The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory

8/13/2019 The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory

1/9

The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War TheoryAuthor(s): Agnes Heller and Mark RitterSource: New German Critique, No. 15 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 49-56Published by: New German CritiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487905

Accessed: 09/09/2010 17:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Duke University Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toNew German

Critique.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ngchttp://www.jstor.org/stable/487905?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=dukehttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=dukehttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/487905?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ngc


2/9

The Positivism Dispute as a TurningPoint in German Post-War Theory

by Agnes Heller

The year 1960 is often deemed a turning point in German post-warliterature. According to this interpretation, the period between the so-callednadir of 1945 and the year 1960 did not bring forth any authentic newbeginning. Two types of exile literature dominated the literary scene: theliteratures of internal and of external exile. This literature concerned itselfwith historical events - and to some extent, on a high artistic level - but theforms of life and the problems of the present were not included as themesand, more importantly, it did not result in the creation of new literaryforms.The new literary public sphere, a new form of reception of art, was createdonly in the 1960s and by the works published then.I wish to point out in the present essay that this was not only the case inliterature: the new strivings in art cannot be abstracted from the overallatmosphere of cultural life. The same date (1960) was also a turningpoint intheoretical reflection, especially in sociology and philosophy.Prior to this date, sociology and philosophy in the Federal Republic weremarked by the same characteristics as literature. We can distinguish threecurrents here. The first was the continuation of the philosophy andsociologyof the 1920s and 1930s as represented by theorists, some of whom retreatedinto inner exile after a flirtation with Nazism or who lived from the outset inan ambiguous inner exile: Heidegger in philosophy and Gehlen in sociologi-cal anthropology are the biggest names here. The second current wasrepresented by theories that had returned home from exile: their repre-sentatives continued elaborating theories that in truth had long since beenworked out, but in so doing they emphasized despair and skepticism; thiscan be seen as a natural reaction to their isolated position in German culturallife and to their loss of hope duringthe Cold Warperiod. This tendency wasrepresented primarilyby the FrankfurtSchool, that is, by the protagonistsofthat school who had returned to Germany from America. The thirdtendency (appearing first in sociology) was characterized by its imitation ofAmerican sociology. While its representatives adopted to some extentParsons' functionalism, they adhered mainly to the methods and littletheories of American empirical sociology. This simple transplantationof thegreat victor's methods, which was also intentionally encouraged by

49


3/9

50 Heller

fellowship policies, dominated the scene in the Cologne school, but not onlythere: Hofstitter in Hamburg also worked with the models of ingroup-outgroup relations, and Dahrendorf was experimenting at the time - butonly in part - with the current American role theory. The great Germansociological tradition seemed sunk in complete hibernation. Part of theproblem was the lack of a general theoretical public sphere: the schoolsisolated themselves and there were no methodological confrontations whichmight have encouraged the taking of general positions.The turning point was the positivism dispute. Of course, we must discussfurther what was meant by point. The dispute was in fact a process ofreflection and self-reflection. In this process a new theoretical public spherewas created. The positivism dispute, in the broad sense of the word, lastednearly ten years. Adorno took the first step in 1957: he was a good seismo-graph. The Cold War still held sway, but with sharp eyes one could alreadymake out the end of the tunnel. The relative end of the dispute came in 1967.Relative, we say, because it resumed in the 1970s (in the Luhmann-Habermas dispute), but on an entirely new level. At that later date thetheoretical public sphere was already present. This is not, of course, dueonly to the positivism dispute; the overall events of 1968 in Europecontributed much to it. But the positivism dispute created the basic cate-gorical machinery: everyone knew already what was at stake and what thetheoretical conflicts meant practically.If I said that the physiognomy of the German theoretical public spherewas created in the positivism dispute, I did not intend to deny that this was anoccasion that also had parallels in other European countries. Frequentreference is made to the Polish discussions in the German positivismdispute. But in France, too, something similar occurred. The debatebetween existentialism and structuralism had the same function in terms oftheory. The socio-political implications were at first (compare the Levi-Strauss-Sartre debate) not so farremoved from those in Germany, but in thelatter part of the debate they were characterized by shifts which were neverpart of the German debates. Although these parallelismswere obvious fromthe outside point of view of another culture, those participating in thediscussions did not react to one another. Whether the mutual suspicionbetween the two cultures contributed to this is a question we must leaveopen, although it was asked on the German side (I am thinkingof Lepenies,who responded theoretically to this rift).Although the positivism dispute is also of great importance from thepoint of view of the theoretical solutions and suggested solutions, we mustlimit ourselves primarilyto a presentation of its function. This is all the moreimportant because I myself am not neutral on the substantive issues of thedebate. The attitudes of the anti-positivists are much closer to my ownthinking than those of the positivists, even if I do not consider all thearguments of the former relevant.


4/9

ThePositivismDispute 51The first article in the dispute - Adorno's Sociology and EmpiricalResearch ( Soziologie und empirische Forschung ) - is an attack onAmerican sociology, and through this mediation it is an attack on theAmerican way of life as well. The suggestion that German sociology befreed entirely from American sociology gives the analysis overtones ofpathos. At the same time the total rejection of American sociology is formu-lated as a stand against the Americanization of Germany.Both main tendencies of American sociology at the time were attacked.According to Adorno, Talcott Parsons' systems theory takes place on such ahigh level of abstraction that it lacks all value in terms of providing socialunderstanding. Empirical sociology, which works with questionnaires,

gathers the opinions of mere subjects and assumes that the statisticalaverage of these opinions is truthand reality. Thus it identifies the fetishizedreality with reality in general and becomes fetishistic itself, like themarket relations it obeys. Sociology, however, which is supposed topenetrate fetishism, ought to be critical and at the same time explain theopinions in relation to the totality. We would like to mention only in passingthat in his Negative Dialectics (formulated at the same time), Adorno totallyrejects this concept of totality, and that this concept appears in this article intwo quite different interpretations: first, as the ontological totality of thetotally alienated world, and secondly as a method of the dialectical discoveryof an understanding of the world, that is, in a negative and in a positive(Hegelian and Marxian) formulation.Like Parsons' systems theory, empirical sociology is also described andcriticized as positivism. For Adorno, positivism is characterized here bytwo features which are not necessarily linked together: one is the applicationof the methods of the natural sciences to society, the other is the notion thatone presupposes that which exists positively to be absolutely existent. Thequestion of value, which plays such an important partin the laterdiscussion,does not yet appear here.This critique of the American sociology of that time was certainly calledfor. The question of whether the concept of positivism can be applied to somany and such different variants of sociology is one that we can with goodconscience omit. We cannot, however, ignore one essential feature of thisstand, namely the fact that the examples for an adequate and essentialunderstanding of society stem, with one exception, from German thought.The exception is Allport, the first who ventured to transplant the Germantradition to American soil. This is all the more important because, at thetime when Adorno was formulating his credo, the forms of Americansociology he rejected were being attacked by the American school ofcultural criticism. C. Wright Mills was one of the leading figures in thisschool. This internal American dialogue, however, was completely absentfrom Adorno's field of view.

We can explain this in part with the previously mentioned tendency: theintended goal was the emancipation from America and the initiation of a


5/9

52 Heller

sociology rooted in the German tradition. But there is another tendency andmotivation in the article, without which the next step in the positivismdispute cannot be understood. Let us follow the arguments. Adorno says:No matter how positivistic the methods may be, they are implicitly basedon an idea derived and generalized from the rules of democratic elections. Itis the idea that the quintessence of the contents of people's consciousnessand unconsciousness, which form a statistical universe, is key to an under-standing of the social process. And again: Empiricalsocial research itselfbecomes an ideology, as soon as it posits public opinion as absolute. It ismisled to do this by a nominalistic conception of truth which foists off thevolonte de tous as truth itself, because no other truth can be derived.Naturally, Adorno immediately adds that the volontdgindrale has wroughteven more havoc than the acceptance of the volonte de tous. But the solutionthat he proposes, that is, to judge the agreement or disagreement ofopinions with relation to the matter at hand, is more thandubious, it puts thesociologist-philosopher, who is to check the agreement or disagreement ofopinions, above the world that is to be analyzed. In light of the concurrentrejection of scientistic considerations, this presumes a volonteggindrale fterall, one which is equated with the point of view of a dialectic critical theory.Consequently, Adorno's theory is itself ambiguous: it is aimed at massdemocracy, and attacks not only the fetishism in it, but also its verydemocracy. It is not political democracy that is being attacked, but themethod of a possible democratic production of theories.For that reason, it is small wonder that at the 1961 Tiibingen WorkSession of the German Society for Sociology, where the real positivismdispute began, Dahrendorf found more agreement than disagreementbetween the papers given by Adorno and Popper. Empirical sociology isrejected by Popper as much as by Adorno, even though the rationale isdifferent. For Popper, the original sin is not the application of scientificmethods as such, but of obsolete methods. The sociology of knowledge (andits conception of historicity) are also rejected by both men. And whenPopper confirms the irrationalityof that which is value free (Wertfreiheit)asa value, there is no real debate here either. The conception of values asreifications - where even the value free appears as a reification on thesame level - only underscores Adorno's defensive argumentation. Afterwhat was discussed above, it is plausible that the mutual politeness, whichdid not reflect the essential conceptual differences, was based in a commonattitude: as Adorno places the philosopher-sociologist above the society, soPopper places the scientist above the same society. And while Adorno'sunderstanding of the category of critique was universal (conceived of ascritique of society in general) whereas it had a limited meaning for Popper(as a critique of theories), one must admit that the limited conception ofcritique can be fit more homogeneously than the universal one into thearistocratic attitude.


6/9

ThePositivismDispute 53The post-war generation also took part in this discussion, but it wasdissatisfied with the results. For this generation the emancipation fromliberal-positivistic American sociology was already a fait accompli. Threeprerequisites for a new beginning were already present: the end of the ColdWar, the creation of a theoretical public sphere and the existence of the post-war generation itself. As we shall see, the older generation also reacted in alively way to the new situation, but the theoreticalnew beginning was takenover by the younger generation.In the period of the positivism dispute the new philosophy and sociologywere launched almost entirely by the young theorists who had received their

training from the Frankfurt School. The protagonist of this discussion wasJiirgen Habermas, who proved in later years to be the most important figureof the post-war generation. Positivism was being defended by Hans Albert,a member of the Popper school. As is well known, the Popper school wassubject to a strict discipline that offered no chance to work out and representnew thoughts in reaction to the German situation. That is why Luhmann'sappearance in the second positivism dispute (which was not called this, butwas nothing else) was so important for the German public. Habermaswelcomed the appearance of the new opponent, because he filled a placethat had previously been occupied only symbolically. Luhmann succeededwhere Albert had not: in bringing a variety of positivism (specifically,systems theory) together with a Germanphilosophicaltradition,Heideggerianphilosophy. Thus at this time the theoretical presuppositions of Habermasproved to be true: that positivism must be thought of as a variant ofirrationalism; if not in all of its forms, then at least in the form in whichirrationalism had most recently established itself in Germany. Lacking anadequate opponent the participants in the firstpositivism dispute spoke pastrather than with each other. Albert made no effort even to understand thepositions of the other school, and Habermas was always forced to strike atthe original source, Popper, which was more fruitful for the working out ofhis positions than it would have been to react to a second hand version of thesame line of thought. Habermas was the only one in this discussion whounderstood the positions of the other side and scrutinized them in a funda-mental way. As we shall see, Adorno had also failed to do that.For Habermas, who had meanwhile published his book on theory andpractice, this discussion was a process of enlightenment and self-enlighten-ment. Albert's charge that in many respects Habermas had changed hisposition over the course of the debate speaks for and not against him. Hisfirst essay, The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics ( AnalytischeWissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik ) was written as a postscript to thecontroversy between Popper and Adorno, and was meant as a defense ofAdorno's position. In one sense this contribution is still an interpretation ofAdorno's line of thought. Most of the categories with which it operates comefrom Frankfurt thought; categories such as totality and dialectics occupy acentral position here. But a shift of theoretical interests and of attitudes is


7/9

54 Heller

already visible. First, the philosophy announced here is not thought of as anegative dialectics. A new type of positive dialectics is formulated hereagainst positivism. Critique retains its central place, but the point of viewfrom which we criticize, and the history for which we criticize, are definedmore clearly and less ambiguously than is the case with Adorno. Habermasdoes not equate totality with reification as a possible application of theconcept. The utopian element becomes stronger and the attitude of despairdisappears entirely. In short: this philosophy is tailored to a social situationwhich can and should have a future. And for that very reason, an apprecia-tion of the opponent's arguments is much more important for Habermasthan it was for Adorno. As far as the interpretation of the social function ofpositivism is concerned, they are in agreement. But Habermas feels obligedto take seriously and work through the relationships between science andtechnology within the overall concept of the relation between means andend. Here he shares one leading idea with the positivists: the idea ofprogress. For him, progress is not conceived of as a scientific-technicalprocess common to all of society, ratherscience and technology are includedwithin a conception of progress.In his second contribution to the discussion, Against a PositivisticallyTruncated Rationalism ( Gegen einen positivistischhalbierten Rationalis-mus ), Habermas takes a furtherstep. The conceptof totalitydisappearsalmostcompletely; the category of rational enlightenment is put in the center, andin contrast to Adorno the concept of identity is applied in a positive sense.Under the conditions of reproduction in an industrial society, individualswho have only technical knowledge at their disposal, and can expect norational enlightenment about themselves or the goals of their actions, wouldlose their identity, he writes. And he adds: Their demythologized worldwould be full of demons, because power cannot be broken positivistically.The problem of value is also taken up again. In his first contribution,Habermas' argumentation with respect to this problem was still quiteconventional; he showed that the notion of value free is in itself a postulationof value, something, incidentally, that was never denied by Popper. Buthere he goes further in a direction that will prove fruitful: he attacks theseparation of science and ethics. Put simply: he criticizes the Popperianconcept of ethics, where it is equated with the ethics of the scientist.Habermas also points to human needs, sufferings and motivations, thetheoretical formulation of which as a process of enlightenment and self-enlightenment has had no place in positivistic theorizing and the positivisticattitude. The problem is once again not understood by Albert. In his replyhe argues with an indubitably true assertion: Science becomes possibleprecisely when there are social areas in which the interest in knowledgeemancipates itself from such elementary needs, which, however, saysnothing about the question that has been posed. The postulate that thescientist should emancipate himself from his own sufferings, motivationsand need in his interest in knowledge, says nothing about whether these


8/9

ThePositivismDispute 55

sufferings and needs should or should not become thematic in the theory,nor about whether people can or cannot relate these theories back to theirown needs, sufferings and motivations, and, if so, in what way.In the course of the discussion, Habermas began to tie up with a traditionand way of thought other than that of Adorno: with American pragmatism,especially with the theoretical suggestions of Peirce. The ideas of communi-cation and community are brought together. The communicativecommunityof scientists is accepted as the starting point, and the extension of theconcept to the idea of a universal communicative community, which playsthe central role in the second positivism dispute, is already hinted at here.As we have seen, the starting point of the positivism dispute was theattack on American sociology. We also recall that the emancipation fromthe American way of thinking was simultaneously a critique of massdemocracy and that this attack aimed at democracy itself. Habermas'reference to Peirce therefore has a symbolic significance. He criticizes notonly the methodology and scientism in positivism, but also its skeptical-liberal, yet antidemocratic position. By hooking up with Peirce, Habermasestablished a link with the values and traditions of democracy. The themati-zation of the life world and the idea, never explicitly pronounced butnonetheless supported, of the primacy of practical reason point, of course,in the same direction. The aristocratic attitude which - despite all theoreti-cal differences - brought about the astonishing initial agreement inAdorno's and Popper's theses, disappeared entirely. The theory of societyof the younger generation of the Frankfurt School (besides Habermas, oneshould mention Krahl, Negt, Wellmer and Offe here) is democratic:Marxism is understood as a democratic tradition.This does not, of course, mean that democratic theorizing was the onlyimportant one at the time, although other theorists (like Apel), who did notcome out of the Frankfurt School in the narrow sense of the term, haveassumed an important place in the development of this theorizing. It shouldnot be forgotten that, at the beginning of the development of a new theoreti-cal public sphere, Gadamer's book Truth and Method (Wahrheit undMethode) was published, a book which represented a new - and conserva-tive - variety of hermeneutics. And neither should it be forgotten that, atthe end of the same period, non-democratic leftist theorizing (though notrepresented by important names) gained strength and influence. But thedebates about hermeneutics and Marcuse's theories alreadyoccurred withinthat theoretical public sphere that had been elaborated and to some extentcreated by the positivism dispute.When the contributions to the positivism dispute appeared in book form,Adorno wrote a preface and Albert a (short) postscript to it. Albert's post-script is characterized by the blindness of scholastic dogmatism. He does notrecognize the social function and meaning of the debate at all. He complainsthat the book was put together in a biased way. He considers this scientificmisconduct, rather than seeing it as an expression of the essential shift in the


9/9

56 Hellersocial atmosphere and in the process of self-reflection. Adorno's preface isthe diametric opposite of the postscript. Functioning as a good seismograph,the grand old man of the Frankfurt School translates the entire discussioninto social terms. Although he refers again and again to Habermas' argu-ments and quotes them approvingly, we must see that he was unaware ofwhat was substantially new in the debate.The reference to the first appearance of the student movement alreadypoints to Adorno's sensitivity. Although essentially he discusses his oldthoughts, a slight shift towards optimism is discernible. In extending itselfby virtue of its immanent dynamism to the living work of people, theprinciple of exchange turns itself of necessity into an objective inequality,that of classes. Tersely put, the contradiction is: in exchange everything is allright and at the same time not all right. Logical critique andthe emphaticallypractical demand that society must be changed, if only to prevent a reversionto barbarism, are impulses in the same movement of the concept, he writes.The basic idea of Negative Dialectics, that we have missed the moment for achange in society, is no longer to be found. To point to a parallel again: inFrance a group of theorists had formed who called themselves Socialismeou barbarie.The social function of positivism is formulated clearly and brilliantly inthe preface: If such a transfer (the transfer of the natural-scientificmethodto social science) were in any way possible, if it did not grossly misunder-stand the power relations in whose actuality it constitutively maintainsitself,then society, totally controlled by science, would remain an object, that ofscience, totally dependent as always. But just as he does understand thesocial function of positivism, he does not understand the criticized thesesthemselves. He attacks the thesis of logical consistency, he insists that thingscontradict one another, and this means that he did not wantto understand-in the theoretical sense - the suggestions of his opponents. I can no longerconceal the fact that here one can detect an astonishing similaritybetweenAdorno and the later Lukacs. The chapter on positivism in LukAcs'Ontology expresses the same attitude and is characterized by the same argu-ments. No matter how energetically the two grand old men may havepolemicized against one another, we must recognize that a shared traditionalone can point thoughts in the same direction.The positivism dispute shows what a great influence Adorno had on theforming of the new German theoretical public sphere. He himself, however,is not really a part of it. The man who personally initiated the turning pointparticipated in that same turning point only emotionally, not theoretically.The valley pasture, I after all, belonged to the generation of ThomasMann. But through his personality, exile theory has had a greater influenceon contemporary German theory than exile literature on contemporaryGerman literature. Translatedby Mark Ritter1. A play on Adorno's rather fanciful, Romantic middle name (Wiesengrund).

Documents

The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory