THE POLITICS OF PRIVATE TIME

CHANGING LEISURE PATTERNS IN URBAN CHINA

Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton, Elizabeth J. Perry, eds.

Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community

in Post-Mao China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 149-172

Shaoguang Wang

Department of Political Science

Yale University

1

PRIVATE TIME, PUBLIC TIME

(from E = MC2 sequence)

Private time, public time -

By my love I measure my time

By your love you measure your time

By our love we measure our time.

Content, we

assuming all

private times agree,

adjust even market clocks

to our fine degree.

Then bitter physics teach us other lies,

cosmic rays dying slow make us reckon wise.

Public time, private time-

By my hate I measure my time

By your hate you measure your time

By their hate we measure our crime.

Angry, we

accepting public time, by our sighs

only, find our lives can synchronize.

Now, observing, not serving time,

our courses relative and less than light,

all our collisions we reduce to proof -

Not what o’clock,

but who’s o’clock?

---Robert Shaw1

2

All societies of any complexity distinguish between public and private.

However, the definition of the private sphere varies from one society to

another; and even within one society it varies from time to time. This

article attempts to examine the changing boundary between the public and the

private in contemporary China by reviewing changing leisure patterns in the

last forty years. It is divided into five sections. The first section is a

brief theoretical reflection about the politics of private time. The next

section reviews leisure patterns during Mao's era. The third section

describes main trends in the use of leisure time in Deng's China, while the

fourth analyzes the principal characteristics of leisure practices in the

l980s. The fifth section discusses the impacts of marketization on state

control over leisure.

The Politics of Private Time

The private sphere has two dimensions: spatial and temporal. In

discussing the significance of the private sphere, many have focused their

attention on private space. What has been neglected is that private time, no

less than private space, is an integral part of the private sphere. Both are

necessary to the creation and maintenance of the private sphere--a cup of

coffee yields little satisfaction if there isn’t time to drink it.

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines "leisure" as "free

time as a result of temporary exemption from work or duties." The

overwhelming majority of sociological definitions also equate leisure with

free time. Vickerman may be cited here to serve for illustrations purposes:

he takes leisure time "to be roughly equivalent to free time. That time left

over after meeting commitments of work and such essential human capital

maintenance as sleeping, eating and personal hygiene."2 Even under the most

democratic system, work is still tightly disciplined and controlled. However,

few questions the idea that leisure time should be a private time. A

universal principle seems to have long been accepted everywhere: "The master's

right in the master’s time, and the workman's right in his own time."3 It is

in leisure rather than work that individuals see themselves as free to act and

develop as they please.

3

Leisure has also been considered essential for human development.

Aristotle, for instance, argues: "Nature herself requires that we should be

able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for...the first

principle of all action is leisure."4 Probably no one has attached more

importance to leisure than Marx does. According to Marx:

Time is the room of human development. A man who has no free time

to dispose of, whose whole lifetime apart from the mere physical

interruption of sleep, meals and so forth, is absorbed by his

labor for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden.5

For obvious reasons, however, leisure has to be kept within bounds.

First of all, it seems necessary to define how much time should be allocated

to work and how much to leisure. The historical record shows that this issue

has given rise to social conflicts since the beginning of industrialization.6

More important, free time is open to abuse. The list of leisure abuses is

both long and familiar. Free time is often associated with crime, violence,

and physical and psychological demoralization. Authoritative voices have long

expressed their concern about the possible consequences of unbridled leisure.

There have always been voices urging people to use leisure "properly,"

"correctly," "fruitfully," "wisely," "constructively," and above all

"rationally." The problem is who have the right to decide what leisure

activities are acceptable and what are not. In traditional societies, it was

the leaders of "culture" who bore a heavy responsibility for discovering

criteria for ways of correctly employing leisure.7 In modern times, however,

the regulation of leisure activities has increasingly involved the exercise of

state power. By cultivating or imposing a particular ideal of acceptable

leisure activity, the modern state, capitalist and communist alike, aims to

draw all social groups into "rational recreation" to curb the potential

dangers of free time.8

Thus "free time" is "free" only in the sense that time is at one’s

command that is free of duties. Like everything else, the "free" time is more

or less regulated. "Bread and Circuses" was already recognized as an effective

4 . Aristotle, Politics, l337a 31. 5 . Karl Marx, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart, l968), 219.

4

means of social control in the time of the Roman Empire. Given that leisure

is playing an increasingly important part in people’s everyday life today, it

is probably inevitable for the state to take stock of leisure activities. In

order to maintain the status quo, the state needs to shape a "disciplined" and

"healthy" (physically and psychologically) population. To do so, it has to

suppress "immoral," "irrational," and "dangerous" activities on the one hand,

and to inculcate "elevated" modes of social and moral behavior on the other.

The politics of leisure is not only contained in such control efforts on

the part of the state, but also in the active attempts of the governed to free

themselves from imposed restraints. It is wrong to depict the governed as

impotent consumers, having little or no say in the term and content of

leisure. In fact, the governed have the capacity to resist and contest

attempts at social control. As Chris Rojek points out:

One of the central errors of the conventional wisdom in the

sociology of leisure is the ideal that socialization simply

imprints values and beliefs regarding leisure behavior on the

individual self. Against this it is necessary to stress that the

adult self is a skilled and knowledgeable actor who can manipulate

social roles as resources for innovations and critical departures

in leisure practice.9

In other words, state hegemony is by no means impenetrable. The

governed can “penetrate, neutralize, and negate that hegemony”10

Leisure thus is best seen as a site of struggle of conflict, which

constantly redefine the existing relations between the state and the

society.11 Leisure relations are not relations of freedom. On the contrary,

they are relations of control and resistance.12 This is what leisure

signifies. This is why I choose leisure as a breach to investigate changing

state-society relations. Many may absorb the everyday view of leisure as too

trivial to merit serious attention. Indeed, the study of leisure for its own

sake (like any other aspect of the society) is no great weight. But if we

look beneath the surface of leisure and try to penetrate to hidden structures

which have produced its existing leisure relations, the study of leisure may

reveal some hard facts about political reality we may otherwise ignore.

5

The focus of this article therefore is not on "leisure" as such. Its

real aim is to explore what a study of leisure can tell us about the nature of

contemporary China. To do so, we have to first answer the following

questions. How much breathing time and space do Chinese people enjoy? How

does the Chinese Communist state define "healthy" and "unhealthy" leisure?

What are the mechanisms through which the state enforces its rules of

legitimate and illegitimate pleasure? Have leisure patterns been changed over

the last forty years? To what extent is the discourse on leisure related to

people's daily practice of leisure? By focusing on the changing structural

location of leisure in the overall social, economic, and political context, we

hope to reveal the vicissitudes of state power in the Chinese society.

Leisure in Mao's China

The control of leisure can generally be achieved in one of three ways or

in their combinations: regulating the length of leisure, regulating the forms

of leisure, and regulating the contents of leisure. The Chinese Communist

regime tried all three before and during the Cultural Revolution (hereinafter

CR).

Regulating the Length of Leisure.

In Marx' view, leisure represents a haven from the "dull compulsion of

economic relations." He believes that an important measure of wealth in a

communist society will be the quantity of leisure time, time which people

would be able to spend on the "harmonious development of their

personalities."13 But according to Maoist interpretation of Marx, leisure was

merely the time given to workers for their recuperation. Leisure was

meaningful only if people used the time to take a rest, to reduce stress, and

to enhance physical and mental ability so that they could work more

productively later. That was why a quotation from Lenin was very popular

during Maoist era--"[t]hose who don’t know how to rest don’t know how to

work." Here the emphasis was placed on work. An official commentator wrote

in 1959:

Why do we have to eat, drink, dress, and rest everyday? Why

6

should we sometimes go for music, opera, movie and art exhibition?

In the final analysis, what is the purpose of our lives? The

purpose is to produce more and better material and spiritual

products.14

Thus, the primary function of leisure was to make better workers. It

should provide rest, reduce stress, strengthen supportive relationships,

enhance physical and mental health, and generally serve the ends of

productivity. Since leisure was supposed to be subordinate to work, it was

often sacrificed to boost production. In the years of the 1950s through

1970s, Chinese planners and managers tended to believe that it was legitimate

to cut leisure time so long as it offered workers with enough physical

restoration. It was not uncommon in those years that people were asked to

work extra hours and even extra shifts with little or no compensation.

Moreover, Party and Youth League members and political activists were often

organized to undertake "voluntary labor" on Sundays and holidays.15 Such

practices were carried to extremes during the Great Leap Forward period when

millions of Chinese were driven so hard that they worked for months without

even sufficient sleeping time. Frederick Noisal, a The Globe and Mail

reporter in Beijing, wrote in 1959 that he had seen on many occasions "the

weary workers, the worn-out women, the peasants dead beat with physical

fatigue." He watched "people sleeping peacefully beneath blaring loudspeakers

and even during Peking opera performances when the Chinese musical

accompaniment seemed loud enough to keep the tiredest workers awake." What he

had witnessed led him to the conclusion that "complete leisure as the

Westerner knows it is very rare in China. The endless cycle of life in China

today consists of working, studying, eating and sleeping."16

People might put up with the weariness for a while but it was impossible

for them to do so forever no matter how loyal they were to the regime. The

Chinese leaders quickly realized that the great physical and mental strain on

Chinese people might become counterproductive. Between November 1958 and May

1960, the Party issued at least two directives requiring that "the masses" be

guaranteed eight hours of sleeping time and a few more hours of "free time."17

It needs to be noted, however, that here leisure was still considered passive

relaxation and restoration of energy for work.18 More important, the state

had no intention to give up its control over time. The two documents in fact

7

sanctioned that "the masses’ time" should be subject to "unitary

arrangements."19

Regulating the Forms of Leisure

In Chinese political culture, the public interest had always occupied "a

position of sacrosanct priority," and the communist revolution reinforced this

corporate concept of interest.20 Like everything else, the forms of leisure

in the years before and during the CR reflected this tendency. In the name of

"collectivism," it became an unwritten rule that leisure activities should

take the form of group action. A senior high school in Kaifeng, Henan

Province, for instance, laid down in 1954 a set of rules which was titled

"What Should We Do and When and How Should We Do Them." The regulation

consisted sixteen sections and fifty-six items, which specified times for

getting out of bed, washing, meals, classes, recesses, exercise, and sleeping.

It even detailed the manners of eating, talking, walking and playing. In one

word, everything had to be done in group and in unison.21 This case was by no

means out of the ordinary in those days. It was common then that students and

workers were organized to go to movie, sport event, dance party, and the like

together regardless of their personal preferences. Even reading was often

dictated. Party and Youth Leagues branches from time to time issued lists of

"recommended books," and discussion sessions were often scheduled afterward so

that everyone felt compelled to read the assigned books. Those who failed to

participate in officially organized leisure activities risked being criticized

of "cutting themselves off from the masses" and "lacking collectivist

spirit."22

Since "collectivism" was highly valued, not surprisingly, in sports it

was team games such as basketball, soccer, and volleyball that were strongly

promoted in factories, army units, and schools by the government. Team games

20 . Lowell Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests and the

Participatory Ethic in China," in Victor C. Falkenheim, ed., Citizens

and Groups in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies

of the University of Michigan, l987), l7-66.21 . Zhen De, “Mantan jiti huodong ji qita” Zhongguo qingnian 4

(February, l956), pp. 6-7.

8

were considered as an instrument of cultivating such desirable personal traits

as group loyalty, willingness to cooperate with others, self-sacrifice, and so

on. Those values were fully consistent with the official ideology of

"collectivism."

Thus by the l950s, the Chinese communist had controlled not only the way

in which individuals divided their time between work and leisure but also the

ways in which they conducted in leisure. The mobilization pattern of

22 . Mei Qi, "Yingdang zunzhong bieren di zhiyou;" Guo Lin, "Weishenmo

yiding yao qiangqiu yizhi [Why do We have to Impose Rigid Uniformity],"

ZGQN l2 (June, l956): 30-31; and Shang Qi, "Guanche ziyuan yuanzhe,

gengjia fengfu duocai di kaizhan kewei huodong [Implement the Principle

of Freedom and Develop a More Colorful Program for Extracurricular

Activities]," ZGQN l7 (September l956): 8-9.1 . Robert Shaw, Private Time, Public Time (London: Poet & Printer,

1969), p. 1.2 . R. W. Vickerman, “The New Leisure Society: An Economic Analysis”.

Futures, Vol. l0, No. 3 (l980); p. l92.3 . Quoted from P. Baily, Leisure and Class in Victorian England

(London: Routleges & Kegan Paul, l978), l80. 6 . For example, see E. P. Thompson, "Time-Work-Discipline and

Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present 38 (l967): 56-97; and Douglas

A. Reids, "The Decline of Saint Monday: l766-l876," Past and Present 78

(l976): 76-l0l.7 . W. Sutherland, "A Philosophy of Leisure," Annals of the American

Academy (September l957): l36.8 . For a discussion of the role of the capitalist state, see John

Clarke and Chas Critcher, The Devil Makes Work: Leisure in Capitalist

Britain (London, MacMillan, l985), l22-l43.9 . Chris Rojek, Capitalist and Leisure Theory (London: Tavistock

Publications, l985), pp. l80-l8l.10 . James Scott, The Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1989) p. 336.11 . Stephen G. Jones, Workers At Play: A Social and Economic History

of

Leisure l9l8-l939 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, l986), p. l65.

9

officially organized leisure activities was an important aspect of what many

have termed "totalitarianism."

Regulating the Contents of Leisure

Whereas, in the l950s, the state had absorbed a great deal of the

population’s time and started to regulate the ways in which people conducted

their leisure activities, in the l960s and l970s the regime went further

trying to monopolize people's spare time by specifying the contents of

permissible leisure activities.

In March l960, the most widely circulated magazine of that time,

Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth) carried a letter by a young woman by the

name of Xiao Wen, in which she expressed her desire to have some free and

enjoyable leisure time.23 In the following three months, the journal received

12 . Rojek, Capitalism and Leisure Theory, p. l56.13 . Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of l844 (London,

Lawrence at Wishort, l970), 737.14 . Liu Zijiu, "Yishou zhua shengchan, Yishou zhua shenghuo [Be

Concerned with Production as well as the Well-Being of the Masses],"

Chongtian genjin he kexue texin [Boundless Enthusiasm and Scientific

Attitude] (Hong Kong: Shannian Publications, l959).15 . Mei Qi, "Yingdang Zunzhong bieren di zhiyou [Respect Others'

Freedom]," Zhongguo qingnian [Chinese Youth, hereinafter ZGQN] 12 (June

l956): 3l.16 . Charles Taylor, ed., China Hands: The Globe and Mail in Peking

(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, l984), 26.17 . Ma Qibin and Chen Wenbin, Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian

l949-l989 [The Chinese Communist Party: Forty Years in Power, 1949-1989]

(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, l989), l85.18 . See an editorial of Chinese Youth, "Laoyi jiehe shi weiliao

baozhen chixu dayaojin [To Continue the Great Leap Forward, We Have to

Strike A Proper Balance between Work and Rest]," ZGQN 12 (June, l960):

30-3l.19 . Ma and Chen, Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, l85.

10

over 14,000 letters discussing Xiao's letter, and it selectively published

about a dozen. Most of the letters published took a strong critical view of

Xiao Wen’s desire. They typically argued that it was not the time for Chinese

to enjoy, for communism had not yet been realized in China. They asserted

that those who had paid too much attention to leisure could not be "real

revolutionaries."24 The conclusion derived from the discussion was that spare

time should never be used for private enjoyments. Rather it should be used to

heighten one’s political consciousness.

In the early l960s, the Party began to develop a new thesis of leisure:

spare time could not a "political vacuum;" it was filled by either

"proletarian ideas" or "bourgeoisie ideas." Due to this ideological

innovation, leisure became increasingly politicized. By the end of the CR,

the politicization of leisure had undergone three stages.

In the first stage (roughly l960-l962), the politicization was

relatively mild. People were reminded that it was politically dangerous to

enjoy pastime in a carefree mood. Although they might have been successfully

socialized to the communist ideology, the Party thought it necessary to

continually reinforce their earlier learning at work as well as in leisure.

That was the only way to keep them from slipping into the "mire of bourgeois

ideology." In particular, people were advised to be sensitive to "hidden

scripts" underlying movies, dramas, music, poems, novels, painting, and the

like, especially those imported from abroad and those produced before the

liberation. They were also told that sports were not as innocent as they

tended to believe. So-called "cups and medals mania" (jinbiao zhuyi), which

was said to be still prevalent in China then, was criticized as a

manifestation of "magnified individualism" (fangda di geren zhuyi). Games

were supposed to promote only "collectivism." In one word, there was no "pure

leisure." Leisure was seen as a "battle-field between the proletariat and the

bourgeoisie."25

25 . Ma Ye, "Kan dianying buneng zhishi weiliao tu qingsong [Movie-

going is not just for Fun]," ZGQN l5 (August l960): 24; Ma Xiuyun,

"Woman shi zenyang yindao qingnian guohao yegu shenghuo di [How do We

Guide Young Workers in Their Leisure Activities]," ZGQN 4 (February

l96l): 24.

11

Whereas in the first stage people had been asked to make personal

judgments about what were "right" and what were "wrong" and the Party had

given only some hints, in the second stage (1963-1965) the Party began to make

judgments for them, probably because it had become disappointed by what had

been achieved without explicit direction.

In l963, two modern dramas, Never Forget and The Young Generation, were

publicized. Each had a negative character, Ding Shaochun in the former and

Lin Yusheng in the latter. Ding was criticized for having forgotten his

working-class origin partly because he had developed a "bourgeois habit"--

hunting. Lin was criticized because he dreamed of marrying a petty girl and

enjoying a "bourgeois style of life" together: "Every evening, we may read a

novel or poems while listening to music, or we may go to movie or concert. On

Sunday, we may take a walk in the park or visit friends..." Both dramas were

reproduced in every major city and eventually made into movies. Workers and

students were organized to watch them. National and local newspapers and

journals devoted special columns to discussing them. By presenting the two

negative examples, the Party hoped to teach people, among other things, what

they were not supposed to do in their leisure.26 As for what people were

supposed to do in their leisure, the answer could be found in the titles of a

group of essays appearing in an issue of Zhongguo Qingnian [Chinese Youth] of

1964: "Value Your Spare Time," "Leisure Activity Should Serve One's Work,"

"You Must Behave Yourself Even In After-hours," and "Spare Time Must Be

Devoted To Studying."27

Also in the mid-sixties, official publications began to warn people that

"pursuing a hobby may sap one’s will to make progress" (wan wu sang zhi). As

a result, fanciers of hunting, fishing, collecting stamps, keeping pet birds,

growing flowers, and all kinds of hobbies faced a hard choice: either giving

up their avocations or preparing to be criticized for "wallowing in petty

bourgeois amusements." Moreover, many movies, plays, and books began to be

singled out as "poisonous weeds," which were soon to disappear from the public

scene altogether.

China thus had become an "unexciting society" even before the Cultural

Revolution.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), state intrusion into the

daily life of the population reached such a degree that demarcation between

"private-time" and "public time" became meaningless. Maoist leaders were no

12

longer content with the elimination of "poisonous weeds." They now wanted to

saturate people with nothing but Maoist propaganda. The "Smashing of the Four

Olds" campaign at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution made it an

unwritten rule that no leisure activities were legitimate unless they were

officially sanctioned. Thus, for a number of years, 800 millions of Chinese

were allowed only to watch eight "revolutionary model plays" and few dozens of

carefully selected films. In the later years of the Cultural Revolution, more

movies were produced and more books published, but to a large extent they were

simply propaganda in crude artistic forms. They didn’t even pretend to

provide people with relaxation, because the term "leisure" itself then was a

dirty word.

As Susan Ford Wiltshire had aptly noted, "when the corrective ballast of

private life is lost, the public front becomes a monolith, a facade behind

which there is nothing except more of the same."28 With the state completing

its monopolization of private time (not only the length of private time, but

also the ways of spending private time), China literally became a totally

dictated society in the late l960’s and the early l970’s.

Of course, the extent to which the Communist Party attempted to maintain

control over leisure time is one thing. How far such control was possible is

another. Ironically, in 1967 and 1968 when the Cultural Revolution was at its

climax, many Chinese found that they had a plenty of free time for the first

time in years. They were the so-called "wanderers" (Xiaoyaopai), those who

for one reason or another didn't have interest in factional struggle. Since

schools were closed and factories severely benumbed, the problem for the

wanderers was how to while the time away. Junior high students found that it

was more fun to play with their friends in the neighborhood than with their

comrades of Red Guard organizations in school. Every day, they wandered about

the streets seeking excitement from childish games such as cockfighting and

raising carrier pigeons. Senior high and college students found more

sophisticated ways to entertain themselves. Some played cards, go, and

chess. Others read novels, Chinese and foreign, modern and classic. Books

that had been subjected to burning during the Smashing the Four Olds campaign

now became the vogue. Still other youths were engrossed girl or boy friends.

28 . Susan Ford Wiltshire, Public and Private in Virgil’s Aeneid

(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, l989), p. 64.

13

Indulging in the romantic life, they could partially dismiss the turbulent

situation in the surrounding world from their thoughts. There were also

people who were very busy. Some returned to an ivory tower, devoting

themselves to learning foreign languages, or studying mathematics, physics,

and the like. Some were more practical, learning how to knit sweaters, cut

out garments, cook stylish dishes, assemble and repair radios, play musical

instruments, and develop other skills. Workers seemed even more pragmatic.

They wanted to improve the daily life quality of their families with a minimal

investment. Therefore, fishing, hunting, carpentering, and home repairing

became many's avocations. In late 1967, it was bruited about in many Chinese

cities that regularly injecting cock blood into the veins would prolong one's

life. For a short time, it became a hot topic in town. Many boldly applied

this secret recipe to themselves, and more enjoyed talking about its

efficaciousness. It was indeed ironical that while hundreds and thousands

were killed and injured in factionalist battles, others were looking for

magical methods to prolong their lives. More ironically, many movies that

had been labeled as "poisonous weeds" were shown again under the pretext that

to criticize them the masses needed to view or review them. But the truth was

that people were tired of watching a few boring "revolutionary" movies and

wanted broader choices. Some mass organizations were even trying to make a

profit from showing those movies to culturally hungry audience. Occasionally,

there were reports that an organization snatched the copies of such movies

from another.29

Leisure in Deng's China

The nature of leisure has dramatically changed since the end of the

Cultural Revolution. This section examines how China's market-oriented reform

and open-door policy have transformed people's leisure patterns in the 1980s.

Change in the State’s Attitude Toward Leisure.

The 1980s was distinguished from the previous three decades first by a

change of official tone. From the l950s to the l970s, what the Chinese

government had attempted to achieve was to restrain all leisure activities

except those harmonious with the state ideology. In the 1980s, however, the

pragmatic Deng regime seems to have followed a different rule of thumb: people

14

are allowed to spend their spare time in ways they please so long as those

activities pose no threat to the existing social order. It does not follow

that the state has given up its control over leisure. In fact, whether or not

a certain type of behavior poses a threat to the existing social order is

still subject to the regime’s discretionary judgment. Nevertheless, leisure

no longer has to always fit into the schematic strait-jacket of the state

ideology. After the CR, the Party becomes willing to partially relinquish its

control over leisure because it has learned that the monopolization of private

time could result in a cheerless society, which is not in its best interests.

Moreover, since the Party has devalued "collectivism" and no longer takes

"class struggle as the key link," it makes sense for it to recognize

relaxation, entertainment, and relatively free choice as valid elements of

leisure.

Thus, the demarcation between "public" and "private" time re-emerges,

although the boundary line is far from unambiguous. As a part of the new

"social contract," the state develops a new guideline for managing leisure

activities: "Encouraging those conducive to the maintenance of the existing

social order, allowing those harmless to the existing social order, and

suppressing those inimical to the existing social order."30

The Increase of Leisure Time

Chinese time-budget surveys generally divide everyday human behaviors

into four categories: Work (including commuting to work), physiological needs,

housework, and free time. Time spent on physiological needs (sleeping,

eating, and personal hygiene) is obviously the least elastic. Thus the

increase of leisure time depends on the reduction of the amounts of time spent

in work and housework. Since l949, official length of work in China have

always been eight hours a day, forty-eight hours a week. This hasn't changed

after 1980.31 But, as discussed in the previous section, actual hours spent

at work were much longer in the first three decades of the Peoples Republic,

if various non-standard forms of work, such as nonpaid overtime "voluntary"

work and participation in compulsory and semi-compulsory political activities

30 . Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian l989 [Chinese Broadcasting and

Television Yearbook: 1989, hereinafter DSNJ] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo

xueyuan chubenshe, l989), 336.

15

were included. After the CR, as voluntary work and political study have

gradually lost luster, actual working time has been significantly shortened.

But, because there had been no time budget surveys before l980, it is

impossible to document exactly how significant the reduction was.

The housework burden has always been substantial, occupying a large

portion of the non-working time of Chinese households. But thanks to the

proliferation of various time-saving machines (refrigerator, washing machine,

gas oven, sewing machine, and the like), the improvement of commodity-supply,

the rise of the service sector, and more important, the growing purchasing

power of the average Chinese families, the time spent on housework has also

drastically declined in the l980s.32

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As a result of the reduction of actual working time and housework, the

total amount of free time has increased.33

Changes in Leisure Patterns

23 . Zhongguo qingnian 5 (March l960), pp. 36-37.24 . See Zhongguo qingnian 6-l0 (March-May l960).26 . Bai Ye, "Zouchu geren zhuyi xiaotiandi [Do Away with

Individualism]," ZGQN 24 (December l963): l0-l1.27 . ZGQN 8-9 (May, l964): 46-47.29 . See Shaoguang Wang, Failure of Charisma: The Chinese Cultural

Revolution in Wuhan, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1990, pp.

490-49l. Also see Perry Link “Hand-Copied Entertainment Fiction from

the Cultural Revolution”, in Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul G.

Pickowicz, eds., Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the

People’s Republic (Boulder: Westview, l989), pp. l7-36.31 . The National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui tongji zhiliao,

l985 [Chinese Social Statistics Yearbook, 1985] (Beijing: Zhongguo

tongji chubanshe l985), 307-308; Zhongguo Shehui tong zhiliao, l987, pp.

28l-284; and Qing Nianbing, "Da chengshi zhigong shenghuo shijian fenpai

he liyong wenti di chubu yanjiu [A Preliminary Research Report on Time-

Budget of Chinese Workers Living in Large Cities]," Shehuixue yanjiu

[Research in Sociology] l (l990): 92-l02.

16

The demonopolization of leisure time occurred simultaneously with the

advent of tape record and television in China. On average, China produced

only 3,000 sets of black-white television per annum in the l960s and 3,000

sets of color television per annum in the l970s. And most of the televisions

then belonged to work units rather than individual households.34 By the end

of the l980s, however, over 90 percent of urban households owned at least one

television set.35 Before l980, most of the Chinese had never seen a tape

recorder. Now tape recorder has become a household item in urban China.36 In

the last few years, VCRs, CDs, and karaokes also began to enter Chinese

families.

These modern entertainment devices have brought revolutionary changes in

the ways in which Chinese spend their leisure time. Before l980, the dominant

free-time activities were probably reading, listening to the radio, movie-

going, socializing with friends (gossiping), and simply doing nothing. In

l985, television audiences for the first time exceeded radio’s.37 A l987

nationwide survey showed that on average, every urban resident spent l.5 to

2.0 hours in front of the television each day, which accounted for almost a

half of the time available for leisure.38 Numerous recent surveys indicate

that since l982 television viewing has become the most popular form of leisure

activities.39

37 . XWNJ l989, 2l7.38 . Qing Nianbing, p. l02; Li Yuanpu, and Yen Jinchang, "Tianjin shi

jumin yeyu shenghuo chouyang diaocha [Random Samples of Tianjin

Residents' Leisure Pattern]," Liaowang [Outlook] 22 (November l986): l2;

and Deng Tongtong, "Dianshi wenhua shixiang lu [Reflections on TV

Culture]," Shehui [Society] 7 (July l990): 35. 39 . Zhang Yun, Cai He, and Jiang Shanhe, "Qingnian gongren shenghuo

fangshi xianzhuang tedian yanjiu [A Research on New Characteristics of

Young Workers' Life Style]," Shehui kexue zhanxian [Social Science

Front] 3 (June l982): l0l-l08; Mai Jungang, "Qiye gaige yu zhigong

xianxia shenghuo fangshi di bianhua [Enterprise Reform and Changes in

Workers' Leisure Pattern]," Shehui diaocha yu yanjiu [Social

Investigation and Research] 7 (July l985): 86-893; and Sun Zaiqing, "Dui

zhigong yeyu shenghuo di sanxiang diaocha [Three Investigations on

Workers' Leisure Activities]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] ll

17

The rise of television was accompanied by a great decline in motion

picture viewing. For a typical Chinese urban resident, movie-going declined

from once every two weeks in l979 to once every four weeks in l985.40

Thereafter, movie audiences began to stabilize. In l990, 4.3 billion urban

residents went to movie theaters, which, though representing a five billion

drop from the record of l979, shows that going to the movies is still an

important form of leisure.41

Equally significant in the last few years has been the rise of VCR,

which provides an alternative to both movie and television. It is recently

estimated that there are already 60 to 70 millions of VCR sets in China, and

that the number is growing very fast. In large cities like Shanghai and

Beijing, at least one out of every five families owns a VCR, and in Guangzhou

the ratio has hit 40 percent.42 In the early to mid-l980s when VCR was still

rare in Chinese cities, many private entrepreneurs and even state agencies

(such as Workers' Cultural Palace) found it profitable to open "video rooms."

Thus, video rooms sprang up like mushrooms throughout the country.43 While

the contents of movies and television are usually subject to relatively strict

state control, the government has found it difficult, if not impossible, to

monitor what is being shown in largely profit-driven video rooms. In fact,

for several years, the state simply didn’t have any video to supply. Before

l984, imports from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and foreign countries had dominated

video rooms. It was estimated in l985 that about 2,000 titles of "illegal

videos" were being circulated in the country.44 In comparison with tedious

Chinese-made movies and television series, foreign videos were sensually

exciting, which therefore attracted a large number of audiences. Instead of

going to movie theaters or staying home watching television, many, especially

young people, became frequent visitors to video rooms.45 For instance, in

Shanghai, a city with 10 million population, “video rooms’ had l0 million

audience in the six months between November l987 and April, l988.46

Apart from television, movie, and video, other popular leisure

activities include listening to radio, listening to records, and playing

mahjong tiles, billiards, and video games. The last three items deserve a few

more words, for there have been "mahjong fever," "billiards fever," and "video

game fever" in Chinese cities in the recent years.

(November l986): ll-l2.

18

After l949, the Chinese government has always discouraged mahjong

playing, because playing mahjong was considered a form of gambling. At the

beginning of the CR, mahjong became a target of the "Smashing of the Four

Olds" campaign. As a result, mahjong disappeared altogether in China for more

than a decade. The revival of mahjong playing started in Guangdong in the

early 1980s, and in the last four or five years, a "mahjong fever" has

engulfed the entire country. Not only do retirees, housewives, private

businesspersons, and workers play mahjong, government officials, university

professors, college students, and even high school students also indulge in

the game. In Guangzhou, a report suggests, almost every family has members

who plays mahjong.47 Gambling has made a strong comeback in the wake of the

mahjong fever, because only with betting is mahjong exciting. For many,

gambling provided a new form of diversion and excitement, with the prospect of

a useful win.48 Although in most cases betting was small in scale, just a few

cents or a cigarette a game, there has been growing concern that gambling may

bring many people to ruin.49

If mahjong is popular among all age groups and all social groups,

billiards is favored mainly by young workers, and video games by teenagers.

Thousands of billiards tables and video game machines have been installed in

Chinese cities, big and small. Many Chinese are still living in over-crowded,

poorly ventilated and dimly lit apartments. For those youths who find their

homes restrictive, the street is a better place to spend spare time. Thus

street corners where billiard tables and video game machines are placed are

usually where young people from working class families like to hang about.

Playing billiards or video games not only brings excitement, it also forges an

informal collective life for those young people who find the surrounding world

is becoming increasingly alienating.50

Reading has continued to be an important form of leisure.51 Now Chinese

readers have much wider choices than a decade ago. The number of books

published has risen from less than 5,000 in 1970 to l7,000 in l979 to 88,000

in l991 (see Figure 1).52 Expansion of newspapers has been more remarkable.

Between l970 and l989 the number of newspapers grew from 42 (all were national

or provincial party organs) to 852 (see Figure 2). A similar pattern is

observable in magazines--the total number had increased from 21 in 1970 to

6,500 in 1991 (see Figure 3).53

19

FIGURE 1, 2, 3 ABOUT HERE

"Popular" readings account for a large share of the expansion of books,

newspapers, and magazines. Among the l6 magazines with circulation of a

million copies and more in l987, for instance, l3 were "popular" (see Table

2).54

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Do those facts suggest that the Chinese leisure has been directed more

towards distractions and diversions than toward creative recreation? Not

necessarily. In fact, minority pursuits have also been on the increase. Take

fishing as an example. In May l983, at the opening ceremony of the First

Chinese-Japanese Fishing Contest, a senior leader, Wang Zhen, praised fishing

as a "healthy sport." Three months later, the Chinese Fishing Association

was founded in Beijing and a special magazine, Chinese Fishing, began to be

published. By the end of l988, 24 of the 30 provinces had established fishing

associations with a total membership of over 30 millions. While sales of many

magazines were falling, the circulation of Chinese Fishing kept growing,

topping l30,000 in l987.55

The l980s also saw increasing numbers of people who devoted their

pastime to their fads and fancies. Amateur collecting has attracted more and

more people. In Shanghai alone, there are about l00,000 active amateur

collectors, collecting everything from stamps to maps, from model ships to

soft drink cans, and from abacuses to tortoises. Over 30 specialized

collectors’ associations have been established in the city, with memberships

ranging from two dozen to two thousand.56 Also in the l980s countless

families started to breed pets. Birds, gold-fishes, tropical-fishes, and

crickets have their special devotees. It was reported that there were 5-

600,000 fish enthusiasts and 500,000 cricket aficionados in Shanghai in

l990.57

Due to the limit of space, I cannot go on to discuss the growth of other

"fevers" of pastime pursuits, such as "qigong fever," "tourism fever," "keep-

fit classes fever," "go fever," "dressmaking fever," and the thousand and one

other ways in which Chinese people occupied their non-working hours.58 The

20

vitality or variety of leisure activities is an important indication of how

far the state's "indifference zone" has extended.

New Characteristics of Leisure in the l980s

Depoliticization

During the CR, as discussed in Section II, leisure activities were

highly politicized and sometimes even the concept of leisure itself was

regarded as an element of "bourgeois ideology." The overpoliticization of

social life evoked a strong aversion to anything political among a large

segment of the population in the later years of the CR. To regain popular

support, when reformist leaders came to power, they thus had to somehow

depoliticize social life, redefining the boundary between the private time and

the public time, and allowing greater autonomy for individuals to decide how

to spend their private time. The state, of course, hasn't given up its

attempt to control leisure. But the Deng regime’s understanding of "control"

is different from that of the Maoist regime’s. For the latter, "control"

meant "dictating," or "having everything all my way," while for the former,

"control" means "curbing," or "keeping bad things in check." That is why

depoliticized leisure is acceptable, or even desirable for the Deng regime. A

certain degree of political apathy may be conducive to the regime’s stability.

Privatization

One of the results of depoliticizing social life has been the

privatization of leisure pursuits. After a decade of weary "class struggle"

in the CR, people began to retreat from outside social relationships into the

domestic sphere in the late l970s. This tendency was reinforced by the advent

and spread of television, audio, and video equipment in the l980s. The

overwhelming majority of urban residents have become habituated to staying at

home after work. The home thus has become the major site of leisure

experience in China, just as what have happened in many other countries.59 As

an "exit," the privatization provides an important option for many of those

who have found the public life meaningless and alienated. In this sense, the

"exit" is functioning like a safety valve for the society.

Diversification

21

As political hindrances to the enjoyment of private time have been

lessened, there has been increasingly diversity of leisure activities.

Indeed, it is only natural that the freeing of private time has led to the

expansion of private space. With relative freedom in the area of leisure,

people of course tend to unleash previously suppressed emotions, express

previously suppressed desires, and pursue previously suppressed interests.

Hence, many previously forbidden games (e.g., playing mahjong, reading love

stories, breeding birds, etc.) have come out of the closet; and many new ways

32 . Qing Nianbing, pp. 95-96, pp. l00-l0l; and Zhang Jianguo, "Gaige

chujing liao zhigong shenghuo fangshi di bianhua [Reform Has Resulted in

Changes in Chinese Workers' Life Style]," Shidai [Time] l (January

l987): 7-l0.33 . Because there have never been nationwide time-budget surveys, I

have to base my estimates about leisure time on a number of regional

surveys. The comparability of the surveys is, of course, far from

perfect. Nevertheless with supporting evidence, I have reasonable

confidence to believe that the Table 1 represents the general trends in

China. For instance, in Beijing, the daily amount of free time

increased from 3.5 hours to almost 4 hours in the four years between

l982 and l986. The trend in other cities may be more or less the same.

Of course, the situation varies tremendously from place to place and

from social group to social group. All statistical data available are

too general for us to gauge variations. 34 . DSNJ l989, 33l-332. 35 . DSNJ 1988, 40l; Institute of Journalism, Chinese Academy of Social

Science, Zhongguo xinwen nianjian, l988 [Chinese Journalism

Yearbook:1988, hereinafter XWNJ] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo chubanshe,

1988), l92.36 . The Chinese Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, l990

[Chinese Statistics Yearbook: 1990, hereinafter TJNJ] (Beijing: Zhongguo

tongji chubanshe, 1990), 294.40 . Chinese Motion Picture Association, Zhongguo dianying nianjian

l986 [Chinese Motion Picture Yearbook: 1986, hereinafter DYNJ],

(Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, l986), ll-5, ll-l3.41 . Liaowang, February l8, l99l, 41.

22

of leisure (e.g., watching television, playing video games, tourism, etc.)

have been embraced enthusiastically by millions of Chinese who have long

hungered for relaxation, fun, and amusement.

"Westernization"

Here "Westernization" refers to influences from the outside world,

including Hong Kong and Taiwan. The demonopolization of private-time

concurred with the introduction of "open-door" policy. In the l980s, the

42 . China News Agency, Beijing, February 12, l992.43 . DSNJ l988, l7-70.44 . DYNJ 1986, ll-6.45 . DSNJ l989, 344.46 . Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian, l989, p.344.47 . China News Agency, Guangzhou, January l, l992.48 . Lu Hanlong, 84.49 . Wei Yunheng, Liu Yuxun, Xin Minghua, "Dongbei sansheng dufeng

toushi [Gambling Crazy in the Three Northeastern Provinces], Liaowang 7-

8 (February l8, l99l): l9-20; Chen Lu, "Dubo qishi lu [Reflections on

Gambling]," Zhongguo Zhichun [China Spring] 2 (February l99l): 77-80;

and Zhong Shu, "Zhongguo dalu shaoshu getihu di shenghuo baitai [Private

businessmen's Life Style]," Zhongguo shibao zhoukai [China Time Weekly]

3 (January l9-25, l992): 7l.50 . Yun Lan, "Fangguan jiehe, jiji daoxiang, tuidong wenhua shichang

jiankang pengbo fazhai [Combine "Relaxation" and "Regulation," Actively

Guide the Development of Cultural Markets]," Qunzhong wenhua l0 (October

l989): 9-ll.51 . Wang Haiping, "Nanjing qingnian di dushu re [Reading Fever among

Youth in Nanjing]" Baxiaoshi yiwai [After Eight Hours] 3 (March l987):

ll. 52 . New China News Agency, Beijing, December 29, l99l.53 . Shijie ribao [World Journal], January 12, l992. 54 . The other three, Hongqi (Red Flag), Banyuetan (Fortnightly) and

Gongchan dangyuan (Communists) were subscribed mainly by work units

rather than by private citizens. See Zhongguo chuban nianjian l988

[Chinese Publication Yearbook: 1988, hereinafter CBNJ], l20-l2l.

23

numbers of foreign tourists (including visitors from Hong Kong and Taiwan)

increased by 500 percent.60 To accommodate foreign guests, China has built

hundreds of luxury hotels in cities all over the country. To entertain

foreign guests, those hotels are attached by bars, discos, bowling alleys, and

in some cases even golf courses.61 Visitors come and go, but the constant

flow of foreign visitors presents vivid examples of how people in other parts

of the world spend their leisure time. As a result, bars and dance halls have

been proliferating in Chinese cities.

Chinese don’t have to go to Westernized bars and dance halls to

experience foreign influence. The foreign presence is everywhere. Chinese

now are listening to the music of Michael Jackson, Deng Lijun (a Taiwanese

singer), Zhang Xueyou (a Hong Kong singer); reading books written by Jin Yong

(a Hong Kong writer), Qiong Yao (a Taiwan writer), or translated from American

paperbacks; and watching movies, videos, and television programs produced in

Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Hollywood.62 As Orvill Schell points out in his Discos

and Democracy.

Gone were the days when China’s youths spend their every waking

hour going to political study meetings, reading the Little Red

Books and working as volunteer laborers in order to learn from the

workers, peasants, and soldiers. Having caught a few fleeting

reflections of the outside world through books, magazines,

television and films, these youths now wanted more exciting,

cosmopolitan forms of entertainment.63

55 . Dai Banyun, "Fengmi zhongguo di diaoyure [Fishing Fever in China]

Hubei qingnian [Hubei Youth] 8 (August, l989): 20-23. 56 . Sheng Yu, "Shanghai minjian siren shouchang di diaocha [Private

Collections in Shanghai]," Shehui 8 (August l990): l6-l9.57 . Zhao Zhenda, "Chongwu chao [Pet Wave]," Shehui 7 (July, l990): 20-

22. 58 . For example, see Yan Jian, "Beijing di weiqi re [Go Fever in

Beijing]," Shidai [Times] l (January l988): 55. 59 . Jones, Workers at Play, 200-20l; and Rojek, Capitalism and leisure

Theory, l9-20.

24

We may safely replace "China’s youths" and "these youths" in this

paragraph with "Chinese," because the "open-door" policy has led to an inflow

of new cultural patterns and aspiration not only for China’s youths but also

for all Chinese at large.

Commercialization

The changed position of leisure also manifests in the fact that commerce

has intruded the leisure domain. Instead of regarding leisure as a

battlefield between "proletarian" and "bourgeois" ideologies, the Deng regime

now considers it as a market--"cultural market." It is accepted that

"cultural commodities" such as films, audio and video tapes, books,

newspapers, magazines, dance halls, etc. should be subject to the same

economic rules that apply to other commodities. Thus, "cost," "profit,"

"quantity," "quality," "demand," "supply," "competition," "import," and

"export" are no less legitimate concerns for producers and consumers of

"cultural commodities" than for their counterparts of other commodities.

Although the government has emphasized that both "economic and social

efficacy" are important in "cultural production," the economic reform has in

fact driven most, if not all, of producers of "cultural commodities" to pursue

profits at the expense of "social efficacy."

The pursuit of profit maximization was part of the reason why Chinese

television stations and video studios would rather import programs from abroad

than produce their own. It usually costs about 60,000 yuans to purchase the

broadcasting right of a 20-parts TV series from abroad. But if a television

station decides to make a 20-parts TV series itself, the cost could go as high

as 200,000 yuans.64 Similar cost-benefit concern applies to video producers.65

The result is that in China, television has become congested with foreign-made

programs and the video market has been dominated by imports.

In sum, due to the fact a lot of money could be made out of people's

spare time activities, entertainment and leisure have become increasingly

commercized. Rather than ideologically motivated propagandists, most of

entertainment providers have become profit-driven businessmen.

Polarization

The commercialization of leisure implies that purchasing power in terms

of income matters, for one could not take part in commercialized leisure

25

activities without money. Numerous studies have shown that the

differentiation between "haves" and "have nots" has been growing since the

early l980s.66 A result is the polarization of leisure patterns. At one end,

those whose incomes are barely sufficient to maintain the minimum standard of

living haven't benefited much from the general expansion of commercialized

leisure. Many of them have to take second jobs and thus sacrifice hours of

leisure to obtain more income.67

Most of the Chinese find that their resources cannot stretch beyond the

requirements of basic everyday existence and easily accessible pastimes. For

them, the home is the main site of leisure and recreation, and TV viewing is

the staple leisure activity. Only occasionally do they participate in leisure

activities that require not only time but also money.

At the other end, there is a small proportion of the urban population

who could afford expensive leisure activities. It is them who are regular

customers of Western-styled dance halls, bars, and cafes. The new rich

consists of upstart private businesspersons, employees of foreign companies,

cultural elites, and corrupt officials. For those people, especially for

private businesspersons, the extravagant pattern of leisure is as much for

relaxation and recreation as for flaunting their elite status. A private

businessman, for instance, arrogantly proclaims: "Those who ride bicycles at

best could only afford to play billiars" (because he and his friends either

ride motorcyles or take taxis). With minimum expenditure of 50 yuan or more

per visit, night life in dance halls, bars or cafes is simply too expensive

for ordinary Chinese to enjoy.68 Therefore, there has been a growing sense of

deep inequality of access to leisure.

Formation of Voluntary Associations

In the first three decades of the People’s Republic, the Chinese

communist state didn’t tolerate the existence of any voluntary groups. This

situation began to change in the post-Mao period. The l980s witnessed "the

emergence of avowedly autonomous formal associations."69 By l99l there have

been over l00,000 registered voluntary, semi-voluntary, and quasi-official

societies in the nation,70 many of which are recreational groups. The

aforementioned national and provincial fishing associations are just an

example. But national or provincial autonomous organizations are still few

and far between. Most of the newly established leisure groups are operating

26

only at the grassroots and at local levels. In Capital Steel Corporation, for

instance, there were over 30 recreational clubs in l986, pursuing a broad

range of interests such as music, dance, modern drama, folk art, the fine

arts, calligraphy, photography, stamp collection, sports and etc.71 Such

community leisure groups are often sponsored by the official trade unions or

Youth League committees in a given unit or a given locality. In theory, they

should be subject to the sponsors’ supervision. However, those groups do have

a certain degree of autonomy. In most cases, they are free as long as their

activities don’t run counter with the sponsors’ interests.72

To prevent voluntarily organized leisure activities from growing out of

control, the state discourages the formation of transunit and transregional

recreational organizations.73 Nevertheless, thousands of such groups have

come into existence. As mentioned above in Shanghai amateur collectors alone

had set up over 30 voluntary associations by l990. In Wenzhou, a medium-sized

city, for instance, there were about 400 transunit leisure organizations, such

as poem societies, art salons, sports clubs, flower-lover associations, and

the like in l987.74

For the members of leisure groups, the emphasis is less on the

individual home than on the voluntary collective life in the community.

Precisely for this reason, the state takes an ambivalent position toward such

organizations. On the one hand, home-centered leisure activities, though not

harmful, are not as "healthy" as those conducted by voluntary leisure groups,

because the former function mainly to kill time rather than to spend spare

time in creative ways. On the other hand, however, any autonomous

organizations, especially those which transcend administrative boundaries,

could become potentially dangerous, even if they ititially have no political

agenda. After all, groups are not as readily amenable to governmental

control as isolated individual households.

Individual Preferences, Market, and State Control

When the state decided to demonopolize private time, it intended to

loose rather than lose its control in this regard. However, the matter of

fact is that the government ability to manipulate pastime activities has been

significantly impaired in the last decade. This is an unanticipated

consequence of the government's initial decision to step back and allow

27

whatever is not "harmful." Once allowed to be expressed through "cultural

markets," individual preferences for leisure become a very powerful force, so

powerful that it is able to "chip away" the state's domination over people's

private time. The state is no longer the sole provider of recreational

products. Even in those areas in which the state still seems to be the sole

provider, its control has become less and less effective, largely because the

reform has transformed many of state agents from ideologically motivated

propagandists into profit-driven businesspersons. Take movie, television, and

publication as examples.

Movie

The state may have the authority to decide what people shouldn’t see on

the screen, but people have the right to decide what they are going to see.

The state’s control over the movie cannot be said effective unless it is able

to get people to see what it wishes them to see. This has never been an easy

task. But when people have more choices for their leisure as they do in the

post-Mao era, it becomes a great challenge for the state.

In the early l980s, when Western and Hong Kong movies were allowed to be

imported for the first time in decades, Chinese-made movies lost the market by

a big margin. A survey conducted in Shanghai in l982 showed that 62% of

audiences liked foreign films while only 23% liked those made domestically.75

The result of a l983 study was just as shocking: Judged by what Chinese call

"box office rate" (namely, on average how large percentage of the theatre

seats being filled when a given film was being shown), only 27% of

domesitcally-made movies did reasonably well ("audience rate" at 50% or

higher). The same study also revealed that martial-arts adventures, spy-

thrillers and light comedy topped the audience’s choices, whereas movies

awarded by the government had few audience.76 The fact that over 50% of the

movies lost money forced Chinese movie makers to take the audience’s taste

seriously. In the following years, more researches were done, almost all of

which came to the same conclusion that people went to the movies to amuse

themselves rather than to appreciate those movies' ideological content or

artistic quality. One film critic's policy suggestion was bold and

representative: "Given the consumption structure of our movie market,

entertainment should be the first concern in movie-making."77 Before the

Cultural Revolution, the Party set a guideline for the Chinese movie industry:

28

at least 60% of films dealing with contemporary issues (so-called "policy

movies") and 30% revolutionary histroy, and only l0% or less "healthy" light

comedy. After l986, however, "entertainment films" have dominated the market

(60-70%), outshining "propaganda films" and "art films." 78

Television

Since TV viewing has become the staple leisure activity, it is important

for the state to dictate the content of television programs. Given the fact

that there are no privately-owned television stations in China, at first

glance, this doesn’t appear to be a difficult task. But as in the case of

film, the real situtation is not that simple. Although so far the programs

that Chinese TV audiences may choose are very few, they have one choice over

which the state has no control--turning off the machine.79 To make the

television programs attractive, the State thus has to yield to the audience’s

taste.

Numerous researches have shown that audience watch television mainly for

relaxation and fun. They don’t like programs which carry a strong dose of

indoctrination. Their favorite is TV drama, especially those imported from

Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States.80 As a response, the

production of TV drama rapidly increased in the l980’s (see Figure 4).81 And

imports still accounted for one third of the series shown on television by the

late l980’s.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

Both cases of movie and television demonstrate that the state is no

longer able to competely dictates what people see on the screen. On the

contrary, people’ tastes to a certain extent limit the autonomy of program

planners. In Norbert Elias’ language, here the state and film and TV

audiences make up a "figuration."82 Since the state is the only provider of

films and TV programs, audiences have little choice except to see what the

State allows them to see. But it doesn’t follow that the State can control

the overall bonding in the figuration. To capture audiences, the State has to

constantly rethink what to produce and what to import. In this sense,

audiences restraint the scope of the state’s choices. These interdependencies

29

engender structural tensions, conflicts, and struggles which determine the

direction of the long-term figurational shifts.

Publication

If the state so far is still able to retain its monopoly over motion

pictures and television, its domination in publication has been seriously

challenged.

In the last decade, thousands of printing facilities have been installed

by township or village enterprises or even private entrepreneurs. To seek

exorbitant profits, those publishing concerns care more about "market signals"

than governmental guidelines. More important, required to assume the sole

responsibility for their profits or losses, China’ five hundred state presses

and six thousand registered journals and magazines have also turned themselves

into profit maximizers. As a result, the government has found itself

increasingly unable to control what are being printed. The declining state

capacity in this regard is best illustrated by its losing battle against

"illegal publications."

Since l980, Chinese readers' favor has changed in several

distinguishable turns: detective stories in l980, traditional knight errant

fiction between l981 and l983, modern knight errant fiction between l984 and

l985, triangular love stories in l986, pornographic stories after l987.83

Accordingly, the contents of "illegal publications" have gone from martial

arts to murder, from pornography to obscenity, from feudal superstitions to

directly attacking the Chinese Communist Party and socialist system. The

government has tried to discourage publishing houses from printing "unhealthy"

and "harmful" stuff at every turn, but all its attempts have stopped short of

achieving this goal.84 In the late l980s, in face of growing competition from

hundreds of newly founded pulp magazines, even serious literary journals

became more or less corrupted by profit consideration. To respond to "market

signals," many of them were forced to cater to readers' tastes for

supernatural martial arts, romance, fashion, violence, crime, intrigue, and

above all, sex.85

When the state launched its first crackdown against "illegal

publications" in l987, the target was "underground publishers," namely,

unregistered township or village printing houses that didn’t have permits to

publish.86 However, "illegal publications" became flourishing again in l988.

30

And this time, it was official presses (including ones owned by academic

institutions, trade union, and even the army) that took the lead. Thirty-five

state presses received warnings for publishing pornography in that year.87

But, "illegal publications" were subdued only for a short moment. The

spring of 1989 saw a new wave of pornography. That is part of the reason the

Chinese government initiated a more vigorous campaign against "illegal

publications" after the turmoil of l989. By the end of the year, thirty-one

million volumes of books and magazines had been confiscated, one-hundred-six

pulp magazines, one-hundred-ninety newspapers, and forty-one publishing houses

closed.88 Before long, however, "illegal publications" began to make a

comeback. Varieties of "illegal" books and magazines reappeared at bookstalls

in 1990.89 In the winters of l990 the state started its fourth campaign

against "illegal publications." In spite of those annual campaigns, "illegal

publications" is still flourishing. Hundreds of "underground networks" are

now in operation. Many of them have become highly organized and disciplined.

A recently uncovered network, for instance, consisted of two-hundred-fifty-

seven editing, publishing, and distributional units that were scattered over

eighty-five cities and counties in twenty-seven provinces.90 In the winter of

l99l, China launched a sweeping new crackdown on "illegal publications," the

fifty in a row.91 It curbed "illegal publications" for the moment. But it is

unlikely that the state would win the battle. As long as huge demands for

such "illegal publications" exist, there would always be some people who are

willing to take the risk of violating the laws in order to make big profits.

When I visited China in 1992 and 1993, "illegal publications" were on display

at almost every bookstall.

31

However, the market-oriented reform has eroded the state's ability to

exercise its guidance role. At the same time when leisure is being

depoliticized, it becomes increasingly commercialized. Profit has replaced

ideology to become the primary concern for most of providers of recreational

products, including state agencies. To maximize profit, they often ignore

official guidelines to respond to "market signals." Individual leisure

preferences thus can often be satisfied through "gray" or "black" cultural

markets, which in effect expands people's private space.

32

Conclusion

In the course of China's economic reform, the legitimacy of private time

has been rehabilitated. Along with the changed conception of social time,

private space has been in effect enlarged. Chinese people now enjoy a

relatively larger private sphere than at anytime since 1949.

The expansion of the private sphere is attributable as much to the

state's intentional retreat as to societal forces' "nibbling" efforts. The

state is willing to retreat because it has learned that, left with little

breathing time and breathing space, people are likely to become dispirited and

depressed. To arouse masses' enthusiasm for its "four modernization" program,

the state cannot afford to continue the monopolization and politicization of

people's every minute. But it doesn't mean that the state would take a

laissez-faire attitude toward the ways in which people spend their private

time. Although the state's "indifference zone" has been broadened, it still

hopes to shape people's leisure pattern in one way or another so as to channel

people’s excessive energies into activities that it believes are physically

healthy, morally correct, socially consolidating, and politically integrative.

Table 1: Leisure Time

(in hours and minutes)

Year l980(a) l982(b) l984(c) l986(d) l988(e) 1991(f)

Free Time 2:2l 3:26 3:16 3:59 4:3l 4.48

a. Calculated from Wang Yalin and Li Jinrong, “Chengshi zhigong jiawei

laodong yanjiu [A Study of Urban Residents' Housework],” Zhongguo shehui

kexui [Social Science in China] l (l982): 60.

b. Calculated from The National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui

tongji zhiliao l985 [Chinese Social Statistics, 1985], 307.

c. Calculated from he National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui

tongji zhiliao l987 [Chinese Social Statistics, 1987], 28l-282.

d. Qing Nianbing, "Da chengshi zhigong shenghuo shijian fenpai he

liyong wenti di chubu yanjiu [A Preliminary Research Report on Time-

Budget of Chinese Residents of Big Cities]," Shehuixue yanjiu [Research

in Sociology] l (l990): 92-l02.

e. Calculated from Lu Hanlong, “Laizhi geti di shehui baogao [A

Sociological study of Individual Lifestyle]” Shehuixue yanjiu

[Researches in Social Science] 1 (l990): 83.

f. National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui fazhan zhiliao l992

[Chinese Statistics on Social Development, 1992] (Beijing: Zhongguo

tongji chubanshe, 1992), 114.

33

Table 2: Sixteen Most Widely Circulated Magazines in 1987

(in ten thousand)

1. Gushihui (Story-telling Session)# 494.6

2. Banyuetan (fortnightly)& 457.0

3. Hongi (Red Flag)& 282.0

4. Jiating (Family)* 255.2

5. Qingnian yidai (Young Generation)$ 235.3

6. Gushi dawang (Story King)# l73.7

7. Duzhe wenzhai (Readers’ Digest)% l63.6

8. Gongchan dangyuan (Communists)& l60.8

9. Minzhu yu fazhi (Democracy & Rule of Law)% l59.2

10. Liaoning qingnian (Liaoning Youth)$ 150.0

11. Nongmin wenzhai (Peasants’ Digest)% 133.4

12. Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth)$ 125.5

13. Zhi ying (Bosom Friends)$ 116.5

14. Shanhai jing# 109.6

15. Zhongguo funu (Chinese Women)* 107.0

16. Jingu qiguan (Eternal Wonder)% 100.0

# Story Magazines, * Women's Magazines, $ Youth's Magazines

% Miscellaneous, & Propaganda

Source: Zhongguo chuban nianjian l988 [Chinese Publication Yearbook:

1988], l20-l2l.

34

Figure 1:

200019901980197019600

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000Number of Books Published in China

Source: National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991

[Chinese Statistics Yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo

tongji chuban she, 1991), 755.

35

Figure 2:

Source: National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991

[Chinese Statistics Yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo

tongji chuban she, 1991), 756.

36

Figure 3:

200019901980197019600

2000

4000

6000

8000

Number of Journals Published in China

Source: National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991

[Chinese Statistics Yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo

tongji chuban she, 1991), 755.

37

Figure 4

60 . Zhongguo tongji nianjian l990, 658.61 . Orville Schell, Discos and Democracy, 349-356.62 . Ibid, 355.63 . Ibid, p. 355.64 . Shi Liuzi, "Dianshiju di kewang he kunhuo [The Prospects of TV

Dramas]," Zhongguo zhichun 5 (May l99l): 65. 65 . DSNJ 1989, 336.66 . Tianjin ribao [Tianjin Daily] July 20, l988; and Zhao Renwei,

"Woguo zhuanxingqi zhong shouru fengpai di yixie teshu xianxiang

[Special phenomena in the Income Distribution of Our Country during the

Transition Period]," Jingji yanjiu [Researches in Economics] l (January

l992): 53-63.67 . Contrary to the conventional perception, "second economy" is not a

new phenomenon. At the beginning of the l980’s, there was already 5% of

state enterprise employees who had second jobs. The number of state

employees who took second jobs has steadily increased in the course of

the economic reform. By the late l980’s, about 20% of state employees

were working on more than one job. In Zhenzhen, the ratio was as high

as 35%. Lin Guoxing and Yuan Qingshou, "Shehui zhuyi shehui de zhigong

yeyu laodong[Second Jobs in Socialist Society]," Beifang Luncong

[Northern Tribune] 5 (October, l98l): 64-68; Yang Yuan, "Dier zhiye

toushi [Perspectives on Second Jobs]," Shidai [Times] ll (November

l988): l7-l9; and Zhang Yun, "Shenzhen dier zhiye zhuangkuang kiao cha

[Second Jobs in Shenzhen]," Shehuixue yanjiu [Sociological Researches] 3

(March l989): 76-85.68 . Yi Xudong, p. 7.69 . Martin K. Whyte, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?" in

Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed., State and Society in China: The

38

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19880

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

Number of TV Dramas Produced in China

Consequences of Reform (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 9l. 70 . She Dehu, "Youguan woguo shehui tuanti wenti di shikau

[Reflections on Voluntary Associations of Our Country]," Qiushi [Seek

Truth] l7 (September, l99l): l5,71 . The Council of Trade Unions, Capital Steel Corporation, 'Banhao

zhigong wenhua huodong zhongxin, chujin liange wenming jianshe

[Strengthen Employees' Cultural Centers, Promote the Construction of Two

Civilizations]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] 6 (June, l986): l5.72 . Shao Zhixiong, "Lanzhou lianyou chang zhigong yeyu xinggu huodong

kaizhan huoyao [Pastime Activities are Brisk at Lanzhou Oil Refinery],"

Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] ll (November, l987): 28-29.73 . Chen Lu, "Ba qingnian di yeyu wenhua shenhuo zhenzheng huoyao

qilai [Enliven Youth Pastime Activities]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass

Culture] 5 (May l986): 2-3.74 . Huang Ruigeng, "Wenzhou shi gunzhong wenhua huodong kongqian

huoyao [Pastime Activities are Brisk in Wenzhou]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass

Culture] 10 (October, l987): l6.75 . Chinese Motion Picture Association, Zhongguo dianying nianjian, l984

(Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, l984), p. l9l. 76 . Zhongguo dianying nianjian l985, pp. 67l-675.77 . Wan Tie, “Dianying wenhua shixian zuijia shehui xiaoyi di zhonggao

zhongjie”, in Zhongguo dianying nianjian l986, p. ll-l6.78 . Hong She, “Xiaofei, wenhua, dianying”, Qunzhog wenhua l (January,

l988), pp. l8-21.79 . A national survey shows that one fourth of audiences tend to turn

off the television if they don’t like the program. See Liang Xiaotao,

“Zhongyong dianshitai chuanguo dianshi guanzhong chouyang diaocha fengxi

baogao”, Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian, l988 p. 407.

39

80 . Zhongguo xinwen nianjian l987, pp. l38-l87; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi

nianjian, l987, pp. 469, 475; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian , l987,

pp. 32l-324, 339-340; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian, l988, pp. 400-

4l3.81 . Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian l986, p. 883; Zhongguo guangbo

dianshi nianjian l987, p. 744; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian1988,

p. 59l; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian l989, p. 5l8.82 . Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, l978).83 . Bian Chunguang, "Chong seqing yinhui duwu di chuban suo xiangdao

di [Reflections on the Proliferation of Pornography]," Chuban gongzue

[Publication Works] l0 (October l988): 6.84 . Renmin ribao [People's Daily], November l5, l985; Zongguo gingnian

bao [Chinese Youth Daily], March l6, l986.85 . Shen Daran, "Qingchu jingshen wuran, quanli zhengdun shukan

yinxiang shichang [Clean up Spiritual pollution, Consolidate the markets

of Books, Journals, Audios and Videos]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass

Culture] , l0 (October l989): 7.86 . Chuban gongzou [Publication Work] 8 (August l987): 6-l3.87 . Cai Bo and Yang Jian, "Huangfeng lueguo beijing cheng [Pornography

Wind Sweeping Beijing]," Shidai [Times] ll (November l988): 30-3l.88 . The Editorial Broad, Zhongguo baike nianjian, l990 [China Yearbook

of Newspapers and Magazines, 1990] (Beijing: Zhongguo da baike chubanshu

, l990), l45-l59.89 . Yin Jindi, "Xiaochu huangdu, gongzhai qiunqiu [Clean up

Pornography]," Liaowang 46 (November l2, l990): 6-9. 90 . China News Agency, Zhengjiang, December 25, l99l. 91 . UPI, Beijing, December l9, l99l.

40

Endnotes

41