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The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University [email protected]

The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University [email protected]

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Page 1: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

The Public Finance of Private Communities

and Private Transit

Fred E. FoldvaryDept. of Economics

Santa Clara [email protected]

Page 2: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

We can recover from “smart” growth with private communities.Entrepreneurs seek to maximize land rent, which optimizes the land use.

Page 3: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

General Principles

• Optimal price = marginal cost.

• Civic works create site rentals.

• Marginal benefits decline.

• Optimal quantity: MC = MB.

Page 4: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Spencer Heath, 1957, Citadel, Market and Altar * Hotel services: like a city, but voluntary.* Hotels compete.* Services paid from the room rentals.

Page 5: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Spencer Heath MacCallum

The Art of Community, 1970

Society suffers from schizophrenia. The same agency that performs public services also performs disservices, cannibalizing society with taxation.

Page 6: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

William Vickrey

• Price services e.g. transit at marginal cost, including congestion costs.

• Build if rent generated is greater than cost, when users pay MC, often free.

• Rent pays the remaining costs.

Page 7: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Fred Foldvary, 1994

• Public Goods and Private Communities

• There is market success providing public goods, in theory and in practice.

• Demand is revealed by rent.

• No free riders: users pay rent.

• Condominiums, residential associations.

Page 8: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Replace zoning and regulations

• Covenants and easements.

• Association deeds and bylaws.

• Proprietary governance.

• Allow secession and tax substitution.

Page 9: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Private streets and transit

• Cars pay congestion, pollution charges.

• Jitneys, vans, have curb rights.

• Public transit charging MC if generates rent, quantity at MC = MB.

• Streets owned by civic associations.

• No proxie taxes, e.g. on gasoline.

Page 10: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Replace taxes

• Voluntary user fees, with electronic tolls and meters.

• Community assessments.

• Congestion and pollution charges.

• Private and voluntary services.

Page 11: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Mass democracy fails

• Rent seeking by special interests.

• Tyranny of the median voter.

• There is no “general will.”

• Rational voter ignorance: not worth knowing better.

• Candidates must have the money.

Page 12: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Small-group voting

• Little need for campaign money.

• Can personally meet and know candidates.

• Bottom-up power and money.

• Complements private communities.

Page 13: The Public Finance of Private Communities and Private Transit Fred E. Foldvary Dept. of Economics Santa Clara University ffoldvary@scu.edu

Conclusion

• Replace dysfunctional mass democracy with bottom-up small-group voting.

• Replace zoning with covenants.

• Replace taxes with fees, assessments.

• Privatize transit, streets, roads.