Summer 1995

The Relevance of Happiness to Eternal

Existence: Some Reflections on

Ibn Sina’s View by Shams C. Inati, Ph.D.

Villanova University

Abstract The task of this paper is to determine Ibn Sina’s view on the following issues: the nature of the object of human happiness, the method for attaining this object, and the consequence of attainingor of falling short of attaining this object.

I Ibn Sina identifies human happiness with the highest human

good. His view was developed in relation to the thinking of previous philosophers, which bears reviewing here. Aristotle, a key influ- ence, contends that human happiness consists of being good and that goodness consists of having the soul act in accordance with virtue. There are, moreover, various types of virtue. The more complete and better the virtue, the higher the good. I t follows that the highest good is in accordance with the most complete and best

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virtue.'The most complete and best virtue, however, is that which is in accordance with or which completes the essence of a thing-this virtue being an activity or exercise of the essence of a thing. This activity or exercise constitutes the proper or specific function of a thing. The essence of being human, according to Aristotle, is reason. The conclusion to be drawn is that the highest good or happiness is an activity or exercise of reason. This activity or exercise is contem- platiox2

The question then arises: What, to Aristotle, is the object of contemplation? Aristotle's general view seems to be this: Such an object consists of the essences or forms of things, including those of the celestial intellects and stars, as well as of the first or undemon- strative principles of kn~wledge.~ Aristotle attributes nobility and divinity to such thing^,^ perhaps on account of their eternity.

Now how do we attain such an object? The Aristotelian re- sponse asserts that we have two types of senses: external senses and internal senses. The external senses are sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. By means of these senses, we discover common features (forms) of physical things around us. We extract these forms from things by the external senses, wherein they remain represented as attached t o material things. Therefore, they cannot be completely intelligible or known, for materiality, as Plato, Aristotle, and many other ancient and medieval philosophers thought, is an impediment to knowledge. In order for a thing to be known, that thing must be completely free from matter. After the forms pass through the external senses, they are transmitted to the internal senses, the last of which is the imagination. In the internal senses, the forms are somewhat purified; nevertheless, they remain mixed with matter. Thus, they remain unintelligible. In addition to our senses, there is an element that is referred to as the active or agent-intellect that has been, and still is, the subject of contr~versy.~ This active intellect is compared to the sun, which sheds its light on the imagination, making the objects of the imaginationvisible to our intellect. At that point, we know the essences or realities of things. This realization gives us happiness.

Moving on to Plotinus, we find that the Aristotelian notion of contemplation is transformed into the notion of union or being with the object. A human being is no longer to seek knowledge as such; he is now to seek union, or being with the object.6 Further, the object of this union is no longer just the essences of things, but God hirn~elf .~ Plotinus teaches that there are two movements in the universe, downward and upward. The downward movement, a flow

D@t of Middh Eust Studies 13

of things from God, is referred to as “emanation” or, in some sense, a “creation.” The upward movement is the reverse of this: things return to God, their primary source, and unite with Him. This union is the ultimate human good or happiness.

Ibn Sina comes to synthesize these two trends, the Aristotelian and the Plotinian. The story of creation, as Ibn Sina tells it, sheds light on his approach. We cannot begin by saying: “Once upon a time there was something called God,’’ because God is out of time. Rather, we can say that God existed and was pure intelligence. Because of this, He could do nothing but think. Since in eternity there was nothing in the universe other than Him, He could not think except of Himself. As He thought of Himself, another idea or intelligence came about-the first-caused intelligence. This first-caused intelli- gence also had nothing else to do other than think. I t had a larger number of objects of thought than God had, however. I t had the option of thinking of (1) God as its cause, (2) itself as a necessary outcome of God‘s thought, and (3) itself as possible in itself.8 Thus, this intelligence thought of these three objects. As it thought of God as its cause, a second intelligence came into being, the intelligence of the first heaven. As it thought of itself as necessitated through God, the first soul in the universe, the soul of the first heaven, came into being. Finally, as it thought of itself as possible in itself, the body of the first heaven came into being. The second intelligence, or intelligence of the first heaven, also had the option of thinking of its cause, of itself as necessitated through its cause, and of itself as possible in itself. As it thought of these three objects, another celestial intelligence, soul, and body came into existence, respec- tively.

This process of production or creation through thought or reflection continued until there were eleven heavenly intelligenc- e ~ , ~ ten heavenly souls, and ten heavenly bodies. This process culminated in the production of the intelligence of the moon, this intelligence being the active or agent-intellect which manages our world. As mentioned, the nature and place of the Aristotelian active intelligence is controversial. Ibn Sina leaves no room for controver- sy in this regard. Like al-Farabi, he gives the name “active intelli- gence” or “agent-intellect” to the last celestial intelligence, the intelligence of the moon.1°

When the intelligence of the moon thought of its cause, a divine element akin to the celestial intelligences was produced in our soul. This is our theoretical or speculative intellect. Because it is divine and infinite, it is capable of grasping those aspects of the universe

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that are of a similar nature. When the agent-intellect thought of itself as necessitated through its cause, another element akin to the celestial souls was produced in our soul. This is our practical intellect. A link between the theoretical intellect and the human body, the practical intellect is responsible for knowing the ethical norms and applying them to our daily lives. Finally, as the agent- intellect thought of itself as possible in itself, our bodies and other material things on this earth came into being.

Now that we are on this earth, what is our primary task? Our primary task is said to be to achieve what is best for us. And what is best for us is said to be what completes our nature or essence. This completion is our specific or proper perfection. To Ibn Sina, as to Aristot1e;this completion consists of thinking, which is the activity of our reason since reason is our essence. This completion can be achieved through two principles, love and yearning, that have been implanted in our nature, as they are implanted in the natures of all physical things.” Love is defined as the joy of conceiving the presence of a certain essence, while yearning is defined as the movement for completing this joy.12

The question now arises, What is the object of our activity of reason? Is it just the essences of things, as Aristotle holds, or is it God, as Plotinus believes, or is it something else? Ibn Sina synthe- sizes both the Aristotelian and Plotinian views. As we will soon see, he believes that the essences or realities of things-as well as all the heavenly intelligences, souls and bodies, and primarily God-are objects of our reasoning or contemplation. I t is also worth noting here that Ibn Sina speaks of “contemplation” in a different sense from Aristotle’s use of it, transforming contemplation into “union.” This shift in meaning may have resulted from an attempt on Ibn Sina’s part to synthesize the Aristotelian and Plotinian points of view. But one may wonder whether it is possible for contemplation to be turned into union. Ibn Sina’s stand is that this is possible because the object of thinking, thought, and the thinker are onel3- all being immaterial. Therefore, there is nothing that separates them. Thus, to think, contemplate, or know something is to become one with it.

I t must be made clear that the above interpretation of Ibn Sina’s position is controversial. There are some, for example, who understand Ibn Sina to be saying that the highest object of human contemplation is nothing but conjunction with the agent-intellect i t~e1f.l~ Another point that seems to be proposed is that it is the Aristotelian concept of contemplation or vision and not the Plotin-

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ian concept of union that Ibn Sina retains.15 The following passage from Ibn Sina will serve to confirm my interpretation, however:

The perfection proper to the rational soul is to become an intelligible world in which the form ofthe whole universe, the intelligible order proper to that whole, and the good permeating it are inscribed starting with the first principle of the whole, and passing on to the superior substances that are pure- ly spiritual, and then to those spiritual substances that have a certain relation to physical bodies, and then to those bodies ofhigher forms and powers, and so on, until it has encompassed the forms of all beings. Thereupon, it is transformed into an intelli- gible world corresponding to the existing one entire- ly and engaged into contemplating absolute truth, absolute goodness and absolute beauty. It becomes united with it, imprinted with its archetype and form, circumscribed by it and transformed into its substance.I6

Let us note and remember the following: (1) The first principle of the whole is God. (2) The superior substances that are purely spiritual are the heavenly intelligences. (3) Again, the spiritual substances that have a certain relation to physical bodies are the heavenly souls. (4) Further, those bodies ofhigher forms and powers are the heavenly bodies themselves. (5) The forms of all beings are the essences or realities of things. (6)At grasping the above, the soul is said to become an intelligible world mirroring the existing world in its entirety. In this state, it contemplates “absolute truth, abso- lute goodness and absolute beauty.” This contemplation is immedi- ately translated into union, however, for Ibn Sina asserts that “It becomes united with it, imprinted with its archetype and form, circumscribed by it and transformed into its substance.’’ No doubt, Ibn Sina speaks of conjunction with the agent-intellect as a state of “intellectual beauty” and “eternal pleasure.”” It seems, however, that Ibn Sina thinks of this conjunction as an intermediary step on the way to the final object, which is contemplation of and union with the eternal aspects of the universe, beginning with God. This notion is similar to the Plotinian position that makes contact withnous an intermediary step toward union with God.18

For further support of my interpretation, one need only to turn

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to other texts of Ibn Sina, such as Essay on Prayer, Essay on the Soul and Its Continuance and Resurrection, Essay on Love, Essay on Happiness, his well-known work, Remarks and Admonitions, and an-Najat. In hisEssay on Prayer, Ibn Sina speaks of two kinds of prayer, external prayer and internal prayer.lS External prayer is a bodily activity, as opposed to internal prayer, which is a rational activity. We know that Ibn Sina’s general view is that the latter activity and its object are higher than the former activity and its object. According to him, in external prayer, we worship the agent- intellect. But in internal prayer, the object of our worship is God.20 He defines internal prayer as “the witnessing of God.”21 So it looks certain that to him we are capable of witnessing God.22 Whatever witnessing involves, it seems that, being described as a rational activity, it must, at least, involve vision or contemplation, even if that is considered in the restricted Aristotelian sense. Thus, God is said to be the object of our contemplation. Again, in his Essay on Love, Ibn Sina expresses the same idea mentioned earlier, namely, that the greatest or highest object a human being can find himself face to face with is God. There he speaks of the greatest manifesta- tion that a human being can encounter, namely, the manifestation of In Essay on Happiness, the greatest human happiness is said to be the experience of the lifting of intermediaries between our souls and God.” InRemarks and Admonitions, the upward intellec- tual journey of the knower does not stop at conjunction with or contemplation of the agent-intellect. Rather, its final destiny is said to be the First Truth, Granted, in the above passages there is no assertion of the concept of union with God as such. But clearly thereis at least the assertion that God, not the agent-intellect, is the proper object of human contemplation. In other works, however, such as an-Nujut, the assertion is made that intellectual happi- ness of the human soul consists in “union with the First Truth.”26

I1 The question now is, How do we attain the ultimate object of

human contemplation? Available for this quest are the theoretical intellect, the practical intellect, and the senses. The function of the practical intellect is to prepare the way for the theoretical intellect to grasp the previously mentioned eternal aspects of the universe. The practical intellect achieves this end by controlling and moder- ating the faculties of the body. The needs and operations of our various faculties may sometimes be in conflict with each other. For example, while the eyes may want to see something, at the same

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time the ears may want to hear something, the stomach to digest something, or the reproductive system to bear or generate a child, and so on. The job of the practical intellect is to moderate the needs and demands of these faculties so that the whole body will function in an orderly fashion. Once the whole body reaches an orderly state, the theoretical intellect no longer has to be preoccupied with the affairs of the body. It is true that the primary task of the theoretical intellect is to look upward and to grasp the eternal aspects of things, but it also has a secondary role to play in this life, namely, that of looking downward and managing the body. The theoretical intellect accomplishes this end by transmitting to the practical intellect certain practical principles that the practical intellect uses to moderate the body. If the body is not governed by such practical principles that impose moderation on it, the following will result: (1) corruption of the bodily life, which affects both the individual and society, and (2) more importantly, distraction of the theoretical intellect from being able to look upward owing to the body’s calling for more or better management from this intellect. Distraction is a trap for the theoretical intellect, preventing it from reflecting on the eternal elements of the universe.

Assuming that the practical intellect performs its job properly, this condition would not be sufficient to supply the theoretical intellect with its objects. The faculty of imagination is called on to assist in the process of knowledge in a manner that will soon become clear. As in Aristotle, so also in Ibn Sina. The external senses are responsible for picking up the forms or essences from external objects. To be more precise, imprints of such forms or essences are picked up, not the forms or essences themselves. In the external senses, these forms remain mixed with matter. From there, these forms are transmitted to the internal senses. The first of these is the common sense, which takes in the imprints of the forms that are picked up by the various external senses and purifies them to some extent. After that, it stores them in the representational faculty, which adjoins it and functions as its storage area. At that point, what is known as the estimative facultyz7 picks up these imprints and purifies them further. This faculty can receive its objects either from the representational faculty, which derives them primarily from the external senses, or it can receive them directly from the outside world, as a sheep receives the notion that a wolf is harmful to it.28 The sheep perceives this threat, not through any external sense, for it is not from any physical aspect of the wolfthat the sheep receives this notion. Regardless, the estimative faculty is said to

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store these forms in its own adjacent storage area, the memory. The imaginative facultyz9 lies exactly in the middle of the other four faculties, with the common sense and the representational faculty on one side, and the estimative faculty and memory on the other. This middle faculty has access to both storage areas. I t takes up their forms, combines them, and breaks them down, constructing new forms out of them.30 Even in these new forms, however, there is still some degree of materiality since the forms out of which they are composed are still somewhat material, in spite of a certain degree of purification they undergo. For this reason, these new forms, or objects of the imagination, are best described as half-true and half-false. The imagination, therefore, is a halfway house between truth and falsity.

The only human faculty capable of knowledge (capable of grasping the full truth or the pure forms) is the theoretical intel- l e ~ t . ~ l By itself, however, this faculty cannot do anything, for it is in pure potentiality. The only thing capable of acting is something that is already in actuality. The agent-intellect, being in full actuality and in most proximity to the theoretical intellect, can act, and its acts can assist in actualizing the knowledge of the theoretical intellect. This actualization occurs when the agent-intellect sheds its light on the imagination, thereby reflecting and imprinting the images, or objects of the imagination, on the theoretical intellect. This process renders these objects fully known.

I11 At this point, the human soul becomes a replica of the universe,

a mirror that reflects universal order, beauty, and truth. This state is the most blissful and happiest a human being can reach, for in it, he or she is one with the eternal aspect of the universe.

It must be stated, though, that the already discussed way to happiness is the one that the philosopher alone can follow. Yet another way-only for prophets-leads to the same state of happi- ness. The latter way requires no effort, either on the part of the practical intellect or on the part of the senses, whether external or internal. Unlike other human beings, the prophet’s theoretical intellect is naturally ready to receive pure forms. This state is possible for him because his theoretical intellect is not preoccupied with the demands and conflicts ofthe body; thevarious powers ofhis body, being naturally moderate, have no need for any attention from the rational soul. The agent-intellect, which contains the pure forms permanently, imprints these forms directly on the theoretical intel-

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lect. In other words, the prophet’s knowledge or happiness is an act of grace handed to him from above, as opposed to the philosopher’s knowledge or happiness, which, as we have seen, is the result of concerted human effort.

Do non-philosophers and non-prophets, then, have any way of grasping the pure forms and therefore of receiving any happiness? This group of people divides into three subgroups: (1) Those who have acquired beliefs contrary to the truth. These cannot grasp pure forms either in the present life or in the life to come because, in the present life, their false beliefs leave no room for grasping the truth, and they retain these beliefs in the life to come. Worse still, the means through which the truth can be grasped-the senses-are no longer available after death since the senses cease to function on the destruction of the body. This group suffers eternal miserP2 since its members grasp the contrary of the object that gives human happi- ness. (2)Those who do notgrasp the truth as it is but only a symbolic form of it as presented to them by the prophets. This group is the religious believers that have no access to theoretical knowledge. Rather, these people spend their lives on the level of the imagina- tion, experiencing half-truths and half-falsities. Neither absolute happiness nor absolute misery is their lot: the measure ofhappiness they receive is proportionate to the measure of knowledge or attainment of the truth they possess.33 (3) Those who can be classi- fied as the intellectually incompetent, such as children, the insane, and the dull-minded. “Intellectually incompetent” is used in the sense of having no theoretical power to grasp the forms. But this does not mean the lack of theoretical power to grasp anything at all. Indeed, this group, like any other human group, is said to be able to grasp primary universals that are exemplified in the principles “The whole is greater than the part” and “Truth and falsity cannot be applicable and inapplicable to the same thing at the same time.’,% To grasp these principles is primary knowledge, whereas to grasp the forms is secondary knowledge. The former requires no intermedi- ary, be it other principles to support it or any other instrument or matter.35 When this type of knowledge is given to a human being, it is conveyed directly by the agent-intellect. Like the last group, this group is said to experience neither absolute happiness nor absolute misery.36 After all, they have no capacity to grasp the forms or even their contrary. Because they are blank and pure of any opposition, however, even after death the agent-intellect can transmit to them some joy proportionate to their attainment of primary knowledge.

In brief, according to Ibn Sina, to be happy is to be good and to

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be good is to exercise one’s reason; but the proper exercise of reason focuses on certain objects proper to the nature of reason. Such objects are the pure forms of things, the heavenly bodies, souls and intelligences, and, primarily, God. Since these objects are immate- rial, they are eternal. When reason grasps them, it itself becomes eternal, for nothing can grasp the eternal except that which is of the same nature. The rational soul becomes indistinguishable from the universe in character, so that the soul is endowed with eternal bliss. Both the philosopher and the prophet can attain this state, even though by way of two different routes. The majority lives in some degree of ignorance and, hence, falls short of genuine happiness. The degree ofhappiness or misery apportioned to the various groups falling under this majority depends, in the main, on the degree to which they have grasped the truth. A study of the degrees of happiness and misery, however, must be left for another paper.

Notes

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10, 7, 1104. 2. Ibid. 3. W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History ofHis Deuelop-

ment (London: Oxford, 1948), pp. 240-243. I t is also possible to interpret Aristotle as adhering to the view that God is the highest or proper object of human thought. This interpretation can be based on Aristotle’s description of thought in which human beings participate as eternal and completely blessed or divine, whose object is then identified with God (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12, 1072b 170. This view, however, does not seem to be the one to which Aristotle adheres in general, but a discussion of this point would lie beyond the scope of this paper.

4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10; 11, 77a; 15. 5. Some believe it is God, others believe that it is not God but a

separate entity that resides somewhere, and still others believe that it is an element in our soul.

6. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 9,9-10. 7. Ibid., VI, 1, 11; 3, 17. 8. That is, as capable of existing, but only through the agency of

9. That is, ten after the first. 10. Muslim philosophers also call this intelligence “the giver of

forms’’ (wahib as-suar), because its most important function is

another being.

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two-fold: First, it gives material things their forms when these things are disposed to receiving their forms. For example, it dispenses the human soul to the human body when the latter is ready to receive its soul or form. This operation of supplying material things with their forms completes the substantiality of these things. Second, as we will soon see, the intelligence of the moon also makes available to the human intellect the forms or universal aspects of things, thereby completing human knowl- edge.

11. Ibn Sina, al-Isharat wat-Tanbihat, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1957-19601, pp. 787-788. See also Rasa’il ash-Shaykh ar-Ra’is Fi Asrar al-Hikma al-Mashriqiyya (hereafterRasa’il), ed. M.A.F Mehren (Leiden: A.D.G. Brill, 18991,

12. Ibn Sina, al-Isharat wat-Tanbihat, p. 782. 13. Ibn Sina, Ahwal an-Nafs, ed. A. F. al-Ahwani (Cairo: Dar Ihya’

14. See, for instance, M. Fakhry, “The Contemplative Ideal,” Jour-

15. Ibid., pp. 141-142. 16. Ibid., Appendix, pp. 143-144. See also Rasa’il, p. 18, and Ibn

Sina, Rasa’il Ibn Sina, ed. H. D. Ulkin (Istanbul: Matba‘at Ibra- him Kharuz, 19531, p. 149.

17. Ibn Sina, ash-Shifa’, an-Nafs, ed. F. Rahman (London: Oxford, 1959) p. 248.

18. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 1, 11; 3, 17. 19. Rasa’il, p. 35 . 20. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 21. Ibid. 22. See also Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Hidaya, ed. Muhammad ‘Abdu

(Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira al-Haditha, 19741, pp. 302,305. There the claim is made not only that it is possible for a human being to view God, but that human happiness, which is attainable, de- pends primarily on this viewing.

p. 22.

al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyya, 19521, p. 131.

nal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 14 (1976), p. 141.

23. Rasa’il, p. 23. 24. Ibn Sina, Majmu‘ Rasa’il ash-Shaykh ar-Ra’is, ed. A. A. I. A.

al-‘Alawi (Haydar Abad: Jam‘iyyat Da’irat al-Ma‘arif al-‘Uthmaniyya, 1354 A.H.), p. 18.

25. See al-Isharat wat-Tanbihat, Part Four, Ninth Class. 26. Ibn Sina, an-Najat, ed. al-Kurdi (Cairo: Matba‘at as-Sa‘ada,

27. Neither Aristotle nor any of his commentators before Ibn Sina 1938), p. 295. See also Ibn Sina, Rasa’il Ibn Sina, p. 147.

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seem to have mentioned this faculty. Ibn Rushd later mentions it, but only by way of disagreeing with Ibn Sina on the need for its existence.

28. Ibn Sina, al-Karamat wal-Mu'jizat wal-Ma'ajiz in at-Tafsir al-Qur'ani wal-Lugha as-Sufiyya fi Falsafat Ibn Sina, ed. Hasan 'asi (Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-Jami'iyya lid-Dirasat wan-Nashr wat-Tawzi', 1983), p. 227.

29. It should be pointed out that even though this faculty is known in Ibn Sina's philosophy as imaginative, this designation applies only if it is employed by the estimative power. If, on the other hand, it is employed by the rational soul, it is known as cognitive (Ibid. 1.

30. Ibid., p. 228. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibn Sina, Risala Adhawiyya, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr

33. Ibid. 34. Ibn Sina, Majmu' Rasa'il ash-Shaykh ar-Ra'is, p. 6. 35. Ibn Sina, Ithbat an-Nubuwwat, ed. M. Marmura (Beirut:

36. Ibn Sina, Risala Adhawiyya, p. 121.

al-'Arabl, 1919), p. 121.

Al-Matba'a al-Kathulikiyya, 1968), pp. 32,33,44.

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