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1 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS APPEALS TRIBUNAL (PPDA APPEALS TRIBUNAL) APPLICATION N0. 2 OF 2014 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND AKAABA ENTERPRISES LTD FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT APPLICANT: M/S AKAABA ENTERPRISES LTD RESPONDENT: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS AUTHORITY

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND … · relied on the case of Clear Channel Independent Vs PPDA HCMA No 380 of 2008, where it was held that ^if a statute or regulations

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Page 1: THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND … · relied on the case of Clear Channel Independent Vs PPDA HCMA No 380 of 2008, where it was held that ^if a statute or regulations

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THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS APPEALS TRIBUNAL

(PPDA APPEALS TRIBUNAL)

APPLICATION N0. 2 OF 2014

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC ASSETS AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND AKAABA

ENTERPRISES LTD FROM PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

APPLICANT: M/S AKAABA ENTERPRISES LTD

RESPONDENT: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC

ASSETS AUTHORITY

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(Before: OLIVE ZAALE OTETE- CHAIRPERSON, MOSES JURUA ADRIKO- MEMBER,

DAVID KABATERAINE-MEMBER and ARCHITECT JOEL KATEREGGA, MEMBER)

DECISION OF THE PPDA APPEALS TRIBUNAL

1.0 BACKGROUND/FACTS

1.1 M/S Akaaba Enterprises Ltd (the Applicant) participated in Procurement of

Batch A, Community Access Roads under the Community Agricultural

Infrastructure Improvement Programme- Project 3 (CAIIP-3). The Project

was initiated by the Ministry of Local Government which also advertised

the procurement.The Applicant submitted a bid to Kole District Local

Government on the 3rd April 2013.

1.2 In a letter addressed to Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs)dated 7 th

October 2013, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government (PS

MLG) informed the CAOs that a number of forgeries had been detected on

a number of construction firms that had bided for the rehabilitation under

CAIIP-3. In this letter, the CAOs were directed to further examine the

forgery issues and proceed with submissions to PPDA for suspension of the

affected firms.

1.3 On the 8th November 2013, the Authority received a letter from Oyam

District Local Government recommending a number of firms to be

blacklisted. Realising that the other districts that participated in CAIIP-3 had

not sent the forgeries as directed by the PS MLG, on 25th November 2013,

the Authority wrote to MLG and advised it to request all the affected Local

Governments to submit all the bids and relevant documents to MLG which

would then handover the documents to the Authority. MLG was further

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advised to submit to the Authority a detailed report and relevant

documents on the forgeries including Contracts Committee minutes.

1.4 On the 7th February 2014, the Authority received a letter from MLG dated

3rd February 2014 forwarding copies of the bid documents of each affected

firm and all relevant documents on the matter for the Authority’s action.

The list indicated forgeries in 21 District Local Governments including Kole

District Local Government.

1.5 The Applicant in this case (Akaaba Enterprises Ltd) was one of the firms

listed as having forged two (2) certificates of completion which had been

attached in their bid to Kole District Local Government.

1.6 The Authority opened a case file for investigations into these forgeries. The

Authority by letter dated 29th July 2014, wrote to the Applicant informing it

of the suspension proceedings and requested the Applicant to file a

defence and also attend a hearing. By letter dated 15th August 2014, the

Applicant’s Counsel submitted a defence to the Authority, which contained

preliminary objections. The preliminary objections raised by the Applicant

were:

1. The recommendation to suspend Akaaba Enterprises Ltd was brought by

a wrong party contrary to regulation 349(1) of the PPDA Regulations S.I N0.

70 of 2003

2. The action of probing into the bid is time barred as the validity of the bid

document submitted by Akaaba Enterprises Ltd to Kole District Local

Government had expired by the time of the purported recommendation by

the Ministry of Local Government.

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1.7 The Authority in its letter dated 3rd September 2014, suspended the

Applicant for three (3) years. The Applicant was not satisfied with the

decision of the Authority, hence this application for review of the decision

of the Authority (the Applicant refers to it as an appeal).

2.0 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION DATED 3RD

SEPTEMBER 2014.

By letter dated 16th September 2014 the Applicant now seeks to have the

decision of the Authority reviewed on the following grounds:

1. The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored and or failed to

rule on the preliminary objections on points of law raised by the

Applicant therein arriving at a wrong conclusion hence occasioning a

miscarriage of justice.

2. The Authority erred in law and fact when it made its decision without

conducting a hearing thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.

3. The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored procedure in the

PPDA Act and Regulations 2003 which was brought to its attention by

the Applicant, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

4. The Authority erred in law and fact when it also suspended Moses

KaKungulu, Jesca Kyomugisha, Joy Kyamwine, Arthur Abaliwano and

Allan Kakungulu from participating in public procurement for 3 years.

5. The Authority erred in law and fact when it passed a manifestly

harsh, arbitral and excessive sentence of suspension from public

procurement of three (3) years thereby occasioning a miscarriage of

justice.

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2.1 The Application was received by the Tribunal on 16th September 2013. On

17thSeptember 2014 and 23rd September 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the

Authority requesting the Authority to provide:

1. detailed background of this matter;

2. record of proceedings;

3. the report containing the decision of the Authority and a letter of

communication between the Authority, the Ministry of Local

Government and relevant procuring and disposing entities.

2.2 By letter dated 17th September 2014, the Tribunal directed both Parties

to file with the Tribunal written submissions and any rejoinder to the

submissions. This was done and the submissions were served on the

respective parties.

3.0 DISPOSAL OF APPLICATION

In disposing of the application for review, the Tribunal analysed the

following documents:

1. Appeal against PPDA Decision to suspend Akaaba Enterprises Ltd

from participating in public procurement dated 16th September 2014

and the correspondences between the Applicant and the Authority

attached to the application as Annexes;

2. Responses and submissions to the Applicant’s application by PPDA

dated 22nd September 2014 and 25th September 2014 and Annexes

attached to the responses.

3. The Applicant’s written submissions and submissions in rejoinder;

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3.1 The Tribunal summoned both parties for a hearing on 26th September 2014.

The Applicant was represented by Mr. Mugisa Raymond of Wagabaza and

Company Advocates. One of the Applicant’s directors, Mr. Arthur

Abaliwano attended the hearing. The Authority was represented by Ms.

Patricia Asiimwe and Mr. Uthman Segawa.

3.2 In the written submissions and at the hearing, Counsel for the Applicant

reiterated the grounds of appeal as set out in the Application to the

Tribunal.

Counsel argued grounds 1 and 3, reproduced below, together.

3.3 Ground One (1): The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored and

or failed to rule on the preliminary objections on points of law raised by

the Applicant therein arriving at a wrong conclusion hence occasioning a

miscarriage of justice.

3.4 Ground three (3): The Authority erred in law and fact when it ignored

procedure in the PPDA Act and Regulations 2003 which was brought to its

attention by the Applicant, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

3.5 The crux of the Applicant’s submission on these grounds is that the

Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government had no locus to

recommend to the Authority the suspension of the Applicant. The said

recommendation was submitted to the Respondent by the PS MLG instead

of the Contracts Committee of Kole District Local Government, contrary to

regulation 349(1) of the PPDA Regulations S.I 70 of 2003 (now repealed)

which reads as follows:

“A recommendation to suspend a provider shall be submitted to the

authority in writing by a contracts committee”

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Counsel submitted that the above regulation, (though it is now repealed)

should be applicable because the bid document in question was submitted

on 3rd April 2013 before the coming into force of the PPDA Regulations S.I 8

of 2014, which came into force on the 3rd March 2014.

The Applicant opined that a new law becomes enforceable on the day of

commencement; that there is no such intention expressed in the PPDA

Regulations 2014 to the effect that they will apply retrospectively or to

transactions that were executed prior to its commencement. Hence the

practice is to apply the law of the time, therein the PPDA Regulations 2003.

He relied on the case of Attorney General Vs Dr. James Rwanyarare & ors

Constitutional Appeal No.2 of 2003, and Tom Butime Vs Muhumuza David

& Anor E.P.A No.11/2011,to support his argument. In the latter case, it

was held that “the court will not ascribe retrospective force to new laws

affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication….”

In conclusion of the issue of the recommendation, Counsel further

submitted that the PS MLG is neither a contracts committee nor a member

of the same. Therefore it had no locus to recommend suspension of the

Applicant. The right party which ought to have made the said

recommendation to the Authority for the suspension of the Applicant was

the Contracts Committee of Kole District Local Government. The Applicant

relied on the case of Clear Channel Independent Vs PPDA HCMA No 380 of

2008, where it was held that “if a statute or regulations binding on a

domestic tribunal prescribe the procedure to be followed, that procedure

must be observed”. It was further held that non-compliance with the PPDA

Act and Regulations amounts to an illegality.

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3.6 The Applicant further submitted in the alternative, that the Authority based

its decision to suspend the applicant on a bid document that had expired by

the time of the said recommendation. In support of his argument, he relied

on regulation 49(1) of the Local Governments (PPDA) Regulations S.I

39/2006 which states that “Bid documents shall state the period within

which the bid is to remain valid”

Regulation 49(2)“Bid validity period shall be calculated from the closing

date of the bid submission and shall remain in force until the close of

business on the last day of the validity period”

The Applicant submitted that in this case, bid submission was on 3rd April

2013 with a bid validity period of 120 days; that the bid document expired

on 1s t August 2013. Thereafter the bid document was rendered non-

existent and any acts such as the recommendation of 3rd February 2014

that were done after the bid document had expired on 3rd July 2013 were

null and void.

3.7 In response to the Applicant’s submissions on the issue of the

recommendation having been submitted to the Authority by a wrong party,

Counsel for the Authority, in written submissions and also at the hearing

argued that the Authority, after receiving information on the forgeries from

the PS MLG in a letter dated 3rd February 2014, initiated its own

investigations on the 29th July 2014, using its powers under section 8 and 94

of the amended PPDA Act. She submitted that the date when investigations

commence i.e. 29th July 2014, was after the commencement of the PPDA

amendment Act, and therefore the actions of the Authority were in

accordance with the amended PPDA Act.

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3.8 On the issue of retrospective application of section 94 of the PPDA Act as

amended, Counsel relied on the case of Philips V Eyre (1870) ILR 6 QB 1

which laid down a general principle to the effect that “the Court will not

ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights unless by express

words or necessary implications that such was the intention of the

Legislature”. She submitted that though the issue of retrospective

application is not relevant in this case, the Applicant’s rights were not

affected in any way since the suspension was premised on an investigation

by the Authority.

3.9 In rejoinder to the Authority’s response, the Applicant insisted that in the

letter suspending the Applicant, the Authority made no mention of its

investigations as the cause of the suspension, but instead it relied on the

recommendation of the PS MLG. Counsel further reiterated that under

section 3 of the PPDA Act which defines a procuring and disposing entity, it

is the Chief Administrative Officer who should have recommended to the

Authority and not the PS MLG.

3.10 Resolution of Grounds one (1) and (3)

The Tribunal carefully studied the letter written by the Permanent

Secretary Ministry of Local Government dated 3rd February 2014 addressed

to the Authority. It is this letter which both parties are referring to as a

“recommendation to suspend the Applicant”. The relevant extract to the

letter reads as follows:

“Following your advice (the Authority’s), the Ministry tasked all the

concerned Local Governments to submit all the bids and relevant

documents.

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The purpose of this communication is therefore, to forward to you a copy

of the bid document of each affected firm as in Annex 1 and all the

relevant documents on the matter (Annex II) for your action”

At the hearing, the Tribunal asked both Counsel to show the Tribunal the

part of the letter which recommends suspension of the Applicant. Counsel

for the Applicant agreed that the letter has no words recommending the

suspension of the Applicant; however it is the same letter which the

Authority relies on to suspend the Applicant. Counsel for the Authority

responded that the letter was a recommendation for the Authority to take

action.

The Tribunal observed that the Authority wrongly referred to the said letter

in its communication to the Applicant as a “recommendation”. However,

the Tribunal finds that the letter in issue does not anywhere recommend

the suspension of the firms listed in Annex I which include the Applicant;

instead the letter submits the list of firms that allegedly forged documents

to the Authority “for your action”.

Having found that the letter complained of is not a recommendation, the

Tribunal did not find it helpful to respond, in a detailed manner, to the

Applicant’s submissions in respect to the recommendation being filed by a

wrong party contrary to regulation 349(1) of the PPDA Regulations and the

whole issue concerning retrospective application of the amended PPDA Act

and Regulations.

3.11 The Tribunal is in agreement with the submission of the Authority that it

commenced its own investigations on the basis of the said letter, which

investigations culminated in the suspension of the Applicant. From the

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record, the Authority commences investigations by a letter dated 29th July

2014 addressed to the Applicant whereby the Authority is informing the

Applicant of the suspension proceedings and asking the Applicant to make

its defence.

3.12 By 29th July 2014 when the Authority commenced suspension proceedings,

the amended PPDA Act (section 94) which empowers the Authority to

initiate its own investigations in respect to suspension of providers was in

force.

3.13 The Tribunal therefore finds that the Authority has power under sections 8

and 94 of the PPDA Act to initiate its own investigations, which from the

evidence, it did. The issue of ‘recommendation of suspension by a wrong

party’ is therefore irrelevant in this case because an investigation was

carried out by the Authority on which its decision to suspend the Applicant

was premised.

In any case the Tribunal found that the rights of the Applicant were not in

any way prejudiced by the investigations of the Authority.

3.14 With respect to the alternative submission by the Applicant that the bid

had expired, and therefore, the action of probing the bid and

recommending suspension was null and void, the Tribunal agrees with the

submission of the Authority that the alleged forged documents were

submitted as a bid by the Applicant while the bids were still valid.

3.15 While the Tribunal is in agreement with the Applicant that the bid had

expired by the time of the probe, the Tribunal disagrees with the Applicant

that the alleged forged certificate should therefore not have been probed

‘since there was no bid’. The Tribunal notes that in procurement,

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certificates of completion are usually attached to bids by providers to show

evidence of experience in similar works, which in the instant case are

allegedly forged. The certificate does not therefore expire with a bid as

submitted by the Applicant. There is no bar to a bidder from using

certificates of completion for other bids in the future.

3.16 According to the evidence on record, the Authority received confirmation

from Mubende and Bukwo districts that the certificates of completion

submitted by the Applicant were forged. These certificates were given to

the Applicant by the Authority well before the scheduled hearing. The

Applicant at the hearing before the Authority and in their defence had

ample opportunity to rebut the allegations but were unable to credibly

deny the allegations. Similarly at the Tribunal hearing, the Applicant did not

present credible evidence to rebut the findings in relation to the forgeries.

3.17 In Motorcentre East Africa Ltd versus PPDA Miscellaneous Cause 90 of

2010, a matter where the Court dealt at length with the procedure for

suspension of a bidder and observed at page 14 that;

“Although the applicant accuses the respondent of not adequately

investigating the issue of forgery, even in the instant application the

applicant has not made any attempt to cast doubt on the finding of the

respondent that the Manufacturer’s Authorization which was submitted

during the bidding process was forged. Clearly this was the reason for its

suspension. It was not enough for the applicant to argue that it was not

the author of the document in issue or that it was not aware that the

document was illegitimate and submitted it in good faith. The fact

remains that it was a forged document. It is immaterial that other

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company had been getting similar Authorizations from the same source or

that the applicant had used similar documents in other procurements.

Two wrongs do not make a right. If indeed the document was originated

by the applicant’s agent as it alleges, the acts of the agent are binding on

it as the principal. The fraud of its agent is imputed on the applicant. As

learned counsel has correctly observed, a court of law cannot sanction

what is illegal and an illegality once brought to the attention of court

overrides all questions of pleading. The reason for the law’s refusal to

give effect to such transactions is commonly put in the Latin Maxim ex

turpicausa non orituractio(‘no claim arises from a base cause’). “

3.18 The Tribunal agrees with the principle laid down by in the above case and a

number of cases that where a court discovers an illegality, the court must

address the illegality, irrespective of all questions of pleading (Makula

International Ltd V. His Emminence Cardinal Nsubuga and Anor H.C.B

1982).The fraud having been brought to its attention by the PS MLG, the

Authority, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal was in order to investigate the

alleged fraud, even though the bid to which the alleged forged certificates

were attached had expired.

Grounds One (1) and three (3) fail.

3.19 Ground two (2): The Authority erred in law and fact when it made its

decision without conducting a hearing thereby occasioning a miscarriage

of justice.

3.20 In both the written submissions and at the hearing, the Applicant submitted

that the Authority did not accord the Applicant a hearing. Counsel did not

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dispute that the Authority by its letter dated 29th July 2014, invited the

Applicant to submit its defence and to attend a hearing on 8th August 2014.

Counsel did not also dispute that the Authority by its letter dated 8 th August

2014 forwarded documents to the Applicant to enable preparation of a

defence and in the same letter asked the Applicant to file a defence by 15th

August 2014.

3.21 The Applicant avers that after it submitted its defence to the Authority on

the 15th August 2014, it did not hear from the Authority, but only received a

letter of suspension. The Applicant submits that the denial of an

opportunity to present its case and to interface with witnesses who alleged

that it had forged documents, was an injustice, because they were denied

the right to be heard. The Applicant relied on the case of Hon. Justice Anup

Singh Choudry V. Attorney General Civil Appeal N0. 0091 of 2012.He

further submitted that this case was all fours with the present matter

before the Tribunal.

3.22 Counsel for the Authority in rebuttal submitted that the Authority notified

the Applicant of the suspension proceedings and gave it an opportunity to

prepare its defence. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant attended

a hearing on the 8th August 2015 and also submitted its defence to the

Authority on 15th August 2014. Quoting the Minutes of the hearing thus:

“the Provider’s representative agreed that he would file a defence for his

client before or on 15th August 2014.

MAC informed both parties that the Authority’s decision would be issued

within the statutory period”,

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Counsel for the Authority submitted that it was implied from the

information that the decision would be issued within the statutory period

and that no further hearing was necessary. Counsel for the Authority

further submitted that Counsel for the Applicant at that stage had an

opportunity to request for a further hearing which it did not exercise.

3.24 Resolution of ground two (2)

The Tribunal has seen evidence on record pointing to the following

chronology of events:

1) On 29 September 2014, the Authority writes to the Applicant notifying it

of the suspension proceedings; asking it to submit a defence by 4 th

August 2014 and attend a hearing on 8th August 2014;

2) On 1s t August 2014, the Applicant writes to the Authority asking for

more time to prepare its defence;

3) On 6thAugust 2014, the Applicant writes to the Authority asking for

documents to enable it prepare its defence. These documents include

the recommendation from the Ministry of Local Government to suspend

the Applicant and the bid document in which the alleged completion

certificates arose from;

4) On the 8th August 2014, a hearing takes place and it is attended by the

Applicant’s Counsel;

5) On 8th August 2014, the Authority writes to the Applicant submitting the

required documents and asks the Applicant to submit its defence by 15th

August 2014;

6) On 15th August 2014, the Applicant submitted its defence to the

Authority.

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3.25 From the evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was given an

opportunity to present its defence. Indeed in its defence, the Tribunal notes

that the Applicant denies in toto the forgery allegations raised against it.

The Tribunal agrees with the Authority that if Counsel for the Applicant had

wished for a further hearing after the submission of its Client’s defence, he

should have clearly stated at the meeting that he wished for a further

hearing. The Minutes do not show that he raised this issue at the meeting.

At the hearing, Counsel for the Applicant did not controvert the fact that

the Applicant’s Counsel did not clearly ask for a further hearing at the

meeting. Instead Counsel told the Tribunal that they ‘expected’ that the

Authority would call a further hearing.

3.26 The Tribunals finds that there was a hearing to the extent that the

Applicant was given the opportunity to present its defence, and did not

clearly ask for a further hearing after presentation of the defence.

3.27 With regard to the Authority of Anup Singh (Supra) cited by Counsel for the

Applicant theTribunal finds that this case is distinguishable from the facts as

presented. That case dealt with proceedings against a judicial officer under

section 11 of the Judicial Service Act Cap 14 by the Judicial Service

Commissionwhich provides an elaborate procedure for the discipline and

removal of judicial officers. Section 11 is reproduced for ease of reference:

“11. Rules of natural justice.

In dealing with matters of discipline, and removal of a judicial officer, the

Commission shall observe the rules of natural justice; and, in particular,

the

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commission shall ensure that an officer against whom disciplinary or

removal proceedings are being taken is—

a) informed about the particulars of the case against him or her;

(b) given the right to defend himself or herself and present his or her case

at the meeting of the commission or at any inquiry set up by the

commission for the purpose;

(c) where practicable, given the right to engage an advocate of his or her

own choice; and

(d) told the reasons for the decision of the commission.”

3.28 In the case of Prime contractors Limited versus Inspector General of

Government and Uganda National Roads Authority (Misc. Cause no. 301

of 2013)on the right to a fair hearing, The Hon. Justice Stephen Musota in

considering whether a written statement can suffice as a fair hearing stated

that:

“After considering the submissions by all learned counsel on this issue, I

am satisfied that the applicant was given a right to he heard when he

recorded statements and addressed the IGG over all allegations against

the applicant in his correspondence. In fact the applicant was exonerated

on bribery allegations against UNRA. The right to be heard does not

necessarily mean oral hearing. Oral hearing is not mandatory once one is

afforded an opportunity to defend oneself and where a written statement

of defence is made, it is sufficient; Onyait David Stephen VsBusia District

Local Government &Busia Town Council Misc Application No. 34 of 2006

per Muhanguzi J.

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In the instant case, the 1st respondent summoned Wilson Kashaya the

Managing Director of the applicant to attend before Inspectorate officer

to give evidence in the inquiry. The summons was not private as alleged in

paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support, but official. It was issued under S.

26(1) of the IGG Act. Mr. Wilson Kashaya made a statement wherein he

denied that he bribed the officials of the 2nd respondent. Therefore the

complaint was investigated and the applicant participated in the

investigation by recording a statement. He was accorded a fair hearing.”

3.29 From the evidence on the record and chronology of events cited above the

Tribunal finds that the Applicant was given a fair hearing.

Ground 2 fails.

3.30 Ground four (4): The Authority erred in law and fact when it also

suspended Moses KaKungulu, Jesca Kyomugisha, Joy Kyamwine, Arthur

Abaliwano and Allan Kakungulu from participating in public procurement

for 3 years.

3.31 Counsel for the Applicant noted that the Authority in its response on this

ground states that the Authority never stated that it suspended the

directors of the Applicant; rather it is the Applicant which had been

suspended. Counsel submitted that he was satisfied with the Authority’s

response.

The Tribunal thus made no finding on this ground.

3.32 Ground five (5): The Authority erred in law and fact when it passed a

manifestly harsh, arbitral and excessive sentence of suspension from

public procurement of three (3) years thereby occasioning a miscarriage of

justice.

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3.33 The Applicant submitted that a suspension of three years is harsh and

excessive given that it was the very first time that the Applicant was

accused of any wrong doing.

3.34 In its response, Counsel for the Authority submitted that section 94 of the

PPDA Act empowers the Authority to suspend a provider for a period

determined by the Authority. She further submitted that the Board of

Directors of the Authority approved a Procedure Manual of the

Management Advisory Committee (MAC Manual) which lays down criteria

for imposing punishment.

Counsel for the Authority submitted that the Authority in prescribing the

suspension period for the Applicant was guided by the MAC Manual which

provides in interalia that where a provider makes a first breach of the law

but it is deemed to be serious, although there is no financial loss to the

Government, the maximum period of suspension shall be three (3) years.

Since it was established that the provider had uttered two false documents,

a maximum period of three years was given which is not manifestly harsh,

arbitral or excessive for the provider. The sentence was in accordance with

the said manual.

3.35 Resolution of ground five (5)

In resolving this ground, the Tribunal considered the submissions of the

Counsel for the Authority and the provisions of section 94 of the Act and

paragraph 5.7 “Period of suspension” of the MAC Manual. The Tribunal

notes that the Authority is empowered by law to determine the period of

suspension of a provider. The Authority in a document approved by its

Board of Directors has laid down guidelines on period of suspension.

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3.36 In the eyes of the Tribunal, in order to arrive at an appropriate period of

suspension, all the Authority has to do is to match the facts of the case in

issue to the criteria laid down in the MAC Manual, and nowhere else.

3.37 In the instant case, the Authority had found that the Applicant submitted

two forged certificates. It appears to the Tribunal that the Applicant, in its

defence submitted to the Authority put more effort on arguing matters of

procedure rather than the substantive accusation of forgery. At the

hearing, the Tribunal observed the same trend.

3.38 The Tribunal agrees with the Authority that the uttering of false documents

is completely at variance with the basic principles and ethics of public

procurement and disposal.

3.39 The Tribunal is satisfied that having forged two completion certificates, and

having failed to rebut the forgery allegations, the suspension of three years

in accordance with paragraph 5.7 (b) of the MAC Manual is appropriate.

Ground five (5) also fails.

4.0 DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL

1. The Tribunal affirms the decision of the Authority to suspend the

Applicant from participating in public procurement for a period of three

years.

2. Pursuant to section 91K (1) (d) of the Act, the Tribunal awards costs of

this application to the Authority amounting to two million shillings

(2,000,000=).

Dated at Kampala this 29th Day of September 2014.

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SIGNED by ] ………………………………….

OLIVE ZAALE OTETE ] CHAIRPERSON

SIGNED by ] …………………………………

MOSES JURUA ADRIKO ] MEMBER

SIGNED by ] …………………………………

DAVID KABATERAINE ] MEMBER

SIGNED by ] ………………………………….

JOEL KATEREGGA] ] MEMBER