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‘The Principles of Steam’: Political Transfer andTransformation in Japan, 1868–89Janny de JongPublished online: 18 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Janny de Jong (2005) ‘The Principles of Steam’: Political Transfer and Transformation in Japan, 1868–89,European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire, 12:2, 269-290, DOI: 10.1080/13507480500269092
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‘The Principles of Steam’: PoliticalTransfer and Transformation in Japan,1868–89Janny de Jong
In the first decades of the Meiji period Japan started a deliberate modernizationprogramme of state and society in which foreign models played a very important role. Thespeed with which foreign ideas concerning a constitution, a national assembly and popular
rights were adopted and adapted is astonishing. Perhaps most impressive is the fact thatthis policy was not simply an elite matter, issued from above, but involved the general
public as well. The various drafts of constitutions that have been found in villagestorehouses show political modernization had a broad social basis. European political
history in the nineteenth century shows numerous instances of the rhetorical use of theforeignness of particular political models or ideas. Their foreign background made
rejection or opposition easier. In Japan we meet a proud country that embarked on acourse in which the adoption—and adaptation—of foreign political ideas and institutions
was simply considered the proper thing to do. Japan became a perfect example of howpolitical practices migrated, in the process were transformed in a national context andwere used in political rhetoric.
The phenomenon of political transfer is best understood when the carriers and theprocess of transfer are studied in their national and international context. The studyof political transfer in nineteenth-century Japan, subsequently, is highly relevant
because essential issues such as the ratio between transfer, adaptation and the givingof a new meaning emphatically come to a head both in the history of Japan and in
Japanese historiography. At the same time this particular past and thehistoriography raise the problem of to what extent political transfer was forced
upon the Japanese political culture within the context of nineteenth-century
ISSN 1350-7486 (print)/ISSN 1469-8293 (online) q 2005 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13507480500269092
Janny de Jong is a lecturer in modern and non-western history at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Correspondence to: Department of History, P.O. Box 716, 9700 AS Groningen, The Netherlands. Email:
European Review of History—Revue europeenne d’Histoire
Vol. 12, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 269–290
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imperialism and the internal struggle of power. The Japanese choices from variousWestern political, technical and military models also beg the question of to what
degree political transfer can be optional.However that may be, the political elites of Japan in the nineteenth century had
come alive to the necessity of large-scale political transfer from foreign Westerncivilizations that had successfully developed institutions and concepts deserving
emulation and imitation. These points could all be found in the Memorial on theEstablishment of a Representative Assembly of 17 January 1874: ‘The reason why
foreigners have perfected [council chambers] only after the lapse of centuries is that noexamples existed previously, and these had to be discovered by actual experience. If wecan select examples from them and adopt their contrivances, why should we not be
successful in working them out? If we have to delay the using of steam machinery untilwe have discovered the principles of steam for ourselves . . . our government will be
unable to set to work.’1 This plea for speedy reforms and for the adoption of foreignmethods and examples was written by a group of eight samurai, including former
members of the Meiji government. The memorial has become famous because one ofits key devisers, Itagaki Taisuke,2 was to become the central figure in the popular
movement for political rights.It was also in the same year, 1874, that a small book on the use of speech and public
debate was published by the then already well-known educator, writer and propagator
of Western knowledge Fukuzawa Yukichi. It was a successful publication; no less than200 000 copies were sold. The booklet Kaigiben (‘How to hold a conference’) was in
fact a translation and adaptation of an American manual with procedural rules forvarious types of meetings.3 It discussed principles of parliamentary procedure as well
as rules and instructions on the holding of conferences and meetings. Fukuzawa andhis two fellow authors wanted to prove that the basic principles could be introduced in
all sorts of meetings. After all, Western people and Japanese were similar and ‘there isno reason why humans cannot do what other humans can do’.4
But that was theory. In practice, speaking in public meant a radical step in a societythat only recently had abolished the formal division in hereditary estates and the legalprivileges of samurai. Fukuzawa rejected preordained differences. In 1872 he had
published the first ‘section’ of a series of 17 essays called Gakumon no susume(An Encouragement of Learning). The first sentence ran: ‘It is said that heaven does not
create one man above or below another man. . .. There is no innate distinction betweenhigh and low . . . the distinction between wise and stupid comes down to a matter of
education’. This particular essay reached a very large audience.5
These are just a few examples in the early 1870s of influential people who stressed
the importance of the adoption, or transfer, of Western political practices andinstitutions in Japan. People inside and outside the Meiji government, variousdebating societies, political parties and newspaper journalists, as well as members of
rural communities, all became convinced that political reform in Japan, including aconstitution, was necessary. And, in fact, in 1889 a constitution was promulgated and
a year later the bicameral Imperial Diet held its first session. Political developments,
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which often took centuries to develop elsewhere, were compressed into just a fewdecades. The speed of the reform was—and is—breathtaking.
One of the most interesting features of this development, seen from the perspectiveof political transfer, is of course the seemingly nationwide consensus. European
political history in the nineteenth century shows numerous instances of the rhetoricaluse of the foreignness of particular political models or ideas. Their foreign background
made rejection or opposition easier. Of course this rhetorical instrument was happilyused by political nationalists of all denominations, but they certainly were not the only
ones. A foreign origin of ideas, persons or even names often seemed to cast a dubiousspell. The fact that in 1917 the British Royal House changed its name from ‘House ofSaxe-Coburg-Gotha’ to ‘House of Windsor’ illustrates this point neatly. Japan in the
Meiji period, however, felt the utter necessity to modernize and in this process toadopt foreign political ideas and models. The difficulty of confronting and adapting
modern civilization was significantly enlarged by the cultural difference.It is the aim of this article to look closer at this process of adopting and adapting
foreign models in the years 1868–89. Political power in the Meiji period was largelyexercised by an oligarchic group of (lower) samurai origin, which tried to impose the
reforms from above. But at the same time a political modernization movement atgrassroots level came into existence. The influence that this movement could exerciseand the motives behind it is the other development that will be discussed. In this way a
clear example can be offered of what political transfer meant in Japanese history in theyears between 1868 and 1889.
Diffusion, Transfer and Modernization
Before describing and analysing the political change in Japan it seems useful to analysehow the Japanese case fits in the theoretical debate on ‘transfer’ and on ‘diffusion’ of
political ideas and social and cultural movements. The concept of cultural diffusionhas its origin in anthropology, and at first was used mainly for the analysis of the
spread of cultural or social traits and movements. But in the 1960s and 1970s the ideaof political diffusion, in the sense of emulation of policy innovations, was discussed
as well.6
The borrowing and copying of cultural traits has often been applied to the globaltransfer of Western knowledge and institutions from Europe, or ‘The West’. This
‘Eurocentric diffusionism’ divides the world roughly into two parts: a core and aperiphery. The core, or Inside, modernizes and leads; the periphery, or Outside, is
called traditional, is backward and held only capable of imitation.7 In connection withthis view, the economic success of Japan supplied a role model for other non-Western
countries. In the preface of a much-used textbook, to name but one example, Japan iscalled the only non-Western nation that responded ‘successfully to the challenge of
superior Western technology’ and therefore stood in a special relationship to ‘the otherstill not fully industrialized or “modernized” non-Western cultures’.8 The problem of
over-emphasizing Western achievements is real. The Australian historian Tessa
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Morris-Suzuki provided a well-composed overview of the Japanese ‘challenge’ to ‘our’intellectual preconceptions in this respect. The usual explanations concerning the
nature and causes of technological change indeed focus on the dynamic achievementsof Western Europe and North America, thereby forcing Japan into a ‘mere postscript’
to this narrative.9
The American geographer J. M. Blaut saw Japan as proof of the fact that its
industrialization had taken place without Western interference: ‘Japan becameindustrialized precisely because of a lack of diffusion.’10 To see Japan’s development in
such a way is particularly one-sided. Of course Japanese industrialization started longbefore contact with Western powers became more intense and recent historiographydraws attention to the influence of the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) and the internal
factors to account for the rapid change in the second half of the nineteenth century.But to rule out Western influence altogether is highly misleading.
The issue of Japanese modernization became politizised during the cold war. TheJapanese model proved that there was a successful alternative available to communism
and socialism. The evolutionary scheme of W. W. Rostow in particular was highlyinfluential. Rostow described Japan in his Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-
Communist Manifesto as the sole Asian country that had already attained theimportant stage of ‘take-off ’ in the nineteenth century.11 ‘Modernization’, which in thedecolonization period had been coined as a more neutral word than the previously
used ‘Westernization’, soon became an ideologically worn-out and even old-fashionedconcept. Revisionist historians in particular criticized the idea of a linear process,
based on Western experiences. An integral, global approach was called for.12
When in the following the term modernization is mentioned, this by no means
suggests an essentialist, diffusionist approach. It must be clear that transfer of politicalmodels always implies an alteration in the original feature to make the element fit into
the new context, which is thereby changed as well. Cross-cultural borrowing thereforenecessarily implies change. The difficulty increases when political concepts are so
different that the invention of new words, a new terminology, is necessary. The searchfor proper translations was complex.13 To seek for equivalents of Western politicalthought in non-Western societies and come to the conclusion that the differences are
substantial is missing the point. Dismissing the changes at the receiving end asaberrations or anomalies does not work either. This holds true for the transfer of
technological and scientific knowledge, and even more for the travel of political ideas.For this reason there are some who find the entire concept of transfer misleading.14
But I think that the concept of transfer may help us to understand the process ofchange involved.
The change in the original concept nevertheless poses new problems. Even if thealteration is taken for granted, this still leaves unanswered the question ‘how muchchange can be allowed for?’. In other words, when does a variant ‘transform’ into
something essentially different? In the analysis of whether it is helpful to refer toJapanese reformists in terms of Western European conceptions of liberalism, the
political scientist Hoston, for instance, sketches the dilemma between a Eurocentric
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view on the one hand (‘Can non-Western people understand the essence of the liberal-democratic ideals?’) and the use of a very broad conception of liberalism to include all
varieties on the other. In her interesting article she calls liberalism in Japan a valid andlegitimate variant of (Western) liberalism even though ‘conditioned by the cultural,
political, and socio-economic dimensions of their indigenous context’.15 The conceptof transfer allows us to accept this change as natural. But the next problem would be at
what point Japanese liberalism has to be called a non-valid, or even illegitimate,mutation. This matter is highly relevant, as is proved by the many discussions on, for
instance, the character and political heritage of the postwar Liberal Democratic Party,founded in 1955.16
Within the political transfer of Western political models to Japan in the nineteenth
century the concept of power is crucial. The particular transfer of political ideas isdirectly related to the international political power structure in which colonial
expansion and rivalries among Western powers were important catalysts. Without thedrive to change the asymmetrical power relation into a more symmetrical one, the
particular urge to introduce Western political models would probably not havehappened. Modernity was a related element. ‘Becoming modern’ was to develop into
the central issue in Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth century. But Japan’sdefensive modernization was by no means unique.17
Through the policy of adopting elements of Western civilization from Europe and
America (called Euro-America, Obei) and neatly dividing between Japanese andWestern food, clothes, etc., an East–West dichotomy was created. Since it was a
reversal of the East–West bipolarity that E. Said described in Orientalism, this can be,and indeed has been, called Occidentalism. But the term Occidentalism is by no means
clear and manifests itself in various forms depending on place and context. The recentinterpretation of Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit links the concept to a revolt against
the West and what it stands for.18 The Chinese scholar Nin Wang, though aware of thevarious manifestations of the notion, saw in Occidentalism primarily a form of protest
against the West. Japanese ‘occidentalism’, for instance, meant ‘a drive to reconstructJapanese culture’ and a way to cope with the ‘double cultural coloniality’; that is, theChinese influence before the nineteenth century and the Western impact in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.19
Like the East, the West has been stereotyped and used to further political ambitions.
In reality no uniform ‘Western’ model existed, of course, and Japan’s transition into amodern nation-state was an obvious, and moreover deliberate, mixture of old and
new, and of both Western universalistic and traditionalist schools of statecraft.Tradition, whether real or ‘invented’, served to strengthen this modernizing
transformation.In the study of colonial relations attention has been drawn to the fact that not one
but several colonial models existed, as well as a great variety of inter-social relations
and socially transformative projects. For example the particular form and substance ofBritish colonialism in India was shaped by the British, but probably even more by the
Indian country, people, time and already existing institutions. And ‘India’ also
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influenced British politics and the British way of life at home.20 In the case of Japan’sadoption of political ideas and institutions, no such specific mutual relationship
existed.21 In the field of political transfer, as we shall see, political ideas, models andpractices that originated in Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany
became most important. That these countries were also the most powerful certainlywas no coincidence.
Establishment of the Meiji State and the Context of Transfer
The change of political regime in 1868 was related to the Western pressure on Japan toopen its harbours for international trade. In 1868 the restoration of direct Imperial
Rule was proclaimed. Certainly at first the official imperial ‘restoration’ was largelysymbolic. The emperor was a boy aged 16 and in fact a group of rather young menfrom the south-western part of Japan became the nucleus of power. In the three
decades preceding the change of regime, dissatisfaction had grown with theshogunate’s rule; the fact that in the 1850s it had been unable to stand up against the
foreign pressure to end the seclusion policy was a very important factor. The slogansonno joi, ‘revere the emperor, expel the barbarians’, became popular in the 1860s and
expressed the demand to get rid of the foreign presence. These were not only words:the unequal terms in the treaties with Western countries, and the often arrogant
behaviour of Western people in Japan, gave rise to violence. Choshu batteriesbombarded foreign ships in Shimonoseki straits (1863) and individual foreigners were
killed. In 1865 and 1866 severe inflation and crop failures had caused economichardship and social unrest. A curious form of public protest occurred with the ‘ee janai ka’ spontaneous outbursts, in which large crowds of people were dancing and
singing in the streets shouting ‘What the hell!’.22
When the opposition forces from the outer domains Choshu en Satsuma joined
hands with two other domains and with court circles, the matter was soon decided.Though the proclamation of the Imperial Rule was followed by a short civil war, the
opposition against the new leadership could not generate much power. This is not tosay that the whole country was now overly enthusiastic. The fact that insurgent leaders
had tried to buy a measure of public support by promising substantial tax reductionsdid not do much good either, especially since these promises were not kept.
The anti-shogunal forces had made use of anti-Western sentiments that seemed to
mean that the policy of seclusion would be taken up again. Fukuzawa for instance wasat first very pessimistic about the future, as he recalls in his autobiography: ‘[I] had
decided that biased and foolhardy men from various clans were getting together tomake a worthless government which might even bring disaster to the country.’23 The
way they had acquired power was ‘through a combination of military force, anddeployment of the emperor as the fig leaf of legitimacy for a new regime’.24 In spite of
joi, the new Meiji government made clear that it accepted the treaties that would be inneed of revision shortly. In the last 15 years of the Tokugawa period more than 200
foreigners had already been employed, and also students had been sent abroad. In the
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Meiji period the Imperial government chose the countries that were most advanced incertain fields or whose institutions fitted best into the Japanese context, and then asked
the country in question to send some experts to stay and teach in Japan for a certainperiod. In government service alone well over 3000 employees were hired in the years
1868–1912.25 Under the previous regime some 40% of the instructors had beenDutch. Though they were still employed in fields in which they had specific expertise,
for instance in harbour engineering; during the Meiji period they became very muchoutnumbered by English, French, German and American employees. This certainly
bore relation to the strength and international position of the home country of the‘Japan helpers’.26
By 8 April 1868, a document was issued by the emperor that gave an indication of
the course the Meiji government wanted to follow. The document is known as CharterOath (or Imperial Oath) and consists of five articles. The first article stated:
‘Deliberative councils shall be widely established and all matters decided by publicdiscussion’, and the second ‘All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying
out the administration of affairs of state’. ‘Evil customs of the past shall be broken off ’,article four promised; everything would be ‘based upon the just laws of nature’. The
fifth article ran: ‘Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthenthe foundations of imperial rule.’27
At first sight this is an entirely progressive document: what else could the deliberate
councils of article one mean, other than a pledge to institute a parliament in the nearfuture? The truth is, however, that the Charter Oath had another purpose: it was
designed to assure the domains that had fought the restoration forces in the Civil Warthat they would not be excluded from political decisions. But the document was also
intended to settle the power relationship. Feudal lords, court nobles and governmentofficials were to pledge allegiance to it.28 It is paradoxical that the document that at
first glance seemed to be democratic, but in truth was not, in fact did develop into animportant tool in the popular movement to establish political rights.
There is an anecdote that one of the drafters of the Charter Oath, Kido Takayoshi,while abroad studying foreign parliamentary procedures, governments andconstitutions, had to be reminded of the existence of Charter Oath. While discussing
the question of whether the political changes of Japan ought to be formalized in anofficial document like the American constitution, the 1868 pledge of the emperor was
brought forward by one of the persons involved in translating the Americanconstitution into Japanese. It is remarkable that the political movement jiyu minken
undo that started in the early 1870s, and is known in English under the name Freedomand Popular Rights movement, often referred to the Charter Oath in the same
manner.29 In that case the Charter Oath could be viewed in a new light, one that gave anew significance to the document as a first step to further reform.30
The problems that the new government faced were huge. In the early 1870s the
structure of the state was changed into a central government, with the abolishment ofthe feudal domains and their replacement by prefectures, the introduction of a
national tax system and national defence. Three aims came to the forefront: the
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building up of a strong military force, a quick industrialization and political reform.The first two were related: the military modernization that gained priority stimulated
development in shipping, mining and munitions. In all three issues foreign examplesand models were taken into consideration and applied. For instance the introduction
of a conscription system in 1873 was propagated by army leaders who argued that the‘crushing victory’ of Prussia over France in 1870 probably bore a relation to their large
number of reservists.31 Earlier discussion about whether to adopt the French orGerman model of army organization had, however, resulted in the choice of the
French. When France was defeated one month after this decision was taken, this didnot result in a change of mind because of fear that other countries might get anuntrustworthy impression of the Japanese Empire, which would then as a result
become ‘a laughing stock among the nations’. Furthermore, according to the Japanese,the French defeat was not caused by a defective army organization but by a lack of
popular support.32
Carriers of Transfer
Kido Takayoshi was one of the Meiji leaders who became convinced that Japan needed
a constitution. He was vice-ambassador of the Iwakura mission that spent almost twoyears abroad, between December 1871 and the summer of 1873.33 The Iwakura
mission consisted of leading members of the Meiji government and high-rankingofficials. Their goal was to pay goodwill visits on behalf of the emperor to the
monarchs and heads of state of the Western countries with which Japan had concludedtreaties. If possible they were to start negotiations on revision of these treaties. Also theaim was to study Western society and institutions. The mission was in general well
received and each country that was visited tried to offer an interesting programme ofexcursions to parliaments, factories, schools etc. The Western countries kept a close
eye on how the Japanese delegation was received elsewhere and in general tried tomake a good impression. Revising the treaties at this point was asking too much
though. Nevertheless this trip was very useful: the Japanese delegation discovered forinstance the huge difference between the European countries, and the
first-hand observation of Western societies, their institutions and economic strengths(or relative weakness, as was the case in for instance Russia) made a huge and enduringimpression.
Kido was one of the members who made specific study of educational systems,constitutions and parliamentary practices. He made visits to parliaments and
legislatures at different levels: local, state and national. He also kept in touch with thepeople who were busy translating the various constitutions, such as the American and
the German ones. This was not an easy task because a lot of essential words like‘society’ or ‘justice’ were simply not known in Japan and new ones had to be
invented.34 In major countries such as the United States, Great Britain, France andGermany, Kido received assistance by one or two Japanese students who lived in the
capitals that were visited. Members of the mission also consulted experts on law and
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political systems. Not only did they meet various leading statesmen and politicianssuch as the American president, Queen Victoria and Chancellor Bismarck, but they
also discussed politics and law with scholars such as the French historian FrancoisGuizot, the German professor of constitutional law Rudolph von Gneist and the
former journalist and editor Maurice Block. Block, for instance, often came to theJapanese legation in Paris to lecture on Western economic and political thought.
Block was none too pleased with the political situation in France in 1873 andbrought the message that legislative assemblies could be dangerous if given too much
power too soon. The recent revolutionary history of France illustrated his point.35
Block was only one in a long line of Western specialists and politicians who told theJapanese that they had to move cautiously and very gradually. With a conservative
statesman such as Bismarck or the political philosopher Herbert Spencer this is notsurprising.36 Former American president Ulysses Grant, who visited Japan in 1879,
also warned against offering liberties prematurely. Once given, they could not bewithdrawn.37
Nevertheless, Kido tried to persuade his colleagues that a constitution was verynecessary. In a memorial submitted in 1873 he stated: ‘While every nation’s
achievements are greater or smaller according to their respective levels of civilizationor backwardness, their rise or fall depends essentially on how strictly they respect theirconstitution.’ In rather idealistic terms he sketched the situation that in ‘enlightened
nations, the people of the whole nation give expression to their united andharmonious will . . . all who hold office respect the united will of the people’ and
parliamentary representatives had the duty to inspect and check everything.38 The firstformal move towards a first constitution was made in April 1875 when an imperial
edict announced gradual progress towards a constitutional regime. It was vagueconcerning the time that was needed, however, and it was a concession granted after
public pressure.Outside the Meiji government discussions concerning reforms along Western lines
were held too. The most influential stimulator of what is called ‘the Meijienlightenment’ is Fukuzawa Yukichi.39 He worked hard to get his opinions on theintroduction of modern Western knowledge and institutions across. He wrote books,
founded a school, which is now Keio University, was active in debating societies, andfounded magazines and a newspaper. Fukuzawa succeeded in reaching a large
audience. Japanese historian Irokawa, who carried out fieldwork in agriculturalvillages in the 1960s, noted that nothing was as ‘frequently encountered in old
storehouses as his early works’.40
Fukuzawa started his career as a student of the Dutch language and had been to the
United States and Europe several times in the 1860s in the employ of the envoys theTokugawa government had sent abroad. He started his self-imposed mission toeducate the Japanese public, as he phrased it, with a description of the most
‘commonplace details of foreign culture’, which he himself found the most difficult tounderstand. It was the information one would not find in books. His books Seijo Jijo
(‘Conditions in the West’, 10 vols), published during the years 1867–70, gave practical
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information on Western institutions and the Western way of life in simple words. In hisautobiography he explained that technological and scientific advances were no
problem: though not having seen the actual machine before, he had for instance readabout the principle of telegraphy. But the customs abroad like dancing, the lack of
respect for tradition (for instance the shocking news that in America the family ofPresident Washington was not particularly revered) and also the material wealth, were
very confusing and strange.Most difficult to comprehend, however, were political matters.41 Fukuzawa thought
representative government a ‘perplexing’ institution. While in England he had askedwhat the ‘Election Law’ and ‘parliament’ were, but received only a smile in reply‘meaning I suppose that no intelligent person was to ask such a question. . .. I learned
that there were bands of men called political parties—the Liberals and theConservatives—who were always fighting against each other in the government.’ But
what was meant by ‘fighting’ in peacetime, and what did the expression ‘enemies in theHouse’ mean when the so-called enemies could be seen eating and drinking
together?42
In the early 1870s Fukuzawa went a step further with the essays Gakumon no
susume (An Encouragement of learning). In these essays he spoke rather franklyabout the concepts of liberty, the equality of man and of nations, and the role ofeducation. What was needed in Japan was a different attitude: never be
complacent but keep striving to attain a higher standard. That was exactly whathad gone wrong with India, once a famous centre of civilization but now a British
colony, and Turkey, which was nominally independent but in reality leaned onFrance and England. It was not enough, Fukuzawa told his readers, to be
concerned about public morals in schools—a clear assault on traditionalConfucianist education—what was important was to catch up with the West in
every respect.43
In the fourth essay, published in January 1874, he addressed a key problem in
the Meiji state. The reason that progress was slow, and the government was in fact‘as despotic as before’, was that ‘the civilization of a nation cannot be made toadvance solely through the power of the government’. He was not only critical of
the Meiji government but also turned against the scholars trained in Westernstudies who accepted government positions. Though Fukuzawa himself had been
in the service of the Shogunate in the 1860s, he now remained aloof. With hiscriticism he attacked the new self-conscious group of advocates of political and
social change, the Meirokusha, though he himself was also a member. TheMeirokusha (‘Meiji six’, the sixth year of Meiji) had been founded in November
1873 on the model of the American learned societies in which ‘scholars studiedcommunally and benefited the public by giving lectures’.44 With the exception ofFukuzawa and one other original member, all were in government employ.45 Most
charter members were to rise to important positions in the Japanese society inlater life, often in education: ‘the charter members read like a who is who in
education for early modern Japan’.46
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Traditionally a lot of influence has been attributed to the Meirokusha, though thesociety existed only for a few years. It was one of the think tanks during the early Meiji
Years. In gatherings or in articles in their magazine, the Meiroku zasshi, the questionwas debated as to how to apply Western concepts. One of the subjects discussed was
the question of whether the Japanese language ought not to be replaced by English;then the tiresome task of translating difficult terms into Japanese would be solved.
A somewhat less radical proposal was the writing of Japanese in the Roman alphabet(romaji).47
The influence of the society as a debating or lecture society, however, should not beexaggerated. In fact few public meetings were held, and political issues were avoided.In that respect Fukuzawa’s criticism really hit the nail on the head. In early Meiji
people often very easily shifted from bureaucracy and government into the emergingpolitical party movement and vice versa.48 This stimulated a spirit of subservience. It
hindered their functioning as citizens: ‘In Japan there is only a government and as yetno people.’49
Fukuzawa himself was an ardent propagator of political debate and of addressing anaudience by way of a formal speech. In the stratified feudal society of Japan,
speechmaking had been almost completely absent, the only exception being priests’sermons and performances by comic storytellers. Confucian ethics moreover stressedthe importance of deeds over words: ‘the Good man is chary of speech’.50 Fukuzawa
pointed to the fact that formal speech was used in Western countries in all sorts ofinstitutions and even on minor occasions such as the opening of shops and firms. The
exchange of ideas and the method of dialogue used in Western countries had beeninstrumental in their becoming strong and wealthy. It was evident that public speaking
was badly needed in Japan as well: how could a diet function without having‘techniques for the expression of one’s own opinion’?51 Training of oratorical skills
therefore was a key element in the modernization process of Japan; public speech‘should be practised and mastered for learning, for commerce, and for politics’.52
Therefore Fukuzawa’s founding of an oratorical society was a logical step. He tookalso the initiative to build an assembly hall on the campus of Keio University. He drewthe blueprint of this building after examining American plans of assembly halls, sent to
him by a friend who was visiting the United States at that time. On the 45th meetingof the Oratorical Society, on 1 May 1875, the building was opened. The hall was a
two-storey wooden structure that looked like a New England town hall, with its whitewalls and heavy wooden pews, but it had Japanese elements as well, for instance its
tiled roof.53
There was an explosive rise of public speaking in the wake of its initiation by
Fukuzawa. Many open meetings were held for large audiences. Because there was agreat upsurge in oratorical meetings for which no suitable place existed, restaurants,theatres and temples were rented. Fukuzawa then took the initiative to build a larger
assembly hall. This Meiji Assembly Hall building opened in 1881. The main hall couldseat no less than 3000 people. The government, however, was not amused by the
fact that anti-government speeches were being held in this building. Because of this,
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and because the costs were substantially higher than expected, the building wassoon sold.54
Popular Agitation and Choices made during the Process of Political Transfer
Besides these general societies sometimes addressing political matters, a number ofreal political discussion societies came into being in the first two decades of the Meiji
period. These societies are known as the movement for freedom and political rights,Jiyu minken undo. The movement loosely allied groups composed of former samurai
and commoners pursued their goal to reform the new Meiji government alongWestern democratic lines. It is obvious that this was very remarkable indeed in a
society that had known very strict formal class divisions.The most important political leader in the 1870s and 1880s was Itagaki Taisuke,
whose memorial of 1874 has already been mentioned. Itagaki had earned his spurs in
the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate and had been a member of the Meijioligarchy from the very start. In 1873 a serious internal crisis had occurred when five
members, including Itagaki, left the government. Their plan to provoke an invasion ofKorea was crushed by members of the Iwakura mission who had hurriedly returned to
avoid military action at this stage. Several members of the Iwakura mission were nowadmitted to the government council. But, paradoxically, this did not mean a
quickening of the pace of reforms, rather a slowing down. Though very much aware ofthe need to learn from the West, the newly returned members of the Iwakura mission
felt it necessary that the Japanese people would first have to be able to understand theneed for modernization.55
Itagaki, however, wanted immediate political reforms. The Memorial pointed to the
significance of developing public discussion in the Empire through the establishmentof a council chamber. That the taxpayer had an undeniable right to share in the affairs
of the government and of approving or condemning was not even considered worthyof discussion: it was a principle universally acknowledged. A council chamber chosen
by the people would have great advantages: it would create a real community and‘promote the culture and intelligence of the people and cause them to advance rapidly
into the region of enlightenment’.56
The call for public discussion had immediate success. After the 1874 memorandumof Itagaki for a national assembly was published in one newspaper, it provoked an
immediate response by others. In January 1874 Fukuzawa had criticized the lack ofindependence of the newspapers, which ‘never carry opinions unfavourable to the
authorities. However, every commendable trifle about the government is praised inbold letters.’57 This changed very quickly. Almost all the major newspapers gave room
to political analysts to discuss in editorials the memorandum and political matterssuch as political freedom, suffrage and the establishment of a national democratic
parliament. ‘If one cannot become prime minister’, one of the journalists remarked in1874, ‘one should become a journalist’. That this sometimes also worked the other way
round was shown by four prime ministers who had been reporters in the 1870s.58
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Of course the press agitation was also simply an instrument for Itagaki to regainpower. Nevertheless the immediate result was that in 1875, in an effort to calm down
the agitation, a Senate was established in which elder statesmen, appointed by theemperor, would start by drafting a constitution. At the same time the Press Ordinance
of June 1875 made criticism against the state an offence liable to a prison sentence.59
The movement for popular rights started from a narrow social base. Many were
shizoku (former samurai) or among the more wealthy and prominent members ofvillages. But the movement was soon linked with feelings of social discontent and grew
considerably. An increasing number of adherents came from a commonerbackground. In Osaka a political coalition was formed: the Aikokusha (PatrioticSociety), which also had local chapters. Many of those were organized by local
schoolteachers. No less than 130 000 members of various local popular rights societieswere represented in 1880 in Tokyo, in the Alliance (League) for Establishing a National
Assembly. It submitted a formal petition asking for a national assembly. Thegovernment refused to accept the document. More than 240 000 people signed similar
petitions during that year. The second meeting of this league called on the affiliatedorganizations to prepare a prospectus for a properly drafted constitution within a year.
It was the starting point for a nationwide movement that resulted in a great many draftconstitutions, often based on a draft Fukuzawa had published in April 1881.60 Westernpolitical and social ideas were discussed in meetings by schoolteachers, sake brewers,
merchants and poor farmers as well as wealthy landowners. The local people’s rightsgroups often centred on farmer associations.
The popular agitation, the pressure of the press and the various debating societies ofcourse were a matter of great concern to the government. In July 1881 Inoue Kowashi,
who was chief officer of the council’s Legislation Bureau and would be involved indrafting the Meiji constitution of 1889, wrote in a private letter to the prominent Meiji
leader Ito Hirobumi that Japan should opt for a Prussian-style constitution and do thisquickly. The English-style constitution had not yet become fixed in the minds of the
Japanese people. ‘But if we lose this opportunity and vacillate, within two or threeyears the people will become confident that they can succeed. . .. Most of the politicalparties will be on the other side, not ours; public opinion will cast aside the draft of a
constitution presented by the government, and the private drafts of the constitutionwill win out in the end.’61 At the same time a member of the Meiji government, Inoue
Kaoru, also stressed that the British system could not be transferred to Japan. It wasbased on common law, which could not be imitated elsewhere. He advocated adoption
of the German constitutional model as well.62
Inoue Kowashi’s interesting letter mentions the growing force of public opinion
and the press and it also refers to various private drafts of constitutions. Thespeed with which foreign models for a constitution, a national assembly andpopular rights spread in Japan was indeed astonishing. But the fact that Inoue
mentions these two Western models had a specific reason as well. Some monthsearlier that year a member of the Meiji oligarchy, Okuma Shigenobu, had
surprisingly taken a radical stance in the matter of a possible future Japanese
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constitution. All government members had been asked to give their opinion, andall except for Okuma had advised in favour of a gradual approach. Okuma said
that an immediate introduction of a British-style parliamentary government wasnecessary. He was consequently suspected of trying to ingratiate himself with the
popular movement, all the more so since Okuma previously had been against theintroduction of British models.63 When the government was fiercely attacked in
the press over a matter that smacked of favouritism, his colleagues suspected thepragmatic Okuma was one of the people behind the agitation. A carrot-and-stick
policy was then applied: Okuma was ousted from the government while at thesame time the intention to draft a constitution and establish a National assemblybefore 1890 was announced.
This announcement signalled the impulse to establish a Liberal Party (Jiyuto) in1881. Itagaki was its leader. This party was heavily influenced by Rousseau’s Contrat
Social, while the second party (1882), the Constitutional Reform Party (RikkenKaishinto) of Okuma and his followers, tended to be somewhat more conservative,
though it was in favour of the British model. The parties did not work together andwere internally divided as well. Soon a well-known characteristic of the Japanese
parties could be seen: the existence of many factions within the party, based onpersonal ties.64
A modern consciousness of political rights was advancing, not only within the
elite but also at lower levels in the countryside. It was inspired by Western thoughtand had a basis in earlier Japanese moral and political traditions as well.65 In the
early 1880s revolutionary romanticism mixed with cries for Yanaoshi, worldrenewal. In 1883 and 1884 many peasant uprisings took place. They were caused
by the social distress that raged in the countryside due to the deflationary policyand heavy taxation of Finance minister Matsukata. In those uprisings and riots,
appeals for opening a national government and a new government of benevolencewent hand-in-glove with the cry for abolition of evil laws. Western theories of
liberty and popular rights easily mixed with Confucian ideas such as ‘benevolence’and ‘deposing evil rulers’.66 It was an excellent example of the mingling of Westernand Eastern concepts.
The riots meant the shattering of the popular rights movement, however. Whenin 1884 the mountain district of Chichibu protests turned violent, the government
restored order, arresting more than 3000 peasants and hanging five of the leaders.The peace preservation law of 1887 furthermore imposed stringent regulations
on speeches, public meetings and the press. The liberal party had not tried tohelp the insurgents but denounced the people involved in the Chichibu uprising.
The Jiyuto party temporarily dissolved itself in 1884 and reformed itself onlyafter the constitution of 1889; the Kaishinto party remained in existence butOkuma quit the party and in 1888 joined the government again. In 1889 he was
almost killed when an ultranationalist showed his dissatisfaction with theconciliatory attitude of this foreign affairs minister towards Western treaty powers
in Japan.
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The Constitution of 1889: Mixture, Choice and the Carriers of the Processof Political Transfer
When in 1889 a constitution was eventually promulgated, the inspiration was found in
the model of the German empire. The constitution firmly installed the imperial houseas the cornerstone of the state. Now, for the first time in Japanese history, imperial
powers were made legally explicit. The Emperor had in the 1880s already turned into asymbol of national unity, not only of a political and legal kind but also a patriotic one.This role had been actively promoted.67 In the opening paragraph of the constitution,
Japanese tradition was given a proper place. The paragraph referred to Japanesemythology. In this way the modern institution was consciously embedded in the
Japanese tradition and Japanese history, and the introduction of a Western institutionwas given a Japanese colouring.68
The actual promulgation of the constitution was a mixture of old and newelements. In the morning the emperor conducted rites, clad in priestly robes, to
make the promulgation sacred. These rites were performed in the Palace sanctuary,seen only by the rites’ performers. Then he put on his military uniform for the
formal ceremony, the handing of the constitution to the prime minister in the newThrone Room. This underlined the fact that the granting of a constitution was animperial gift. The scene was witnessed by Japanese members of the peerage, high
civil and military officials and members of the foreign diplomatic corps.Interestingly, 18 newspaper reporters were also present; they were the editors of 10
Tokyo newspapers, five provincial and three English-language papers. In theafternoon the emperor, empress and entourage made an inspection at the Aoyama
Military Parade Field. The imperial couple rode in an English carriage adorned withchrysanthemum crests and a crown of a golden phoenix, a symbol that was used on
imperial palanquins in ancient times. A particular new element was the fact that theempress was present. The promulgation ceremonies and associated festive activitiesintentionally drew in ordinary Japanese people. Not only did schoolchildren line
the streets but enormous crowds celebrated throughout Tokyo with festive eatingand dancing. New elements like national flags, portraits of the imperial family and
rising sun lanterns mixed with familiar forms of the community festivals. HistorianCarol Gluck compared the general festive atmosphere to the mood prevailing in
Great Britain in 1851 when Queen Victoria opened the Great Exhibition, which TheTimes had described as a ‘second and more glorious inauguration’ of the
sovereign.69 The festival-like atmosphere was ridiculed by some foreigners and bycontemporary Japanese journalists because not all celebrants understood what the
constitutions was all about. Historian Fujitani, however, warned that thesignificance of such popular participation must not be overlooked: ‘The masseshad taken part for the first time in history in a national communion.’70
In 1900 Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi explained the principles behind theintroduction of the constitutional government in the following way: ‘the existence of a
nation is a historical phenomenon and a reform of the fundamental structure should
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be based on the national history. As long as the reforms are based on the historicalbackground, the nation cannot be destroyed. So I thought that Japan’s constitutional
government should be brought about along the lines of the fundamental structureblending together change and continuity.’71 In these words the new element that the
constitution undoubtedly was almost completely disappeared under the garb of‘national history’ and ‘continuity’. Efforts were made to recognize familiar elements in,
or even affinities with, the foreign elements.Even though a new structure, the constitution received a firm basis in Japanese
history and religion. Of course this was in part a deliberate invention and a clearattempt to put the emperor forward as a cornerstone of the new Japanese state. In thisrespect the years 1889 and 1890 in general marked a turning point. The feeling ran that
the process of modernization had taken place too quickly and Confucianist thinkersgained more influence. This was for instance very clearly discernible in the Imperial
Rescript on education, issued in 1890. Schoolchildren were taught to be filial to theirparents, advance common interests and in case of emergency to offer themselves to
the state. Stressing morality—the Confucian virtues—and a sense of nation cametogether.72
Conclusion
Japan in 1868–89 forms a perfect example of how Western political models migratedand in the process were transformed into the Japanese context and used in political
rhetoric. The political models were consciously selected. Political change fitted in withthe general goal to build a strong nation with a modern economy and military andindustrial power. The constitution of 1889 was meant as a signal to the world that
Japan definitely had joined the club of the ‘modern’ nations. Its document was atypical mixture of Western ideas and institutions within a Japanese structure.
Political ideas travelled fast. Concerning the introduction of a constitution twomodels stood out: the British model and the German. The choice of the German
model was made by the Meiji oligarchy because it provided a way to incorporate theJapanese monarchy in the system and gave away as little political power as possible.
This movement for modern political reforms from above was stimulated and pressedforward by the movement from below. It is clear that the transfer of political ideas wasnot restricted to the political and intellectual elite but reached lower social levels as
well. The popular movement for political rights that developed in cities and in thecountryside combined Western ideas with Confucianist principles. Meetings and
debates offered ways of practising political skills. In the 1880s social distress led tovarious peasant uprisings. The government acted immediately and the liberal party
severed its ties with the popular movement. But the popular movement definitely hadspeeded up the pace of political reform, which turned out not to be a mechanical
process of transfer.In fact, transfer never can be a simple question of give-and-take. The concept of
transfer is helpful in the analysis of this change that the original political ideas, models
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and practices undergo when moved into a different political and cultural setting. Thechange itself is no aberration or anomaly, but inherent and necessary. The Japanese
history of political transfer during the years 1868–89 shows that a transformation eventakes place when a new political or legal structure borrows heavily from foreign
sources.
Notes
[1] “Memorial on the Establishment of a Representative Assembly”, 432. See also Jansen, ModernJapan, 378.
[2] Personal names in the text are given in the Japanese order; surnames first.[3] The American original has not been retrieved.[4] Fukuzawa, quoted in Oxford, Speeches of Fukuzawa, 23. Basic rules of Western parliamentary
procedure had been compiled earlier, in 1868. Ibid., 21, note 5.[5] Fukuzawa, Encouragement of Learning, 1. The first edition sold 200 000 copies, and another
220 000 in pirate editions. In Fukuzawa’s lifetime it went through 17 printings, or a total of3 400 000 copies. Ibid., xi.
[6] Robert Eyestone discusses this debate in “Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation”.[7] Blaut, Colonizer’s Model. Eurocentric diffusionism is also called ‘essentialist diffusionism’.
Chabot and Duyvendak, “Globalization”, 688–689.[8] Reischauer and Craig, Japan, ix. See for an example of the use of Japanese economic
development in a simulation model to use on South East Asia: Kelly and Williamson, “WritingHistory Backwards”.
[9] Morris-Suzuki, Technological Transformation, 2.[10] Blaut, Colonizer’s Model, 215–216. Quote in note 6. Blaut’s version of the nineteenth-century
history of Japan’s modernization is very simplistic. He wrote for instance that by the timeEuropeans had subdued China, Japan had been able to begin its military modernization, ‘hencethe victory over Russia’.
[11] Rostow, Stages of Economic growth, 9. Van der Geet, Vooronderstellingen.[12] Cullen, History of Japan, 4–6.[13] Howland, “Translating Liberty” discusses the use of the concepts liberty and freedom,
individual and civic liberty, and the debate on liberty and religion between 1872 and 1874 inJapan.
[14] Clancey, “Foreign Knowledge”, 162 calls the word transfer misleading because scientific transferis not comparable to the act of ‘sending a parcel through the mail’.
[15] Hoston, “State, Modernity”, 288–289 and 293, quote on 310.[16] This debate was stimulated by publications such as Van Wolferen’s Enigma of Japanese Power.[17] See for a good overview Curtin, The World & the West, part three.[18] In Carrier, ed. Occidentalism, written long before 9/11 several other interpretations are given.
De Jong, “Japans Occidentalisme”, 210–222. MacFarlane, Modern World, 141. Bonnett,“Occidentalism” draws attention to Fukuzawa’s stereotypic representation of the West as a toolto diminish the power of the traditional elite.
[19] Wang, “Orientalism”, 64.[20] Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture, 97–98. On the matter of political models, e.g. Tilly, “Political
Processes”, 1600–1601 and 1605. Cannadine, Ornamentalism.[21] But Japanese cultural influences are very clear. Just as the World Exhibition of Paris in 1867
started a huge European interest in Japanese prints, the Centennial Exhibition of 1876 inPhiladelphia started the hype of all kinds of things Japanese in the United States. Benfey, TheGreat Wave.
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[22] Wilson, Patriots and Redeemers, chapter 6.
[23] Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa, 204–205.
[24] Cullen, History of Japan, 204.
[25] Jones, Live Machines, xv–5.
[26] Jones, “Bakumatsu foreign employees”, 305. Jones Live Machines, 9. On the Dutch expertise in
water management see Van Gasteren, ed., Japanse stroomversnelling.
[27] Jansen, Modern Japan, 338. See for a discussion on the different translations in English:
Sansom, TheWestern World and Japan, 318–320. For an interesting view on the rituals involvedsee Breen, “The Imperial Oath”, 407–429. Breen objects to the use of the word Charter Oath,which became the standard English translation.
[28] Kido Takayoshi, 1 March 1872 in Diary of Kido Takayoshi, 133–134.
[29] The content is known of 69 of the 130 petitions, 51 of which cited the Imperial Oath of 1868.
Statistics by Emura Eiichi, quoted in Breen, “The Imperial Oath”, 427–428. The Freedom andPopular Rights movement is also known as the Freedom and People’s Rights movement.
[30] Jansen, Japan and its world, 63. Diary of Kido Takayoshi, Vol. II, xxi.
[31] Banno, Democracy, 4. Tipton, Modern Japan, 42–43.
[32] Quoted in Westney, “The Military”, 177, also in Tipton, Modern Japan, 43. The French-style
military organization that was eventually adopted had earlier been proposed to the shogunatein 1865 by French diplomat Leon Roches. Arima, “Military Science”, 376.
[33] The very interesting, long report (5 vols, over 2000 pages, published in 1878) on this mission
has recently been translated into English. The Iwakura Embassy 1871–73.
[34] Mayo, “Kume”, 26–27. See on a comparable problem Aruga, “The Declaration of
Independence”. He also points to the fact that often English concepts were not translatedbut ‘transliterated’, which explains the large number of transliterated English words in modernJapanese. Ibid., 1410, n. 2.
[35] DeVere Brown, introduction Diary Kido xxii–xxiii. Mayo, “Kume”, 29–30.
[36] In 1873 Spencer warned not to attempt to diverge widely from the existing form of
government. See Swale, Political Thought, 67 and the appendix on Mori and Spencer, 188–219.Nagai, “Herbert Spencer”.
[37] Jansen, Modern Japan, 388.
[38] Banno, Democracy, 9.
[39] Macfarlane, Modern World provides a recent discussion on his thought.
[40] Irokawa, Culture, 66.
[41] Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa, 114–115.
[42] Ibid., 134.
[43] Fukuzawa, Encouragement, 79.
[44] Recollection of Nishimura Shigeki quoted in Huish, “The Meirokusha”, 212. Issue two of
Meiroku Zasshi was devoted to a rebuttal of Fukuzawa’s view. Meiroku Zasshi, 20–29.
[45] Huish, “Meirokusha”, 218. Swale, Mori Arinori, 75. Cusumano, “Enlightenment Dialogue”, 380.
[46] Bonnallie, Education in Early Meiji Japan, 104. For instance a later president of Tokyo
University, president of teaching seminar Tokyo, private tutor of the emperor, minister ofEducation. De Lange, Journalism, 56. Mori, “Speech”, 365. In 1874 the magazine numbered 25issues; 80 127 of the 105 984 were sold. Hall, Mori Arinori, 233–245.
[47] Nishi, “Writing Japanese”, 9.
[48] Lebra, “Yano Fumio”, 1. On natural leadership: Bonnallie, Education, 101–104.
[49] Fukuzawa, Encouragement, 25.
[50] Okabe, “Yukichi Fukuzawa”, 192–194. The quote is from The Analects of Confucius.
[51] Oxford, Speeches Fukuzawa, 42.
[52] Speech Fukuzawa quoted in Roichi Okabe, “Yukichi Fukuzawa”, 192.
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[53] Oxford, Speeches Fukuzawa, 31–32. The Mita Public Speaking Hall still exists. It is designated anational cultural asset, being the oldest still existing Western-style building in Tokyo (http://www.keio.ac.jp/01/03.html).
[54] Oxford, Speeches Fukuzawa, 54–55.[55] Nish, “ Aftermath”, 190–191.[56] “Memorial on the Establishment of a Representative Assembly”, 428–430.[57] Oxford, Speeches Fukuzawa, 426.[58] Quoted in Huffman, “Meiji Roots”, 456. This concerned Kato Komei, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Saijonji
Kinmochi, Hara Satoshi. Devine, “Way of the King”, 52. See also De Lange, Japanese Journalism,35–54 for the development of the press in this period.
[59] De Lange, Japanese Journalism, 44–45.[60] Irokawa, Culture, 107, Banno, Democracy, 25–29. Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan, CD-ROM,
entry “Jiyu minken undo”.[61] Quoted in Joseph Pittau, “Inoue”, 263 and Richard Devine, “Way of the King”, 53.[62] Banno, Democracy, 59–60.[63] Ibid. 49. An analysis of the views on constitutional government and the rivalry between Choshu
and Satsuma men in government is given in Chap. 2.[64] Hane, Modern Japan, 122–123.[65] In particular, John Stuart Mill’s reputation in Japan became very great and an inspiration for
the Freedom and Popular Rights movement. Hane, “Sources”, 265.[66] Irokawa, Culture, 151–181.[67] Gluck, Modern Myths, 75–79. Gluck notes a significant change after 1889. In late Meiji the
Emperor only travelled for specific purposes and instead of meeting people, roads were nowoften swept clean of spectators.
[68] See for a discussion of how in the Japanese constitution of 1947, which certainly did not takeaccount of Japanese specific traditions, older notions like filial piety also influenced the newconstitutional provisions. Principles like the right to life, clearly put forward in the constitutionof 1947, therefore have a different meaning in Japan, because the cultural and religious setting isdifferent from the context in which this principle was first formulated. Williams, The Right toLife.
[69] The Times, 2 May 1851, quoted in Gluck, Modern Myths, 49.[70] Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 105–111, 222–223. Quote on 223.[71] Quoted in Pittau, “Inoue”, 268.[72] Gluck, Modern Myths, Chap. 5. In 1882 the imperial rescript to soldiers and sailors, intended as
the official code of ethics of all soldiers and sailors, already stressed absolute loyalty to theemperor.
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RESUME: Dans les premieres decennies de l’ere Meiji le Japon commenca un programmede modernisation de l’etat et de la societe dans lequel les modeles etrangers jouaient le plus
grand role. La rapidite avec laquelle les idees etrangeres sur la constitution, l’assembleenationale et le droit surprend encore. Peut-etre plus impressionnant encore est le fait que
cette politique n’etait pas le fait du pouvoir seul mais aussi celle du public dans sonensemble. Des propositions de constitutions ont ete trouvees dans des archives villageoises
qui demontrent bien le soutien populaire pour la modernisation. L’histoire europeenne estaussi riche de nombreux exemples de l’utilisation rhetorique de modeles etrangers, leurorigine etrangere facilitant egalement leur adoption ou le rejet. Dans le cas japonais
l’adoption et l’adaptation de modeles etrangers furent plus simplement la chose a faire. LeJapon represente l’exemple ultime de la migration de pratiques politiques transformees par
un contexte national.
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