The Resurgent India March 2015

The Resurgent India 11111 March 2015

Year 5 Issue 12

March 2015

A Monthly National Review

Let us all work for the Greatness of India.Let us all work for the Greatness of India.Let us all work for the Greatness of India.Let us all work for the Greatness of India.Let us all work for the Greatness of India. The Mother

The Resurgent India March 201522222

The Resurgent India English monthly published and printedby Smt. Suman Sharma on behalf of The Resurgent India TrustPublished at C/o J.N. Socketed Cement Pipes Pvt. Ltd., VillageBhamraula Post Bagwara, Kichha Road, Rudrapur (U.S Nagar)email: [email protected], [email protected], URL :www.resurgentindia.org

Printed at : Priyanka Printing Press, Hotel Krish Building,Janta Inter College Road, Udham Nagar, Rudrapur,Uttarakhand

Editor : Ms. Garima Sharma, B-45, Batra Colony, VillageBharatpur, P.O. Kaushal Ganj, Bilaspur Distt. Rampur (U.P)


Year 5 Issue 12

A Monthly National Review

TTTTTHEHEHEHEHE R R R R RESURGENTESURGENTESURGENTESURGENTESURGENT I I I I INDIANDIANDIANDIANDIA

SSSSSUCCESSFULUCCESSFULUCCESSFULUCCESSFULUCCESSFUL F F F F FUTUREUTUREUTUREUTUREUTURE

(Full of Promise and Joyful Surprises)Botanical name: Gaillardia Pulchella

Common name: Indian blanket, Blanket flower, Fire-wheels

March 2015


CONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTS

The new law in land acquisition: A drastic reversal orcontinuation of status-quo? ....................................... 6

The History of Sino-Indian Relations and the BorderDispute Between the Two Countries (5) ................ 18


A Declaration

We do not fight against any creed, any religion.We do not fight against any form of government.We do not fight against any social class.We do not fight against any nation or civilisation.We are fighting division, unconsciousness,

ignorance, inertia and falsehood.We are endeavouring to establish upon earth union,

knowledge, consciousness, Truth, and we fightwhatever opposes the advent of this new creation ofLight, Peace, Truth and Love.

- The Mother(Collected works of the Mother 13, p. 124-25)


TTTTTHEHEHEHEHE NEWNEWNEWNEWNEW LAWLAWLAWLAWLAW INININININ LANDLANDLANDLANDLAND ACQUISITIONACQUISITIONACQUISITIONACQUISITIONACQUISITION: A : A : A : A : A DRASTICDRASTICDRASTICDRASTICDRASTICREVERSALREVERSALREVERSALREVERSALREVERSAL OROROROROR CONTINUATIONCONTINUATIONCONTINUATIONCONTINUATIONCONTINUATION OFOFOFOFOF STATUSSTATUSSTATUSSTATUSSTATUS-QUOQUOQUOQUOQUO?????

The land acquisition bill has followed a tumultuous politicaltrajectory, and the deadlock is no closer to being resolved now thanit was a year back. When, in 2013, the UPA-II finally succeeded inpassing its landmark land acquisition law titled The Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitationand Resettlement Act, the law was widely seen as a result of theprecipitation of efforts to address the injustices inherent in thecolonial era land law the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA 1894) according to which land acquisition could be conducted arbitrarilyby the state in the name of public purpose. The colonial era lawincorporated no clear understanding of the idea of public purposein the name of which the land acquisition by the state was sought tobe justified and had no real mechanism for addressing the grievancesand demands of landowners with regard to compensation,resettlement and livelihood. The 1894 law was a product of reformsand amendments to a series of British India land laws from 1857 to1870, and was based on a promotion of the vested British interestof development of Indias infrastructural economy mostprominently the railways for fulfilling the extractive accumulationmotives of Britain.

The 1894 colonial legislation was based on the legal doctrineof eminent domain. It is this doctrine that lies at the heart of thegeneral idea of land acquisition in any country. According to theconcept of eminent domain which first found expression in theworks of Grotius in 17th century, the property of citizens or subjectsconstitutes such a domain which the state can use out of extremenecessity or for fulfilling a public purpose, and, in return, cancompensate the affected citizens for their losses. It has not beenlaid out in the Indian Constitution, and, as a result, historical disputesover land acquisition by the state have played out variously over theyears. The doctrine of eminent domain has been justified to curb


the economic fallouts from the collective action problems that ensuein trying to voluntarily acquire consent from the landowners priorto taking their land. The classic economic problem is that eachlandowner will have an incentive to maximize his own interest, sohe may threaten not to sell the land in the hope that others will selltheir lands, so that he will, thus, be able to retain his land and alsobe able to get the benefits of the overall project that is developed.Since each landowner will behave in such a way, no one will givetheir consent and the project will not come up at all. This necessitatesthe power of the state under eminent domain.

How sound this classic economic logic is can only be testedagainst real world circumstances it may very well be applicable tothe rich farmers of the West, but not in the Indian context. The logicof such reasoning is belied in the way the land acquisition processhas played out in India, and how strong the collective mobilizationsagainst land acquisition in India have been. Such mobilizations thwartthe assumptions about rational individual farmers acting in isolationto maximize their own gains. They have been shaped by the politicalcircumstances surrounding the process of land acquisition afterIndependence.

Unsurprisingly, the independent Indian republic inherited thecolonial law of 1894 as a part of the rest of its constitutionalinheritance of the colonial era systems and institutions. The majorquestion is why this colonial era constitutional baggage continuesto remain with us despite the dynamic nature of the Indian society?As it now stands, the draconian law is fully geared towards makingthe process of land acquisition easier for the state, with deliberateambiguity over the definition of public purpose, urgency clause andissues of compensation creating practical complications thatprecipitate in conflict and forcible land acquisition for the fulfillmentof corporate interests. However, this was not always the case. Sincethe doctrine of eminent domain was not enunciated in theConstitution, legal disputes over land acquisition after Independencewere decided according to the changing political reality. The central


conflict in the early years of Independence was mainly between thefundamental right to property under Article 19 of the Constitutionand the legitimacy of the state in acquiring land from big landlordsto ensure the welfare of the landless and the tenants. With a fewexceptions like the 1952 Supreme Court judgment, the dispute wasalmost always settled by the judiciary in the favour of big landlordsright to property, despite the fact that the government wanted tointroduce pro-poor land reforms to break the monopoly of thezamindars over the land. It was only during the 1970s when thejudiciary was brought under the authoritarian control of Mrs.Gandhis government and with the scrapping of the fundamentalright to property in 1978 that there was acknowledged the need topromote land reforms to ensure redistributive justice. Thus, theeminent domain or the states absolute power to acquire land wasviewed as a socialist ideal conforming to the interests of thelandowners and the dependent landless and wage farmers.Moreover, the power of the state to acquire land also underwent aseries of other Parliamentary amendments in the immediate post-Independence period to prevent the judiciary from upholding theright to property of the landowners, mainly through the FirstAmendment and the 25th Amendment. However, this earlyacquisition by the state in the name of welfare could not be sustainedfor long, and over the years land acquisition underwent drasticchanges. Three major factors were responsible for this:

First, acquisition was fraught with challenges as the resistanceto land reforms also came from the big landowners who wereopposed to acquisition of land for redistributive purposes and formeda sizeable electoral lobby.

Second, the strong state under Mrs. Gandhi began to promoteits own interests in a political environment fraught with mountingcorruption and degradation. The rights of the poor and the landlesswho were supposed to have been the beneficiaries of land reformincreasingly took a backseat. Through a series of amendments, itnow became possible to avoid paying compensation for the


deprivation of property under Article 300A except to tillers ofcultivated land and minority educational institutions. The right tocompensation excluded from its purview the vast majority oflandowners and landless peasants and wage workers who weredisplaced.

Third, the government, from 1980s, began to operate in activecollusion with corporate interests. In 1984, the government passeda landmark amendment to the Land Acquisition Act (1894), wherebyit expanded the scope of public purpose for which the land couldbe acquired. It now no longer simply included public utilities in whichthe government was the main stakeholder, but private projects also.This amendment marks a watershed moment in land acquisitionreforms, as besides the state, the zamindars and the landless poor,it now brought in the corporates as a new player. It was also adecisive step backwards and made the new policy of landacquisition even more retrogressive than the colonial law.

It was after this period that major displacements arising out ofland acquisition began in a newly liberalizing economy from the1990s onwards. It precipitated in major protests against landacquisition for Special Economic Zones (SEZs) during the 2000s,reaching its peak with the infamous Nandigram and Singur cases inWest Bengal in 2007. The mounting voices against land acquisitionhad begun to affect the electoral prospects of the major party inpower viz. the Congress, as states like Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, TamilNadu, Maharashtra and Assam were gripped by protests againstforcible acquisitions and states like Haryana and Uttar Pradeshincreasingly agitated against inadequate compensation provided. Itwas in response to the snowballing controversy over land acquisitionthat the UPA-I government sought to repeal the 19th century lawand promulgated a new land bill in 2007. The Land Acquisition(Amendment) Bill of 2007 was an attempt to address the coercivenature of the colonial legislation while ensuring that the process ofdevelopment, industrialization and urbanization did not face anyhurdles in the process of acquisition, thereby according greater


priority to the economic goals of the government. Under this bill,public purpose included strategic and other works of the state suchas naval, military, air-force and infrastructure projects. However, the2007 bill had to be eventually dropped due to large-scale acquisitionfor the SEZs in the name of Public Private Partnership (PPP) andrampant government corruption, which led to protests fromlandowners, citizens groups and NGOs.

Finally, the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and ResettlementBill (LARR) was promulgated in 2011 and was ultimately cleared bythe Parliament in 2013 in the form of Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Bill (RTFCTLARR). It was the bill that sought to do awaywith the LAA 1894 radically by bringing into consideration,rehabilitation and resettlement for the first time. The 2013 lawsought to address the injustices involved in the process of landacquisition by introducing a number of radical changes, such as:

Mandating Social Impact Assessment (SIA) in case of large-scale displacement of people.

Obtaining the consent of 70% of landowners for acquiringland for Public-Private Partnership Projects and of 80% of landownersin case of private projects.

The compensation proposed was four times the market ratein rural areas and twice the market rate in urban areas, as well asproviding a one-time compensation for other affected parties.

It also mandated that the government had to pay for anydamage caused to the land or the crops in the process of acquisition.

The government could not acquire multi-crop irrigated area,except minimally and as a last resort and never above 5% of thestate total cultivable area. It also had to develop an equivalent areaof cultivable wasteland or deposit an equivalent amount with thestate government to be invested in promoting food security.

Very importantly, the land acquired under the law whichremained unused for a period of five years would be returned tothe appropriate state government.


The cardinal features of the 2013 law appear dramaticallyopposed to the current governments land acquisition bill viz. RTFTC2015. Widely viewed as echoing the draconian colonial law andvociferously opposed by even NDAs own allies, the current bill,promulgated through an ordinance, seemingly reverses the pro-poor conditions set forth in the 2013 law, by removing the SIA, theconsent clause or the requirement to obtain prior consent of thelandowner before acquisition in case of major projects, expandingthe range of projects under public purpose to presumably favourthe capital more, and reversing the retrospective application of thelaw such that unused land would not be returned to the stategovernment. Despite the nine amendments introduced recently tomake the bills passage possible in the Rajya Sabha the bill continuesto reflect a compromise and dilution rather than a genuine change.Some of the main features, including the latest amendments, of thebill that have acted as a bone of contention are:

The 13 acts (such as the National Highways Act, Railways Act)which were excluded from the RTFCTLARR 2013 have been broughtunder its purview. Thus, their rehabilitation, resettlement andcompensation policies have been merged into one policy.

Exemptions of five categories of projects from certainprovisions viz. industrial corridors, PPP projects, rural infrastructure,affordable housing and defence. Of all these areas, the major protestsare against removing the consent clause for industrial corridors andPPP projects. In response to the protests, as a part of the nineamendments that were floated by the government, it was stipulatedthat industrial corridors would be built by government orgovernment undertakings and the land acquired can be up to 1 kmof the designated railway line or industrial corridor. It also removedsocial infrastructure projects from the exempted categories, as apart of the nine amendments.

While the RTFCTLARR 2013 mandates that 70% and 80%consent requirements be obtained in case of PPP and private projectsrespectively, the 2015 bill removes these consent requirements in


case of the categories mentioned above. While the RTFTC 2013 mandated the identification of families

and an assessment of the social impact of the projects, the abovecategories have also been exempted from Social Impact Assessmentsin the current 2015 bill.

Unlike in the previous Act, it would also be possible to acquireirrigated multi-crop land without worrying about being limited by aceiling under the categories of projects mentioned above. However,due to protests, as a part of nine amendments the governmentstipulated that it must be ensured that the land acquired must be inkeeping with the minimum land required for the project. It shouldalso conduct a survey of wasteland first.

While the RTFTC 2013 applied to private companies only,the current 2015 bill makes a significant departure by applying it toprivate entities. Since private entities may include a host of otherprivate organizations including non-profit bodies and partnerships,there have been widespread protests by the opposition partiesagainst this change also.

Though the current 2015 bill had amended the RTFTC 2013to include private hospitals and educational institutions also underits purview, due to widespread protests about the public functionof these enterprises, they have been excluded again as a part of thenine amendments introduced by the Modi government.

Another point of criticism of the 2015 bill is that it amendedthe RTFTC 2013 to ensure that now prior government sanction wouldbe required to prosecute a government official for an offence in theprocess of acquisition.

To ensure compliance with rehabilitation and resettlementnorms, the government, as a part of nine amendments, providesfor compulsory employment to one person of the family displaced,instead of just a general promise of employment as was done before.

It is, thus, clear that after passing some of the key amendments,the bill looks much better than how it was originally promulgated.Critically, the compensation remains untouched and the government


promises to hold a survey of wastelands and acquisition of multi-crop land only to a provable minimum. However, apart from thesocial infrastructure projects, the need of consent for the other fourcategories of projects remains elusive. This will considerably curbthe bargaining power of the landowners and force them to acceptthe amount of compensation fixed under the bill. Whether theamount of compensation fixed even under RTFTC 2013 viz. four timesthe market rate in rural areas and twice in urban areas is just aformality or really in accordance with the needs and wishes of thelandowners, remains questionable.

Thus, despite the gaping difference between the 2013 and 2015versions of the bill, it does not mean that the previous law of 2013laid the foundations of justice in land acquisition any more than thecurrent proposed bill. The 2013 land law was not a genuineinstrument for expressing the changing aspirations and social realityon the ground, but was merely a compromise and anaccommodation. It was a product of the amended land acquisitionlaw of 1984, which had expanded the idea of public purpose toinclude state intervention to acquire land on behalf of companiesalso something that was not present in the original law of 1894based on limited compulsory acquisition. The amendment of 1984,in fact, reflected the intended changes in the patterns of landacquisition to make it more in tune with the coming era of capitalistdominance during and after the late 1980s. The subsequent bill in2013 did not depart from this reality of privileging the interests ofthe capital, but only proposed measures to counter-balance theside-effects of land acquisition on the farmers and other implicatedgroups. As laid down in the 1984 amendment, the concept of publicpurpose continued to be conflated with public-private interests.

Much like the current proposed law by the Modi government,therefore, even the previous land law was based on a sweeping,overarching idea of development, assuming that farmers wouldwant to be a part of the development process and contribute toeconomic growth by foregoing the claim to their lands. We cannot,


in fact, proceed with any such assumption. Therefore, instead ofderiving solutions based on broad assumptions about the ruralcommunities and landowners, there is a need to bring thefundamental problems on the ground to bear in policy. In this regard,the most critical questions are those of compensation and foodsecurity, with the latter being a particularly important issue in thelight of the food scarcity and the reality of the deterioration in foodquality being faced by the country. Despite this, the current proposedlaw only mentions a voluntary survey of wastelands for landacquisition purposes rather than a compulsory mechanism to curbthe appropriation of agricultural land.

The issue of compensation too cannot be dealt withmechanically. It is often determined with regard to determinantssuch as fertility of the land, location of the land viz. proximity tourban centres, the intended use of the land and the potential profitsto be generated. Thus, the amount of compensation to be paid willvary according to these contextual factors and cannot be determinedarbitrarily, and should also allow space for bargaining by the farmers.It is not that farmers do not want to part with their land, as a recentsurvey shows that 62% farmers want to move to better-payingemployment. Then what is the problem? The central point is two-fold:

First, the valuation of land (or the corresponding compensation)may never really capture the actual meaning or relation of land withthe people. This does not merely refer to the cultural attachmentswhich are articulated during resistance movements, but to a morefundamental expression of insecurity arising from a flaw in thecurrent development model. The current model of development inIndia has completely marginalized the agricultural economy and failsto provide conditions of mobility to ensure employment in thedominant service economy. Thus, even when majority of farmersdo not want to remain engaged in the occupation of farming or havetheir offspring follow this path, this kind of subsistence farming, inseveral major states of the country, acts as a source of survival,


livelihood and insurance which cannot easily be given up in exchangefor a certain amount of compensation no matter how high, in theabsence of a viable livelihood alternative. Such an alternative hasnot been provided in our imported development model and theprevalent idea of land acquisition is precisely a part of thisunquestioned development model spanning the entire politicalspectrum, from the Congress to the BJP.

Second, the problem before us is not simply to change theexisting laws, but to establish the right and dynamic institutionswhich can permanently provide groundwork for solving the miseriesof the farming community. In order to ensure this, three issues mustbe taken note of:

Providing the right amount of monetary compensation:Admittedly, in the existing law, the compensation provided waschanged to four times the market value of the land in case of ruralland and twice the market value in case of urban land. Yet, given thedeplorable condition of our agricultural sector, a case for morecompensation can be supported. However, at the same time, weneed to recognize that monetary compensation can only go so far,unless the broad problems of the land acquisition policy are tackled.Increasingly, displaced landowners are no longer satisfied withcompensation but also demand a right to some part of the developedproperty.

The process by which such an amount is determined: A properinstitutional framework should be put in place such that thebargaining process between the farmers and the buyers or investorsis not in itself an arbitrary one.

Ensuring that the compensation packages do not result inpermanent displacement of the farmer: This is the most critical pointin the current land acquisition debate, having much widerimplications, and one that is often missed. The manner in which thecompensation package is determined should take into account thespecific socio-cultural and economic context in any country and itsstates. Very often, the category of compensation is taken for granted


in land acquisition debates. It is often assumed that there is a sharpdivide between pro-poor compensation and pro-corporateacquisition, and once the right mode of compensation is decidedthe debate ends. However, the moral issue of doing justice is muchmore fundamental and goes beyond these sweeping economiccategories. If compensation is to be just, then it should guaranteean end outcome which is assuredly as good as or better than theoriginal situation of the landowning farmer. However, the currentidea of merely providing monetary compensation, no matter howhigh the amount, does not guarantee such an outcome. Given theprevailing socio-cultural conditions in rural India, most of the farmersdo not invest the compensation amount in income-generating assets.Instead, they are more likely to spend it on short-term plans or wasteit altogether. In fact, the experience of operation of various Self HelpGroups in rural areas shows precisely this kind of a spending patternand inability to generate long-term income. Such conditions wouldmorally result in a permanent displacement of the farmer despitethe monetary compensation being awarded.

The problem is, clearly, a behavioural one and reflects the widegap between the so-called slogan of development and the realityon the ground which is full of fundamental exclusions. It is becauseof this that bringing in even a reformed land acquisition law aswas done by the UPA-II government in 2013 will, in itself, not besufficient, unless the institutions operating on the ground are alsochanged. How can these institutions on the ground, which shapebehavioral interactions between landowners and the authorities andthe investors as well as among the farming community itself, bechanged? The most dominant practical proposition that has emergedis to strengthen the role of the NGOs and activists who can representthe interests of the uninformed farmers and can not only bargainon their behalf but also create institutional establishments to ensurethat they invest their monetary awards in income-generating assets.However, the assumption here is that NGOs and other suchorganizations are fool-proof and are truly representative of thefarmers interests. That is clearly not the case. Numerous such


experiments continue to take place in different states and have endedin disastrous failures, as these developmental NGOs are themselvesnot above corruption and lack of transparency. A more long termsolution to tackle the deteriorating rural reality would be to promoteskill-development and capacity-building programmes on a large-scaleand in an effective manner. The government is already investingresources in such programmes and is even entering into partnershipswith private foundations to promote it more effectively.

For the present, this may be a viable alternative. Such behavioralchanges at the ground level may certainly result in more consciousand effective modes of generating long-term income and livelihood,so that compensation out of land acquisition for development doesnot remain merely an ineffective formality on paper. However, thisshould not delude us into thinking that such solutions can provide amodel for long-term change.

A real alternative can emerge only by, first and foremost,recognizing the transitional nature of our ideas of development,democracy, institutions and social change, within which we havebeen circumscribed for far too long. The problem is not simply thatwe have been shaped by imported Western understandings of socialchange/behavior and development and the problems thataccompany them, but we have also shaped our self-understandingsand collective action in accordance with such an understanding. Themajor policy assumptions of the land acquisition question, includingassumptions by NGOs and the state alike, of how farmers will behaveand what they would rationally expect, has been framed by a verylimited understanding of collective action, which has ended upproducing major social conflicts that cannot be cured by merelyproviding a one-time compensation. Instead of blindly borrowingthe idea of eminent domain (necessity of state intervention) andimposing its top-down logic on the Indian society without therequisite transformation in other socio-economic conditions and ablind reliance of law as an instrument of bringing about change,new institutional alternatives need to be explored in the light ofIndias own experiences and conditions.


TTTTTHEHEHEHEHE H H H H HISTORYISTORYISTORYISTORYISTORY OFOFOFOFOF S S S S SINOINOINOINOINO-IIIIINDIANNDIANNDIANNDIANNDIAN R R R R RELATIONSELATIONSELATIONSELATIONSELATIONS ANDANDANDANDAND THETHETHETHETHEBBBBBORDERORDERORDERORDERORDER D D D D DISPUTEISPUTEISPUTEISPUTEISPUTE B B B B BETWEENETWEENETWEENETWEENETWEEN THETHETHETHETHE T T T T TWOWOWOWOWO C C C C COUNTRIESOUNTRIESOUNTRIESOUNTRIESOUNTRIES (5) (5) (5) (5) (5)

III. TIII. TIII. TIII. TIII. THEHEHEHEHE P P P P POSTOSTOSTOSTOST-IIIIINDEPENDENCENDEPENDENCENDEPENDENCENDEPENDENCENDEPENDENCE R R R R RELATIONSELATIONSELATIONSELATIONSELATIONS B B B B BETWEENETWEENETWEENETWEENETWEEN I I I I INDIANDIANDIANDIANDIAANDANDANDANDAND C C C C CHINAHINAHINAHINAHINA FROMFROMFROMFROMFROM 1947 1947 1947 1947 1947 TOTOTOTOTO THETHETHETHETHE P P P P PRESENTRESENTRESENTRESENTRESENT

This section is divided into four sub-sectors, namely: (A) ThePeriod from 1947 to 1954, (B) The Period from 1955 to 1961, (C)The Years 1962 and 1963, (D) The Period from 1964 to the Presentand the Conclusions.

(A) The Period from 1947 to 1954(A) The Period from 1947 to 1954(A) The Period from 1947 to 1954(A) The Period from 1947 to 1954(A) The Period from 1947 to 1954

1. Sino1. Sino1. Sino1. Sino1. Sino-Indian Relations, 1947Indian Relations, 1947Indian Relations, 1947Indian Relations, 1947Indian Relations, 1947-19501950195019501950The first communication of the Government of Independent

India to the Tibetan Government was a request to the latter to ratifythe Simla Convention of 1913-1914. New Delhi wrote to Lhasa inJuly 1947: The Government of India would be glad to have anassurance that it is the intention of the Government of Tibet tocontinue relations on the existing basis until new arrangements arereached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This isthe procedure adopted by all other countries with which India hasinherited treaty relations from His Majestys Government.1

According to Richardson, the then British representation inLhasa the Tibetan Government acknowledged the message but didnot make any reply. According to him the Tibetans were claimingthe lost territories of Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Arunachal Pradesh andcertain parts of Ladakh before ratifying any treaty.2 This act of Tibet... made the newly independent Indian Government suspicious oftheir intention, and this at a time when Tibet needed all its potentialfriends.

This was in fact one of the most preposterous actions of theTibetan Government and even now, more than fifty years later, theonly excuse one can think of is that the Tibetan Kashag and NationalAssembly were totally inexperienced in dealing with foreign policymatters. It was not without reason that Jawaharlal Nehru and other


officials were very displeased with the Tibetans.It is difficult to say today whether it would have made a

difference, but it is certain that the only wise course for the TibetanGovernment would have been to answer Delhis note immediately.The Tibetan Government should have reasserted its adherence tothe Simla Convention and other treaties, accepted the IndianGovernment as the successor to the British and requested Delhi tohold negotiations on their lost territories.3

It took almost one year for Lhasa to accept India as the successorof the British India and thus causing much harm to themselves inthe process. This delay and this ill-advised claim [to lost Tibetanterritories], made by the Tibetan Government resulted in thetemporary loss of certain amount of Indian sympathy for Tibet.4

The Dalai Lama during an interview with Claude Arpi, theFrench-born Tibetologist when he was asked that had Kashag notcommitted a great mistake by refusing to ratify the Simla Conventionand bargaining instead for the return of some lost territories toTibet, he replied: Yes, it is my strong feeling. At that time the TibetanGovernment should have send a strong delegation to celebrate theIndependence of India. Of course that was a big mistake.5

On July 8, 1949, Chen, the acting head of the Chinese missionin Lhasa, was called by the Kashag and informed that he and hisstaff as well as all Chinese working in schools and hospitals had toleave Tibet. The Chinese were swiftly expelled by the TibetanGovernment. Their bank accounts were frozen on the request ofthe Tibetan Government. The Indian Mission was later informedabout the fait accompli. It was a complete surprise for the IndianMission, Richardson commented later.

In 1947, when India became independent, the NationalistKuomintang government was in power in China and India establisheddiplomatic relation with this government in 1948 and sent K.M.Panikkar as its first ambassador. Panikkar sent a note on 22ndNovember 1948, to the Government of India expressing his viewson the then conditions of China and the likely emergence of a strong


Communist dictatorship which would organize a strong united China.According to him, A China so organized will be in an extremelypowerful position to claim its historic role of authority over Tibet,Burma, Indo-China and Siam. The historic claims in regard to theseare vague and hazy, at different times China did exercise authorityover Tibet, Burma, Tonkin and Annam and claimed suzerainty overKhmer kings of the present state of Siam.6

In the year 1949, Nehru was full of admiration for theCommunist regime as it was rapidly taking over the country fromthe hands of the Kuomintang whose final defeat led to theestablishment of the Peoples Republic of China on October 1st, 1949.India welcomed this change over and on December 30, 1949extended official recognition to the new regime and had thedistinction of being the first non-communist country to do so.

While Nehru, inspite of the reservations of some Indian leaderslike C. Rajagopalachari, was positively inclined towards the newregime in China, it took some time for the Communist leaders toaccept Indias stance of non-alignment which they strongly criticizedon many occasions. At that time, Nehru, who strongly believed inAsias resurgence looked upon Indian independence and the Chineserevolution as parallel expressions of it. Independent India alsoacknowledged, as the British had done, the suzerainty of China overTibet with the latter constituting an autonomous unit of the PeoplesRepublic of China. Still, India was surprised and shocked when theChinese army, numbering 40,000 troops, moved into some areas ofTibet on October 1st, 1950.

On 28th October, the following note from the Government ofIndia was sent to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: We haveseen with regrets reports in newspapers of official statements madein Peking to the effect that Peoples Liberation Army units have beenordered to advance in Tibet. We have received no intimation of itfrom your ambassador here or from our ambassador in Peking.

The decision to order an advance of Chinas troops into Tibetappears to us most surprising and regrettable. The Government


of India can only express its deep regret that in spite of the friendlyand disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the ChineseGovernment should have decided to seek a solution of the problemof their relations with Tibet by force instead by the slower and moreenduring method of peaceful approach.

Now that the invasion of Tibet had been ordered by theChinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly besynchronized with it and there naturally will be fear on the part ofthe Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the presentcontext of world events, invasion by the Chinese troops in Tibetcannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the consideredjudgement of the Government, not in the interest of China or Peace.7

Two days later, Zhou Enlai replied, The Central PeoplesRepublic of China would like to make it clear: Tibet is an integralpart of the Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirelydomestic problem of China. The Chinese Peoples Liberation Armymust enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend thefrontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central PeoplesGovernment.

Therefore, with regard to the point of view of the Governmentof India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central PeoplesGovernment of China cannot but consider it as having been affectedby the foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and henceexpresses its deep regret.8

During the last days of October, 1950, Lhasa sent feelers toDelhi to see if India would be ready to sponsor the Tibetan appealto UN. Indias reply was that it would certainly support an appealfrom Tibet, but would not like to sponsor it. Till mid-Novemberthe position of the Government of India was clear: India wouldsupport the Tibetan case if raised by any other nation. Then Indiabegan to vacillate.9

In the light of the above happenings, Sardar Patel, the thenHome Minister, wrote the famous letter of foresight to Nehru, thethen Prime Minister of India.


My dear Jawaharlal,Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet

meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteenminutes notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all thepapers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibetand I thought I should share with you what is passing through mymind.

I have carefully gone through the correspondence between theExternal Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and throughhim the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse thiscorrespondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the ChineseGovernment as possible, but I regret to say that neither of themcomes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Governmenthas tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My ownfeeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instil into ourAmbassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire tosettle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubtthat during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinesemust have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The finalaction of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. Thetragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to beguided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of themeshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From thelatest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue theDalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find anexplanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As theExternal Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, therewas a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or tworepresentations that he made to the Chinese Government on ourbehalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing inthe so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations inTibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must havedistrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stoogesof Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinelyentertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to


them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friendsof China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With theCommunist mentality of whoever is not with them being againstthem, this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take duenote. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, wehave practically been alone in championing the cause of Chineseentry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances onthe question of Formosa. We have done everything we could toassuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defendits legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence withAmerica and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is notconvinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us withsuspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, ofscepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can goany further than we have done already to convince China of ourgood intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have anAmbassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendlypoint of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese.Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in thesummary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chineseforces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude isdetermined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friendspeaking in that language but a potential enemy.

In the background of this, we have to consider what newsituation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, aswe knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates.Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrablebarrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibetwhich gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had theirown domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was notendorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetanautonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship.Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The


Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can,therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all thestipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. Thatthrows into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlementswith Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting duringthe last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united andstrong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we haveon our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturallynot different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined stateof the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with itsaffinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of thepotential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitterhistory also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialismand that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as anyother. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayanslopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam.They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the addeddifficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up eventhe semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communistimperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism ofthe western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makesit ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansionlie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger fromthe north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist andimperialist. While our western and north-western threat to securityis still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from thenorth and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, Indiasdefence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Ourdefence measures have so far been based on the calculations ofsuperiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have toreckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, acommunist China which has definite ambitions and aims and whichdoes not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentiallytroublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches


consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas inAssam. From the point of view of communication, there are weakspots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost anunlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a verysmall number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to befully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no meansclose and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have noestablished loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling andKalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. Duringthe last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciableapproaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. Europeanmissionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, buttheir influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim,there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible thatdiscontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, butits affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weakoligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict witha turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightenedideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make peoplealive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a verydifficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only byenlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am surethe Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would notmiss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in supportof their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In myjudgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to becomplacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of whatwe wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we shouldachieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating ourobjectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives isbound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have toface serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengarto send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the IntelligenceBureaus appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist


Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communistsabroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them.They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontierson the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have acomparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists andthrough them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifthcolumnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of havingto deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangalwe may have to deal with communist threats to our security alongour northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of armsand ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals inChina. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems onwhich we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I saidearlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the methodby which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that theaction will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only ourdefence strategy and state of preparations but also problem ofinternal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose.We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problemsin the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.

It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out allthese problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problemswhich, in my opinion, require early solution and round which wehave to build our administrative or military policies and measuresto implement them.

a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threatto India both on the frontier and to internal security.

b) An examination of military position and such redispositionof our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea ofguarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subjectof dispute.

c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, ifnecessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Armyin the light of the new threat.


d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My ownfeeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunitionand armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak andwe would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficultiesboth from the west and north-west and north and north-east.

e) The question of Chinas entry into the UN. In view of therebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followedin dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate itsclaim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtuallyto outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war.We must determine our attitude on this question also.

f) The political and administrative steps which we should taketo strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This wouldinclude the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeelingand the tribal territory in Assam.

g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well asthe states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengaland Assam.

h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air andwireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.

i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts atGyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation inTibet to guard the trade routes.

j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is

possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into widerquestion of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain andBurma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though somemight be basically very important, e.g., we might have to considerwhether we should not enter into closer association with Burma inorder to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do notrule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, Chinamight apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely


undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial.In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China,and therefore, might claim its first attention.

I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion onthese problems and decide on such steps as we might think to beimmediately necessary and direct, quick examination of otherproblems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.

Vallabhbhai Patel, 7th November 195010

In response to this Nehru wrote a note on China dated 18thNovember 1950. The note was forwarded to Sardar Patel as itanswered matters raised by Sardar in his letter to Nehru.

1. The Chinese Government having replied to our last note, wehave to consider what further steps we should take in this matter.There is no immediate hurry about sending a reply to the ChineseGovernment. But we have to send immediate instructions to ShriB.N. Rau as to what he should do in the event of Tibets appealbeing brought up before the Security Council or the GeneralAssembly.

2. The content of the Chinese reply is much the same as theirprevious notes, but there does appear to be a toning down and anattempt at some kind of a friendly approach.

3. It is interesting to note that they have not referred specificallyto our mission at Lhasa or to our trade agents or military escort atYangtse, etc. We had mentioned these especially in our last note.There is an indirect reference, however, in Chinas note. At the end,this note says that as long as our two sides adhere strictly to theprinciple of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality andmutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between Chinaand India should be developed in a normal way, and that problemsrelating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relationswith respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutualbenefit through normal diplomatic channels. This clearly refers to


our trade agents and others in Tibet. We had expected a demandfrom them for the withdrawal of these agents, etc. The fact thatthey have not done so has some significance.

4. Stress is laid in Chinas note on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet,which, we are reminded, we have acknowledged, on Tibet being anintegral part of Chinas territory and therefore a domestic problem.It is however again repeated that outside influences have been atplay obstructing Chinas mission in Tibet: In fact, it is stated thatliberation of Changtu proves that foreign forces and influences wereinciting Tibetan troops to resist. It is again repeated that no foreignintervention will be permitted and that the Chinese Army willproceed.

5. All this is much the same as has been said before, but it issaid in somewhat different way and there are repeated referencesin the note to China desiring the friendship of India.

6. It is true that in one of our messages to the ChineseGovernment we used sovereignty of China in relation to Tibet. Inour last message we used the word, suzerainty. After receipt ofChinas last note, we have pointed out to our Ambassador thatsuzerainty was the right word and that sovereignty had been usedby error.

7. It is easy to draft a reply to the Chinese note, pressing ourviewpoint and countering some of the arguments raised in theChinese note. But, before we do so, we should be clear in our ownmind as to what we are aiming at, not only in the immediate futurebut from a long-term view. It is important that we keep both theseviewpoints before us. In all probability China, that is, present-dayChina is going to be our close neighbour for a long time to come.We are going to have a tremendously long common frontier. It isunlikely, and it would be unwise to expect that the present ChineseGovernment will collapse, giving place to another. Therefore, it isimportant to pursue a policy which will be in keeping with this long-term view.

8. I think it may be taken for granted that China will take


possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. Thereis no likelihood whatever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it.It is equally unlikely that any foreign Power can prevent it. We cannotdo so. If so, what can we do to help in the maintenance of Tibetanautonomy and at the same time avoiding continuous tension andapprehension on our frontiers?

9. The Chinese note has repeated that they wish the Tibetanpeople to have, what they call, regional autonomy and religiousfreedom. This autonomy can obviously not be anything like theautonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed duringthe last forty years or so. But it is reasonable to assume from thevery nature of Tibetan geography, refrain and climate, that a largemeasure of autonomy is almost inevitable. It may of course be thatthis autonomous Tibet is controlled by communist elements in Tibet.I imagine however that it is, on the whole, more likely that what willbe attempted will be a pro-Communist China administration ratherthan a communist one.

10. If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricateproblems arise and each one of these problems will be inter-relatedwith others. Even the question of defence of India assumes a differentshape and cannot be isolated from other world factors. I think thatit is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real militaryinvasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in theforeseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration ofvarious world factors. In peace, such an invasion would undoubtedlylead to world war. China, though internally big, is in a way amorphousand easily capable of being attacked, on its sea coasts and by air. Insuch a war, China would have its main front in the south and eastand it will be fighting for its very existence against powerful enemies.It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and its strengthacross the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wildadventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatlyweaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus Irule out any major attack on India by China. I think theseconsiderations should be borne in mind, because there is far too


much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If welose our sense of perspective and world strategy and give way tounreasoning fears, then any policy that we might have is likely tofail.

11. While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of amajor attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradualinfiltration across our border and possibly of entering and takingpossession of disputed territory, if there is no obstruction to thishappening. We must therefore take all necessary precautions toprevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between theseprecautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack.

12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provisionfor it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial andotherwise, and it would weaken our general defence position. Thereare limits beyond which we cannot go at least for some years, and aspreading out of our army in distant frontiers would be bad fromevery military or strategic point of view.

13. In spite of our desire to settle any points at issue betweenus and Pakistan, and developing peaceful relations with it, the factremains that our major possible enemy is Pakistan. This hascompelled us to think of our defence mainly in terms of Pakistansaggression. If we begin to think of and prepare for Chinas aggressionin the same way, we would weaken considerably on the Pakistanside. We might well be got in a pincer movement. It is interesting tonote that Pakistan is taking a great deal of interest, from this Pointof view in developments in Tibet. Indeed it has been discussed inthe Pakistan press that the new danger from Tibet to India mighthelp them to settle the Kashmir problem according to their wishes.Pakistan has absolutely nothing in common with China or Tibet. Butif we fall out completely with China, Pakistan will undoubtedly tryto take advantage of this, politically or otherwise. The position ofIndia thus will be bad from a defence point of view. We cannot haveall the time two possible enemies on either side of India. This dangerwill not be got over, even if we increase our defence forces or even


if other foreign countries help us in arming. The measure of safetythat one gets by increasing the defence apparatus is limited by manyfactors. But whatever that measure of safety might be, strategicallywe would be in an unsound position and the burden of this will bevery great on us. As it is, we are facing enormous difficulties, financial,economic, etc.

14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion andwar, or, to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism meansinevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naive. It may meanthat in certain circumstances. Those circumstances would dependupon many factors, which I need not go into here. The danger reallyis not from military invasion but from infiltration of men and ideas.The ideas are there already and can only be countered by otherideas. Communism is an important element in the situation. But, byour attaching too great importance to it in this context, we are likelyto misjudge the situation from other and more important angles.

15. In a long-term view, India and China are two of the biggestcountries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certainexpansive tendencies, because of their vitality. If their relations arebad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but onAsia as a whole. It would affect our future for a long time. If a positionarises in which China and India are inveterately hostile to each other,like France and Germany, then there will be repeated wars bringingdestruction to both. The advantage will go to other countries. It isinteresting to note that both the U.K. and the U.S.A. appear to beanxious to add to the unfriendliness of India and China towards eachother. It is also interesting to find that the USSR does not view withfavour any friendly relations between India and China. These arelong-term reactions which one can fully understand because Indiaand China at peace with each other would make a vast difference tothe whole set-up and balance of the world. Much of course dependsupon the development of either country and how far communismin China will mould the Chinese people. Even so, these processesare long-range ones and in the long run it is fairly safe to assumethat hundreds of millions of people will not change their essential


characteristics.16. These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we

should be prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies,the real protection that we should seek is some kind of understandingof China. If we have not got that, then both our present and ourfuture are imperilled and no distant Power can save us. I think onthe whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons. If this isso, then we should fashion our present policy accordingly.

17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, andour very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. Itwould be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her withouthaving the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible,however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a largemeasure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and goodfor India. As far as I can see, this can only be done on the diplomaticlevel and by avoidance of making the present tension between Indiaand China worse.

18. What then should be our instructions to B.N. Rau? Fromthe messages he has sent us, it appears that no member of theSecurity Council shows any inclination to sponsor Tibets appeal andthat there is little likelihood of the matter being considered by theCouncil. We have said that we are not going to sponsor this appeal,but if it comes up, we shall state our viewpoint. This viewpoint cannotbe one of full support of the Tibetan appeal, because that goes farand claims full independence. We may say that whatever might havebeen acknowledged in the past about Chinas sovereignty orsuzerainty, recent events have deprived China of the right to claimthat. There may be some moral basis for this argument. But it willnot take us or Tibet very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet.No outsider will be able to help her and China, suspicious andapprehensive of these tactics, will make sure of much speedier andfuller possession of Tibet than she might otherwise have done. Weshall thus not only fail in our endeavour but at the same time havereally a hostile China on our door-step.


19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibets appeal. Iwould personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal isnot heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly. If it isconsidered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter speakingand accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, aswell as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in theleast. It must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A.,nor indeed any other Power, is particularly interested in Tibet or thefuture of that country. What they are interested in is embarrassingChina. Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannotserve that interest, we fail.

20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibets appeal inthe UN. Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spiteof our not wishing this, what then? I would suggest that ourrepresentative should state our case as moderately as possible andask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to theirdesire that the Sino-Tibetan question should be settled peacefullyand that Tibets autonomy should be respected and maintained.Any particular reference to an Article of the Charter of the UN mighttie us up in difficulties and lead to certain consequences later whichmay prove highly embarrassing for us. Or a resolution of the UNmight just be a dead letter, which also will be bad.

21. If my general argument is approved then we can frame ourreply to Chinas note accordingly.

J. Nehru18 November 195011

On November 20, 1950, Nehru stated in the Lok Shaba: TheMcMahon Line is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allowanybody to come across that boundary.12

...On November 24, at the request of the tiny State of ElSalvador, the matter came up for discussion in the GeneralCommittee of the United Nations. India moved a motion forpostponing the matter: Jam Saheb of Navangar, the Indian


representative declared: The Indian Government was certain thatthe Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means, andthat such a settlement could safeguard the autonomy which Tibetenjoyed for several decade while maintaining its historical associationwith China. The matter was adjourned. The noose had tightened onTibet. The door of the United Nations had been closed.13

2. Sino-Indian Relations 1951-532. Sino-Indian Relations 1951-532. Sino-Indian Relations 1951-532. Sino-Indian Relations 1951-532. Sino-Indian Relations 1951-53

On December 6, 1950, Nehru clarified that he was interestedin Tibets autonomy but without challenging Chinas suzerainty overit. He further said that Tibet was not in position to begin or continuethe war and there is no threat from Tibet to China obviously. Indiavoted against a resolution, branding the Peoples Republic of Chinaas an aggressor in Korea, in General Assembly on February 1, 1951.And taking over of Tawang in the first week of February without anyopposition from the Chinese was rightly regarded by the Governmentof India as indicating that China was psychologically prepared toaccept the McMahon Line as the boundary. All this led to a furtherimprovement in Sino-Indian relations during this period.14

Nehru stated in the Parliament on February 12th, 1951, that,we were aggrieved at a certain turn of events in Tibet, but we didnot allow that to affect our policy or our desire to maintain friendlyrelations with China. I am glad to say that our relations with thenew China are friendly at present.15

The Government of India felt relieved from the tensions on theTibetan situation when a 17-point agreement was signed betweenTibetan authority and the Chinese Government on May 23rd, 1951.As result of this agreement Tibet formally became a province ofChina. According to the provisions of the Agreement it was renamedas the Tibetan Autonomous Region which would enjoy autonomy inits purely internal matters while the Chinese Government willexercise exclusive control over defence, communications andexternal affairs.

Since 1951, there started an exchange of visits between Indiaand China by goodwill and cultural missions, and this fostered mutual


understanding. There was a discernible conciliatory shift in Chinasattitude towards India, partly in response to Indias constant friendlyovertures and partly influenced by a subtle change in internationalcommunist tactics. The Chinese press started praising Nehrusstatesmanship and spoke of India as a neutral and peace lovingcountry. The Government of India welcomed the soft attitudeadopted by the Chinese. India declined to attend a conferenceconvened in San Francisco on September 8, 1951 to sign a peacetreaty with Japan because, among other reasons, China was not aparty to it.

On September 27, 1951, Chou En Lai informally assured theIndian ambassador, K M Panikkar at Beijing that China intended inevery way to safeguard Indian interests in Tibet, adding that therewas no territorial dispute or controversy between India and China.India welcomed the new soft line in Chinas policy and resumed itsendeavours to put Sino-Indian relations on a firm basis in a widerperspective.16

On November 3, 1951, when at a press conference someoneraised the point of certain differences between India and China onthe work of Indian Mission at Lhasa, Nehru remarked that the Indiamission would continue to function there. A few months later, atanother press conference when this issue again came up Nehrupointed out that the Indian Mission was dealing with only certaintrade and cultural matters and never really had any diplomatic status.

Since Tibet was no longer an independent entity in 1952, theGovernment of India decided to redesignate the IndianRepresentative in Lhasa as a Counsel-General. In a letter to Nehruof 28 July, Zhou En Lai for the first time officially requested theregularisation of the Indian Mission in Lhasa. While recognisingthe legitimacy of Indias trade and cultural interests in Tibet, theChinese Premier suggested that the political agency at Lhasa shouldbe regularised by its transformation into an Indian Consulate-General in exchange for the opening of a similar Chinese Consulatein Bombay.


When Sinha, the Indian representative in Lhasa, asked for aloan of Rs. 2 lakhs to help the forces fighting for Tibetanindependence, Nehru clarified the policy of the Government of Indiavis-a-vis the Mission in Lhasa. In a cable to Sinha, he informed himthat it would be improper and unwise for our representative to getinvolved in Tibetan domestic affairs or intrigues. He added that Indiawas naturally friendly towards Tibetans, but this should not giveanyone the impression of possible interference or help. He concludedby telling his representative: We have to judge these matters fromlarger world point of view which probably our Tibetan friends haveno means of appreciating.17

Panikkar, the Indian ambassador in Peking was very friendlywith the Chinese leadership. According to Claude Arpi, Panikkarwas increasingly enamoured of the Communist regime in Beijing.Zhou continued to speak of stabilization of the Indo-Tibetan border,but Panikkar chose to understand that there was no difference ofopinion on the border and that both India and China agreed to theMcMahon Line as well as the frontier in the central and westernsectors in U.P. and Ladakh.

In his biography of Nehru, Dr. S. Gopal noted: this shroudedsentence [about the stabilization of the border] was not an explicitrecognition of the frontier. Other officials of the Ministry of ExternalAffairs did not agree with Panikkars optimistic views. A Note entitledThe Threat from Tibet written in early October by Sir G.S. Bajpai,the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External affairs, had pointedout that though a large Chinese army or a Tibetan army underChinese inspiration and leadership may not attempt an invasion ofIndia, the possibility of small forces dribbling in through thenumerous passes and then combining to make trouble for us cannotbe and had not been ruled out. However, Nehru did not believe inthe possibility of a regular invasion of Nepal or India. He ruled it outeven as a remote contingency. He thought that: What mighthappen is some petty trouble in the borders and unarmedinfiltration. To some extent this can be stopped by check posts


Ultimately, however, armies do not stop communist infiltration orcommunist ideas Any large expenditure on the army will starvethe development of the country and social progress.18

At this time there was a very poor awareness of the Indo-Tibetan border even among the top Indian leadership. For example,during a press conference on 14 January 1952, Nehru was asked: Isthere any implication of joint administration and joint defence [withNepal] of the north-east border? After having explained that theMcMahon Line had nothing to do with Nepal, Nehru continued: TheMcMahon Line is the frontier, but this side of the McMahon Linethere have been undeveloped territories-jungles, etc. You take tendays to a fortnight to reach the frontier from any administrativecentre. However when the journalist pointed out the north-westsector, the Prime Minister was less assured: I do not know. TheMcMahon Line is a definition of that border on the north-east. Butthe journalist insisted: There is a certain tract which is undefinedso far even on the maps it is shown as undefined towards thenorth-east and north-west, between Nepal and the province ofKashmir: near Lake Manasarovar. Nehru answered I do not knowthat any question had arisen; it has not come up before me at all atany time.

And once again when the press pointed out But even on themaps it is shown as an undefined border. Nehru could only sayMaybe. All these are high mountains. Nobody lives there. It is notvery necessary to define these things.19

...in September 1952, S. Sinha, the Indian Representative inLhasa wrote a long report; a very dismayed Nehru immediatelyanswered his Representative in Tibet: Your telegram is ratherdisturbing as it indicated that our policy is not fully understood. Thatpolicy is to recognize that Tibet is under Chinese suzerainty and,subject to that, to protect our own interests in Tibet. Otherwise, wedo not wish to interfere in internal affairs of Tibet and we cancertainly be no party to any secret or other activities against theChinese. That would be both practically and morally wrong. It is for


Tibetans and Chinese to settle their problems. Nehru added: Weare naturally friendly towards Tibetans, as we have been in the past,but we must not give them any impression of possibility ofinterference or help.

The note was titled: Chinese Designs on the North East Frontierof India. This Foreign Service office was warning his South Blockbosses against the new danger on the Northern border. Nehruimmediately sent the note to Panikkar for his comments.

Panikkars view was that the issue was not one of Chinese, orChinese-inspired military adventure against the border of India, buthe felt that India should be developing settled conditions withinIndias border, in areas where the administrative position was weakand the political position was only growing. His suggestions whichwere to be followed by Nehru during the following years were toimplement a policy of firm friendship to the people of the area, ofnon-interference in their social life and making available to themthe advantages of modern developments. Nehru also held that Indiashould take advantage of the contradictions in Chinese policy vis--vis Tibet. The meaning of this last intention is not clear as there wasyet not much contradiction or even opposition to the Chinese policyin Tibet.

About Sinhas note, Nehru wrote to Panikkar: to talk aboutChinas designs itself indicated that he is not taking quite an objectiveview of the situation but has started with certain presumptions. I donot rule out the possibility of such developments in Tibet, on ourborder or elsewhere. But we must take a balanced view.20

The occasion for Nehru to formulate his new Tibet and Chinapolicy came when in March 1953, S. Sinha who by the time hadbeen transferred as the Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry ofExternal Affairs, wrote a new note on the North-Eastern frontiersituation. The note drew the attention of the Ministry to possibledangers on the border areas. It again greatly upset Nehru whocontemptuously wrote: It appears that Mr. Sinha does not appreciateour policy fully. He should be enlightened.


It is worth quoting Nehrus answer to Sinhas Report: I findMr. Sinhas approach to be colored very much by certain ideas andconceptions which prevent him from taking an objective view ofthe situation. The note starts by reference to the lust for conquestof the Chinese and is throughout based on this. Mr. Sinha looks backwith a certain nostalgia to the past when the British exercised a gooddeal of control over Tibet and he would have liked very much forIndia to take the place of the British of those days. As a matter offact, the weakness of our position in Tibet has been that we aresuccessors, to some extent, of an imperial power which had pushedits way into Tibet. When that imperial power has ceased to haveany strength to function in the old way, it is patent that we cannotdo so, even if we so wished. We do not, in fact, wish to do so in thatparticular way. What we are really interested in is our own securitymaintenance of our frontiers.

It serves little purpose to think regretfully of past days and pastways. That is only done by people who have been pushed aside bythe advance of history and who can only think of the past whenthey played an important role in the historic process. The biggestevent since the last War is the rise of Communist China. It is totallyimmaterial whether we like it or dislike it. It is a fact. It followednaturally that a strong Chinese Government had done with more orless success. It followed also that there was no power, however big,which could resist that claim in Tibet. Certainly we could not do so.To take up an attitude of resistance without the strength to follow itup would have been political folly of the first magnitude. Therefore,we had to accept the changes that took place. We shall have to acceptany other changes internal to Tibet. But one thing we are notprepared to accept is any modification of or intrusion across ourfrontiers. Therefore, we must concentrate on that and not thinkvaguely of other matters.

While there is much in Mr. Sinhas report that has a basis oftruth, this is put forward in such an exaggerated and emotional waythat it loses force That does not help in understanding asituation.21


In September 1953, Nehru wrote a letter to Chou En-lai wherehe expressed Indias desire to open negotiations with China onbilateral issues. After consultation between the foreign affairsofficials of both countries it was resolved that the negotiations shouldbegin immediately.

G.S. Bajpai, the Secretary General in the Ministry of ExternalAffairs had strongly advised that India should force Beijing torecognize the traditional boundary between India and Tibet whichhe thought was the only way to resolve all outstanding issuesbetween India and China. Panikkar, the former Indian ambassadorto China had, on the other hand, advised Nehru not to raise theborder issue with the Chinese. Nehru accepted Panikkars views andruled that the border issue should not be discussed with China.

In early December R.N. Pillai, the Secretary General of theMinistry of External Affairs put up a Note in which he listed thefollowing main points for discussions with China in the forthcomingmeeting of the officials in Beijing:

1. The question of Indias frontier with Tibet,2. Indo-Tibetan trade and trade agencies,3. Freedom of movement of Indian and Tibetan traders and pilgrims,4. Passports and visas,5. Telegraph, post office and hospitals,6. Security guards and escorts, and7. Special position of Bhutan.22

Nehrus response to the Note was, We should not raise thisquestion. If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise andpoint out that this is a settled issue. Further, during the last twoyears or so, when reference was frequently made about Indo-Chinaor Indo-Tibetan problems, there has never been any reference tothis frontier issue and it is surprising that this should be brought upnow. Our delegation cannot discuss it.23


3. The Year of Panchsheel 19543. The Year of Panchsheel 19543. The Year of Panchsheel 19543. The Year of Panchsheel 19543. The Year of Panchsheel 1954Negotiations between the representative of Indian and Chinese

governments began in Beijing on December 31st, 1953. It wasexpected to last only for five to six weeks but dragged on for almostfour months. Contrary to the Indian approach towards thesenegotiations, China attached great importance to its first evernegotiations with a non-socialist country and set up an elevenmember Commission for Sino-Indian negotiations. Nehru hadalready expressed his desire to waive off any claim in Tibet as beingnot in keeping with full sovereignty of China, and to maintain traderelations with Tibet in cooperation with China. As China declaredSinkiang a closed area, India had also agreed to drop the Kashgarconsulate from the agenda of the forthcoming talks, despite its earlierhopes of reopening the trade routes between Kashmir and Sinkiangthrough Ladakh. Even while the negotiations were going on, somemembers expressed their distrust of the Chinese motives and urgedthe adoption of a more positive policy. Nehru assured the Housethat the Government was fully aware of the need for maintainingthe countrys security and that McMahon Line was Indias boundaryand there was no question of discussing it with any country.24

The Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse betweenIndia and the Tibet Region of China, popularly called the PanchsheelAgreement, was signed on April 29, 1954. The main points of theAgreement were:

1. As per the title, Tibet becomes a Region of China.2. The Five Principles or Panchsheel.3. Recognition of the six (border) passes in the middle Sector.4. Establishment of consulates (for India in Lhasa and Shanghai,

for China in Calcutta and Bombay).5. Setting up of trade agencies (for India at Yatung, Gyantse

and Gartok and for China at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong).6. Establishment of ten trade marts in Tibet for customary petty

border trade by Indian traders.


7. Facilitating entry and ensuring security of Indian and Tibetanpilgrims to each others holy shrines (Bodh Gaya, Sarnath and Sanchiin India; Kailash, Mansarowar and Lhasa in Tibet).25

The Five Principles (Panchsheel) were:1. Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and

sovereignty;2. Mutual non-aggression;3. Mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs;4. Equality and mutual benefit; and5. Peaceful co-existence.On May 1954, Nehru summarised his thinking on Panchsheel

Agreement in a note to the officials in the Ministry of External Affairsas follows: The Agreement between India and China on Tibet shouldbe communicated formally to the Commonwealth countries. Withthat Agreement there should be a note mentioning our oldconnection with Tibet and the necessity that arose to make freshadjustments in view of the recent changes in Tibet. Petty difficultieswere cropping up in regard to trade, pilgrimage and other matters.These talks between the two Governments were, therefore,suggested by the Government of India and accepted by theGovernment of China. After prolonged discussions in Peking betweenthe representatives of the two Governments, the Agreement wassigned. This Agreement not only settles these various points in regardto Tibet which have been troubling us during the last two years orso, but also we hope will have a stabilising effect over this region, aswell as, we think, to some extent, in Asian affairs.26

On May 15, 1954, Nehru presented the Agreement to the IndianParliament. After reading the preamble he commented on itsimplications for Tibet in the following words: So far as Tibet isconcerned, it is a recognition of the existing situation there. In fact,that situation had been recognised by us two or three years ago....It is true that occasionally when China was weak, this sovereigntywas not exercised in any large measure. When China was strong, it


was exercised. Always there was a large measure of autonomy ofTibet, so that there was no great change in the theoretical approachto the Tibetan problem from the Chinese side. It has been throughoutthe last 200 or 300 years the same. The only country that had moreintimate relations with Tibet was India, that is to say, British India inthose days. Even then, when it was British policy to have somemeasure of influence over Tibet, even then they never denied thefact of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, although in practice it washardly exercised and they laid stress on Tibetan autonomy. Recentevents made some other changes, factual changes, because a strongChinese State gave practical evidence of exercising that sovereignty.So that what we have done in this agreement is not to recogniseany new thing, but merely to repeat what we have said previously,and what, in fact, inevitably follows from the circumstances, bothhistorical and practical, today.27

Parliamentary and public reaction to the 1954 treaty wasgenerally favourable but not without opposition from some quarters.An opposition leader in the Lok Shaba, Acharya Kripalani, had strongreservations about it and later described this treaty as being bornin sin because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approvalupon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated withus spiritually and culturally.28

In the Rajya Shaba, Dr. Ambedakar remarked that, By allowingthe Chinese to take possession of Lhasa, the Prime Minister haspractically helped them bring their border down to the Indianborder Aggression might well be committed by people who arealways in the habit of committing aggression.29

The agreement between India and China thus gave strongsignals to other Asian countries that the China indeed could coexistpeacefully with its neighbours. It was for the first time that Chinathrough negotiations made a capitalist country to give up itsprivileges in China. It exhibited the independent foreign policy andnew diplomatic approach of New China on all fronts including thenegotiation policy, negotiation skills and the spirit of resolving the


jittery problems through consultations. The agreement betweenIndia and China, on Tibet certainly contributed a great deal towardsthe improvement of relations between the two countries.

The Geneva Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland, fromApril 26 to July 20, 1954 between different nations to attempt tofind a way to settle outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula anddiscuss the possibility of restoring peace in Indo-china. The SovietUnion, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, andthe Peoples Republic of China were participants throughout thewhole conference while different countries concerned were alsoinvited to this conference. From this conference India and Chinaemerged as countries of decisive importance in the context of worldpolitics in general and Asian affairs in particular. In Geneva, Indiawas represented by Krishna Menon who extended an invitation toChou En-Lai to visit India. Chou took time off from GenevaConference and visited India for the first time from June 25-29, 1954.The Chinese premier was given a rousing welcome and slogans ofHindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) generateda temporary euphoria about China. Chou had cleverly timed his visitto India with deliberate finesse. Pointing out that no solution of anyinternational problem, an Asian problem in particular, would bepossible without the participation of the China; Premier Chou hadmooted the suggestion for an Asian consultative Committee to whichNehru showed no interest.

Intoxicated by the agenda of world peace, the Indian leadershipdid not raise the crucial issues that ex

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The Resurgent India March 2015