52
The Quality of The Quality of Government Government What you get? What you get? What it is? What it is? How to get it! How to get it! Bo Rothstein Bo Rothstein The Quality of Goverment Institute The Quality of Goverment Institute Department of Political Science Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg University of Gothenburg

The Quality of Government What you get? What it is? How to get it! Bo Rothstein The Quality of Goverment Institute Department of Political Science University

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

The Quality of GovernmentThe Quality of Government

What you get?What you get?

What it is?What it is?

How to get it!How to get it!

Bo RothsteinBo Rothstein

The Quality of Goverment InstituteThe Quality of Goverment Institute

Department of Political ScienceDepartment of Political Science

University of GothenburgUniversity of Gothenburg

The Quality of Government (QoG) The Quality of Government (QoG) Institute at University of Institute at University of

GothenburgGothenburg Started in 2004 (minor grant to build Started in 2004 (minor grant to build

database)database) Indepentent academic research instituteIndepentent academic research institute Major funding for research from 2007 Major funding for research from 2007

(about 8 mil. Euro). About 20 researchers(about 8 mil. Euro). About 20 researchers Aim: To carry out and promote research Aim: To carry out and promote research

about the importance of trustworthy, about the importance of trustworthy, reliable, competent, non-corrupt, non-reliable, competent, non-corrupt, non-discriminatory, and competent discriminatory, and competent government institutions = QoGgovernment institutions = QoG

QoG ResourcesQoG Resources

Two open access major cross-country Two open access major cross-country and over time databanks and over time databanks

Largest survey so far of QoG (34000 Largest survey so far of QoG (34000 n)n)

QoG expert survey for 126 countriesQoG expert survey for 126 countries About 200 workings papers, About 200 workings papers,

published articles, books, etc.published articles, books, etc. Just ”google” QoGJust ”google” QoG

ANTICORRPANTICORRP Anticorruption policies revisited: Global Anticorruption policies revisited: Global

trends and European Responses to the trends and European Responses to the Challanges of CorruptionChallanges of Corruption

Large-scale integrative project funded by the Large-scale integrative project funded by the European Union Seventh Framework programEuropean Union Seventh Framework program

Started in 2012 and will last for 60 monthsStarted in 2012 and will last for 60 months Involves 21 research groups in 16 EU Involves 21 research groups in 16 EU

countries countries Total budget about 10 mil. EuroTotal budget about 10 mil. Euro Largest EU-funded research project in the Largest EU-funded research project in the

social sciences social sciences www.anticorrp.euwww.anticorrp.eu

ANTICORRP:ANTICORRP:Background and goalsBackground and goals

Goal: To investigate factors that promote or Goal: To investigate factors that promote or hinder the development of effective hinder the development of effective anti-anti-corruption policiescorruption policies

Interdisciplinary project Interdisciplinary project

While the detrimental effects of corruption on While the detrimental effects of corruption on many central aspects of human well-being are many central aspects of human well-being are by now well-knownby now well-known

knowledge about how knowledge about how corruption can be corruption can be successfully fought by political means is much successfully fought by political means is much less less developed developed

The failure of the international anti-corruption The failure of the international anti-corruption regimeregime

The Quality of Government: The Quality of Government: Corruption, ineguality and social trust in a Corruption, ineguality and social trust in a

comparative perspective (University of Chicago comparative perspective (University of Chicago Press 2011)Press 2011)

QoG - An example: IMF QoG - An example: IMF 20062006

“promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper”

But…. how important is But…. how important is QoG compared to other QoG compared to other

political variables? political variables?

The huge and impressive success of democracy The huge and impressive success of democracy and democratization since the 1970sand democratization since the 1970s

More countries than ever are now considered to More countries than ever are now considered to be democraticbe democratic

More people than ever now lives in More people than ever now lives in democraciesdemocracies

But …. the effect of democracy on human well-But …. the effect of democracy on human well-being is so far not impressive being is so far not impressive

Syria

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Papua New Guinea

ArgentinaS. Arabia

Nor

Croatia

JapanSwe

South Korea

Egypt

BahrainArmenia

Macedonia

ZimbabweSwaziland

Malaysia

AzerbaijanTurkmenistan

Mongolia

Israel

Georgia

Singapore

South Africa

Belarus

USA

Russia

Nigeria

Burundi

Equatorial Guinea

Kuwait

EthiopiaKenyaDjibouti

RwandaCameroon

Afghanistan

Senegal

Lesotho

Mozambique

Laos

BotswanaLiberia

Iraq Gambia

Honduras

Angola

Maldives

Tanzania

Cambodia

TuvaluBangladesh

Brunei

Sierra Leone

Mali

Tajikistan

Cuba

HaitiChad

Pakistan

IranLebanon

China

3040

5060

7080

He

alth

y L

ife Y

ea

rs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.01

Sources: WHO (-), Freedom House/Polity (2002-2006)

Healthy Life Yearsvs. Level of Democracy

Low High

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Albania

ArgentinaBahrain

Bangladesh

BoliviaSolomon IslandsMyanmar

Burundi

CambodiaCameroon

Cape Verde

Dem. Rep. Congo

Eritrea

Estonia

Gabon

Gambia

Ghana

Iran

Israel

Japan

Kazakhstan

Lebanon

Lesotho

MalaysiaMaldives

Mali

Morocco

Mozambique

Vanuatu

Nigeria

Norway

QatarRussia

Rwanda

Sao Tome

Saudi Arabia

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Vietnam

Swaziland

Swe

Egypt

USA

Burkina Faso

.2.4

.6.8

1

Hu

ma

n D

eve

lop

me

nt

Ind

ex

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.22

Sources: UNDP (2002), Freedom House/Polity (2002-2006)

Human Development Indexvs. Level of Democracy

Low High

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Albania

ArgentinaBahrain

Bangladesh

BoliviaSolomon IslandsMyanmar

Burundi

CambodiaCameroon

Cape Verde

Dem. Rep. Congo

Eritrea

Estonia

Gabon

Gambia

Ghana

Iran

Israel

Japan

Kazakhstan

Lebanon

Lesotho

MalaysiaMaldives

Mali

Morocco

Mozambique

Vanuatu

Nigeria

Norway

QatarRussia

Rwanda

Sao Tome

Saudi Arabia

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Vietnam

Swaziland

Swe

Egypt

USA

Burkina Faso

.2.4

.6.8

1

Hu

ma

n D

eve

lop

me

nt

Ind

ex

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.22

Sources: UNDP (2002), Freedom House/Polity (2002-2006)

Human Development Indexvs. Level of Democracy

Low High

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Azerbaijan

ArgentinaBahamas

Belgium

BhutanBotswana

Solomon Islands

Chile

Dem. Rep. Congo

Eq. Guinea

Eritrea

FinlandFrance

Djibouti

Ghana

Grenada

Haiti

India

IsraelItaly

JapanSouth Korea

Lesotho

Mali

Mexico

Oman

Namibia

Niger

Nigeria

Norway

Russia

Sierra Leone

SingaporeSweden

USA

Burkina Faso

Venezuela

.2.4

.6.8

1

Hu

ma

n D

eve

lop

me

nt

Ind

ex

-2 -1 0 1 2 3

Control of Corruption

R²=0.47

Sources: UNDP (2002), World Bank (2002-2008)

Human Development Indexvs. Control of Corruption

High Corruption Low Corruption

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Bangladesh

Brazil

Bulgaria

China

Colombia Denmark

Ethiopia GeorgiaIndia

Iran

Iraq

Mexico

Nigeria

Romania

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Zimbabwe

Sweden

Egypt

Tanzania

USA

45

67

8

Life

Sa

tisfa

ctio

n

0 2 4 6 8 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.28

Sources: World Values Survey (1996-2008), Freedom House/Polity (2002-2006)

Life Satisfactionvs. Level of Democracy

Azerbaijan

Argentina

Austria

Bangladesh

Brazil

Chile

China

Colombia Denmark

Estonia

Finland

GeorgiaIndia

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Ireland

JapanKorea, South

Kyrgyzstan

Lithuania

MaltaMexico

Nigeria

Romania

Russia

S. Arabia Singapore

Zimbabwe

Sweden

Egypt

United Kingdom

Tanzania

USAUruguayVenezuela

45

67

8

Life

Sat

isfa

ctio

n

-2 -1 0 1 2 3

Control of Corruption

R²=0.46

Sources: World Values Survey (1996-2008), World Bank (2002-2008)

Life Satisfactionvs. Control of Corruption

High Corruption Low Corruption

High

Low

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

AfghanistanAngola

Antigua and Barbuda

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Botswana

Brazil

Myanmar

Burundi

Cambodia

Cameroon

China

Comoros

Cuba

Benin

Ethiopia

Eritrea

Estonia

Djibouti

Gabon

Ger

KiribatiHaiti

India

Iran

IsraelJapan

Kenya

Kuwait

Lebanon

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mongolia

MozambiqueNigeria

PakistanRussia

Rwanda

San Marino

Saudi A.

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Singapore

South Africa

Zimbabwe

Swaziland

Swe

TajikistanThailand

United Arab Emirates

Ukraine

USA

Uzbekistan

Zambia

4050

6070

80

Life

Exp

ect

an

cy a

t B

irth

(Y

ea

rs)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.19

Sources: World Bank (2000-2006), Freedom House/Polity (2002-2006)

Life Expectancy at Birthvs. Level of Democracy

Low High

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Afghanistan

AlbaniaArgentina

Australia

BahamasBarbados

Bhutan

Botswana

Solomon Islands

Cape Verde

China

CubaDenmark

Equatorial GuineaEthiopia

Eritrea

Estonia

Finland

Ghana

Greece

HaitiIndia

Iraq

ItalyJapan

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Malawi

MongoliaRussia

Sierra Leone

Singapore

South Africa

Zimbabwe

Swaziland

Sweden

Ukraine

USA

Burkina Faso

Venezuela

Zambia

4050

6070

80

Life

Exp

ect

an

cy a

t B

irth

(Y

ea

rs)

-2 -1 0 1 2 3

Control of Corruption

R²=0.41

Source: World Bank (2000-2008)

Life Expectancy at Birthvs. Control of Corruption

High Corruption Low Corruption

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Albania Argentina

Brazil

Belarus Cambodia

Cameroon Cape Verde

China

Colombia

Fiji Georgia

Greece

India

Israel

Jamaica

Japan

Kenya

Kuwait

MalaysiaOman

Nor

Qatar

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Singapore

Vietnam

Swe

ThailandTunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

Egypt

USA

Uruguay

VenezuelaZambia

24

68

10

Fo

reig

n C

red

it R

atin

g

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.13

Sources: Standard & Poor's (2011), Freedom House/Polity (2009)

Foreign Credit Ratingvs. Level of Democracy

Low High

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Albania

Chile

China Taiwan

France

Greece

Grenada

IcelandIreland

IsraelItaly

Japan

Kazakhstan

Jordan

Lithuania

Malaysia

New Zealand

Norway

Papua New Guinea

Peru

Poland

Russia

Saudi Arabia

SwedenSwitzerland

Uganda

Macedonia

Egypt

USA

Uruguay

24

68

10

Fo

reig

n C

red

it R

atin

g

-2 -1 0 1 2

Control of Corruption

R²=0.62

Sources: Standard & Poor's (2011), World Bank (2002-2008)

Foreign Credit Ratingvs. Control of Corruption

High Corruption Low Corruption

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Antigua and BarbudaBahrain

Bangladesh

ArmeniaBosnia

Brunei

Belarus

Cambodia

Cameroon

Taiwan

Fin

Gabon

Gambia

IsraelJapan

Kazakhstan

North Korea

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Monaco

Mongolia

NorwayQatar

Russia

Saudi ArabiaSeychelles

Singapore

Vietnam

Swe

United Arab Emirates

Turkmenistan

Tuvalu

USA

Uruguay

Venezuela

025

000

5000

0

GD

P /

Ca

pita

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Level of Democracy

R²=0.16

Sources: Gleditsch (2002), Freedom House/Polity (2002-2006)

GDP / Capitavs. Level of Democracy

Low High

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

Afghanistan

Barbados

Belgium

Bhutan

Brunei

Belarus

Cape Verde

Chad

Chile

Equatorial Guinea

Estonia

FinlandGermany

Ireland

IsraelItaly

Japan

Luxembourg

Mauritania

New Zealand

Niger

NorwayQatar

Russia

Sao Tome

S. Arabia

SingaporeSweden

Trinidad

United Arab Emirates

Turkmenistan Ukraine

USA

Uruguay

025

000

5000

0

GD

P /

Ca

pita

-2 -1 0 1 2 3

Control of Corruption

R²=0.71

Sources: Gleditsch (2002), World Bank (2002-2008)

GDP / Capitavs. Control of Corruption

High Corruption Low Corruption

Data runs by: Richard Svensson

Low

High

QoG versus DemocracyQoG versus Democracy

For all standard measures of human well-For all standard measures of human well-being, QoG measures clearly outperforms being, QoG measures clearly outperforms measures of democracymeasures of democracy

This is not a problem that is related only to This is not a problem that is related only to developing countries or former communist developing countries or former communist countriescountries

An overwhelming part of human misery in An overwhelming part of human misery in today’s world is caused by low QoGtoday’s world is caused by low QoG

This should have implications for researchThis should have implications for research

Why are definitions Why are definitions important?important?

In order to study it, we have to know what In order to study it, we have to know what we are speaking aboutwe are speaking about

Terminology can be very confusingTerminology can be very confusing If we do not have a clear definition, we If we do not have a clear definition, we

cannot operationalize and measurecannot operationalize and measure If we cannot measure, we cannot explain If we cannot measure, we cannot explain

variatonvariaton If we cannot explain variation, we cannot If we cannot explain variation, we cannot

combat corruptioncombat corruption

TerminologyTerminology

Good GovernanceGood Governance State CapacityState Capacity Government effectivenessGovernment effectiveness CorruptionCorruption State captureState capture Rule of lawRule of lawQuality of GovernmentQuality of Government

What it is: The many What it is: The many problems of defining QoGproblems of defining QoG

The ”too broad” definitionsThe ”too broad” definitions The relativistic definitionsThe relativistic definitions The simply wrong definitiionsThe simply wrong definitiions Definitions that include what we want to Definitions that include what we want to

explainexplain The confusion around ”governance”The confusion around ”governance” Functionalist definitionsFunctionalist definitions Definitions that are disconnected from Definitions that are disconnected from

normative theorynormative theory

Too broad definitions of QoG:Too broad definitions of QoG:

World Bank: “World Bank: “the traditions and institutions the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercisedby which authority in a country is exercised””

““(1) the process by which government are (1) the process by which government are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3)(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3)

ProblemsProblems

If QoG is everything, than maybe it is If QoG is everything, than maybe it is nothingnothing

If QoG is just ”good democracy”, then why If QoG is just ”good democracy”, then why do you need another conceptdo you need another concept

QoG can not be just Democracy because QoG can not be just Democracy because the curve between D & QoG is J-shapedthe curve between D & QoG is J-shaped

We would like to know if democracy We would like to know if democracy increases QoG and if democracy is increases QoG and if democracy is included in the definition this is not included in the definition this is not possilbepossilbe

Should policies be included?Should policies be included?

””Sound policies”: Do we really know?Sound policies”: Do we really know? ””Sound policies” – will there by Sound policies” – will there by

consensus?consensus? Epistocracy: The Problem from Plato Epistocracy: The Problem from Plato

and Leninand Lenin It is problably easier to get broad It is problably easier to get broad

based concensus about the based concensus about the procedures than about policies procedures than about policies (substance)(substance)

Definitions that are simply Definitions that are simply wrong wrong

Leading economists: Small government = Leading economists: Small government = High QoGHigh QoG

Alberto Alesina: ”Alberto Alesina: ”a large government increases corruption and rent-seeking”

Gary Becker: ”To Root out Corruption, Boot Out Big Government”

But what about Northern Europe? Data: High corruption equals small

governments ”Big Government” is ”Good Government”

Functionalist definitions of QoG:Functionalist definitions of QoG:

La Porta et al. (1999, 223): “good La Porta et al. (1999, 223): “good governance” = “good-for-economic-governance” = “good-for-economic-development”development”

The Economist The Economist ((June 4th, 2005June 4th, 2005)): : ““What is required for growth? What is required for growth?

−− Good governance. Good governance. And what counts as good governance? And what counts as good governance?

−−That which promotes growth.”That which promotes growth.” But then what promites growth?But then what promites growth? - Good governance- Good governance And so on….And so on….

Relativistic definitions of QoGRelativistic definitions of QoG

Absence of corruption, Absence of corruption, But….Corruption in itself difficult to defineBut….Corruption in itself difficult to define Low QoG not only about corruptionLow QoG not only about corruption Corruption = ”the abuse of public power Corruption = ”the abuse of public power

for private gain”for private gain” But was should be considered ”abuse”? But was should be considered ”abuse”? The problem with relativism The problem with relativism These definitions lack a normative These definitions lack a normative

baselinebaseline Cannot be used for comparative researchCannot be used for comparative research

Definitions that includes Definitions that includes what you want to explainwhat you want to explain

QoG as efficiency/effectivenessQoG as efficiency/effectiveness But, we want to explain efficiency/ But, we want to explain efficiency/

effectivenesseffectiveness QoG as efficiency lacks a normative QoG as efficiency lacks a normative

baseline for how the state should baseline for how the state should treat citizenstreat citizens

Acemoglu & Robinson: Why Acemoglu & Robinson: Why Nations FailNations Fail

What is required is ”inclusive institutions” What is required is ”inclusive institutions” defined as system that defined as system that “allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skill and enable them to make the choices they wish” + rule of law etc.

Well, big news: The good society produces the good society

Arguments for a Arguments for a normative definition of normative definition of

QoGQoG Should we accept a relativistic understanding of Should we accept a relativistic understanding of

democracy, human rights , gender equality?democracy, human rights , gender equality? If not, why should we accept a relativistic def. of If not, why should we accept a relativistic def. of

QoG?QoG? If we accept a relativistic definition, we can If we accept a relativistic definition, we can

forget the ambitions to meausere to compareforget the ambitions to meausere to compare And we will not be able explain variation in QoG And we will not be able explain variation in QoG

by any general theoryby any general theory The empirical arguments for a relatvistic The empirical arguments for a relatvistic

definition of QoG are not convincing?definition of QoG are not convincing?

Is Africa that different?Is Africa that different?

The Two Worlds of The Two Worlds of GovernanceGovernance

Governance 1 Governance 1 as understood by public as understood by public adminstation & public policy scholars adminstation & public policy scholars studying western liberal democraciesstudying western liberal democracies

Non-normative, functionalist critique of Non-normative, functionalist critique of hierarchial and rule-of-law administration hierarchial and rule-of-law administration (Weberianism). (Weberianism).

Focus on private-public partnerships, Focus on private-public partnerships, pseudo-market solutions, new public pseudo-market solutions, new public management, etcmanagement, etc

Governance as a meta-concept for all types Governance as a meta-concept for all types of social co-ordination. of social co-ordination.

Weak on conceptual precision and Weak on conceptual precision and operationalizations and therefore no operationalizations and therefore no measures.measures.

Governance mode two.Governance mode two. ””Good Governance”Good Governance” Governance as understood in development Governance as understood in development

researchresearch Normative (good) and empiricalNormative (good) and empirical State-centered, rule of law, property rights, State-centered, rule of law, property rights,

meritocracy, competencemeritocracy, competence Strong focus on operationalizations and Strong focus on operationalizations and

measurement measurement This ”same terminology for different things” This ”same terminology for different things”

has created a lot of conceptual confusionhas created a lot of conceptual confusion

Definitions that are not Definitions that are not related to modern political related to modern political

philosophyphilosophy The idea that one could speak of The idea that one could speak of

GOOD governance or the QUALITY of GOOD governance or the QUALITY of government without entering into a government without entering into a dialoque with modern political dialoque with modern political philosophy is …. unjustifiedphilosophy is …. unjustified

May result in utilitarian definitions of May result in utilitarian definitions of QoG by which individuals are QoG by which individuals are sacrificed for some notion of ”the sacrificed for some notion of ”the collective good” (”Leninism”)collective good” (”Leninism”)

Requirements of definition of Requirements of definition of QoGQoG

UniversalismUniversalism PrecisionPrecision Non-functionalismNon-functionalism Connected to democratic theory Connected to democratic theory

(proceduralism)(proceduralism) Resonate with major works in modern Resonate with major works in modern

political philosophy about justice, rights political philosophy about justice, rights and equalityand equality

Resonate with central empirical findingsResonate with central empirical findings

Democratic theory and QoGDemocratic theory and QoG

Input side: Political Equality (Robert Input side: Political Equality (Robert Dahl)Dahl)

Output side: Impartiality (Rothstein & Output side: Impartiality (Rothstein & Teorell)Teorell)

BASIC NORM = In both cases, we should BASIC NORM = In both cases, we should expect considerable variation in the expect considerable variation in the specific institutional configuration specific institutional configuration

The opposite to justice is …..The opposite to justice is ….. ……..favoritism..favoritism

QoG = ImpartialityQoG = Impartiality When implementing laws and policies, When implementing laws and policies,

government officials shall not take government officials shall not take anything about the citizen/case into anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not consideration that is not beforehandbeforehand stipulated in the policy or the law stipulated in the policy or the law

QoG is about the QoG is about the exerciseexercise of power, not of power, not the the access access to powerto power

Rules out corruption, but also other Rules out corruption, but also other forms of favoritism such as clientelism, forms of favoritism such as clientelism, nepotism, patronage and discriminationnepotism, patronage and discrimination

Rawls two great hopesRawls two great hopes

By arranging fair procedures for By arranging fair procedures for collective decision-making (= liberal collective decision-making (= liberal democracy) the probability of just democracy) the probability of just outcomes will increaseoutcomes will increase

By arranging fair procedures for the By arranging fair procedures for the implementation of these decisions (= implementation of these decisions (= QoG), the probability of just outcomes will QoG), the probability of just outcomes will increaseincrease

In both cases, there can be no guaranteeIn both cases, there can be no guarantee

QoG and Political LegitimacyQoG and Political Legitimacy

““it is notable that democratic rights, it is notable that democratic rights, while certainly qualifying as one of the while certainly qualifying as one of the most important causes of legitimacy, most important causes of legitimacy, turn out to be roughly on par with turn out to be roughly on par with welfare gains, and both of these are far welfare gains, and both of these are far less important than good governance. less important than good governance. This clashes with standard liberal This clashes with standard liberal treatments of legitimacy that give treatments of legitimacy that give overall priority to democratic rights“ overall priority to democratic rights“ (Bruce Gilley)(Bruce Gilley)

Political legitimacy, cont.Political legitimacy, cont.

””It is Quality of Government and the It is Quality of Government and the impartial treatment on the output side of the impartial treatment on the output side of the political system, and not electoral political system, and not electoral democracy, that creates regime legitimacy”democracy, that creates regime legitimacy”

(Torbjörn Gjefsen 2012)(Torbjörn Gjefsen 2012)

How to get it? How to get it? What do we know?What do we know?

Avner Greif in Handbook of Avner Greif in Handbook of Institutional Economics 2005: Institutional Economics 2005: Efficient (i.e., QoG) institutions Efficient (i.e., QoG) institutions ””operate in a few advanced contemporary countries and only in recent times. We know surprisingly little, however, regarding the institutional development that led to these modern successes”

Two theoretical Two theoretical misspecifications of the misspecifications of the

problemproblem The principal-agent theoryThe principal-agent theory Agents as rational utility maximizersAgents as rational utility maximizers Problem can be fixed by incremental Problem can be fixed by incremental

change of incentive structurechange of incentive structure

The public ethics theoryThe public ethics theory Agents are motivated by social normsAgents are motivated by social norms Problem can be fixed by enlightened Problem can be fixed by enlightened

educationeducation

QoG and the Human NatureQoG and the Human Nature

Reciprocity is the central motive that Reciprocity is the central motive that drives human agency. drives human agency.

““if people believe that cheating on if people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption and abuses of the taxes, corruption and abuses of the welfare state are widespread, they welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat themselves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes, or abuse on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions” (Fehr and welfare state institutions” (Fehr and Fischbacher 2006).Fischbacher 2006).

Low QoG/Corruption as a Low QoG/Corruption as a social trapsocial trap

QoG as a problem of collective actionQoG as a problem of collective action Actors strategies based on reciprocityActors strategies based on reciprocity ““What agents do, depends on what they What agents do, depends on what they

think most other agents will do”think most other agents will do” Corruption as a self-reinforcing Corruption as a self-reinforcing

equilibriumequilibrium Rationality is “strategic” or “interactive”Rationality is “strategic” or “interactive” Equilibria about expectations must Equilibria about expectations must

changechange Requires as “big bang” change” Requires as “big bang” change”

QoG as a Social TrapQoG as a Social Trap Everyone knows that if all respect the impartiality Everyone knows that if all respect the impartiality

of institutions, all will winof institutions, all will win But – if people cannot trust that “almost everyone But – if people cannot trust that “almost everyone

else” will respect the impartial institutions they will else” will respect the impartial institutions they will be destroyed because the end is contingent on be destroyed because the end is contingent on honest cooperation by “almost everyone else”honest cooperation by “almost everyone else”

Thus, dishonest behavior may be rational when Thus, dishonest behavior may be rational when people do not trust that others will also be honest.people do not trust that others will also be honest.

Conclusion: Efficient cooperation for establishing Conclusion: Efficient cooperation for establishing impartial institutions will only come about if people impartial institutions will only come about if people trust that most other people will respect themtrust that most other people will respect them

Lacking this trust, the social trap is for real. That is, Lacking this trust, the social trap is for real. That is, we end up in a state of affairs that is worse for we end up in a state of affairs that is worse for everyone, even though everyone know that they everyone, even though everyone know that they would profit from impartial institutionswould profit from impartial institutions

What does it take to break What does it take to break out of a social trap?out of a social trap?

The Ostrom Approach – What is needed ?The Ostrom Approach – What is needed ?

1.1.A minimal set of institutions for decision-A minimal set of institutions for decision-makingmaking

2.2.A general understanding of the seriousness of A general understanding of the seriousness of the problemthe problem

3.3.New ideas that ”another world is possible”New ideas that ”another world is possible”

4.4.And to go for a BIG BANG CHANGEAnd to go for a BIG BANG CHANGE

To summarizeTo summarize1.1. The negative impact of low QoG on The negative impact of low QoG on

human well-being and political human well-being and political legitimacy is hugelegitimacy is huge

2.2. Democracy is no guarantee against Democracy is no guarantee against low QoGlow QoG

3.3. The conceptual/theoritical work in this The conceptual/theoritical work in this area has been quite problematic area has been quite problematic

4.4. The dominant theories about The dominant theories about corruption seem to have mispecificied corruption seem to have mispecificied the problemthe problem