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Page 1 of 81
THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CV 2011 - 04459
Between
Ricardo Youk-See
First Claimant
Randy Youk-See
Second Claimant
Kairon Baptiste
Third Claimant
and
The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
Defendant
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. DES VIGNES
Appearances:
Mr. Abdel Mohammed and Mr. Kent Samlal for the Claimants
Ms. Raisa Caesar instructed by Ms. Zelicia Haynes for the Defendant
JUDGMENT
1. In this action, the First, Second and Third Claimant (“the Claimants”) claim against the
Defendant damages for false imprisonment, assault and battery and detinue and/or
conversion. The Defendant is sued in its capacity as the Legal Representative of the State and
as the employer of Police Officers in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service pursuant to the
provisions of the State Liability and Civil Proceedings Act, Chapter 8:02 (“the Act”).
THE CLAIM
2. By Claim Form and Statement of Case filed on 16th
November, 2011 the Claimants allege
that they were arrested by police officers and detained unlawfully without charge at the
Page 2 of 81
Chaguanas Police Station (“the Station”) from 8:30 p.m. on 11th
March, 2010 to 9:30 a.m. on
14th
March, 2010, a period of approximately 61 hours.
3. The Claimants allege that:
a. On or about 11th
March, 2010 at approximately 8:00 p.m., they arrived at Superpharm
located at Price Plaza Shopping Complex, Chaguanas in a Nissan Sentra Motor
Vehicle, registration number HAZ 4588, (“the Sentra”) which was owned and driven
by the First Claimant. The First Defendant entered Superpharm and, while the
Second and Third Claimants remained in the Sentra, a Hyundai Tucson Motor
Vehicle, registration number PBZ 1690 ( “the Tucson”) approached and blocked the
Sentra;
b. Two police officers dressed in Task Force attire alighted from the Tucson and asked
the Second and Third Claimants for the driver of the Sentra. The Second and Third
Claimants provided the officers with the name of the First Claimant and informed
them that he was in Superpharm purchasing some items;
c. The police officers then instructed the Second Claimant to drive the Sentra to the
southern section of the car park, in the vicinity of Subway to a “dark corner of the
car park”;
d. When the First Claimant came out of Superpharm, he could not find the Sentra so he
called the Second Claimant who informed him of what had occurred. The First
Claimant then met the two Police Officers who requested of him his policy of
insurance, certified copy and engine receipts for the Sentra which he provided;
e. The Police Officers informed the First Claimant that the registration number of the
Sentra matched a stolen number plate of a Nissan B14 motor vehicle. The First
Claimant denied that the number plates were stolen and insisted that he was the
certified owner of the Sentra;
f. The Police Officers then began to shout expletives at the Claimants, maintaining that
the Sentra was a stolen vehicle and then proceeded to shove them into the Tucson and
transported them to the Station. There were three other police officers in a white
unmarked police vehicle which accompanied the Tucson and one of the Officers
present at the time of their arrest drove the Sentra to the Station;
Page 3 of 81
g. At approximately 8:40 p.m., the Claimants were taken to the Criminal Investigations
Division (CID) section of the Station where they were searched and their personal
items were seized. The names of the Claimants were entered in the Station’s
computer and this search revealed that the First and Second Claimants had pending
matters against them. Upon discovering this, the police officers at the CID, whose
identities were unknown to the Claimants, began accusing the Claimants of being
drug transporters and the officers shouted expletives at them for about five (5)
minutes;
h. The Claimants were then grabbed by the officers and one of the officers shouted, “all
of allyuh is gunman and car thief and we go deal with allyuh. We will show you how
central police does do it!” The Claimants were then flung onto the ground and
kicked, slapped and beaten about their heads, backs, hands, chest and facial areas.
This beating by the police officers continued for approximately thirty (30) minutes;
i. The Claimants were subsequently handcuffed and dragged to a room at the side of the
Station where the First and Second Claimants were kicked and slapped about their
bodies by a party of between five and eight police officers and were forced to sit in a
barrel of water. The First Claimant pleaded with the officers that he could not sit
down as he had an open wound on his left hand but the officers continued to shout
expletives at him for a further ten minutes. While the Claimants were being beaten,
the Second and Third Claimant were removed from the barrel and taken back
separately by the officers to the Superpharm car park at approximately 10:00 p.m. “to
see if they get anything”. At the Superpharm car park, the officers accused the Second
and Third Claimants of being car battery and laptop thieves. The officers slapped and
struck the Second and Third Claimants with a gun and threatened to kill them. At
about 10:45 p.m. the Second and Third Claimants were taken back to the Station
where they were placed back into the room at the side of the Station with the First
Claimant;
j. One of the police officers came into the room with a taser gun which he referred to as
“mammy”. The First and Second Claimants were thrown into a barrel of water and
electrocuted several times with the taser gun. The Third Claimant was held down by
Page 4 of 81
the officers and struck about his belly, back, hands, groin and genitals with a golf club
and he was also electrocuted with the taser gun;
k. One of the Police Officers then brought out another taser gun which he referred to as
“daddy” and said “feel big daddy now because mammy ain’t doing nothing”. The
torture of the Claimants continued until about 1:45 a.m. on 12th
March, 2010. At
approximately 2:30 a.m. the Claimants were given a wet cloth to wipe their bruises
and wounds they received from the beating and they were then logged into the Station
Diary and placed in a holding cell and informed that they had to remain in custody as
they were being held “on enquiries” ;
l. The Claimants remained in the cell from 2:30 a.m. on 12th
March 2010 to
approximately 9.30 a.m. on 14th
March 2010 when they were released without charge;
m. Upon leaving the Station, the Claimants requested the return of their belongings but a
police officer informed them they would have to return the next day to collect their
items. The Claimants visited the Station on the 15th
March 2010 and requested the
return of the Sentra and their belongings. Sergeant Kissoonlal returned to the First
Claimant his groceries from the Sentra but informed the Claimants that there was no
record at the Station of their personal items and that the Sentra had to be examined by
the Forensic Sciences Center;
n. On 16th
June, 2010 the First Claimant, accompanied by his mother, visited the Station
and made a request of Superintendent Cummings for the return of the Sentra.
Superintendent Cummings responded that the Sentra was cleared and would be
returned to him. Approximately one hour later, the keys to the Sentra were given to
the First Claimant. However, before the First Claimant was able to enter the Sentra,
another police officer attached to the Robbery Squad at the Station violently grabbed
the keys from him and told him that the Sentra could not leave the Station as it had to
be sent to the Forensic Science Center for testing. Subsequently, Superintendent
Cummings informed the First Claimant that the Sentra could not be released. To date,
the Claimants’ personal belongings and the Sentra have not been returned, despite
several attempts to secure their release; and
o. By reason of these matters, the Claimants have suffered personal injuries, pain and
suffering, distress, humiliation, loss and damages.
Page 5 of 81
4. The First and Second Claimants alleged that they suffered the following personal injuries as
set out in the Medical Report of Dr. Vernel Ayhew dated April 7, 2010 and the Medical
Report of Dr. Emanuel C. Hosein dated August 23, 2010:
First Claimant –
Left sided anterior chest wall tenderness;
Left shoulder mildly swollen over deltoid region, with slightly reduced range of
motion due to pain;
Generalized body pain mainly of left chest and forearm;
Tenderness to left ribcage in mid axillary line;
Tiny spot “scratches” to left upper arm (allegedly from shock device”);
Left ear tender; and
Tenderness at site of old 5 inch laceration to left forearm.
Second Claimant –
Tenderness of anterior chest wall and lower back region;
Multiple scars starting to heal extending over superior region of the back;
Generalized body pains mainly of his chest, back and head;
Multiple scratches to chest and abdomen with tenderness;
Multiple scratches and bruises to head, neck, back and upper arms with
tenderness and tenderness to left shoulder;
3 inch deep scratch to left thigh; and
Small bruises with swelling to right ankle.
5. The Third Claimant alleged that he suffered the following personal injuries as set out in the
Medical Report of Dr. Emanuel C. Hosein dated August 23, 2010:
Third Claimant –
Multiple small scratches to upper chest, right hand (at base of thumb) and right
elbow; and
Tenderness to right lower ribcage, right lower leg and top of hand.
6. The Claimants claim that they have suffered the following special damages:
First Claimant - special damages of $73,450 and continuing (to be updated at trial) for -
Page 6 of 81
Detinue/conversion of a Sony Ericsson phone $ 1,500.00
Detinue/conversion of one gold chain $ 5,000.00
Detinue/conversion of cash $ 1,500.00
Detinue of Sentra $17,000.00
Loss of use of Sentra for 16 months $48,000.00
Loss of earnings for three days $ 450.00
Second Claimant - special damages of $500 for -
Detinue/conversion of a Motorola mobile phone $ 500.00
Third Claimant - special damages of $600.00 for -
Detinue/conversion of a Nokia mobile phone $ 300.00
Detinue/conversion of cash $ 300.00
7. Further, the Claimants allege that their reputation was injured and they were put through
considerable trouble, inconvenience, anxiety and expense and that the conduct of the police
officers was arbitrary, oppressive and/or unconstitutional.
8. As a consequence, the Claimants claim damages, including aggravated and exemplary
damages for false imprisonment, assault and battery and detinue and/or conversion together
with interest thereon at such rate and for the period that the Court deems just pursuant to
Section 25 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and costs.
THE DEFENCE
9. By Defence filed on June 1, 2012, the Defendant contends that it is not the employer of the
Officers but is only subject to liabilities in tort committed by the Officers pursuant to the Act.
10. The Defendant puts the Claimants to strict proof that the First Claimant was the driver and
owner of the Sentra. The Defendant admits that the officers approached the Second and Third
Claimant but contends that when they did so the Sentra was being driven by the Second
Claimant who was then instructed to park in front of the Pricesmart Building. The Defendant
further admits that the officers were told about the First Claimant’s whereabouts.
11. It is the Defendant’s case that the investigating and arresting officer was Corporal Balkaran,
Regimental No. 13767.
Page 7 of 81
12. The Defendant admits that the First Claimant was informed that the Sentra’s registration
number matched that of a stolen vehicle, but denies that the officers requested the production
of any documents. It is the Defendant’s case that the Claimants were cautioned, arrested and
taken to the Station. The Defendant denies that the officers used expletives or shoved the
Claimants. Further, the Defendant denies knowledge of an unmarked vehicle accompanying
the Tuscon.
13. The Defendant avers that that the Claimants were interviewed separately in relation to the
Sentra. The Defendant admits that the Claimants were placed in a holding cell and informed
that they were being held “on enquiries” and were released without charge at about 9:30
a.m. on March 14, 2010.
14. The Defendant avers that the Claimants were arrested in order to further enquiries in relation
to recent serious reported crimes, suspected warrants and the Sentra and that the Claimants
were informed of their constitutional rights and privileges but made no requests. It is the
Defendant’s case that Corporal Balkaran and the other officers involved in the investigation
had reasonable and probable cause to arrest the Claimants and seize the Sentra. The
Defendant intends to rely on the Police Service Act, Chapter 15:01 for its full terms,
meaning and effect.
15. The alleged particulars of reasonable and probable cause are as follows:
a. There was information regarding a spate of robberies in the Price Plaza Compound
and acting on this information, officers conducted surveillance in the area on March
11, 2010 when Corporal Balkaran observed the Sentra manoeuvring suspiciously
(driving at a slow pace through the compound and stopping in the vicinity of
unoccupied parked vehicles);
b. Information from the E999 Command Center revealed that the registration number on
the Sentra was registered to a green Nissan B14 Motor Vehicle under the name Nigel
Lewis while the Sentra they were observing was a Nissan B12 Motor Vehicle. As
such, Corporal Balkaran and Constable Chalerie (Regimental No. 13658) approached
the Sentra, at which time the First Claimant arrived and introduced himself as the
owner.
Page 8 of 81
c. Corporal Balkaran informed the Claimants of the information in his possession
regarding the Sentra cautioned them and took them to the Station where they were
separately interviewed;
d. The Officers made calls to Stations in the Northern district to enquire whether the
Claimants were wanted for any enquiries. Corporal Balkaran was later informed that
officers from the Tunapuna Station would collect the Claimants in relation to
investigations in the Northern Division. On March 14, 2010 the Claimants remained
uncollected and Inspector Levia released them; and
e. On May 14, 2010 Josanne Salina, Scientific Officer I – Forensic Science Center,
examined the Sentra and subsequently provided a Certificate of Analysis dated
November 12, 2010 to Corporal Balkaran. This certificate indicated that the chassis
number on the Sentra was not the original and that a portion of the firewall was cut
and replaced with another bearing the visible number. As a result of this Corporal
Williams, Regimental No. 14244, of the Stolen Vehicles Squad was instructed to
continue enquiries (which are still ongoing) as it was believed that the Sentra
belonged to someone else.
16. The Defendant denies that any accusations were levied against the Claimants, neither were
any of their personal belongings seized or found on them.
17. The Defendant makes no admission as to the alleged beatings of the Claimants as this is the
subject of a related criminal matter and put the Claimants to strict proof thereof. The
Defendant further denies the allegations that the Claimants were shocked with a taser.
18. The Defendant admits that the Second Claimant was taken back to Superpharm by Corporal
Aroon and other officers as he was assisting them with their investigation into larcenies in
the area. The Defendant denies that there was any threat to kill the Claimants.
19. The Defendant neither admits nor denies the Claimants’ allegations regarding repeated
requests for the return of the Sentra or personal belongings seized as it has no knowledge of
this and put them to strict proof thereof.
20. The Defendant neither admits nor denies the Claimants’ particulars of injury and puts them to
strict proof thereof. The Defendant further avers that medical records indicate pre-existing
injuries of the First and Third Claimant.
Page 9 of 81
21. The Defendant denies liability for detinue or conversion of the personal belongings of the
Claimants as the alleged items were not found on the Claimants or taken by the officers
involved. The Defendant further denies liability and detinue for the Sentra or for its loss of
use as it is still the subject of investigations as to its ownership.
22. The Defendant denies liability for any loss of earnings or general damages and puts the
Claimants to strict proof thereof. The Defendant also denies the Claimants claim for
aggravated and exemplary damages.
23. The Defendant denies that the officers were under its direct direction and control and that the
Claimants were falsely imprisoned or that there was detinue or conversion of their property
and makes no admission in relation to assault and battery as these allegations are before the
criminal court.
THE REPLY
24. In its Reply filed July 27, 2012 the Claimants join issue with the Defendant. The Claimants
state that at no material time did the officers inform them of the information in their
possession or caution them.
25. The Claimants aver that upon their arrival to the Station the Second Claimant was beaten by
Corporal Balkaran and deny that they were ever interviewed by any of the officers, informed
of their constitutional rights or given an opportunity to make a telephone call.
26. The Claimants deny the allegations of reasonable and probable cause and aver that at no time
did they drive the Sentra in a suspicious manner through the compound and/or stop by
unoccupied vehicles.
27. The Claimants aver that the First Claimant is the owner of the Sentra which he purchased
from Debra George and has no knowledge of the registration number being registered to
another vehicle. The Claimants also contend that the Certificate of Analysis is hearsay and
requires that Ms. Salina present herself for cross-examination on same.
28. The Claimants further allege that the injuries they sustained were as a result of the beatings at
the hand of the Officers. The First Claimant states that a pre-existing wound to his left
forearm was affected due to the beatings while the Third Claimant denies knowledge of any
pre-existing injury.
Page 10 of 81
THE ISSUES
29. I am of the view that the following issues fall to be determined in this matter:
a. Were the Claimants falsely imprisoned on the account of their unlawful arrest and
detention?
b. Were the Claimants wrongfully and illegally assaulted and battered by police officers
at the Station?
c. Is the Defendant liable to the First Claimant for detinue/conversion of the Sentra?
d. Is the Defendant liable to the Claimants for detinue/conversion of their personal
items?
e. Are the Claimants entitled to damages, including aggravated and exemplary
damages?
A: WERE THE CLAIMANTS FALSELY IMPRISONED ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR
UNLAWFUL ARREST AND DETENTION?
The Law
30. As it relates to the tort of false imprisonment, Halsbury’s Laws of England,1 states as
follows:
“A claim of false imprisonment lies at the suit of a person unlawfully imprisoned against
the person who causes the imprisonment. Any total restraint of the liberty of the person,
for however short a time, by the use or threat of force or by confinement, is an
imprisonment . A constable is liable in false imprisonment if he unlawfully arrests or
detains another in circumstances which do not amount to a valid arrest. He is also liable
if he makes a lawful arrest but does not comply with the conditions for continued
detention, or if he detains the person for an unreasonable time without taking him before
a magistrate.”
31. According to Section 3(4) of the Criminal Law Act, Chapter 10:04:
“Where a Police Officer, with reasonable cause, suspects that an arrestable offence has
been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom he, with reasonable cause,
suspects to be guilty of the offence.”
1 Volume 84 (2013) at para 435.
Page 11 of 81
32. Section 46(1)(d) of the Police Service Act, Chapter 15:01 provides that a Police Officer
may arrest without a warrant:
“a person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to
have been stolen or who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence
with reference to such thing;”
33. Therefore, the issue of liability for the tort of false imprisonment turns initially on the factor
of reasonable and probable cause to effect a lawful arrest. In Richardson & Another v The
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,2 Madam Justice Dean-Armorer adopted the
definition of the phrase, “reasonable and probable cause” as set out in the Court of Appeal
decision of Hicks v Faulkner,3 which was later adopted by the House of Lords in Herniman
v Smith.4 In Hicks (supra) Hawkins J, provided the following definition:
“… I should define reasonable and probable cause to be an honest belief in the guilt of
the accused, based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the
existence of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably
lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser, to
the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed…”
34. The tort of false imprisonment received authoritative consideration by the Privy Council in
the recent decision in Ramsingh v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.5 The
Privy Council held that the issue for determination was whether the Appellant’s detention
was lawful and amounted to the tort of false imprisonment. It was noted that at the trial the
Appellant’s case was that both his arrest and detention were unlawful. However, before the
Board, it was accepted by the Appellant that the arrest itself was lawful. In his judgment,
Lord Clarke summarised the relevant principles:
“[8] The relevant principles are not significantly in dispute and may be summarised as
follows:
“i) The detention of a person is prima facie tortious and an infringement of
section 4(a) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.
ii) It is for the arrestor to justify the arrest.
2 HCA No. CV 2007-2686 – Delivered on January 8, 2013.
3 (1881-1885) All ER Rep 187 at page 191.
4 (1938) All ER Rep 1 at page 8.
5 (2012) UKPC 16 at paras 8 – 11.
Page 12 of 81
iii) A police officer may arrest a person if, with reasonable cause, he suspects that
the person concerned has committed an arrestable offence.
iv) Thus the officer must subjectively suspect that that person has committed such
an offence.
v) The officer's belief must have been on reasonable grounds or, as some of the
cases put it, there must have been reasonable and probable cause to make the
arrest.
vi) Any continued detention after arrest must also be justified by the detainer.”
[9] These principles are established by a series of cases, both in England and in the
Caribbean. See in particular Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348, [1964] 2 All ER 610,
128 JP 379, per Lord Denning MR at 617 and per Diplock LJ, in a well-known passage
at 619; and Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437, [1984] 1 All ER 1054, [1984] 2
WLR 660 per Lord Diplock at 1059. See also two decisions in Trinidad and Tobago
which make it clear that the lawfulness of continued detention raises different questions
from those relevant to the arrest: Mauge v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
HCA No 2524 of 1997 and Mungaroo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
HCA Nos S-1130 and 1131 of 1998.
[10] The position after arrest in England is now to be found in Pt IV of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”): see s 34. Section 37(2) provides that, where a
person is arrested without a warrant and the custody officer does not have sufficient
evidence to charge him, the person arrested must be released either with or without bail:
“unless the custody officer has reasonable grounds for believing that his
detention without being charged is necessary to secure or preserve evidence
relating to an offence for which he is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by
questioning him.”
As Clayton and Tomlinson put it in their Law of Human Rights, 2nd edition (2009), at
para 10.56, the police must justify detention on a minute by minute basis.
[11] Although PACE does not directly apply in Trinidad and Tobago, s 37(2) reflects the
correct approach at common law. Thus in the instant case the person who decided to
continue the Appellant's detention pending the obtaining of a report upon the medical
Page 13 of 81
state of the victim must have had reasonable grounds for believing that the Appellant's
detention without being charged was necessary pending the securing of that evidence.”
[emphasis mine].
35. In Mauge & Others v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago & Others6Mendes
J. (Ag) as he then was, dealt with, inter alia, the issue of the arrest and detention of a
husband and wife for approximately 36 hours. The couple was arrested upon suspicion of
having stolen certain documents discovered by police during their execution of search
warrants (for other items, not found) at properties owned by the Applicants. On the facts, the
couple was arrested between 2.30 p.m. to 3.00 p.m. on 7th
February, 1997 and released
without charge at 1.00 a.m. on 9th
February, 1997. Mendes J (Ag) was of the view that on the
evidence or rather lack thereof, there was no investigation conducted into the suspicions of
the police in relations to the couple while they were being detained. He stated as follows:
“There is a remarkable absence of any attempt on the part of any of the police officers
involved in this case to give any account of what action they took to further the
investigation which began with the arrest of the Mauge’s”7
36. Accordingly, Mendes J (Ag) was of the opinion that the question to be answered in the
determination of this issue was:
“Did this inactivity on the part of the police officers turn what was initially a lawful
arrest into an unlawful detention?”8
37. In arriving at a conclusion on this issue, Mendes J (Ag) referenced Lord Diplock in Holgate-
Mohammed v Duke9 in which the law lord spoke to the inevitability of potential conflict
between the public interest in preserving liberty and that of crime detection and bringing
offenders to justice. He stated that Lord Diplock also observed that it was legitimate to use
the period of detention following a lawful arrest “to dispel or confirm the reasonable
suspicion by questioning the suspect or seeking further evidence with his assistance.”
38. In light of this as well as the Respondent’s failure to explain the conduct of the police,
Mendes J (Ag), held that detention of the husband beyond 4.30 p.m. on 7th
February, 1997
and of the wife from the moment of her arrest, was unlawful and in violation of their human
6 HCA No. 2524 of 1997
7 Ibid at page 28.
8 Ibid at page 29.
9 (1984) 1 All E.R. 1054 at page 1059.
Page 14 of 81
rights and that they were entitled to damages in this regard. In his summation he had this to
say:
“In my judgment, not only is it legitimate to use the power of arrest and subsequent
detention to further enquiries into the suspected offence; indeed, it is mandatory that
these enquiries be conducted to either to confirm or dispel the reasonable suspicion. For
it appears to me that where no real effort is made to further the investigation into the
suspected offence in order to advance the public interest in the detection of crime, the
equally important public interest in preserving the liberty of the individual would be
unnecessarily and arbitrarily sacrificed.”10
39. In Balchan and Mungaroo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago11
the First
Claimant alleged, inter alia, that he was wrongfully detained without charge by the police.
On the evidence, the First Claimant was interviewed on several occasions by the police while
in custody and a cautionary statement was obtained from him after which he was allowed to
leave. Mendonca J. (as he then was) cited Holgate-Mohammed (supra) and Mauge (supra)
and reasoned as follows:
“In this jurisdiction the Constitution requires that the person who is arrested and
detained must be brought promptly before a judicial authority. That introduces a
limitation as to the length of time the suspect may be detained but the constitutional
requirement cannot be used as a defence when having regard to the circumstances of the
case the suspect ought to have been released sooner. The constitutional requirement does
not give the right to the police to detain a person for however long it might take to bring
him before a judicial authority. It is as it were the outside limit: a time beyond which the
arrested person should not be detained before he is brought before a judicial authority.
Subject to that limitation the obligation of the police in each case is to act reasonably and
they would have so acted, if the arrested person is detained for no longer than necessary
to conduct further inquiries be it inquiries that must be conducted outside the police
station or by the interrogation of the suspect and the potential witnesses.”12
10
Ibid at page 31. 11
HCA No. 1131 of 1998/HCA No. S-1130 of 1998. 12
Ibid at pages 21 – 22.
Page 15 of 81
40. In Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,13
Rajkumar J. found that as it
related to the issue of the arrest and detention of the Claimant, the arresting officers had
sufficient reasonable and probable cause to justify his arrest and some part of his detention
while certain aspects of his detention were unreasonable. In his analysis of the law he stated
as follows in paras 44 to 47:
“[44.] The onus is on the police to justify the arrest of the Plaintiff in an action for
unlawful arrest and to establish reasonable and probable cause for the arrest: (Dallison
v Caffery [1965] 1 Q.B. 348 at 370).
[45.] The test required was stated in O’ Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary [1997] 1 AER 129 p 138j –139a) per Lord Hope of Craighead as partly
objective and partly subjective. The test is subjective because the arresting Police Officer
must have formulated a genuine suspicion within his own mind that the accused person
has committed the offence.
[46.] Further, the test is partly objective as reasonable grounds for the suspicion are
required by the arresting officer and this must be judged at the time when the power is
exercised. (See also the judgment of the Honourable Mendonca J as he then was in
Harold Barcoo v A.G of T. & T. and Browne – HCA 1388 of 1989 delivered December
19, 2001 page 5 –6 where he adopted the following analysis from the text (Clayton &
Tomlinson Civil Actions against the Police (1987).
i. The test whether there was reasonable and probable cause has both subjective
and objective elements.
ii. Did the officer honestly have the requisite suspicion or belief?
iii. Did the officer when exercising the power honestly believe in the existence of
the objective circumstances which he now relies on as the basis for that
suspicion or belief?
iv. Was his belief in the existence of these circumstances based on reasonable
grounds?
13
HCA No. CV 2012-02695 – Delivered on March 20, 2014.
Page 16 of 81
v. Did these circumstances constitute reasonable grounds for the requisite
suspicion or belief?
[47.] The first two are subjective and the second are objective and as the Honourable
Justice Mendonca, as he then was, pointed out, if the answer to any one of these
questions is “no” then the officer would not have had reasonable grounds.
41. Accordingly, the objective element of the test of reasonable and probable cause requires a
determination of whether a reasonable man having knowledge of the facts that the Defendant
knew at the material time, would have believed that the Claimant was guilty of the alleged
crime. Conversely, the subjective aspect of the test looks at whether the arresting officer has
formulated a genuine suspicion within his own mind that the accused committed the
offence.14
42. As it relates to the issue of whether continued detention is justifiable, in Ramsingh
(supra),15
the Privy Council held that this was dependent upon all the circumstances of the
case. Lord Clarke stated as follows:
[16.] The answer to this question depends upon all the circumstances of the case. As
explained above, the Respondent must show that the whole period of detention was
justified. However, while it would be wrong in principle to hold that, because the initial
arrest was justified, it follows that the subsequent detention was also justified, it is
important to consider the subsequent detention in the light of the arrest...
[19.] It is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that, given the reasonable suspicion that
the assault was serious, perhaps very serious, it was prudent for the police to detain the
Appellant until the position was clear... The Board accepts those submissions.”(emphasis
mine).
43. The burden of proof in the tort of false imprisonment is placed on the Defendant to justify the
arrest and detention and prove that such was lawful. In Gomez v The Attorney General of
Trinidad and Tobago16
the Court of Appeal stated as follows:
“But when the arrest and continued detention is challenged in Court and the arrest and
detention is proved the respondents must place before the Court the evidence that they
14
Carrera v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago – HCA No. CV 2010-00694 at para 23. 15
(2012) UKPC 16 at paras 16 and 19. 16
CA Civ No. 71 of 1993 cited in Richardson (supra) per Dean-Armorer.
Page 17 of 81
have justifying the arrest and detention. That is the onus that is placed on them at the
stage and the evidence must disclose the facts on which they relied to suspect that the
appellant was guilty of the offence they were investigating.”
The Evidence
The Defendant’s Evidence
The Arrest
44. In the Defence, it is alleged that PC Balkaran and the other officers involved in the
investigations had reasonable and probable cause to arrest the Claimants. This was based on
the fact that there had been a spate of robberies on the compound and whilst surveillance was
being conducted the Sentra was observed manoeuvring suspiciously. Further, E999
information revealed discrepancies in the registration number of the Sentra in relation to its
make, model and ownership.17
45. Having regard to the authorities as earlier cited, the evidence of PC Balkaran, as the arresting
officer, is of critical importance in determining whether or not he had reasonable and
probable cause to arrest this issue.
PC Balkaran
46. In his witness statement, PC Balkaran stated that on 11th
March, 2010 at approximately 6:00
p.m. he was in charge of a party of officers conducting surveillance at the Price Plaza in
relation to reports of larceny of motor vehicles on the compound. He stated that they had
received information that suspected thieves were patrolling the compound. He also stated that
around 8:00 p.m., while in the company of PC Charlerie in the Tucson, they received
information which led them to intercept the Sentra which was occupied by the Second and
Third Claimant and being driven by the Second Claimant. At paragraph 5 of his Witness
Statement, PC Balkaran stated:
“I observed the vehicle driving at a very slow pace through the compound and stopping
in the vicinity of unoccupied parked vehicles. I then received further information from
E999 Command Center that HAZ 4588 was registered as a green B14 motor vehicle
under the name of Nigel Lewis of Martinez Street Arima.”
17
Paras 12, 14 and 15 of the Defence filed on 1st June, 2012.
Page 18 of 81
47. PC Balkaran indicated that he introduced himself and PC Charlerie as police officers to the
Claimants and the First Claimant introduced himself as the owner of the Sentra. In paragraph
7 of his Witness Statement, PC Balkaran stated that:
“I informed all three men of the information in relation to the vehicle and cautioned
them…the Claimants were not handcuffed. The Claimants were searched and I informed
them of suspected warrants in their names and of their legal rights and privileges. They
were arrested…”
48. Under cross-examination, PC Balkaran stated as follows in relation to the arrest of the
Claimants:
“Around 8 p.m. I received information. As a result I intercepted HAZ 4588… The
information that they would have passed to me was that this motor vehicle was observed
to be slowing down and stopping in the vicinity of parked unoccupied vehicles on
compound. It would have been Constable Aroon and Seepersad who gave that
information. As a result of receiving that information and other reason, I intercepted
vehicle. I made contact with E999 command center and passed on info relative to HAZ
4588 and they in turn passed information back to me that this vehicle was recorded on
their database as a Nissan B14 motor vehicle registered to Nigel Lewis of Martinez
Street, Arima. I observed that the vehicle was a white coloured B12 vehicle. The
information from Aroon and Seepersad was one of the reasons. I also observed the
vehicle. I did not observe the vehicle throughout the entire compound. I observed it in
vicinity of Price Smart building…. On this exercise, there had been reports of larceny of
vehicles on Price Plaza compound… When Ricardo arrived, he informed me that he was
owner of vehicle… As a result of what he told me, I informed him of information I had
received… I asked him for the certified copy. I did not ask him for his Driver's permit. It
is not in my Witness Statement that I asked him for certified copy… I intercepted vehicle
because of information I had received as I said earlier… I then cautioned them of their
rights and then I arrested them based on information I had in my possession. This was
info I received from Aroon and Seepersad, my own observations and information from
command center in relation to the number plate. I arrested them based on 3 pieces of
information. I agree that I did not mention anything about suspected warrants in my oral
evidence. My reasons for arresting claimants were information in relation to registration
Page 19 of 81
number, information passed by Aroon and Seepersasd and my own observations in
relation to vehicle. I would like to add that I had my own suspicions in relation to
warrants that may have existed in relation to claimants… I did not receive any
information from Command Center about warrants…Claimants were arrested based on
my suspicions”
PC Charlerie
49. In his Witness Statement, PC Charlerie stated that on 11th
March, 2010, he was part of the
party of Officers conducting surveillance at Price Plaza in relation to reported motor vehicle
larceny on the compound. He stated that the Sentra was intercepted by himself and PC
Balkaran subsequent to information they received. He indicated that the Sentra was observed
driving at a very slow pace through the compound and stopping in the vicinity of unoccupied
parked vehicles. He also stated that they had received information from E999 that the license
plate on the Sentra was registered to a green B14 under the name Nigel Lewis.
50. PC Charlerie stated that PC Balkaran informed all the Claimants of the information in
relation to the Sentra and cautioned them. He stated that the First Claimant alleged that he
owned the Sentra and produced his Driver’s Permit. He indicated that the Claimants were
searched and told of their legal rights and privileges and subsequently arrested.
51. Under cross-examination, PC Charlerie stated as follows:
“As a result of information received, we intercepted vehicle HAZ 4588. I received
information through wireless communication that vehicle was seen in Pricesmart area,
slowing down and looking into vehicles. This was not from Command Center. I can't
recall who gave me that information. As a result of that information, I intercepted that
vehicle…Claimants were arrested after they were searched and the vehicle was
searched…
The Detention
52. In relation to the detention of the Claimants at the Station after their arrest, PC Balkaran
stated as follows:
“8. When they arrived at the Chaguanas Police Station the Claimants were taken to the
Task Force Office where they were allowed to sit on chairs. I did not accuse the
Page 20 of 81
Claimants of being drug transporters, gunmen or car thieves and I did not overhear
anyone use expletives towards the Claimants.
9. The Claimants were seated for about 20 minutes in the Task Force office. I also gave
instructions for various calls to be made by Police Constable Charlerie to ascertain if
there were warrants for the Claimants in any other division… Thereafter they were
separated and interviewed in relation to Larceny of HAZ 4588. I took the Third named
Claimant to the Robbery Squad Office and interviewed him for about ten to fifteen
minutes…
10. After the interview I took the Third named Claimant back to the Task Force Office
where the First and Second named Claimants were seated…
13. After the interviews the three Claimants were taken to the Charge room area of the
Chaguanas Police Station where they were placed in cells for safe keeping…
14. We were informed by officers from the Tunapuna Police Station by telephone call that
they would come to pick the Claimants up. I did not have any further communication with
any of the Claimants and I was later informed that they were released…”
53. Under cross-examination, PC Balkaran stated as follows:
“There was a need to interview them and that is why they were not taken to charge room.
There was no place in charge room to interview them. I can't recall what time they
arrived at Police Station. It may have been approximately 8.30 p.m. That information
would be recorded in the station diary. It should have been recorded in station diary as
soon as we arrived as far as practical... They were made to wait for about 20 minutes to
interview them...I was arresting officer. I was also investigating officer in respect of the
car… I came off duty but I can't recall what time that was. I did not return to Station until
13th
March, 2010. While they were in station, I cannot recall what I would have done by
way of investigation. I agree there is nothing in my Witness Statement about what
investigation I did while they were at Chaguanas Police Station. Based on information
from Command Center the vehicle was green B14 in name of Nigel Lewis. I did not
contact Nigel Lewis while they were at station. I agree there is nothing in Witness
Statement about investigations done by me as investigating officer while they were in
station. When I resumed duty on 13th
March, 2010 I had no dealings with them. They
remained in cell and I had no dealings with them…”
Page 21 of 81
54. In relation to the detention of the Claimants after their arrest, PC Charlerie stated in his
witness statement that the Claimants were taken to the Task Force office and he made
telephone calls to ascertain whether they were wanted in any other station districts. He stated
that he ‘was moving in and out of the Task Force office making calls and relaying
information to Corporal Balkaran and other officers.” He stated that he spoke with Police
Constable Peterson of the Tunapuna Police Station in relation to the Claimants and submitted
copies of the telephone message book extracts where records of his calls were detailed. At
paragraphs 12 to 14 of his Witness Statement he stated as follows:
“12. I informed Police Constable Peterson that we had the three Claimants in custody
and I asked him if they were known to him and the Tunapuna Police. He answered in the
affirmative and informed me that they were wanted for some robbery and shooting
offences in the district.
13. I was also informed that arrangements would be made to pick up the Claimants from
the Chaguanas Police Station to transport them to the Tunapuna Police Station. I came
off duty on 12th
March, 2010.
14. On 13th
March, 2010 I returned for duty and I realized that the Claimants were still at
the Chaguanas Police Station. I called Police Constable Peterson and made further
enquiries as to when the Claimants would be collected. Sometime thereafter I received a
call on my cellular phone from Police Constable Peterson that the Claimants would be
collected. I cannot recall the exact time of these calls. This was my last time that I had
any involvement with this matter.”
55. Under cross-examination, PC Charlerie stated as follows:
I went to make phone calls- any warrants etc. I contacted Tunapuna Police, San
Fernando Police and South control and the repeat offenders programme. I did not make
an entry in the telephone book. An entry was made. Proper practice must always be
followed. At Tunapuna Station, I spoke to Corporal Peterson. He told me they were
wanted for robbery and shooting in Tunapuna District. I can't say if they were gunmen.
He said they would send officers to collect claimants. That information would have been
recorded in telephone message book. It would have been recorded that officers from
Tunapuna would come to collect Claimants and that they were wanted. I can't recall
exact wording. It should have been recorded because that is proper police practice and it
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must be followed. I referred to extracts from phone message book. That does not appear
in phone message book. It is not necessary that it must be recorded in book. There is
nothing there that Tunapuna officers were coming to collect them. I am aware of
Standing Orders but I am not familiar with it at this time. I have seen the Standing
Orders, SO17. I came off duty on 12th
March, 2010 but I can't recall what time. I came
off duty before lunch. I returned on 13th
March, 2010. I can't recall what time. It was in
morning time. Probably 8:00 a.m. On 13th
March, 2010, I had conversation with
Corporal Peterson. I can't recall how. I got call on cell phone. I can't recall how I made
call. If I made call from station, it would have been in message book… Anything that
happens has to be recorded. I understand (c)(i) to mean that any phone calls to station
must be recorded. (g) means that entries must be recorded when man comes in and when
he leaves.”
Analysis & Findings
The Arrest
56. In consideration of the evidence adduced and in applying the relevant legal principles, I find
that the Defendant has proved on a balance of probabilities that PC Balkaran had reasonable
and probable cause to arrest the Claimants.
57. The Second and Third Claimants stated that when the First Claimant drove into the
Superpharm car park, he exited the Sentra and went into Superpharm. They remained seated
in the Sentra waiting for him to return when two men exited a Tucson and approached them
shouting “Police, Police”. By way of explanation for the Second Claimant being in the
driver’s seat at the time that the police approached them, the Second Claimant stated. “…I
entered the driver’s seat as we were listening to music…”, while the Third Claimant stated
“…. Randy went into the driver’s seat as he wanted to play some music”.
58. On the other hand, PC Balkaran stated that while he was on patrol at the Price Plaza
compound he observed the Sentra being driven by the Second Claimant at a slow rate of
speed and stopping in the vicinity of unoccupied parked vehicles before he intercepted the
vehicle. PC Balkaran also stated that he received information from E999 to the effect that
HAZ 4588 was registered as a green B14 motor vehicle in the name of Nigel Lewis of
Arima. PC Balkaran also said that he received information from PC Aroon and PC Seepersad
that the Sentra had been observed slowing down and stopping in the vicinity of parked,
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unoccupied vehicles on the compound. However, PC Aroon and PC Seepersad did not give
evidence of passing such information to PC Balkaran.
59. In my opinion, the evidence of PC Balkaran with regard to the circumstances of the
interception of the Sentra is more plausible than the evidence of the Second and Third
Claimants that they were seated in the Sentra in a parked position when the Police
approached them. I believe that the Second Claimant was in the driver’s seat because he was
in fact driving the Sentra at the time that he was stopped by PC Balkaran and not that he
moved from the back seat to the driver’s seat because he was listening to music.
60. With respect to the First Claimant, he gave evidence that when he left Superpharm, he could
not locate the Second and Third Claimants and the Sentra. He then called the Second
Claimant who told him that they were in a dark corner of the car park in the vicinity of
Subway. He walked in that direction and found the Sentra. There he saw two police officers,
one of whom asked him who was the owner of the vehicle. He replied that it was his. He was
then requested to produce his policy of insurance, a certified copy of ownership and engine
receipts for the Sentra. He complied and provided these documents to the police officer. He
was then informed by the officers that they had done a check on the Sentra and the number
plate matched a stolen Nissan B-14 motor vehicle. The First Claimant denied this and
insisted that he was the lawful owner of the Sentra and that he had bought it from Debra
George, as stated on the certificate of ownership that he produced to the police officers. The
police officers ignored him and repeated that HAZ 4588 was a B-14 motor vehicle. He was
then arrested.
61. PC Balkaran agreed that the First Claimant informed him that he was the owner of the Sentra
but stated that he never offered to provide his certified copy. He said he informed the
Claimants of the information in his possession in relation to the Sentra, he cautioned them
and they remained silent. The Claimants were searched and he informed them of suspected
warrants in their names and their legal rights and privileges. He then arrested the Claimants
and took them to the Station. However, under cross-examination, PC Balkaran gave evidence
that he asked the First Claimant for his certified copy of ownership and his certificate of
insurance although he did not say so in his witness statement. In addition, he admitted that he
did not receive any information from the Command Center about outstanding warrants in the
Page 24 of 81
names of the Claimants but stated that he suspected that the Claimants had warrants against
them.
62. The inconsistencies between the evidence contained in the witness statement of PC Balkaran
and his evidence under cross-examination undermines his credibility as to the details of his
communication with the First Claimant at the material time. However, what is clear from his
evidence is that he made observations about the suspicious movement of the Sentra driven by
the Second Claimant and he had information from E999 about HAZ 4588 being a green B-14
registered in the name of Nigel Lewis. Although in the Reply served by the Claimants, they
denied that the police officers ever informed the Claimants of the information in their
possession, they admitted in their evidence at the trial that PC Balkaran informed the
Claimants that the number plate of the Sentra matched that of a stolen B-14 vehicle and that
he suspected that the Sentra was a stolen vehicle. Further, PC Balkaran stated that he was in
charge of a party of police officers conducting surveillance duties at the Price Plaza
compound as a consequence of reports of larceny of motor vehicles and larceny on that
compound.
63. Based on my evaluation of the evidence, I am satisfied that, based on his own observation
and the information supplied by E999, PC Balkaran genuinely suspected the Claimants of
driving a stolen vehicle. Further, I am satisfied that a reasonable man having the knowledge
of the facts that PC Balkaran knew at the material time would have believed that the
Claimants were guilty of larceny of the Sentra. Accordingly, I find that PC Balkaran had
reasonable and probable cause for his suspicion.
64. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Defendant has justified the arrest of the
Claimants at the Price Plaza compound.
The Detention
65. In respect of the detention of the Claimants after their arrest, I am not satisfied that the
Defendant has justified their continued detention until 14th
March 2010 at 9.30 a.m.
66. PC Charlerie gave evidence that at approximately 10.00 p.m. on 11th
March 2010 he
contacted PC Peterson at the Tunapuna Police Station who informed him that the Claimants
were wanted for robbery and shooting offences in the district. He was informed that
arrangements would be made to pick them up from the Station and he proceeded off duty on
Page 25 of 81
the 12th
March 2010 and returned on the 13th
March 2010, without leaving any definite
arrangement in place for their collection within a reasonable time.
67. PC Balkaran, as the investigating officer and the officer responsible for their arrest and
detention, stated that he went off duty on 12th
March 2010 and returned to the Station on 13th
March 2010 at 8.30 p.m. Although he could not recall the exact time that he went off duty on
12th
March 2010, he stated under cross-examination that he was rostered to go off duty on
12th
March 2010 at 8.00 a.m. He produced no evidence from the station diary or otherwise to
show that he went off duty either earlier or later than that time and, therefore, I find that PC
Balkaran went off duty at 8.00 a.m. on 12th
March 2010.
68. Under cross-examination, PC Balkaran said that he could not recall what he did by way of
further investigation of the offence for which he had arrested the Claimants. He admitted that
he did not contact Nigel Lewis whose vehicle he suspected to be stolen, and he did not order
a certificate of ownership for the vehicle. He only interviewed the Third Claimant for 10-15
minutes but he refused to give a statement. Further, he made no recordings of his interview
with the Third Claimant in the station diary or his pocket diary or anywhere else. Although
he had given instructions for the First and Second Claimants to be interviewed by other
officers, he could not recall the names of the officers who conducted the interviews. He also
said that he spoke to the other officers who interviewed the First and Second Claimants but
there was no mention of any such conversation in his Witness Statement.
69. It is apparent from this evidence that having taken the Claimants into custody, PC Balkaran
did not conduct any further investigation, prior to their release on 14th
March, 2010, to dispel
or confirm his reasonable suspicion that the Sentra was a stolen vehicle and that the
Claimants or any of them were guilty of the offence of larceny. Having arrested the
Claimants at approximately 8.30 p.m. on the 11th
March 2010, it would have been legitimate
for him, in order to advance the public interest in the detection of crime, to detain them for a
reasonable time to conduct further enquiries into the suspected offence. However, based on
the fact that PC Peterson of the Tunapuna Police Station had stated that they were wanted in
that district for robbery and shooting offences and had promised to come to collect the
Claimants and take them into his custody, it is apparent that PC Balkaran neither pursued any
further investigation nor gave instructions to any other officer to do so prior to going off duty
on the 12th
March 2010 or up to the time of their release on the 14th
March 2010. In the
Page 26 of 81
absence of any attempt by any of the police officers involved in the case to give any account
of what action they took to conduct further investigations, I am of the opinion that such
inactivity turned what was initially a lawful arrest into an unlawful detention.
70. Accordingly, I find that the Defendant has failed to justify the detention of the Claimants
beyond 8.00 a.m. on 12th
March 2010 when PC Balkaran went off duty and their detention
between 8.00 a.m. on 12th
March 2010 and 9.30 a.m. on 14th
March 2010, a period of 49 ½
hours, was unlawful and in violation of their constitutional rights for which they are entitled
to damages.
B: WERE THE CLAIMANTS WRONGFULLY AND ILLEGALLY ASSAULTED AND
BATTERED BY POLICE OFFICERS AT THE STATION?
The Law
71. In relation to the tort of assault and battery, Halsbury’s Laws of England,18
states as
follows:
“A person commits an assault if he intentionally or recklessly causes another person to
apprehend the application to his body of immediate, unlawful force. An assault can be
committed by words alone if they cause the necessary apprehension. The requirement of
the apprehension of immediate force is satisfied if the prosecution proves a fear of force
at some time not excluding the immediate future.
A person commits a battery if he intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force to the
body of another person. The slightest degree of force, even mere touching, suffices. It is
not necessary that the victim should feel the force through his clothes: a touching of a
person's clothes is the equivalent of touching him…
Although an assault is a separate, independent crime and should be treated as such, for
practical purposes the term 'assault' is generally synonymous with 'battery' and is used to
mean the actual use of unlawful force to another person with the requisite mens rea…”
72. In Skinner v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,19
Pemberton J. stated that
both assault and battery are actionable per se, which means that once its occurrence is
established, the Claimant is entitled to compensation even if no actual damage was suffered.
18
Volume 25 (2010); Volume 26 (2010) at para. 157.
Page 27 of 81
The Evidence
The Claimants’ Evidence
73. The Claimants allege that they were brutally assaulted, battered and tortured on multiple
occasions by the servants and/or agents of the Defendant at the time of their arrest and
detention.20
First Claimant – Ricardo Youk-See
74. In his witness statement, the First Claimant stated that upon arrival to the Station on 11th
March, 2010, they were taken to the CID Section where their personal items were seized and
their names searched on a computer at the Station. At paragraph 12 of his Witness Statement
he stated as follows:
“… the police officers suddenly began beating us mercilessly. Two police officers whose
names I do not know, began to slap me in my face, kick me in my belly and cuffed me
about my body. I tried my best to brakes some of the blows however the police continued
to beat me. Every time I was cuffed it felt as if all the air inside my lungs was knocked out
of me…I could not bear the blows to the wound on my hand and the pain was
intolerable… The police officers continued beating me about my head, back, hands, chest
and face over a period of about thirty (30) minutes.”
75. He continued:
“13. … I was then dragged by the police officer to another room and they ordered me to
sit in a barrel drum, which had water in it… I refused and responded, “Boss I cah sit
down there because I just remove stitches from the wound in meh left hand this
morning”. The police officers said to me in response, “fuck that you go get thirty-six
more when we done with you!
15. The two police officers then bundled me to the ground and began shocking me with
the Taser. I immediately felt shocking, cramping pains in my body. My body felt lifeless,
as I was not able to move my body… I curled up in pain when the bursts of electricity
went into my body. I felt ripples running through my body and it felt as if my muscles in
my legs and hands were tearing apart…
19
HCA No. CV 2006-03721 at para 27. 20
Statement of Case filed on November 16, 2011 at para. 23(c).
Page 28 of 81
16. The police officers kept on pressing the red button and touching me with the taser
shocker all over my body from my belly going up to my head. The police officers kept on
shocking me until the Taser ran out of charge… The tall police officer then left the room
and brought back another shocking device,…
17. The tall police officer then ordered me to sit down in the grey metal barrel with water
and whilst I sat down, another brown skinned police officer approached me and poured
two mugs of water all over me… The tall police officer then walked towards me with the
taser and began to shock me all over my body… I bawled and begged the officers to
stop… I screamed out, “Ah going an dead call ah ambulance!” I felt as if my heart would
stop beating due to the amount of shock I endured…
19. Another police officer then approached me and took out a black gun and a bullet and
placed the bullet by my head. He then shouted, “Hear how a fucking bullet does sound
like!” I sat in fear… The officer then placed the magazine back into the gun and shouted,
“tell yuh brother your last wishes cuz you going an dead!” I stood in fear… The officer
then pointed the gun and pulled the trigger twice…
21. The police officers then continued to beat us again and I was repeatedly slapped,
kicked, cuffed and was shocked about six (6) times again with the taser gun. I was beaten
to a pulp and I had bruises and cuts all over my body…”
76. The First Claimant stated that upon his release from the Station on 14th
March, 2010, he
immediately visited the Eric Williams Medical Sciences Complex (“the Hospital”) to seek
treatment for the injuries he sustained while in police custody where he was examined and
treated by Dr. Ayhew who prepared a medical report. The First Claimant further stated that
he sought additional treatment on 16th
March, 2010 from Dr. Emmanuel Hosein who also
prepared a medical report. Both medical reports were annexed to his Witness Statement and
describe the injuries he sustained.
77. The First Claimant also stated that on 14th
March, 2010 he was interviewed by TV6 Reporter,
Ms. Marcia Hope and her report of the incident was aired on the 7.00 p.m. news on the said
day. He also stated that on 15th
March, 2010, he was interviewed by Crime Watch Talk Show
host, Mr. Ian Alleyne about the incident and the injuries suffered. At paragraph 43 of his
Witness Statement he stated:
Page 29 of 81
“The said news reports highlighted the injuries we suffered and a brief statement about
our incident. On Ian Alleyne’s programme, Mr. Alleyne, Kairon, Randy and I visited the
Chaguanas Police Station and we pointed out the areas of the station where the torture
occurred...”
78. Under cross-examination, the First Claimant stated as follows in relation to the alleged
assault and battery:
“I was taken to Task Force section and CID section…We were carried to side room.
There were four (4) officers there... There were about ten (10) officers involved in
beating… I was cooperating all the time. They just start beating us. They said they would
show us how Mammy is work and they shocked us. Lashes were hard. Slap and kick and
all kind of thing. I tried to brakes from lash. I was covering my face, and back and side. I
did not have real black and blue. I had real pain. I did not get bruises on face. I got burn
marks. I got bruises on hand and belly. I showed doctor all of that. I showed him burn
marks on my skin but not bruises on belly… I was tazered. I was unable to move. I curled
up. I gave up in a kind of way.
… They told us not to say that we were beaten by police because we have the Chaguanas
Health Centre locked. We were bawling out. None of officers came out. They were
beating us in another room. We were bawling in a whisper.
… Beating stopped at 1.45 a.m. It was not 5 hours of licks. There was beating and
stopping and changing us around. I can't add it up. More than half hour per person. It
was about hour…. We got licks on back, bottom when we were on ground and on hand.
They were hitting us medium… The officer in charge room asked if we had any injuries
and we said "No." We said that because the officers told us if we say yes we have injuries
they would deal with us.”
Second Claimant – Randy Youk-See
79. In his witness statement, the Second Claimant stated as follows:21
“14. The police officers of African and Indian descent who brought us in suddenly began
cuffing and kicking us about our bodies… I was dealt several hard blows to my hands
back and shoulders. I tried in vain to block the blows with my hands. The said police
21
Witness Statement of the Second Defendant filed January 18, 2013 at paras 14-16, 18-21, 23-28.
Page 30 of 81
officers hit me about fifteen (15) times about my body over a period of thirty (30)
minutes…
15. …the tall police officer that drove Ricardo’s car entered the room and ordered that
we stand up. I observed that he had in his hand a black object that was rectangular in
shape and was about four (4) inches long. He walked up to me and said, “Feel this”….As
he touched me, I felt a massive shock going through my body…
16. …The officers kept shocking us to the point where the battery had no more current...
18. …The tall police officer who had the taser then returned to the room with another
one… The officer then shouted, “allyuh ready to feel daddy now cuz mammy ain’t doing
nothing!”…
19. … The tall police officer that was holding the shocker then placed me on a chair with
my hands handcuffed behind my back. He then kept shocking me on my back with
“daddy”. While he was shocking me, the tall officer stood behind me and stepped on my
hands as he continued shocking me. The pain of the shock was unbearable… The shock
was so powerful that I immediately fell flat onto the ground.
20. One of the Indian police officers then took the taser, raised my jersey and began
shocking me repeatedly on my bare skin… the heat from the pins were so hot that it burnt
my skin. Every time the taser touched my bare skin, I heard a sizzling sound and my skin
smelt like it was roasting… I bawled and cried in pain uncontrollably…This torture was
the worst thing I ever endured.
21. … I received shocks to my back, arms, head, chest and legs. As a result of the amount
of shocks I got on my bare skin, I received burns and bruises all over my body…
23. … I was taken back to Pricesmart car park sometime around 10:00 p.m….the officer
with the bulletproof vest began slapping me about my back, hands, shoulder and face…
Afterwards, the police officer with the bulletproof vest took me back to the vehicle and
pulled out his gun and tapped me on the back of the head with it…
24. …The officer with the bulletproof vest then threatened me and said that he will kill me
and to turn around. When I turned around, the other officer had a handgun in his hand
and he placed the gun to my head and clicked the trigger twice. I immediately began to
cry as I thought that they were going to kill me….
Page 31 of 81
25. … I was taken back to the same area of the C.I.D. section …The same officers who
were present before started to beat me again. I was again slapped, cuffed and kicked
about my body several times over a period of about twenty (20) minutes…I had bruises
all over my body…
26. …The said officer then took a golf stick and began hitting us on our backs and
buttocks with the stick. I was struck about three or four times. The officer struck me so
hard that my skin got welt marks on it.
27. …the officer with the bulletproof vest picked me up and proceeded to drop me in a
grey metal barrel which had water in it. My hands were still handcuffed and when I fell
into the barrel my elbow got cut as it rubbed against the edges of the metal barrel.
28. The officer with pimples on his face then approached me with a taser in his hand and
started to shock me about my body… As I was soaked in water, the shocks felt even worse
than before…”
80. The Second Claimant stated that upon his release from the Station on 14th
March, 2010, his
mother took him to the Hospital to get treatment for the shocking and beating he received
while in custody. At paragraphs 39 and 40 of his Witness Statement the Second Claimant
stated that he was examined and treated by Dr. Ayhew as well as Dr. Emmanuel Hosein, both
of whom prepared medical reports which outlined the injuries he sustained. These reports
were annexed to his Witness Statement. Further, at paragraph 41 of his witness statement, he
said that on 14th
March 2010, his mother took photographs of his bruises to his neck, ankle
and back which showed the extent of the cuts and bruises that he sustained. Copies of the
photographs were annexed to his witness statement as exhibit “R.A.Y.S. 3”. However, since
these annexures were unclear photocopies of photographs, the Court was informed that the
photographs annexed to the Statement of Case as “Annex 7” were the colour photographs
which had been photocopied and annexed to the Witness Statement.
81. The Second Claimant also stated that shortly after his release on 14th
March, 2010 he was
interviewed by TV6 Reporter, Ms. Marcia Hope and her report of the incident was aired on
the 7.00 p.m. News on the said day. He also stated that on 15th
March, 2010, he was
interviewed by Crime Watch Talk Show host, Mr. Ian Alleyne about the incident and the
injuries suffered. In his Witness Statement he stated that he visited the Station along with Mr.
Alleyne and the other Claimants to point out the areas where the torture occurred.
Page 32 of 81
82. Under cross-examination, the Second Claimant stated as follows in relation to the alleged
assault and battery he sustained whilst in custody:
“… When I got cuff in face, I blocked the next one with my hand… They were not beating
me continuously. After they beat me, they would go to brother and then Kairon and then
come back to me. When I was being tazered, they put brother first and then throw me on
top of him. It was a steel barrel. It was like a steelpan barrel. My skin felt like it was
tearing but it did not tear. It was sinking in my hand. I told doctor that. I had on a jersey.
They raised up my jersey at bottom. They ripped up the top. The Tazer had metal pieces…
In medical from Dr. Ahyew he said tenderness to chest and back…. I don’t see any
reference to upper back. I had pain in upper back …. Same device used on back and
chest. Marks were not different on back and chest. They shocked back the most… They
put tazer on back, chest, behind my neck, back and a little thing on my foot. They were
using a small one named Mammy and a big one named Daddy. I saw big one with two
metal pieces…
Officers took me back to Price Plaza. Places started to close and place were dead when
they were clicking gun behind my head. They were beating me medium-- for me to feel. I
did not get any black and blue. No broken bones or welts. In police complaints I mention
everything about being hit with golf club….. There is no mention of golf club (in
complaint)”
Third Claimant – Kairon Baptiste
83. In his witness statement, the Third Claimant stated as follows:22
“13. …the police officers of African and Indian descent in the room suddenly grabbed us
and began cuffing, slapping and kicking us about our bodies several times. I was kicked,
slapped and cuffed about my back, shoulders, legs and hands… The beating went on for
about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes.
14. …The officer came towards us and pushed the black object towards my chest. I
immediately felt a burst of current running through my body… The officer continued
shocking us to the point that the battery in “Mammy” went dead.
22
Witness Statement of the Third Defendant filed January 18, 2013 at paras 13-16, 18-22.
Page 33 of 81
15. …The officer then grabbed me and began shocking me several times with “Daddy”
about my chest, neck, head and back…
16. Whilst they were beating and shocking me with the taser, there were about six to eight
officers present… The officers kept hitting and slapping me and shocking me with the
taser for about thirty (30) minutes…
18. One of the officers then said to me, “Make yuh last wish cuz we takin you to Carlsen
Field to be killed!” I began to tremble in fear… Soon after, one of the men in the Task
Force uniform began cuffing me three (3) times about my head, shoulder and neck…One
of the officers in the vehicle then said, “Yuh lucky your parents know you with we cuz I
was going to kill you and throw yuh body in the Caroni River!”… I was so scared that
they would kill me…
19. When we arrived back at the police station, I was then taken back to the CID
department… The same officers who were present started to beat me again. I was again
slapped, cuffed and kicked about my body several times…
20. …we were ordered to lie flat on our belly on the ground next to one another. One of
the police officers present then took a golf stick and began hitting us about our bodies.
The lash was so hard that I got welt marks on my body. The officers took turns hitting me
on my back, legs and bottom… I was once struck on my genitals with the golf club…
21. …one of the officers grabbed me by my neck and dropped me inside a grey barrel that
was half cut… My hands were handcuffed and became bruised when they threw me into
the barrel. The officers then took “daddy” and began shocking me about the body…
22. … I could not take the torture and beating anymore…
84. The Third Claimant stated that upon his release from the Station on 14th
March, 2010, he
visited the Hospital to get treatment for the injuries he sustained while in custody. The Third
Claimant stated that he was examined and treated by Dr. Ayhew on 14th
March, 2010 and by
Dr. Emmanuel Hosein on 16th
March, 2010, both of whom prepared medical reports which
described the injuries he sustained. These reports were annexed to his Witness Statement.
85. The Third Claimant also stated that shortly after his release on 14th
March, 2010 he was
interviewed by TV6 Reporter, Ms. Marcia Hope and her report of the incident was aired on
the 7.00 p.m. news on the said day. He also stated that on 15th
March, 2010, he was
Page 34 of 81
interviewed by Crime Watch Talk Show host, Mr. Ian Alleyne about the incident and the
injuries suffered. In his Witness Statement he stated that he visited the Station along with Mr.
Alleyne and the other Claimants to point out the areas where the torture occurred.
86. Under cross-examination the Third Claimant stated as follows in relation to the alleged
assault and battery:
“I was trying to block licks when officers were beating me. I was not blocking with my
hands. I was handcuffed. I could not block blows at all. According to medical of Dr.
Ahyew, he did not see a scratch on my body. I did not like that medical. I went to get
different medical from Dr. Hosein… More than 6 officers were involved in beating. Those
involved in beating included the 6. There were about 4 additional officers involved in
beating. One officer, a female officer, was not involved...
When I was being tazered, Ricardo and Randy were being beaten too. At the same time
everybody was getting beaten. It was in a line. It was non-stop licks. The officers did not
have to interchange. Everybody was handcuffed so we could not put up our hands to
block. I said I was beaten for about 10-15 minutes. I added another 20 minutes of
beating. I had bruises. They got black and blue. I got black and blues on back and on my
right forearm. Handcuffs were very tight.
On 11th
March, 2010, I was taken back to Price Plaza… When we went back there and
officers were clicking guns by our head, people were not seeing. Where we was nobody
would have seen us… I did not take pictures of black and blues. I showed reporter from
TV 6 the black and blues. I am not too sure if they showed that on TV.
A golf club is a hard metal thing. They were hitting me with hard metal thing at bottom.
They were hitting me very hard under my foot, my private parts and on my back. This was
very outstanding part of incident for me. In my complaint dated 15th
March, 2010, I did
not mention that…
All the injuries were on right side of my body. I was getting beaten in places to feel. I was
beaten all over the body. I agree there is nothing in medical about electric burn... I say
there is information in medical to support that I was assaulted and battered.”
Page 35 of 81
Medical Reports from the Medical Records Department, EWMSC
87. The Agreed Bundle of documents contained medical reports issued by the Medical Records
Department of the Eric Williams Medical Sciences Complex in respect of each Claimant.
These reports were all signed by Dr. Ahyew and described the injuries suffered by the
Claimants as well as expressed an opinion on how the injuries were probably inflicted.
88. The Report in respect of the First Claimant is dated 30th
March 2010 and stated that, upon
examination on 14th
March 2010, Dr. Ahyew found him to be suffering from “soft tissue
injury to anterior chest wall—mainly left side” and “soft tissue injury to left shoulder and
forearm.” Further, it stated that the injuries were probably inflicted with “hands and feet of
assailant.”
89. The report in respect of the Second Claimant is also dated 30th
March 2010 and stated that,
upon examination on 14th
March 2010, Dr. Ahyew found him to be suffering from “soft
tissue to anterior chest wall and lower back region” and “multiple healing scars over the
superior region of his back.” Further, it stated that the injuries were probably inflicted with
“hands and feet of assailant. Also, use of an electric shocking device.”
90. The report in respect of the Third Claimant is dated 15th
April 2010 and stated that, upon
examination on 14th
March 2010, Dr. Ahyew found him to be suffering from “soft tissue
injury to body mainly head, chest and abdomen.” Further, it stated that the injuries were
probably inflicted with “hands and feet of assailant.”
Medical Reports of Dr. Vernel Ahyew
91. The Agreed Bundle of documents also contained two medical reports dated April 7, 2010
from Dr. Ahyew which confirmed that the First and Second Claimants were examined by
him on 14th
March 2010, the date of their release from custody.
92. In his medical report for the First Claimant, Dr. Ahyew stated:
“The above mentioned patient was seen at Adult Priority Facility Department at Eric
Williams Medical Sciences Complex on 14/03/10. He presented one day after being
released from a four day stay in a prison cell. Patient claims during this time he was
beaten about the body, kicked in his chest and shocked several times with an electric
device. He presented with generalized body pain mainly of chest, left shoulder and
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forearm. The patient had removal of sutures to a stab wound of left forearm the day prior
to being incarcerated.
On examination he was found to have left sided anterior chest wall tenderness. His left
shoulder was mildly swollen over the deltoid region with slightly reduced range of
motion due to the pain, but there was no evidence of fracture. The left forearm showed
the healing laceration where the sutures had been removed. This was also tender and
mildly swollen but no signs of infection present. His vital signs were stable and
respiratory, cardiovascular examination normal. The patient was given an injection for
the pain and subsequently discharged on analgesics.”
93. In his medical report for the Second Claimant, Dr. Ahyew stated:
“The above mentioned patient presented to Adult Priority Care Facility Department at
Eric Williams Medical Sciences Complex on 14/03/10. The patient had been incarcerated
for four (4) days prior to presentation and claims he had been beaten over the body,
kicked in his chest and back and also shocked with an electric device. He was
complaining of generalized pains mainly of his chest, back and head.
Upon examination there was tenderness of his anterior chest wall and lower back region.
He was also noted to have multiple scars which has started to heal extending over the
superior region of his back. His vital signs were stable and there was no evidence of any
broken bones. Cardiovascular and respiratory examinations were normal.
He was given an injection for the pain the subsequently discharged on painkillers.”
Dr. Emmanuel Hosein
94. In his evidence-in-chief, Dr. Hosein stated that he examined the Claimants individually on
16th
March, 2010. The Claimants told him of their complaints, and he examined them
physically. He identified and put into evidence three medical reports dated 23rd
August, 2010
in respect of each Claimant.
95. Under cross-examination, Dr. Hosein stated as follows:
“I would be able to detect different types of injuries and how to classify injuries. I was
told they were shocked with taser devices. This was first time anyone complained of being
shocked with taser devices. I had examined persons who complained of being assaulted
Page 37 of 81
by police officers hundreds of times. I checked my pathology book. I noticed there was
blackened edges that were consistent with burns. Tiny wounds that looked like scratches
with blackened edges, some of them.
I examined them five days after incident. My report did not refer to blackened edges. That
is my fault. I thought it was significant but did not mention it. My report gave description
but I did not say they had burns. If a person was hit by golf club, I may not find swelling
and contusions after five days. It would depend on the extent of force used.
I don't recall having examined people being shocked. That is why I checked books. That
is why it gave blackened appearance. I checked books. Losing consciousness would
depend on amperage. Taser has high voltage but low amperage. When I say tenderness I
mean tender to touch. There is a method for grading. There is no grading in reports. In
original notes, I would have graded most of it…In pathology book, there was no picture
of person who had been tasered. It was word description. I am not acquainted with
tasers.
High voltage can create same effect as high temperature --produces same effect. I have
brought no literature here to support that. I brought my knowledge.
High amperage would cause burning as well. It produces a whole range of effects. I
cannot say how high or low voltage would cause burn. I know nothing about tasers. I am
not aware if they had two matching prongs. I am not able to answer in relation to tasers.
I said persons heal more quickly than others. Generally speaking, different factors would
affect healing. The rate of healing would depend on number of factors. If person was
treated and not treated, the healing would depend on how the injury was caused-- clean
scapel or pen knife would affect healing.”
96. In relation to the medical reports received from the Hospital, Dr. Hosein stated as follows:
“These reports ought not to show less injuries. That would be very surprising.”
97. In relation to the First Claimant’s evidence at paragraphs 12, 15, 16, 17 and 21 of his witness
Statement, Dr. Hosein stated as follows:
“My medical is not consistent with those allegations. He only had scratches on left upper
arm and not all over body…
Page 38 of 81
Ricardo Youk See had injury to left arm. It was old scar. In relation to other injuries, I
did not make any comparison of oldness or newness. I was told that that injury was old
injury. I can't say when other injuries would have occurred. I can't say if injuries were
old or new. It was not possible to say how long before the injuries occurred. In addition,
young persons heal quickly. I could say it would not have occurred within 48 hours. I
could not say if it occurred on 10th
March, 2010. Possibly it could have been 14th
March,
2010.”
98. In relation to his examination of the Second Claimant, Dr. Hosein stated as follows:
“I said Randy had multiple scratches to chest and abdomen… If someone was beaten by
multiple persons over 4 hours finding haematomas would depend on when you examine.
If person was kicked by police boots, it would depend on force of blows. If beating was
savage beating for 4 hours with metal and hard boots, I would expect to find
haematomas. Bearing in mind the time since the incident, injuries were consistent with
what I was told...
In case of Randy Youk See, I cannot say if injuries occurred on 11th
March, 2010. I can
say it would have been more than 48 hours before. It could not have been on 15th
March,
2010. It could have been 14th
March, 2010. It would not have been less than 48 hours. It
could have been 13th
March, 2010.”
99. When cross-examined on paragraphs 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Second
Claimant’s Witness Statement, Dr. Hosein stated as follows:
“I would not say that my medical reflects these allegations. I did not find marks from
handcuffs. Everything else is consistent especially because it was five days after. You
might find black and blue marks depending on how much blood leaked into tissue.
In my medical, there were scratches were all over body. I drew diagram showing
scratches to head, neck, back and upper arms. On front, on chest and abdomen there
were multiple scratches. On back of left thigh, there was 3 inch deep scratch and
moderate swelling. Nothing on calf and shin. There were scratches on ankle. Nothing on
buttocks.”
100. In relation to his examination of the Third Claimant, Dr. Hosein stated as follows:
Page 39 of 81
“… I said he had multiple scratches. A scratch is smaller than puncture in depth. A
scratch would be more superficial than a laceration. I did not make any conclusions. I
did not mention blackened edges. I have not seen scratches in persons who fall down or
playing sport. I have seen persons with scratches who received them from falling down.
No doctor could say when an injury occurred… The body would disperse blood over 2
weeks. Colour changes could give you an idea of time period. Being hit with golf club or
being cuffed in eye may cause haematoma. It would depend on where and how hard. In
terms of electric shock, being in contact with water may increase conductivity…”
Video Evidence
101. By consent of the parties, the Court viewed he video of the TV6 News Report by Marcia
Hope recorded on 14th
March, 2010 (“Video 1”) as well as the Crime Watch Interview by Ian
Alleyne recorded on 15th
March, 2010 (“Video 2”) and made the following observations:
Video 1
102. On Video 1, the Second Claimant displayed the injuries he allegedly sustained and the
video recording revealed what appeared to be significant bruising, scratches and/or scars on
his chest, stomach, back, neck and left elbow. However, the other Claimants did not display
their alleged injuries.
Video 2
103. On Video 2, all three Claimants displayed the injuries they allegedly sustained. In
relation to the First Claimant, I was able to see what appeared to be minor scratches on his
upper left upper left arm only. In relation to the Second Claimant, the video recording
revealed what appeared to be significant scratches and/or bruises and/or scratches and/or
scars on his chest, stomach, arms, and head as well as more severe bruises and/or scars to his
upper back and neck. In relation to the Third Claimant, I was able to see what appeared to be
minor scratches and/or bruises on his chest.
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The Defendant’s Evidence
104. In relation to the Claimants’ allegations of assault and battery, the Defendant, in the
Defence, made no admissions and stated that these allegations are the “crux of a related
criminal matter and put the Claimants to strict proof.”23
PC Balkaran
105. At paragraph 9 of his Witness Statement, PC Balkaran stated as follows in relation to the
assault and battery of the Claimants:
“9. … I did not assault or beat the Claimants but I do not wish to go into this issue since
it is before the criminal court…”
106. Under cross-examination he stated as follows:
“I recall allegations made by Claimants of being cuffed. I made a witness statement as a
result of allegations made against police officers by Claimants. I agree that I have not
put info in witness statement about Claimants being assaulted and battered. I say matter
is before the criminal court. I don't want to say anything about assault because matter is
before the criminal court. I came to assist the Court in this matter. I prefer to say nothing
about the assault because matter is before the criminal court.”
PC Charlerie
107. At paragraph 15 of his Witness Statement, PC Charlerie stated as follows in relation to
the assault and battery of the Claimants:
“15. The assault and battery aspect of this matter is engaging the criminal court and I
prefer not to go into detail about it but I will say that I did not assault and beat the
Claimants...I did not observe any other scratches, scars, scabbing on him or any of the
other Claimants because they were fully clothed.”
108. Under cross-examination he stated as follows:
“I am aware of allegations made by Claimants - assault, battered, beaten. I don't know
about being kicked. I am not aware they were slapped, cuffed on 11th
March, 2010… I am
aware they are alleging that they were tasered. These are serious allegations. My witness
statement is in answer to those allegations.”
23
Defence filed on June 1, 2012 at paras. 8and 9.
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PC Seepersad
109. At paragraph 9 of his Witness Statement, PC Seepersad stated as follows in relation to the
assault and battery of the Claimants:
“9. …I did not assault or beat the Claimants…”
110. Under cross-examination he stated as follows:
“I am aware of allegations made in this matter. I would have read it. I remembered they
said they were tasered. There is property register at Station. I don't know of any taser at
Station. I did not check property register for golf club. There is possibility that those
items could have been there.”
PC Aroon
111. At paragraph 9 of his Witness Statement, PC Aroon stated as follows in relation to the
assault and battery of the Claimants:
“… The Claimants did not report having been injured or threatened in any way by
anyone, … nor did I injure or threaten them in any way…”
112. Under cross-examination he stated as follows:
“I handed them over to Constable Lutchman. They did not report injuries to Lutchman.
He asked them and they said No. It is proper thing to do. I would have done so if I was
sentry. Constable Lutchman should have recorded their condition before he put them in
the cell. They did not report anything to me, injury or otherwise…”
113. Further, when the Claimants’ case was put to PC Aroon, he stated that during the time he
spent with the Claimants, (which amounted to between 30 minutes to 1 hour), he did not
observe anyone assaulting or battering them. He further stated that the Claimants were in his
presence from the time of their arrest to the time he placed them in the cell and during this
time they were not tasered.
Analysis and Findings
114. In my evaluation of the evidence, I am guided by the decision in Reid v Charles and
Bain24
where the Privy Council emphasized that where the Court is confronted with an acute
24
Privy Council Appeal No. 36 of 1987 at page 6.
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conflict of evidence between opposing parties, although the impression which the evidence
makes upon the judge is of the greatest importance, a wrong impression can be gained if this
is solely relied upon. In the words of Lord Acker:
“... In such a situation, where the wrong impression can be gained by the most
experienced of judges if he relies solely on the demeanour of the witnesses, it is important
for him to check that impression against contemporary documents, where they exist,
against the pleaded case and against the inherent probability or improbability of the
rival contentions, in the light in particular of facts and matters which are common
ground or unchallenged, or disputed only as an afterthought or otherwise in a very
unsatisfactory manner. Unless this approach is adopted, there is a real risk that the
evidence will not be properly evaluated and the trial judge will in the result have failed to
take proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses."
115. Bearing this guidance in mind, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the
Claimants were assaulted and battered by several police officers at the Station. In coming to
that conclusion, I have taken into account the following:
a. The evidence of each Claimant was in large measure consistent with each other
and confirmatory of the allegations made in the Statement of Case. Although
there were some inconsistencies with regard to the length of time that they were
beaten by the officers, they were not shaken in cross-examination from their
versions about the beatings, the administering of shocks to their bodies in a barrel
of water with tasers and the threats to kill them;
b. The witnesses for the Defendant were not very helpful in their evidence confining
themselves to bare denials that they had assaulted and beaten the Claimants and
declining to say more on the ground that there was a criminal matter before the
Magistrate’s court. Further, Counsel for the Defendant attempted in her cross-
examination to get the Claimants to admit that they had been engaged in a fight at
Maracas beach and that their injuries had been sustained in that incident.
However, the Defendant failed to make that allegation in the Defence or to call
any evidence to support this line of cross examination and, although the First
Claimant admitted that he was stabbed on his left forearm in that incident, the
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Second and Third Claimants did not admit that they had sustained any injuries in
that fight;
c. The evidence of the Claimants was consistent with the contemporary documents
produced at the trial, namely:
i. the medical reports for the Claimants issued by the Medical Records
Department of Eric Williams Medical Sciences Complex on 30th
March
2010 and 15th
April 2010 (included in the Agreed Bundle of documents);
ii. the Medical Reports of Dr. Ahyew dated 7th
April 2010 (included in the
Agreed Bundle of documents);
iii. the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Complaint Forms dated 15th
March 2010 signed by the Claimants (included in the Agreed Bundle of
documents);
iv. the medical reports of Dr. Hosein dated 23rd
August 2010 in respect of his
examination of the Claimants on the 16th
March 2010;
v. The statements dated the 18th
March 2010 signed by the Claimants
(included in the Agreed Bundle of documents);
vi. The further statements dated 23rd
April 2010 of the First and Second
Claimants (included in the Agreed Bundle of documents);
vii. The video recorded by TV 6 on the 14th
March 2010 (which revealed
bruises, scars and/or scratches on the Second Claimant’s body which was
consistent with his evidence) and the video recorded by the Crime Watch
program show on the 15th
March 2010 (which revealed bruises, scratches
and/or scars on the bodies of the Claimants which were consistent with
their evidence); and
viii. The photographs produced by the Second Claimant and annexed to the
Statement of Case and his Witness Statement. Although Counsel for the
Defendant sought to persuade this Court to disregard these photographs
on the grounds that they were inadmissible hearsay, she did not take any
evidential objection thereto prior to the tendering of his Witness
Statement into evidence. Further, Rule 30.8 gives the court a discretion to
permit a party to adduce hearsay evidence even though the party has not
served a hearsay notice. In the exercise of my discretion, therefore, I am
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prepared to admit these photographs since they are consistent with the
images of the Second Claimant contained in the two videos which were
admitted by consent of the parties and the Defendant will not suffer any
prejudice if these photographs are admitted into evidence.
d. The Claimants’ evidence about the injuries sustained from the assaults and battery
was supported in large measure by the testimony of Dr. Hosein at the trial.
Although Dr. Hosein stated that his medical was not consistent with the
allegations made by the Claimants in their witness statements as to the extent of
the physical beatings they endured, I am of the opinion that he gave a satisfactory
explanation for this difference based on the length of time that had elapsed
between the date of the injuries and the date of his examination (almost five days)
of the Claimants and the fact that the injuries sustained would have begun to heal
over that period of time;
e. The Claimants’ account of what transpired at the Station is more probable than
the Defendant’s suggestion that the Claimants may have sustained their injuries in
a fight at the beach. The Claimants’ evidence was made more credible by their
efforts to seek medical attention on the day of their release, the interviews
recorded by TV 6 on 14th
March 2010 and Crime Watch program on 15th
March
2010, their complaints to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service on the first
working day after their release and their efforts to seek further medical attention
from Dr. Hosein on 16th
March 2010. When I contrast this contemporaneous
evidence with the bare denials of assault and battery by the witnesses called by
the Defendant, I consider their version of events to be more plausible and
probable; and
f. The description of the injuries sustained by the Claimants in the several medical
reports and the video evidence of the injuries they sustained confirmed in my
mind that the Claimants were not fabricating these allegations of horrific
treatment while in custody but were speaking the truth.
116. Accordingly, I find that the Claimants have proved on a balance of probabilities that:
a. Shortly after their arrival at the Station, several police officers flung them to the
ground and kicked, slapped and beat them about their heads, backs, hands, chest
and facial areas;
Page 45 of 81
b. The Claimants were thrown into a barrel of water and electrocuted several times
about their bodies with taser guns;
c. One of the police officers at the Station, placed a bullet to the head of the First
Claimant and also placed the magazine into a gun and threatened to kill him. The
said police officer also pointed the gun at the First Claimant and pulled the trigger
twice which caused him to fear for his life;
d. One of the police officers who accompanied the Second Claimant back to the
Price Plaza compound on or about 10.45 p.m. on 11th
March, 2010, threatened to
kill him and another officer placed a gun to his head and clicked the trigger twice
which caused the Second Claimant to fear for his life; and
e. One of the police officers who accompanied the Third Claimant back to the Price
Plaza compound on or about 10.45 p.m. on 11th
March, 2010, cuffed him in his
head, shoulder and neck and another officer threatened to kill him which caused
the Third Claimant to fear for his life.
117. In the circumstances, the Claimants are entitled to damages for the heinous and vicious
assaults and battery perpetrated upon them by police officers at the Station as outlined above.
C: IS THE DEFENDANT LIABLE TO THE FIRST CLAIMANT FOR
DETINUE/CONVERSION OF THE SENTRA?
D: IS THE DEFENDANT LIABLE TO THE CLAIMANTS FOR THE
DETINUE/CONVERSION OF THEIR PERSONAL ITEMS?
The Law
118. According to Clerk & Lindsell on Torts:25
“The gist of liability in detinue is the wrongful detention of the plaintiff’s chattel. The
action was available against a defendant … who withheld the plaintiff’s chattel after the
plaintiff had demanded its return. The principal object of the action was to recover the
value of the chattel so detained…”26
“Conversion is an act of deliberate dealing with a chattel in a manner inconsistent with
another’s right to his possession or his right to the possession on it. To be liable the
25
13th
Edition (1969) No. 3 26
Ibid – para. 1072.
Page 46 of 81
defendant need not intend to question or deny the plaintiff’s rights; it is enough that his
conduct is inconsistent with those rights.27
”
119. In the Court of Appeal decision of Rattansingh v The Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago and Doopan (which was later approved by the Privy Council28
) Warner JA
stated as follows:29
“The claim in detinue
This action lies at the suit of a person who has an immediate right to the possession of the
goods against a person who is in possession of the goods and who on proper demand,
fails or refuses to deliver them up without lawful excuse. (See dictum of Donaldson J. in
Alicia Hosiery v Brown Shipley and Co. Ltd. [1969] 2 All E.R. 504 at 510). I think this
aptly encapsulates the relevant law.
The claim in conversion
To constitute conversion, there must be a positive wrongful dealing with the goods in a
manner inconsistent with the owner’s rights and an intention in so doing to deny the
owner’s rights or to assert a right inconsistent with them. The gist of the action is
inconsistency. There need not be any intention to challenge the true owner’s rights. A
demand and refusal is sufficient evidence of conversion.”
120. In the Privy Council decision of Jaroo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and
Tobago30
the Appellant claimed to have purchased a vehicle which was later suspected of
being stolen. The Appellant voluntarily handed the vehicle over to the Police for examination
and, in excess of fourteen years later, it had not been returned to him. The appeal was
dismissed by the Board which upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeal that the Appellant’s
decision to proceed with the action by way of constitutional motion was an abuse of process
and the appropriate remedy for the Appellant was to pursue at common law an action in
detinue.
121. In delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord Hope of Craighead considered the
relevant authorities on the issue:
27
Ibid – para. 1077. 28
(2004) UKPC 15 – PCA No. 41 of 2003. 29
CA Civ No. 105 of 2000. 30
(2002) UKPC 5.
Page 47 of 81
“[20] In Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427, [2000] 1 All ER
209, the police sought to retain sums of money which had been seized on suspicion that
they were the proceeds of drug trafficking. It was held that, even although it was
established on balance of probabilities that the money was the proceeds of drug
trafficking, this was no defence to the plaintiffs' claims as they could rely on their right to
possession as against the police. May LJ said at p 448:
“As to entitlement to possession, there is an instructive analysis in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Victoria in Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70. The essence of an extended passage in the
judgment of Macfarlan J, at pp 84-87, is that if goods are in the possession of a person, on the
face of it he has the right to that possession. His right to possession may be suspended or
temporarily divested if the goods are seized by the police under lawful authority. If the police right
to retain the goods comes to an end, the right to possession of the person from whom they were
seized revives. In the absence of any evidence that anybody else is the true owner, once the police
right of retention comes to an end, the person from whom they were compulsorily taken is entitled
to possession.”
[21] In Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2001] EWCA Civ 381,
[2001] 3 All ER 150, [2001] 1 WLR 1437, which was concerned with facts not dissimilar
to those in this case, the police seized a motor car which they believed was stolen and
retained it as its owner was unknown. The person from whom it had been taken raised an
action against the Chief Constable for delivery up and damages for unlawful detention of
the car. It was held by the Court of Appeal that, save so far as legislation otherwise
provided, possession, whether obtained lawfully or not, vested in the possessor a
possessory title which was good against the world save anyone setting up or claiming
under a better title and that, although he at all times knew that the car was stolen, the
claimant was entitled to an order for its delivery and to damages. Lightman J, with whom
Keene and Robert Walker LJJ agreed, said at p 1450D that possession is entitled to the
same legal protection whether or not it has been obtained lawfully or by theft or by other
unlawful means. The decision in Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000]
QB 427, [2000] 1 All ER 209, was followed and applied.
[26] In Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693, [1969] 3 All ER 1700, 708 of the former report
Lord Denning MR said that the freedom of the individual, whose privacy and possessions
were not to be invaded except for the most compelling reasons, had to be balanced
against the interests of society at large in finding out wrongdoers and repressing crime.
Page 48 of 81
He then set out at p 708-709 of the former report the following propositions which
explain where the balance is to be struck:
“Balancing these interests, I should have thought that, in order to justify the taking of an article
when no man has been arrested or charged, these requisites must be satisfied:
First: The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that a serious offence
has been committed – so serious that it is of the first importance that the offenders should be
caught and brought to justice.
Second: The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that the article in
question is either the fruit of the crime (as in the case of stolen goods) or is the instrument by
which the crime was committed (as in the case of the axe used by the murderer) or is material
evidence to prove the commission of the crime (as in the case of the car used by a bank raider
or the saucer used by a train robber).
Third: The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person in possession of it
has himself committed the crime, or is implicated in it, or is accessory to it, or at any rate his
refusal must be quite unreasonable.
Fourth: The police must not keep the article, nor prevent its removal, for any longer than is
reasonably necessary to complete their investigations or preserve it for evidence. If a copy
will suffice, it should be made and the original returned. As soon as the case is over, or it is
decided not to go on with it, the article should be returned.
Finally: The lawfulness of the conduct of the police must be judged at the time, and not by
what happens afterwards.”
[27] … It means that the following requisites had to be satisfied by the police in order to
justify their continued detention of the motor car. First, they must have had reasonable
grounds when they insisted on detaining it for believing that it was a stolen vehicle.
Second, they had to be in a position to show that its continued detention was reasonably
necessary to complete their investigations or to preserve it for evidence. As Roskill LJ
said in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1980] QB 49, [1979] 1 All ER 256,
70, there is no general power in the police, when they have lawfully seized property
which is thereafter not the subject of any charge and is clearly shown not to have been
stolen, to retain that property as against the person entitled to possession of it against
some uncertain future contingency. As he put it, the police who wish to continue to detain
the property must be able to justify their retention of it upon some ground which is
clearly ascertainable.”[all emphasis mine].
Page 49 of 81
The Evidence
The Claimants’ Evidence
122. The First Claimant alleged that his Sentra has been illegally detained and/or converted by
the police since the 11th
March, 2010 to date and as a result he has and continues to suffer
losses.
123. The Claimants also alleged that their personal items were seized by the police officers
while in custody and upon their release, the items were not returned. The Claimants
contended that, with the exception of a bag of groceries belonging to the First Claimant, none
of their personal items have been returned to date and as a result they have incurred damages.
First Claimant – Ricardo Youk-See
124. In his evidence, the First Claimant stated that upon arrival to the CID Section of the
Station, the Claimants were searched and all of their personal belongings were taken.31
Upon
his release the First Claimant stated that he requested that the Sentra and his personal items
be returned. At paragraphs 27 through 31 of his Witness Statement, he gives an account of
his efforts to secure the return of the Sentra and his personal belongings:
“27. As we were leaving the station, I requested to the police officers present that they
return my personal belongings and motor vehicle registration number HAZ 4588. My
personal items included the following, my Sony Ericsson cell phone and my Motorola
Rokr cellphone, valued at $2,500.00, my gold chain valued at $5,000.00, $1,500.00 cash
in Trinidad and Tobago dollars and my motor vehicle… However, a police officer…
informed me that I would have to return the next day to get back my belongings.
28. On the 15th
day of March, 2010,… I again visited the police station and we requested
that our items and my motor vehicle be returned to us… Sergeant Kissoonlal … gave me
back the groceries from the backseat of my motor vehicle but nothing else… he informed
me that there were no records of our personal belongings being lodged at the station and
that my motor vehicle… had to be examined by the Forensic Science Centre…
29. On the 16th
June, 2010, I again visited the Chaguanas Police Station… I met with one
Superintendent Cummings and informed him that I would like to get back my motor
31
Witness Statement of the First Claimant filed on 18th
January, 2013 at para. 10.
Page 50 of 81
vehicle… He then informed me that my motor vehicle… was cleared and would be
returned to me…About one (1) hour later, my keys were handed to me.
30. … a police officer... approached me and grabbed the keys from my hand… He then
shouted … “This car cannot leave the station, it still have to go to the Forensic Science
Centre for testing!”
31. To this date, despite several requests my motor vehicle and my belongings have never
been returned to me…”
125. The First Claimant also denied that he ever tampered with the firewall of the chassis and
replaced it. He stated that when he purchased the Sentra from Debra George in 2009, the
chassis number was the same and even prior to the said purchase the chassis number on the
Sentra was the same as reflected in the Certificate of Analysis. This is evidenced on the
certified copy of the Sentra which was annexed to his witness statement. It is on this basis
that the First Claimant argued that the detention of his Sentra was unlawful.32
126. Under cross-examination, the First Claimant maintained that the Sentra was owned by
him since 2009. He stated that he purchased it from Debra George who accompanied him to
transfer the Sentra in December 2009. He also stated that he offered to show his certificate of
ownership and receipt for an engine bought from Bicks to the police officers at the time of
arrest. The First Claimant also admitted that he was informed that the chassis number of the
Sentra was found to be tampered with and as such, it was being detained to conduct
investigations.
127. The Agreed Bundle of documents also included a certified copy of the Registration Card
for the Sentra which records that the First Claimant is the registered owner thereof since 21st
December 2009 and that the previous owner was in fact Debra George.
128. In relation to his other personal belongings, the First Claimant stated as follows under
cross-examination:
“I spoke to East Indian officer about getting belongings. I had a walkman. I provided no
receipt for that. I had another cell phone. In my statement of 18th
March, 2010 I said the
Sony Ericson was $1,200.00. I said it was between $1,200.00 to $1500.00. I did not say
that in my witness statement. I made claims for both phones from beginning…”
32
Witness Statement of the First Claimant filed on 18th
January, 2013 at paras. 36 to 39.
Page 51 of 81
129. When shown the particulars of special damage outlined in his Statement of Case the First
Claimant stated:
“I don't see claim for second phone here. At para 27 of my witness statement, I said both
phones were valued at $2,500.00. In statement dated 18th
March, 2010 I said Rokr was
valued at $900.00. I have no receipt for Rokr. It is not true that no phone was found in my
possession. I said 2 oz of gold valued at $5,000.00. The gold chain was 2 oz. I said it was
worth about $3000.00. I said it was worth $5,000.00. I signed statement without looking.
I don't have a bank account. I get paid through the Bank. I don't walk around with large
amount of cash. My mother gave me money to give my brother. He told me to hold it
because he had no pocket. It was not in my wallet. I had gold chain and money with me. I
contacted police station many times about vehicle. I did not include complaint about
getting back my vehicle. I signed police complaint on 15th March 2010.”
Second Claimant – Randy Youk-See
130. The Second Claimant gave the following evidence in relation to the seizure and return of
his personal items:
“7. The police officer of African descent searched me and took out of the front right
pocket of my jeans a black cardholder from the Eastern Credit Union, which had my
drivers permit, a prayer card. The said police officer also took my red Motorola cellular
phone, which I had, in my left front pocket. The officer took these items from me and they
were never returned.
37. As we were leaving the police station, I requested that the police return my
belongings, which included my driver’s permit, prayers and my Motorola cell phone.
However, I was only given back my driver’s permit and prayers. When I asked about my
cell phone, a police officer… indicated to us that we would have to return the next day to
collect our belongings.
38. On the 15th
day of March 2010… I again visited the Chaguanas Police Station and we
requested that our items be returned to us… Sergeant Kissoonlal attended to us… When I
again asked him about my cell phone he said to us that there was no records of our
personal belongings being lodged in the station and as such he does not know anything
about that.”
Page 52 of 81
131. Under cross-examination, when questioned about the seizure of his belongings at the
Pricesmart carpark, the Second Claimant stated as follows:
“They gave me back Driver’s Permit but kept my phone. They gave me back phone to
answer when brother was calling to ask where car was gone. Police gave me phone to
answer it. I said in my Witness Statement that he took it back.”
132. When shown paragraph 9 of his witness statement, the Second Defendant admitted that
he did not in fact state therein that the officer took back the cell phone from him after he had
spoken to his brother.
133. He further stated as follows under cross-examination:
“In the statement of case, I said I lost $500 for phone. I said I lost $1,500 (in statement
dated 18th
March, 2010). That was money from my mother that I told him (Ricardo) to
keep for me. He claimed it but it was my money and that is same thing.”
Third Claimant – Kairon Baptiste
134. The Third Claimant gave the following evidence in relation to the seizure and return of
his personal items:
“12. … we were taken to the CID section of the station. I was searched and my Nokia
phone and $300 in Trinidad and Tobago currency was taken from me….
30. As we were leaving the police station, I requested that the police return my
belongings, which included my Nokia phone and the sum of $300. However, the police
informed me that I would have to come back the next day to collect our belongings. On
the 15th
day of March 2010… I again visited the Chaguanas Police Station and we
requested that our items be returned to us… Sergeant Kissoonlal attended to us… When I
again asked him about my cell phone and money he said to us that there was no records
of our personal belongings being lodged in the station and as such he does not know
anything about that.”
135. Under cross-examination, the Third Claimant maintained that his cell phone and money
were seized. He further stated that:
“I had my money I went down with…. I don't have number for cell phone to tell Court
today. I don't have receipt for phone. I did not go by B-mobile to get copy.”
Page 53 of 81
The Defendant’s Evidence
136. It is the Defendant’s case that the arresting officer along with the other officers involved
in the investigation had reasonable and probable cause to seize the Sentra. The Defendant
further claims that the investigation into the ownership of the Sentra is still ongoing and as
such it cannot be held liable for any associated losses. 33
137. Further, the Defendant denied that any personal belongings of the Claimants were seized
and contended that the Claimants were not in possession of the alleged items when arrested.34
PC Balkaran
138. In relation to the seizure and detention of the Sentra, PC Balkaran stated in his evidence
that as a result of receiving certain information, the Sentra was intercepted. At paragraph 5 of
his Witness Statement he went on to state:
“5. … I then received further information from E999 Command center that HAZ 4588
was registered as a green B 14 motor vehicle under the name of Nigel Lewis of Martinez
Street Arima.
7. …the First Claimant … introduced himself as the owner of HAZ 4588. I informed all
three men of the information in relation to the vehicle and cautioned them and they
remained silent. The First named Claimant never offered to provide his certified copy …”
9. … Thereafter they were separated and interviewed in relation to Larceny of HAZ 4588.
I took the Third named Claimant to the Robbery Squad Office and interviewed him for
about ten to fifteen minutes. The Third named Claimant did not want to give a
statement…”
139. PC Balkaran gave evidence that the Sentra was inspected by personnel from the Stolen
Vehicles Unit on 19th
March, 2010 who gave instructions for the Sentra to be taken to the
Forensic Science Centre for testing in relation to apparent tampering with the chassis
number. He also stated that he applied for a certified copy for the Sentra and never received
same. As to the findings of the said testing, he stated as follows:
“16. On or about 14th
May, 2010, Josana Salina, a Scientific Officer I attached to the
Forensic Science Centre, examined HAZ 4588 at the Chaguanas Police Station and she
33
Defence filed on 1st June, 2012 at paras 14-15, 21-23.
34 Defence filed on 1
st June, 2012 at paras. 7 and 20.
Page 54 of 81
later provided me with a Certificate of Analysis dated November 12, 2010 which
indicates that the original Chassis number was cut out and replaced…
17. The last thing I know about the vehicle is that it was lodged at the Chaguanas Police
Station and the Stolen Vehicles Unit was conducting certain investigations.”
140. Under cross-examination, PC Balkaran stated as follows:
“The information that they would have passed to me was that this motor vehicle was
observed to be slowing down and stopping in the vicinity of parked unoccupied vehicles
on compound… As a result of receiving that information and other reason, I intercepted
vehicle. I made contact with E999 command center and passed on information relative to
HAZ 4588 and they in turn passed information back to me that this vehicle was recorded
on their database as a Nissan B14 motor vehicle registered to Nigel Lewis of Martinez
Street, Arima. I observed that the vehicle was a white coloured B12 vehicle…
On this exercise, there had been reports of larceny of vehicles on Price Plaza
compound…
When I met Randy and Keiron, Ricardo arrived approximately five minutes after. Before
this, Randy informed me that he was not owner of vehicle. He said Ricardo was owner of
vehicle. When Ricardo arrived, he informed me that he was owner of vehicle. He did not
show me certified copy of ownership for vehicle.
As a result of what he told me, I informed him of the information I had received… I asked
him for certified copy…
It is not in my Witness Statement that I asked him for certified copy. I agree it is relevant
fact in this matter whether he showed me certified copy or not. I recall you asking me
whether I put all relevant facts in Witness Statement…
The First Claimant never offered to provide a certificate of insurance for vehicle even
though he said vehicle was his. I asked him for it. I wanted to ensure it was his vehicle.
When I asked him for certified copy he did not produce anything to me…”
141. In relation to the investigation conducted regarding the Sentra, under cross-examination,
PC Balkaran stated as follows:
Page 55 of 81
“I was also investigating officer in respect of the car. The Claimants were interviewed. I
interviewed the third claimant. I can't recall at this time who interviewed the first or
second claimant. I gave instructions for them to be interviewed. The interview with third
claimant lasted approximately 10-15 minutes. I interviewed him alone. I did not make
recordings of that interview. I did not record this in station diary that I was going to
interview him. I did not record it in my pocket diary. I don't recall if I had a personal
diary. There is nowhere that interview was recorded. I interviewed the third claimant in
relation to the vehicle. I did not accuse him that number plate was tampered with. To the
best of my recollection I interviewed him in relation to larceny of vehicle. I can't recall if
this is first time I am speaking about larceny of vehicle. He made utterances to me that he
only went for a drive with first and second claimants. I attempted to verify that
information. I spoke to other officers who interviewed first and second claimants. I agree
that I attempted to verify information is not in my Witness Statemet. That is an important
matter but it is not in my Witness Statement…
I came off duty but I can't recall what time that was. I did not return to station until 13th
March, 2010. While they were in station, I cannot recall what I would have done by way
of investigation. I agree there is nothing in my Witness Statement about what
investigation I did while they were at Chaguanas Police Station. Based on information
from Command Center the vehicle was green B14 in name of Nigel Lewis. I did not
contact Nigel Lewis while they were at station. I agree there is nothing in Witness
Statement about investigations done by me as investigating officer while they were in
station. When I resumed duty on 13th
March, 2010, I had no dealings with them. They
remained in cell and I had no dealings with them.
I am experienced officer and I am familiar with standing orders. I am familiar with
standing orders in relation to station diaries. I can't recall what it says.
… There is no record of vehicle being seized… I agree there is nothing to say from these
entries… and nothing about seizure of vehicle.”
142. Under cross-examination relative to the Claimants’ possession of any belongings, PC
Balkaran stated:
Page 56 of 81
“I searched them. I searched all of Claimants.... I did not find anything in their
possession. They had no wallets. They had no car keys. They had no cell phone. They had
absolutely nothing on them.”
PC Charlerie
143. In his Witness Statement PC Charlerie made no mention of the seizure and detention of
the Sentra at the Station or any of the personal items belonging to the Claimants. In his cross-
examination, Counsel for the Claimants did not pose any questions to him with respect to the
detention of the Sentra at the Station or the seizure of and refusal to return to the Claimants
their personal items.
PC Seepersad
144. At paragraph 9 of his Witness Statement, PC Seepersad stated that he had no recollection
of the Claimants having anything in their possession, with the exception of the Sentra.
145. Under cross-examination, Counsel for the Claimants did not pose any questions to him
with regard to the seizure by the Police of personal items from the Claimants or the refusal to
return such items to them.
PC Aroon
146. At paragraph 9 of his Witness Statement, PC Aroon stated that he did not witness anyone
or partake in the larceny of any money, jewellery, cell phone or any personal property of the
Claimants.
147. Under cross-examination, Counsel for the Claimants did not pose any questions to him
with regard to the seizure by the Police of personal items from the Claimants or the refusal to
return such items to them.
Analysis and Findings
148. In consideration of the evidence adduced and in application of the relevant legal
principles, I find as follows:
Conversion/Detinue of the Sentra:
149. The First Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for conversion of the Sentra on the
grounds that the police officers, by refusing to return the Sentra to him, deliberately acted in
a manner inconsistent with his right to possession thereof.
Page 57 of 81
150. The initial seizure of the Sentra by PC Balkaran was justified based on his suspicion that
it was a stolen vehicle. He said he ordered a certified copy of the certificate of ownership in
March 2010 but he failed to obtain same within a reasonable time or at all. Further, he stated
that he received a certificate of analysis from the Forensic Science Centre but after his desk
was ransacked in July 2010, he could not locate same so he ordered another copy which he
received in November 2010. Upon my perusal of the Certificate of Analysis, I have noted
that it is dated 20th
May, 2010 and that there is a certificate thereon dated November 12, 2010
stating that it was a true and correct copy of the original certificate of analysis. Assuming
therefore that PC Balkaran received the original certificate of analysis shortly after 20th
May
2010, he did not lay any charge against the First Claimant or any of the Claimants with
respect to the possession of the Sentra within a reasonable time thereafter or at all. Further, I
accept the evidence of the First Claimant, that he again visited the Station on 16th
June, 2010
and again requested the return of the Sentra and was denied same. In my opinion, by 16th
June, 2010, a reasonable time had elapsed for PC Balkaran to make a decision whether to lay
a charge against the First Claimant or release the Sentra to him. This was in excess of three
months since the Claimants were released without charge and also almost one month after the
date of the certificate of analysis. It is not in dispute that PC Balkaran failed to lay any charge
against the First Claimant with respect to his possession of the Sentra and the Defendant’s
justification for the failure of the police to return the Sentra to the First Claimant was that
“investigations as to the true owner of the vehicle are still continuing.”35
However, PC
Balkaran did not produce any evidence that the Sentra was registered in the name of Nigel
Lewis and the certificate of ownership which was included in the Agreed Bundle of
documents confirmed that the First Claimant was the registered owner since December 2009.
He also stated that he did not contact Nigel Lewis while the Claimants were at the Station
and he did not give any evidence that he carried out any further investigations after their
release.
151. I accept the evidence of the First Claimant that he made a request for the return of the
Sentra on 16th
June, 2010 which was not challenged under cross-examination. Further,
notwithstanding the service of the Claim Form and Statement of Case upon the Defendant on
the 17th
November 2011, the Police have refused to return same to him.
35
Paragraph 21 of Defence filed on 1st
June 2012.
Page 58 of 81
152. In my opinion, the Defendant has not justified the refusal to return the Sentra to the First
Claimant when he requested same on 16th
June, 2010. Further, the Defendant has not justified
the continued detention of the Sentra by the Police after 16th
June, 2010 by reference to any
charge laid against the First Claimant or any other investigation being conducted in relation
thereto. Such refusal by the police to return the Sentra to the First Claimant amounted to a
wrongful dealing with the Sentra in a manner inconsistent with the First Claimant’s right to
possession thereof. Therefore, the Claimant is entitled to recover damages for conversion of
the Sentra.
Conversion/Detinue of Personal Items
First Claimant – Ricardo Youk-See
153. The First Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for conversion of his Sony Ericsson
phone as pleaded and not a Rokr phone which was not claimed in the particulars of special
damages. I accept the First Claimant’s evidence that he had a mobile phone with him on the
night that he was arrested and that he used same to contact the Second Claimant when he
came out of Superpharm and could not locate the Sentra and the Second and Third
Claimants. However, having regard to the conflict between the value of the Sony Ericsson
phone as pleaded, and the value stated in his Statement dated 18th
March 2010 and the value
stated in his Witness Statement, I find that the Claimant is only entitled to recover $1,200.00
for the conversion of the Sony Ericsson phone.
154. The First Claimant is not entitled to succeed in his claim for conversion of a gold chain.
The First Claimant claimed that he had a gold chain in in his possession and that it was
seized by the police when he was taken to the Station and that it was never returned to him.
However, his credibility in this regard was severely undermined by the conflict which was
revealed between the Statement of Case and the Witness Statement which both placed the
value of the chain at $5,000.00 and the Statement given by the First Claimant on the 18th
March 2010 which placed its value at $3,000.00. As a consequence of this conflict, I am not
satisfied that the First Claimant was being truthful as to his possession of a chain or the value
thereof. The burden lay upon the Claimant to prove his special damages and since it is
apparent that he sought to mislead the Court in claiming $5,000.00 for the loss of a gold
chain, I am not prepared to find in his favour in respect of this claim.
Page 59 of 81
155. The First Claimant is not entitled to succeed in his claim for conversion of $1,500.00
cash. In his Witness Statement, the First Claimant claimed that as he was leaving the Station
he asked the officers to return his personal belongings which included $1,500.00 cash.
However, under cross-examination, he said that he was holding this money for the Second
Claimant because the Second Claimant had no pocket. However, this evidence is in conflict
with the Second Claimant’s evidence. In his witness statement, the Second Claimant stated
that he was searched by a police officer at Price Plaza and the officer “took out of the front
right pocket of my jeans a black cardholder from the Eastern Credit Union, which had my
driver’s permit, a prayer car. The said police officer also took my red Motorola cellular
phone which I had in my left front pocket. The officer took these items from me and they were
never returned.” However, this evidence was in further conflict with the statement given by
the Second Claimant to the Police on the 18th
March 2010 where he stated that “the negro
police officer rub me down and he take out from my front right ¾ jeans pocket a black bank
card holder from Eastern Credit Union which had my driver’s permit, a card with a prayers
and $1,500.00 in cash Trinidad and Tobago currency made up of fifteen (15) one hundred
dollar bills in it. The negro police also take a Red Motorola camera phone that I had in my
left front pocket.”
156. Having regard to these conflicts in the evidence, I do not believe that the First Claimant
had in his possession $1,500.00 cash belonging to the Second Claimant which was taken
away from him by the police officers since the Second Claimant clearly stated that he had
two front pockets in his jeans and shortly after the incident he claimed in his statement dated
18th
March 2010 that the police took this amount from him when he was searched.
Second Claimant – Randy Youk-See
157. The Second Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for conversion of his Motorola
mobile phone on the grounds that I believe that he had a mobile phone in his possession at
Price Plaza which he used to answer the call from the First Claimant. I also believe that the
police took away this phone from him and have refused to return same. Although the Second
Claimant failed to bring any evidence to prove the value of the phone, he was not shaken in
his evidence that its value was $500.00 during cross-examination. Accordingly, the Second
Claimant is entitled to recover $500.00 for the loss of his Motorola phone.
Third Claimant – Kairon Baptiste
Page 60 of 81
158. The Third Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for conversion of his Nokia mobile
phone and cash of $300.00 on the grounds that I believe his evidence that these items were
taken away from him when he arrived at the Station and never returned to him. The Third
Claimant was not shaken under cross-examination and although he could not provide the
number of his cell phone to the Court, in his statement dated 18th
March 2010 he gave the
number of his cell phone. This lends credibility to his evidence.
E: ARE THE CLAIMANTS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES INCLUDING AGGRAVATED
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES?
SPECIAL DAMAGES
The Law
159. It is trite law that special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved. In
Rampersad v Willies Ice-cream Ltd36
Archie JA (as he then was) opined that a Claimant
was required to prove his losses. He stated:
“The rule is that the plaintiff must prove his loss. The correct approach is as stated by
Lord Goddard C.J in Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel [1948] 64 Law Times 177:
“Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages, it is for them
to prove their damage, it is not enough to write down the particulars, so to speak,
throw them at the head of the court saying ‘this is what I have lost, I ask you to
give me these damages. They have to prove it.”
160. However, in the later Court of Appeal decision of Great Northern Insurance Company
Limited v Ansola,37
Mendonca JA stated as follows:
“[97] ...it seems clear that the absence of evidence to support a plaintiff’s viva voce
evidence of special damage is not necessarily conclusive against him. While the absence
of supporting evidence is a factor to be considered by the trial Judge, he can support the
plaintiff’s claim on the basis of viva voce evidence only. This is particularly so where the
evidence is unchallenged and which, but for supporting evidence, the Judge was
prepared to accept. Indeed in such cases, the Court should be slow to reject the
36
Civ App 20 of 2002 37
Civ App 169 of 2008
Page 61 of 81
unchallenged evidence simply and only on the basis of the absence of supporting
evidence. There should be some other cogent reason.” (emphasis mine).
161. Accordingly, the door is not completely shut on a Claimant who pleads special damages
without producing documentary evidence in support of same. The court has a discretion to
make an award of special damages where the evidence with respect thereto is unchallenged,
providing that the court is otherwise minded to accept it.
162. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England:
“In actions for conversion the measure of damages is ordinarily the value of the goods at
the date of conversion.38
There is no universal rule for the assessment of damages in
conversion. Conversion varies widely both in form and in effect and requires a flexible
remedial response. In general, damages in conversion are compensatory, their object
being to repair the actual loss which the claimant suffers by reason of the conversion.
This conforms to the general rule that damages in tort must (so far as money can do so)
put the person whose right has been invaded in the same position as if it had been
respected. Accordingly, an award of damages in conversion must operate neither by way
of penalty to the defendant nor by way of windfall to the claimant. In general, there must
also be a causal connection between the act of conversion and the loss sustained, and
proof of actual loss.”39
Analysis & Findings – Special Damages
163. In the Defendant’s closing submissions filed on 23rd
May, 2014, in relation to special
damages claimed, it was submitted by Counsel that the Claimants had presented no evidence
in support of their claim for detinue and/or conversion and as such no damages should be
awarded.40
In respect of the First Claimant’s claim for loss of earnings it was submitted by
Counsel that such should not be allowed as he had failed once again to provide a bank
statement to support his income.41
Further, as to the First Claimant’s claim for loss of use, it
was submitted by Counsel that loss of use for driving a taxi was a claim for special damages
that had to be specifically proven but the First Claimant failed to disclose his taxi badge and
38
Volume 29 (2014) – para. 414. 39
Volume 45(2) Re-Issue para. 615. 40
Defendant’s Closing Submissions filed on 23rd
May, 2014 at para 140. 41
Ibid at para 30.
Page 62 of 81
in the absence of such evidence, only nominal damages could be awarded. The authority of
Heru & Others v Singh & Another (CV 2005-000129) was relied upon. 42
164. Further, by way of its propositions of law filed on 31st October, 2013, the Defendant
submitted that if the court were to rule in favour of the First Claimant in relation to loss of
use, a reasonable award would be $30.00 for 105 days. Counsel relied on the authorities of
Cassar v Home of the Running Chef Limited (HCA No. 796 of 1990) and Mahase v The
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2008-00027).43
165. In the Claimants’ closing submissions filed on 12th
November, 2014, it was argued that
although there was no documentary evidence in support of the special damages claimed, this
Court had a “measure of flexibility in the degree of proof”. It was further submitted that the
circumstances of the detinue and conversion was to be borne in mind along with the fact that
it may not have been reasonably practicable for the receipts of the pleaded items to have been
retained. In support of these arguments the Claimant relied on the authorities of Grant v
Moonan (CV 162 of 1995) and Ratcliffe v Evans (1892 2QB 524) respectively. Ultimately, it
is the Claimants’ case, as per their closing submissions, that the special damages pleaded
flow as a natural consequence of their unlawful detention and the detinue and /or conversion
of their property.
166. Further, by way of the Claimants’ propositions of law filed on 7th
May, 2012 and closing
submissions filed on 12th
November, 2014, it was submitted that on examination of the First
Claimant’s claim it is apparent that the Sentra is no longer roadworthy and has been
irreversibly converted. It was further submitted that the First Claimant was also entitled to
recover loss of use for at least 8 months from the date of conversion at a daily rate of
$150.00.
Conversion/Detinue of the Sentra
167. Having already determined that the First Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for
conversion of the Sentra, the issue arises as to the quantum to be awarded in respect of such
conversion. In the Statement of Case, the First Claimant claimed damages for detinue of the
Sentra in the amount of $17,000.00. In addition, he claimed loss of use of the Sentra at the
42
Ibid at para. 29. 43
Defendant’s Propositions of Law filed on 31st October, 2013 at paras 101 – 103.
Page 63 of 81
rate of $150.00 per day for 16 months amounting to $48,000.00 and loss of earnings of
$450.00 for three days.
168. However, in his Witness Statement, the First Claimant did not give any evidence as to the
value of the Sentra as at the date of seizure. The normal measure of damages for conversion
is the market value of the goods converted. As stated by Greer LJ in Hall v. Barclay,44
“where you are dealing with goods which can be readily bought in the market, a man whose
rights have been interfered with is never entitled to more than what he would have to pay to
buy a similar article in the market.” Counsel for the Claimants sought to argue that,
notwithstanding the absence of such evidence, the Court should exercise flexibility with
regard to the degree of proof necessary. However, it is trite law that a claim for special
damages must be specifically pleaded and specifically proved and the burden of proof lies
upon the person seeking to recover an award of special damages. The Claimant did not give
any evidence as to the amount he paid to purchase the Sentra in December 2009 from Debra
George, a mere three months before it was seized by the police. He failed to call Debra
George to give evidence of the price of the Sentra when she sold it to him. He failed to
produce a receipt for the payment of the purchase price and he failed to give any evidence as
to its condition in March 2010. In the circumstances, the Court is left to speculate as to the
value of the Sentra at the date of conversion.
169. According to the certificate of ownership which formed part of the Agreed Bundle of
documents, the year of manufacture of the Sentra was 1994, which means that in March 2010
it was 16 years old. Although I am satisfied that the First Claimant has suffered some loss as
a result of the conversion of the Sentra, in the absence of any evidence of the value of the
Sentra as at the date of conversion, I am only prepared to award the First Claimant nominal
damages in the amount of $10,000.00.
Loss of Earnings
170. The First Claimant has claimed loss of earnings for three days on the basis that he had to
re-apply for a new Driver’s Permit and was unable to work as a taxi-driver for that period. In
my opinion, the First Claimant has failed in his Witness Statement to give any evidence in
support of this claim. Accordingly, this claim is not allowed.
44
(1973) 3 All E.R. 620 at 623
Page 64 of 81
Loss of Use
171. In respect of this claim, the First Claimant is entitled to recover loss beyond that
represented by the value of the Sentra through being deprived of its use. This will turn on the
principles of remoteness of damage.45
However, he failed to produce his taxi badge or to
adduce evidence in support of his earnings as a taxi-driver. He simply stated that he lost
$150.00 per day and did not explain how he arrived at this amount. Notwithstanding the
absence of this evidence, I am satisfied that the First Claimant has suffered some loss as a
result of being deprived of the Sentra which was registered as a taxi. Given that I have
already awarded nominal damages to the First Claimant for the conversion of the Sentra, I
am prepared to award him nominal damages for the loss of use in the amount of $10,000.00.
Conversion/Detinue of Personal Items
First Claimant – Ricardo Youk-See
172. Having already determined that the First Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for
conversion of his Sony Ericsson phone, I take into account the conflict between the value of
the Sony Ericsson phone as pleaded, that is $1,500.00, the value stated in his Statement dated
18th
March 2010, namely $1,200.00, and the value of two phones stated in his Witness
Statement, that is $2,500.00. Although the First Claimant has failed to provide documentary
evidence in support of the value of this item, I find that the Claimant is entitled to recover
$1,200.00 for the conversion of the Sony Ericsson phone.
Second Claimant – Randy Youk-See
173. Having already determined that the Second Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim
for conversion of his Motorola mobile phone, I find that although the Second Claimant failed
to bring any evidence to prove the value of the phone, he was not shaken in his evidence that
its value was $500.00 during cross-examination. Although the Second Claimant has failed to
provide documentary evidence in support of the value of this item, I find that he is entitled to
recover $500.00 for the loss of his Motorola phone.
45
Mc Gregor on Damages (16th
Edition) at para1436.
Page 65 of 81
Third Claimant – Kairon Baptiste
174. Having already determined that the Third Claimant is entitled to succeed in his claim for
conversion of his Nokia mobile phone and cash of $300.00, I find that the Third Claimant is
entitled to recover $600.00 for the conversion of his phone and cash although he has failed to
provide documentary evidence in support of the value of the phone.
GENERAL DAMAGES
The Law
175. In Seegobin v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago46
Master Alexander
stated that:
“15. The primary object of an award of damages is to compensate the claimant for the
harm done to him. The secondary object is to punish the defendant for his conduct of
inflicting harm. In determining the award to compensate the claimant, the Privy Council
in Tamara Merson v The Attorney General of the Bahamas (PC Appeal 61 of 2003)
recommended that a distinction be made between compensatory damages (which would
include aggravated damages) and exemplary damages and the elements attributable to
these awards are to be identified.
16. In making the compensatory award, account shall be taken of the aggravating
features. The normal practice is that one figure is awarded as general damages. As noted
in the case of Thaddeus Bernard, Airports Authority of Trinidad v Nixie Quashie (CA Civ
159 of 1992), de la Bastide CJ (as he then was) explained, “[T]hese damages are
intended to be compensatory and include what is referred to as aggravated damages, i.e.
damages which are meant to provide compensation for the mental suffering inflicted on
the plaintiff as opposed to the physical injuries he may have suffered. Under this head of
mental suffering are included such matters as the affront to the person’s dignity, the
humiliation he has suffered, the damage to his reputation and standing in the eyes of
others and matters of that sort.”
46
HCA No. CV – 2009 - 03089
Page 66 of 81
AGGRAVATED DAMAGES
The Law
176. In the Privy Council decision of Subiah v The Attorney General of Trinidad and
Tobago47
Lord Bingham stated as follows in relation to compensation for aggravated
damages:
“Such compensation will take account of whatever aggravating features there may be in
the case, although it is not necessary and not usually desirable (contrary to the practice
commended by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales for directing juries in
Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 498, 516 D-E) for the
allowance for aggravated damages to be separately identified. Having identified an
appropriate sum (if any) to be awarded as compensation, the court must then ask itself
whether an award of that sum affords the victim adequate redress or whether an
additional award should be made to vindicate the victim’s constitutional right. The
answer is likely to be influenced by the quantum of the compensatory award, as also by
the gravity of the constitutional violation in question to the extent that this is not already
reflected in the compensatory award. As emphasised in Merson, however, the purpose of
such additional award is not to punish but to vindicate the right of the victim to carry on
his or her life free from unjustified executive interference, mistreatment or oppression.”
177. According to Smith JA in Merrick v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
and Others:48
“28. Aggravated damages are an element of the compensatory damages awarded to a
claimant to cater for an element of aggravation of the injury to the claimant. These
damages are separate and distinct from exemplary damages which are in the nature of a
punitive award of damages against a wrongdoer. An appropriate citation for the place of
aggravated damages in unlawful detention/false imprisonment is from the case of
Takitota v Attorney General and Others [2009] UKPC 11 where at paragraph 11 Lord
Carswell stated:
“In awarding compensatory damages the court may take account of an element of aggravation.
For example, in a case of unlawful detention it may increase the award to a higher figure than it
47
PCA No. 39 of 2007. 48
Civ App No. 146 of 2009 – Delivered on 5th
February, 2013.
Page 67 of 81
would have given simply for the deprivation of liberty, to reflect such matters as indignity and
humiliation arising from the circumstances of arrest or the conditions in which the Claimant was
held. The rationale for the inclusion of such an element is that the Claimant would not receive
sufficient compensation for the wrong sustained if the damages were restricted to a basic award.”
29. In Trinidad and Tobago, the accepted practice in cases of unlawful detention/false
imprisonment is to include the award for aggravated damages in the award of general
damages. (See de la Bastide C.J. in Thaddeus Bernard and Another v Nixie Quashie Civil
Appeal 159 of 1992 at page 5 and the most recent endorsement of this practice by the
Privy Council in Subiah v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2008] UKPC 47 at
paragraph 11). Even though a court must indicate the basis upon which it proposes to
make an award for aggravated damages, there is no need to state such aggravated
damages as a separate award.”
False Imprisonment
178. In Merrick (supra)49
Smith JA, stated as follows:
“21. In considering the adequacy of the trial judge’s award of damages one must always
bear in mind that this is a claim for the tort of false imprisonment. The principal heads of
general damage for this tort are firstly, compensation for the injury to liberty and
secondly, compensation for the injury to feelings. Under the head of compensation for
injury to feelings, matters that can be considered include the indignity, mental suffering,
disgrace, humiliation and loss of reputation suffered. (See McGregor on Damages 15th
Edition page 619).
22. The award of damages under the two heads of compensation for the injury to liberty
and the injury to feelings involves many subjective factors. So much so that one can
safely say that no injury to liberty or feelings will be the same as between different
persons. Hence in assessing general damages for false imprisonment:
“Any one person trying to fix a sum as compensation will probably find in his mind a wide bracket
within which any sum could be regarded by him as not unreasonable— and different people will
come to different conclusions. So in the end there will probably be a wide gap between the sum
which on an objective view could be regarded as the least and the sum which could be regarded
as the most to which the plaintiff is entitled as compensation.” (per Lord Reid in Cassell & Co Ltd
v Broome and Another [1972] 1 All ER 801 H.L. at page 836.)
49
Civ App No. 146 of 2009 – Delivered on 5th
February, 2013.
Page 68 of 81
Therefore in the exercise of assessing general damages for the tort of false imprisonment
there will probably be a wide range within which an award could reasonably be made
without interference from a court of appeal.
Further, in considering a range within which damages should fall, comparable cases are
a useful guide to both trial and appellate judges.”
Assault & Battery
179. In determining the general damages to be awarded for personal injuries, the Court is to be
guided by the principles set out by Wooding CJ, in Cornilliac v St. Louis,50
which are
summarized as follows:
i. the nature and extent of the injuries sustained;
ii. the nature and gravity of the resulting physical disability;
iii. pain and suffering which had to be endured;
iv. loss of amenities suffered; and
v. the extent to which pecuniary prospects were materially affected.
Analysis and Findings – General and Aggravated Damages [False Imprisonment]
180. In their Witness Statements, the Claimants described the conditions in the cell at the
Station as filthy with a disgusting smell of stale urine and faeces. They said that the cell had
no running water and the toilet was clogged with gazette paper and water overflowed into the
cell whenever the toilet was flushed. Under cross-examination, the First and Second
Claimants were not shaken in their evidence as to the condition of the cell but the Third
Claimant admitted that the cell was not dirty but insisted that the toilet would overflow onto
the ground in the cell.
181. In his witness station, PC Balkaran stated that there were four cells at the Station and
there was a toilet in each cell which was flushed from the outside and the cells were cleaned
on a daily basis by MTS. This was corroborated by PC Aroon in his witness statement. PC
Charlerie and PC Seepersad did not give any evidence with respect to the condition of the
cells. However, under cross-examination, PC Balkaran admitted that the cleaning of the cells
was supposed to be recorded in the Station Diary but there was no such entry. Further, he did
not see any cleaner from MTS cleaning the cell and he could not say if there was faeces in
50
(1966) 1 WIR 491
Page 69 of 81
the cell. Further, under cross-examination, PC Aroon stated that he could not agree or
disagree as to whether the cells were clean or not.
182. In the light of this evidence, I believe the evidence of the Claimants as to the condition of
the cells for the period of their detention and find that the cells in which they were
incarcerated were in a filthy condition with a disgusting smell of stale urine and faeces, that
the cells had no running water and the toilet was clogged with gazette paper and water
overflowed into the cell whenever the toilet was flushed.
183. The Claimants also stated in their witness statements that during the period of their
detention they were not informed of their constitutional right to retain and instruct an
Attorney-at-Law or allowed a telephone call to a friend or relative. Under cross-examination,
the First and Third Claimants insisted that they were not so informed but the Second
Claimant admitted that he was informed of his constitutional rights and privileges.
184. In his witness statement, PC Balkaran said he informed the Claimants of their legal rights
and privileges at the time of their arrest and this was corroborated by PC Charlerie in his
witness statement. Under cross examination, PC Balkaran insisted that he cautioned the
Claimants and informed them of their rights and privileges at the time of their arrest and PC
Charlerie was not cross-examined on this point.
185. In the light of the conflict between the evidence of the First and Third Claimants and the
evidence of the Second Claimant on this point, I am prepared to accept the evidence of PC
Balkaran and so find that he informed the Claimants of their constitutional rights and
privileges at the time of their arrest.
186. In the Defendant’s Closing Submissions filed on 23rd
May, 2014, it was submitted by
Counsel that the arrest and continued detention of the Claimants was lawful and that any
aggravating features of the arrest as claimed were unreliable when tested against the
evidence. 51
187. In the Defendant’s Propositions of Law filed on 31st October, 2013, Counsel submitted
that if the Court were to rule in favour of the Claimants and find that they were falsely
imprisoned, a reasonable award for general damages including aggravated damages should
51
Paras. 138 - 139.
Page 70 of 81
be within the range of $30,000.00 to $50,000.00 for each Claimant.52
Counsel suggested that
the Court should be guided by the awards made in following authorities:
a. Henry v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2007-03897);
b. Koon Koon v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2007-02192);
c. Kowlessar v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCA 350 of 1997); and
d. Mc Kenna v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago & Another (CV2006-
03114).
188. In the Claimants’ Closing Submissions filed on 12th
November, 2014, and Propositions of
Law filed on 7th
May, 2012, it was submitted that an award of $80,000.00 should be made to
each Claimant as general damages inclusive of an uplift for aggravated damages.53
. The
Claimants relied on the following authorities:
a. Barcoo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCA 1388 of 1989);
b. Clement v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV Civ. No. 95 of 2010);
c. Ramdial v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2009-02336);
d. Huggins v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCA 1714 of 1998);
e. Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2012-02695);
f. Superville v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2011-01152);
g. Bernadine v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-02956);
h. Mitchell v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Another (CV2007-
03220);
i. Francis v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCS 268 of 2003); and
j. Mohammed v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Others (CV2009-
02792).
189. Having already determined that the arrest of the Claimants was lawful but their
subsequent continued detention between 8.00 a.m. on 12th
March, 2010 and 9.30 a.m. on 14th
March 2010 was unlawful, I find that the Claimants are entitled to general damages including
aggravated damages for their unlawful detention for a period of 49 ½ hours. In the
determination of an appropriate award of damages under this head, I have reviewed the
authorities submitted by the parties and have found the following to be of direct relevance:
52
Para. 77. 53
Claimants’ Closing Submissions at Page 52; Claimants’ Propositions of Law at Para. 35.
Page 71 of 81
a. Huggins v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCA 1714 of 1998) -
delivered by Mendonca J. (as he then was) on 13th
December, 1999. The Claimant
was awarded general damages of $60,000.00 for an unlawful arrest and detention for
54 hours. He was also awarded $10,000.00 as aggravated damages.
b. Kowlessar v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCA 350 of 1997) –
delivered by Tam J. on 8th
October, 2001. The Claimant was awarded $38,000.00
inclusive of aggravated damages for false imprisonment for 2 days.
c. Barcoo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (HCA 1388 of 1989) -
delivered by Mendonca J (as he then was) on 19th
December, 2001. The Claimant
was awarded $75,000.00 inclusive of aggravated damages for false imprisonment for
5 days and malicious prosecution.
d. Mc Kenna v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago & Another
(CV2006-03114) – delivered by Stollmeyer J. (as he then was) on 17th
April,
2008. The Claimant was awarded $40,000.00 inclusive of aggravated damages for
false imprisonment for 3 days and malicious prosecution.
e. Mitchell v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Another
(CV2007-03220) – delivered by Jones J (as she then was) on 12th
June, 2008. The
Claimant in this matter was awarded $100,000.00 in general damages for wrongful
arrest and false imprisonment. The Claimant was arrested and detained for 2 days and
7 ½ hours on the mistaken belief that there was a warrant for his arrest.
f. Koon Koon v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2007-02192) –
delivered by Kokaram J. on 4th
July, 2010. The Claimant in this matter was
awarded $35,000.00 in general damages including aggravated damages for false
imprisonment and wrongful detention for 2 days;
g. Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2012-02695) - delivered
by Rajkumar J on 20th
March, 2014. The Claimant was awarded $45,000.00 in
general damages for false imprisonment for 24 hours.
190. I have also taken into consideration the following case not cited by either party:
a. Richardson & Alleyne v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV
2007 – 2686) - delivered by Dean-Armorer J, on 8th
January, 2013. The Claimants
Page 72 of 81
were awarded $40,000.00 each inclusive of aggravated damages for false
imprisonment for approximately 2 days.
191. Having regard to the trend seen in the awards of general and aggravated damages in the
aforementioned cases, and bearing in mind the length of their detention combined with the
condition of the cells in which they were incarcerated as found above, this Court is of the
view that the Claimants should be awarded the sum of $50,000.00 each as general damages
inclusive of an uplift for aggravated damages in respect of their unlawful detention for the
period of 49 ½ hours.
Analysis and Findings – General and Aggravated Damages [Assault & Battery]
192. In the Defendant’s Closing Submissions filed on 23rd
May, 2014, it was submitted by
Counsel that the Claimants’ claim for assault and battery should be dismissed. 54
In the
Defendant’s Propositions of Law filed on 31st October, 2013, Counsel submitted that if the
Court were to rule in favour of the Claimants and find that they were assaulted and battered,
a reasonable award for general damages including aggravated damages should be within the
following ranges for each Claimant:55
a. First Claimant - $20,000.00 to $35,000.00;
b. Second Claimant - $15,000.00 to $30,000.00; and
c. Third Claimant - $10,000.00 to $20,000.00.
193. Counsel for the Defendant suggested that the Court should be guided by the awards made
in following authorities:
a. Dalsingh v Knight (S1035/1975)
b. John & John v Solomon (HC 150/1987)
c. Samuel v TELCO (S431/1970; 1262/1970);
d. Wilson v Super-Mix Feeds (3809/1983); and
e. Campo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago & Another (CV2008-00044).
194. In the Claimants’ Closing Submissions filed on 12th
November, 2014, and Propositions of
Law filed on 7th
May, 2012, it was submitted that an award in the following amounts should
54
Para. 137. 55
Paras. 89 to 92.
Page 73 of 81
be made to each Claimant in respect of general damages inclusive of an uplift for aggravated
damages for assault and battery:56
a. First Claimant - $45,000.00;
b. Second Claimant - $50,000.00; and
c. Third Claimant - $40,000.00.
195. The Claimants relied on the following authorities:
a. Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2012-02695);
b. Superville v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2011-01152);
c. Bernadine v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-02956); and
d. Goring v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-03643);
196. Having already determined that the Claimants were unlawfully assaulted and battered, I
find that they are entitled to general damages including aggravated damages for the injuries
they sustained. In the determination of an appropriate award of damages under this head, I
have reviewed the authorities submitted by the parties and the Court bears in mind the
guidance provided by the Privy Council in Seepersad v Persad & Capital Insurance
Limited:57
“The Board entertain some reservations about the usefulness of resort to awards of
damages in cases decided a number of years ago, with the accompanying need to
extrapolate the amounts awarded into modern values. It is an inexact science and one
which should be exercised with some caution, the more so when it is important to ensure
that in comparing awards of damages for physical injuries one is comparing like with
like. The methodology of using comparisons is sound, but when they are of some antiquity
such comparisons can do no more than demonstrate a trend in very rough and general
terms.”
197. The cases relied on by the Defendant, as a guide to an award under this head of damages,
with the exception of one, were of some antiquity and as such they offered minimal guidance
to the court in making its award. Accordingly, on the authority of Seepersad(supra), this
Court is not inclined to rely on cases decided in excess of thirty (30) years ago.
56
Claimants’ Closing Submissions at Page 55; Claimants’ Propositions of Law at Para. 39. 57
Privy Council Appeal No. 86 of 2002 paragraph 15
Page 74 of 81
198. Accordingly, I have found the following cases to be relevant and useful:
a. Goring v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-03643) –
delivered by Rajkumar J. on 3rd
August, 2011. The Claimant was awarded general
damages inclusive of aggravated damages for assault and battery in the sum of
$100,000.00. Therein, the Claimant allegedly suffered facial lacerations, welt marks
about his body, tenderness, swelling and haematomas about the body, severe face and
head swelling as well as soft tissue injury.
b. Superville v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2011-01152)
delivered by Master Alexander on 20th
May, 2013. The Claimant was awarded
general damages of $65,000.00 for assault and battery. He was diagnosed as
sustaining soft tissue injuries. His specific injuries included lacerations to his face and
body, welt marks and bruises about the body, swelling and tenderness to several areas
of the body as well as extensive scarring.
c. Bernadine v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-02956) –
delivered by Rajkumar J. on 2nd
October, 2013. The Claimant was awarded
general damages inclusive of aggravated damages for assault and battery in the sum
of $55,000.00. The Claimant suffered soft tissue injuries for the most part along with
a laceration to the right eyebrow and ecchymoses of the right eye.
d. Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2012-02695) – delivered
by Rajkumar J. on 20th
March, 2014. The Claimant was awarded general damages
inclusive of aggravated damages for assault and battery in the sum of $55,000.00. The
Claimant suffered several abrasions, tenderness and swelling to the areas about the
body including the face, head, shoulder, arm and elbow.
199. The Claimants did not give evidence of any resulting disability, loss of earning capacity
or loss of amenities as a consequence of their injuries. Accordingly, taking into account the
recent trend in awards of general damages in the aforementioned cases, I accept the
submission of Counsel for the Claimants and make the following awards of general damages,
inclusive of an uplift for aggravated damages, to the Claimants for the injuries they sustained
and the associated pain and suffering they endured:
a. First Claimant - $45,000.00;
Page 75 of 81
b. Second Claimant - $50,000.00; and
c. Third Claimant - $40,000.00.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The Law
200. According to the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard:58
“Exemplary damages are essentially different from ordinary, damages. The object of
damages in the usual sense of the term is to compensate. The object of exemplary
damages is to punish and deter…”59
201. Further in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leceistershire60
it was established that
exemplary damages were to be awarded in the following circumstances:
“(a) The awards for compensatory damages are perceived as inadequate to achieve a
just result between the parties.
(b) The nature of the defendant’s conduct calls for a further response for the courts.
(c) The conscious wrongdoings by a defendant is so outrageous that something more is
needed to show that the law will not tolerate such behaviour.
(d) Without an award of exemplary damages justice will not be done otherwise.
(e) It is usually a last resort to fill a “regrettable lacuna”.”
202. In Merrick (supra) Smith JA stated as follows at para 42:
“42. Since the decision in Rookes v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 it is accepted that
exemplary damages can be awarded in three types of cases, namely:
(a) Where this is authorised by statute;
(b) Where the tortfeasor’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for
himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the innocent party;
or
58
(1964) AC 1129 59
Ibid at page 1221. 60
[(2002) AC 122 at para 63
Page 76 of 81
(c) Where there has been arbitrary, oppressive or unconstitutional action by
servants of the State.
This position has been repeatedly accepted in the courts of Trinidad and Tobago and I
see no reason to change it.”
Analysis and Findings – Exemplary Damages
203. In the Defendant’s Closing Submissions filed on 23rd
May, 2014, it was submitted by
Counsel that the Claimants’ claim for assault and battery should be dismissed and their arrest
and continued detention were lawful and further, any aggravating features of the arrest as
claimed were unreliable when tested against the evidence. 61
204. In the Defendant’s Propositions of Law filed on 31st October, 2013, Counsel submitted
that if the Court were to rule in favour of the Claimants in relation to an award of exemplary
damages, a reasonable award would be $20,000.00 to each Claimant. 62
Counsel relied on the
following authorities:
a. Bartholomew v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2009-04755);
b. Toney v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-00513);
c. St. Rose v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2009-004756); and
d. King v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2009-04757).
205. In the Claimants’ Closing Submissions filed on 12th
November, 2014, and Propositions of
Law filed on 7th
May, 2012, it was submitted that this case was appropriate for an award of
exemplary damages as the police abused their powers and the Claimants suffered brutal,
sadistic and oppressive treatment at their hands. It was submitted that an award of at least
$90,000.00 should be made to each Claimant.63
The Claimants relied on the following
authorities:
a. Wallace v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2008-04009);
b. Goring v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-03643);
c. Bernadine v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-02956); and
d. Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2012-02695).
61
Paras. 137 - 139. 62
Para. 96. 63
Claimants’ Closing Submissions at Page 58; Claimants’ Propositions of Law at Para. 45.
Page 77 of 81
206. In consideration of the evidence adduced and in application of the relevant legal
principles, I find that the conduct of the police officers at the Station was arbitrary,
oppressive and unconstitutional. The Claimants were subjected to horrific treatment by the
Police while in custody at the Station, which included threats to kill them, severe beatings by
the officers and shocks to their wet bodies with an electric taser which, in my opinion,
amounted to torture. The conduct of the officers was most reprehensible and deserving of
harsh criticism by this Court. In a society where every citizen has a fundamental right to life,
liberty, security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process
of law, it is shocking and distressing for this Court to have heard from the Claimants the
terrible ordeal that they were made to endure at the hands of members of the police service
whose motto is “to protect and serve.” In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that an
award of exemplary damages is appropriate in this matter.
207. I have found all the authorities cited by the parties in relation to the determination of an
appropriate award of exemplary damages, to be relevant and helpful.
a. Bartholomew, Frankie, J; Toney, Terrell; St. Rose, Randy; King, Leon v The
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (H.C.4755/2009. CV.2009-04755.
H.C.513/2010. CV.2010-00513. H.C.4756/2009. CV.2009-004756. H.C.4757/2009.
CV.2009-04757.) – delivered by Jones J (as she then was) on 13th
January, 2011.
The Claimants in these cases (which were all heard together as they arose out of the
same incident), were awarded $20,000.00 in exemplary damages. Jones J (as she then
was) found that the Claimants, who were at the material time prisoners in a holding
cell at the Port of Spain Magistrates Court, suffered injuries as a result of extreme and
deliberate force on the part of the police. She also concluded that given the
Defendant’s admission of battery and failure to establish self-defence, the Claimants
case succeeded and they were entitled to general damages including aggravated
damages and also exemplary damages.
b. Wallace v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2008-04009) –
delivered by this Court on 2nd
October, 2009. The Claimant in this matter was
awarded $70,000.00 in exemplary damages for assault and battery. The court stated
that this award was made:
Page 78 of 81
“64. …to reinforce this Court’s condemnation of the inhuman treatment meted
out to the Claimant by these prison officers and to deter the officers concerned
and others from repeating such conduct.”
c. Goring v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-03643) –
delivered by Rajkumar J. on 3rd
August, 2011. The Claimant in this matter was
awarded $100,000.00 in exemplary damages for assault and battery. In this incident
the Claimant was a prisoner and was subjected to a brutal assault by several officers.
Therein Rajkumar J. stated as follows:
“2. With respect to the exemplary aspect of the case, I think first of all this is a
case where exemplary damages must be awarded. The facts and circumstances
detailed herein must attract the strongest possible statement of condemnation.
One of the hallmarks of this case is the repeated nature of the assaults on the
claimant…
4. No court can ignore allegations such as those made by this claimant. The
assaults he described are no different in effect from torture, and whether you call
it assault or torture in this case doesn’t change the nature of the actions that took
place…”
d. Bernadine v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2010-02956) –
delivered by Rajkumar J. on 2nd
October, 2013. The Claimant in this matter was
awarded $90,000.00 in exemplary damages. In giving judgment, Rajkamur J. found
that on the circumstances of this case, exemplary damages ought to be awarded on the
following basis:
“84. … (i) The fact that the unlawful battery of the claimant was compounded by
his detention and his ordeal being prolonged by a show of investigating the
circumstances surrounding the imaginary passenger with the gun, and the farce
of searching for arms and ammunition as a result. (ii) The urgent need to deter
such conduct before there is loss of life.”
e. Ali v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (CV2012-02695) – delivered
by Rajkumar J. on 20th
March, 2014. The Claimant was awarded exemplary
Page 79 of 81
damages of $90,000.00. In this matter the Claimant was falsely imprisoned for 24
hours and assaulted by officers during his detention. Rajkumar J stated as follows:
“204. In the instant case the quantum of the compensatory aspect of the damages,
including the matters in aggravation has been taken into account. The balancing
act, preserving the need for moderation, with the need to send a message of
deterrence, may yet be accomplished by an award of exemplary damages, in this
case of $90,000.00. This is $10,000.00 less than the award of this court in
Goring. The quantum of exemplary damages required to achieve the purpose of
exemplary damages, in particular, deterrence, is accordingly set at $90,000.00...”
208. Taking these authorities into consideration, this Court is of the view that each Claimant
should be awarded the sum of $100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
INTEREST
209. It is my opinion that the Claimants are entitled to interest on the award of general
damages for false imprisonment and assault at a rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
filing of this Claim, 16th
November, 2011, to the date of judgment, 29th
June, 2015.
210. Further, the First Claimant is entitled to interest on the award of special damages of
$1,200.00 for the conversion of his cellular phone at a rate of 6% per annum from 14th
March, 2010 to the date of judgment, 29th
June, 2015 and on the awards of nominal damages
of $20,000.00 for the conversion of the Sentra and loss of use at a rate of 6% per annum from
16th
June, 2010 to the date of judgment, 29th
June, 2015. The Second and Third Claimants are
also entitled to interest on the award of special damages of $500.00 and $600.00 respectively,
at a rate of 6% per annum from March 14, 2010 to the date of judgment, 29th
June, 2015.
COSTS
211. In my opinion, the Claimants are entitled to an award of costs to be determined in
accordance with Rule 67.5 of the Civil Proceedings Rules 1998 (as amended). This Rule
provides that the costs payable should be based on the value of the claim which in the case of
a Claimant is the amount agreed or ordered to be paid. Therefore, the Defendant is to pay to
Page 80 of 81
the Claimants costs to be determined in accordance with Appendix B and based on the
amounts awarded, inclusive of interest.64
THE ORDER
212. In consideration of the aforementioned, it is hereby ordered as follows:
a. That the Defendant do pay to the Claimants special damages for conversion as
follows:
i. First Claimant - $21,200.00;
ii. Second Claimant - $500.00; and
iii. Third Claimant - $600.00.
b. That the Defendant do pay to each of the Claimants general damages, inclusive of
aggravated damages, for false imprisonment the amount of $50,000.00;
c. That the Defendant do pay the Claimants general damages, inclusive of
aggravated damages, for assault and battery as follows;
i. First Claimant - $45,000.00;
ii. Second Claimant - $50,000.00; and
iii. Third Claimant - $40,000.00.
d. That the Defendant do pay to each of the Claimants exemplary damages in the
amount of $100,000.00;
e. That the Defendant do pay to the Claimants interest on the special damages as
follows:
i. First Claimant – Interest on the amount of $1,200.00 at a rate of 6%
per annum from 14th
March, 2010 to 29th
June, 2015 and on the award
of nominal damages of $20,000.00 at a rate of 6% per annum from
16th
June, 2010 to 29th
June, 2015;
ii. Second Claimant – Interest on the amount of $500.00 at a rate of 6%
per annum from March 14, 2010 to 29th
June, 2015; and
iii. Third Claimant – Interest on the amount of $600.00 at a rate of 6% per
annum from March 14, 2010 to 29th
June, 2015.
64
Leriche v Maurice – PCA No. 25 of 2004.
Page 81 of 81
f. That the Defendant do pay to the Claimants interest on the general damages at a
rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of this Claim, 16th
November,
2011 to the date of judgment, 29th
June, 2015; and
g. That the Defendant do pay to the Claimants costs based on the amount ordered to
be paid inclusive of interest pursuant to Rule 67.5 of the Civil Proceedings Rules
1998 (as amended).
Dated this 29th
day of June, 2015
……………………………………
Andre des Vignes
Judge