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THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS APPEALS TRIBUNAL
(PPDA APPEALS TRIBUNAL)
APPLICATION N0. 2 OF 2014
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND AKAABA
ENTERPRISES LTD FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
APPLICANT: M/S AKAABA ENTERPRISES LTD
RESPONDENT: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC
ASSETS AUTHORITY
2
(Before: OLIVE ZAALE OTETE- CHAIRPERSON, MOSES JURUA ADRIKO- MEMBER,
DAVID KABATERAINE-MEMBER and ARCHITECT JOEL KATEREGGA, MEMBER)
DECISION OF THE PPDA APPEALS TRIBUNAL
1.0 BACKGROUND/FACTS
1.1 M/S Akaaba Enterprises Ltd (the Applicant) participated in Procurement of
Batch A, Community Access Roads under the Community Agricultural
Infrastructure Improvement Programme- Project 3 (CAIIP-3). The Project
was initiated by the Ministry of Local Government which also advertised
the procurement.The Applicant submitted a bid to Kole District Local
Government on the 3rd April 2013.
1.2 In a letter addressed to Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs)dated 7 th
October 2013, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government (PS
MLG) informed the CAOs that a number of forgeries had been detected on
a number of construction firms that had bided for the rehabilitation under
CAIIP-3. In this letter, the CAOs were directed to further examine the
forgery issues and proceed with submissions to PPDA for suspension of the
affected firms.
1.3 On the 8th November 2013, the Authority received a letter from Oyam
District Local Government recommending a number of firms to be
blacklisted. Realising that the other districts that participated in CAIIP-3 had
not sent the forgeries as directed by the PS MLG, on 25th November 2013,
the Authority wrote to MLG and advised it to request all the affected Local
Governments to submit all the bids and relevant documents to MLG which
would then handover the documents to the Authority. MLG was further
3
advised to submit to the Authority a detailed report and relevant
documents on the forgeries including Contracts Committee minutes.
1.4 On the 7th February 2014, the Authority received a letter from MLG dated
3rd February 2014 forwarding copies of the bid documents of each affected
firm and all relevant documents on the matter for the Authority’s action.
The list indicated forgeries in 21 District Local Governments including Kole
District Local Government.
1.5 The Applicant in this case (Akaaba Enterprises Ltd) was one of the firms
listed as having forged two (2) certificates of completion which had been
attached in their bid to Kole District Local Government.
1.6 The Authority opened a case file for investigations into these forgeries. The
Authority by letter dated 29th July 2014, wrote to the Applicant informing it
of the suspension proceedings and requested the Applicant to file a
defence and also attend a hearing. By letter dated 15th August 2014, the
Applicant’s Counsel submitted a defence to the Authority, which contained
preliminary objections. The preliminary objections raised by the Applicant
were:
1. The recommendation to suspend Akaaba Enterprises Ltd was brought by
a wrong party contrary to regulation 349(1) of the PPDA Regulations S.I N0.
70 of 2003
2. The action of probing into the bid is time barred as the validity of the bid
document submitted by Akaaba Enterprises Ltd to Kole District Local
Government had expired by the time of the purported recommendation by
the Ministry of Local Government.
4
1.7 The Authority in its letter dated 3rd September 2014, suspended the
Applicant for three (3) years. The Applicant was not satisfied with the
decision of the Authority, hence this application for review of the decision
of the Authority (the Applicant refers to it as an appeal).
2.0 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION DATED 3RD
SEPTEMBER 2014.
By letter dated 16th September 2014 the Applicant now seeks to have the
decision of the Authority reviewed on the following grounds:
1. The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored and or failed to
rule on the preliminary objections on points of law raised by the
Applicant therein arriving at a wrong conclusion hence occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.
2. The Authority erred in law and fact when it made its decision without
conducting a hearing thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
3. The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored procedure in the
PPDA Act and Regulations 2003 which was brought to its attention by
the Applicant, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
4. The Authority erred in law and fact when it also suspended Moses
KaKungulu, Jesca Kyomugisha, Joy Kyamwine, Arthur Abaliwano and
Allan Kakungulu from participating in public procurement for 3 years.
5. The Authority erred in law and fact when it passed a manifestly
harsh, arbitral and excessive sentence of suspension from public
procurement of three (3) years thereby occasioning a miscarriage of
justice.
5
2.1 The Application was received by the Tribunal on 16th September 2013. On
17thSeptember 2014 and 23rd September 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the
Authority requesting the Authority to provide:
1. detailed background of this matter;
2. record of proceedings;
3. the report containing the decision of the Authority and a letter of
communication between the Authority, the Ministry of Local
Government and relevant procuring and disposing entities.
2.2 By letter dated 17th September 2014, the Tribunal directed both Parties
to file with the Tribunal written submissions and any rejoinder to the
submissions. This was done and the submissions were served on the
respective parties.
3.0 DISPOSAL OF APPLICATION
In disposing of the application for review, the Tribunal analysed the
following documents:
1. Appeal against PPDA Decision to suspend Akaaba Enterprises Ltd
from participating in public procurement dated 16th September 2014
and the correspondences between the Applicant and the Authority
attached to the application as Annexes;
2. Responses and submissions to the Applicant’s application by PPDA
dated 22nd September 2014 and 25th September 2014 and Annexes
attached to the responses.
3. The Applicant’s written submissions and submissions in rejoinder;
6
3.1 The Tribunal summoned both parties for a hearing on 26th September 2014.
The Applicant was represented by Mr. Mugisa Raymond of Wagabaza and
Company Advocates. One of the Applicant’s directors, Mr. Arthur
Abaliwano attended the hearing. The Authority was represented by Ms.
Patricia Asiimwe and Mr. Uthman Segawa.
3.2 In the written submissions and at the hearing, Counsel for the Applicant
reiterated the grounds of appeal as set out in the Application to the
Tribunal.
Counsel argued grounds 1 and 3, reproduced below, together.
3.3 Ground One (1): The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored and
or failed to rule on the preliminary objections on points of law raised by
the Applicant therein arriving at a wrong conclusion hence occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.
3.4 Ground three (3): The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored
procedure in the PPDA Act and Regulations 2003 which was brought to its
attention by the Applicant, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
3.5 The crux of the Applicant’s submission on these grounds is that the
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government had no locus to
recommend to the Authority the suspension of the Applicant. The said
recommendation was submitted to the Respondent by the PS MLG instead
of the Contracts Committee of Kole District Local Government, contrary to
regulation 349(1) of the PPDA Regulations S.I 70 of 2003 (now repealed)
which reads as follows:
“A recommendation to suspend a provider shall be submitted to the
authority in writing by a contracts committee”
7
Counsel submitted that the above regulation, (though it is now repealed)
should be applicable because the bid document in question was submitted
on 3rd April 2013 before the coming into force of the PPDA Regulations S.I 8
of 2014, which came into force on the 3rd March 2014.
The Applicant opined that a new law becomes enforceable on the day of
commencement; that there is no such intention expressed in the PPDA
Regulations 2014 to the effect that they will apply retrospectively or to
transactions that were executed prior to its commencement. Hence the
practice is to apply the law of the time, therein the PPDA Regulations 2003.
He relied on the case of Attorney General Vs Dr. James Rwanyarare & ors
Constitutional Appeal No.2 of 2003, and Tom Butime Vs Muhumuza David
& Anor E.P.A No.11/2011,to support his argument. In the latter case, it
was held that “the court will not ascribe retrospective force to new laws
affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication….”
In conclusion of the issue of the recommendation, Counsel further
submitted that the PS MLG is neither a contracts committee nor a member
of the same. Therefore it had no locus to recommend suspension of the
Applicant. The right party which ought to have made the said
recommendation to the Authority for the suspension of the Applicant was
the Contracts Committee of Kole District Local Government. The Applicant
relied on the case of Clear Channel Independent Vs PPDA HCMA No 380 of
2008, where it was held that “if a statute or regulations binding on a
domestic tribunal prescribe the procedure to be followed, that procedure
must be observed”. It was further held that non-compliance with the PPDA
Act and Regulations amounts to an illegality.
8
3.6 The Applicant further submitted in the alternative, that the Authority based
its decision to suspend the applicant on a bid document that had expired by
the time of the said recommendation. In support of his argument, he relied
on regulation 49(1) of the Local Governments (PPDA) Regulations S.I
39/2006 which states that “Bid documents shall state the period within
which the bid is to remain valid”
Regulation 49(2)“Bid validity period shall be calculated from the closing
date of the bid submission and shall remain in force until the close of
business on the last day of the validity period”
The Applicant submitted that in this case, bid submission was on 3rd April
2013 with a bid validity period of 120 days; that the bid document expired
on 1s t August 2013. Thereafter the bid document was rendered non-
existent and any acts such as the recommendation of 3rd February 2014
that were done after the bid document had expired on 3rd July 2013 were
null and void.
3.7 In response to the Applicant’s submissions on the issue of the
recommendation having been submitted to the Authority by a wrong party,
Counsel for the Authority, in written submissions and also at the hearing
argued that the Authority, after receiving information on the forgeries from
the PS MLG in a letter dated 3rd February 2014, initiated its own
investigations on the 29th July 2014, using its powers under section 8 and 94
of the amended PPDA Act. She submitted that the date when investigations
commence i.e. 29th July 2014, was after the commencement of the PPDA
amendment Act, and therefore the actions of the Authority were in
accordance with the amended PPDA Act.
9
3.8 On the issue of retrospective application of section 94 of the PPDA Act as
amended, Counsel relied on the case of Philips V Eyre (1870) ILR 6 QB 1
which laid down a general principle to the effect that “the Court will not
ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights unless by express
words or necessary implications that such was the intention of the
Legislature”. She submitted that though the issue of retrospective
application is not relevant in this case, the Applicant’s rights were not
affected in any way since the suspension was premised on an investigation
by the Authority.
3.9 In rejoinder to the Authority’s response, the Applicant insisted that in the
letter suspending the Applicant, the Authority made no mention of its
investigations as the cause of the suspension, but instead it relied on the
recommendation of the PS MLG. Counsel further reiterated that under
section 3 of the PPDA Act which defines a procuring and disposing entity, it
is the Chief Administrative Officer who should have recommended to the
Authority and not the PS MLG.
3.10 Resolution of Grounds one (1) and (3)
The Tribunal carefully studied the letter written by the Permanent
Secretary Ministry of Local Government dated 3rd February 2014 addressed
to the Authority. It is this letter which both parties are referring to as a
“recommendation to suspend the Applicant”. The relevant extract to the
letter reads as follows:
“Following your advice (the Authority’s), the Ministry tasked all the
concerned Local Governments to submit all the bids and relevant
documents.
10
The purpose of this communication is therefore, to forward to you a copy
of the bid document of each affected firm as in Annex 1 and all the
relevant documents on the matter (Annex II) for your action”
At the hearing, the Tribunal asked both Counsel to show the Tribunal the
part of the letter which recommends suspension of the Applicant. Counsel
for the Applicant agreed that the letter has no words recommending the
suspension of the Applicant; however it is the same letter which the
Authority relies on to suspend the Applicant. Counsel for the Authority
responded that the letter was a recommendation for the Authority to take
action.
The Tribunal observed that the Authority wrongly referred to the said letter
in its communication to the Applicant as a “recommendation”. However,
the Tribunal finds that the letter in issue does not anywhere recommend
the suspension of the firms listed in Annex I which include the Applicant;
instead the letter submits the list of firms that allegedly forged documents
to the Authority “for your action”.
Having found that the letter complained of is not a recommendation, the
Tribunal did not find it helpful to respond, in a detailed manner, to the
Applicant’s submissions in respect to the recommendation being filed by a
wrong party contrary to regulation 349(1) of the PPDA Regulations and the
whole issue concerning retrospective application of the amended PPDA Act
and Regulations.
3.11 The Tribunal is in agreement with the submission of the Authority that it
commenced its own investigations on the basis of the said letter, which
investigations culminated in the suspension of the Applicant. From the
11
record, the Authority commences investigations by a letter dated 29th July
2014 addressed to the Applicant whereby the Authority is informing the
Applicant of the suspension proceedings and asking the Applicant to make
its defence.
3.12 By 29th July 2014 when the Authority commenced suspension proceedings,
the amended PPDA Act (section 94) which empowers the Authority to
initiate its own investigations in respect to suspension of providers was in
force.
3.13 The Tribunal therefore finds that the Authority has power under sections 8
and 94 of the PPDA Act to initiate its own investigations, which from the
evidence, it did. The issue of ‘recommendation of suspension by a wrong
party’ is therefore irrelevant in this case because an investigation was
carried out by the Authority on which its decision to suspend the Applicant
was premised.
In any case the Tribunal found that the rights of the Applicant were not in
any way prejudiced by the investigations of the Authority.
3.14 With respect to the alternative submission by the Applicant that the bid
had expired, and therefore, the action of probing the bid and
recommending suspension was null and void, the Tribunal agrees with the
submission of the Authority that the alleged forged documents were
submitted as a bid by the Applicant while the bids were still valid.
3.15 While the Tribunal is in agreement with the Applicant that the bid had
expired by the time of the probe, the Tribunal disagrees with the Applicant
that the alleged forged certificate should therefore not have been probed
‘since there was no bid’. The Tribunal notes that in procurement,
12
certificates of completion are usually attached to bids by providers to show
evidence of experience in similar works, which in the instant case are
allegedly forged. The certificate does not therefore expire with a bid as
submitted by the Applicant. There is no bar to a bidder from using
certificates of completion for other bids in the future.
3.16 According to the evidence on record, the Authority received confirmation
from Mubende and Bukwo districts that the certificates of completion
submitted by the Applicant were forged. These certificates were given to
the Applicant by the Authority well before the scheduled hearing. The
Applicant at the hearing before the Authority and in their defence had
ample opportunity to rebut the allegations but were unable to credibly
deny the allegations. Similarly at the Tribunal hearing, the Applicant did not
present credible evidence to rebut the findings in relation to the forgeries.
3.17 In Motorcentre East Africa Ltd versus PPDA Miscellaneous Cause 90 of
2010, a matter where the Court dealt at length with the procedure for
suspension of a bidder and observed at page 14 that;
“Although the applicant accuses the respondent of not adequately
investigating the issue of forgery, even in the instant application the
applicant has not made any attempt to cast doubt on the finding of the
respondent that the Manufacturer’s Authorization which was submitted
during the bidding process was forged. Clearly this was the reason for its
suspension. It was not enough for the applicant to argue that it was not
the author of the document in issue or that it was not aware that the
document was illegitimate and submitted it in good faith. The fact
remains that it was a forged document. It is immaterial that other
13
company had been getting similar Authorizations from the same source or
that the applicant had used similar documents in other procurements.
Two wrongs do not make a right. If indeed the document was originated
by the applicant’s agent as it alleges, the acts of the agent are binding on
it as the principal. The fraud of its agent is imputed on the applicant. As
learned counsel has correctly observed, a court of law cannot sanction
what is illegal and an illegality once brought to the attention of court
overrides all questions of pleading. The reason for the law’s refusal to
give effect to such transactions is commonly put in the Latin Maxim ex
turpicausa non orituractio(‘no claim arises from a base cause’). “
3.18 The Tribunal agrees with the principle laid down by in the above case and a
number of cases that where a court discovers an illegality, the court must
address the illegality, irrespective of all questions of pleading (Makula
International Ltd V. His Emminence Cardinal Nsubuga and Anor H.C.B
1982).The fraud having been brought to its attention by the PS MLG, the
Authority, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal was in order to investigate the
alleged fraud, even though the bid to which the alleged forged certificates
were attached had expired.
Grounds One (1) and three (3) fail.
3.19 Ground two (2): The Authority erred in law and fact when it made its
decision without conducting a hearing thereby occasioning a miscarriage
of justice.
3.20 In both the written submissions and at the hearing, the Applicant submitted
that the Authority did not accord the Applicant a hearing. Counsel did not
14
dispute that the Authority by its letter dated 29th July 2014, invited the
Applicant to submit its defence and to attend a hearing on 8th August 2014.
Counsel did not also dispute that the Authority by its letter dated 8 th August
2014 forwarded documents to the Applicant to enable preparation of a
defence and in the same letter asked the Applicant to file a defence by 15th
August 2014.
3.21 The Applicant avers that after it submitted its defence to the Authority on
the 15th August 2014, it did not hear from the Authority, but only received a
letter of suspension. The Applicant submits that the denial of an
opportunity to present its case and to interface with witnesses who alleged
that it had forged documents, was an injustice, because they were denied
the right to be heard. The Applicant relied on the case of Hon. Justice Anup
Singh Choudry V. Attorney General Civil Appeal N0. 0091 of 2012.He
further submitted that this case was all fours with the present matter
before the Tribunal.
3.22 Counsel for the Authority in rebuttal submitted that the Authority notified
the Applicant of the suspension proceedings and gave it an opportunity to
prepare its defence. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant attended
a hearing on the 8th August 2015 and also submitted its defence to the
Authority on 15th August 2014. Quoting the Minutes of the hearing thus:
“the Provider’s representative agreed that he would file a defence for his
client before or on 15th August 2014.
MAC informed both parties that the Authority’s decision would be issued
within the statutory period”,
15
Counsel for the Authority submitted that it was implied from the
information that the decision would be issued within the statutory period
and that no further hearing was necessary. Counsel for the Authority
further submitted that Counsel for the Applicant at that stage had an
opportunity to request for a further hearing which it did not exercise.
3.24 Resolution of ground two (2)
The Tribunal has seen evidence on record pointing to the following
chronology of events:
1) On 29 September 2014, the Authority writes to the Applicant notifying it
of the suspension proceedings; asking it to submit a defence by 4 th
August 2014 and attend a hearing on 8th August 2014;
2) On 1s t August 2014, the Applicant writes to the Authority asking for
more time to prepare its defence;
3) On 6thAugust 2014, the Applicant writes to the Authority asking for
documents to enable it prepare its defence. These documents include
the recommendation from the Ministry of Local Government to suspend
the Applicant and the bid document in which the alleged completion
certificates arose from;
4) On the 8th August 2014, a hearing takes place and it is attended by the
Applicant’s Counsel;
5) On 8th August 2014, the Authority writes to the Applicant submitting the
required documents and asks the Applicant to submit its defence by 15th
August 2014;
6) On 15th August 2014, the Applicant submitted its defence to the
Authority.
16
3.25 From the evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was given an
opportunity to present its defence. Indeed in its defence, the Tribunal notes
that the Applicant denies in toto the forgery allegations raised against it.
The Tribunal agrees with the Authority that if Counsel for the Applicant had
wished for a further hearing after the submission of its Client’s defence, he
should have clearly stated at the meeting that he wished for a further
hearing. The Minutes do not show that he raised this issue at the meeting.
At the hearing, Counsel for the Applicant did not controvert the fact that
the Applicant’s Counsel did not clearly ask for a further hearing at the
meeting. Instead Counsel told the Tribunal that they ‘expected’ that the
Authority would call a further hearing.
3.26 The Tribunals finds that there was a hearing to the extent that the
Applicant was given the opportunity to present its defence, and did not
clearly ask for a further hearing after presentation of the defence.
3.27 With regard to the Authority of Anup Singh (Supra) cited by Counsel for the
Applicant theTribunal finds that this case is distinguishable from the facts as
presented. That case dealt with proceedings against a judicial officer under
section 11 of the Judicial Service Act Cap 14 by the Judicial Service
Commissionwhich provides an elaborate procedure for the discipline and
removal of judicial officers. Section 11 is reproduced for ease of reference:
“11. Rules of natural justice.
In dealing with matters of discipline, and removal of a judicial officer, the
Commission shall observe the rules of natural justice; and, in particular,
the
17
commission shall ensure that an officer against whom disciplinary or
removal proceedings are being taken is—
a) informed about the particulars of the case against him or her;
(b) given the right to defend himself or herself and present his or her case
at the meeting of the commission or at any inquiry set up by the
commission for the purpose;
(c) where practicable, given the right to engage an advocate of his or her
own choice; and
(d) told the reasons for the decision of the commission.”
3.28 In the case of Prime contractors Limited versus Inspector General of
Government and Uganda National Roads Authority (Misc. Cause no. 301
of 2013)on the right to a fair hearing, The Hon. Justice Stephen Musota in
considering whether a written statement can suffice as a fair hearing stated
that:
“After considering the submissions by all learned counsel on this issue, I
am satisfied that the applicant was given a right to he heard when he
recorded statements and addressed the IGG over all allegations against
the applicant in his correspondence. In fact the applicant was exonerated
on bribery allegations against UNRA. The right to be heard does not
necessarily mean oral hearing. Oral hearing is not mandatory once one is
afforded an opportunity to defend oneself and where a written statement
of defence is made, it is sufficient; Onyait David Stephen VsBusia District
Local Government &Busia Town Council Misc Application No. 34 of 2006
per Muhanguzi J.
18
In the instant case, the 1st respondent summoned Wilson Kashaya the
Managing Director of the applicant to attend before Inspectorate officer
to give evidence in the inquiry. The summons was not private as alleged in
paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support, but official. It was issued under S.
26(1) of the IGG Act. Mr. Wilson Kashaya made a statement wherein he
denied that he bribed the officials of the 2nd respondent. Therefore the
complaint was investigated and the applicant participated in the
investigation by recording a statement. He was accorded a fair hearing.”
3.29 From the evidence on the record and chronology of events cited above the
Tribunal finds that the Applicant was given a fair hearing.
Ground 2 fails.
3.30 Ground four (4): The Authority erred in law and fact when it also
suspended Moses KaKungulu, Jesca Kyomugisha, Joy Kyamwine, Arthur
Abaliwano and Allan Kakungulu from participating in public procurement
for 3 years.
3.31 Counsel for the Applicant noted that the Authority in its response on this
ground states that the Authority never stated that it suspended the
directors of the Applicant; rather it is the Applicant which had been
suspended. Counsel submitted that he was satisfied with the Authority’s
response.
The Tribunal thus made no finding on this ground.
3.32 Ground five (5): The Authority erred in law and fact when it passed a
manifestly harsh, arbitral and excessive sentence of suspension from
public procurement of three (3) years thereby occasioning a miscarriage of
justice.
19
3.33 The Applicant submitted that a suspension of three years is harsh and
excessive given that it was the very first time that the Applicant was
accused of any wrong doing.
3.34 In its response, Counsel for the Authority submitted that section 94 of the
PPDA Act empowers the Authority to suspend a provider for a period
determined by the Authority. She further submitted that the Board of
Directors of the Authority approved a Procedure Manual of the
Management Advisory Committee (MAC Manual) which lays down criteria
for imposing punishment.
Counsel for the Authority submitted that the Authority in prescribing the
suspension period for the Applicant was guided by the MAC Manual which
provides in interalia that where a provider makes a first breach of the law
but it is deemed to be serious, although there is no financial loss to the
Government, the maximum period of suspension shall be three (3) years.
Since it was established that the provider had uttered two false documents,
a maximum period of three years was given which is not manifestly harsh,
arbitral or excessive for the provider. The sentence was in accordance with
the said manual.
3.35 Resolution of ground five (5)
In resolving this ground, the Tribunal considered the submissions of the
Counsel for the Authority and the provisions of section 94 of the Act and
paragraph 5.7 “Period of suspension” of the MAC Manual. The Tribunal
notes that the Authority is empowered by law to determine the period of
suspension of a provider. The Authority in a document approved by its
Board of Directors has laid down guidelines on period of suspension.
20
3.36 In the eyes of the Tribunal, in order to arrive at an appropriate period of
suspension, all the Authority has to do is to match the facts of the case in
issue to the criteria laid down in the MAC Manual, and nowhere else.
3.37 In the instant case, the Authority had found that the Applicant submitted
two forged certificates. It appears to the Tribunal that the Applicant, in its
defence submitted to the Authority put more effort on arguing matters of
procedure rather than the substantive accusation of forgery. At the
hearing, the Tribunal observed the same trend.
3.38 The Tribunal agrees with the Authority that the uttering of false documents
is completely at variance with the basic principles and ethics of public
procurement and disposal.
3.39 The Tribunal is satisfied that having forged two completion certificates, and
having failed to rebut the forgery allegations, the suspension of three years
in accordance with paragraph 5.7 (b) of the MAC Manual is appropriate.
Ground five (5) also fails.
4.0 DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
1. The Tribunal affirms the decision of the Authority to suspend the
Applicant from participating in public procurement for a period of three
years.
2. Pursuant to section 91K (1) (d) of the Act, the Tribunal awards costs of
this application to the Authority amounting to two million shillings
(2,000,000=).
Dated at Kampala this 29th Day of September 2014.
21
SIGNED by ] ………………………………….
OLIVE ZAALE OTETE ] CHAIRPERSON
SIGNED by ] …………………………………
MOSES JURUA ADRIKO ] MEMBER
SIGNED by ] …………………………………
DAVID KABATERAINE ] MEMBER
SIGNED by ] ………………………………….
JOEL KATEREGGA] ] MEMBER