oxford Retail Group, in their recent publication 'Planning for Major Retail Developments' (1989), recommended amongst other things that:

"County Authorities in all parts of England and Wales should establish Regional Committees to discuss and agree upon regional shopping policies" (para. 5.1).

They are not alone in their call for some degree of strategic planning (see, e.g., Distributive Trades EDC 1971, 1988; RTPI 1988; Tate 1988; Lee 1989) but the government is increasingly unwilling to implement it. Only SERPLAN in the South-East (1987, 1988) performs such a strategic regional role and although it has gained greater acceptance amongst government circles, it has still been described as something of a 'paper tiger' (Davies and Reynolds 1986).

Similarly, the government has failed to facilitate the positive assessment of these schemes by not updating the Census of Distribution, last held in 1971. This was described as a 'disaster' for planners, developers and retailers alike (Dawson and Sparks 1986). Today, all that consultants know with any certainty is what the situation was in 1971. These gaps in retail planning information and the lack of comparable floorspace data and reliable turnover estimates seriously hinders the application of impact techniques. It has thus become more difficult to assess the extent to which retail space has been lost through the consequences of competition.

The government has persistently ignored the demands for a new Census of Distribution (Robson 1987, Howard 1988), or for the provision of the necessary resources to enable planning authorities to collect comparable data on a consistent and regular basis (Oxford Retail Group 1989, para. 6.1). Meanwhile consultants are able to manipulate the data assumptions to support their own arguments for or against impact, safe from the fears of critical cross-examination.


3. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF IMPACT STUDIES

Introduction Impact studies lack the policy guidance around which they can be framed

and PPG6 fails to clarify how the methodologies currently used could be improved. It calls for a ' . . . broad approach to impact assessment' (para. 11) and for much of the basic data to be agreed between parties before the inquiry stage. However, it could go much further and the government needs to be more actively involved in the development of a common methodology which will at least allow a more realistic comparison of these schemes at Inquiry (Drysdale 1988; Oxford Retail Group 1989, para. 3.1).

As it is, my review of over fifty Impact Studies has revealed the imperfect solutions which result from the imperfect arena in which such studies operate. No two studies look the same or reach the same conclusions. No two studies can agree on all, if any, of the data assumptions. This comprehensive review is too long to be included in this paper. However, six studies have been selected which represent the range of methodologies used by consultants. These studies are compared and contrasted in Tables 1 and 2. Other studies will also be referred to in the text.

The Methods of Impact Assessment There are two broad approaches to impact assessment and they are the

manual models and the gravity or spatial interaction models. This paper will not dwell upon the complexities of these approaches but will attempt to highlight the main differences between them.

Manual models. These can be further subdivided into the traditional 'step- by-step' approach and the 'market penetration' approach. Both methodologies have been adapted from the assessment of superstore impact (URPI 1983) and both rely heavily upon the 'informed' opinions of the consultants as to how they think these RSCs will trade with and impact on the existing retail hierarchy. The major difference between these two approaches is that turnover in the 'step- by-step' method is fixed by the floorspace or likely retail mix of the planned RSC, and in the 'market penetration' method it is fixed by the available expenditure of the catchment population.

Because both of these approaches are inherited from the earlier rounds of impact assessment, they display all of the earlier-weaknesses in the methodologies but multiplied many times over. In particular, the current appraisal of RSC impact suffers from the lack of analogous schemes with which these new schemes can be compared and contrasted. This was also a failing of the earlier round of superstore assessment until an extensive database of analogue stores improved impact techniques. Current research by the Oxford Institute of Retail Manage- ment (OXIRM) into the post-impact of the Metro Centre is an invaluable source (Howard 1986, 1988; Howard and Davies 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988; OXIRM 1988) as are the studies on the earlier Brent Cross development (Lee and Kent 1977; Greater London Council 1980). However, these are only two schemes and they both operate in very distinct and unique retail markets. The only alternative to this is to look at the post-impact data on RSC trading patterns overseas, but such information is scarce and hard to come by.

Unlike superstore development, RSCs have far greater implications in terms of impact. If a wrong decision is taken with regard to superstore location then little harm will result, except maybe to the developer and to one or two nearby stores. However, if a decision to allow a major RSC turns out to be wrong, then

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the continued health of some of our existing town centres could be seriously curtailed and alternative and more suitable locations would be effectively sterilised.

Gravity models. These were popular during the 1960s (McLoughlin et al. 1966) and early 1970s. However, 'Development Control Policy Note 13' (DoE 1977) positively discouraged the use of such models, stating that they, ' . . . may be complicated and based upon a number of arguable assumptions' (para. 13). Although these models would claim to provide an objective analysis of shopping patterns, they involve as much optimistic guesswork as the previous approaches. However, here much of the guesswork and subjectivity is hidden by the workings of the model. These models have had a limited use in the assessment of RSC impact and when they are used, such as by Roger Tym and Partners in the Greater Manchester shopping study (1986) and the Adanac Park (1988) impact study Tables 1 and 2), they tend to be integrated with the 'step-by-step' approach.

Recent gravity models developed by companies, such as URPI (1986) and CACI Ltd. (1989), have been used as a means of forecasting retail change and they do have the advantages of being robust and easy to use. However, until the assumptions which are held in their 'workings' can be agreed upon by all parties concerned and be proven to work in the real world, then scepticism in their predictive powers will persist.

Agreement Over Data Assumptions PPG6 warns that even the smallest Variations in assumptions about trends

in, ' . . . turnover, population, expenditure and the efficiency of the use of existing retail floorspace can lead to a wide range of forcasts', and that this could, ' . . . add significantly to the cost and duration of the planning process without necessarily improving the eventual land use decision' (para. 11). As a positive result of PPG6 much more of this background data is now agreed prior to the inquiry stage. Thus drive time isochrones, population estimates, expenditure per capita, existing centre turnover, and any future developments planned for these centres are now usually agreed to at an early stage. However, the greatest conflict arises over the critical assumptions which determine the final impact scenario. Thus, expenditure growth, 'floorspace efficiency' growth, RSC turnover, market penetration, trade draw and trade diversion from existing centres, are the particular weaknesses of the methodologies. Each of these will be considered in turn and the areas for conflict will be highlighted.

Forecast Assumptions Expenditure growth. This is a particularly controversial area for debate since

the growth in expenditure is the major justification for the additional provision of retail fioorspace. Consumer goods expenditure growth, in contrast to that for convenience goods, fluctuates more markedly with the economic cycle and makes accurate predictions virtually impossible. The studies reviewed all tend to use the data published by the Unit for Retail Planning Information but these figures are based upon the trends of the past and are more of a projection than a forecast. For example, the long-term trend of 3.24 percent per annum is based upon expenditure growth between 1963 and 1986, whereas the short-term trend of 6.24 percent per annum follows expenditure growth between 1981 and 1986 (see, URPI Information Brief 1988). Thus they are not grounded in any theory of the underlying relationships between those factors which might be expected to cause variations in consumer spending. For this reason, the use of these assumptions needs to be far more robust and a greater range of scenarios need


to be tested. Such 'sensitivity testing' would help to determine the implications of a 'worst' and 'best' case impact scenario.

Also, the use of aggregate expenditure per capita figures and aggregate growth rates conceals the fact that expenditure growth on certain goods is much higher than on others. Guy (1987) illustrated this relationship and Figure 2 reproduces his work. He explained that, the further northeast one goes the less likely it is that a new store will automatically lead to a downturn in trade in similar stores elsewhere.

Floorspace efficiency forecasts. This measure is a particularly sensitive area of the impact debate. It is defined as the ability of existing floorspace to accommodate a cumulative annual increase in turnover per square foot, at constant prices, over and above any inflationary increases (see, URPI Information Brief 1986). Annual rates of between 1 percent and 2.5 percent have been used at Inquiry and this can have a significant bearing on the outcome. For example, at the inquiry into the Adanac Park scheme (Tables 1 and 2), Roger Tym and Partners (1988), who were acting on behalf of the planning authorities, tested

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RAPID


an 'efficiency rate' range of between 1.8 percent to 2.5 percent, whereas the developer's consultants (Development Planning Partnership 1988), did not test any rate at all. These differences partly explain why their final estimates of impact (see, Table 1) are So divergent. The concept of 'efficiency' has become a very important weapon in the fight against RSC development and those defending the High Street argue that existing stores need to increase their turnover performances to cover rising overheads. However, the degree to which the High Street should automatically have a first claim on expenditure growth is a particularly controversial area for further debate (see, Hurst 1988; Thorpe 1988) and would also appear to impinge upon the free market ideology of the present government.

Need Assessment Variations in the forecast assumptions used by consultants will radically

alter the final impact scenario. Similarly, such variations will also serve to either raise or lower the quantitative need for more floorspace within a region at the design year. 'Need' is expressed as surplus expenditure available once the existing centres and any new commitments have absorbed expenditure growth to a future date. This surplus expenditure can then be converted into a floorspace estimate by the use of appropriate turnover to floorspace ratios. Such assessments are used in Structure Plans to determine the future provision of retail floorspace in regions but PPG6 warns against policies which attempt to, ' . . . prescribe rigid floorspace limits for new retail developments' (para. 8), since they inhibit any competitive responses to changing markets.

The broad assessment of quantitative need in regions is an important factor in deciding whether or not to allow RSC development. Obviously, if the proposed RSC accounts for only a small proportion of future expenditure growth and floorspace provision, then it is unlikely that the scheme will be refused on 'need' and ultimately impact grounds. However, quantitative assessments of need can be misleading, if not clarified, by qualitative interpretation. For example, quantitative estimates fail to illustrate the quality of the floorspace required; whether the market is in equilibrium at the base year; how the market shares of existing centres may change at the design year; where the qualitative gaps in a region are and whether the optimum location for any surplus floorspace is in or out- of-town. These questions are usually left to the planner or consultants to answer. However, further investigation of the above could lead to 'need' assessments being developed as a powerful planning tool and help to avoid the lengthy and costly public inquiries which have characterised the current round of RSC proposals.

The feature of these developed-led RSCs is that they are highly speculative and often insensitive to the needs of the regions in which they are located. Little, or no account is taken of the viability or probable impact of these schemes before they are proposed. The floorspace of schemes that characterise the current round of proposals, which were appropriate to overseas development, may have limited potential in this country and could upset the delicate equilibrium of trade which exists in some regions. Thus, developers and planners need to make a more concerted effort in deciding upon the appropriate scale and nature of retail provision.

Regional Shopping Centre Turnover The determination of RSC turnover is the most critical stage in the

methodology since it determines the amount of trade to be diverted from existing


centres within a region and thus the scale of RSC impact. Turnover is a function of the size of the catchment population; its spending potential and the attractiveness of the retail provision. However, as explained earlier, the lack of analogous schemes in the U.K. makes accurate turnover estimation very difficult. The studies reviewed have revealed two approaches for assessing turnover.

Turnover fixed by floorspace. The use of aggregate turnover to floorspace ratios to determine RSC turnover is a particular weakness of the methodology. This approach was used in assessing the first two waves of retail decentralisation and was subsequently criticised by Jones (1978), who argued that the relationship between turnover and floorspace, ' . . . is only partially supported by the survey data'. To overcome this weakness in the methodology various studies, such as the ones for Great Lea (Tables 1 and 2), have disaggregated the net floorspace of schemes into their constituent good types and then applied average company sales turnover figures to it. This approach is preferred but it still has its drawbacks in that, first the retail mix of the schemes are not usually known prior to the inquiry and second, average company sales figures are likely to be exceeded in the well-designed shop units of a modern mall.

The lack of comparable turnover estimates for analogous schemes has meant that consultants are able to either increase or reduce impact by forwarding different turnover to floorspace ratios. These disparities amongst consultants is clearly illustrated by Figure 3. Here the estimates forwarded for Great Lea and Adanac Park clearly show how those opposed to RSC development use a higher figure, than those supporting the scheme. The difficulty for the inspector at inquiries is in deciding which of these estimates, if any, are the more realistic. Figure 3 also illustrates how turnover per square foot estimates are insensitive to the size and quality of various schemes. In particular, 'The West Midlands Study' (Drivers Jonas 1987), applied a universal figure of s per square foot to all seven schemes considered, which ranged from the smaller sub-regional centre at Cranmore to the super-regional centre at Sandwell.

Interviews with certain developers at the time of writing have also revealed that they commonly used two estimates of anticipated RSC turnover. One estimate is used for the assessment of impact and the other estimate is used to market the scheme to prospective tenants. It does not need much thought to determine which of these estimates are the higher.

Market Penetration. This method was developed for the assessment of superstore impact as an alternative to the ratio approach and it relates turnover more directly to the size of the catchment population. However, apart from the West Midlands Study and the subsequent assessment of the Monkspath scheme by Drivers Jonas (1987, 1988), market penetration has rarely been used to determine the turnover of these large schemes.

The approach was best used by Breheny et al. (1981) in their study of the impact of a hypermarket planned on the edge of Gloucester. Breheny's methodology adapted the so-called 'Donaldsons' graph, developed by Lee and Kent (1978), which was based upon the penetration of similar-sized hypermarkets into their catchment populations across many countries. Like Jones (1978), Lee and Kent found that sales correlated more closely to the catchment population than to the floorspace of these schemes.

Figure 4 reproduces the 'Donaldsons' graph and Figure 5 illustrates the market penetrations of the reviewed RSCs into their catchment populations. Although based upon the consultants' own guesstimates of how they perceive these RSCs will interact with their catchment populations, the graph does offer up some guidance for future studies. Research is also being initiated to see


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whether such a graph can be reproduced for RSCs overseas where there are more schemes trading. However, as explained earlier, the apparent dearth of post-impact information has meant that very little progress has been made in this area. Care also needs to be taken in the interpretation of such graphs as they take no account of the differing characteristics of the catchment populations, the disparities in expenditure potential, the nature of existing retail provision nor the relative attractiveness of the planned centre.

Trade Draw The market penetration approach also provides an estimate of trade draw

which is more rigorous than the current methods. Currently, trade draw in the majority of studies is determined by superimposing a crude statistical template over the complex pattern of existing flows to shopping centres. Such estimates take no account of the characteristics of the catchment populations. For example, the evidence forwarded at the inquiry into the Lakeside scheme at Thurrock (DoE 1987) revealed two very different estimates of trade draw. Here, the applicants determined that since the population within the fifteen minute isochrone was lower than in the fifteen to thirty minute isochrone, the resultant trade draw would be 22.5 percent. However, the Consortium of Local Authorities


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arguing against the scheme, determined that the RSC would draw twice as much trade (48.4 percent), from the local catchment and thus its local impact would be far greater.

It is generally accepted that RSCs have a wide draw and that patronage extends over longer distances. However, little work is available which determines how leisure integration (OXIRM 1989), or differing retail formats, extend the trade draw boundaries. The answers to the problem of determining trade draw may lie more in the characteristics of the catchment population, than in the use of crude drive time boundaries. Thus the developments in geodemographics and GIS need to be related more directly to the definitions of trade draw areas.


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Impact The final and most complex stage in the methodology is the determination

of where the expenditure drawn from within each isochrone would be spent if the RSC did not exist.

Given assumed existing centre turnover for the forecast year without the RSC, summation of such expenditure losses in each centre gives the change in existing centre turnover and hence the percentage impact. However, the problems lie in first, now knowing centre turnover and shopping trip patterns for present and future years; second, in devising a means of calculating this diversion of spending; and third, in deciding whether this diversion should be based upon the potential or planned future turnover of these existing centres.

Apart from extensive shopper surveys at the base year and/or the use of the gravity model to replicate expected shopping patterns at the design year, there is very little evidence to suggest which centres will be affected by the introduction o fa RSC into the retail hierarchy and the magnitude of this effect. The estimation


of trade diversion is full of assumptions and uncertainties and in the majority of studies it is derived by the use of judgement rather than by theoretical rigour.

Figure 6 clearly illustrates the differences between percentage and monetary impacts for the six selected studies. Obviously, the use of a threshold level, such as 10 percent, to indicate adverse impact is spurious, since impact assessments need to be sensitive to the quality of the existing floorspace and how it is likely to change if trading levels are reduced.

Thus, these impact estimates should be considered as the beginning rather than the end to impact assessment. Such broad estimates require clear qualitative interpretation if they are to be relevant to the situation on the ground, since some centres are more able to recover from impact than others. The problem lies in the interpretation of these figures and what does, or does not, constitute an adverse impact. PPG6 warns against developments which could, ' . . . seriously affect the vitality and viability of a nearby town centre a s a whole ' (para. 7), and sites increased vacancies, a reduction in the services provided by the town centre and its overall physical deterioration, as being important considerations. A clear framework of qualitative indicators needs to be developed for all centres

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threatened by impact, so that the consequences of future development can be better assessed. Table 3 forwards some important 'Indicators of Health' and has been derived from the studies reviewed and from the research of other commentators (Schiller and Jarrett 1985; Brown 1985; Guy 1987; SERPLAN 1989). These indicators have been used by some of the consultants some of the time but never by all of the consultants all of the time. Future research will be aimed at developing some quantitative measure for these qualitative indicators. However, the lack of retail planning information means that this is a difficult task.

The idea that all impact is negative is an 'untruth' and was demonstrated with the gradual acceptance of the first 'two waves' of retail development. Table 4 illustrates the pros and cons of RSC development which have to be carefully balanced by the inspectors at inquiry and ultimately by the Secretary of State. Experience at the Metro Centre suggests that Newcastle city centre has been affected, but the prime retail pitch remains vibrant and retains its role as the principal shopping destination for the region, due largely to its superior access

TABLE 3. Qualitative 'Indicators of Health' I. Shopping Mix

II. Demand for Space from Retailers III. Attitudes of Investors IV. Recent Major Schemes Completed V. Pressures from Developers to build more Floorspace

VI. Vacancy Levels VII. The Apparent Busyness of the Centre

VIII. Signs of Refurbishment IX. Over-representation of certain goods types X. The level of Multiple Representation

XI. Pedestrianised and Covered Shopping Areas XII. Non-Retail Functions

XIII. Rental levels

TABLE 4. The 'Pros' and 'Cons' of POSITIVE IMPACT ECONOMIC: Creates employment; Promotes competition between Centres;

Can be 'complementary' to high streets;

Catalyst to further development around RSC;

Meets consumer demand in growth areas;

Can act as an initiator for investment in existing centres; Large, buoyant centres will ride RSC impact;

ENVIRONMENTAL: Relieves pedestrian & vehicular conflict in traditional centres; Protects Historic Centres; Provides safe & comfortable environments in which to shop; Easier access and car parking;

SOCIAL Caters for car-owning population; Adds to shopping choices;

Regional Shopping Centre Impact NEGATIVE IMPACT

Changes structure of employment; Loss of 'vitality & viability' of certain centres; Certain centres will have to change retail focus & move down hierarchy; Can lead to increased vacancies and physical deterioration of centres; Demand could have been met in existing centres; Causes loss of business confidence and investment interest in centres; Centres already declining will suffer severe impact;

Public costs of providing new infrastructure;

Visually intrusive;

Creates new centres of congestion;

Isolates elderly & immobile;


by public transport and the refurbishment of Eldon Square. However, it is the slump in Gateshead's turnover which has caused alarm and which further suggests that it is the medium-sized towns which are most at risk. The active planning for the contraction of such centres has been debated at inquiries and in the case of the Lakeside scheme (DoE 1987), the Secretary of State, in granting planning permission to the RSC, accepted that Gray's town centre would lose its current position in the retail hierarchy.

Thus Impact is an emotive area for debate. There are many facets to impact assessment and many areas which cannot be measured quantitatively. In particular, the most damaging impact of an RSC would be to cause the loss of investment interest and business confidence in our existing centres. All quanti- fiable measures of impact are derived from this. However, one must not presume, as is often the case in the 'doom and gloom' of the impact study world, that affected centres will not respond to the challenge of RSC development. Com- petition is, after all, the instrument of change. One needs only to consider the adoption of town centre management by some planning authorities and the commitment to these centres by retailers, developers and investors alike to realise that our existing centres are quite capable of competing in the same market as RSCs.

One must also remember that the 'retail revolution' has succeeded because it has met the rising aspirations of the more discerning consumer. If it can be demonstrated that RSC development in some regions would actually benefit the consumer, then it would be wrong for planning authorities to stand in the way of competition. Planners, as one commentator stated, must accept that, ' . . . the retail hierarchy is not immutable, rather it is a product of its time' (Brown 1987).

The concentration of development into our traditional town centres may only serve to squeeze the life out of them as they become increasingly constricted by pedestrian and vehicular conflict. If there is a demand for RSCs, and the draw of the Metro Centre suggest that there is, then impact techniques need to be applied more positively to determine where they can best serve the consumer and the retail market with a minimum of impact.

4. CONCLUSIONS The confusion which has surrounded RSC development in the U.K. and

the assessment of their impact, has arisen because they are such a relatively new phenomena. The planning and policy system has been slow to realise that there is a need for greater guidance and for accurate and up-to-date retail planning information. Similarly, impact techniques have operated in a vacuum for more than two decades and the impact debate at inquiries has become very negative and adversarial. It is now not clear whether impact studies are actually facilitating or hindering the decision-making process. The Distributive Trades EDC in their publication, 'The Future of the High Street' (1988), question whether, ' . . . such studies, with all their difficulties, cease to have a useful purpose and may even become harmful' (page 151).

As the 1980s draw to a close, there is a real danger that impact techniques will once again be dropped. The rise of the retail park (Hillier Parker 1989), the downturn in retail sales, the slump in the property market and the eclipse of economic impact issues by 'green' issues, have all led to a cessation in RSC proposals (refer to Figure 1). At the time of writing, the new Secretary of State had even commented on the need for greater intervention in the market place (CSW 1989). Once considered a dirty word amongst government circles, 'inter-


vention' is now deemed as a necessary to prevent the serious traffic and environmental intrusions of out-of-town shopping.

So why should the demise of impact techniques be considered a danger? The answer lies in the cyclical nature of retail development, which suggests that impact will once again emerge as an important issue in the future. However, if impact techniques fail to develop during this period, then they will be even less relevant to the conditions pertaining in the market place of the future.

Meanwhile, outside of the inquiry arena, in the commerical world, impact and viability studies are still an important consideration for retailers and developers who strive to optimise the returns on their investments. Thus impact studies can be instrumental in shaping the entire future of our urban forms. The question is, will impact assessment ever be fully equipped to undertake such a responsibility?

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S I would like to thank Mike Breheny for all his advice and encouragement

during the course of my Ph.D., upon which this article is based.

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Documents

The return of impact assessment: Assessing the impact of Regional Shopping Centre proposals in the United Kingdom