The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention · The Regionalization of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . .2 ... profiteering by third parties, and coping mechanisms among civilian

The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention

IPA Seminar Report

Hotel ThayerWest Point, New York

5-9 May 2003

IPA gratefully acknowledges the financialsupport of the Governments of Finland,Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

Rapporteur: Charles Cater

TABLE OF CONTENTSExecutive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2II. The Regionalization of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . .2

A. Regional Conflict Complexes . . . . . . . . . .2B. Transborder War Economies . . . . . . . . . . .3C. Case Study: West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

III. The Regionalization of Intervention . . . . . . . .5A. OSCE and EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5B. AU and IGAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6C. UN Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Appendix I: Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Appendix II: Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Executive Summary• Regional conflict formations are interconnected wars

among adjacent countries that are mutuallyreinforcing and therefore typically protracted. Theyare characterized by complex political, economic,social, and military transborder linkages. Regionalconflict formations are distinct from interstate andintrastate wars, and thus also require new strategiesfor intervention by the international community.

• Transborder war economies include economicallymotivated violence by rebels and states, warprofiteering by third parties, and coping mechanismsamong civilian populations. Thus, while it is true thatsome insurgencies may be characterized by forms ofeconomic predation, it remains unclear whetherinterdiction or cooperation is the best strategy formanaging conflict goods during regionalpeacebuilding efforts.

• The West African conflict formation offers severallessons: good governance helps prevent conflict whileautocracy fuels war, government support for rebels innearby countries creates cycles of retribution, sub-regional organizations need adequate militarycapability for intervention, regional hegemonspossess capacity for intervention but may compro-mise impartiality, and appeasement has typicallyfailed with “spoilers”.

• Certain regional organizations and coalitions of thewilling possess comparative advantages relative tothe UN: rapid deployment capabilities, better localinformation, enhanced interoperability, sustainabilityof intervention, the capacity for peace enforcement,the ability to “deepen” and “widen” an operation forbetter human security, and more financial resourcesto offer warring parties as incentives for compliance.

• H o w e v e r, a trend toward the regionalization ofintervention does have liabilities as well: regionalorganizations must frequently contend with localconflicts of interest among members, and mostregional organizations in developing countries do not

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have the required institutional and financial capacityfor intervention. Thus, the regionalization ofintervention has likely exacerbated a global patternof “peacekeeping apartheid”.

• UN partnerships with regional organizations andcoalitions of the willing should be guided by thefollowing principles: regular consultation within acommon framework, prior agreement regarding thelevel of support, a clearly defined division of laboraccording to comparative advantages, a strategy thatis commensurate with the resources made available,and a coherent implementation among partners.

I. Introduction

The International Peace Academy held its annual NewYork Seminar, May 5-9 2003, at West Point’s historicHotel Thayer. Nearly seventy panelists and participantsrepresenting the UN, regional organizations, membergovernments, NGOs, academia, and the media contributedto a lively debate on this year’s theme, “RegionalApproaches to Conflict”. Recent developments in placessuch as Liberia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC), and Iraq set the context for discussions.Perhaps due to the importance of US-UN relations, aconcern with the situation in Iraq was reflected in manycomments by panelists and participants at the seminar.The associated issue of how US unilateralism mayrepresent an extreme example of an overall trend awayfrom UN universalism is a theme that this report willreturn to in the concluding section.

The seminar at West Point began by exploring thedynamics of regional conflict complexes and transborderwar economies in places such as West Africa, Central Asia,the Andean region, and the Balkans. It then continuedwith an analysis of the various roles played by regionalorganizations and coalitions of the willing – often incollaboration with the United Nations – in terms ofpeacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peaceenforcement. At a deeper level, the positive and negativeimplications of increasingly regionalized forms ofintervention were also considered. While it admittedlyraises more difficult questions than it provides definitiveanswers, this report represents a brief analytical summaryof the five day IPA seminar on “Regional Approaches toC o n f l i c t ”.

II. The Regionalization of Conflict

It has become commonplace among scholars and policy-makers to assert that the latter half of the 20th centurywitnessed a decline in the incidence of interstate war anda rise in the frequency of intrastate war. Certainly in thepost-Cold War era the international community hasdirected its attention and resources toward peacefullyresolving what have been typically understood as civilwars – achieving considerable success in some caseswhile seemingly inexplicably failing in others. However,as knowledge, policy, and practice inevitably lag behindreal world events, an important reason for failure withinthese interventions can often be traced back to fuzzyassumptions made about the nature of conflict itself. Forexample, while the apparently “civil” wars in regionssuch as West Africa exacerbated one another throughprominent regional dimensions such as transborder wareconomies, the regionalization of conflict has untilrecently attracted scant attention among academic andpolicymaking communities. As this section stronglyimplies, getting the analysis right is a necessary precursorfor effective intervention.

A. Regional Conflict Complexes

According to one panelist, regional conflict formations(also known as regional conflict complexes) can beunderstood as “sets of transnational conflicts that formmutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughouta region, making for more protracted and obdurateconflicts”. This analytical category should be understoodas distinct from interstate conflicts and intrastateconflicts with multiple parties, nor can it be reduced tosituations where there is simply a “spill over” effect fromone conflict to another or where there are severalessentially autonomous civil wars within a region.Rather, regional conflict formations are typically charac-terized by fundamental, interconnected networking andprocesses within a region: institutional weaknesses ofone or more states, regional security competition, aparallel and transnational informal economy, transbordersocial networks, illegal trafficking and trade, naturalresource exploitation, militarization and arms transfers,and transborder armed groups.

While the primary characteristics of regional conflictcomplexes have been noted above, it is a more compli-

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An International Peace Academy ReportThe Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention2

cated task to precisely identify the most salient relation-ships between these eight dynamics and the incidenceand perpetuation of regionalized large-scale violence. Inother words, what exactly are the causal arguments thatbest explain regional conflict formations? One steptoward answering this question and then formulating anappropriate policy response lies in the recognition thatstates are necessarily the building blocks for successfulregional peacebuilding. Thus, the problem becomesframed primarily in terms of the first point listed above:institutional weaknesses of one or more states. Seen froma macro-historical perspective, the underlying issue is aprocess of state building that without reciprocity assumesvarious forms of predation upon the civilian population.Furthermore, states are also shaped by how they areintegrated into the global system – suggesting a need toalso focus on the national level and the internationallevel in order to properly understand developments at theregional level. The primary long-term task may be toexplore new ways of creating sustainable, secure externalenvironments for fragile states.

More immediately, peacemaking efforts directed towardregional conflict complexes could take one or more of atleast four different forms: comprehensive, tactical,strategic, and networked. First, a comprehensiveapproach would entail several simultaneous peaceagreements incorporating regional partners, but liabili-ties may include persistent regional rivalries and thepossibility of missing key factors such as arms transfersthat also require international measures. Second, atactical approach would make a regionally focused effortto directly affect the immediate cost/benefit calculus ofbelligerents toward the peaceful resolution of conflict,but this would typically only suffice as an interimmeasure. Third, a strategic approach would target theparticular economic and political networks that are ke yto perpetuation of the regional conflict complex (e.g. thetrade in coltan from the DRC), but most organizationsare not yet oriented toward conceptualizing andimplementing this form of intervention. Finally, it couldbe possible to facilitate a network of actors (i.e.analogous to the networks that sustain wars) dedicatedtoward regional peacebuilding, but this also remains afairly speculative approach that currently lacks aninstitutional home.

B. Transborder War Economies

Transborder war economies have at least three differentdimensions: activities that directly support belligerent

parties such as the extraction and sale of naturalresources by rebel groups; war profiteering by actors suchas arms merchants, organized crime syndicates, andcorporate mercenary firms; and economic copingmechanisms among civilian populations such as trade ina wide range of goods across state borders. However,attaining a clear understanding of how transborder wareconomies function is not always a simple, intuitive task.The arms trade serves as a good example of thiscomplexity: state collapse may actually lead to theexportation of weaponry regionally (e.g. Albania), whileincreasing stability could yield both an influx of arms aswar profiteers take advantage of weapon buy-backschemes and an outflow of arms that exacerbates conflictin nearby states (e.g. Sierra Leone). Likewise, the relation-ship between politics and economics is not alwaysentirely clear as strong political links may supportnascent economic networks, while significant economicrewards may instead prop up fragile political alliances.Finally, the social aspects of transborder war economiesare probably the least well understood, such as occupa-tions requiring legal travel and trade with war-torncountries, family ties across state boundaries, and the roleof diasporas in financing conflict.

In the context of debating transborder war economies,several panelists and participants critiqued a prominentschool of thought among the academic and policycommunities, the economic predation thesis, whichsuggests that most insurgencies are primarily motivatedand facilitated by the availability of lootable commodi-ties. While granting that in cases where state militarycapacity is very weak an insurgency may transform frompolitically motivated violence to economically motivatedviolence, one panelist argued that a rebel’s instinct forself-preservation from “extermination” is actually themost fundamental consideration. Furthermore, focusingupon the supposed economic motivations of rebel groupsignores a wide range of other relevant dimensions amonginterconnected conflicts: governance and the rule of law,external regulatory regimes, the demand for “conflictgoods” among consumers in developed countries, copingmechanisms among civilian populations, and the role ofneighboring states. For example, in countries such as theDRC where transborder war economies have clearlyperpetuated a regional conflict formation, rebel violencefor economic purposes really only tells part of a muchmore complex story that includes: civilian economicsubsistence through the extraction and trading of naturalresources such as coltan, and apparent commercialmotivations for intervention among the armed forces of

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regional states such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda. Formulating and implementing effective strategies formitigating the adverse effects of transborder wareconomies has proven particularly difficult due to a lackof knowledge, the unintended consequences of state-centric sanctions regimes, insufficient transnationalregulation of the private sector, and conflicts of interestamong intervening organizations and states. There islittle agreement among scholars who study wareconomies, and thus there is also a notable lack ofconsensus among those who make policy in response towar economies. For example, is interdiction or coopera-tion the best approach for managing “conflict goods”during peacebuilding? In situations where sanctions arethe tool of choice, with few exceptions they are directedat just one state without adequate consideration for theregional dimensions of resource extraction and armstransfers. Likewise, the potential adverse socio-economicconsequences of sanctions regimes upon legal commercein neighboring states are rarely fully considered. Andwhen steps are taken toward addressing transnationaldimensions, the regulatory regimes tend to be fairly weak– particularly if they encompass the private sector.Ironically, the biggest obstacle for the internationalcommunity in combating transborder war economiesmay actually be the complicity of its own states.

C. Case Study: West Africa

Unfortunately for West Africa, perhaps no other area ofthe world better illustrates the processes and structuresthat typify a regional conflict complex. As one panelistdescribed, the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire have formed an “interconnectedweb of conflicts”. Keeping in mind that there aretransborder networks within the region that are not easilydescribed through reference to conventional geographiccategories, it is nonetheless useful to analyze these fourwars in terms of the domestic, regional, and internationallevels. And while there are not yet very many successstories to tell about the international community’s roleregarding war and peace in this area, two of these WestAfrican conflicts are noteworthy in terms of UN interven-tion: Liberia represents the first time that the UNdeployed a peacekeeping force, UNAMIL, alongside a pre-existing regional force, ECOMOG; while in Sierra Leone,UNAMSIL is currently the UN’s largest peace operation inthe world.

In Liberia, the war from 1989 to 1997 was characterizedby rapacious natural resource exploitation and an

attempt by warlord Charles Taylor to buy off his domesticrivals, divided support for various factions and thedeployment of ECOMOG at the sub-regional level, andwhat one panelist termed a “poor man’s war” in terms ofinternational financial resources committed for peaceoperations. Eventually, Taylor won the presidency in1997 and a new insurgency, Liberians United forReconciliation and Democracy (LURD), was launched in1999. Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone the RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF) funded their brutal war campaignthrough illicit diamond exports, nearby countries backeddifferent factions (e.g. Taylor’s support for the RUF) whilealso eventually deploying a peacekeeping force, andfinally the UN subsequently assumed responsibility forthe peace operation with the withdrawal of ECOMOGforces in 2000. As for Guinea-Bissau, domestic peacenegotiations were conducted in bad faith, there was ameager commitment of 700 peacekeepers deployed at thesub-regional level, and there was a general reluctanceamong actors outside of West Africa to intervene in anysignificant way. Finally, the current conflict in Coted’Ivoire results in part from economic decline (i.e. $14billion in external debt as of 1999) and sharp north-southdivisions within the country; at the sub-regional level,there has been some blowback from Cote d’Ivoire’sinvolvement in Liberia, while the Economic Communityof West African States (ECOWAS) has also deployedpeacekeepers; and at the international level, France hassent 4,000 troops to support the regime while the US hasreportedly blocked recent French initiatives within theUN Security Council.

There are multiple lessons from the West African experi-ence that are useful reference points for understandingthe ongoing wars in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire as well assuggesting possibilities for how to better manage futureregional conflict complexes:

• good governance is a crucial element for conflictprevention, while autocracy has been shown to fuelconflict in a number of cases (e.g. Sierra Leone,Liberia);

• support by governments for insurgencies inneighboring states can create cycles of retributionand chronic regional instability;

• sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS needadequate military capacity for intervention inconflicts where peace enforcement operations arenecessary;

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• regional hegemons (e.g. Nigeria) can serve as thebackbone for effective intervention, but they need tolearn to “speak softly” while carrying a “big stick”;

• appeasement and inclusion has typically failed with“spoilers” (e.g. Foday Sankoh), suggesting thatestablishing criminal tribunals may be moreeffective;

• and the role of external actors has facilitated peacein some conflicts (e.g. UK in Sierra Leone) but mayhave complicated others (e.g. France in Cote d’Ivoire).

III. The Regionalization ofIntervention

As one panelist commented, quoting Sir Brian Urquhart,there was “a crisis of too much confidence” in the early1990’s as the UN assumed responsibility for numerousdifficult and complex peacekeeping operations. The UN’ssubsequent problems created a backlash against theorganization, with its operational capacity beingfundamentally called into question. As a result of whatanother panelist termed the “Somalia-Rwandasyndrome”, less than half of all peace operations since1997 have been undertaken by the UN, while instead themajority of peace operations have been assumed byeither regional organizations or coalitions of the willing.Of course, this distinction is not entirely clear-cut inpractice as a number of these peace operations have alsoactually had some form of UN authorization, coordina-tion, or complementary field presence. While anincreased reliance upon regional organizations and adhoc arrangements such as coalitions of the willing hashad some success, it is also worth critically probing thepotential long term implications for international peaceand security.

A. OSCE and EU

The Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) has three main strengths in the area ofconflict management: inclusive membership fromRussia in the East to the US in the West, a comprehen-sive conception of security, and an extensive set of fieldmissions throughout Europe. Ac c o r d i n g l y, the OSCE willl i kely play a key role in resolving most conflicts in theCaspian region (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh) and EasternEurope (e.g. Georgia). However, one notable exception is

Chechnya, where the OSCE has withdrawn at the requestof Russia. The OSCE has also developed a wide range ofconflict prevention tools such as institutionalizingstandards for minority and human rights, electionmonitoring, and developing early warning mechanismsthrough field missions. While the OSCE can continue tom a ke a strong contribution toward preventing andresolving conflicts, the organization does also havesome serious limitations with respect to peaceoperations: it does not deploy military forces so itusually operates only in conjunction with a politicalsettlement, and the fiscal requirements of reconstructionare often beyond the OSCE’s capacity.

The European Union (EU) first established some institu-tional capacity for conflict management in 1999 as partof the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Keycomponents of the EU’s evolving operational capacity arepeacekeeping, policing, rule of law, civilian administra-tion, and coordination. The organization is now movingtoward meeting its goal of being able to deploy 60,000peacekeepers, 5,000 policemen, and up to 300 justicepersonnel. Initial field presences include: the EuropeanPolice Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia with 500 police, asuccessor to the UN’s International Police Task Force(IPTF); and the 350 troop deployment called “Concordia”in Macedonia, a successor to a NATO peacekeepingoperation. [Note: since this conference was held in May,the EU has also sent peacekeepers on the organization’sfirst out of area deployment to support the UN’soperation in the DRC.] In terms of conflict resolution, theEU is uniquely placed to play a key role in resolvingenduring conflicts such as Cyprus. Finally, asdemonstrated in Kosovo, the EU can also contributesignificant financial resources and expertise toward post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

With respect to undertaking peace operations, there are afew potential comparative advantages that NorthAmerican and European institutions may have relative tothe UN:

• peacebuilding may be facilitated by using theprospect of future integration with the EU as anincentive for compliance with a peace process;

• regional organizations can be more efficient due torapid deployment capabilities, better information,enhanced interoperability, and sustainability;

• some regional bodies (e.g. OSCE, EU) can “widen”

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and “deepen” intervention – yielding a more compre-hensive approach and better human security;

• and in the case of NATO, the regional securityalliance has much greater capacity than the UN forengaging in peace enforcement when necessary.

B. AU and IGAD

The African Union (AU) has developed a substantialprotocol on peace and security, including provisions forintervention within member states under certainconditions, but this has yet to be ratified. Previously, itspredecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) hadcreated a conflict prevention mechanism for interstatewars in 1993 and a protocol on unconstitutional changesof government in 1999, but these initiatives provedextremely difficult for an essentially administrative bodyto implement in practice. Thus, a decision was made toreform the OAU toward common political, economic, anddefense systems using sub-regional organizations (e.g.ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD) as the building blocks for thenewly formed AU. However, increasing the operationalcapacity of the AU has been a slow process. Remainingchallenges include: political disparities among diversemember states; coping with different types of conflictsuch as interstate, intrastate, and regional; definingworking relationships for the organization sub-region-a l l y, regionally, and globally; a lack of financialresources; and institutional inertia. Nonetheless, the AUhas brokered the Algiers agreement between Ethiopia andEritrea, while also deploying a symbolically importantfield presence.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y, the Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD) represents a perfect example of howan organization can be paralyzed by conflicts of interestamong its own members. Some important examplesinclude: each of the member states have supported theirown warlords within Somalia’s ongoing conflict, thusperpetuating what might otherwise appear to be a civilwar; US-backed IGAD member states border anothermember state Sudan, thus raising the cost of continuedwarfare for that regime but not resolving the conflict;and two other members, Ethiopia and Eritrea, had aborder dispute that ultimately resulted in trench warfarewith massive humanitarian consequences. There are afew lessons to be learned from IGAD’s experiences withconflict in the Horn of Africa. First, authoritarian andsemi-authoritarian member states are incapable of

enforcing good governance codes of conduct through apeer review process. Second, organizations such as IGADare inherently state-centric, therefore leaving little roomfor the participation of civil society organizations inregional peacebuilding activities. Finally, focusedintervention by actors from outside the Horn of Africa,including measures such as imposing aid conditionality,may be required to facilitate peace.

While capacity building for regional and sub-regionalorganizations in Africa is a worthwhile endeavor,increasing reliance upon them to undertake African peaceoperations does have certain limitations:

• organizations must often contend with competinginterests of member states that may be contrary tothe realization of effective regional peace operations;

• with few exceptions, most regional organizations inthe developing world lack adequate financing andinstitutional capacity to engage in peace operations;

• where capacity exists (e.g. SADC/South Africa,ECOMOG/Nigeria), a regional hegemon’s interestsmay not be reconcilable with the need forimpartiality;

• and the fundamental problem of devolution toregional organizations remains the massive inequal-ities characterizing global expenditures for peaceoperations.

C. UN Partnerships

In some cases, regional organizations have operatedwithout UN authorization or in contravention of the UNSecurity Council (e.g. NATO’s bombing of Kosovo during1999). However, as the following examples suggest, theUN has more commonly acted in partnership with aregional organization or a coalition of the willing:

• a dual key arrangement with UN authorization for aregional organization, but some control retained bythe UN (e.g. initial NATO operations in Bosnia),

• complementary deployment of a regional organiza-tion with a UN peace operation (e.g. ISAF andUNAMA in Afghanistan),

• a regional organization’s peace operation that hands

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off to a UN peace operation (e.g. ECOMOG andUNAMSIL in Sierra Leone),

• a UN mission that transitions to a regional organiza-tion’s peace operation (e.g. UNPREDEP and NATOpeacekeeping in Macedonia),

• a regional organization’s operation as a pillar withinan overall UN mission (e.g. EU reconstruction andUNMIK in Kosovo),

• deployment by a coalition of the willing (or a state)but not under the control of an existing UN mission(e.g. Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR in Rwanda),

• or a coalition of the willing operation authorized bythe UN Security Council that transitions to a UNmission (e.g. INTERFET and UNTAET in East Timor).

Ultimately, as one panelist observed, these partnershipsare usually “supply driven” rather than “need driven” –typically resulting from expedient political trade-offsrather than strategic considerations by member states.

Considering the ad hoc manner in which UN peaceoperation partnerships often come into existence, they dorequire a significant degree of coordination and cooper-ation during implementation. Although, reconcilinginstitutional mandates and managing organizationalrivalries often presents a serious challenge: as onepanelist commented, “everyone wants to coordinate, butno one wants to be coordinated”. Nonetheless, in the areaof conflict prevention, the Department of Political Affairs(DPA) has identified thirteen modalities to guide ongoingUN collaboration with regional organizations (e.g.increased joint staff training). Meanwhile, the Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) hast a ken the lead regarding civil-military coordinationissues during deployment. Key functions includeplanning, information sharing, and task division – activi-ties not easily coordinated among multiple UN agencies,let alone in conjunction with other organizations. Inparticular, ensuring that aid and development workersare provided adequate protection by peaceke e p e r sremains a key dilemma. Unsurprisingly, this can be acontentious and problematic issue in situations where themandates for civilian and military components residewith different organizations.

Beyond the logistics of coordination during peace

operations, panelists and participants at the conferencealso suggested several underlying principles that shouldguide UN partnerships: regular, substantive, andreciprocal consultation among partners within a commonframework; prior agreement regarding the level ofmaterial support expected from each organization orcoalition; a clearly defined division of labor organizedaccording to the comparative advantages of the respec-tive actors; a strategy that is commensurate with theresources made available for the peace operation; andcoherent implementation so that one partner’s efforts(e.g. military coercion by a coalition of states) do notundermine another’s (e.g. mediation by the UN). Finally,although a coalition of the willing or a regional organi-zation may assume a lead intervention role, this shouldimply neither the right to dictate terms for the participa-tion of other organizations nor license to dodge respon-sibility for the aftermath of a military intervention. Asone panelist remarked, “he who kicks in the door shouldnot walk away from the house.”

IV. ConclusionOne might reasonably assume that regional conflictswould ideally require a regional form of intervention bythe international community. Intuitively, it seems tomake sense that if the problem is “regional”, then theproposed solution should be “regional” as well. But whathas this really meant in terms of policy and practice thusfar? Unfortunately, policy planning rarely goes beyondstate-centric approaches that fail to specifically target thepolitical and economic networks that often sustainregional conflict complexes. Although, with the recogni-tion that sanctions upon Liberia were required in order toresolve a conflict in adjacent Sierra Leone, the UN hasshown some signs of strategic adaptation in this regard.Nonetheless, the obstacles to better policy formation inthe future appear to be both conceptual and institutional.Thorough empirical research and critical policy analysisshould probe the regional dimensions of contemporaryconflicts, while organizations should also explore waysto incorporate new insights regarding transborderconflict dynamics into bureaucracies typically alreadystructured in terms of country-specific portfolios.

The international “division of labor” for intervention canbe conceptualized in terms of a continuum, with univer-salism and unilateralism at opposite poles. In mostinstances, the participation of regional organizations andcoalitions of the willing would fall somewhere between


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these two extremes. While it is true that regional organi-zations and coalitions of the willing can play a construc-tive role (e.g. INTERFET in East Timor), in general thedevolution of primary responsibility for implementingpeace operations away from the UN has also exacerbatedglobal inequalities. This trend has resulted in what onepanelist has termed a “peacekeeping apartheid” – a farfrom ideal situation for anyone concerned about the fate

of war-torn developing countries. Nonetheless, regionalorganizations and coalitions of the willing can often playcomplementary roles within the existing UN frameworkfor the maintenance of international peace and security.In contrast, the unilateralism exemplified by the USinvasion of Iraq may ultimately threaten to underminethe institutional and normative foundations of theinternational system itself.

Participants at the 2003 New York Seminar, West Point

Appendix I: Agenda

2003 New York Seminar

Thayer Hotel, West PointMay 5-9, 2003

Program Chair

David M. MalonePresident, International Peace Academy

“Regional Approaches to Conflict”

Rapporteur

Charles CaterD.Phil. Candidate, International Relations

St Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK

Monday, May 5, 2003

09:30 Travel to Hotel Thayer, West Point

15:00 – 15:20 Orientation

Colonel Jussi Saressalo, Military Adviser, International Peace Academy

15:20 – 15:50 Opening Remarks

Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy

16:00 – 17:30 Keynote Speaker:

The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict ManagementH.E. Mr. René NybergAmbassador of Finland to Russia

AddressFuture Partnership with Regional Institutions: The Role of the United Nationsin Conflict Management Mr. Christopher Coleman, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Africa Division,Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Discussion

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19:00 – Reception and Dinner

Address: H.E. Ms. Marjatta RasiPermanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations

Tuesday, May 6, 2003

07:30 – 09:00 Breakfast in the main Dining Hall

09:00 – 10:30 Panel 1: Regional Approaches to Contemporary Conflicts

Chair: Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy

Panel: CIC’s Work on Regional Conflict FormationsDr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow,Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Ms. Andrea Armstrong, CIC Research Associate

Regional Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Their Implicationsfor PeacebuildingDr. Susan L. Woodward, Professor of Political Science, The Graduate Center,The City University of New York

Discussion

10:30 – 11:00 Coffee break

11:00 – 12:30 Panel 2: Regional Economic Dimensions of Conflicts

Chair: Ms. Karen E. Ballentine , Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Panel: Regional Economic Dimensions of Civil War Dr. Neil Cooper, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Plymouth

The Regional Political Economy of Conflict in West AfricaDr. Emmanuel Kwesi AningAfrican Security Dialogue & Research, Accra

Discussant: Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow,Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Discussion

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch

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14:00 – 15:30 Panel 3: Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention

Chair: Dr. Chandra Sriram, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Panel: The UN’s Subregional Approach to Conflict Resolution andPrevention in West AfricaMr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Generalfor the Great Lakes Region

The UN’s Strategic Efforts to Coordinate Better with Regional andSubregional Organizations in Conflict PreventionDr. Tapio Kanninen, Chief, Policy Planning Unit,Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Discussant: The Linkages between the UN and Regional Organizations in ConflictPrevention and the Capacities of Regional OrganizationsMr. Rasheed Draman, Ph.D. CandidatePolitics Department, Carleton University, Canada


16:00 – 17:30 Tour to West Point, US Military Academy


Address: H.E. Mr. Wegger StrømmenDeputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

Wednesday, May 7, 2003


09:00 – 10:30 Panel 4: UN and Regional Organizations in Peace Operations

Chair: Ambassador John L. Hirsch , Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

Panel: Challenges and OpportunitiesDr. Fred Tanner, Deputy Director, Head of Academic Affairs,Geneva Center for Security Policy

Perspectives from the FieldMajor General Martin Luther Agwai, Deputy Military Advisor,Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Discussant: Dr. Michael Pugh, Reader in International Relations,Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Plymouth

Discussion



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11:00 – 12:30 Panel 5: Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operation (CIMIC)

Chair: Dr. Stephen E. Henthorne, FRUSI, MlnstF, Professor, Civil-Military Relations,US Army Peacekeeping Institute

Panel: Relations between the Humanitarian Community and the MilitaryMs. Ingrid Nordström , Deputy Chief, Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU),OCHA, Geneva

Civil-Military Coordination in UN Commanded Peacekeeping OperationsMr. Anthony Craig, Liaison Officer, Military Division,Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Discussant: EU-Civilian Crisis Management and Cooperation with the ForceMr. Michael Matthiessen, Director, Civilian Crisis Management,DG E-Directorate IX, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union

Discussion

12:30 – Group photo

13:00 – 14:30 Lunch

14:30 – 18:00 Breakout Groups:

Group 1: Confronting the Legacies of Regional War Economies:Challenges for Peacebuilding Facilitator: Dr. Neil Cooper

Group 2: Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention Facilitator: Dr. Chandra Sriram

Group 3: UN and Regional Organizations in Peace OperationsFacilitator: Colonel Jussi Saressalo


Keynote Speaker: David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Thursday May 8, 2003


09:00 – 10:30 Panel 6: Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Regional Approachesto Managing Conflicts

Chair: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director of the Africa Program,International Peace Academy

Panel: The African Union (AU) and Security Mechanisms in Africa:Problems and ProspectsProfessor Margaret Vogt, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General,Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Building Peace in the Horn of Africa: IGAD’s Peacemaking Efforts Professor Ruth Iyob, University of Missouri, Department of Political Science

Discussant: Southern Africa’s Security Challenges Mr. Joao Bernardo Honwana*, Chief, Conventional Arms Branch,Department for Disarmament Affairs – DDA, United Nations

Discussion


11:00 – 12:30 Panel 7: Regional Approaches to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Chair: Dr. Simon Chesterman, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Panel: The Role of the UN and Regional Actors in Providing Emergency Reliefand ReconstructionMs. Ameerah Haq, Deputy Director of the Bureau for Crisis Preventionand Recovery, UNDP.

Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United NationsDr. Simon Chesterman, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Discussant: Mr. David Harland, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit,Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch

Lunch speaker: Cadet Seth Johnston, US Military Academy

14:00-18:00 Breakout Groups

Group 4: Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace OperationsFacilitator: Mr. Anthony Craig

Group 5: Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Regional Approaches toManaging ConflictsFacilitator: Professor Ruth Iyob

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Group 6: Regional Approaches to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Facilitator: Dr. Simon Chesterman


Address: H.E. Mr. Thorsteinn IngolfssonPermanent Representative of Iceland to the United Nations

Friday, May 9, 2003


09:00 – 10.30 Plenary session

Conclusions of breakout Groups 1 – 3Conclusions of breakout Groups 4 – 6

Discussion


11:00 – 11:45 Concluding remarks by Dr. Simon ChestermanEvaluation and presentation of certificates

12:00 Departure for New York City

13:30 Arrival to New York City

* To Be Confirmed

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IPA Seminar Report

Appendix II:New York Seminar 2003

Participants


Mr. Robert AfriyieFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations19 East 47th Street New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-832-1300 ext 265Fax: 212-751-6743Email: [email protected]

Ms. Ushani AgalawattaUN Bureau CorrespondentInter Press Services (IPS)United Nations, Room S-485New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-963-6156Cell: 646-258-9762Fax: 212-754-2791Email: [email protected]

Ms. Nicole Archer Second SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Commonwealth of theBahamas to the United Nations231 East 46th Street New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-421-6925 ext 45Fax: 212-759-2135Email: [email protected]

Ms. Cheryl J. AugustineFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Grenada to the United Nations800 Second Avenue, Suite 400KNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-599-0301Fax: 212-599-1540Email: [email protected]

Mr. Stefan BarrigaLegal AdviserPermanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtensteinto the United Nations633 Third Avenue, 27th FloorNew York, NY 10017

Tel: 212-599-0220 ext. 225Fax: 212-599-0064Email: [email protected]

Mr. Michael BlissSecond Secretary & Legal AdviserPermanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations150 East 42nd Street, 33rd FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-351-6620Fax: 212-351-6610

Mr. Ricardo Luis BocalandroCounsellor Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United NationsOne United Nations Plaza, 25th FloorNew York, NY 100017Tel: 212-688-6300Fax: 212-980-8395Email: [email protected]

Ms. Fatou Camara-HouelPolitical Affairs OfficerDepartment of Political AffairsUnited Nations, One UN PlazaNew York, NY 10017Tel: 1-927-367-4149Fax: 1-967-367-0356Email: [email protected]

Ms. Margherita CapellinoProgram OfficerDepartment of Peacekeeping OperationsUnited Nations248 East 32nd StreetNew York, NY 10016Tel: 212-725-6835Fax: 212-963-9053Email: [email protected]

Mr. Tomas Anker ChristensenCounsellorPermanent Mission of Denmark to the United NationsOne Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza


IPA Seminar Report

885 Second Avenue, 18th FloorNew York, NY 10017-2201Tel: 212-705-4929Fax: 212-3083384Eamil: [email protected]

Mr. Helfried CarlCouncellorPermanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations823 United Nations Plaza, 8th FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-210-9866Fax: 212-953-1302Email: [email protected]

Ms. Marie DimondProgramme SpecialistUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations, Room DC1-2128New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-906-5742Fax: 212-906-5379Email: [email protected]

Mr. Francsico DuarteFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations866 Second Avenue, 9th FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-759-9444Fax: 212-355-1124Email:

Ms. Anna Karin EneströmCounsellorPermanent Mission of Sweden to the United NationsOne Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza885 Second Avenue, 46th FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-583-2571Fax: 212-832-0389Email: [email protected]

Mr. Patrick HaleyUnited States Mission to the United Nations799 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017-3505Tel: 212-415-4339Email: [email protected]

Mr. Alain HandyAssociate ExpertDepartment for Disarmament Affairs, DDADC2-560New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-963-2874Email: [email protected]

Mr. Haron HassanSecond SecretaryPermanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations866 Second Avenue, 4th FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-832-9553 ext 232Fax: 212-832-5346Email: [email protected]

Mr. Peter Idwasi Program AssistantQuaker United Nation Office 777 UN Plaza, 5th floorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-682-2745Fax: 212-983-0034Email: [email protected]

Mr. Galib IsrafilovSecond Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijanto the United Nations866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 560New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-371-2559Fax: 212-371-2784Email: [email protected]

Mr. Niklas LindqvistFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 222New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-821-0269Fax: 212-759-6156Email: [email protected]

Mrs. Beatriz LondoñoMinister PlenipotentiaryPermanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations140 East 57th Street, 5th Floor

IPA Seminar Report


New York, NY 10022Tel: 212-355-7777 ext. 229Fax: 212-371-2813Email: [email protected]

Ms. Nadira MangrayAttachePermanent Mission of the Republic of Guyanato the United Nations866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 555New York, NY 10017Tel: 212- 527-3232Fax: 212-935-7548Email: [email protected]

Mr. Kuido MeritsFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Republic of Estoniato the United Nations600 Third Avenue, 26th FloorNew York, NY 10016-2001Tel: 212-883-0640Fax: 212-883-0648Email: [email protected]

Mr. Haruo MoritaFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations866 United Nations Plaza, 2nd FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-521-1513Fax: 212-308-1451Email: [email protected]

Ms. Doris MpoumouGender & Governance Program CoordinatorWomen’s Environment and Development Organization(WEDO)355 Lexington AvenueNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-973-0325Fax: 212-973-0335Email: [email protected]

Mr. Dag NylanderFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations825 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022

Tel: 212-310-1556Fax: 212-688-0554Email: [email protected]

Mr. Renzo PomiAmnesty InternationalRepresentative in the United NationsAmnesty International777 United Nations Plaza, 6th FloorNew York, NY 10017Tel: 212-867-8878Fax: 212-370-0183Email: [email protected]

Ms. Kristiina RinkinevaAdviser to President AhtisaariInternational Crisis GroupErottajankatu 11A00130 HelsinkiFinlandTel: +358 9 698 7024Fax: +358 40 717 6151Email: [email protected]

Mr. Driss OukassouSecond SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to theUnited Nations866 Second Avenue New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-421-1580Fax: 212-421-7826Email: [email protected]

Mr. Qian BoFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the People's Republic of China tothe United Nations350 East 35th Street New York, NY 10016Tel: 212-655-6148 (0)Fax: 212-481-2496Email: [email protected]

Ms. Erica SchoutenFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlandsto the United Nations235 East 45th Street 16 floor

New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-697-5547Fax: 212-370-1954Email: [email protected]

Mr. Andrea SemadeniCounsellorPermanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations633 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-286-1540Fax:212-286-1555

Mr. Albert V. SitnikovFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of the Russian Federation to theUnited Nations136 East 67th Street New York, NY 10021Tel: 212-861-4900Fax: 212-628-0252Email: [email protected]

Ms. Hazel de WetProject OfficerUnited Nations Children’s FundUNICEF HouseUnited Nations, Room H-1380New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-824-6547Fax: 212-326-7037Email: [email protected]

Mrs. Cecilia O. YahayaMinister CouncellorPermanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations828 Second Avenue New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-953-9130 Fax: 212-697-1970

Mr. Peter ZalmayevProgram CoordinatorInternational League of Human Rights823 UN Plaza, Suite 717New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-661-6480 ext. 100Fax: 212-661-0461Email: [email protected]

Mr. Sami ZeidanFirst SecretaryPermanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations866 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017Tel: 212-355-5460Fax: 212-382-2819Email: [email protected]


IPA Seminar Report

777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 T EL [ 21 2 ] 687-4300 FAX [ 21 2 ] 983-8246 E-M A I L i p a@i p a c a d e m y. o r g

Documents

The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention · The Regionalization of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . .2 ... profiteering by third parties, and coping mechanisms among civilian