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This article was downloaded by: [University of Boras] On: 02 October 2014, At: 23:21 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK South African Journal of Philosophy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsph20 The Rationality of Happiness Deborah Roberts a a School of Philosophy and Ethics University of KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg Private Bag X01, Scottsville, 3209 South Africa, E-mail: Published online: 28 Oct 2013. To cite this article: Deborah Roberts (2004) The Rationality of Happiness, South African Journal of Philosophy, 23:4, 375-382 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v23i4.31405 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever

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Page 1: The Rationality of Happiness

This article was downloaded by: [University of Boras]On: 02 October 2014, At: 23:21Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

South African Journal ofPhilosophyPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsph20

The Rationality of HappinessDeborah Robertsa

a School of Philosophy and Ethics University ofKwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg Private Bag X01,Scottsville, 3209 South Africa, E-mail:Published online: 28 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Deborah Roberts (2004) The Rationality of Happiness, SouthAfrican Journal of Philosophy, 23:4, 375-382

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v23i4.31405

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever

Page 2: The Rationality of Happiness

or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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The Rationality of Happiness

Deborah Roberts

School of Philosophy and EthicsUniversity of KwaZulu-Natal

PietermaritzburgPrivate Bag X01, Scottsville, 3209

South AfricaE-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

In his recent book, Happiness: personhood, community, purpose, PedroTabensky answers the question of what happiness is. He develops an Aristo-telian account of happiness that, he claims, is everyone's maximally rationalideal. Much of the support for this claim rests on what Tabensky calls themethod of critical introspection. This method involves introspecting on thekind of beings that we are and the kind of lives we can thus lead. If properlycarried out, Tabensky claims, critical introspection will reveal to any individ-ual that the active life of virtue is in fact the maximally rational ideal. I arguethat two features of Tabensky's account undermine this claim. The first is hisaccount of the method of critical introspection itself. The second is his ac-count of the nature and acquisition of virtue developed in his analogy be-tween living and painting, and in his discussion of the eudaimon community.Tabensky's account of critical introspection carried out at the general level ofpersons shows only that it works negatively to identify the kind of lives wecould not lead as persons. It does not function positively to reveal that themaximally rational life for any person is the active exercise of virtue.Tabensky does suggest that the method carried out by particular individualswill reveal the kind of life they should be leading. However, it follows fromTabensky's account of the nature and acquisition of virtue, I argue, that criti-cal introspection can only reveal the active life of virtue to be the maximallyrational ideal for those individuals who have had the right sort of upbringingin the right sort of community.

Introduction

In his book, Happiness: personhood, community, purpose, Tabensky aims to recapturethe spirit of ancient philosophy by making a contribution not to any specific debate,but to ‘philosophy for the sake of life’ (Tabensky 2003: 1).1 He asks the question‘What is Happiness?’ and aims to give an answer ‘to each person’ (Williams 1985:40). If we were each to introspect critically, Tabensky suggests, each of us can cometo realise that we already know what happiness is. The process of answering the ques-tion is thus a process of unconcealment (p.6). Tabensky's answer is that happiness iseudaimonia, understood largely as Aristotle understood it.2

1 Unless otherwise specified, all further page references will be to this text.

2 That is, happiness understood as well-being, flourishing and living the ethically good life.

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376 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(4)

It is my claim that, in terms of Tabensky's own account, it does not follow that theeudaimon ideal is everyone's maximally rational ideal. I argue that, according to hisown account of the method in which we discover what we have normative reason todo, it will not necessarily always be the case that an individual has normative reason tolive virtuously.

According to Tabensky the eudaimon ideal maps onto the structure of desire be-cause we all want to be happy (p.25). Thus, we would all be motivated to live in ac-cordance with happiness, or eudaimonia, if we had a correct understanding of it (p.20,my emphasis). The process of coming to a correct understanding of eudaimonia ispractical, as well as intellectual. In fact, it is primarily practical, as Tabensky's analogybetween living and painting reveals. Coming to have the right set of dispositions forliving the maximally rational life; that is, coming to have the virtues, is analogous tolearning a skill. The eudaimon life is a life of the active exercise of virtue. The virtuesare active dispositions. Crucially, as Tabensky shows in his final chapter, coming tohave these active dispositions involves having the right sort of upbringing in the rightsort of community. Being brought up in the wrong sort of community; a neo-liberaldemocracy for example, can leave you without the ‘motivational resources’ to choosea meaningful life option (p.181).

Working out how one has normative reason to live involves, as Tabensky argues inchapter five of his book, using the hermeneutic method of critical introspection toachieve an ideal organisation among the beliefs we already have about the kind of be-ings we are. What it is good from the point of view of reason to do, what we have nor-mative reason to do, is just what we should desire to do after the process of critical in-trospection is suitably carried out.

On examination, however, it seems that the method of critical introspection, whencarried out at the level of generality that applies to us all, delivers less than it initiallyseemed to promise. It reveals how we necessarily live as persons, not how we neces-sarily should live as good persons. At this level, the method places few constraints onhow we ought to live, being concerned to detail how we necessarily cannot live. It isthe method carried out at this level that forms the bulk of the chapter. If the method ofcritical introspection is carried out at the level of the individual

3 then, I argue, the kindof particularities that must be factored in over and above the beliefs concerning thekinds of beings we are will include already established dispositions of character.

Tabensky is happy to accept this, I think, precisely because communication with di-verse others, as he argues following Davidson, is necessary for an individual to be ra-tional. However, this introduces tension into his account. The method of critical intro-spection carried out at the level of persons, I argue, underdetermines how we havenormative reason to live.4 The method of critical introspection carried out at the indi-vidual level might determine how that individual has normative reason to live but it isnot clear, I will argue, given Tabensky's account of the nature and acquisition of vir-tue, that it is always necessarily true that an individual has normative reason to live inaccordance with the eudaimon ideal. If Tabensky wishes to hold on to the claim thatthis is the case then, I think, the eudaimon ideal becomes indeterminate to such a de-gree that is ceases to be normative.

3 Tabensky suggests on p 94 that this would be the appropriate method for determining how an individualhas normative reason to live.

4 Note that I am not here defending the idea that the good life is fully determinate.

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1. Anti-Foundationalist Holism

Tabensky emphasizes from the start that his account of happiness as an ethical ideal isanti-foundationalist, one that does not draw on any external authority or ethical axiomsfor justification. As such the justification for his account of happiness comes from aholistic account of the nature of our being as persons. Ethical principles are justifiedby being a part of the best overall understanding of one's life qua the life of a person.This overall understanding justifies an ethical principle precisely because it is itssource of intelligibility. This is the only way, says Tabensky, that such principles canbe relevant and thus meaningful to our lives. One can only make sense of the good forpersons from the ‘vantage point of persons’ (p.3).

That there is such a thing as the ‘vantage point of persons’ on the good is in part de-fended by the claim that our lives as persons are teleologically structured, which I ex-plore below, and in part by the claim that we do already have a unitary conception ofhappiness, even if we are, most of us, not intellectually fully aware of it. The supportfor this claim comes from a number of sources (p.4-6). First, Tabensky points out that,after reflecting, we tend to agree that happiness is the fundamental goal of life. Life islived for the sake of happiness; people desire above all else to be happy. Second, weare fairly good at recognising happy individuals and even the degree to which they arehappy. Third, even if we do disagree substantively about what happiness is, the merefact that we are able to share our different conceptions as conceptions of happiness,presupposes that there must be some common pre-theoretical understanding of happi-ness underlying our conversations.

I will not explore whether these considerations in fact support the claim that we allhave, and have knowledge of, a unitary conception of happiness.

5 Tabensky's accountmust start from some such a point if it is going to be an account to each person, in thesense outlined above. Thus, Tabensky argues that it must be true in some sense that wealready have knowledge of happiness in the thick sense; that is, happiness as spelt outby the substantive ideal of eudaimonia. This knowledge must, however, be concealedfrom our intellectual faculty; otherwise we would have no need to make sense of thenotion of happiness. Thus, the book aims to be a process of unconcealment, designedto show that, if the process of critical introspection is carried out properly by each ofus, we will come to full knowledge of this unitary conception of happiness.

The eudaimon ideal is a practical ideal. It represents the way in which we have mostreason to live our lives. Tabensky emphasises that the kind of understanding involvedin living well is primarily practical. Being a moral expert involves being an expert in akind of practice. It must be true then, if Tabensky's anti-foundationalist holism is towork, that critical introspection, once it has been properly carried out, reveals that wehave normative reason to live virtuously.

That we all agree, says Tabensky, that life is lived for the sake of happiness warrantssaying that our lives as persons are guided by the eudaimon principle. Given that hisaccount of happiness is a holistic one, this means that the ultimate criteria of desirabil-

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(4) 377

5 Although, I do think that Tabensky has not done enough to here to show that having a vague idea ofwhat happiness is translates into knowing what happiness is in a way that is 'concealed from our mind'seye'. I think this claim probably rests on the further claim that the process of critical introspection, ifproperly carried out by an individual, will reveal that the correct conception of happiness was alreadycontained in her existing set of propositional attitudes. But, as I say below, given the nature of virtueand what we have to do to acquire it, as well as the distinction between person and good person, I do notthink this can be true.

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378 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(4)

ity thus ‘flow from the system that constitutes us as persons and not, by contrast, froma point outside the system’ (p.25). Thus, the ultimate criteria of desirability, or whatwe have normative reason to want, flow from the substantive account of eudaimonia.It is precisely because Tabensky's account is holistic and addressed to each person thatit must be true that the process of critical introspection must result in each person hav-ing normative reason to act virtuously.

2. Teleology, the eudaimon principle and levels of personhood

In chapters two to four, Tabensky defends the notion, following Aristotle, that as per-sons our lives are teleologically defined. His defence is detailed and involves a de-tailed critical discussion of Aristotle's teleology that diverges from the orthodox inter-pretation. I will not examine this discussion closely. Rather, a brief account of howTabensky understands this notion will help explicate in what way he sees eudaimoniaas the maximally rational ideal, the one that everyone has normative reason to pursue.

In keeping with his holistic, hermeneutical account, Tabensky is not explicitly de-fending the idea that our lives are understood as lives belonging to creatures of a cer-tain natural kind, as might be implied by using the term human being. Tabensky ar-gues that Aristotle, properly understood, defends the view that ‘we are by nature ratio-nal entities (persons) instead of rational animals (human beings)’ (p.69). Furthermore,Tabensky takes persons to be a wider, more inclusive category than human beings,largely because persons do not necessarily have to have the sort of bodies that humanbeings have.

What his account establishes, I think, is that there are levels, or degrees, ofpersonhood. For simplicity's sake I will distinguish between two levels, potential andfull personhood. These might otherwise be characterised as a distinction between per-sons and good persons. Full personhood is attained when living in accordance with theeudaimon ideal. That we have some idea of what full personhood is, or what a goodperson is, enables us to identify those at the level of potentiality, Tabensky argues.

6

Aristotle defends the notion that we have telos as persons through a discussion ofthe function, or essence, of persons, and Tabensky goes along with this. If we acceptthat we have a function, understood as a characteristic manner of acting in the world, itseems to make sense to say that we have a telos, understood as perfect or excellentfunctioning. This is eudaimonia. Given that our characteristic manner of acting in theworld can plausibly be characterised as operating rationally,7 it follows that excellentfunctioning is operating in accordance with the maximally rational ideal.

This notion that our lives as persons are teleologically structured is given furthersupport and clarification, argues Tabensky, if we consider an analogy between life andpainting. Just as painting is a skill-based practice directed towards and understood inrelation to the goal of good art, so living is a skill-based practice directed towards andunderstood in relation to the goal of good living. The goal of painting is to produce awork of art that is a coherent whole that meets certain standards, a work that harmo-nises all the different elements that make up the painting. These different elements are

6 He argues that personhood can be understood as a developmental process. He discusses in some detailhow developmental processes cannot be understood in isolation from the ideal towards which they aredirected. This means that in order for me to accurately identify, say, that someone is potentially a goodjazz musician, I must be operating with some idea of what a good jazz musician is. Analogously, thatwe can make sense of our being as persons at all is due to the fact that we understand our lives as de-fined in relation to a telos of full personhood.

7 ‘Rationally’ is here understood as opposed to arationally.

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given meaning by the place they occupy in relation to the whole. A work of art is aunity. A good work of art is a well-composed unity. A life can be understood in a sim-ilar way. A good life is one in which all the aspects are rationally organised into a co-herent whole so that each aspect is given meaning by its relation to the overall rationalstructure that constitutes a eudaimon life.

Thus, the eudaimon ideal is an organisational ideal of rational unity. It is also anideal of activity, the activity of living happily. Tabensky takes the different aspectsthat constitute our active lives to be our goals, our propositional attitudes and the be-haviour expressive of them, or our projects. Just as the elements of a painting aregiven meaning in relation to the painting as a unity, as a coherent whole, so particularprojects in a life are given meaning by considering the overall shape of that life. Whatdefines us as individual rational subjects is, to some extent, that each of us is one, thatour lives form a unity. A unified life is a precondition for being able to grasp one's lifeas one's own. A good life is thus one that has achieved ideal coherence, or unity. Sucha life would be maximally intelligible, argues Tabensky, further supporting the claimthat the eudaimon ideal is the maximally rational ideal (p.68). A life in accordancewith this ideal can thus be understood as life in accordance with logos, or rationalprinciple. That logos can also be understood as life in accordance with complete virtuefollows from the fact that the virtues are simply characterised as those active disposi-tions that enable an individual to live in accordance with the eudaimon ideal.

For these first chapters, then, eudaimonia and the virtues remain relatively emptyplaceholders at the level of full personhood, against which the lives of persons are de-fined. Eudaimonia is the maximally rational organisation of the different aspects ofour lives; the virtues are those capacities that enable us to live out this maximally ra-tional ideal.

3. The method of critical introspection

In chapter five, Tabensky discusses the method that is supposed to reveal ‘the mostperfect manifestation of the concept of personhood’ (p.91)8 as the method of criticalintrospection. This method, it is thus reasonable to suppose, gives some content to theideal of the maximally rational life. Indeed it is a critical method just in so far as itachieves this (p.85).

Since we already have a conception of the good life, as discussed above, the methodof critical introspection simply refines it, honing our self-conceptions. The procedureis thus hermeneutical, beginning with beliefs we already have about the kinds of be-ings that we are. By examining these beliefs for internal coherence, and also by exam-ining their coherence in the light of our overall conception of the world, the methodreveals, says Tabensky, the fundamental aspects of our being as persons. In otherwords, it reveals the structure of the psychological: ‘since to be a person just is to havea psychological life as understood here – a rational life’ (p.89). It is a critical methodsince, if a given conception of who we are is found to be radically incoherent, then it isto be disregarded. This suggests, however, that the method of critical introspection,when applied at the level of generality that includes all persons, is applied at the levelof potential personhood – at the level of persons rather than good persons. This mightseem disappointing in that this method is supposed to reveal the most perfect manifes-tation of personhood.

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(4) 379

8 It must be emphasized that Tabensky does not take perfect to mean complete. Our self-understandings,like our lives, are ongoing and indeterminate. A life is, he says, a dynamic narrative totality.

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380 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(4)

It might be taken as a reply to this worry that Tabensky points out that the eudaimonideal is not a constraining ideal, and many different lives can instantiate it. Moreover,Tabensky is at pains to point out that our conception of personhood can never be fullydeterminate (p.91). What we can determine with some certainty is that there are certainlives that cannot be lived by persons, as Tabensky argues, largely following MarthaNussbaum. By exploring the ideas we already have concerning the being of persons itis revealed that we have a conception that is ‘constituted by a totality of concepts in-tertwined in constitutive relations’ (p.114).

Through this method it is revealed that, at the level of persons, there are three kindsof lives we could not lead. First, we could not lead lives of radical hedonism; second,we could not lead the lives of gods and third, we could not lead the lives of immortals.That we could not lead any of these lives, Tabensky argues in detail, is revealed by thefact that none of the lives are capable of achieving eudaimonia. None of these livesthem is compatible with achieving the ideal of organisation that constitutes eu-daimonia. This is not surprising: we are not gods, nor are we immortal, and lives ofradical hedonism, as explored in Plato's Philebus, would be lives without reason. Asessentially rational creatures, we cannot consistently desire a life that is radically dif-ferent from this largely negative conception of the being of a person.

Tabensky says that we can conclude form this exercise of the method of critical in-trospection that we are able to establish the rational unity that constitutes the ethicalideal of eudaimonia. This seems too quick, however, even given the fact that the idealis not fully determinate. At the end of this chapter, although we have refined our un-derstanding at the level of potential personhood, it is not clear that much substance hasbeen added to the conception at the level of full personhood. That this is the case is, Ithink, evidenced by the obvious point that no actual life of any particular person couldbe taken to contravene these constraints. It's not clear then, that we are any closer todetermining the substance of the kind of life that we have normative reason to live.

The method can be applied to individual lives, as mentioned above, by factoring inindividual histories. Tabensky discusses this only briefly; however, it does seem thatthe method of critical introspection, as employed by an individual agent with regardsto their particular life, could plausibly generate an account of how that individual hasnormative reason to live. In other words, it appears that this method can plausibly givesubstance to the ethical ideal of persons. But, if this method is applied at the individuallevel, it must be the case that at least some individual dispositions of character are fac-tored into the initial starting point for reflection. At least some of these dispositions arelikely to be produced by one's upbringing and life within a certain community. Thisaccords with Tabensky's account of our inescapably political nature in the final chap-ter of the book. The virtues are acquired by internalising and practising principleslearnt in a eudaimon community, structured primarily around eudaimon relationships,or virtuous friendships.

If this is correct, then how we have normative reason to live must, it seems, be afunction of our individuality, including our individual dispositions. If an individualhas had an upbringing that substantially diverges from an upbringing in a eudaimoncommunity, then it seems plausible to say that the result of the process of critical intro-spection carried out at the level of individual particularity may not map onto the ide-ally rational unity constituting eudaimonia and expressed by the virtues. This meansthat the individual may not necessarily have normative reason to live the virtuous life.

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At first glance it appears that Tabensky can reply to this point in one of two ways.Either, it must be the case that such an individual cannot exist, or it must be the casethat such an individual has not applied the method of critical introspection correctly,that there is some aspect of his conception that is inconsistent with his overall under-standing of his life, the being, or persons, or the world in general. Given that themethod of critical introspection is a hermeneutic one and largely a matter of obtainingcoherence, it does seem implausible to say that such a person could not exist. Such alife, being the life of a person and not a god, an immortal or a shellfish, would fallwithin the bounds of possible lives.

It must be true then, that there is some incoherence in this individual's conception ofhow she has normative reason to live. Given the points made above, it is plausible toargue that the incoherence in question is not due to the fact that his individual has anormative conception of a life that offends against the constraints established in chap-ter five.

However, Tabensky argues that there is a further constraint on the lives of (poten-tial) persons. Persons must necessarily live social lives. This follows from the fact thatpersons are essentially rational. Tabensky supplements Davidson's minimum condi-tions for rationality that establish that communication with at least one other is essen-tial for the lives of rational, thinking creatures. Tabensky argues that these minimumconditions can be most fully implemented, that is that rationality can be developedmost fully, only in a pluralist community that acknowledges and fosters individual dif-ference (p.126).

Again, however, this constraint is established at the level of persons, rather than atthe level of good persons. It is plausible to argue that an individual could meet thisconstraint and still, at the level of individual particularity, be unable to acquire thekind of understanding through critical introspection, required for her to have norma-tive reason to live virtuously. Tabensky's account of nihilistic individuals brought upin neo-liberal communities might serve as an example here.

What really gives the eudaimon ideal substance is Tabensky's discussion of ourcommunitarian political nature in the last chapter. However, even in this chapter thedistinction between persons and good persons again works to undermine his claim thatwe all, necessarily, have normative reason to live virtuous lives. As persons, the argu-ment runs, we cannot help but understand ourselves as constituted in relation to ourcommunities. Our identities are essentially communal. At the level of good persons, heargues, eudaimon lives can only be realised in a eudaimon community.

I do not want to dispute here, Tabensky's substantive characterisation of eudai-monia. However, I think that the discussion of the last chapter in effect adds furtherplausibility to my point that the individual who has been brought up in the wrong sortof community might not necessarily have normative reason to live in accordance withthe eudaimon ideal. Since, on this communitarian account, she cannot help but under-stand her embedded nature in relation to and to some extent constituted by such acommunity, it is perfectly plausible that she could have, after critical introspection iscarried out relative to her particular conception, a conception of the good life that doesnot accord with the virtuous life and yet does not offend any of the constraints in placeat the level of (potential) personhood.

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(4) 381

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Conclusion

“To live the life one ought to live is quite uninformitavely to live a good life, since agood life is simply defined as the sort of life one ought to live” (p.17). The fundamen-tal task of ethics is thus to illuminate what the good life is. It emerges from his investi-gation, says Tabensky, that the good life is the happy life. Thus we are justified in call-ing the happy life an ethical ideal. What justifies the identification of the good lifewith the happy life, given the teleological understanding of the lives of persons, is thatas essentially rational entities, it is our defining goal, our ultimate desire, to live in ac-cordance with the maximally rational ideal. That eudaimonia is everyone's maximallyrational ideal is something that Tabensky takes the hermeneutic method of critical in-trospection to show.

I started this paper with the claim that Tabensky fails to show that the eudaimonideal is necessarily everyone's ideal. The method of critical introspection functions atthe level of persons. As such it gives us constraints on what can count as lives of per-sons. However, it leaves thoroughly indeterminate what counts as the life of the goodperson. Even if we concede that the good life is indeterminate, and that individual di-versity is necessary to constitute the eudaimon community that constitutes theeudaimon life, it must still be true, on Tabensky's own holistic account of each person,that if each person were to properly carry out the method of critical introspection, heor she would have normative reason to live the eudaimon life. If I am correct that themethod of critical introspection functions at the level of the lives of persons, and not atthe level of the good life, then it is not clear, I have argued, that this will necessarily bethe case for each person.

If it is not the case that each person necessarily has normative reason to live theeudaimon life, the plausibility that his account is a holistic account to each person isundermined. As I discussed above, the success of the method of critical introspectionis crucial in this regard. Moreover, Tabensky's defence of the claim that our lives areteleologically structured is defended largely on the basis that, as essentially rationalcreatures, eudaimonia is every person's maximally rational ideal. The method of criti-cal introspection is meant to establish this. If the method of critical introspection failsto achieve this, as I have argued, it follows that we have reason to doubt the teleologi-cal structure of our lives: Tabensky's claim that all our lives are structured in relationto the ideal of happiness, understood as eudaimonia, is undermined.

Bibliography

Tabensky, P. 2003. Happiness: personhood, community, purpose. Aldershot andBurlington: Ashgate.

Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana.

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