THE RESCUE OF EUROPEAN JEWRY AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION …jewishtraces.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/OXFORDJOURNAL.pdf · Rescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palestine

Dalia Ofer

THE RESCUE OF EUROPEAN JEWRY ANDILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE

IN 1940-PROSPECTS AND REALITY:BERTHOLD STORFER AND

THE MOSSAD LE'ALIYAH BET

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Illegal immigration to Palestine was an escape route for thousands ofJewish refugees from the Third Reich, and should be viewed in thecontext of the mass exodus of Jews from the Third Reich to all corners ofthe world. Palestine was not one of the major destinations sought bythese refugees; but relative to its size and absorption capacity, Palestinetook in a disproportionate share of displaced Jews: of the half millionJews who fled the Greater Reich from 1933 until the war broke out, about100,000 came to Palestine, some of them illegally.

This pattern of escape, very untypical of the law-abiding CentralEuropean Jewish middle class, demonstrated the gap between the numberof people in need of immigration and those who were admitted by thecountries to which the Jews sought entry. A combination of economicdepression, an inability to grasp the nature and the danger of the NaziJewish policy, and the influence of Nazi anti-Semitism, decreased con-siderably the number of immigration permits issued by the immigratingcountries—mainly the United States.

From 1937 on the British restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine.This was due to a retreat in British policy from the commitment to theJewish National Home. The White Paper of May 1939 limited Jewishimmigration to a maximum of 75,000 in the next five years. This numberwas far below the individual applications and the request of the Jew-ish agency.

When the Nazi policy of encouraging emigration changed to forcedemigration and expulsion, illegal immigration became a mass movementDistinguished and honored citizens, young and old, participated in thismovement The organizers of illegal immigration were few. The twomajor factors were: 1) the Revisionist (New Zionist Organization) organi-

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zation, through its youth movement—"Betar"—and its military under-ground force—"Irgun"; and 2) the "He-chalutz"—Labor Zionist YoungPeople's Movement —which prepared its members for immigration toPalestine. Other Zionist parties participated in the illegal immigration,but they used either the Revisionist or the He-chalutz organizations tooperate.

Both groups created special bodies which were in charge of illegalimmigration strategy and operation. Labor Zionism generated the "Mos-sad Le'Aliyah Bet" —the organization of immigration B. The Revisionistscreated the"Mercaz Le-Aliyah"—Center for Immigration. Both had theiroperation headquarters in Paris.

The Mossad was part of the Hagana—the underground militaryforce of the Jewish community in Palestine, which was under the authorityof the Jewish Agency. The Mercaz operation was supported in Europe byBetar members, and it was guided on the seas and in clandestine landingsby the Irgun. The two organizations had envoys (Schlichim) in the Jewishcommunities who organized the immigrating groups, selected the candi-dates, prepared the needed documents (exit permits and transit visas),and supplied the boats, crews, and food for the voyage.

A third important factor in illegal immigration was the role of privateorganizers. Some were motivated by the possibility of economic gain,others were motivated by Jewish solidarity, and common fate. Some ofthese organizers were connected to the Zionist movement, like Dr.B. Confino of Bulgaria, or to the Revisionists like W. Perl and W. Faltinfrom Vienna. These private organizers played a very important role inpromoting the movement of illegal immigrants and between a fourth to athird of the traffic was due to their efforts (6000-7000 people).

The Nazis' attitude towards illegal immigration derived from theirapproach towards Jewish emigration from all the territories under theircontrol. Their major goal was a "Judenrein" Reich, and migration was(at first, at least) regarded as a means towards this end. And although thequestion of where the Jews should go did concern the Nazis, it was only asecondary consideration to the issue of the Jews' willingness to emigrateat all. Therefore, the main test of illegal immigration from the Nazis'viewpoint was its degree of success in evicting the Jews from the Reich.

True, Nazi anti-Semitic ideology would probably have preferreddispersing the Jews in small numbers all over the world and creatingnumerous small and destitute Jewish clusters to instigate further anti-Semitism; whereas the gathering of large numbers of Jews in Palestinecould well have raised the spectre of a "Jewish Vatican."1 But immigrationto Palestine did not depend entirely on the Nazis, nor did the immi-grants arrive only from the Reich. This convinced the SS leaders toadopt a pragmatic approach whereby the Reich's Jews were ordered toemigrate, as a means of 'cleansing1 Germany of its Jews. This policy was

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stated explicitly by Heydrich in January 1939, at the inter-ministerialmeeting that established the Jewish Emigration Center in Berlin.2 Hey-drich was a staunch advocate of illegal immigration to Palestine as one ofthe ways of evicting German Jews from the Reich. At the same meeting,H. Wohlthat (who replaced H. Schacht in the negotiations with G. Rubleeon Jewish migration affairs)23 announced that he had been told in Londonthat Palestine could absorb another million or so Jews. If these were thenumbers envisaged by Nazi policy makers, Jewish emigration to Palestinemust surely have been taken very seriously indeed.

The Germans therefore supported the organizers of illegal immigra-tion. According to the resolutions of the above-mentioned meeting, suchsupport was to be extended covertly, as the German State could hardlysanction illegal operations overtly. The operational scene was thus setfor all emigration efforts from the Reich in this period.

The "illegality" of these efforts was purely a British concern, as it wasBritish policy that restricted (or barred) entry of Jews to Palestine in ac-cordance with the White Paper policy. In 1939 Britain stepped up itsstruggle against illegal immigration and persisted in these measures forthe first two years of the war. The coast-line of Palestine was guardedagainst penetration and clandestine landings; immigrants who werecaught were placed under arrest and threatened with deportation totheir countries of origin; captured vessels were confiscated and theircrews imprisoned. Britain also exerted strong diplomatic pressures oncountries with Black Sea and Mediterranean ports, to prevent the de-parture of immigrants for Palestine and providing them with supplies.3

In spite of all these measures, illegal immigration accounted for 63 per-cent of total immigration to Palestine in 1939 (of around 27,000 immi-grants, some 17,000 were 'illegal').

CONDITIONS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

When war broke out the difficulties of organizing illegal immigration in-creased. At the same time, the direct need for actual rescue operationsbecame all the more critical: in the early months of the war Jews werealready being deported from the Reich to Poland. The problems entailedin purchasing and sailing ships, acquiring foreign currency and otherfinances, all increased immeasurably. Shipping costs soared by hundredsof percentage points as available vessels became scarce. Countries pro-hibited the transfer of ships' ownership to foreign citizens, planning touse these vessels in their own war effort. No one knew how much longerimmigrant ships would be able to make their way to Palestine. The Jew-ish institutions in the Reich were concerned about their contacts with theoutside, while similar institutions in the free world were worried about

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maintaining communications with the Reich. Envoys from Palestine,being 'enemy aliens,' had to leave the Reich and the territories it occupied,and Jewish residents of the Reich were declared 'enemy aliens' by aBritish government concerned about spies and fifth columnists, althoughthey had long since been deprived of their German citizenship. Britishanti-espionage precautions took on panic proportions especially after theGermans occupied Belgium and the Netherlands.4 Jews in the Reich atfirst entertained hopes that the outbreak of war would create a need for arational German policy regarding the Jews, and perhaps shift the au-thority for handling Jewish affairs from the SS to the army5—these hopeswere dispelled. They still wished to emigrate, while at the same timeGerman pressures for emigration ^and illegal immigration) did notlet up.

In September 1939 there were still quite a few active local emigrationoperatives in the Reich: Ehud Avriel of the He-chalutz movement (pre-viously an assistant to Moshe Agami, a member of Kibbutz Kfar Giladi,who was also an envoy of the Mossad, and had to leave by Eichmann'sorder in the Spring of 1939); Y. Dorfman, another leading He-chalutzmember, who returned to Vienna from Geneva six weeks after the warbroke out; W. Perl, a young Viennese lawyer and member of the Re-visionist movement; and Emerich Faltin, also of the Revisionists. BothPerl and Faltin worked for the 'Immigration Center' run by the Re-visionists, and in a private capacity. Berthold Storfer, a well-knownViennese businessman, and a person well-versed in migration affairsthrough the Zentrum Travel Agency in Vienna, was also involved. Allthese operatives were in touch with groups of emigrants in various stagesof preparedness for travel, some of whom were just about to depart forthe Black Sea. These groups comprised the complements that boardedthe "Atlantic," the "Noamy Julia," and the "Rodanitzar," ships thatreached Palestine in September-October 1939, and the "Hilda" and the"Sakariya" that arrived in the beginning of 1940. Other groups wereeither en route or in the final stages of preparation.

The restrictions on the shipping market once hostilities broke outled to the cancellation of agreements, postponements, and various delaysthat called for improvisation, circumstances that affected all Aliyah oper-atives. The Mossad was in the process of organizing the extrication ofsome 10,000 Jews from Germany in collaboration with the GermanHAPAG Company6 and groups of He-chalutz pioneers in Bratislava andVienna were also ready to move out. The Revisionists had planned totake several groups out of the Protectorate (a plan that was partly ac-complished several months later on board the "Pencho"), and furtherplans were under way under the auspices of individuals who had par-ticipated in the illegal organization since its inception, such as Dr.B. Confino of Bulgaria, W. Perl, R. Mandler, and Berthold Storfer.


The Mossad was hard hit by the loss of direct communications withlocal Jewish communities. Its agents and He-chalutz envoys left the Reichfor various other countries. The independent operation of the Palestineoffices—the legal immigration offices of the Zionist Movement—alsocame to a halt and a German government official was placed in charge ofJewish emigration. This had an especially severe impact on Mossadoperations, mainly because it affected the selection of candidates forillegal immigration according to their suitability for life in Palestine.

To British claims that the Germans were liable to plant spies amongJewish emigrants or use them as a fifth column by holding their familieshostage in the Reich7 —the Mossad responded by promising to maintaincontrol over who would emigrate on their ships and by giving assurancesthat there would be no cause for fears about hostile elements. But theircontrol over thie selection of candidates for emigration was diminishedwhen their agents had to leave the Reich. The tightening ship marketand the loss of vessels through fraud only worsened the Mossad's financialproblems. All these factors combined to make the operations of Mossadagents remaining in Europe extremely difficult

In addition, considerable embarrassment was caused by the renewedreservations expressed by the Zionist leadership concerning illegal im-migration. The wartime conditions led these Zionist leaders to devise anew political strategy: collaboration in the British war effort in order toclaim a share in the fruits of victory. From the Zionist movement's view-point, these fruits were expected to be plentiful: the strengthening of theYishuv's defense capability as a consequence of fighting against Hitler (aprime national objective), and maneuvering Britain into changing itsWhite Paper policy. Any attempt at undermining coordination with theBritish was therefore considered undesirable. Thus, although illegal im-migration was conceived as a useful means of fighting against the WhitePaper, how could one ensure that this struggle would not damage theaspired-for collaboration in the British war effort? Illegal immigrationwas also a means to rescue Jews from the Reich and the areas it hadoccupied, a need that had intensified since the outbreak of the war. Howcould one reconcile these two sometimes conflicting aspects of illegalimmigration?

The Mossad suffered acutely from the ambivalent Zionist policyafter the war broke out and from the other changes that have been cited.Could it somehow continue and expand immigration operations in theseyears? Reconstructing the historical reality of 1940, one realizes that thenecessary external preconditions for illegal immigration existed. TheGermans did not waver from their support of illegal immigration. TheMediterranean was still open to the sailing of boats, and the BalkanStates, mainly Rumania, allowed illegal immigrants through their ports.The necessary internal (Jewish) preconditions changed, in part. Jews

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were ready to embark on illegal boats and to risk their lives on illegalvoyages. But the organizations that provided the human and financialresources were ambivalent. They were reconsidering the inevitable needto cooperate with Nazi authorities in organizing illegal immigration afterthe war began. It became more difficult politically and morally to co-ordinate with the Nazis even on an illegal basis. They lost the direct in-volvement and control over the immigration activities, since their envoys(Schlichim) had to leave German territories. They had to rely on a middleman, Berthold Storfer, who was appointed by the Nazis, and who wasassumed by many to be a Nazi agent

Under these circumstances the disadvantages of illegal immigrationseemed larger than the advantages. After realizing that they could notreplace Berthold Storfer, nor control him as they wished, they practicallygave up the efforts to emigrate people from the Reich. This was a tragicerror for reconstructing the situation of 1940 from an objective distanceone can see that a unique chance to provide for the possibility of immigra-tion was not used. This assertion, of course, requires proof and to providethe necessary evidence we now turn to a description of Storfer's per-sonality, his methods of operation, and his relations with the Mossad.

BERTHOLD STORFER: HIS BACKGROUND AND STATUS

Berthold Storfer was a commercial consultant who was born in 1882 inBukovina. For many years he was in the timber trade in Rumania andHungary, and during the First World War he was engaged in trans-porting supplies to the Kaiser's Army on die Russo-Rumanian front(where he was decorated twice). After the war he was appointed financialadvisor to the Czech and Austrian governments and also served severallarge commercial firms. His fields of expertise were banking credit andoverseas exports.8

What part did Storfer play in Jewish public life? He was not a centralfigure in the Jewish community, nor one of the party activists and he isnot known to have held public office before the Anschluss. His first knownpublic endeavor was at the Evian Conference of July 1938, in which heappeared with Professor Neumann and Dr. Lowenherz on behalf ofAustria's Jewish community to present their requests on matters relatedto emigration. Aldiough die delegation appeared in Evian under Germanauspices and was convened under German initiative, Storfer himself wasnominated to it by Lowenherz, die head of die Jewish community inVienna.9 Why did Lowenherz nominate Storfer? No doubt Storfer's eco-nomic contacts could be helpful in organizing emigration, but there musthave been odier Jews with similar qualifications among the more promi-nent members of die Jewish community. Possibly the very fact diat Storfer


was not a prominent figure acted in his favor, and Lowenherz may havechosen him for tactical reasons—being aware of his unique contacts withthe Germans. This, however, is pure speculation. Storfer did place hisexperience and international economic contacts at the disposal of theEvian delegation, alongside Neumann's reputation and Lowenherz's of-ficial status in the community.

Storfer's status and operations in the field of emigration and illegalimmigration to Palestine gained ground during 1938. He became afamiliar figure in German official circles and in 1939 was commended byEichmann in connection with the activities of the Zentrum emigrationoffices.10 Zentrum was one of the major offices engaged in Jewish emi-gration. Among its other activities it sent people out of the Reich withtourist visas to conceal their true intentions. After this tactic was un-covered, groups organized by Zentrum were no longer allowed into thecountries of destination, causing great indignation, criticism, and debatein the local and international press. The Germans, though not averse toJewish emigration even by such 'devious' means (provided it was carriedout covertly and successfully), opposed any method whose disclosure wasliable to create adverse propaganda. Zentrum was penalized several times,and even shut down for different periods. Storfer seems to have beenappointed to head Zentrum in March 1939. We do not know whether thisappointment resulted from German intervention or pressure, but Eich-mann's commendation concerning the future operations of this officeunder Storfer's direction may indicate that Eichmann knew Storfer andtrusted him.

From August 1939 on, and certainly after the outbreak of the war,Storfer was in control of emigration plans initiated by other organiza-tions. He was empowered to cancel plans or halt groups of emigrantseither before their departure or en route. One illustration of his powercan be found in the irate comments of Alivah officials of the He-chalutzand the Revisionist movements,11 and Ehud Avriel's letter to Storfer,dated December 1, 1939, is particularly revealing.12 Avriel tried to or-ganize a group of emigrants independently, without Storfer's permission,taking advantage of Storfer's absence from Vienna. (Storfer was in Lublin,on behalf of the Jewish community, inquiring after the condition of Jewswho had been deported there in November 1939.) Avriel ran into financialdifficulties as his group numbered 200 more persons than he had planned.He needed help, and the only way he could get it was from the Jewishcommunity in Vienna and the Emigration Center. But this requiredStorfer's approval. He wrote a flattering and pleading letter to Storferpraising his work and dedication. In later evidence, and in his book,Avriel makes no attempt to disguise his contempt for Storfer, consideringhim an opportunist who exploited the Jewish plight to further his per-sonal aims. By March 1940 Storfer was in sole charge of organizing emi-gration from all parts of the Reich.13

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We have dealt at length with this point in order to emphasize thefacts of Storfer's official status and to underline the suspicions arousedwhen his authority in emigration affairs grew stronger. This issue con-stantly clouded relations between the Jewish organizations that sought towork with Storfer, both within and outside the Reich, the Mossad, theJoint, the He-chaJutz, and the Revisionists. Community leaders in Viennaand leaders of the Reichsvereinigung (the central body of the GermanJewish community, created in June 1939 under Nazi order) were notalways hostile to Storfer. The Vienna archives also include many lettersof gratitude to Storfer, praising his efforts and accomplishments in theemigration cause.

STORFER'S OPERATIONS-CONSTRAINTS AND ADVANTAGES

Organizing emigration from Vienna in 1939 was a very complex under-taking. Emigration offices sprouted up all over, competing fiercely forthe few available visas; it was a virtual battlefield between greedyswindling adventurers over the hopes and despair of Jews who des-perately sought any means of escape and who were prepared to considerany offer, serious or otherwise, provided it was channelled through theJewish community. It was this community's job—through Storfer's office— to weed out the spurious bids and warn prospective emigrants. But itwas difficult to maintain control over the situation, especially in view ofthe constant pressure exerted by Eichmann to increase the flow of emi-gration. LOwenherz came under constant fire from the Germans whocomplained that the Jews were not leaving rapidly enough, while at thesame time he had to try and head off proposals which he consideredfraudulent. It is therefore not surprising that LOwenherz had to leanheavily on Storfer, as the freedom of operation enjoyed by other bodiesdiminished: the Palestine Office was shut down in July 1939, Jewishorganizations were forbidden to collect funds for emigration purposesunless through the Jewish Emigration Center, and it is possible that atsome stage Ldwenherz found himself totally dependent on Storfer's help.

Storfer operated with a Greek travel agent named Socrates Avgerinoswho was responsible for obtaining ships, establishing contacts with othertravel agents, and hiring crews. He also handled the ships' provisioning,registration, ownership documents, and technical arrangements. Storferalso had 'representatives' in various countries: his brother, Joseph, inBucharest, helped him organize the crucial Rumanian leg of the voyage;his brother-in-law, Goldner, acted as "ambassador-at-large" in Slovakia,Hungary, Rumania, and Austria, and also served as liaison officer be-tween Storfer and Aliyah agents in other countries such as B. Confino (inBulgaria), and R. Mandler (of the Perl organization in Bratislava and


Budapest). All financial matters—even those requiring travel abroad— were handled by Storfer personally, as were contacts with the JewishEmigration Center and the Jewish community in Vienna. Storfer wasalso personally responsible for negotiations with local travel agenciessuch as the "German Danube Company" that transported emigrants fromthe Reich to the Black Sea. For the sake of efficiency, Storfer needed thesupport of both the Germans and the Jewish organizations, especially theJoint Without the latter's allotment of foreign currency Storfer wouldnot have been able to operate at all.

What were the considerations that guided these Jewish organizationsin formulating their attitude towards Storfer? Naturally enough, one ofthe more important considerations would be his reputation with otherJewish organizations within the Reich itself. The fact that Lowenherzrelied on Storfer must have weighed heavily in his favor. But the factthat Aliyah organizers for the He-chalutz and Revisionist movementsregarded Storfer as a power-hungry German lackey made a distinctlybad impression. Another factor influencing the attitude of the Jointleaders to Storfer was the question of his freedom to determine his ownactions. Could he impose his own scale of priorities? Could he ac-commodate Joint requests pertaining to emigrant lists? Or was he totallysubjected to the demands made by Eichmann and the Nazis? What su-pervisory measures could they impose on Storfer to ensure that hismethods were compatible with at least a minimum degree of safety forhis charges? How could one guarantee that he would not use funds en-trusted to him for personal gain or that he would not subject his pas-sengers to inflated travel costs?

Dealing with all these problems, with Germany almost completelycut off from the rest of the world, called for no small measure of mutualtrust and for full agreement on the aims and means of the operation.Storfer was not as free an agent as he would have wished —or as theJewish organizations would have wished. He was completely under Nazicontrol. The Nazis were quite capable of suddenly deciding to restrictStorfer's operations exclusively to Jews from the Reich itself, whereuponany group leaving the Reich that got stranded (such as the Kladovogroup) would be out of reach of his help.14 The Nazis could also decide torelease certain persons from their concentration camps and deport themfrom the Reich within seven days.15 They nurtured constant fears of im-minent inspections, 'visiting' Storfer's offices unannounced to examinehis correspondence with foreign countries, the Jewish community, andwith individuals. They would confiscate the company's books to comparetheir entries with their own sources of information.16 All this must havemade it quite clear to Storfer that his freedom was severely curtailed.Eichmann and his henchmen also interfered in security matters: whenAliyah operations were shaken by Italy's entry into the war and doubts

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were raised over the freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean, theGermans announced that none of this was relevant to the issue of emigra-tion, and that they expected it to proceed regardless.17

All this demonstrates how constrained Storfer was in conducting hisoperations because of the Germans' policy with regard to "The JewishQuestion." Were there any spheres in which Storfer did enjoy a freehand? Lists of emigrant candidates, subject to the overall restriction toresidents of the Reich, were compiled by the Jewish community's Selec-tion Committee, of which Storfer was a member. The Germans did notinterfere with these lists and the number of camp internees they releasedwas, quantity-wise, negligible. It seems plausible to assume that personalpressures and bribes could be employed to secure German interventionand favor, but there is no evidence of this having happened. From theGermans' viewpoint, the main object was to organize efficient emigration,so that the imposed quota of Austrian Jews would indeed depart from thecountry, thus achieving a "Judenrein" Austria (the deadline set for ac-complishing this was at first February 1940, postponed to February 1941,and again to the end of 1941).18

We have several reports of the Selection Committee's sessions. Storfertook part in these meetings and could have proposed candidates andpressed for the inclusion or exclusion of persons on the lists. The evidenceof those emigrants who reached Palestine on board his ships indicatesthat some people paid Storder hundreds of dollars which he pocketed.Given the conditions prevailing in Austria after the war broke out, thedeportation to Lublin, the eviction from apartments, and routine confis-cation of property, it should come as no surprise that attempts were madeto bribe Storfer or that would-be emigrants thought it was possible to try.Is it true that Storfer abused his authority for personal gain? We do notknow. We should certainly not rely on the evidence of those who toldtheir tale after reaching a safe haven. However, neither can we dismissthe evidence out of hand.

Anyone responsible for emigration from the Reich had to work inclose coordination with the German authorities or accomplish nothing.The question is not: was Storfer free of German control, but whether hewas able to convey to the Germans that for the emigration effort tosucceed it would have to be conducted with the full support of the Jewishcommunity. This would have called for subtle maneuvering betweenantithetical elements striving for the same aim—the Germans wantedemigration to proceed apace, but it also depended on action taken byJews outside their sphere of influence. The German Jewish communityhad to make it clear to the German authorities that the non-Reich Jewishcommunities also had to be considered, otherwise no support for emigra-tion would be forthcoming. The position taken by these non-Reich Jewsdepended, among other things, on their faith in the leaders of the German

Rescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration Co Palatine 169

Jewish community, and therefore it was in the German interest to fostersuch trust There was not much room for maneuver, as we know today,but the Jews in the Reich were aware of the scenario and managed tomaintain contact with the Joint, the British Zionist movement, and others.Jewish leaders like Epstein, from Berlin, Edelstein, from Prague, Lowen-herz, and others, left the Reich for Trieste and Geneva with the Germans'blessing, to meet Jewish leaders from abroad. Storfer tried to employ thesame tactics.

Storfer also tried to hold his own in other spheres: he did not hesitateto complain to Eichmann about the German Danube Company, withwhich he was ordered to work, when they exploited their monopoly andraised their prices, created difficulties in arranging schedules, etc.19 Healso managed to get help from the German Foreign Office in extendingthe validity of passports and the transfer of funds.20 He trod a wary pathbetween German policy vis-a-vis the Jewish question and the status of theJewish community. Nonetheless, one cannot say that his own status gavehim much advantage over other organizers of emigration. He soughtships in the same narrow Greek market, he had to bribe foreign councilsto obtain proper registration, and he depended upon outside Jewish as-sistance for funds.

STORFER'S RELATIONS WITH JEWISH

ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE THE REICH

What did the Jewish organization abroad know of all this? What did theyglean from the information they received about the conditions prevailingin the Reich's Jewish community? The Joint's attitude to Storfer in themiddle of 1940 can illustrate these and associated problems. In December1939 Storfer suffered a heavy loss when a ship he chartered, the "Astria,"sank with nine crewmen on the Black Sea during a severe storm. Thisship was to have taken on 600 emigrants waiting in Bratislava.21 Storferwas faced with a three-pronged problem: first, the funds he had investedin the "Astria" had been lost, and the insurance settlement would taketime; second, the emigrants left stranded had to be provisioned, andStorfer did not have the necessary funds to do so; third, the River Danubefroze early that year. Storfer had to postpone this group's departure tothe Spring of. 1940. In the meantine he considered purchasing a largervessel, then docked in Greece, to carry some 1,400-1,600 passengers— adding to the Bratislava group emigrants from Vienna whom theGermans were anxious to move out22 Implementation of this plan de-pended on the transfer of $55,000 via the Joint in order to purchase thevessel.

Lttwenherz met with representatives of the Joint in Geneva and in

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Budapest in January 1940, and obtained their general consent to financethe project.23 Storfer planned his moves accordingly: he took out anoption to purchase the vessel by the end of March and started recruitinga captain and crew and planning the details of the voyage down theDanube to the Black Sea and then to Palestine. He did all this with thehelp of Avgerinos, his Greek agent (or partner).** By the end of Marchthe funds from the Joint had not yet arrived. Storfer feared the entireproject might be cancelled if the money was not forthcoming immediatelyand sent a stream of letters calling for help, advising caution, and gen-erally seeking attention.25 "Funds should be wired . . . situation extremelydelicate and unless caution and resolution are exercised we may lose theship . . . what will become of the voyage? Contact Brussels urgently tofind the reason for the delay . . . prices are soaring daily . . . we arealready in an untenable position and it is becoming worse . . . we needhelp and support." Storfer's pleas remained unanswered. The moneynever arrived. The Joint never sent it. Avgerinos' option lapsed. NoStorfer ship sailed with the Vienna and Bratislava emigrants that April.

What or who stopped the Joint from forwarding the funds? Severalfactors combined to support the suspicion, already growing in the mindsof the Joint officials, that Storfer was unreliable and no more than a Nazipuppet. In January 1940 representatives of the Joint were berated by theBritish Foreign Office for supporting illegal immigration. The ForeignOffice had tracked down a cable sent by H. Katzki (a Joint operative inEurope) to M. Troper, the Joint's European representative, requestingaid for the "Lowenherz refugees" whose ship had sunk,26 probably re-ferring to Storfer's Bratislava group destined for the "Astria."

At that time about 3,000 Jewish refugees in Rumania were awaitingtransport to Palestine—comprised of groups that had arrived on the"Sakariya" and the "Hilda" in January and February of 1940. They hadspent a harsh winter on riverboats and their case had raised a furor in theinternational press. The Joint was asked to assist, while the British wereon guard against their planned illegal immigration to Palestine. At thesame time a group of 1,000 persons was caught in the small Yugoslavport of Kladovo, also on riverboats and in harsh winter conditions. They,too, received aid from the Joint and were placed under British observa-tion lest they continue on their way to Palestine illegally. The Joint cameunder strong British pressure and had to take notice, especially sincethey were receiving reiterations of British concern about spies, this timefrom Mossad operatives as well.

While Storfer was busy planning his group's Spring move, the Mossadwas also trying to help its emigrants. Mossad agents sought vessels totransport groups already prepared for departure and awaiting transporta-tion. Both Storfer and the Mossad were thinking in terms of a largevessel, capable of taking on several groups at once. Both concentrated

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their search in the same dwindling Greek shipping market. The Mossadwas also short of funds, a shortage that grew more acute in the winter of1940. It considered Storfer a harmful and unreliable competitor. Shouldhe receive Joint funds, they believed, their own chances of obtainingfunds would diminish. The Mossad was warned —on behalf of the British— by Zionist leadership about the possibility that German spies could beplanted among the emigrants. The Mossad dismissed this contention,but could give no firm guarantee that spies could not possibly be plantedamong the refugees in the absence of strict supervision over the composi-tion of emigrant lists. The Jewish Agency was ready to help the British insecurity checks of illegal immigrants arriving in Palestine. All this theMossad communicated quite clearly to the representatives of the Joint,who did not wish to appear as supporters of illegal actions, or of a so-called Nazi agent

The Mossad and Weizmann urged the Joint to withold support fromStorfer unless a way was found to exercise control over his operations.Such control would ensure that the Germans would not be able to useemigration as cover for espionage activities. How could it be exercised?Storfer could be obliged to clear his operations through Mossad opera-tives or representatives of the He-chalutz movement whom they trusted.The Joint consented, and advised Storfer that he would have to counter-sign Shmaryahu Tzameret—the Mossad's man in Athens—in order torelease the funds earmarked for him and deposited in an Athens bank.Tzameret asked to inspect Storfer's lease contracts and travel arrange-ments before signing the transfer order. Storfer refused.

The Joint had acted in good faith. They were wary about transferringfunds to Storfer and were being subjected to increasing pressure. Theytherefore obliged Storfer to clear the transfer through Tzameret whosetask was to ensure that the money would be used for the right purpose.But Tzameret, as the representative of the Mossad, did not restrict himselfto Joint directives; as a Mossad man he had an account to settle withStorfer (see below). Storfer, for his part, could not consent to Tzameret'ssupervision, and the end result was that the transfer of funds was delayed.The Joint had become embroiled in a dispute in which it really had nopart (between Storfer and the Mossad) at the cost of postponing the de-parture of emigrants' ships. This, as the operatives on the spot were fullyaware, could mean cancellation of the voyage.27

STORFER AND THE MOSSAD LE-ALIYAH B E T -

RELATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

Why did the Mossad want Storfer to fail? Would not such failure implythe failure of Aliyah in a wider sense? The answer to the second question

172 Dalia Ofer

is a definite "No"; and its explanation derives from the answer to thefirst. Mossad operatives received their information on Storfer from twosources: one was their own or other Eretz Israel envoys to Germany andVienna operating since before the war, who had met with Storfer andwere acquainted with him (for example, Pino Ginsburg, a kibbutz memberin Palestine who emigrated from Germany in January 1934 and wentback as an envoy of the He-chalutz in 1939, and Moshe Agami). Thesecond source was He-chalutz and Zionist movement leaders who re-mained in the Reich (Erich Frank, a leader of He-chalutz in Germany;Georg Israel, a major figure in the Reichsvereinigung; Jacob Edelstein,from Prague; and others).

P. Ginsburg and M. Agami were familiar with the situation that pre-vailed before Storfer took sole charge of emigration from the Reich.They were also familiar with the internal power structure and with thefact that the division of labor between the Gestapo and the Jewish Emigra-tion Center was not yet quite clear-cut. Agami, recalling his attempts toweave his way through the various Nazi authorities, ascribes the successof illegal immigration to these delicate maneuvers.28

Surprisingly, He-chalutz and community leaders inside the Reichalso failed to correctly assess Storfer's power and status after the warbroke out, and provided the Mossad with misleading information.29

In January 1940 the Reichsvereinigung tried to carry on with illegalimmigration operations started by Ginsburg and the Mossad in the Springand Summer of 1939. They hoped to do so with their German contact,"von Haffner," who had access to the SS and had worked with Ginsburg,and to implement their "Grand Plan" of emigrating 10,000 German Jewsout of Italian ports.30 If they could collaborate with the Mossad in thisproject, they could shake off their dependence on Storfer and on theDanube-Black Sea route. In this way they could handle the immigrationaccording to their wishes.

The stand taken by these leaders in Geneva concerning the Mossadoperatives—in January 1940 —maintained that the key to successfulAliyah was in its actual implementation. The Germans did not care whocarried out emigration as long as it was going on efficiently. In the be-ginning of 1940, Storfer's status was as if declining—his ship had sunk,and the scandal surrounding Reich emigrants awaiting transport inRumania in harsh winter conditions did nothing to improve his image(people asked themselves how these emigrants could have been allowedto leave the Reich when no ships were at hand, and this was Storfer'sresponsibility).31 Storfer's (justified) excuse, that these groups had exploitedhis absence and left Vienna while he was away in Lublin, did not ease thetension. German He-chalutz members and leaders of the Reichsvereinigungbelieved that if the Mossad had extricated their emigrants, Storfer wouldhave been in no position to interfere.'2 Jacob Edelstein, who arrived in


Geneva at that time, held the same belief. He criticized all the leaders ofthe Jewish community in Vienna —not only Storfer—believing that theirattitude towards the Germans was too submissive and virtually invitedextreme German measures (such as deportation to Lublin). Edelsteinfurther believed that taking a firm stand against German policy couldprevent additional extreme steps, that neither Storfer nor Lowenherzwas qualified to cope with the situation, and that neither of them shouldbe given support He thought Aliyah operations should be carried outindependently and was prepared to turn over the funds still held by thePrague Palestine office to the Mossad for this purpose. Successful Mossadactivities would also serve to strengthen the weakening position of thatoffice due to the lack of immigrants.

Given this approach, which reinforced the Mossad's dim view ofStorfer, the opposition of Z. Yehieli, the head of the Mossad in Europeoperating from Geneva to collaboration with Storfer, intensified. Storferand Yehieli met in Bucharest in February 1940s3 and Storfer tried toconvince Yehieli that collaboration would be to the Mossad's advantage,suggesting that he, Storfer, should continue organizing the groups ofemigrants in accordance with German directives but would at the sametime consider the Mossad's interests and requests in selecting candidatesfor emigration and giving priority to He-chalutz groups from Germanyand Prague. The Mossad was, however, expected to understand that theGermans also obliged Storfer to take care of the old and infirm in Viennaas well as released camp internees. The Mossad, Storfer continued, wouldhandle the sea voyage part of the operation. Storfer sharply criticizedoperations conducted behind his back that had led to scandals and harmedthe emigration cause (e.g., the "Sakariya" and "Kladovo" affairs), as wellas individual efforts such as those of Edelstein in Prague.

Why did Storfer seek collaboration with the Mossad? He himselfgave no explanation, but there is no doubt that he needed the Mossad'shelp mainly in order to bolster his status in the Reich's Jewish community(the Reichsvereinigung, the Palestine office in Prague), and with the Joint,thereby clearing away some of the obstacles in his fundraising efforts. Healso needed the Mossad's help in everything related to sailing the Medi-terranean and clandestine landings on Palestinian shores. This wouldboth improve his own reputation as an Aliyah organizer and promoteemigration operations as approved rescue policy.

But instead of being a working discussion, the meeting betweenYehieli and Storfer turned into a violent argument. Storfer vilified Avrieland Edelstein —which made Yehieli furious and led him to warn Storferagainst taking measures against He-chalutz groups. Storfer, for his part,declared that no one could emigrate from the Reich without his consent.Yehieli was anxious, but refused to divulge Mossad plans or to promisecooperation.

174 DaUa Ofer

What would the Mossad gain from such collaboration, at the end ofFebruary 1940? Given hindsight, and knowing that the Mossad wasshortly to find itself virtually helpless, collaboration with Storfer wouldseem to have been a sensible move. But this was not the way thingsseemed in February 1940. The Mossad had taken an option on a largeTurkish vessel, the "Watan," and had reached an agreement with Edel-stein whereby the funds held in Prague would be used to lease it. It washoped that some 3,000 passengers from the Protectorate and Kladovocould board this ship. In a telephone conversation Edelstein confirmedthat the Prague Palestine office had a free hand in this matter. Storferwas not in a position to interfere should the "Watan" proceed as planned.Considering all this, Yehieli had no incentive to enter into a dubiouscollaboration with Storfer.

But events took a different turn from the one anticipated by Yehieliand his friends. The option on the "Watan" was not as secure as they hadbelieved, the transfer of funds from Prague was delayed, and Storfer wasbelieved to have had a hand in it In the meantime, the Turkish govern-ment prohibited the transfer of ownership over Turkish vessels to for-eigners ostensibly because of the war and their own military needs. (Thismove may have been instigated by pressures from the British ForeignOffice following the voyage of the "SakariyaJ1 which was also a Turkishship.)

The loss of the "Watan" was a severe blow to the Mossad. They con-ceded that the plan had been ill-conceived from the outset, but were par-ticularly incensed at Storfer. What role did Storfer's alleged delayingtactics play in holding up the transfer of funds and the cancellation of thelease? Had the funds arrived in time and the deal closed, would it havebeen possible to effect the transfer of ownership? Storfer's tactics remindedYehieli of the meeting in Bucharest and of Storfer's attitudes at that time.Just how much did Storfer have to do with the cancellation of the "Watan"scheme? There was no clear cut answer to this question, but suspicionensued. The Mossad's opinion of Storfer, as expressed to the Joint duringthese very weeks, was naturally tainted by this affair. Thus, the Joint'sstipulation that Tzameret would have to countersign Storfer's expendi-tures was, in a sense, their answer to his part in the "Watan" affair—andin kind.

What we have described here is the failure of two Aliyah operations:one Storfer's and the other the Mossad's. In both cases, tactics and opera-tional procedures were of the utmost importance. Tactics depended on abroad set of considerations whose fundamental premise was the need topromote Aliyah, and that were related to Zionist concepts of Jewishmutual responsibility. But given the complex situation of the Jews in theReich, these considerations failed to appreciate the urgency of the matterand revealed a certain measure of inflexibility in adjusting to rapidly

Retcue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palatine 175

changing circumstances. Furthermore, both failures resulted in bittergrudges and a desire to settle accounts on either side.

Nor were all the misunderstandings and recriminations resolvedseveral months later, at another meeting between Storfer and Yehieli inMay 1940.34 This time Yehieli's position was weaker than it had been thepreceding February. It was Spring, and the Mossad ship had not yetsailed. In fact, the prospects for its imminent departure were extremelyslim. Reports from the Reich were becoming more and more alarming,and the messages to coordinate efforts with Storfer were coming fromJewish leaders. The American Zionist movement criticized the Mossadfor failing to do its job and wasting funds (the "Watan" affair). TheZionist leadership was growing increasingly hesitant towards illegal im-migration, and sometimes even hostile, and opponents to such immigra-tion drew support from these failures. Insufficient support was, of course,one of the causes of these failures to begin with. Even so, no collaborationbetween Storfer and the Mossad was in sight

The second meeting between Storfer and Yehieli, in May 1940, tookplace only a few days after fighting started on the western front. Storferoutlined his plan to extricate 3,500 Jews from the Reich (on board thefuture "Milos," the "Pacific," and the "Atlantic"), requesting aid and col-laboration, especially in organizing the landing operation. His conditionwas the release of funds held in Greece. The passenger list that was ofsuch great concern to the Mossad had been approved by the Reichs-vereinigung officials. Yehieli contended that the lists did not include1,000 Prague halutzim to whom the Mossad had promised passage back inJanuary of that year, nor did it include the Kladovo group. Storferreplied that the Prague contingent had refused to work with him andthat they had therefore been replaced with other passengers (namely,Mandler's Revisionists), while the Kladovo people were not "in his juris-diction." He did agree, however, that future lists would include thePrague group and that he would try to help the Kladovo people if hecould. From Yehieli's viewpoint, this amounted to rejection.35

What could have convinced Yehieli to work alongside Storfer? Storfersought open Mossad support primarily to bolster his position vis-a-visthe Joint Could the Mossad gain from extending such support? In May1940 it seemed not The Mossad preferred not to participate in Aliyahoperations in which the German authorities were directly involved, andStorfer was left to transport his emigrants without Mossad assistance.

THE FATE OF STORFER'S "THREE SHIPS"

Storfer's "Three Ships" succeeded in reaching the shores of Palestine. Inspite of enormous difficulties and frequent delays, the Reich refugees

176 Dalia Ofer

boarded the German Danube Company vessels in August and September1940, reaching the Rumanian port of Tulcea where the "Milos," "Pacific,"and "Atlantic" were awaiting them. The "Milos" brought 700 passengersto Palestine, the "Pacific"-1,000 and the "Atlantic"-1,800. Storfer sentunreliable reports to the Joint on the condition of these ships and hispreparations: the vessels were described as seaworthy passenger andcargo ships, but the emigrants found ill-equipped freighters and dis-organized crews. Tulcea is a small port on the Danube's estuary on theBlack Sea, and the sudden influx of 3,500 refugees had an immediateeffect on its demographic composition. Food, water, fuel, and shippingmaterial became scarce, leading to the development of a black market ineverything required for the voyage. This, in turn, increased the tensionbetween the emigrants and their leaders on the one hand, and Storferand his agents (his brother Joseph, and his brother-in-law, Goldner) onthe other. The passengers joined in the preparation efforts and the jobwas completed in three weeks. The "Milos" and the "Pacific" were betterships than the "Atlantic" and their complements better regimented. Eachof these two first vessels contained a socially cohesive group of youngsters:German He-chalutz members on the "Pacific" and Betar members fromthe Protectorate on the "Milos." The "Atlantic" —largest but least sea-worthy of the three ships—was also the most crowded and its complementlacked a sufficiently large, well-organized cadre of leaders. The "Atlantic"passengers wanted to move some of their number to a fourth ship thathad arrived in Tulcea in the meantime, the "Rosita," to ease the over-crowding and tensions, but Storfer refused. The emigrants then tried tocontact the Rumanian authorities, seeking their intervention on thegrounds that they, the Rumanians, bore part of the responsibility for therefugees' welfare according to international law. Storfer was furious,rightly fearing that the Rumanians might unexpectedly cancel the voyage.The "Atlantic" sailed before completing all the necessary preparations,with insufficient fuel and other provisions.

The sea voyage was not easy. Here, too, the "Atlantic" suffered most.Storfer did not keep his promise to maintain contact in case problemsshould arise; and he failed to provide the promised provisions en route.Were it not for the aid of the Jewish community in Athens the passengerswould not have been able to continue on their way from the Aegean toPalestine. The voyage had not been properly organized. Letters writtenby emigrants from Tulcea, Varna, and Athens,36 evidence given afterlanding in Palestine,37 and the report submitted by the Jewish communityin Athens,38 all bear witness to general negligence. It was only thanks tothe passengers' own resourcefulness, the calm weather, the assistancerendered by Jewish communities en route, and a great deal of luck thatthe voyage was completed safely. The British officer who sailed the"Atlantic" from Cyprus to Haifa after it was caught confirms the im-portance of the element of luck in this enterprise.39

Rescue of European Jewry and Illegal Immigration to Palatine 177

Nonetheless, all this must be viewed in the proper context All immi-grant ships were overcrowded, and all their voyages perilous; many ofthem suffered from short provisions and bad communications. The tragicend of these three ships' passengers exceeds the bounds of the presentstudy, and will therefore be related in brief: the British decided to deportthe refugees to Mauritius. They assembled on board the "Patria" —all thepassengers from the "Pacific," and the "Milos," and a few from the "At-lantic." The "Patria" was a French cargo vessel also caught by the British.The Jewish political leaders in Palestine failed in their efforts to have thedeportation order rescinded, whereupon the Haganah decided to disablethe "Patria" so as to prevent it from sailing to Mauritius. The operationwas coordinated with the He-chalutz leaders Erich Frank and HansRaubel. But the quantity of explosives required was overestimated; thevessel was old and rusted through, and started sinking rapidly shortlyafter the explosion, drowning 202 souls. It was a disaster. The survivorsreceived special permission to remain ashore in Palestine, but those ofthe "Atlantic" passengers who had not been on the " Patria" were deportedto Mauritius where they remained for the duration of the war.

These three ships were Storfer's last operation. Why? He did haveanother ship, the "Rosita," and started planning its voyage in March1941. The answer must therefore be sought in the change that occurred inGerman policy regarding emigration in general, and to Palestine inparticular. This was related to the "Final Solution" and the closer tiesestablished by the Germans with the Mufti of Jerusalem — Haj Aminel-Husseini. This issue, too, exceeds the scope of our present discussion.

CONCLUSION

Can we evaluate Storfer's operations both in historical perspective andby the yardsticks of his time? Looking back, he clearly did rescue 3,500Jews from the Nazis. The question of how he did it seems rather im-material nowadays. The crucial point to bear in mind is that Storfer didnot rescue these people by sacrificing any other group of would-be immi-grants. He is the object of harsh criticism today by people who workedwith him, under similar conditions. Their main criticism lies in his rela-tions with the Germans and what might be called his "style." To hiscritics, Storfer was a weak man, a coward and a sycophant, and his bar-gaining with the Nazis was a source of both anger and revulsion. But wemust ask ourselves how these critics could discern, in Storfer's mannerismsand his obstinate stand against the German authorities, either pride inbeing Jewish, or an attitude of servility and cowardice? How can onedistinguish between collaboration with the authorities—a necessity—andattempts at self-serving ingratiation? And at what stage do the dynamicsof working alongside the Germans tend to obscure the unequivocal reali-

178 Dalia Ofer

zation that one is dealing with the enemy? Who can determine the "bareminimum" of cooperation necessary? Did the protagonists at that timehave strict criteria for resolving these dilemma? They did not. Edelstein,Frank, and Avriel all felt that Storfer had exceeded the bounds, but theytoo, could only rely on their personal feelings. The accusations thatStorfer used to set up his lists of emigrants by standards that were notnecessarily Zionistic were not relevant. The claim that he abused hisauthority for personal gain was never proven. Storfer's ultimate fate wasthe same as that of those Jews who failed to leave the Reich in time. Itherefore believe that his rescue operations had best be evaluated, first,by what they accomplished, and secondly by his integrity in relation withother organizations dealing with Aliyah. Yet another way of looking at itis according to Storfer's own self-determined norms of behavior.

We have described Storfer's achievements and found them consider-able. What about the other elements—his integrity in relation to otherAliyah organizations? His attitude towards other Aliyah organizationswas scathing: he never let up on the shortcomings of, and constantlyreviled, other Aliyah operatives—Dr. Confino, the Mossad, and the Re-visionists—in his reports to the Joint, to the local community, and to theNazis. He fiercely attacked anyone else concerned with Aliyah. This wasexpressed in his reaction to the "Sakariya" affair or to Dr. Confino'sefforts after the "Iiber-tand" was caught (in the summer of 1940) and the"Salvador" was sunk (in December 1940). He virtually exulted over theMossad's failure with the Kladovo affair. He had harsh words for theGreek Assistance Committee in Athens that had helped his own ships—simply because the fact that his vessels had required help at all reflectedbadly on his own image. Thus he failed to appreciate that the Greekcommittee had performed an act of Jewish solidarity and "love of Israel."Storfer did not inquire after the fate of groups that had been held up enroute and needed assistance, such as the "Pencho" passengers.40

What were his own norms for judging himself? Storfer never thoughtof himself as a leader responsible for the Jewish community's welfare. Inhis letters he introduced himself as a businessman, stressing the fact thathe was an honest one. He took great pains to preserve his reputation andprevent slander against him. The available material does not revealwhether he drew any satisfaction or comfort from the fact that his diffi-culties and injured pride were incurred in the course of helping hisfellow man. He asked Lowenherz in hurt pride and astonishment: "Howdid I ever get mixed up in this company?"41 —i.e., the company of thoseleaders responsible for the fate of the Jewish community.

Storfer started out on his way as a public official in the capacity of abusinessman summoned by Lowenherz to participate in a specific mission,and he never ceased being a businessman. The task with which he wasentrusted did not increase his stature, and he, for his part, did not grow


with it He fully appreciated his increasing influence, but it did notapply equally to his public and moral responsibilities which remainedthose of an "executive agent."

Jews could still leave the Reich in 1940. Lowenherz believed that30,000 Jews could be extricated from Vienna (some to Palestine). Germandemands to speed up the emigration process and the early deportationsto Poland impressed the Reich's Jews with the urgent need to depart Butthe various organizations mentioned in this study did not consider il-legal immigration as a rescue operation of paramount importance. It wasbound up with political undercurrents, partisan interests, and war-in-duced financial and logistic difficulties.

Storfer operated under Nazi supervision; and the Mossad, operatingwithin the framework of both Zionist.and British policies, did not con-ceive of illegal immigration as a politics of rescue. Storfer and the Mossadwere motivated by different goals and had different backgrounds. Theresult was that when their paths crossed in 1940, before the "Final Solu-tion" became official German policy and while some of Europe's Jewscould still escape, they had neither the flexibility nor the farsightednessto work together.

HEBREW UNIVERSITY

NOTES

1. See U. Israeli, The German Reich and Palestine (Tel-Aviv, 1974), pp. 101-261(Hebrew); C. Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office (London-New York, 1978), Chapter 1.

2. Documents of the German Foreign Office, Series D, 1953, Vol. 5, pp. 333-336.2a. In December 1938, H. Schacht, the president of the German Central Bank,

proposed a plan for the emigration of German Jews. It was offered to G. Rublee,the American director of the Intergovernmental Committee. This committee wasestablished after the Evian conference, to help German refugees to resettle.Schacht proposed that a fourth of German Jewish capital that would remain afterdeduction of all taxation would be placed in a giant trust. From this trust, emi-grating Jews could credit 10,000 marks per person to re-establish themselves innew places. The money would be repaid to Germany by international corpora-tions (namely International Jewry, in German terminology), in foreign exchange.In this way, claimed Schacht, the emigration of poor Jews would be possible.Although the proposal was opposed strongly by Jewish organizations and Westerngovernments, it was decided not lo reject il immediately. Rublee went to Berlinto discuss the proposals and offer amendments. In January 1939 H. Wolthat—aforeign exchange expert from the Foreign Office—replaced Schacht in the talks(the Foreign Office was against the proposals). For further elaboration, seeH.L. Feingold's The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holo-caust, 1938-1945 (New Jersey, 1970), pp. 49-64.

180 Dalia Ofer

3. See detailed discussion in D. Ofer, Illegal Immigration to Palestine, 1939-1942,PhD dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1981, pp. 298-338(Hebrew).

4. See Bernard Wasserslein, Britain and the Jews of Europe (London, 1979),Chapter 3.

5. Letter from Pino Ginsburg, September 1939; R. Bondi, Edelstein AgainstTime (Tel-Aviv, 1981), p. 209 (Hebrew).

6. Pino Ginsburg, Oral Testimony 1979, Oral History Department, Instituteof Contemporary Jewry: Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Y. Braginsky, A NationMoving Ashore (Tel-Aviv, 1979), elaborated in D. Ofer, op. til., pp. 219a-220.

7. B. Wasserstein, op. ciL, p. 49.8. Central Archives of the History of the Jewish People —the Life of Slorfer

— AW/665 (Jerusalem, Vienna Archives) —Central Archives.9. Ibid, Mitteilung, 40, AW/2515, 30.4.1940.10. Yad Vashem Archives, Lowenherz Report, 0-3/015, p. 9.11. Hagana Archive—Tel-Aviv, 14/417 Kornfeld Report on Milos, November

1940.12. E. Avriel, Open the Gates (Tel-Aviv, 1979) (Hebrew); Braginsky, op. ciL;

Hagana Archives 14/417, the Braun Report, November 1940, and the KornfeldReport, November 1940, and Central Archives AW/2515 Avriel to Storfer.

13. Central Archives, AW/2515, 15.6.40 and 19.7.40.14. Ibid., The Storfer Report, 28.4.40. The "Kladovo group" —a name given lo

1200 emigrants—got stranded in the small harbor of Kladovo on the YugoslavDanube River. Of these, 700 left Vienna in haste in October 1939, under thethreat of the first expulsion lo Lublin. On their way, more people joined hopingto reach Palestine by illegal voyage. This transport was organized by EhudAvriel —He-chalutz leader in Vienna —and the "Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet" people inGeneva. The Mossad had to provide a sea boat in Rumania (Tulcea or Constanza)to proceed lo Palestine, but it failed. In December 1940 the traffic on the DanubeRiver stopped due lo freezing conditions. The people entered the small Kladovoharbor for ihe Winter. In the Spring, ihey hoped to continue the voyage. For avariely of reasons the Mossad did not succeed in getting the people out. Only 206children received Youth Aliyah certificates and immigrated lo Palestine by land,in March 1941. The rest of the people were murdered by the Germans during1941, after the occupation of Yugoslavia. The full story of this group has not yetbeen written. For further elaboration on the efforts to immigrating the people,see D. Ofer, op. cit, pp. 89-144.

15. Yad Vashem Archives, Lowenherz Report, p. 21.16. Central Archives, AW/2515, Mitteilung 70, 6.5.40; and Mitleilung 56,

28.4.40; Lowenherz Report, p. 19.17. Central Archives, AW/2515, Mitteilung 18, 15.6.40 and Report 12.6.40.18. Yad Vashem Archives, TR-3/1147, March 1941, conversation with Eich-

mann and community leaders.19. Central Archives, AW/2515, tellers dated August 11 and 28, 1940, from

Storfer lo the Jewish Emigration Center; letter lo Mr. Schulz of August 11, 1940, areport from Prague dated 12.9.40, and a letter lo the Emigration Center dated17.9.40.


20. In addition to material in the Vienna Archives this is supported by cor-respondence with the German Foreign Office. Yad Vashem Archives JM/3140,from Zimke, representative of the German Foreign Office in Prague, to Berlin,19.6.40, and Slorfer's office to the Consul General in Bratislava, 13.7.40.

21. Central Archives, AW/2515, Milleilung 22, 2.12.39; and VertraulicherAktion Noliz, 25.12.39.

22. Ibid., letters 3.2.40, and 7.2.40.23. Yad Vashem Archives, Lowenherz Report.24. Central Archives, AW/2515, 4.3.40. Summary Report to the Foreign Cur-

rency Department.25. Ibid., AW/2515, 22.3.40, Slorfer to L6wenherz, 23.3.40, Milteilung 45; and

31.3.40, Milleilung 46 (Translated from German by D. Ofer).

26. P R Q / F O 3 7 1 / 1 2 5 8 3 .6857

27. For more details, see D. Ofer, op. at., pp. 239-249.28. Hagana Archives, testimony of Moshe Agami.29. Ibid., Yehieli Report, 14/153.30. The "Grand Plan" called for transporting 10,000 Jews from Germany's

"Hemden" port on board German vessels, and was to have been executed in thefall of 1939. On von HSffner and his position, see Ginsburg testimony, op. ciL, andGerman Foreign Office, Yad Vashem Archives JM/3140, von Haffner to Lishka,7.12.39.

31. The "Sakariya" and "Hilda" refugees.32. Hagana Archives 14/153, Yehieli Report, p. 20.33. Ibid., pp. 26-27.34. Ibid., p. 39.35. Ibid, pp. 40-41.36. Central Archives, AW/2515 letters from Tulcea, 18.9.40 signed H.; 19.9.40

no signature; 21.9.40 signed Freitz; 24.9.40 signed Hanzi, Erich Frank from Varnaon board the Milos 11.10.40; Ernst Brown on board the Pacific 18.10.40 to theJewish community in Athens, and to the Pacific's captain.

37. Hagana Archives 14/417. 16.10.40; 18.10.40.38. Joint Archives 4-19, and Central Archives AW/2515 telegrams from the

Joint 30.10.40, 3.11.40.39. PRO 371/29160.40. "Pencho" was an immigrants' ship organized by the Revisionists that sailed

(after many delays) in March 1940. The voyage was not properly organized andafter a hazardous journey the "Pencho" finally struck a reef and sank off anAegean island on the eve of Yom Kippur. The passengers and crew were rescuedby the Italian Navy and transported, first to Rhodes and later to southern Italy.For additional details see D. Ofer, op. cit., pp. 187-194.

41. Central Archives, AW/2515, letter 9.11.40.