The Public and Public Risk

The public and public risk

Written and researched by Wood Holmes Group

October 2009


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The Risk and Regulation Advisory Council This report was produced for the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council. The Risk and Regulation Advisory Council is an independent advisory group which aims to improve the understanding of public risk and how to respond to it.

More information about the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council can be found at www.berr.gov.uk/deliverypartners/list/rrac

About the authorsWood Holmes is a strategy consultancy, headquartered in Newcastle upon Tyne with offices in Manchester and London. It operates nationally and internationally, helping a wide range of clients develop solutions to complex problems.

Contact:Wood Holmes GroupFloor 17, Cale Cross House156 Pilgrim StreetNewcastle upon TyneNE1 6SU

Telephone: 0191 2112999 Email: [email protected]

Note This work was commissioned by the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council. The contents of the main report are the responsibility of the authors. Comments in the discussion summary come from discussion participants.


Contents

Executive summary 4

Main paper: The public and public risk 6

Appendix: case studies 34

A response: points made by the public in a discussion 48

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Executive Summary

The public defies simplistic categorisation, as it is the product of a complex system and interplay of societal level values, beliefs, education and media consumption.

All other risk actor groups are subsets of the public risk actor grouping - in this way public risk actor could be considered a meta-category.

The risk issues and subject matter that the public risk actors get involved with are almost as diverse as the group itself.

Following Peter Sandman, risk in the public realm must acknowledge outrage factors (or fright factors) reflecting needs and values of the public risk actor alongside characterisation of the hazard and its intensity.

Public risk actors need some form of attractor around which to coalesce; a systems view is thus required.

Issues of institutional trust, societal and personal values all play a strong role in the computation of a risk response in the public domain.

Public risk actors are strongly influenced by the media. Likewise, the media relies on public risk actors for source material.

The Governments move toward localisation and sustainable communities (which involve wide spread consultation) inherently motivates risk perception, awareness, and response amongst public actors.

The public risk actor has been conditioned through societal, legal and governmental processes to not take any personal responsibility for risk.

The public risk actor is or has been conditioned to be attuned to risk as a politically, legally, and commercially motive force.

The public risk response is, in many ways, an unavoidable reaction to change. In this regard resilience rather than control presents the greatest opportunity for the policymaker.

The paper has been developed through literature review, consultation and field experience.

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Main Paper The public and public risk


Main paper: The public and public risk

The public risk actor

The notion of ‘the public’ as a discrete and bounded categorisation of risk actor, in the same way as ‘media’, ‘politician’ and ‘standard setter’ , is fraught with difficulty:

‘I am a concerned member of society, you are a one man pressure group, he or she is a busybody’ (Sir Konrad Schiemann 1990)

The size, complexity and diversity of the public risk actor group make easy categorisations of the group impossible. Another layer of complexity is added when we consider that each of the other identified risk actor groups is, in fact, a sub-set of the larger public group.

Each of the sub-set groups can have some form of influence on the ‘public’ risk actor, with arguably the media having the strongest sway.

In this respect we view ‘the public’ as a meta-category which encompasses, and should be seen to encompass all of the other risk actor categories.

Any work which aims to examine and resolve the nature and action of public risk actors must acknowledge the scale and complexity of such an undertaking.

We need only look to Walter Lippmann’s treatment of the ‘phantom public’ (1925) and the depiction, by John Dewey (1927), of a public brought into existence solely in response to a negative externality, to demonstrate the intractable problem of attempting to frame ‘the public’ components and roles.

In fact, rather than delineating a uniform, static, and homogenous group, we must acknowledge that individuals are ‘of the public’ only with respect to a specific context.

‘There is no single ‘public’, but different levels of public based on differing levels of interest and ability’ (Aggens 1983)

Furthermore, we must address this public condition in a dynamic environment where the passive turn to active involvement according to their changing relationships with other risk agents.

Emerging science in complex adaptive systems may provide a direction forward when thinking about the complex interactions of the public:

‘A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is a dynamic network of many agents (which may represent cells, species, individuals, firms, nations) acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. The control of a CAS tends to be highly

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dispersed and decentralized. If there is to be any coherent behaviour in the system, it has to arise from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. The overall behaviour of the system is the result of a huge number of decisions made every moment by many individual agents’ (John Holland)

Simplistic classifications can be derived from the field of psychology; Verber and Nie (1972) proposed the following classification system of activism:

‘The Inactives’ – individuals psychologically and actively detached from politics

‘The Voting Specialists’ – individuals with attachment to national, party politics, unlikely to side on community conflict issue extremity

‘The Parochial Participants’ – individuals participating in narrow, community issues concerning their personal lives, yet lacking engagement in the political context

‘The Communalists’ – individuals committed to non-adversarial, community development goals, with an understanding and engagement in political dimensions

‘The Campaign Activist’ – individuals who maintain strong partisan affiliations within community conflicts nurturing extreme issue positions

‘The Complete Activist’ – individuals who are involved in extremity and conflict yet maintain political awareness and a commitment to community goals

From the perspective of 2008 this classification (focussing as it does on politics) seems dated and reminiscent of a marketing segmentation exercise.

In the context of ‘public risk’ simplistic classifications such as this fail to recognise two fundamental and critically important features: the existence of multiple, dynamic ‘publics’ at an individual and group level, and the role of complex social systems.

The implication is that individuals act according to social and physical context in a manner that is effectively impossible to predict, at least at the level of individual agent. Therefore, the public risk actor defies static characterisation frameworks.

‘The public consideration of risk characteristically occurs in a social group or community context, consisting of multiple sources and channels of information, peer groups, and an agenda of other ongoing social issues. Much more is known about the response to risk by members of the public as individuals than as members of social groups’ (Kasperson and Kasperson 2005 pg 27)

In this manner, in questioning the status of a public risk actor, an understanding of why the activist is supported by their relevant community may present a more valuable pursuit. Therefore, in terms of classification of public risk actors, we may consider the ‘potentials’ of specific publics:

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‘Individuals tend to specialise in types of policy issues and arenas of public involvement. Accordingly, they present different priority problems and may require different strategies of risk communication to reach the spectrum of social groups in a particular community. Each group, in short, has its own appeal and incentives and its own ‘thresholds’ of involvement for varying risk issues. Typologies of participation explain in part the existence of the ‘participation paradox’ – those most often affected by a particular risk or prospective development may be the most uninvolved and difficult to reach. Depending upon the ‘fit’ of the risk to the ‘participation domain’ of the individual or group, publics may be readily involved or, alternatively, quite resistant to communication and involvement efforts. Even ‘stakeholders’ will not all be responsive to a given approach to risk communication’ (Kasperson and Kasperson 2005 pg 26)

We can see that single actions can be classified retrospectively, but the subsequent translation to classification of the individual and their ‘next move’ in response faces huge challenges. In the practical world, this shifts emphasis towards systems of classification that are resilient to challenges of complexity.

The table below proposes a simple classification typology of public risk actors based on ‘typical’ means of engagement.

Table 1: Typology & Engagement of Public Risk Actors

Formation Mode Typical Means Example

Indi

vidu

al

Action as lone agents expressing personal opinion

Direct correspondence MP lobbying Local media

correspondence Public meeting attendance Petition Legal challenge Emigration Internet Chat

Anti-war protestor parliament square.

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Formation Mode Typical Means Example

Grou

p

Essentially collections of like-minded individuals coalescing around ‘attractors’ thus integrating a group dynamic and element of representation

In line with individual but with greater intensity in terms of volume, numbers, scope, and media interest.Additional actions: Community recruitment

and awareness Local publicity and local

political lobbying Internet deployment Recruitment Alliance and coalescence Legal class-action Physical protest

Local Mobile phone mast protestors, Localized Planning Development Protestors

Orga

niza

tion

Structured, goal-orientated, political, representative, and resourceful interest groups. Often have no interest in local issues and will promote a national agenda regardless of local need.

Incorporating individual and group capabilities but extending to: Regional/national Political engagement/

lobbying Charity/NGO status Mass-media engagement Comms and broadcast Mass-protest and rallies Strike-action Bargaining and negotiation Fundraising Political lobbying/formation

of political parties

Greenpeace, ASH, NFU, WWF etc

An alternative might be to categorise the public risk actor responses based on the ‘mode of engagement’ associated with different formations of public risk actor: The MOA Handbook on Mast Siting (Kemp & Greulich 2004) created simple heuristics designed to guide mobile network operators on the likely impact of their operations based on potential public responses to specific mast-related activities.

In this manner the approach is not based on a prediction following analysis of ‘a public’, rather a resource to develop resilience in preparation for an uncertain public risk response (Kemp & Greulich 2004). The next figure illustrates the process.

In summary, the public’s participation as risk actors, or with particular subject matters, is hugely complex and defies universal categorization. Whether a particular social

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demographic or stratum of the public is more or less likely to be come a risk actor is entirely context specific, with the limited research on the matter only serving stereotyped expectations.

However, we would argue that looking for clues, triggers and patterns within a complex milieu is worthwhile and can yield useful results.

Figure 1: The site acquisition process

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History and Evolution of the Public Risk Actor

The historical evolution of the public risk actor, including developments in their action, role, and influence, may be best understood in terms of several key socio-political trends apparent in the UK post-WWII.

Rather than mapping a linear, causally-linked history we can consider the convergence of the following strongly interlinked components:

Development of the ‘adversary culture’ and protest movement post-1968 bringing the articulation of public ‘values’ to the fore and crystallising ‘mass movement’ activism (Rootes 2008).

Slow-revolution in the relationship between knowledge and power, enhancing scrutiny and transparency of the state/authority and driving the Freedom of Information movement from the Franks Report (1972).

Transformations in media technology and attitude through commercialised TV, the tabloid press, post war British satirical boom through to the Internet’s chat-rooms, blogs, and networks driving a public service reportage agenda in which scrutiny of state/authority are held prime; watershed examples being the Profumo Affair (1963), Watergate in the US (1974) and the more recent Iraq dossier affair (2002).

Increasing accessibility to the media. User generated content now forms a huge part of the broadcast news agenda. Technology effectively makes everyone a “reporter”. This further exacerbates mixed messages; the competition for air time and readership increasingly tends toward a sensationalist media, which actually leaves people feeling more uncertain than ever. Also styles of journalism lead us to believe that adversarial challenge is good. Paxman, Humpreys & Campbell being primary proponents on the BBC.

Emergence of the ‘stakeholder society’ and growth of public participation principles which attempt to bring publics closer to the decision making process; a core principle of the New Labour message ‘an economy run for the many, not for the few. . . in which opportunity is available to all, advancement is through merit, and from which no group or class is set apart or excluded’ (Tony Blair quoted in Davies 1996).

Politicisation of risk-messages in recognition of their power to motivate public responses; heralding the age of the PR ‘risk-communicator’. The ex-MI5 chief Stella Rimington has added to the critique of the ‘terror-risk’ message and the politicisation of national security applied internationally post-9/11 (Norton-Taylor 2008).

Models of governance ranging across principles of New Public Management, Third Way centrism, and Managerialism in the UK across the 1990s and 2000s driving ‘Economism’ in policy that regularly fails to align with public values (Henderson 1996).

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The post-WWII UK culture is proposed by many to be a particularly individualistic or atomistic society in terms of the extent to which people are expected to stand up for themselves and to choose their own affiliations (Hofstede 2001).

Perceptions of a UK ‘compensation culture’ that is argued to enforce the ‘where there’s blame, there’s a claim’ mentality focussed on liability and risk-aversion that predominates risk management in the public arena (BRTF 2004).

Growing mistrust of perceived technocratic policy, clearest of all in the evaluation of clashes between medical-science communities, the media, the public, and regulation/governance bodies; the MMR debacle being a key example (Petts and Niemeyer 2004).

Rise of ‘technoscience’ critiques and the oft unforeseen and unequal implications of technological intervention making ‘neo-luddism’ a relevant issue amongst an increasingly technologically discerning public (Winner 1988).

These drivers serve to develop the public risk actor in several key dimensions: They are often attuned to the nature, extent, and political/legal power of ‘risk’ Implicated in formalised political/legal risk management processes, such as a stakeholder

consultation exercise driven by the planning system Advocated by a public-service and commercial media (further facilitated by the internet) They are more informed, connected, and proactive than ever before (again we cannot

underestimate the role of internet in this issue) They are empowered, encouraged, and hence confident to maintain and express

adversarial opinion

Illustrative examples that demonstrate how these factors combine within single public risk actor contexts are presented in the Appendix.

Therefore, we could argue that the impact and the influence of the public risk actor has been both stimulated and facilitated by factors in post-WWII UK to construct a specific risk-paradigm in 2008. However, it has been argued that the impact of risk actors post 1990 has undergone a disarming and neutralising process derived from community disunity, disillusionment with failed protest, and the relative comfort (standard of living) of many UK populations (Hollander 1996).

To conclude therefore, we must acknowledge several apparent trends associated with the public risk actor: Growth in the awareness of risk and the power of ‘risk dialogues’ Heightened ‘potential’ impact and influence supported by formal and informal

mechanisms Highly context specific ‘actual’ impact and influence which defeats generalisations

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This condition presents great challenges for policy-making, driving some theorists and practitioners away from ‘predict and control’ responses, toward strategic resilience. This apparent trend will be explored in greater depth in the following sections.

The Nature and Extent of the Public Risk Actor

A historic analysis of public risk action indicates a number of factors that are associated with development in the ‘potential’ for risk actors to act with influence in formal and informal processes. However, the translation of this potential to real action is proposed to be highly context dependent.

The following discussion seeks to draw out the details of this context specific relationship through the analysis of commentary and case-study (for case-studies refer to Appendix 1).

The following questions will be considered: Which risks dominate the contemporary public risk actor activity? What are the motives/objectives behind public risk actor responses? What is the journey of the public risk actor response? What responsibility for risk does the public risk actor take? What are the results and consequences?We cover these components in turn.

Which risks dominate the contemporary public risk actor activity?The particular types of risk that public risk actors are involved with are determined by complex mechanisms of perception (individual and group) and subsequent response triggered by a risk event.

In fact any attempt to list types of risk that public risk actors are involved with soon runs into difficulty due to the infinite diversity of issues the public are involved with.

We propose that ‘risk’ in the public domain has a strong linkage with ‘change’, movement from equilibrium, either through changes made by direct human action or by changes imminent through lack of human action.

Fundamentally, this places public risk action firmly within a reactive paradigm; a response to change (either defensively, proactively or opportunistically) or the expectation (fear) of change.

Therefore, key to the understanding of how a public risk actor perceives the change, is the manner by which it is recognised, understood, and ‘experienced’.

It should be noted that relatively few individuals have direct experience of a ‘risk’ and indeed risks such as ‘climate change’ are difficult if not impossible to ‘experience’. This stems from the fact that many risks are localized in time/space and in most cases concern change in the future.

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The paradox is of course that the lack of tangible experience is one of the key drivers behind risk fears.

“Biases are like mushrooms. They grow well in the dark” (Adams 1995) The motive power of risk messages is very evident in political approaches to recruitment of ‘the public’: ‘one goal of risk communication is to produce in the audience the appropriate level of concern and action’ (Sandman 2004 pg 45).

Lupton, taking the example of healthcare, indicates the potential ramifications of such a course:‘Health education emphasizing risks is a form of pedagogy, which, like other forms, serves to legitimize ideologies and social practices. Risk discourse in the public health sphere allows the state, as the owner of knowledge, to exert power of the bodies of its citizens. Risk discourse, therefore, especially when it emphasizes lifestyle risks, serves as an effective Foucauldian agent of surveillance and control that is difficult to challenge because of its manifest benevolent goal of maintaining standards of health. In doing so, it draws attention away from the structural causes of ill-health’ (Lupton 1993 pg432)

However, the use of risk messages as a recruitment tool by NGOs and charities active in healthcare and environment demonstrates that application of risk to drive public behaviour is not restricted to government.

The media is clearly core to the issue of messages. The culture of the press trained towards risk reportage by consumer trends, seemingly attuned to the inherent risk of every act, complete with the detrimental effect to certain quarters of society, is evident across all media channels.

In this form, to a degree, the media represents a ‘black box’ in which risk messages from multiple sources are combined with in-house risk analysis and commentary (Clarkson, Littlejohn, Monbiot etc) and communicated to a receptive target audience.

The clearest evidence of such a situation is the disparity in column inches between risks of equal ‘scientific’ risk:‘Emerging health hazards are over-reported in mass media by comparison to common threats to public health. Since premature mortality in industrialized societies is most often due to well-known risks such as smoking and physical inactivity, their under-representation

on public agendas may cause suboptimal prioritization of public health resources’ (Bornlitz and Brezis 2008)

Arguably the most potent tool at the media’s disposal is the ability to transform an abstract media message into an indirect experience for the audience. Hence personal case studies are often used in risk reportage.

The public actor is not passive in the interpretation of risk and we should consider which risks public actors may be predisposed to react to.

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A series of systems have historically been developed that consider the needs, or wants, of the public actor; key examples being Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943) and Max-Neef’s update (2008).

Table 2: Max-Neef’s system of needs

Subsistence Creation

Protection Identity

Affection Freedom

Understanding Recreation

Participation

The proposal is that public risk actors are most attuned or predisposed to risks that threaten their current success in meeting needs or challenge their achievement of a greater success in meeting these needs. As we will come to consider, the motives of a risk actor can be considered in terms of the protection of such needs.

We may extend this idea of predisposition to include a further factor: that of historical context. The example of UK infrastructure planning process as a system that has evolved to inadvertently perpetuate associated public risk perception, through public participation and risk-awareness processes, is clear.

Once supported, the history of know-how and precedent developed during one risk-response is seen to drive repeated actions. This is evident with UK motorway protests, as early as the Archway Road widening and the Newbury bypass campaigns which can be considered as a precursor to present day infrastructure protest.

The result is that the public risk actor is increasingly attuned to those risks with well established precedents in the fashion of ‘conditioning’. Furthermore, it is this precedent that also orientates associated risk actor responses in media and government with potential amplification as a result, as will be considered in subsequent sections.

To summarise at this point, we suggest that, through ongoing processes of conditioning and predisposition, the public develops a distinct pattern of risk acceptance and response. Mary Douglas proposes ‘people select their awareness of certain dangers to conform with a specific way of life…to alter risk selection and risk perception, then, would depend on changing the social organization’ (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982 pg9). As such may consider that every social organisation (every public) may be characterised by their own risk acceptance profile in a manner that challenges efforts to reduce risk perception to nil.

In complement to ideas of conditioning and predisposition we must consider a further, final dimension determining the pattern of risk response in the public actor: the threshold at which perceived threat and hazard elicit a response from the public risk actor.

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To this end, Sandman considers the differences in risk perception associated with the parties implicated in the event, introducing ‘outrage’ as a fundamental determinant of public interpretations:‘Expert risk assessments ignore outrage and focus on hazard, but for the citizen, risk assessments are more a product of outrage than of hazard. That is, we consistently underestimate the hazard of risks that are of low-outrage and overestimate the hazard of risks that are high-outrage. We do this because we care about outrage’ (Sandman 2005 pg46)

Continuing, Sandman outlines factors contributing to the level of ‘outrage’ felt by the public risk actor, implicating concepts of control, morality, fear, intensity, familiarity, voluntariness, etc within a complex subjective equation.

The result may be that ‘the particular types of risk public risk actors are involved with’ are most likely to be those types where the public has a low threshold of ‘outrage’ or where the risk communicator is clumsy in their approach to outrage versus hazard (or both).

Therefore, in terms of identifying those types of risk most relevant to the public risk actor of 2008 we may look to determine those issues, and associated communities, with low thresholds for risk-orientated reactions.

For example, the U.S. urban community appears to present a low flashpoint in response to perceived risks of terrorist events:

‘In the USA's post-9/11 era of terror-awareness, extreme actions of groups like Al Qaeda are no longer necessary to spark detrimental anxiety-based social reactions. The two snipers who placed the nation's capital under siege for three weeks with one rifle and a box of bullets confirmed this fact. Washington DC's duct tape and plastic panic buying spree, spurred by a Terrorism Threat Index increase, illustrated how the mere hint of a future event can induce irrational behaviour. Clearly, the emergency management community can no longer simply blame the media for such strong public sentiment’ (Coppola 2005 pg 32)

(‘No one can terrorize a whole nation, unless we are all his accomplices’ Ed Murrow 1954)In the UK, the public risk actor response to 7/7 may not be as direct as is evident in the US. DfT research suggests that 85% of London commuters had no behavioural response (another 10% returning to norm shortly after) to the 7/7 attacks.

We might attribute such disparity in response to deep seated societal factors. For example, the impact of a historical precedent in the UK (repeated IRA bombings) versus ‘fortress America’; the injurious intensity of 9/11 versus the more limited extent of injuries associated with 7/7; the graphic Hollywood reportage of 9/11, the community status of U.S. firefighters, and U.S. attitudes to ‘heroism’ arising from 9/11 versus the more reserved reporting of 7/7.

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Outrage and FrightDebates surrounding ‘Outrage’ or ‘Fright’ factors are numerous; the following sources presenting prime components:

Sandman (2001) presents components of ‘outrage’ as the following ‘safe vs. risky’ characterisations of the risk: Voluntary vs. Coerced Natural vs. Industrial Familiar vs. Exotic Not Memorable vs. Memorable Not Dreaded vs. Dreaded Chronic vs. Catastrophic Knowable vs. Unknowable Individually Controlled vs. Controlled by Others Fair vs. Unfair Morally Irrelevant vs. Morally Relevant Trustworthy Sources vs. Untrustworthy Sources Responsive Process vs. Unresponsive Process

Continuing this line, the Department of Health (1998) reviews components of ‘fright’: Risks which are involuntarily imposed (eg pollution from an incinerator) tend to be

seen as less acceptable than voluntary ones (eg driving a car or undertaking dangerous sports).

Unfamiliar risks (eg genetically modified organisms) tend to cause greater concern, particularly if they are considered to be poorly understood by science.

Activities which pose a threat of a dreaded form of death, injury or illness (eg cancer) are viewed with alarm and are less acceptable.

Man-made or 'technological risks' (eg pesticides, nuclear power stations) are less acceptable than natural ones (eg floods and radon).

A risk which may cause a single large-scale consequence (eg civil aviation accident) causes more concern than risks which result in numerous small-scale consequences (eg car accidents).

Alarm may be caused by risks when the consequences of exposure are delayed and cause hidden or irreversible damage (eg exposure to ionising radiation).

Inequitable distribution of risks and benefits as a result of a particular activity is likely to make a risk less acceptable.

Activities which pose a risk to certain groups such as children and future generations are generally more worrying.

Risks which are the subject of controversy and contradictory information generally cause concern.

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What are the motives/objectives behind public risk actor responses?The motivations behind a particular individual’s decision to get involved with a particular public risk is a complex matter which defies a simplistic explanation.

The table below provides a simple model of key motivating factors that individuals are shown to follow when engaging in public risk, based upon field experience and interviews with participants in public risk protests.

Table 3: Motivating Factors for Public Risk Actors

Motivating Factor Description

Protection of Family Protection of loved ones, children, parents etc is an extremely strong motivating force. Any risk alarm involving children and protection of innocents is hugely motivational.

Protection of Property

‘An English man’s home is his castle’ . This phrase neatly sums up the particular emotional attachment the British have with housing. Not only does it provide us with shelter it has become part of our identity and thus anything which might ‘threaten’ this becomes a strong motivating factor.

Protection of Self Protection of self from physical, emotional, and mental harm or persecution. This is an inbuilt response to external threats, based on survival.

Protection of a Third Party (environment, planet, helpless community, animals)

Many people get involved with a particular cause in order to protect others that may not have the ability, or perceived ability to protect themselves. Those who are vulnerable are felt to need protecting from those who are “culpable”. In addition, individuals might get involved through guilt induced responses or for wider social reasons.

Promotion of Organisation

Once established groups and organisations often begin to get involved with risks/causes that provide a platform for the promotion of the group itself, and may help to sustain the group once the initial raison d’etre may have been resolved.

Desire to wield power or control

This is a powerful motivating force for some and can be manifested in a covert desire for ‘power’ or a more overt need to feel in ‘control’ of ones own destiny.

Self Interest

Whilst rarely admitted, naked self interest or promotion can be a strong motivating force. This might particularly be the case with sole traders or academics looking to build a career on the back of an emerging risk. Similarly, public risk actors can begin to enjoy their media profile. Also in this category we need to consider deeper personal psychological drivers such as a desire for attention, companionship, pursuit of conspiracy theories, and a sense of gained respect.

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Clearly, referring back to the idea of ‘needs’ considered in the previous section, a selfish dimension to risk perception, and thus the response triggered, must be considered. ‘a risk which has not materialized within the individual's own experience is unlikely to be regarded seriously’ (Rose 1992 pg22).

The typical case studies that we have assembled (Appendix 1) often illustrate the ‘attractive’ power of localized events. They also illustrate how the energy of risk actors can dissipate rapidly once the attractor is removed.

Skilled operators can amplify and even create these ‘attractors’ relatively easily and at a large enough scale attractors can be very powerful and self-reinforcing e.g. Heathrow Climate Camp, Newbury Road Protests.

Similarly, organizations and government often inadvertently create attractors through clumsy planning policy, attempts to control information flow, or poor community interventions.

Perhaps a final point to make here is that in some cases government and organisations have no control over how individuals interact with the risk landscape as that is shaped heavily by their own trust networks, value system and worldview. This means that even the best crafted and carefully planned risk communication activity is prone to failure.

In Appendix 1 we provide an illustrative case study of an individual taking part in the Heathrow Climate Camp. Even though this individual was highly educated they at no time used ‘official’ sources of information on Climate Change and were to a certain extent influenced in their actions by other ‘trusted’ sources, usually websites with a pro-climate camp agenda.

The response to this phenomena we would suggest is to re-emphasise the need for significant horizon scanning to spot emerging ‘public risks’ either real or perceived, as well as substantial work in understanding the societal level values that influence responses.

What responsibility does the public risk actor take?In terms of the responsibility being taken by public risk actors and efforts to manage the risk, the impact and balance of numerous interdependent factors and features must be considered.

Prime amongst such factors and features are the following: Power and resource of the public risk actor to address the risk alone. Capability of the public risk actor to recruit aides to address the risk. Cost to the individual of the required action. Threat to personal or family safety as a result of action or inaction. Legal, criminal and moral liability attached to the risk and its consequences. Emotional attachment to the context that would be lost. The risk’s solubility and nature of potential salve. Relative strength of competing opinion/action.

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Desire to perpetuate condition of risk as a political device. Willingness to relinquish ‘at risk’ status. Complexity of compromise and bargaining faced by opposing intractable risk perceptions. Cynicism regarding the issue’s resolution. Restriction and exclusion limiting access to potential solutions. Lack of formal processes to accommodate public risk actor solutions.

Arguably the most salient of these factors is the responsibility being taken by those in authority and the culture of responsibility in place. A number of examples in UK governance, particularly associated with the welfare state, present paternal attitudes amongst authority organisations that limit the potential for public risk actors to take responsibility.An example of such conditioning may be the current responsibility being taken for lifestyle illness within a UK NHS/welfare-state context:

‘Just as a moral distinction is drawn between "those at risk" and "those posing a risk", health education routinely draws a distinction between the harm caused by external causes out of the individual's control and that caused by oneself. Lifestyle risk discourse overturns the notion that health hazards in post-industrial society are out of the individual's control. On the contrary, the dominant theme of lifestyle risk discourse is the responsibility of the individual to avoid health risks for the sake of his or her own health as well as the greater good of society’ (Lupton 1993 pg429)

Likewise, UK Health & Safety Law is fundamentally predicated on the need to protect the citizen from the harm that they may inadvertently do themselves. This is further enshrined in recent legislation regarding corporate manslaughter.

The House Of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration recently received evidence from three former ministers of state; David Blunkett, Ken Clarke and Nick Raynsford. Each of whom indicated their view was that the British Public now believed that it was the duty of Government (and specific Government ministers) to protect the public from any harm (real or perceived) which might befall them. This was in their view an unrealistic expectation and one which caused the overall system of public administration to become burdensome1.

Values, Trust and Networks within the public risk actor groupValues are beliefs, either individual or societal, about what is important in life, and thus about the ends or objectives which should govern and shape public policy. Values link very closely to trust and ‘institutional trust’ and all of these concepts play a significant part in shaping the public risk actors behaviour.

The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), in its 21st Report on ‘Setting Environmental Standards’ comprehensively, tackled this issue of values in relation to risk and public attitudes. It concluded that:

1 www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/public_administration_select_committee/pasc0708pn60.cfm

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“Values are an essential element in decisions about environmental policies and standards. People’s environmental and social values are the outcome of informed reflection and debate. To ensure that such values are articulated and taken into account, less familiar approaches need to be used to extend and complement present procedures for consultation and participation” (RCEP 21st Report 1998)

However, on the back of this we need to have a wider debate as to the values/beliefs that underpin our society and future economic development. For example, do we always allow economic concerns to have primacy, or do we always prioritise sustainability?

This constant balancing act is the realm of policy makers and politicians. There is no silver bullet (and there never will be) to resolve these conflicts, and politicians and policy makers (guided by the societies that they serve) will always need to make difficult choices and subsequently explain these choices.

Dillow (2008) argues that public and politicians alike have forgotten these trade offs and have begun to expect that ‘equality and efficiency’ are always compatible. Unfortunately, the real world seldom is. The belief that all ideals and values are mutually compatible contradicts an intellectual tradition associated with Sir Isaiah Berlin, which states the opposite:

“The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all the good things co-exist, seems to be me not merely unattainable – that is a truism – but conceptually incoherent. I do not know what is meant by a harmony of this kind. Some of the great goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss…we must engage in trade offs – rules, values, principles must yield to each other in varying degrees in specific situations.” (The Proper Study of Mankind )

Recent policy debates about ‘reducing the burden of red tape’ or ‘better regulation’ to some extent simplify the complexity of these choices . Again, magnification of issues through other risk actors such as the media need to be considered here.

On a recent BBC 1 political programme David Cameron was meeting small business owners in the West Midlands. In the course of the televised meeting Cameron asked the business owner what his ‘big issues of concern were?’ The business owner intimated that red tape was causing him a problem. Cameron, unsurprisingly, stated that his Conservative Party would repeal a whole plethora of red tape if elected into power. However, when challenged by the BBC interviewer neither party could specifically identify to a piece of 'red tape' that they would undo.

This highlights the truism that one person’s unnecessary regulation is another’s necessary protection. To cite Berlin again, “These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and what we are”

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‘No Fear: Growing up in a risk averse society’by Tim Gill, published by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation

In the past, those tackling child abuse focused on family, where the vast majority of child abuse takes place. However, the focus has shifted in recent years. The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 is the latest and arguably most risk averse step in this trend.

The Act places around nine million adults technically under suspicion of abuse: a third of the adult working population.

The Act for the first time extends mandatory vetting to include over two million volunteers and workers involved in sport and leisure activities, and over 200,000 school governors.

The annual running cost of the vetting system was £83 million in 2005/6. When the Act comes into effect this is expected to rise.

The number of cases of child abuse prevented will be tiny in comparison to the abuse that still takes place in domestic settings. The NSPCC estimates that around 79 children a year are being killed by their parents or others in their families.

Although the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check is widely seen as the ‘gold standard’ that induces public confidence, it is no guarantee that a person is not a threat because much abuse goes unreported and undetected.

Reliance on a technical, bureaucratic procedure may ultimately leave children less well-protected since many agencies will focus on carrying out checks at the expense of other measures, such as training and awareness-raising, that could be more effective in protecting children from abuse.

The new regime is also beginning to have an adverse impact on levels of volunteering and community activity around children.

The role of this particular aspect of the legal profession is again outside the scope of this paper but must be considered.

Finally, people who work in organisations are members of the public too. This is not a particularly startling insight. However, we would contend that many if not most people get their first overt taste of Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) legislation, and other regulatory procedures, in the workplace. Hence, this heightens their awareness of HSE outside the workplace and further contributes to the conditioning and attunement to a risk society that we have indicated above.

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Amplification/Diminution of Public Risk by the Public Risk Actor

There is a substantial body of published work on the theory of risk amplification and some work on how specific actors (media in particular) might ‘amplify risk’ in their specific context. (Refs Kasperson, Pidgeon et al)

Our experience of direct work with public groups engaging with specific risks will be applied to this discussion and readers are referred to the case studies in Appendix 1, each of which highlight different dynamics in play in terms of risk amplification.

Inadvertent amplification/diminution It can be argued that all members of UK society are at any one time or another unconsciously amplifying or diminishing risk. For example, the probabilistic risk of ‘stranger danger’ or of a child being randomly snatched and coming to harm are so small in comparison with other potential risks (eg serious injury in road traffic accident) and yet the fear and narrative around this is are so encompassing that the vast majority of primary school children in the UK will not be allowed to walk to school unaccompanied – even if there is a traffic free walking route.

This phenomena has received much press attention and yet very few parents appear to changing their behaviour. In addition, a generation of school children are conditioned to the cosseted environment of the school car run and the incorrect belief that danger lurks for them around every corner.

Earlier in this essay we touched upon societal level conditioning to risk. Is the UK population conditioned to ‘risk’ in ways and dimensions that other countries are not? A discussion of this type is outwith the scope of this work but anecdotal evidence (Jackson 2008) would indicate that the UK risk society manifests itself differently from other jurisdictions.

Similarly, whilst many members of the public would join residents groups to fight developments such as mobile phone base stations, opencast coal mines, waste incinerators or electricity pylons and often use health grounds as a means of protest, the same individuals would provide a child with a mobile phone (on the grounds of personal safety) which contravenes WHO precautionary safety guidelines.

A rational or simplistic economic analysis of this might suggest that the individuals are making rational cost v benefit type calculations; weighing up different options to pursue the optimum strategy. However, this analysis falls down when we consider how many times individuals opt for the more probabilistically risky act over something which they perceive to be more dangerous.

A more topical example may be the loss of trust in the global banking system and the ‘run on the bank’ phenomena typified by the Northern Rock collapse in 2007 whereby a self-reinforcing herd mentality adopted by the ‘public’ saw queues of depositors outside bank branches.

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Deliberate Amplification/Diminution We have discussed, above, the ‘accidental’ amplification that occurs when individuals either acting alone or at a societal level adopt patterns of behaviour that amplify risk. In some instance members of the public or groups of members of the public can amplify risk in order to further their cause or personal agenda. (See Housing Market Renewal Case Study).

This will usually involve the exaggeration of a particular argument or issue in one dimension or another. This is recognisable as a tactic used in debates throughout history and is employed by politicians, government and the media for centuries. Whilst, in some ways, the public recognise this phenomenon and are far more attuned to the nature and tactics of propaganda than ever before, the fundamental power of stories and narrative to grip the human imagination is such that rationality and logic can easily be overridden.

A final aspect we need to consider is the rise of the litigious society in the UK. Objectively, we might cite figures from the Ministry of Justice presenting a 16% increase on defended claims from 2006. However, the ‘perception’ of the litigious society is arguably the greater issue; the ‘Where there’s blame there’s a claim’ phenomenon driving heightened consciousness of ‘liability’.

In conversations with risk professionals and other organisational employees, it appears that the fear of being ‘sued’ often takes primacy over everything else. Many National and Local government departments and other organisations appear to operate in such fear of litigation, that their prevailing culture is one of total risk aversion. Risk aversion is not risk management.

Regulation of the Public Risk Actor

The public risk actor (either acting as an individual or as a group) is regulated in the same way as any other citizen. They need to operate within the laws and regulations that govern society.

However, there are clearly individuals and groups that go beyond what is deemed acceptable in law (notably animal rights protestors, direct action green campaigners). These groups and individuals would argue a moral supremacy in their case which supersedes any notion of the law.

The UK has in fact a long and illustrious history of direct action and protest which it can be argued led to several positive changes that few would wish to see repealed. For example, the direct action of suffragettes.

Over the past 20 years there has been a clear shift in UK Environmental/ Development/ Infrastructure Planning law to favour the individual over the collective. This move has been driven by a plethora or reasons ranging from direct protests, EU legislation, political changes and move toward a more atomistic, laissez faire society. The move to decentralise decision making is reflected also in the localisation of public involvement.

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In Margaret Thatcher’s oft misquoted epithet, “There is no such thing as society”, we see the genesis of the ‘me society’ which arguably preceded the ‘where there is blame there is a claim’ phenomena mentioned elsewhere in this report:

“I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand "I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!" or "I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!" "I am homeless, the Government must house me!" and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbour and life is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much in mind without the obligations.” (Margaret Thatcher quoted in Interview for Woman's Own ("no such thing as society") with journalist Douglas Keay (23 September 1987).Prior to the 1990’s planning in Britain (and planning guidance) often contained ‘national interest considerations’ which acted as an overriding principle in many areas. However, due to the perceived unscrupulous use of these clauses and the need to balance environmental issues and emerging human rights law, planning and development law has, over time, begun to favour the rights of the individual over the rights of the collective.

This is, of course, a simplification of a complex issue which is outside this report’s scope but should be acknowledged in the legal risk actor report.

The enshrining of Human Rights legislation into UK law further strengthens the role of the ‘individual’. This codifies absolutely the rights of the individual. The impacts of Human Rights Act are still to be fully understood. However, there is evidence that many Local Authorities reference Human rights considerations when determining planning applications. (for an example see Manchester City Council Planning Website 2008)

However, we do see that the more sophisticated public risk actor groups are able to use regulations to their advantage such as the use of the little known Aarhus Convention (http://www.unece.org/env/pp/) as a tool against the Governments proposed eco-towns.

Likewise, other groups’ lack of understanding of regulation and governance can often put them at a perceived disadvantage over governments and organizations. These groups often immediately retort to a media response to support their case, to varying degrees of success. This again indicates the importance of the media in the amplification, or otherwise, of risk.

Table 4: Summary of Regulatory/Legal Landscape In Relation to Public Risk Actors

Instrument Description How is it used to regulate?Property Law Includes law on development rights,

permitted building uses, trespass, Prevent direct action on buildings, to remove

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ingress, unauthorised entry protestors, to provide protective zones

Planning & Environmental Legislation

Includes items such as Local Development Framework/Area Development Framework process, Transport and Works Acts, Infrastructure Acts, environmental permits, statements of community involvement, regional spatial planning policy, Aarhuss

Prescribes consultation and engagement processes, provides routes to judicial review and challenge

Human Rights Legislation

Deriving from EU Human rights legislation, provides individuals protection of their property, way of life and business

Can be used to challenge or defend specific developments.

Public Order Legislation

Includes items such as Police and Criminal Evidence Acts, Anti-Terror Legislation, Regulation of Investigatory Powers and Freedom Of Information legislation

Used to monitor public actors, used to prevent assembly, used to prevent specific types of protest. Used by public risk actors to obtain information or challenge

Civil Law

Includes items such as judicial review, tort, libel, slander

Has been used successfully/unsuccessfully to constrain public risk actors. Examples include animal rights protestors, MacLibel case, other class action cases.

Unintended Consequences

A typical ‘unintended consequence’ of a negative public reaction to ‘risk’ would be the movement to a different economy a particular technology. For example the movement overseas of GMO development (Grove-White et al 1997), or nanotechnology manufacturers. The potential cost to UK PLC in monetary terms might run into the £billions in these cases. However, it is worth bearing in mind that sections of the public and society will see this price as being entirely reasonable if it means protecting the environment, or food chain. Hence, we return to Berlin’s consideration of values and how a society regulates risk in a way which reflects its member’s values.

The table below attempts to summarise some ‘unintended consequences’

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Table 5: Common Unintended Consequences & Potential Impact

Unintended Consequence Description Potential Impact

Added Cost Burden

Public reaction to a perceived risk results in legislation or further regulations to constrain or mitigate the impact of that risk.

Additional costs on business and small business

Costs on Local Authorities and tax payers through increased income and council tax.

Changes in Investment Priorities and slowdown in technological/ economic progress

A negative reaction can sway investors about placing money in a location, firm or organization that is faced with a high degree of public protest

Loss of economic benefit to UK plc, loss of global competitiveness

Environmental Impact

The interconnected nature of the environment that legislation or regulation in one environmental domain can result in impacts in another. Recent example would be the Severn Barrage

Economic and environmental impasse. Increased capital costs or infrastructure schemes, delays in planning.

Health Impacts

Health risks are one of the key areas of public involvement. Witness MMR, CJD,. Likewise anti-smoking, obesity, drugs campaigns all fall into this sphere

Unintended consequences include rise in cases of ‘defunct’ diseases such as measles, whooping cough, mumps etc

Impact on brewers and publicans through smoking ban

Rise in Social Division

Negative public risk reaction erodes societies trust in its own members and institutions. This has impact in terms of lack of engagement in sporting groups, social groups, local politics.

Polarized society, frightened society (Hoodies), rise in anti-social behaviour, election of far right and far left wing parties, decline in grass roots sporting achievement.

In terms of localised consequences through our field experience we have witnessed and dealt with several unintended consequences of the public response to risk.

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These ‘consequences’ don’t make the national headlines as the GMO example might but taken in totality all of these minor, local consequences could be argued to expend large amounts of the public purse, organisational and individual time. In addition, a growing ‘industry’ has emerged in this area. This might include researchers (market and social), PR & Communications consultants, technical consultants, legal firms, VCO organisations and the media. Estimates for this activity suggest up to 25% of the worlds GDP is generated in the ‘persuasion’ industry. (McClosky & Klamer 1995)

Levers and Interventions

From the perspective of 2008, the evolution of public risk actor role and influence is a genuinely complex issue that defies simplistic characterisation and easy answers. It has become almost clichéd to state that the individual now has a more active voice in risk than ever before. However, this is a truism that policy makers, developers and governments do not yet truly appear to have understood.

Whilst we can conceive of the public risk actor as a meta-term which encompasses all other categories of risk actor, it is quite clear that the actions of government, politicians, NGO’s and other vested interests can successfully influence specific sub-sections of the public risk actor.

Therefore ‘the levers of change’ to influence this group already exist and it is the ability and the desire to use these that requires further examination.

For example, clever use of media is one of the key weapons of the NGO. However, not only are NGO’s arguably more skilled in utilising certain aspects of the media they also operate in a totally different context and are therefore able to deploy tools and approaches which may be unacceptable for government to consider.

The additional power the internet can provide to a lone voice in terms of information provision and connectivity with other likeminded individuals is also a factor that is not properly understood. We recommend further research be carried out on the specific role of the internet in public risk.

Given the complexity of the issues and motivations of the public when engaging with risk issues then it is also clear that there is clearly no one right way to effect changes in the role and influence of this group.

The UK Government and its agencies have over the past 30 years commissioned several studies (see references) into this phenomenon all of which reached broadly the same conclusion. The Government needs to learn the lessons of these reports and seek to avoid a fruitless search for easy answers.

We would recommend that the Government look toward the emerging fields of complexity science, naturalistic decision making and cognitive neuroscience for insights on how to manage and operate in complexity.

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Attempts to ‘artificially mitigate anxiety’ in the public should on the whole be avoided or be extremely well delivered. We have seen in the past that attempts by government or politicians to do this often badly backfire – notably Gummer and CJD.

The wish to mitigate anxiety in the public, whilst at one level potentially well meaning and in some cases (Petrol Shortages) sensible from a public safety point of view, can also smack of state ‘nannyism’, reinforcing the expectation in the public that the Governement can control and by extension be responsible for every ‘risk’ which befalls them. Ex-minsters themselves have cited, in recent select committee evidence, the need to manage these expectations (see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmpubadm.htm)

In addition, clumsy handling of a risk issue can in itself be enough to create a more prominent risk than might otherwise have existed. A potential risk has the ability to become a tangible risk simply through the ill placed efforts of Government to reassure the public. We may cite numerous efforts by Government to stabilise petrol demand during periods of perceived ‘crisis’ as examples of foresight in risk management/communication efforts actually serving to hasten (and even amplify) the public risk response. In this manner an early recognition of risk potential by authoritative parties has been interpreted as an acknowledgement of actual risk by the public.

Government needs to understand that trust and values play a huge part in the public perception and reaction to risk. In the MOA Community Consultation Handbook (Kemp & Greulich 2004, p7) a 10 step list is provided for engaging with ‘stakeholders’. Step 3 reminds operators to ‘clarify the preferences and values of the community’ prior to attempting any mast development.

In line with the RCEP 21st Report we would recommend that “values should be articulated at the earliest stage possible in setting standards and developing policies”. We also recommend that further work is carried out into the role of values in risk and methods for understanding societal values around risk. In addition, how these values are incorporated into standard setting and in public risk protection measures that the Government may be proposing.

The media clearly plays a role in influencing and shaping the public risk actor’s response to risk. This is both through the stories they report, the editorial stance they choose to take and their efforts to produce a form of “balanced” reporting, which pertains to illustrate both sides of a story, while frequently setting an agenda that sensationalises the more newsworthy, or emotional, risks regardless of factual balance. The influence of ‘commentators’ functioning outside usual journalistic norms should not be underestimated here. (Hobsbawm and Lloyd 2008)

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http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmpubadm.htm


BiographyAdams. 1995. ‘Risk’. UCL Press

Aggens. 1983. ‘Identifying different levels of public interest in participation’.

Better Regulation Task Force. 2004. ‘Better Routes to Redress’.

Bornlitz and Brezis. 2008. ‘Misrepresentation of health risks by mass media’. Journal of Public Health 2008 30(2):202-204

Cabinet Office. 2002. ‘Risk: Improving Government's Capability to handle risk & uncertainty’. Strategy Unit Report

Coppola. 2005. ‘Gripped by fear: public risk (mis)perception and the Washington DC sniper’. Disaster Prevention and Management, issue 14, pg 32-54, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Davies. 1996. ‘Tony Blair puts meat on the stakeholder bones’. The Independent, Jan 15, 1996

Department of Health. 1998. ‘Communicating About Risks to Public Health - Pointers to Good Practice’. London, UK, TSO

Dewey. 1927. ‘The Public and its Problems’

Douglas, Mary & Wildavsky, Aaron, Risk and culture. An essay on the selection of technological and environmental dangers. Berkeley, CA (University of California Press), 1982, 9

Grove-White R, Macnaughton P, Mayer S and Wynne B (1997). ‘Uncertain World: Genetically Modified Organisms, Food and Public Attitudes in Britain’. Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, University of Lancashire.

Henderson. 1996. 'Fighting Economism'. Futures 28: 580-4

Hobsbawm and Lloyd. 2008. ‘The Power of the Commentariat’. Editorial Intelligence, Proof 7 - a/w approved, 24 April 2008. O’Mara Associates

Hofstede. 2001. ‘Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations’. 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications

Holland John Henry. 1998. ‘Emergence: From Chaos to Order’ Oxford University Press.

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Hollander. 1996. ‘Reassessing the Adversary Culture’. Academic Questions, Volume 9, Number 2, Springer New York

Isaiah Berlin, 2007 ‘The Proper Study of Mankind', Chatto and Windus, 238, 11

Jackson T, TT2 Ltd, Personal Communication. 2008. (NB: Mr Jackson is of South African descent and currently manages one of the largest construction projects in the UK. He has an international perspective on UK H&S Laws and regulation.)

Kasperson and Kasperson. 2005. ‘The Social Contours of Risk’. Earthscan.

Kemp, R & Greulich T 2004. ‘Working with the Community: Handbook on mobile telecoms community consultation for best siting practice’. MOA ISBN 0-9544444-0-X

Lippmann. 1925. ‘The Phantom Public’.

Lupton, Deborah, ‘Risk as moral danger. The Social and political functions of risk discourse in public health’. In: International Journal of Health Services, No. 3, Vol. 23, 1993, 425-435, here: 432-433

Maslow. 1943. ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’. Psychological Review 50 (1943):370-96.

Max-Neef. 1991. ‘Development and Human Needs’. Chap 2 of Max-Neef, Elizalde, Hopenhayn. 1991. ‘Human scale development: conception, application and further reflections’. New York: Apex

McCloskey D & Klamer A. 1995 ‘One Quarter of GDP is Persuasion’. The American Economic Review

NCTA. 2004. ‘The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’. W. W. Norton & Company

Norton-Taylor, 2008. ‘Response to 9/11 was 'huge overreaction' - ex-MI5 chief’. The Guardian, Saturday October 18 2008

Petts and Niemeyer. 2004. ‘Health risk communication and amplification: learning from the MMR vaccination controversy’. Health, Risk & Society, Vol. 6 pp.7-23.

Robinson and Dunkley. 1995. ‘Public Interest Perspectives in Environmental Law’.

Rootes. 2008. ‘1968 and the Environmental Movement in Europe’ in Klimke and Scharloth. 2008. ‘1968 in Europe: A Handbook on National Perspectives and Trans-national Dimensions of 1960/70s Protest Movements’. Palgrave, New York

Rose, Geoffrey, ‘The Strategy of Preventive Medicine’. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1992, 22

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Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution – 21st Report. 1998 ‘Setting Environmental Standards’.

Sandman. 2001. ‘Risk Communication: Evolution and Revolution’.

Sandman. 2005. ‘Hazard versus outrage in the public perception of risk’. In Covello, McCallum, Pavlova. 2005. ‘Effective Risk Communication: The Role and Responsibility of Government and Non-government Organizations’. Springer

Sir Konrad Schiemann. 1990. ‘Locus Standi’ in ‘Public Law’.

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Thatcher Margaret, Interview for Woman's Own "No such thing as society" with journalist Douglas Keay, 23 September 1987.

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AppendixCase studies


Appendix: case studiesThe following case studies are provided here to illustrate several of the points raised in the preceding paper.

The Residents and the Young Offenders Hostel

Street X is a leafy Edwardian cul-de-sac consisting primarily of large terraced properties built before WW1 adjacent to the main retail centre of a large city. Like many similar enclaves around the UK the properties in the street were (due to their size) a mixture of converted flats, large prime residential terraces and some institutional/commercial uses – mainly nursing homes, dentists and university accommodation.

One of the large premises in the street was a substantial residential care home. Unfortunately, the operator of the home went bankrupt and the residents were moved out. The property lay empty for many months and rumours were rife over its potential buyers and uses.

Resident X lived directly opposite the vacant property and because he felt it was becoming an eyesore, he began making informal inquiries with the Local Authority as to what could be done.

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In making these inquires he was surprised to find out that in fact the Local Authority was preparing to lease the property from its current owner and convert it into a residential facility for young offenders leaving secure care.

On discovery of this, Resident X began to canvass other residents about the proposed future use of the property. Resident X had personal concerns over the alleged proposal. With two teenage daughters living at home he felt their safety could be compromised by the future tenants (who would be freely able to look into his home, and directly into his daughters’ bedrooms, from their own rooms). He felt sure other people living in his street would share his concerns and set out to inform others and gauge opinion.

In doing this Resident X ‘amplified’ the potential risk by stating to fellow residents that there would be no ‘control’ over the types of offenders to be housed in the hostel. This quickly evoked images of paedophiles, rapists and serial killers (society’s ultimate bogeymen) moving into the quiet residential street.

This had the desired impact, from Resident X’s point of view, and a large number of residents came together in protest against the development.

Several of the residents, in their professional lives, worked in or dealt with Local Authority planning procedures. They were also familiar with the internal mechanisms of local governance.

This meant that rather than ‘go to the local paper with a scare story’, which they had seen other residents groups unsuccessfully attempt, they devised a more sophisticated, multi-faceted strategy which involved influencing four key stakeholder groups: politicians, LA officers, other residents and, as a final measure, the media.

The angle played with each of these groups differed. However, each approach focussed on what the residents’ group perceived to be the weak spot of each stakeholder category. Taking each group in turn:

Politicians – the group of residents (being fairly articulate) began to lobby local councillors and in their discussions raised the possibility that they, the residents, would field an independent candidate in forthcoming elections. The nature of the ward was such that this could potentially unseat the incumbent politician who immediately galavanised behind the residents in direct opposition to his own Cabinet.

Officers – officers were challenged throughout on due process. Had there been adequate consultation? Public statements existed on the council’s website stating the processes and commitment to consultation, yet evidence in this situation appeared to be lacking. Were contracts already in place and had these been advertised through OJEU or other official channels? Evidence began to arise that indicated that sub-contracts were already in place. In addition to publicly pursuing such lines of investigation, for example, through open questions at planning committee meetings, the hierarchical nature of Local Authorities was

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exploited and letters, phone calls and emails to the Chief Executive of the Authority ensured that the issue was ‘live’ every day on the planning officer’s desk.

Residents – the residents group had galvanised as a result of this perceived threat. It existed as a relatively small group of the most directly concerned (or potentially affected) residents. In order to improve its potential impact the group decided it needed to mobilise support from other streets and the wider community. These other members of the community were of course not directly impacted by the development and had no reason to support the cause. However, they were mobilised by the concept, or scare story, that such an incident could happen in their street next, as well as a more general frustration with the behaviour of the council. This social networking provided a much bigger voice (and political threat) for the cause. Residents groups were able to connect and mobilise easily using internet and mobile phone technology.

Media – finally when they were ready the residents went to the local press. One of the group was a retired journalist who had contacts within the local paper and was able to draft a press release which contained the key messages that the group wanted to get across. Engaging the media was in fact used as a bargaining tool with the council and politicians. The residents explained that they were being put under pressure by wider members of their group to “go to the press”, and that they would do so if they felt they had no other course of action left open to them. This gave the council’s decision makers an option to bow out quietly if they wished to.

The upshot of this activity was that, after only a few weeks of the ‘protest’, the City Council withdrew its plans for the Hostel and placed the property back on the open market (it has since been converted into residential flats).

The Council intimated that the residents group had fought an extremely sophisticated campaign and members of the group were asked to join the Council’s public housing strategy forum as formal consultees on wider policy decision making. The council wished to understand how better to integrate public values into their future decisions and as such an adversarial situation became one of positive partnership working.

Flushed with their success the residents group continued to hold their meetings but began to notice that attendances were dropping off. It became apparent that without an ‘attractor’ to bring the group together the energy and interest of individuals was waning.

The group tried to ‘artificially’ create an ‘attractor’ by deciding to campaign about the closure of a local footpath. However, this did not have the desired effect as the ‘threat’ was just not great enough to mobilise people into action.

Eventually, the residents group dwindled down to two or three regular members. These issue a newsletter for the street and also organise an annual Christmas Carol service.

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Insights

Whilst being sociable and generally highly educated the residents of the street had never before ‘organised’ until an attractor – in this case the Local Authority’s plan for a Young Offenders Hostel.

Once they were organised they were able to make contact and mobilise other similar groups throughout the city. This was facilitated through modern technology such as the internet and SMS text messaging.

The educated nature of the group meant that they were able to utilize planning law and other regulations to disrupt the Local Authority’s original plan.

Once the LA had withdrawn its plan and the ‘fight had been won’ momentum of the group began to wane, to the point where only 3 or 4 people turned up to meetings and the group now only meets around Christmas.

In line with our ‘Table of Motivating Factors’ (See main text) once the immediate perceived ‘threat to family and property’ had been removed the energy dissipated from the majority of the group.

Arguably one of the key weaknesses of the local authority’s approach was its secretive nature. Despite a public commitment to consultation, residents discovered the plans for the property inadvertently. No consultation had taken place with the people who felt they would be most affected by the outcome of the decision, and contracts had been placed before any notification of the council’s plans had taken place. Seeking to conceal information had the effect not only of destroying trust between the most local residents and the council, but fuelled frustrations and a sense of distrust that wider communities may have had regarding council decision making.

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Climate Camp Participant

David is a 23 year old originally from the North East of England but currently living and working in Manchester. He took an active part in the Heathrow Climate Camp in 2008 and this case study is based upon an interview with him to discuss his motivations.

David is a graduate in English Literature from a major red brick university. He is from a white middle class family and has had a relatively ‘typical upbringing’. During his time at University his main hobbies were music and promoting bands in local venues near to his home.

Through some of these interactions and through his own study, David’s political awareness was raised and he found himself drawn to counter culture ideas and being interested in deep green, anarcho-green and the anti-globalization movement.

A friend from within this group sent David a link to a website (which he could not recall the specifics of) which purported to lay out the facts relating to man made climate change. In David’s own words the content on the website was so alarming that, “he couldn’t sleep for two days for worrying about the end of the world”.

The information on this website further reinforced David’s interest in ‘deep green’ issues and he began to explore other sources of information. These were all linked from the initial website or were within the same anti-establishment ‘genre’. He also discovered and began to read the work of ‘mainstream’ writers on the subject such as George Monbiot and Naomi Klein.

Throughout this period, by his own admission, David never looked at any ‘official’ documentation or any official scientific data on the subject. In fact he was unaware that

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Government departments such as DEFRA and BERR existed. He had also never engaged with international sources such as the UN or IPCC.

This is a key point and indicates the power of commentators, and popular writers in the media. Rather than engage with the science first hand a large proportion of people prefer to receive information on a subject processed, edited and reflected through the lens of a particular journalist or newspaper.

This is understandable, as most people don’t have the time or the inclination to read the vast amount of scientific literature on a particular subject. In fact it is the researchers’ experience that most people faced with potential risks do not want to become learned experts in a new subject matter, preferring instead to be given readily digestible answers that align with their inclined thinking towards the subject. The downside to this instant sense of expertise gained from popular culture sources is that commentators have a large amount of influence over the public and are able to create a groundswell of opinion through largely unchallengeable channels. While someone might write in to the letters page of a newspaper to criticise a commentator’s column inches, the original column will nonetheless retain a greater impact on the average reader.

Insights

There are obviously complex psychological motives behind David’s engagement with the issue of climate change and the motivating factors that provoked him to attend the climate camp.

The role of trust is very important here. The website referenced to David was provided by a trusted friend and the content of that website was therefore immediately ‘validated’.

Whilst highly intelligent, at no time did David really engage with climate change science – even through relatively accessible documents such as Stern or IPCC. Instead, it appears that most information was gleaned from populist sources mainly of deep green persuasion such as the Guardian/George Monbiot/Naomi Kline.

Once at the camp, David found the confluence/congruence of issues problematic – for example not accepting the relevance of certain protest groups that were present, to the climate change agenda.

There appears to be a total mistrust of ‘official sources’ and a willingness to buy into conspiracy theories.

At the time David had never seen or questioned the link between his ability to protest at Heathrow and the success or otherwise of the UK economy.

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The Planning Officer and the Mobile Phone Mast

Planning Officer X is a senior planning professional based in the North West of England. Planning Officer X was responsible for forming and leading a campaign against a mobile phone base station installation near his / her house. This case study is presented in transcript format from the original interview.

Q – Why do you think people get involved with public risk or protests around some form of perceived risk?

A – In my view, the primary drivers for people getting involved in protest groups are (i)self interest and (ii) a genuine passion about their particular area of concern eg.Environment. I formed a local protest group regarding a phone mast near to my house. I became extremely passionate about it initially for self interest reasons and began to research the topic, the health reports, the relevant legislation and planning case law etc. As I became more engrossed and incensed at what I perceived to be an injustice, I planned to become more involved in the issue generally and beyond the particular planning application that affected me. However, "my" planning application was eventually refused and, with all of the other demands on my time, my crusading plans slipped off the bottom of the list. I suspect this is the same for most people. Once the self interest element subsides, personal priorities shift.

Q – What was the perceived injustice?

A – The injustice, in my view, was the planning "fudge" surrounding phone masts (and I was working in the planning system at that time). Essentially, phone masts didn't require planning permission like any other development, simply because, if they did, none would ever get approved due to adverse public reaction and councillor/ Planning Committee sympathy. Hence, the "rules" provided that 15m high masts went through planning on the basis that planning committee could make observations but not refuse them. The observations were passed to a government department that then filed them in the bucket at the side of their desks and approved the mast "application". (masts over 15m high still required planning permission). These things are seriously unsightly and property-devaluing and I speak from personal experience when I say that the prospect of one being installed outside your house can cause serious anguish and sleepless nights. Similar current analogies are the government’s eco-town proposals and the nuclear power station proposals, both of which are subject of public perceptions that they will be fast-tracked through the planning process without observance of the usual procedures.

Q – Was the devaluation of your property the major concern or was it health or both?

A – The devaluation of my property and health reasons were of equal concern but you can add to that the visual intrusion. I moved into the country to look at trees and cows when I open my window, not an ugly phone mast. I am well aware of the fact that the planning system considers that there is no entitlement to a "view" but it's still a bitter pill to swallow when your view is taken away.

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Q – The rationale behind the 15m rule was to take the strain off the planning system (which would have crashed had each authority had to decide on every dipole) at the same time allowing UK to develop a mobile infrastructure. Policy makers in Whitehall might say that this led to UK leading edge in an emerging technology which provided (and still does) for lots of jobs and economic growth. For example, cellphone coverage in the USA is still way behind UK

A – I completely understand the rationale behind the 15m rule but that is to prioritise pragmatism over fairness. It was often peddled by mast proponents, in an attempt to paint protestors as hypocritical nimbys, that "we all have mobile phones but nobody wants a mast next to their house". It's true that we all want mobile phones but I was never really convinced that sufficient effort was taken to ensure that masts were placed where they didn't cause blight. They were placed in locations that were convenient and cheap for the operators. As for "that statement”, we all go for a s**t in the morning but who would want to live next to a sewage farm? We all like a beer and a kebab but who would want to live next door to a pub or a takeaway.

Q – What sources of information did you use?

A – If I remember, I will provide you with a copy of the report. I can't remember its source. I can't remember the report precisely but I think it was based around the fact that phone masts emit their radiation 24-7, not just for the time it takes to heat up a frozen lasagne

Q – Do you think the media interest in an issue comes first or a protest comes first?

A – I don't think that there is a fixed template for which scenario comes first. Sometimes the public learn about issues, get hysterical and then the media whip it all up further (eg. MMR vaccine?). Other times, the media are the instigators of the hysteria - they then provoke public reaction/ protests (a bit like the electricity pylon/ cancer scares - one Panorama programme and all hell lets loose). In both scenarios, the public are very, very sceptical about government commissioned reports that say everything is OK.

Q - Did you ever come across Mast Action UK?

A – I think I did tune into Mast Action UK web site at some stage but (without wanting to sound smart or demeaning) I was a planning professional at the time so I knew which arguments had a chance of success and which were doomed to failure. Emotive arguments rarely work and I wasn't particularly sold on my neighbour’s medical report (as you said - too many reports out there saying no problem) but it wouldn't have been a good strategy to start alienating allies.

Q – Did your involvement in this influence your decisions/approaches elsewhere in your planning day job?

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A – The mast issue never flavoured my professional approach. I had dealt with many mast applications before and after "mine" and dealt with them all consistently (I hope). Similarly with other schemes and applications - I am a professional and I take my duties very seriously, both then and now. I could say that it gave me more empathy but, in truth, I don't think it made any difference - I've always tried to deal with stakeholders helpfully and sympathetically - that's my job!

Q – Did you contact the media?

A – In our campaign, we didn't specifically get the media involved although we did talk about the possibility. Perhaps with a different issue, it would have been a more appropriate "strategy". The documentation we used comprised planning case law and a medical study into phone mast "radiation emissions" (one of my neighbours is a doctor).

Q – If, as you suggest, people don’t want to live next to sewage farms, incinerators, power stations and yet all of these things are seen as 'critical' to our continued economic progress/environmental survival what is the answer?

A – I wasn't suggesting that we go back to the dark ages or that nobody should ever have to suffer the imposition of a nearby development that they don't want - far from it. I have personally been bringing forward highway schemes and facilitating developments for many years. I fully accept that power stations need to be built, and the same for sewage farms, incinerators etc. and that this will, in many instances, affect nearby residents. I was simply denouncing "the statement" that I mentioned earlier. In other words, I didn't think that the people who peddled that statement would adopt the same philosophy themselves when it came to a sewage farm being built next to their house. Do you? As I said, I accept the need to develop services and facilities etc. Remember - this started off with my particular perceived injustice regarding a telephone mast for which there was no normal planning process and which, in my view, could have been more appropriately located. Indeed, it eventually was - so I was right, so there!

Q – The research requires us to ask if people take these macro-level considerations into account. Either in terms of protest or generally at all in their day to day life.

A – I think some people do take macro level considerations into account and are happy to make the sacrifice for something they see a the greater good. However, for others, self interest considerations will prevail.

Insights:

This case study resonates with the first one (the young offenders hostel) in demonstrating that injustice in the planning process and decision making can galvanise otherwise uninterested individuals to form an action group. Likewise, the two groups used an intelligent, carefully planned approach to redress the local planning decision that directly affected them. Once the ‘attractor’ issue had been resolved the groups found little reason to remain active.

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The frustration felt in all three case studies led to the actions taking place. there was a desire to take control and to try to influence decisions in a wild card manner because the formal processes had failed the activists.

In all of these examples research into the subject matter was an important element of the process. However the research was based upon a desire to find information that reinforced and justified the perspective of the activist rather than the pursuit of balanced information.

Despite this individual working for a public planning authority the lack of trust in ‘official’ government sources

A clumsy or badly thought out planning or engagement approach can spark a response in the public either at a local or national level.

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Housing Market Renewal

Whilst much of we what hear in the media about housing in the 1990’s and 2000’s was around affordability and housing shortages the UK Government, through various agencies, was undertaking a very large scale programme of ‘housing market renewal’ across a swathe of cities in Britain. This programme was designed to correct housing market failures and often took place under the seemingly innocuous title of ‘Housing Market Renewal’.

The causes of why previously sustainable housing areas should be earmarked for demolition are numerous. They include: obsolete or unpopular stock; stigmatized areas; local economic collapse; anti-social behaviour; and poor interventions by government agenciesThis particular example focuses on an ex-mining village in North East England. This settlement had been prioritised to receive regeneration funding but this was contingent on the production of a coherent ‘masterplan’ for the village which would determine spending priorities and the need/amount of housing stock to be removed.

A planning consultancy firm was appointed to develop the masterplan in collaboration with key stakeholders, who were, in this case elected members, community representatives and council officers.

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As with all such plans a baselining exercise was first undertaken. This consisted of a full social and economic analysis of the village combined with an intial stage of community consultation.

The community consultation event was widely advertised. Unfortunately the turnout from residents of the village was relatively small. Nonetheless they provided useful and positive input into the initial stage of the masterplan.

During this period residents groups and other social activists were identified and also consulted with and engaged. During the course of this activity, one individual came forward and identified himself as being Chairman of the ‘regeneration partnership’ for the village. On investigation with the Local Authority it seems that the ‘regeneration partnership’ was mainly this one individual, who through bidding for government funds had turned this role into a full time occupation.

After the first round of consultation and analysis, it became clear that little or no demolition would be required in the village and most of the planning proposals involved little more than streetscape work.

At the next round of consultation, the Chairman of the regeneration partnership complained that not enough members of the public were attending the consultation sessions and this was the fault of the consultants. He also expressed concern that the proposals were not ‘radical enough’ and he proposed more extensive demolition. The consultants thanked him for his views but indicated that the vast majority of residents had expressed a preference for no demolition and were clearly opposed to this course of action.

Following this consultation event there was a sudden change in public mood.

At an evening consultation event, the previously apathetic public were out in force, so much so that the local hall booked for the event could not hold all those wanting to attend. Around the village, hand made posters had sprung up telling residents to attend the public meeting as it would be about the ‘Demolition of Our Village – Just Like Category D ’.

Of course this had caused a huge amount of concern and the meeting was initially very tense. Category D was an infamous planning policy pursued in mining communities in the 1970’s and was bound to stoke emotions. However, once residents found out that their houses were unaffected by the plan they began to leave, seemingly uninterested in the wider streetscape proposals. Eventually, only the residents that had attended all the way through were left.

On investigation, it was found out that the Chairman of the regeneration partnership had put up the posters. When challenged he claimed to have acted on the behalf of the community, but further investigation through the land registry indicated that he (unbeknown to many residents) was in fact a major property owner in the area. He potentially stood to gain from the proposals. He had also lobbied councillors to try and get the planning work for his own partnership and had been annoyed when outside consultants were brought in.

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This whole incident had a series of knock on effects – ‘unintended consequences’ if you like:Firstly, several elderly residents panicked when they wrongly believed their houses were to be demolished (as a result of the poster). This resulted in numerous calls to councillors and the council and dedicated round of home visits needed to be instituted.

Councillors and potential funders of any regeneration began to get cold feet as a result of the controversy. Hence, the village missed out on potential funding.

The planning consultants involved were effectively ‘blackballed’ by the Authority and neighbouring authorities as rumour spread about their ineffective consultation. This cost the firm a potentially large fee income and resulted in one member of staff losing their job.

Insights

The motivations of individuals when engaging with public risk may not be obvious at first.

Notions of ‘community’ are fluid depending upon the subject matter, or the nature of the risk being presented. This throws into question the Governments quest for sustainable communities.

Individuals can easily construct and buy into conspiracy theories. In this case members of the public attributed high levels of strategic thinking and Machiavellian intent to public authorities despite most evidence to the contrary. Individuals will believe far more outlandish or irrational things from people they trust than they will from perceived authorities.

‘Scare’ stories that resonate motivate the public into action. The trustworthiness of these sources is important but cannot be predicted. Trustworthiness is also a fluid concept. Surveys regularly show that the public do not trust journalists or politicians and yet in this case study and others the public often turn to these sources for support.

Individuals and communities recognise ‘patterns’. In this way communities and the public risk actor have a ‘memory’. Hence, events from several years previously can and will shape the risk response of the public risk actor.

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A responsePoints made by the public in an event to discuss this research


A response: points made by the public in an event to discuss this research

General points

The public are a very varied group. It is wrong to treat them as a single group with a single view.

Trust is very important. The impact of any group on the public will be very different with and without trust.

Interactions with the public

Most of the group felt that the media had an important impact on the public, and some felt it was the most important of all groups. It’s effect can be positive or negative in terms of public risk. Sometimes, the media exaggerate risks, often to increase their audience - which can lead to a public outcry and then overreaction by politicians. At other times, the media are essential for allowing the public to get their voice heard by politicians.

Some of the participants thought the public just read headlines and believed them. Others thought that the public are sceptical and not stupid.

There is a complex relationship between the public and the media. They obviously affect each other, but it is not always clear which way the causation is.

Pressure groups can be seen as the ‘good guys’ and are often trusted. But they do sometimes exaggerate risks. The number of pressure groups can lead to confusion and an incorrect view of risks by the public.

The public are greatly affected by their peers, family, social networks etc. They are often trusted sources of information.

Business was felt to be a strong influence on the reaction to public risks. Some have a positive effect, for example by reducing risk through innovation. Others can have a negative effect, for example by selling dangerous products. Businesses are seen as tending to act in their own interest which means the public trust them less than an NGO for example.

The public can have a significant affect on businesses since businesses obviously need the public to buy their products or services.

Professionals that are known and trusted by the public such as teachers or doctors can have a significant influence on risk perceptions.

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Scientists are also trusted and therefore influential, but the extent of this trust will depend on: the status of the scientist whether they are independent or industry/government sponsoredThe public can be influenced by bad science as well as good.

Some people are strongly affected by the views of their religious group or church.

The public affect the government by lobbying their MPs for example. Politicians have to react to the public as they want to be re-elected. However, governments sometimes do not respond to very large protests (for example anti-war protests), whilst they do respond to much smaller protests. It is perceived that politicians do not have the time to find out what all the public think or want and therefore turn to special interest groups, lobbyists etc.

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Risk and Regulation Advisory CouncilOctober 2009Funded by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skillswww.berr.gov.uk/deliverypartners/list/rrac/index.html URN 09/1420

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Documents

The Public and Public Risk