The Project Called Socialism - Gyorgy Markus

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The Project Called Socialism

«The Project Called Socialism»

by György Márkus

Source:PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 2 / 1984, pages: 208-227, on www.ceeol.com .

http://www.ceeol.com/


http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=9e4d6499-94a7-47c0-b6d3-48244233281f




CRITICAL REVIEW

TH E PROJECT CALLED SOC IALISM1

György Markus

The motivational and legitimation deficit of modern Western societies —which has been an important element of their radical critique in the lastdecades — in the late seventies became not only a rather modish topic oireflection for neoconservative thought, but also a direct item on the agenda ofconservative political action. Revitalization of the original values of a self-confident, 19th-century individualism with its ethics of disciplined labou r anddeserved acquisition has become the target of massive and well-orchestratedpolitical and cultural efforts. Today it already can be stated that in respect ofthis directly ideological objective the conservative offensive has failed. It is,however, no less conspicuous that this attack which coincided with the wrorsteconomic recession in post-war history and with open attem pts to d ism ant le atleast some institutional elements of the welfare state, has equally failed toevoke a comparable mobilization of radical forces — either politically orideologically.

In fact, the widely perceived crisis of a welfare state neocapitalism has

paradoxically coincided, in the ideological field, with the crisis of its maintraditional adversary, i.e. Marxism itself. In a sense, it is just this coincidencewhich makes the phenomenon of a theoretical crisis of Marxism (which hadanalogies in its earlier history) today so acute. The theoretical difficulties andinadequacies now widely acknowledged by radical intellectuals connectedwith this tradition are, p r se> not so new: at least as objections they werearticulated by critics as a rule much earlier. If today they are perceived asaffecting the very core of the theory (and not merely — as was usua l in the past— some of its m isinterpre tations against which it is necessary to r e tu rn to a

true orthodoxy ) — this sudden change of the hermeneut ica l persp ect ivecannot be explained by intellectual-theoretical reasons alone. It is partiallymotivated by the bewildering experience that at the t ime of a palpable socialcrisis which seems just to confirm the radical-critical o rienta tion of the theo ry,this latter simultaneously is unable to offer even broad strategic indications ofin what ways the historical possibilities abstractly present can be used.

The interna l intellectual crisis of M arxism is one of the facets of that divorcebetween socialist theory and practice that today seems to be com plete. On the

practical-political side of this divide, large segments of the Left have u nd ergone a development toward what may be called radical fun dam enta lism : anattempt to center their whole strategy on issues and values so elemental andbasic that they need no further legitimation. As ( though in a much mo relimited extent) it has already happened during the period of struggle withFascism, radical groups and movements conceive their task primarily not interms of emancipation, but that of deliverance : saving m an kind from thePraxis International 4:2 July 1984 0260-844 8 $2.00



Praxis International 209

unimaginable catastrophe. And certainly the danger of nuclear war is no lessreal and definitely not less horrifying than a victory of Fascism has been.Nevertheless there are significant differences between the two situations.Fascism as a social-political system represented a concrete enemy: the struggle

ag ain st it ha d a well-defined political sense and w as at the same time a strugglefo r definite values. The spiralling arms-race or ecological devastation are, asev ery on e rea lizes, conseque nces of very complex system causes. The ir divorcefrom these latter certainly can create a basis for a broader consensus and inthis sense help to overcome the isolation of the Left. It can be realized,however, only through the transformation of isolated events in theseseemingly self-propelled processes into issues of symbolic significance. Thenegativism of such a political strategy which is inevitably directed at stopping

something or other, the deep emotionalization of separate-segregated issueswhich gives new dimensions of bitterness to the fragmentation of the Left —all this seems to demonstrate that logical priorities are not necessarily transform able into political on es. L ife is certainly a precondition of good andju st life at w hich ultim ately th e Left has always aimed. T he difficulties andfailures to articulate in a believable way what this latter can mean in theco nc ret e circu m stanc es of the presen t make a fundam entalist strategyattractive — but this latter seems to be deeply problematic already in respectof a po litical effectivity on the longer r un , leaving all othe r, perhaps w eightierand more complex, problems aside.

The present situation well illustrates that the legitimation crisis of neocapi-talism does not act as a radicalizing factor in itself. The very same social andcu ltu ra l proce sses w hich p rod uc e this crisis at the same tim e tend to delegitim-ize any co un tera ltern ativ e. In this sense the system has a nega tive legitimation because, even when it does not deliver the increased amount of promised

g o o d s (whose intrinsic value may also become questionable for m any), whatis coun te rp os ed to it seem s to be either so vacuous as to be unrealizable, or nobe de sira ble at all. Socialism m eans today either its reality in EasternEurope which certainly very few want, or vague assurances that it signifiesso m et hi ng radically different w hich is spelt out only in negative term s. Wh a

good and just life (or a better and more just one) for all can mean underco nd itio ns of dissolution of com m una l cultural traditions, radical value pluralism, significantly differing need interpretations and life expectations, i.e.under conditions of modernity — in the divorce between theory and practicejust the answer to this question, the meaning of that radical social project

w hi ch the nam e socia lism deno tes, has been eroded to a large extent.In this context the book of the distinguished Yugoslav economist, BrankoH o r v a t , The Political Economy of Socialism, represents a most timely andim p o rt an t theore tical co ntrib utio n. Political econ om y in its title expressean attempt to fuse economics and politics into a single social theory.Accordingly the work attempts and offers more than its title may suggest: iproposes in a well-reasoned way the outline of the institutional structure of asocial system about which it meaningfully can be said that it transcends thebasic antagonisms of both modern capitalist and Soviet type (in the terminology of the author: etatist)2 societies. Horvat underlines and convincingly

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21 Praxis International

demonstrates the disastrous consequences of the traditional Marxist hostilitytoward all ut op ia s : an atrophy of social imagination and an ultim atedisorientation in cases when the practial possibilities of an anti-capitalist masaction are present. True, Horvat himself conceives his own task also not adrawing some Utopia, bu t as an exercise in system de sig n. H ow eve r, thiterminology of social engineering — which is rather at odds both with hicommitment to a praxis philosophy and with his sharply anti-elitist, antisubstitutionist political orientation — ultimately expresses only his determination to limit the discussion of future social possibilities to that which iessentially realizable at the given level of technical, economic, and sociadevelopment.

The topicality of this aim and of the basic content of the work strangelyclashes, however, with some of its features making it a rathe r u n ti m el y oneThis contradiction has to be mentioned at the very beginning because it wouldbe a serious loss — a loss for the reader — if some of the conspicuous, latefeatures overshadowed the first ones.

Leaving aside some specific assumptions of the author, it is first of all hiself-confident optimism concerning the overall progress of socialism which iperhaps most out of tune with that the majority of its addressees feels andthinks today. T he re is little do ub t that the world is m oving towa rds a

socialist, self-governing society at an accelerated pace (p . 173) — th is statement expresses not only the firm belief of Horvat in a better future, but alshis evaluation of the present social and political trends of change. Thisoptimism certainly contains qu ite justified corrective elemen ts against the nowso strong sentiment of an impending doom and futility. Horvat takes a verylong, historical view of the development of radical movements in respect oalmost all the problems he treats and quite legitimately reminds us of theiachievements: from the establishm ent of bo urg eois political dem ocracy (

dem and and attainmen t of the organized labour m ove m ent, at least in Eu rop eto the introdu ction of elements of w ork ers ' participation in industrial m anagement, e.g. in some Scandinavian countries, etc. When he regards this wholprocess as the contradictory and certainly open-ended, but nevertheless steadygrowth of elem ents of socialism within developed capitalist societie s, hiview again represents a needed antidote against that type of radical criticismwhich perceives in all this only the ruse of capital to integrate the wholesociety under its own dominance. He legitimately indicates that each of thesachievements brings with itself new types of conflict and therefore a potentiafor further radicalization, and he is right in his conviction that no possibleradical development can simply bypass these forms. If Horvat's cheerfuoptimism of a world on the move towards socialism remains, neverthelessunconvincing, this is so because he tends to abstract this social process fromthat broader context within which it occurred. While at some places he seemto over-estimate the purely economic possibilities of a neo-Keynesian welfarestate (see e.g. th e silent presuppos ition of its ability to ensur e full em ploym enon pp. 171, 197, 432, etc.), he in general underestimates the weight of thoseproblems which a neocapitalist development has brought with itself. In this

i i h i i h h i h i h l d i d




radical discourse in the last decade are not really dealt with in the book.Direction and rate of economic development, the ecological impact of presentindustrial growth, transformations in family structure and problems of sexualinequality, the changed relationship between the spheres of private and public, between everyday life and the autonomous cultural activities — all theseproblems are either not mentioned at all, or are answered by rather unmotiv-ated assurances that they become easily solvable in a society based on theprinciple of self-management.

The Political Econom y of Socialism is an intensely Ea st Eu rope an work —certainly not in its explicit content or in respect of the (truly impressive)erudition of its author, but in the direction of his attention and theoreticalsensitivity. Horvat is primarily concerned with the possibility of solving those

social antagonisms, tensions, and difficulties the weight and importance ofwhich had been practically proven in the historical experience of those EasternEuropean countries which undertook the experiment of a non-capitalistdevelopment.

While this fact constitutes the limitation of the book, it also determines itstheore tical significance. W ha t prove d to be the historical fiasco of socialism inEastern Europe is regarded today by many Western radical intellectuals asmerely an embarrassing dead-end from which one has simply to dissociate theidea of an emancipated society. In their view there is very little, however, tolearn from the experiences of this failure, since it was essentially the result ofan economic and cultural backwardness. This belief that the problemsencountered in these countries simply disappear at a higher level of well-beingand political-cultural maturity — a belief which in all other circumstanceswould be denounced as the most mindless variant of a bourgeois conceptionof automatic progress — is only a form of escapism from the painful task ofre-examining what the idea of a socialist society may signify today. It had to alarge exte nt co ntri bu ted to tha t erosion of m ean ing that was mentioned

earlier. Horvat's book not only demonstrates the necessity of such a self-critical re-examination, since it effectively indicates the insufficiency orinadequacy of some cherished Marxist dogmas in the light of relevant socialexperiences, but also outlines ways a new type of social organization can copewith such problems without sacrificing those basic aims and values thatanimated the socialist tradition in its long history. The book has in this respecta richness and concreteness which follows from its success in transmitting andtheoretically generalizing the experiences of that generation of socialist intellectuals in Eastern Europe who practically participated in the post-war buildup of th e institu tion s of new society, who have an in sid er's knowledge oftheir working (and misfunctionings), and who have lost in this processneither their radical commitments, nor their critical ability. This representsthe m os t fruitful an d significant c on tribu tion of the book to present debates —it should be both appreciated and criticized primarily from this viewpoint.

The Diagnosis

In th e first sentence of his boo k Horv at describes it as in a sense . . . a




life's wo rk . And certainly in the very bread th of its prob lem ati c it reflects alife-long concern w ith, and comm itment to, the idea of socialism. T h e w orkopens with a concise characterization of the two competing contemporarysocioeconomic systems: modern capitalism and etatism. To both the idea of asocialist society is counterposed as it can be derived from the very history osocialist thought and movements critically surveyed in a large chapter dealingin a balanced way with both Marxist and non-Marxist elements of thisheritage. The fundamental organizational structure and the comparative macroeconomic efficiency of the three models is discussed next at a still relativelabstract level. This whole part, aiming at the clarification of the generaprinciples involved in the project of a socialist alternative, ends by answerinthe question: how far can the basic value-choices embodied in such an

alternative — in Horvat's conception: the choice of the interconnected, bunon-substitutable values of freedom, social equality, and human solidarity —be both justified and more closely specified in respect to ou r pr es en t hi sto ric apossibilities?

Among these three fundamental values Horvat then selects that of equalityas the most readily operationalizable and takes it as the s ta n d a rd andcriterion for an effective concretization of the idea of socialism. In the centrapart of his work he attempts to outline in a relatively detailed an d c o m p re h e nsively argued way the institutional mechanisms of a society that is able toensure the substantive, meaningful equality of all its members in the threefundamental societal roles which his conception attributes to each individualtheir equality as prod ucers , consum ers, and citizens. Acco rdingly h e dis cu ssethe possibility (and difficulties) of an organisation of workers' management iall branches of labour activities, the principles and mechanisms of a socialisdistribution of goods and services, and the institutions of a participatorydemocracy capable of accomplishing an effective déconcentration anddecentralization of political power and authority. He also indicates In whaways (especially from the aspect of their economic integration) the threespecified institutional structures can be in principle united with each otherFinally, in the last large pa rt of the w ork , the questions of an effective stra teg yof transition and possible paths to socialism are raised In respect of the thremain social-political areas of the contemporary world: the countries of developed capitalism, of etatism, and the ' 'und erd eve lop ed societies of th e T h ir dWorld, from China to Africa.

Within this very broad range of problems the analysis of etatist societies —

as already indicated — has a weight and impo rtance not reflected co m ple telyin the extent of the chapter explicitly dealing with them. The demonstrationthat these societies do not represent a realization of, or even a transition tosocialism (at least no more than mo dern capitalist democracies of th e W e s t docertainly sets up the very task of the book: to redefine, against its alleged

reality, the project of socialism. H orvat is, how ever, n ot satisfied w ith amere negative proof, he attempts to explicate how these societies work andwhat confers upon them a relative stability, and the results of this analysilargely orient him in how he approaches the solution of his positive task. Onof the most conspicuous features of his book consists in the fact that in




redefining socialism as a social project it concentrates the attention almostexclusively on the formal institutional organization of such a society. Thisapproach, however, is to a large extent motivated by the basic conclusiondrawn from the experience of etatist societies: it is po litics, in the broad sense

of the institutional organization of power relations, which constitutes theproblem of socialist society (cf. p. 232).Etatism, in Horvat's understanding, represents a socioeconomic system

which, on the one hand, does not transcend the limits of capitalism, remainsw ithin the horizon of the bourgeois w orld , but at the same time constitutes

a separate social formation basically different from capitalism (cf. pp. 43 and46-47) . This seemingly contradictory characterization finds its explanation inthe fact that th e stru ctu re and functioning of present etatist societies cannot bedivorced from their historical origin: they are the results of anti-capitalist (intheir intention) socialist movements and revolutions which in their verysuccess failed, and at least partly for intrinsic reasons. From this realcontradictio n of the ir origin follows the inco ngruous com bination of definite socialist tenets and values, from which their ruling elite cannot free itself,with a centralized, authoritarian state both oppressive and exploitative.

This strange blend of characteristics is ultimately traced back by Horvat tosome of the features of those anti-capitalist movements from which thesesocieties arose. Especially in the relatively early phases of their developmentthese movements tend to identify socialism with the straightforward andsimple negation of bourgeois institutions and values (abolition of privateproperty with its nationalization, of capitalist market relations with the centralized, administrative allocation of all resources, that of representativedemocracy restricted to an electoral choice between competing parties withthe rule of one party, of egotistical individualism with an enforced collectivism , etc .). Jus t th er e, how ever, these movem ents remain essentially captive toa bourgeois structure of consciousness: conceiving property relations in inher

ited legal categories; identifying the market as a general economic institutionw ith its specifically capitalist form : unab le to envisage a political systemwithout parties, etc. Even Marxian theory was not completely free (especiallyin economic respects) from such simplifications, which become much morepronounced in Leninism. When social movements guided by such ideas gainpower in a violen t revolu tion w hose very dynam ics foster authoritarianism ancentralization of power, and especially when they take place in a backwardenvironment which has not passed through the rationalizing experience of

bourgeois development, they tend to give rise to a society which is not theovercoming, but the negative mirror image of capitalism. It was, howeveronly Stalinism which has effected, through the bloodiest terror extirpating alelemen ts of a revolutionary mass spon taneity, the comp lete appropriation andmonopolization of all social power by party and state bureaucracy and therebrendered etatism stable as a new sociopolitical system. The legitimation osuch a political mo nopo ly is ultimately provided thro ug h a consensus baseon faith (p . 40 ), by the essentially religious structu re of social consciousnes

which is partly inherited from the past, partly constantly recreated throughthe destruction of civil society, through its decomposition into a mere con




glomerate of ind ividua ls. At least for the time being th is provide s for politicastability accompanied by a high rate of economic development.

In contrast to capitalism, the control over the work and life of others andextraction of surplus labour is realized in etatist societies not by predominantly economic means (tied to the institution of private property), but bpredominantly political ones (the economic expression of which is thinstitution of state property). Submission of the individual to the system osocial domination is secured under capitalism first of all by the combinemeans of a manipulative persuasion and economic coercion, while undeetatism through a system of ideologically supported symbolic status-rewardand political coercion. Social position of the individual in the first case ilargely determined by wealth, in the second by his/her standing in a monolithically organized bureaucratic hierarchy. With all these differenceshowever, etatism represen ts a class society whose general pa ttern of classtratification is similar to that found in cap italism (p p . 71 -72). T h e basisocial division between politocracy (variously characterized as the ruling elitor class), the broader class of subordinated bureaucrats, and the workinmasses essentially reprodu ces the fund amen tal division into a ruling , m idd leand work ing class under capitalism. In this sense etatism is again capita lismin rev ers e : its social struc ture repre sen ts a m eritocra tic m odification of th

old class division between m anua l and non-ma nual w o rk (p . 74 ). It icharacterized, in comparison with capitalism, by a larger degree of sociamobility (though opportunity to occupy positions in the bu reau cratic hierarch yis to a significant extent inherited), but at the same time also by a greaterigidity due to its monolithic organization which enforces a strict conformitof conduct. The integrity of this internally deeply stratified society is secureby the ruling party, a social device keeping the structure together and at thsame time performing a screening and controlling function over all position

of power.In economic respects the domination of a ruling politocracy and(subordinated to it) bureaucracy is realized through administrative (centralplanning, meaning the imperative (i.e. based on orders) coordination of aleconomic activities. This necessarily destroys the autonomy of primary unitof prod uction and mak es im possible the prop er use of m ark et a nd pricmechanisms which leads to a substantial loss and distortion of socially available economic information and to endemic discrepancies between the struc

ture of supply and demand. In comparing the working of such an economwith the model of capitalism, Horvat finds it (somewhat simplifying hianalysis) in microeconomic respects (at the level of the firm) less, but inmacroeconomic respect more, effective. At the level of national economyimperative planning allows the effective mobilization of all resources and othe wh ole population in the purs uit of selected targets imp orta nt for a strategof development. (Though he also indicates that with the growing complexityof national economy this relative advantage diminishes and may disappear.

From this follows a rate of growth in output which — especially in lessdeveloped etatist countries — is substantially higher than in a comparabl




tion, all the more because — due to the impossibility of renouncing socialistideals outright — though social inequalities in the distribution of incomes arepres erv ed , their, scope is significantly reduced. On the w hole the basic welfareof the co m m on perso n in an etatist society is highe r, i.e. th e broad masses of

the population live longer, receive more education, and enjoy much bettermedical care than would otherwise occur generally under alternative socialarra ng em ents at the same level of economic dev elopm ent (p. 49).

H or va t's m ost general characterization of the historical place of etatismand many of his more specific points of analysis coincide with conclusionsreache d b y myself in a book w ritten together with F . F eher and A . Heller andnow published. There are, at the same time, significant areas of disagreement(e.g. concerning stratification and mobility) which cannot all be elaboratedhere. I shall concentrate only on some questions which seem to be importantfrom the viewpoint of the further, positive argumentation of the book.

Horvat's description of the religious structure of collective consciousnessbelongs to the most vivid portions of his book. But the very evocative picturedrawn refers essentially to a phenomenon of the past. Suppression of theindividual self, unconditional faith in a charismatic leader, the sacrosanctcha racter of a m on as tical organization (party) and its dogmas — thesefeatures in fact seem to be hardly reconcilable with the elsewhere equallyemphatically indicated phenomena of almost universally present bribery and

co rru ptio n, the com plete divorce between official and private conduct andspheres of existence, etc. The idea that the stability and legitimacy of theetatist social system s is based on a con sensus of faith may be important tounderstand their origin; it is, however, essentially inapplicable to theirpre sen t-day functioning. In th e Soviet Union where the system, in oppositionto the de pe nd en t c oun tries of Central Eastern Eu rop e, has a rather wideconsensual acceptance or support, its legitimacy seems to be based — insofaras it relies at all on an inte rio rize d ideology — n ot on a quasi-mystical belief in

a theo logical socia lism , bu t rath er on a massive and aggressive nationalismconnected primarily with its role as a superpower in the world arena. Ingeneral it seems to me that Horvat misconceives the role of official ideology incontemporary etatist societies. He regards them as important faith generatingsocial-cultural devices (which therefore also impose serious restrictions uponthe conduct of, and the options available to, the ruling elite). Even in Sovietcircumstances this does not seem to be true any more. The official ideology of

so cia lism in these coun tries has to a large exten t been transformed into anempty verbal ritual which invokes in the population at large the feeling of atired bo re do m . Its role consists not in creating rational or irrational grounds forvoluntary compliance, but in the monopolization of all forms of public discourse, in an appropriation of the cultural means of public communicationwhich, through the very meaninglessness of this imposed official language, isrendered incapable of articulating real problems and alternatives. The function of this official ideology today is not the integration of society into aco m m un ity of faith, bu t the disintegration of a com mo n language of meaningful social understanding. In a sense it is a device to recreate under conditions

of m od ern ity tha t situation of obedience from d um b custom (in view of the




unimaginability of alternative social arrangements) which Weber found characteristic of traditional societies. And one should add that this device workreasonably successfully in the Soviet Union, while it essentially fails in otheetatist societies.

As a result Horvat seems to overestimate not only the determining-restrictive, but also the potential critical-eman cipatory, role th e ^'so cialis telements verbally contained in official ideology can play. His belief that theetatist plutocracy is extrem ely vulnerable55 (p. 463) to both internal andexternal criticism invoking against it the principles of socialism is not bornout either by the development and fate of internal opposition in thesecountries, or by the impact and evolution of Eurocommunism. The idea thatechnical and cultural-educational progress by itself pro du ces a gro w ing

grass root pressu re for political re fo rm s so that it is on ly a m att er of timeuntil substantial changes can be expected5' (p. 467) is , unfortunately, anaußlärisch illusion tellingly refuted by the whole post-war Soviet development.

1 have serious doubts also about the validity of those considerations whicHorvat invokes as the second factor explaining the relative stability of etatissystems. He po ints to the legitimating effect of a higher basic welfare in thesesocieties, for which he provides the evidence of an ingenious, quantitativinvestigation comparing the ranking of countries according to per capita grossnational product with their ranking according to three selected social indicators (life expectancy, higher education, and health services). I am certainlyincompetent to evaluate the methodological intricacies of such a statisticacomparison, though it has to be indicated that there are a number of (even iless aggregated and therefore non-conclusive) data which do not seem tosupport Horvat's conclusion (the rather well documented case of a fallinglife-expectancy in the Soviet Union from the mid-sixties; the directly opposeresult of studies about the comparative weight and growth of communal and

welfare-related infrastructural investments in Hungary and in some Europeacapitalist countries of a roughly similar level of economic development, etc.)More importantly, however, it seems to me misleading to evaluate whatHo rvat at some poin ts describes as we lfare of m asses5' on the basis ofindicators which exclude bo th the (certainly elusive) average real wages ofmanual workers and per capita ho usin g. In b oth respects a similar com parisonwould give results, I am certain, which would be to the disfavour of etatism

Soviet-type societies certainly provide, in comparison with capitalist econo

mies, enhanced job security and generally ensu re the safety and or de rlycharacter of a set everyday existence — under conditions of strict politicacompliance. This pervasive state paternalism (which cannot be sufficientlyexplained by reference to ideological constraints) belongs to the principles otheir functioning. Etatism also m ade po ssib le, in the post-Stalinist ph ase of itdevelopoment, a very slow, but steady, rise of the average living standards andgeneral welfare — until this trend was bro ke n by the steep d ro p in th e ra te ogrowth that occurred in the last few years in almost all these countriessimultaneously (and to which Horvat refers rather as to a future possibility)One definitely should not underestimate the stabilizing (or in case of the recen




developments: destabilizing) effect of these factors. But etatism did not provide for a higher basic welfare, in any meaningful sense, than the one presenin comparable capitalist environments, especially in welfare states. It ishowever, an inclination toward the simplifying, and in definite respects

distortive, reduction of the opposition between capitalism and etatism to thabetween safeguarding political-culture freedoms or ensuring basic mass welfare which to a large extent underlies Horvat's conviction about the absoluteprimacy of questions of political organization for the solution of the problemof contemporary socialism.

The same point can be argued from another angle, too. In his analysis ofetatism Horvat essentially describes its fundamental social organizations andmechanisms (party, bureaucratic administration, central planning, etc.) in

terms of those formal principles, and internal to these organizations norms,according to which they should function (cf. p p . 37 -39, 71 , etc .). He naturallyknows well and clearly indicates that they do not operate in this way inprac tice: th e party is not a mona stic orde r, directives do not run simply from aunified top in an uninterrupted chain of command to the bottom of thebureaucratic apparatus strictly under control in their execution, etc. Hetrea ts, how ever, these pervasive divergences between the prin ciple s and

p ra ct ic e as ano m alies an d disfunctionalities causing specific inefficienciesTo explain the nevertheless considerable integrative power of such a system(wh ich certain ly is in evidence at least in its cen te r ), he postulates anirration al, quasi-religious collective men tality which is un tro ub led by, andinsensitive towards, contradictions (pp. 41-42) and is reinforced by the considerable economic and welfare achievements. Against this view, the problematic ch aracter of wh ich I tried to indicate, I would hold — a point arguedin detail in the book earlier referred to — that the integration and stability othis system of domination is achieved, to formulate the matter in a somewhaoverly-simplified way, not despite, but through its seeming ano m alies, manyof w hich prove to be from the viewpoint of its reprod uction not disfunctio na l at all. A n analysis of the ways the rigidly hierarchic-m onolithic organizations of power and control really function in these societies reveals, behindtheir formal principles, the working of informal structures and mechanismsthrough which the changing claims of various functional units and broadesocial groups are both expressed and screened, channelized, to be ultimatelyreconciled with each other through their submission to the dominant interesof a ruling bu reau cra tic appa ratu s. E tat ism seems to represent just a cas

which especially underlines the insufficiency of attempts to treat any society— past, present, or future — merely from the viewpoint, and in terms, of itformal organizational principles.

The Design

The critical analysis of etatism and the social experiences of modern capitalism counterposed to it demonstrate for Horvat that the main problem facing socialist society consists in ensuring an effective decentralization anddéconcentration of power: such an institutional structure of social organis






ses legislative and executive autonomy in the sphere of its competenceCompetences (and the disposition over the necessary resources) should bseparated in such a way as to allow decisions to be taken always at the lowespossible level concerned and affected. (2) Higher legislative organs combinthe principles of territorial and functional representation, the first aimed —roughly speaking — at the articulation of the interests of members of societyas consumers according to regions, the second at the representation of theiinterests as producers according to the branches of production. Executivpower is exercised by the elected Executive Council of the whole Assembly(3) Public administration and administration of justice are carried out byprofessional and independent civil service and judiciary respectively. Theimembers ought to be selected in open competition on the basis of merit by

elected Recruitment Boards established at various levels of self-government(4) Election of delegates to the various representative organs of the politicasystem ought to take place without the mediation of political parties. Horvaargues that parties as large-scale, oligarchic, and bureaucratic organizations opolitical power render the free and equal access to participatory democracyimpossible. On the other hand, the roles traditionally associated with partorganizations in modern democracies — the various functions of interesarticulation and aggregation, political socialisation and recruitment — can btaken over by a multiplicity of more transient and more loosely organizedassociations (specific cause- or interest-oriented groups, broader politicamovements and societies). One of the basic preconditions for the working osuch a political system, as Horvat indicates, is the ensuring of the positivright of each citizen to information about all matters affecting his/her interest— a right which first of all demands an appropriate organization and controof the mass media.

One of the chief merits of Horvat's book consists in the relatively detaileelaboration of the organizational design merely indicated here. It gains iconcreteness also from the fact that, as a rule, Horvat systematically discussethe theoretical objections which usually are or can be raised against its variouelements and simultaneously gives a very frank and informative picture of thdifficulties which — as available practical experiences indicate — they maencounter. On the whole he succeeds in showing the overall consistency osuch an institutional structure and plausibly argues that it can initiate furtheprocesses of desirable social change enhancing its coherence.

A critical discussion within a review inevitably has to be limited to som

particular — and somewhat arbitrarily chosen — aspects of this project. Thquestion about the relationship between market and planning certainldeserves such special atten tion — bo th in view of its practical significance anits place in past and present disputes concerning the meaning and possibilitof a socialist society.

The opposition between market and planning belongs to the firmest elements of a Marxist tradition of socialism. Marx's critique of capitalism was a large extent a critique of the reified mediations of a market economy whic

can establish the necessary proportionality between the various constituenand branches of economic activity only ex post, at the cost of enormous




disfunctionalities and behind the back of the social actors themselves, whosreal needs become in this process disto rted by , and subm itted to , the logic of a

relentless drive for the m aximization of profit. A m arket e con om y, first of alcompletely neglects and suppresses the needs and interests of workers as

producers since it transforms labour power itself into a saleable commoditwhich is taken into account only as one of the factors of production for profiSocialism means, therefore, an economic system which directly ensures thesocial character of production through a central plan which, ex ante, explicitlyand im mediately link s conscious social needs with the effective use of availabresources.

In his critique of this traditional conception Horvat emphasizes not so mucthe often-argued inefficiency (or unrealizability) of a non-market economy

but the fact that it actually contradicts some of the basic tenets and values osocialism. First of all, the replacement of the market by central plannincannot mean anything else but the administrative allocation of resources anthe imperative direction and control of central organs over the activity of aenterprises. That is, it involves the denial of the autonomy of the units oproduction and any possibility of workers' self-management which waregarded both by Marx an d Engels as an obvious aspect of the socialization the means of production. Insofar as the activity of enterprises is determineby central orders and signals, there is nothing to m an ag e within thembeyond the technical decisions of how to fulfill in the most effective wathe centrally-administratively specified tasks, and this really demandprofessional competence and not industrial democracy. A non-market economy paradoxically again reduces the producer to the situation of a waglabourer who is the mere executor of the will of somebody else.

Secondly, a direct linkage of social needs and productive resources presupposes that the planners can know the needs. But in a situation of relativscarcity, it is not needs as such, but a hierarchy of needs with respect to thavailable resources and the (changing and alternative) costs, which musdetermine economic decisions. The abolition of the market, however, meanthat the plann ers no longer possess a reliable channel of inform ation abo ut thunderstood needs of the members of society: the system of money prices just the device which allows the indicated comparison and aggregation oneeds. Imperative central planning, therefore, can succeed only If it denies thsovereignty of consumers, i.e. the autonomy of citizens to choose their waand style of life. T he more this control is relaxed, the m ore it leads to endemi

discrepancies between production and consumption, thus to enormous wasteLastly, the activity of enterprises and their labourers can be evaluated i

conditions of a non-market economy only according to the criterion of how fathey succeeded In complying with the central ord ers, whic h, as argue d, do ncoincide with real social demand. Thus such an economy inevitably involvdeviations from the socialist principle of distribution according to the sociutility of labour done. The argument that in a market setting a profiteerinmentality (individualistic or collective) reigns and truly socialist, moral Ince

tives to labou r can no t dev elop , creates a false antinom y. Th e very term m orInc en tive , as H orv at remarks.» Involves a con tradic tion, since 'mora




implies ̂ a sort of c ond uct that is good in itself, not because it leads tosom ethin g else, wh ile the mea ning of an incentive is exactly the oppo site (p502). The difference here is merely between pecuniary and non-pecuniaryincentives, the latter having the character of various status and prestigerewards. If the first may stimulate private greed, the second may impose socialcon form ity. In situations of scarcity, re w ar d has to dep end upon the resultsof the performed work. This is a requirement (though only one aspect) ofsocial justice. Which incentives will be selected is primarily a matter ofefficiency. T h e real difference is not betw een the various types of incentivesbu t between incentives and autonomo us decisions (p. 503) — and onlyworkers5 management ensures this latter possibility.

The traditional conception of socialism as a marketless economy identifies

commodity production in general with universal commodity production specifically cha racteristic of capitalism. The economic institution of the market hasbeen present in all complex historical economic organisms. Its presence doesnot determine the global character of relations of production, just the opposite: the latter determine the type and character of the market. Social planning, i.e. economic coordination of autonomous productive units aimed atachieving socially desirable global proportions and a definite direction ofgrowth, not only does not exclude, but presupposes, the functioning of

market mechanisms as informational and allocational devices. This does notm ean simply a m ixe d eco no m y ; the task is to identify those features ofmarket relations under capitalism which are conducive to alienation of labourand to the production of social inequalities, and then to find institutionaldevices for eliminating th em . A socialist m arket is, in this sense, a regu latedone: it is transformed into an instrument of social planning.

T h e re are at least four aspects in regard to which capitalist market relationought to be fundamentally transformed under socialism. First of all,

com m odity pro du ction un de r capitalism has a universal character. This meanthat labour power itself is marketed as a commodity. Workers5 managementbr ea ks down this relationship since it confers upon each produ cer the functioof co-owner of social capital and co-entrepreneur in a collective enterpriseSecondly, the profit of an enterprise in a capitalist system depends not onlyupon the utility of labour performed (including entrepreneurship) but also onthe magnitude of advanced capital, i.e. accumulated past labour privatelyowned. This problem is not solved by a mere change in the legal title ofownership, since different firms will further work under different economiconditions. Therefore the gross profit of enterprises can also include nonlabour income. It is the task of specific regulatory mechanisms — especiallyprice planning and taxation eliminating various forms of rent — to establishequal business conditions throughout the economy and thereby reduce alincome to labour income alone. These regulatory mechanisms must bedefined clearly and ex ante leaving the autonomy of firms intact, but equalizing the conditions of their economic activity. In this way a socialist economy

comes closer to the textbook competitive model than a capitalist economycan ever d o (p. 269).

Thi dl h f l i d l i fl i h




interests and the life of the whole population cannot be decided by the merinterplay of the autonomous investment-decisions undertaken by separatfirms. These firms m ust be guided by a democratically discussed an d accepteeconomic policy realized through appropriate fiscal means. Social plannin

represents both a forecasting instrument guiding the economic behaviour ofirms through providing information about the predictable future conditionof their activity, and an instrument of global direction of economic development. The plan, however, has an obligatory force only for that governmentabody which accepted it and for its organs.

Lastly, market distribution of goods and services, even under the statedconditions, cannot be accepted as completely compatible with the principleof socialism. As a society aiming at providing equal opportunity of life

chances for each , it cannot accept system atic, even if well d es er ve d,inequalities with respect to those goods that substantially influence thdevelopment of individual capabilities. With respect to these — and Horvaspecifies six such areas, from education to environmental conservation —exchange distribution should be replaced by distribution according to need(provision of goods and services free of charge or at subsidized prices). In thisense socialism solves in its practice the well-known ethical dilemma betweethe two rival conceptions of justice: legitim ate entitlem ent versus equa lity

of ne ed s. It solves this conflict by providing an appro priate sphe re ooperation for each principle. Of course, in situations of scarcity the satisfaction of personality-building, co llec tive needs is also restric ted by thresources available to the whole society. The share of collective consumptioin the whole social prod uct and the d istribu tion between its various elem enthas to be decided according to some priority schedule democratically decideupon in a political process. H er e, how ever, the principle holds tha t th ere is n

juste r distribution than the one wh ich the m em bers of a co m m un ity, afte

an informed discussion by all, accept as just.Horvat's discussion of the relationship between market and planning certainly relies upo n both the Yugoslavian experiences and the various re fo rmproposals elaborated by critically minded East European economists in thlast decades. H e puts the m , howeve r, into a broad theoretical fram ew ork anorganically interconnects this whole problematic with the other pertinensocial and institutional problems. His discussion of what makes thecomplementarity of market and planning both necessary and possible unde

socialism and what this complementarity practically can mean, belongs to thbest balanced and convincing treatm ent of this perennial que stion . W ith in thframework of a very far-reaching agreement, one problem, however, has to beraised.

The complementarity of planning and market under the specified conditions is expressed by Horvat in the following formula: social planning is precondition for a truly efficient market, while a market in socialism represents an (informational and allocational) device of planning. This formula ca

perhaps be accepted as an ideal to be striven for, but when it is offered as thdescription of a state of affairs that can be secured by a definite institutiona




m ate the difficu lty of socialism.N o instr um ent is entirely neu tr al , rem arks Horvat at one place (p. 503)

in discussing th e future role of m ark et. He means by this the dangers involvedin the preservation of market relations insofar as they may reinforce an

acquisitive and competitive mentality. The problem, however, seems to bemuch broader and not purely psychological.In conditions of an economy where both production and, in its wake,

consumptive preferences are dynamically changing, the market is an inelimin-able institutional device since it is necessary to make the differentiated andindividu ated needs com parab le, m eas ura ble , and aggregatable, and withoutsuch information rational allocative decisions are impossible. But the marketis, in this respect, a true channel of information: it processes and transmits

signals about social wants insofar as it channelizes them according to its ownstructural characteristics. Definite types of needs — first of all, needs inindividually disposable and utilizable goods of consumption and short-termservices — can directly and relatively adequately be expressed in the form ofdemand in the market. Other types of needs, however — primarily those ofcollective co nsu m ption , further wants in continuo us or glob al services,and, even more importantly, the needs of producers for more satisfying andmeaningful work activity — can be articulated through market mechanismsonly indirectly and in an ambiguous way, or not at all. Horvat himself veryclearly indicates a number of related problems under the heading of theunpriceability of pu blic go od s and externalities and that of incorrectconsumers' choice (pp. 329-331). He is inclined, however, to treat all theseque stions as those of d istribution. They seem to be, however, much broader intheir significance: they concern the very direction of the development ofprod uc tio n — at least if one does not assume that this is ultimately determinedby some im m utab le and autonom ous laws of technical progress as such. Isocialism is a project to subordinate production of conditions of life to thetotality of needs of associated individuals, planning in this respect ought nobe co m pl em en tar y to , bu t counteracting and counterbalancing, the influences of the ma rk et . It has the function — beyond those indicated in the book— of articu lating those social wan ts and requirem ents toward the allocation oavailable resources which cannot be adequately expressed through marketm echa nism s. T h e q uestion is w heth er, and u nde r what conditions, it can fulfisuch functions.

The relationship between human wants and their satisfaction is not an

external one betw een some subjective emotive state and its relea se. At leasbeyond an elemental level, satisfiability is a precondition for needs to berecognized as such: in a situation where there seems to be no rehabie way otheir satisfaction, wants themselves tend to remain m u te , i.e. to beexpressed only in forms of vague and unspecific frustration and discontentOffering habitual and well envisionable (within our culture) ways to fulfineeds of a definite, but only definite, type, the market truly channelizes wantin a pred efined d irec tion . W he ther its correlated blo ck ing effect can beovercome is ultimately not a question of how planning and the market caninstitutionally be integrated with each other in an efficient economy. The




solution of the problem in the last case depends on whether it is possible tcreate relatively reliable social channe ls thro ugh which the b lo cked(communal-consumptive and productive) wants can be habitually articulatedand mobilized, transformed into realizable social demands. Only under such

conditions can plannin g, however dem ocratic, fulfil its co un terb ala nc ingrole.The initiation of social processes through which organized pressures can b

brought into play against the spontaneous impact of ineliminable markeforces in both systematic and solidaristic ways — this is one of the basiproblems of a socialist strategy. This conclusion certainly does not invalidatthe basic features of H orva t's de sig n. H is ideas concerning wo rkers5 management, on the one hand, and distribution according to needs in respect o

collective goo ds , on the other, can indeed be seen — even if his arg um enfollows different lines — as the specification of those organizational forms anmechanisms that are able to ensure the articulation of both productive andcommunal consumptive wants. Both ideas seem to be. In a general way, validalso from the viewpoint specifically underlined here. But both present us wita number of further (and somewhat analogous) problems that have a direcbearing on the whole approach of the book. Here I shall raise only some of thproblems relating to the organization of self-management as envisaged byHorvat.

The discussion of the difficulties of a self-managerial organization of workactivities (pp. 250-262) belongs to the most illuminating parts of the bookreflecting bo th the practical experiences gained in Yugoslavia and the th eo ret ical perceptiveness of the author. As Horvat indicates, the most difficulproblem that arises in practice concerns the division of functions in, andresponsibilities for, decision-making between the organs of self-managementon the one ha nd , and the professional-functional (managerial and adm ini strative) staff, on the othe r, since m ist ak es in this respect can result no t onlyin gross inefficiencies and in a system of organized irresponsibility, but alstend to make self-management itself formal and easily manipulated.

Horvat's answer to this difficulty runs along the line well known from thsocialist tradition, from Saint-Simon to Engels. It is necessary to separate twdifferent spheres of activity: the interest sphere connected with value judgements and the professional sphere of their technical implementation (p. 241)Self-management ought to be concerned with policy decisions belonging tthe first sphere, not impinging upon the second which requires professionacom petence and autho rity. Or, as he formulates it in another place, hie rarchy may imply coordination or control. In the latter case, it is power baseand handles otherwise unresolvable conflicts. In the former case, it is poweneutral with no conflict of interest. The coordinating hierarchy is a product othe division of labour and as such eternal. The conductor will always conducthe orch estra (p. 189).

It is advisable to leave aside here the general problem of division of labourwith the simile inherited from Marx of an orchestra even though this latter i

not uninstructive. (I personally do hope that socialism will not bar thpossibility of listening to chamber orchestras of virtuosi playing Baroqu




music without a conductor.) The problem with this idea of separating self-m anagem ent of peo ple from the mere m anagem ent of thing s lies primarilyin the fact that while it relies on an undoubtedly valid principle, the lattermust remain counter-factual in situations of economic scarcity. It is certainlyvalid that in respect to value-choices in modern society each person has equalcompetence and should have an equal voice, irrespective of the fact that theim plem entation of such choices deman ds technical (among others managerial)competences not shared by everyone. But the two types of decision not onlycan no t be, as H orva t says, neatly separa ted : there are in principle noim m an en t dividing lines betwe en the two because they are interdepen dent. Insituations of scarcity economically relevant questions almost never take theform of deciding whether to satisfy this or that need or interest as such. One

has to decide whether to satisfy them at such and such a cost and sincethese costs are almost never unambiguously fixed, but represent a range ofalternatives, their determination demands in all somewhat complex societalcases cons iderable professional com petences. Po licy decisions alwaysde pe nd upon tec hn ica l ones (and vice versa).

T h is does not mea n that one has to give up the distinction between po licyan d fun ction al-tec hn ical decisions, a distinction that is certainly decisive forthe very possibility of ind us trial dem ocracy . It implies only that such a

division of com petences cannot be fou nd according to some imm anentcharacteristics of the activities concerned — it has to be made, and madevariously in the varying concrete circumstances under the impact of a greatmany factors not directly related to considerations about the character ofinvolved activities. What are the limits set both by the material conditions ofwork and by the larger society to the range of alternatives that can be optedfor? What weight such decisions can have for the practical life of thoseconcerned? How far and at what cost is alternative professional advice available concerning the conditions and consequences of various decisions? Allthese and similar considerations certainly must, to a significant extent, influence what range of decisions and responsibilities it is possible and worthwhilefor a work-collective to undertake.

With respect to such conditions, however, work organizations in modernsociety show a very great degree of heterogeneity. Differences in skill structure, especially the degree of difference in competences necessary for

m an ag ing and simp ly w ork ing , the range for admissible experimentationan d alternative organisations of w ork, the possible rew ard consequent upo ntheir success or failure — these determinants are widely differing, let us say,in an educational institution, in a middle-sized office, and in a large, semi-automated factory. In view of this fact, it seems to me neither possible, norde sira ble , to find one general and allegedly conflictless organizational structure for workers' management. Socialist society, as it is envisagable today, israther to be comprehended as comprising a number of diverse forms ofparticipatory organizations of socialized enterprises chosen by the concernedcollectives themselves — from the model of self-management along the lines

indica ted by H orv at to the m ore conflict-oriented type of w orkers' co ntr ol.This organizational diversity must also reflect another fact. Given the




present level and character of technical developments w o rk ca nn ot, andeven should not, have the same interest and meaning for the life of everyoneChanging the actual power relations under which labour takes place in thepresent by itself alone does not yet transform the day to day performance o

fragmented and m onoton ous operations into a perso nality-b uilding an denriching activity. H orvat h ere again sees tendencies already o per ating wh ichmake this problem disappear: automation and computerization of productionmake fragmentation of labour irrational and gradually break down the division between manual and non-m anual labour (pp. 407 -40 8,4 28 , etc.) . This ishowever, hardly a realistic evaluation: automation as it takes place undepresent socioeconomic circumstances — either in the West or the Ea st — doenot tend to eliminate the categories of semi-skilled, routinized, and monoto

nous labour, but to recreate them in new forms. Therefore any participatoryorganization of production which departs from the presently given possibilities m us t allow for differences in the degree and character of in ter es ted ne sin work (and therefore also in the range of meaningfully undertaken responsibilities for decisions). It m ust also — and this is one of its m ain tas ks — hav e character permitting such social pressures and experiences be mobilized anddisseminated which are able to give new impetus to technical developmentinfluencing its very direction, ultimately giving a changed meaning to the verconcept of efficiency (which always presupposes some de fin ite, sociallycodified way of reckoning what are the economically relevan t co st s an d

ga ins of an activity). Th is dem ands attention not only to th e organizationally efficient interlocking of the various vertical levels of self-governmenbut, among others, to the horizontal connections at its very base. Lastly, any

proje ct of socialism mu st today take into account that for very large strata oa population alternatives to the present organization of work and leisure(especially to the hab itual division of adu lt life into w or ki ng life an d

retir em ent ) have no less significance th an the transform ation of wo rkrelations themselves — and this naturally includes also the development oforms of socially useful activities not organized as continuously undertakeand renum erated by its results as la bo ur .

Socialism represents the solidaristic organization of a pluralistic societywhich does not impose externally defined life-choices upon the individuals —this is one of the central motives of H orv at's book and d e si g n . H ow ev erthe idea that some general and homogeneous organizational structure canprovide equal opportu nities for any way and style of life that some may desireor try to realize is chimerical. Forms of organization represent solutions tdefinite prob lem s and for definite en ds. T he de sig n pre sen ted by H orv aitself embodies — as he certainly will acknow ledge himself — well-defineand conspicuous value-preferences: of work as meaningful activity central folife, of an autonomous high culture the products of which ought to baccessible for everyone, etc. These values are certainly desirable and sociallrelevant today in the sense that they embody the satisfaction of widespreaand partially blocked needs of m any . Th is does not m ean , how eve r, tha t thes

values are equally central for, or even uncontested by, everyone, and nobecause of individual idiosyncracies or a lack of enlightenment but fo



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The Project Called Socialism - Gyorgy Markus