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The referendum 28 months on.
Dr. Chris Hanretty, Royal Holloway, University of London
Introduction InJuneof2016,theUKvotedtoleavetheEuropeanUnion.
28monthshavepassedsincethen,andpublicopinionhaschanged.
Thereferendumwascounted,notinWestminsterconstituencies,butinlocalauthorityareas.
JustlookingatcountingareasinEngland,ScotlandandWales,aroundsevenintenlocalauthorityareasvotedtoleave,or263intotal.
Howwouldthatlookifwere-ranthereferendumnow?
Wecanuseatoolcalledmultilevelregressionandpost-stratification(MRP)toanswerthatquestion.Thistoolmodelstheopinionsofrespondentstoalargenationalsurvey–inthiscase,asurveyofaround20,000people.
Thoseopinionsarelinkedtopeople’sdemographiccharacteristics–thingsliketheirage,theirhighesteducationalqualifications.Usingthecensus,it’spossibletolookuphowmanypeopleofeachtypeliveineacharea,andmakepredictionsabouthoweachtypethinks.Byaddingupthepredictionsforeachtype,wegetanestimateofhoweachareamightvote.It’snotinfallible,butit’sourbestguidetolocalopinion.
Usingthattool,howwouldtheresultsofthereferendumlooknow?Well,accordingtothisanalysis,theaveragesupportforLeaveacrossGreatBritain,lookingjustatthosewhowouldbelikelytoturnouttovote,wouldbe45.6%–somesevenpointsdownonthefigurefrom2016.
Thatmeansthatfarfewerlocalauthorityareaswouldbelikelytovoteleave:around158,orclosertofourintenareas.
Thatseemslikearadicalshift–butalotofthesechangesinopinionaregradual.TheplacesthatmostsupportedLeavein2016arestilltheplacesthatmostsupportleavenow.YoucanseethatinFigure1,whichshowsthesupportforLeavein2016alongthehorizontalaxis,againstsupportforLeaveinahypotheticalreferendumheldtoday.
SupportforLeaving,thenandnow.EachdotrepresentsalocalauthorityareainGreatBritain.Thebluelineindicatesthelineofbestfit.Thesolidlineshowshowthelineswouldfallifnoonechangedtheirmind.
Thebluelineinthefigureisatrendline.Itrunsprettyclosetothesolidline(whichshowswhatwouldhappenifnothingchanged),butitisslightlyflatter.ThatmeansthatRemainvotingareasstayasRemainastheyeverwere,whilstLeave-votingareasareactuallyswitchingathigherrates.
ThiscanbeseeninFigure2,whichratherthanplotsupportforLeavingtoday,plotstheestimatedchangeintheLeavevotesharebetween2016and2018.Thelargestpanel,onthelefthandside,plotstherelationshipbetweentheLeavevotein2016andthechange.Therelationshipisnegative:thebiggertheLeavevotein2016,themoretheareahasswungroundtoRemain,evenifitstartedfromaLeavierstartingpoint.
Threepatternsofchange.SwitchesawayfromLeavearegreaterthestrongertheinitialsupportforLeave(left-handpanel).SwitchesawayfromLeaveareweakerthestrongerinareasthatvotedConservativeinthe2014EPelections(top-rightpanel).There’snosimplerelationshipwiththeUKIPvote(bottomrightpanel).
ThetoprighthandpanelofFigure2showsthepatternsofchangeaccordingtoConservativesupportinthe2014EuropeanParliamentelections.We’reusingthe2014EuropeanParliamentelectionsbecausethesetoowerecountedatthelocalauthoritylevel.Astheplotshows,theswitchawayfromLeaveissmallerthebettertheConservativesdid.Conservative-votingareasaremorelikelytostickwithLeave–or,conversely,Labourareasaremorelikelytoswitch.
ThebottomrighthandpanelshowsthesamefigurebutforUKIPsupportin2014.Here,therelationshipisessentiallyflat:there’snosimplerelationship.However,becauseUKIPsupportin2014wassuchastrongpredictoroftheLeavevote,thismeansthatifwecontrolfortheLeavevote,wefindthatareaswhichwerestrongerbedsofsupportforUKIPare,justlikeConservativevotingareas,morelikelytostickwithLeave.
ChangeinsupportforLeavingbyregion.Thereddotgivestheaveragechangebyregion.
Youmightwonderwhethertheseestimatesarerobust.Dotheychangemuchifwechangesomeoftheassumptions?
Ifweignorequestionsofturnout,andassumethateveryonevotesinafreshreferendum,thenthefiguresdon’tchangemuch.Wegofrom45.6percentto45.9percent-atinydifference.
Whataboutourconfidenceintheestimatesforeachplace–canwesummarizetheseestimatesinasinglefigure,ordoweneedarangeoffigures?
Ifwe’dconductedastandardpollineacharea,thenthemarginoferrorforeachlocalauthoritywouldbeplusorminusthreepercent.Butbecausewehaven’tconducted380thousandinterviews,wehavetosettleforsomethingless–plusorminusfivepercentineachcase.
Thatmeansthatalthoughweknowalotofareashaveswitched,wecanonlybereallyveryconfidentaboutamuchsmallergroup.Herearetheareasmostlikelytohaveswitched:
• Nottingham(40.1%Leavenowbutwas50.8%Leavethen).• Luton(43.8%Leavenowbutwas56.5%Leavethen).• Slough(41.6%Leavenowbutwas54.3%Leavethen).• Southampton(41.8%Leavenowbutwas53.8%Leavethen).• HighPeak(44.3%Leavenowbutwas50.5%Leavethen).
• Watford(43.6%Leavenowbutwas50.3%Leavethen).• Canterbury(44.6%Leavenowbutwas51%Leavethen).• Cherwell(44.5%Leavenowbutwas50.3%Leavethen).• ReigateandBanstead(44.9%Leavenowbutwas50.5%Leavethen).• Knowsley(39.7%Leavenowbutwas51.6%Leavethen).• NorthTyneside(45.5%Leavenowbutwas53.4%Leavethen).• Birmingham(41.8%Leavenowbutwas50.4%Leavethen).• Sutton(44.9%Leavenowbutwas53.7%Leavethen).• IsleofAnglesey(44.2%Leavenowbutwas50.9%Leavethen).• Swansea(43.2%Leavenowbutwas51.5%Leavethen).• RhonddaCynonTaf(43.5%Leavenowbutwas53.7%Leavethen).
Aswellasaskinghowpeoplewouldvoteinafreshreferendum,wealsoaskedhowpeoplewouldviewparticularproposals,andhowtheywouldvoteonaneventualdeal.
Hereweretheparticularproposalsweasked,togetherwiththeoverallsupport(notincludingthosethatsaiddon’tknow)
• newchecksbeingintroducedongoodscrossingtheIrishseabetweenNorthernIrelandandtherestoftheUK(41%)
• UKandEUcitizenswhowishedtodosobeingabletoliveandworkineachother’scountries
(76%) • LimitationsontheUK’sabilitytomaketradedealswithcountriesoutsidetheEU(25%) • FollowingEUregulationsonmanufacturedgoodssuchasfridges,vacuumcleanersandlightbulbs
(62%) • Supportforthedealasitstands(43%)
Theseproposalshaveverydifferentpatternsofsupport.Thisisshowninthenextfigure,whichshowshoweachareavotedin2016,againstitscurrentsupportforeachproposal.
Theassociationbetweenhoweachareavotedin2016,andhowmuchtheywouldsupportparticularproposalsifthesewerethepriceofadealbetweentheEUandtheUK
Asyoucansee,thehigherthe2016voteforLeave,thelowerthesupportforcontinuingfreedomofmovement,andthelowerthesupportforcontinuingtoacceptEUregulations–eveniftheoveralllevelofsupportfortheseproposalsisquitehigh.
ThestoryisquitedifferentforgoodschecksintheIrishsea,andforlimitationsontradedeals.Thesehavemuchlowersupport,butthey’realsomuchlessstronglyassociatedwiththe2016Leavevote.
Thefinalplotshowstherelationshipbetweenhoweachareavotedin2016,andhowtheywouldvoteonthepresentdeal,howevertheyunderstandthat.
Supportforthecurrentdeal.
Surprisingly,it’sLeave-votingareaswhicharemorelikelytosupportthedeal,eventhoughsupportisnothigh.Remain-votingareasmaybeholdingoutforsomethingbetter.
Full data by local authority can be found here:
https://www.survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/LA-predictions-from-MRP-1.xlsx