The political ideology of the Canadian capitalist class

The political ideology of the Canadian capitalist class

M I C H A E L O R N S T E I N

of Sociology, York University, Institute for Social Research and Department

Cet article expose les rCsultats d’une itude nationale faite en 1977 et portant sur les personnes occupant des postes executifs dans les plus grosses corporations canadiennes et les compagnies de grosseur moyenne ainsi que sur les politiciens et fonctionnaires des ichelons supirieurs fCdiraux, provinciaux et municipaux et sur les chefs de syndicats ouvriers. Le personnel de direction dont il est question, a pris des positions considerable plus ii droite que l’Clite de 1’Etat et encore plus i droite des syndicats en ce qui a trait aux politiques de bien-stre social, aux relations industrielles, i I’intervention du gouverne- ment dans l’economie, i l’investissement i l’itranger et aux taxes d’affaires. Quoiqu’on ait trouv6 des differences idhologiques systimatiques entre les personnes clef des corporations moyennes et majeures, entre les corporations d’industries diffirentes et les cor porations i contrde canadien et Ctranger, il ressort que les differences idOologiques au sein de la classe capitaliste sont considkrablement moins &endues qu’entre le personnel dirigeant des corporations et l’ilite de 1’Etat. Ces dCcouvertes prCtent peu de support au capitalisme monopoliste et i d’autres thCories qui suggkrent qu’il existe des divisions idiologiques majeures au sein des classes capitalistes.

This paper presents the results of a 1977 national survey of the executives of the largest Canadian corporations, executives of medium size companies, top level federal, provincial and municipal politicians and civil servants, and trade union leaders. On questions about social welfare policy, labour relations, government intervention in the economy, foreign investment, and taxation business executives took positions considerably to the

* The survey data described in this paper were collected by the Institute for Social Research at York University with the support of a grant by the Social Sciences and and Humanities Research Council of Canada to Tom Atkinson, Bernard Blishen, H. Michael Stevenson, and the author. I owe a special thanks to Michael Stevenson who was jointly responsible for the design of the elite survey. Kathryn Kopinak, William Johnston, William Carroll, and Roger Boe provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. I thank Rosemary Thompson and Charlene Gilmour for typing, Dada Rhyne for editorial assistance, and anonymous CRSA reviewers for thoughtful and extensive comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association in June, 1979 in Saskatoon. This manuscript was received July 1982, and accepted July 1985.

Rev. canad. SOC. & Anth. / Canad. Rev. SOC. & Anth. 23(2) 1986

183 T H E C A N A D I A N C A P I T A L I S T C L A S S A N D P O L I T I C A L I D E O L O G Y

right of the state elites and far to the right of the trade unionists. While, there were some systematic ideological differences between the executives of large and medium size corporations, of corporations in different industries and of Canadian and foreign- controlled corporations, the ideological differences within the capitalist class were considerably smaller than the differences between the corporate executives and state elites. These findings lend little support to monopoly capitalist and other theories which suggest that there are major ideological divisions within national capitalist classes.

Recent years have seen substantial progress in analyzing the history and contemporary structure of the Canadian capitalist class, particularly in terms of industrial development and the impact of foreign investment. A good deal is also known about the largest Canadian corporations, about the social backgrounds of their executives and directors (Porter, 1965; Clement, 1975; ~ 9 7 7 ) ~ interlocking directorates (Carroll, Fox, and Ornstein, 1981), ownership and control, and the occupational composition of their boards (Niosi, 1978; 1981). While many studies have examined specific aspects of the relationship between business and government (Nelles, 1974; Dosman, 1975; French, 1980; Atkinson and Chandler, 1983), much less attention has been paid to the subject of this paper, the political ideology of the Canadian capitalist class (but see Bliss, 1974).

Our analysis of capitalist class ideology is based on interviews with executives of the largest Canadian corporations and a comparison sample of medium-sized corporations. These interviews are set in the context of the opinions of top-level federal, provincial, and municipal civil servants and elected officials, and trade union leaders, all gathered as part of the same survey. For many of the items, the responses of a representative sample of Canadians were also available for comparison. The analysis of ideology is divided into five sections which deal with social welfare policy, labour relations, government intervention in the economy, foreign investment, and the powers and taxation of different sectors of business.

THEORETICAL D I S C U S S I O N

Capital and the Capitalist State An understanding of the political ideology of the capitalist class begins but cannot end with an assertion of its common interest as a social class. For example, the absence of a serious challenge to public ownership of Canadian electric utilities suggests that the availability of low-priced power outweighs business concern with any precedent of public ownership. Still, obvious prerequisites exist for the continuing accumulation of capital. In particular, commodity production must be governed mainly by market demand, with an adequate supply of and legal protection for the purchase of labour power. We hypothesize that the capitalists‘ class position leads them to oppose improvements in the standing of trade unions and social welfare measures such as unemployment insurance that lessen workers’ dependency on employers.

This hypothesis implies a particular, not unanimously accepted, view that social reform results from the pressure of subordinate class and is sometimes supported by state managers. Block (1977) contrasts this model of social reform to ‘corporate liberal’ theory, which holds that the adoption of reforms requires support of at

184 M I C H A E L O R N S T E I N

least a minority of prominent capitalists. Alvin Finkel’s (1978) account of social reform in the 1930s is in the tradition of corporate liberal scholarship, as is Leo Panitch’s (1977: 12) instrumentalist interpretation of the Canadian state. Other recent accounts suggest that the relationship between capital and the state is more conflict ridden, even if the conflict involves disagreement over how to reach common goals (Offe, 1974; Block, 1977; Holloway and Picciotto, 1978). The existence of pervasive policy conflicts between the capitalist class and state officials also contrasts with theories that link policy formation to a general consensus among elite groups or to a more general public consensus.

Of course, these general comments on the relationship between capital and the state must be set in particular historical and national contexts, The view that capitalists and state officials come into conflict over every policy decision is plainly untenable, as is the view that the state officials are fundamentally opposed to capitalism. The critical theoretical issue is whether, at least at certain times, there are significant policy conflicts over state policy. Clearly, the Trudeau era (when the survey examined in this paper was conducted) provides a much more promising field in which to search for capital-state conflicts than the Pearson, Clark, or Mulroney regimes.

Monopoly Capitalist Theory If capitalist defence of their class position creates a united front of the capitalist class, internal conflicts are caused by ’the process of capitalist accumulation as a whole.’ The survival of the capitalist system requires mechanisms to regulate the relationships between capitalists. Marx (1959: ch. 10) argued that the equalization of the rates of profit in different industries, brought about by the flow of capital into industries with above average rates of profit, ensures ’fairness’ in the competition for profits. Only corporations which exploit limited natural resources or have very large shares of a market may be able to gain above average prolfits for indefinite periods. Monopolization (or, more accurately, oligopolization) is thus a basis for conflict among fractions of the capitalist class over relative shares of the total surplus value.

The formalization of these arguments is known as monopoly capitalist theory. Unlike competitive business, very large corporations are said to insulate them- selves from competition by virtue of their size, efficiency, control of markets, and ties with government. The two economic sectors are termed the monopoly and competitive sectors by O‘Connor (1973 : 13-18), the market and planning systems by Galbraith (i973), and the monopoly and non-monopoly sectors by Poulantzas (1975: 135-51)~ Mandel(1970: ch. 12) and Sweezy (1968: ch. 15); Porter (1965: ch. 8) and Clement (1975 : ch. 4) distinguish ’dominant’ from smaller firms. In this paper we use the term ’core’ and ’periphery’ to avoid the questionable inference that the very large corporations said to constitute the ‘monopoly’ sector are actually monopolistic-many of the& corporations are, at most, oligopolistic and many are subject to domestic or international competition.

While the most important distinction between the two sectors is that core, but not peripheral, firms are able to set their prices at levels that assure profitability, core corporations also benefit from economies of scale and are more likely to employ capital-intensive production processes, use skilled labour power, invest in research, and adopt new technologies.’ Monopoly capitalist theories suggest that


the owners and managers of core corporations are more ‘liberal’ concerning public policy issues than their counterparts in the competitive sector (O’Connor, 1973 : 40ff). The greater profitability of core corporations allows their managers to accommodate trade unionism, and their higher rates of pay mean that policies that might decrease the labour supply or raise the minimum rate of pay, such as unemployment insurance, increases in the minimum wage, and social welfare programs, have relatively little impact on core corporations. Core corporations are more tolerant of government regulation. Finally, because core corporations are more likely to operate in international markets, their executives should oppose protectionism and other aspects of economic nationalism such as controls on foreign investment.

Neo-Staple Theory Naylor (1972) and Clement (1975: 2 9 ~ ) ~ propose an alternative division of the Canadian capitalist class into two fractions based on their roles in producing staples. The ’sphere of circulation’ includes banks and other financial institutions, merchandisers, transportation companies, utilities, and the entire service sector - said to share a ’mercantile’ interest in staple exports and to have opposed industrialization before retreating to a position of accommodation with ‘comprador’ industrialists from the United States, while maintaining some industries as protected turf for Canadian capital (Naylor, 1972: 24). Naylor (1972: 3) also argues that an inverse relationship exists between the levels of profits in the spheres of production and distribution. In Clement’s (1977: 291) view Canadian finance capital

entered into an alliance with U.S. industrial capitalists at home and extended their own base of power abroad under the U.S. sphere of influence such as transportation or utilities because they can still extract their surplus by investing their capital into [sic] those enterprises, regardless of ownership.

Clement (1977 : 293) has also portrayed Canadian capitalists as social conservatives who have created a ’highly structured economy with few avenues through which the lower class can rise. ’ While emphasizing Canadian capitalists’ economic conservatism, aversion to risk, and isolation from other classes in Canadian society,4 Naylor and Clement make no explicit arguments about other aspects of their political ideology. Mercantile economic conservatism and the retricted mobility into it lead us to predict that capitalists in this fraction are more conservative concerning social and political issues than capitalists in other sectors.

SociaZ Backgrounds of Capitalists In addition to representing the interests of the corporations which they head, individual executives’ family backgrounds, educational experiences, geographical mobility, and career patterns could affect their ideological positions. A biographi- cal perspective on ideology easily fits into the neo-staple formulation. Clement (1975 : 203) shows that, compared to foreign-controlled counterparts, Canadian- controlled corporations are somewhat more likely to recruit executives from upper-class backgrounds. If earlier socialization is a continuing influence on


ideology, executives from working-class backgrounds should be more liberal than executives from more privileged backgrounds. Alternatively, executives from worhng-class backgrounds may have little sympathy for people not experiencing the same degree of mobility - so we make no prediction about the effect of family background.

Arguments Suggesting a Unified Capitalist ldeology Besides the general influence of their common class position, four specific arguments may be advanced against the proposition that the Canadian capitalist class is ideologically divided. The first agrument follows from Mandel’s (1975: 3off) attack on the concept of dividing capitalist economies into monopoly and non-monopoly sectors. In his view the continuing survival of capitalism requires that ’competition must in the long run assert itself, though not necessarily price competition. Monopoly surplus profits are always subject to erosion’ (Mandel, 1975: 530-1). The absence of a difference in the rates of profit of the monopoly and competitive sectors removes it as a basis of. ideological conflict within the capitalist class. Semmler’s (1982) extensive view of research on industrial differences in profitability lends support to Mandel’s position.

A second argument involves the supposed antagonism between the spheres of production and distribution. As Macdonald argued (1975), in Capital (1959: part IV) Marx described the relationships among the three major sectors of capital as non-antagonistic, first, because industrial capital depends on commercial capitalists to sell commodities and on the financial sector for credit and financing and, second, because the equalization of the rate of profit extends across all industries, whether or not they produce value. Also, transportation is part of the industrial sphere, which is defined as the sphere in which all value is created (Marx, 1956: 152), because value is created in the movement of commodities to their place of use.

A third argument follows from Carroll, Fox, and Omstein’s (1981) analysis of the network of interlocking directorates between the largest Canadian corporations. They found that the network is roughly circular, so that corporations are largely distinguished in terms of their distances from the centre of the network. Attempts to discern distinct groups of corporations within the network failed. The diffuseness of the network of corporate interlocks should promote the overall solidarity of the capitalist class and prevent the development of ideological divisions. The interlocks are reinforced by business interest associations (Coleman and Jacek, 1983), memberships on university, hospital, cultural, and charitable organization boards (Ornstein, 1983), and a web of informal ties (Porter, 1965: 528ff; Clement, 1975: 243ff; Fox and Ornstein, forthcoming).

The fourth argument reflects recent American studies of industrial segmentation which suggest that modern capitalist economies cannot be divided into segments along single core-periphery axis (Oster, 1979; Hodson and Kaufman, 1982). Thus, for example, firms in the most concentrated industries do not necessarily pay the highest wages, enjoy the greatest profits, or use the most advanced technology. These cross-cutting dimensions overlap and diffuse the economic cleavages that might provide a basis for political differences.

Of more direct bearing on the present study are three studies of cleavages in the American capitalist class. Clawson, Kaufman and Neustadtl (1983), Jenkins and


Shumate (1983)’ and Useem (1981) found that region, industry, and various other variables do not have much effect on the ideology of American capitalists.

M E T H O D O L O G Y

Measures of the political ideology of the capitalist class and of state officials, trade union leaders, and the general public were obtained in surveys conducted in late 1977 and early 1978. Although researchers in the tradition of elite theory (Barton, 1974,1980; Higley, et al., 1979; Eldersveld, et al., 1975) have used survey data, surveys have seldom been used to address questions such as those dealt with here. In Canada, Fournier (1976) and McKie (n.d.) have surveyed business executives, but most studies have relied on documentary sources (Bliss, 1974; Mellos, 1978). One important advantage of sample surveys is that they permit the investigation of issues about which there is little public debate, on which business has not played a public role, or on which executives’ public statements are likely to be rhetorical. Of course, surveys are much less suitable for detailed analysis of policy development. Implicit in this paper’s approach, and consistent with a structuralist approach, is the assumption that the study of ideology cannot be reduced to the study of political action.

M E A S U R I N G I D E O L O G Y

As Larrain (1979) notes, widespread theoretical debate and little consensus exist concerning the definition of ideology (see also Hanninen and PaldAn, 1983). This paper views ideology in what Larrain (1979: 14) describe as a ’positive’ sense, as ‘the expression of the world view of a class . . . the opinions, theories, and attitudes, formed within a class in order to defend and promote its interests.’ The term ’ideology’ is used in this paper instead of ’attitudes’ in order to draw attention to its substantive focus - on class relations and the role of the state - and to its methodological focus - on interpreting the responses to individual items in terms of more general ideological perspectives.

In each of five policy areas our analysis focussed on important current issues at the time of the survey. Our discussion of the results is informed by two cautions. First, as Merelman (1968) and Off6 (1974) persuasively argue, the study of issues that have become the subject of public debate conceals the unexamined assump- tions that prevent many issues from entering political debate - systematically excluding issues that might lead to fundamentally alter the structure of power. There is also a danger of overinterpreting the responses to individual questions because of unintentional biases in item wording, and the context provided by earlier items in the questionnaire and carelessness on the part of the interviewer and respondent may combine to undermine validity. In part, these difficulties are addressed by analyzing the business executives’ responses in the context of the state and labour respondents.

SAMPLE A N D VARIABLES

The 142 big business respondents were chief executives (or other top executives designated as their substitutes) of a random sample of corporations chosen from


the 1976 Financial Post ranking of the largest firms. The comparison sample of 43 chief executives of medium-sized business was selected from lists of firms supplied by the Boards of Trade in the twelve largest Canadian cities (with the number of selections proportional to their populations), which makes it difficult to advance strong claims about its representativeness. None of the medium-sized firms had more than zoo employees; the mean was 50 and the median, 59 employees. While much smaller than the large corporations, the medium-sized businesses are also not small retail stores or workshops.

The sample of civil servants includes approximately equal numbers of federal deputy and assistant deputy ministers, provincial deputy ministers, and department heads from the twelve largest Canadian cities, while the sample of politicians includes approximately equal numbers of Members of Parliament, provincial cabinet ministers in each province, and mayors and city councillors from the twelve largest cities. The sample trade of union leaders includes the presidents of the fifty largest trade unions in Canada and top officials of the major trade union centrals.

The ‘neo-staple industry variable’ divides corporations between the spheres of production and circulation, as defined by Clement and Naylor, and according to whether they are Canadian and or foreign controlled. For the large corporations only (no measure is available for the medium-sized firms) capital intensity is measured by the ratio of corporation sales to assets, a convenient but somewhat flawed indicator. Core-periphery differences are examined by comparing the large and medium-sized corporations and (for large, industrial corporations) by the sales-to-assets ratio.

The measure of class background refers to the work done by the respondent’s father when the respondent was sixteen years of age, in particular his occupation, whether he owned a business, and, if he did, the size of the business, and (for non-owners) whether he supervised other workers. Regrouping Wright’s (1976) categories, three class categories for family background were formed: the ’bourgeoisie‘ includes the owners and top managers of business with fifty or more employees; the ‘medium an petty bourgeoisie‘ includes the owners of all business with less than fifty employees; and the ’working class’ includes all non-owners, including semi-autonomous employees and supervisors.5

RESULTS

In each table the top panel compares the corporate executives as a whole to the samples of civil servants, politicians, and trade union leaders and, when possible, to the general public. The second panel of each table addresses the arguments about core-periphery differences by comparing the executives of large and medium-sized businesses. The third to sixth panels, which refer only to the executives of large corporations, examine the effects of industry, nation of control, ’neo-staple industry,’ and class background. The bottom of each table gives the eta values from analyses of variance corresponding to the cross-tabulations. Because it is a continuous variable, the effect of the sales-to-assets ratio is measured by its correlation with the various dependent variables. Because eta values are influenced by the distributions of the independent variables (variables with more categories


tend to have large eta variables), they should be taken only as general indicators of the relative magnitudes of the effects.

Social Welfare Measures The first three items in Table I measure how much effort, compared to levels of effort at the time of the interview, that respondents believed the government should put into health and medical care, providing assistance to the unemployed and helping the poor. Effort was defined as ‘the proportion of our total resources which is spent in each area.’ The fourth, fifth, and sixth items measure responses to the statements: ’there is too much of a difference between rich and poor in this country;‘ ‘unemployment is high these days because it is too easy to get welfare assistance;’ and ’people with high incomes should pay a greater share of the total taxes than they do now. ‘6

For all six items, capitalists are most conservative, trade unionists on the left, and civil servants, politicians, and the general public somewhere in between just where, depending on the particular issue. The business executives were more conservative concerning redistribution than general welfare measures. Only 13 per cent of the executives believed the rich should carry more of the tax burden, compared to 34 per cent of the civil servants, 54 per cent of politicians, 84 per cent of the trade unionists, and 59 per cent of the general public. By comparison, about 40 per cent of the business executives supported greater efforts to assist the poor. The two items bearing on the unemployed also find the capitalists far to the right of the other groups.

Contrary to monopoly capitalist theory, there are no systematic differences in the positions of the executives of large and medium-sized corporations. Not only are five of the six comparisons below statistical significance, but the directions of the differences are inconsistent.

While there were no consistent differences among executives from corporations in the five major industry categories, the executives of foreign-controlled corporations were somewhat more liberal than their Canadian counterparts. The largest difference involved the statement that welfare payments increase unemployment, a statement with which 56 per cent of the executives of foreign corporations and 68 per cent of the executives of Canadian corporations agreed. Because there were no industry differences this effect could not result from the concentration of foreign capital in certain industries. An examination of the ‘neo-staple industry’ typology supports our prediction that the most conservative element of the capitalist class is the Canadian !mercantile’ fraction - although the differences among the four categories are not large. In the sphere of production, the executives of foreign-controlled corporations were generally more conservative than their Canadian counterparts.

Although family background has a significant effect on the responses of four of the six items in Table I, not all the differences are in the expected direction. Among executives with ’bourgeois‘ backgrounds, 85 per cent agreed that welfare payments raise unemployment, compared to 72 per cent of executives with petit bourgeois and small employer backgrounds and 55 per cent of executives with working-class backgrounds. On support for the poor the effect of class background is in the opposite direction: about one half the executives from bourgeois and small

TA

BL

E I

SU

PPO

RT

FO

R S

OC

IAL

WE

LFA

RE

ME

ASU

RE

S BY

GR

OU

P, T

YPE

OF

FIR

M,

AN

D S

OC

IAL

OR

IGIN

(YO DI

STR

IBU

TIO

N)

Am

ount

of

Am

ount

of

Am

ount

of

gove

rnm

ent

gove

rnm

ent

gove

rnm

ent

Ther

e is

too

Une

mpl

oym

ent

Peop

le w

ith

effo

rt fo

r ef

fort

to

effo

rt to

m

uch

diff

er-

high

bec

ause

hi

gh in

com

es

No

med

ical

car

e un

empl

oyed

po

or

rich

and

poor

ea

sy to

get

m

ore

taxe

s ca

ses

heal

th a

nd

assist th

e he

lp t

he

ence

bet

wee

n w

elfa

re to

o sh

ould

pay

of

-

Inde

vend

ent V

aria

ble

Gro

up

Cap

italis

ts

Civ

il Se

rvan

ts

Polit

iaan

s La

bour

G

ener

al P

ublic

Si

ze o

f Fi

rm

Medium

Larg

e In

dust

ry

Indu

stria

l Resources

Transport, ut

ility

M

erch

andi

sing

Fi

nand

al

Nat

ion

of C

ontr

ol

Can

ada

Fore

ign

26

68

6 47

37

16

10

14

72

14

33

40

27

4

12

71

17

22

43

35

6 0

28

72

4 32

64

2 3

50

47

26

46

38

4

21

67

12

58

23

19

12

28

68

4 44

40

16

10

24

72

4 40

39

15

8 19

71

10

43

43

14

10

31

61

8

41

42

17

8 40

60

0 40

33

27

13

38

57

5

43

48

9 15

34

62

4 49

36

15

12

20

74

6

38

46

16

7

50

56

45

13

55

49

50

54

28

54

47

57

52

48

40

64

14

22

22

13

40

38

13

49

47

13

49

44

12

44

54

8 85

6

6 88

86

2

41

16

18

64

22

10

39

71

22

7 20

24

40

62

11

27

22

10

38

63

13

24

24

7 62

65

10

25

40

20

38

64

0 36

18

9

40

50

17

33

9 0

28

61

11

28

6 17

36

55

11

34

12

8 45

69

12

19

32

12

65

40

38

12

68

56

68

69

40

73

91

77

80

56

85

2 13

54

12

34

45

9

46

8 8

84

26

15

59

78

5 17

87

1

12

88

1

11

90

0 10

90

0

10

83

0 17

83

6

11

85

1 14

89

2

9 (7

3)

(69)

TABL

E I

(con

clud

ed)

Neo

-Sta

ple

Theo

ry

Cana

dran

- 'M

erca

ntile

' 41

54

5

49

36

15

16

51

33

58

12

30

9 13

78

84

3

13

(39)

Fo

reig

n -

Prod

uctiv

e 20

73

7

42

43

15

8 46

46

70

14

16

35

14

51

89

2

9 (5

9)

Can

adia

n - P

rodu

ctiv

e 26

71

3

50

35

15

9 53

38

53

9

38

15

3 82

85

0

15

(34)

Fo

reig

n -

'Mer

cant

ile'

20

80

0 11

67

22

0

60

40

63

0 37

13

0

87

87

0 13

(1

0)

Cla

ss o

f Fa

ther

Bo

urge

ois

31

61

8 50

42

8

12

47

41

66

17

17

9 6

85

86

3 11

(3

4)

Petit

bou

rgeo

is

24

74

2 39

44

17

2

46

52

54

16

30

19

12

30

80

0 20

(4

5)

Wor

king

Cla

ss

29

66

5 46

36

18

16

57

27

4

65

31

34

12

54

94

0 6

(54)

Indu

stry

eta

valu

es fr

om a

naly

sis

of v

aria

nce

Gro

up (e

xclu

ding

publ

ic)

.43"

.4

3*

.30*

* .P

3**

.40**

.50"

Si

ze of

firm

.10

.10

.oo

.18*

.0

4 .0

7 In

dust

ry

.17

.08

.13

.06

.30''

.0

6 N

atio

n of

cont

rol

.16'

.1

0 .0

5 .1

7'

.26"

.0

3 St

aple

theo

ry in

dust

ry

.18

.18

.13

.20

.33'

* .0

8 Sa

les t

o as

sets

ratio

(Pea

rson

r)

.08

.26*

* .0

4 .0

2 .0

4 -.

01

Cla

ss of

fat

her

.05

.14

.22*

.1

3 .3

0'*

.21

'sign

ifica

nt a

t .05

*'

signi

fican

t at

.01

NOTE: N

is in

par

enth

eses


employer backgrounds supported greater assistance to the poor, as compared to only one quarter of the executives from the working class.

Only one of the six items is related to the sales-to-assets ratio. That item is the measure of support for the unemployed which is strongly, positively related to the sales-to-assets ratio. Thus executives of labour intensive firms were more likely to support the unemployed, suggesting that they were not especially fearful that social welfare measures would decrease the labour supply.

The results of the bivariate analysis discussed so far are qualified by their basis on single-item measures and the small numbers of respondents in some of the categories. To address these shortcomings, a multiple classification analysis (not shown in any table) of two multi-item indices measuring opinions on social welfare efforts and on redistribution of income was undertaken. This additional analysis shows that, when family background is held constant, the effect of nation of control disappears. Executives from petit bourgeois and small employer backgrounds were more liberal than executives from the bourgeoisie and the working class.

The eta values at the bottom of Table I clearly indicate much less ideological differentiation within the capitalist class than between the capitalists and the other groups. While none of the eta values which measure differences within the capitalist class exceeds .33 and most range between .I and .2, the eta values which measure the differences between capitalists, civil servants, politicians, and labour leaders range between .3 and .5, with the average about .4. Because the magnitudes of eta values are proportional to their squares, the differences within the capitalist class are typically only about 15 per cent of the size of differences between the capitalist, state, and labour groups.

Rights of Workers On labour relations issues, the business executives were again to the right of the other groups. The capitalists were most isolated in responding to the statement ’employees should be represented on the boards of the companies for which they work,’ with which only 17 per cent of the executives agreed or strongly agreed, compared to 50 per cent of civil servants, 57 per cent of the politicians, 42 per cent of the trade union leaders, and 69 per cent of the general public. For the other items in Table II, and particularly for the evaluation of the power of trade unions, the executives proved only slightly more conservative than politicians and civil servants. Executives overwhelmingly favoured the existing level of workers‘ compensation, opposing the increase of payments to injured workers after their injuries. Similarly, three quarters of the capitalists opposed prohibitions on the hiring of strike-breakers, compared to the majority of the public that supported this measure.

As predicted by segmentation theory, executives of medium-sized companies were more opposed to trade unions than their counterparts in large corporations. On the other hand, executives of medium-sized companies proved somewhat less likely to oppose increases in workman’s compensation and the placing of employees on company boards. Although the individual items differed significan- tly, capitalists’ positions on labour relations issues are not consistently related to nation of control, industry, or family background. Multivariate analysis of scale measuring attitudes towards labour revealed only one significant effect: as

193 THE C A N A D I A N C A P I T A L I S T C L A S S A N D P O L I T I C A L I D E O L O G Y

predicted by monopoly capital theory, executives of capital-intensive corporations were more sympathetic to labour. Although none of the groups within the capitalist class deviated from the generally conservative line on labour relations issues, very large differences existed between the business executives and state officials, trade union leaders, and the general public.

Goverrnent lntervention in the Economy Table III shows the responses to the statement, 'The government should provide jobs for Canadians who want to work but cannot find a job,' and reactions to five instances of government intervention in the economy: passage of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), establishment of the Canada Development Cor- poration (CDC), participation in the Syncrude project,' purchase of Canadair, and the Saskatchewan Government takeover of a major part of the potash industry.7 Compared to the bare majority of politicians and civil servants who opposed this measure and three quarters of the trade unionists and 80 per cent of the general public who supported it, two thirds of the executives opposed the government becoming the employer of last resort. Except for Syncrude, the executives were the least likely of the four groups to support government economic intervention. Forty-four per cent of the executives strongly disapproved and 47 per cent merely disapproved of the potash takeover. The civil servants gave majority support of most government initiatives, but were evenly split on the potash takeover and Canadair purchase. More than two thirds of the politicians opposed the potash takeover.

Following the logic of monopoly capitalist theory, the executives of medium- sized firms were slightly more opposed to government employment and gave somewhat stronger support to FIRA and the CDC than big business - perhaps believing that FIRA would provide some protection from takeover. On these issues the industrial differences were fairly large. For five of the six items the executives of resource firms were most conservative. Eighty-one per cent of the resource industry executives strongly disapproved of the Potash takeover and the remaining 19 per cent disapproved; 85 per cent opposed the government acting as an employer of last resort. Even in the case of Syncrude, when government investment was designed to bail out private investors, only 48 per cent of the resource executives approved.

On the left of the business community were the executives of utilities, a number of whom headed crown corporations. As predicted by the neo-staple theorists, finance industry executives were towards the left of the business opinion in their views of government intervention. Manufacturing industry executives were relatively liberal in their views of FIRA and the CDC and the merchandisers were conservative on some issues and near the average on others.

The differences between the executives of Canadian and foreign-controlled corporations were quite small and, surprisingly, there was no difference in their response to the question about FIRA. The statement concerning the government providing jobs as a last resort was endorsed by 32 per cent of the executives of foreign-controlled corporations, compared to 18 per cent for their counterparts in Canadian corporations - a difference which is consistent with our previous findings that the executives of foreign-controlled corporations are more liberal.

Finally, the effect of class background was quite weak and consistent with earlier

TABL

E n

LABO

UR

RE

LA

TIO

NS

ISSU

ES

BY GRO

UP,

TYPE

OF

FIR

M, A

ND S

OC

IAL

ORIGIN

(%)

Am

ount

of

gove

rnm

ent

Rai

se w

ork-

Pr

ohib

it Pu

t em

ploy

ee

effo

rt fo

r m

an's

com

p.

empl

oyer

s re

pres

enta

- w

orkm

an's

to

pay

leve

l fr

om h

irin

g tiv

es o

n co

m-

Pow

er o

f co

mpe

nsat

ion

befo

re in

jury

st

rike

brea

kers

pu

ny b

oard

s tr

ade

unio

ns

Gro

up

Cap

italis

ts

19

72

9 67

17

16

78

8

14

70

13

17

0 11

55

34

C

ivil

Serv

ants

13

75

12

50

19

31

57

12

31

26

24

50

2

21

57

20

POhh

ChS

4

75

21

49

16

35

57

13

30

33

10

57

3 22

58

17

La

bour

0

37

63

24

4 70

4

4 92

29

29

42

57

34

9

0 G

ener

al P

ublic

4

51

45 - - -

29

16

55

15

16

69

8 31

48

23

Si

ze o

f Fi

rm

Medium

23

72

5 57

29

14

82

9

9 51

16

33

0

9 40

51

Larg

e 17

72

11

70

14

16

76

8

16

76

12

12

0 11

60

29

ln

dust

ry

Indu

stria

l 17

73

10

66

17

17

79

8

13

73

14

13

0 13

51

36

R

esou

rces

10

76

14

78

5

17

65

20

15

75

20

5 0

9 62

29

Tr

ansp

ort, u

tility

15

77

8

70

15

15

61

8 31

83

0

17

0 0

69

31

Mer

chan

disin

g 14

79

7

77

8 15

92

0

8 72

14

14

0

20

73

7 Fi

nanc

ial

25

60

15

74

10

16

79

0 21

84

0 16

0

10

75

15

Nat

ion

of C

ontr

ol

Can

ada

18

69

13

73

9 18

75

6

19

75

12

13

0 10

67

23

Fo

reig

n 16

75

9

67

18

15

78

10

12

76

12

12

0 13

54

33

TABL

E 11

(con

clud

ed)

Neo

-Sta

ple

Theo

ry

Can

adia

n - 'M

erca

ntile

' 18

Fo

reig

n -

Prod

uctiv

e 15

C

anad

ian -

Prod

uctiv

e 18

Cla

ss o

f Fa

ther

Indu

stry

Fore

ign -

'Mer

cant

ile'

22

Bour

geoi

s 20

Pe

tit b

ourg

eois

12

W

orki

ng C

lass

21

Gro

up (e

xclu

ding

publ

ic)

Size

of f

irm

Indu

stry

N

atio

n of

con

trol

St

aple

theo

ry in

dust

ry

Sale

s to

asse

ts ra

tio (P

ears

on r)

C

lass

of f

athe

r

69

13

75

11

14

77

3 20

75

10

67

19

14

78

12

10

70

12

72

6

22

73

9 18

78

0

67

11

22

78

0 22

69

11

78

11

11

82

6 12

77

11

66

16

18

75

7

18

68

11

70

12

18

76

9 15

eta

valu

es fr

om a

naly

sis

of v

aria

nce

.42*

* .3

6"

.53"

* .0

7 .0

6 .0

8 .I

3 .0

6 .1

4 .04

.06

.05

.08

.08

.06

.10

.13

.08

.05

.22'

* -.15

86

3 11

79

12

9

62

22

16

60

10

30

89

11

0 67

13

20

77

10

13

.41*

' .2

7**

.13

.01

.19

.06

.23'

-

0 8

76

16

0 12

52

36

0

12

56

32

0 20

60

20

0 6

64

30

0

9 63

28

0

16

57

27

.60"

.17*

.2

1 .0

5 .1

3 -.l

o .10

*sig

nific

ant a

t .05

"s

igni

fican

t at

.01

TABL

E III

Ali

Tll

JDE

S T

O G

OV

ER

NM

EN

T IN

TE

RV

EN

TIO

N IN TH

E E

CO

NO

MY

BY

GR

OU

P, TYPE OF

FIRM

AN

D S

OM

L O

RIG

IN (

% D

IST

RIB

UT

ION

)

Gov

ernm

ent

Supp

ort f

or

Cre

atio

n of

C

anad

ian

Sask

atch

ewan

sh

ould

be

Fore

ign

Can

ada

Gov

ernm

ent's

go

vern

men

t go

vern

men

t em

ploy

er of

In

vest

men

t D

evel

opm

ent

parti

cipa

tion

purc

hase

of

take

over

on

last

res

ort

Rev

iew

Act

C

orpo

ratio

n in

Sync

rude

C

anad

air

pota

sh

Gro

up

Cap

italis

ts

65

10

25

49

12

39

47

17

36

19

15

66

60

17

23

44

47

3 6

Civi

l Ser

vant

s 41

11

46

13

15

72

17

12

71

8

3 89

38

20

42

4

41

10

45

Politicians

46

14

40

24

16

60

21

10

69

11

8 81

40

16

44

23

46

8 23

La

bour

22

12

66

5

13

82

2 8

90

25

8 67

16

12

72

0

18

2 80

G

ener

al P

ublic

Si

ze of

Fin

n Medium

73

2 25

36

10

54

30

26

44

19

18

63

62

17

21

27

56

10

7 La

rge

63

12

25

52

13

39

52

15

33

20

14

66

59

18

23

49

44

1

6 In

dust

ry

Indu

stria

l 68

7

25

45

15

40

41

16

43

17

15

68

50

20

30

40

52

1

7 R

esou

rces

85

10

5

71

5 24

62

19

19

33

19

48

80

10

10

81

19

0 0

Tran

spor

t, utility

30

20

50

58

25

17

69

15

16

8 8

84

54

15

31

54

38

0 8

Mer

chan

disin

g 50

8

42

53

7 40

72

14

14

29

14

57

67

13

20

50

50

0

0 Fi

nanc

ial

4 33

23

52

11

37

42

15

43

16

10

74

72

22

6

47

37

5 11

N

atio

n of

Con

trol

C

anad

a 54

14

32

50

14

36

56

16

28

14

9

77

64

20

16

50

40

1 9

Fore

ign

71

11

18

53

12

35

48

13

39

25

20

55

55

15

30

49

47

1

3

12

88

0 _

--

--

--

--

--

-

--

--

TABL

E m

(con

clud

ed)

~~

~~~

Neo

-Sta

ple

Theo

ry

Can

adia

n - 'M

erca

ntile

' Fo

reig

n - P

rodu

ctiv

e C

anad

ian - P

roductive

Fore

ign -

'Mer

cant

ile'

Clas

s of

Fath

er

Bou

rgeo

is

Petit

bou

rgeo

is

Wor

king

Cla

ss

Indu

stry

Gro

up (e

xclu

ding

publ

ic)

Size of

fir

m

Indu

stry

N

atio

n of

cont

rol

Stap

le th

eory

indu

stry

Sa

les t

o as

sets

ratio

(Pea

rson

r)

Cla

ss of

fat

her

44

28

28

53

14

33

61

14

25

14

76

12

12

52

12

36

43

16

41

24

66

0 34

47

15

38

50

19

31

15

38

0

62

60

10

30

80

0 20

30

57

20

23

61

14

25

43

14

43

14

55

7 38

44

9 47

46

21

33

21

74

10

16

54

15

31

53

11

26

22

eta

valu

es fr

om a

naly

sis o

f va

rian

ce

.31*

.3

9"

.38"

.0

7 .1

5 .1

9'

.29*

.2

5 .3

1**

.17*

.01

.13

.29*

' .04

.23'

.1

8 .2

2'*

.02

.19

.15

.18'

8 78

20

56

9

76

20

50

8 78

16

63

16

62

.19*

' .04'

.19

.18*

.18

. 01

.12

69

17

14

55

14

31

59

23

18

50

20

30

47

28

25

55

18

27

71

12

17

A**

.01

.24

.12

.13

-.11

.20'

47

42

3 8

47

48

2 3

53

38

0 9

6040

0 0

55

42

0 3

47

41

3 9

46

48

2

4

.57*

* .1

7 .2

7*

.07

.11

- .0

5 .l

l

'sign

ifica

nt a

t .05

**s

lplu

hcan

t at

.01


TABLE IV ATITUDES TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY GROUP, TYPE OF FIRM AND SOCIAL ORIGIN (O/Q DISTRIBUTION)

Effects of foreign Integration of Policy on investment on the Canadian and new foreign Canadian economy US. Economics investment

Group Capitalists Civil Servants Politicians Labour General Public Size of Firm Medium Large Industry Industrial Resources Transport, utility Merchandising Financial Nation of Control Canada Foreign Neo-Staple Theory

Canadian - 'Mercantile' Foreign - Productive Canadian - Productive Foreign - 'Mercantile' Class of Father Bourgeois Petit bourgeois Working Class

Industry

Group (excluding public) Sue of Firm Industry Nation of Control Staple Theory Industry Sales to assets ratio (Pearson r) Class of father

2 3 7

21 5

0 2

0 0 8

14 0

1 3

3 0 0

22

0 2 4

2 9 22 65 17 66 17 5 24 31 37 34 62 4 2 19 27 45 36 56 8

13 26 21 19 52 40 8 8 44 25 18 - - -

2 14 23 61 19 60 21 2 7 22 67 17 68 15

3 8 26 63 19 67 14 0 0 9 91 14 72 14 8 0 15 69 15 77 8 0 7 14 65 15 62 23 0 15 30 55 16 63 21

3 12 24 60 22 64 14 1 1 21 74 12 71 17

3 10 24 60 14 72 14 2 2 22 76 11 75 14 3 15 23 69 29 56 15 0 0 11 67 22 45 33

0 6 19 75 19 61 20 4 7 17 70 20 69 11 2 7 28 59 12 71 17

eta values from analysis of variance .37** .26*' .03 .03 .23 .08 .13 .10 .23 .14

-.21 .06" .15 .11

0 50 50 0 69 31 2 71 27 8 81 11 5 84 11

0 61 39 0 47 53

0 50 50 0 42 58 0 33 67 0 38 62 0 55 45

0 45 55 0 49 51

0 43 57 0 49 51 0 47 53 0 50 50

0 42 58 0 64 36 0 36 64

.29**

.12

.13

.04

.05 -.02

.24*

*significant at .05 '"significant at .01


Policy on new Policy on new Policy on new Policy on new investment in investment in , investment in investment in manufacturing petroIeum banking merchandising

7 12 81 5 18 77 42 33 25 14 35 51 8 17 75 13 16 71 56 24 20 23 36 41

11 17 72 18 14 68 53 26 21 21 35 44 26 13 61 43 23 34 65 25 10 45 15 40 - - - - - - - - - - - -

14 16 70 9 24 67 53 26 21 21 37 42 5 11 84 3 17 80 38 35 27 12 35 53

6 10 84 3 21 76 36 41 23 14 35 51 0 10 90 0 19 81 52 19 29 5 38 57 8 23 69 15 8 77 46 46 8 8 67 25 7 13 80 0 14 86 20 47 33 7 20 73 5 5 90 0 6 94 42 11 47 16 21 23

7 13 80 4 12 84 37 33 30 14 30 66 3 9 88 2 22 76 40 37 23 9 40 51

8 14 78 3 11 86 38 24 38 13 30 57 3 9 88 0 26 74 41 33 36 10 39 '51 3 12 85 6 12 82 37 42 21 15 29 56 0 7 93 11 0 89 30 60 10 0 44 56

3 11 86 3 20 77 28 44 28 11 29 50 13 11 76 5 7 88 44 30 26 21 27 52 0 11 89 2 23 75 40 33 27 6 40 54

.19** .32** .19'* .20*"

.14* .14 .09 .13

.20 .22 .19 .19

.09 .15 .07 .04

.11 .17 .09 .07

.17 .11 .08 .06 -.06 -.19' -.01 - .07


results. For four of the six issues, the executives from working-class backgrounds were most conservative. Three quarters of the executives, most of them upwardly mobile, opposed governments acting as the employer of last resort, compared to just over one half of the executives from other backgrounds. Multivariate analysis of a scale of government intervention items confirmed these findings: it revealed only one significant effect, that the executives of corporations in the resource industry were much more likely to oppose government intervention, compared to the executives of corporations in other industries.

Because the eta values in Table 111 show that the magnitudes of the differences between the types of corporations approach the magnitudes of the differences between capital, the state and labour, we can imagine alliances between sections of the capitalist class and the civil service and politicians on the issues considered in this section. It is significant that the largest differences in responses to these issues involved industries and not nationality of ownership or family background, which implies that charactistics of corporations and related differences in their relations to the state are the most important consideration in predicting attitudes towards state intervention. Inasmuch as they require privileged and exclusive access to natural resources, particularly when commodity prices rise, corporations in resource industries are inherently most susceptible and strongly opposed to political regulation.

Foreign Investment Business executives were much more favourable to foreign investment than state officials, labour leaders, and the general public. Sixty-five per cent of the executives said that foreign investment had at least ‘mostly good‘ effects on the Canadian economy; only one in six believed that integration of the Canadian and American economies was too great (compared to at least one third of state officials, labour leaders, and the general public); one half believed that foreign investment should not be subject to any screening. For each of four areas of the economy - manufacturing, petroleum, banking, and merchandising - executives were the most likely to want to ‘encourage’ or ’strongly encourage’ new investment. However, attitudes differed considerably towards investment in the four areas: 81 per cent of the executives wanted to encourage foreign investment in manufacturing, compared to 77 per cent for petroleum investments, 51 per cent for merchandising, but only 25 per cent for banking. At the opposite extreme were the labour leaders, at least one quarter of whom would ’discourage‘ or ‘strongly discourage’ new investments in each area. The pattern of politicians’ and civil servants’ support for foreign investment in the four areas was similar to that observed for executives, but the state officials were somewhat less likely to encourage investment. Outright continentalism gained little support from any group. Even among executives, only one in six supported closer economic integration with the U.S.

In the context of their overwhelmingly positive view of foreign investment, there were some differences within the business community. Executives of medium-sized companies were somewhat less enthusiastic about foreign investment than big business executives. Comparing industries, executives in the financial and merchandising sectors most strongly supported foreign investment,


while transportation and utility executives were the least supportive. Surprisingly, there were no differences between the executives of Canadian and foreign- controlled corporations or among the categories of the related 'neo-staple' industry categorization. A multivariate analysis of a scale of support for foreign investment demonstrated the presence of strong industry effects, unaltered by controls for other variables. Consistent with previous findings, the executives from small business backgrounds were the least supportive and executives from big business backgrounds the most supportive of foreign investment; executives from working- class families had opinions somewhere in between.

There is a very high degree of consensus in the business community over foreign investment, not only with regard to more general questions, but also concerning investment in four different sectors of the economy. The strongest opposition to foreign investment was found among the executives of medium-sized firms and among executives from small business backgrounds. However, these differences within the capitalist class exist in the context of generally strong pro-investment attitudes.

The Power and Taxation of Business Not surprisingly, corporate executives are unlikely to say they possess too much power or have paid too little in taxes. And, once again, the trade unionists differed most sharply from the executives. For example, 10 per cent of the executives said that large industrial corporations carried too small a part of the total tax burden, compared to 39 per cent of the civil servants, 34 per cent of politicians, and 94 per cent of trade union leaders. Only the items dealing with the power of and taxes paid by small business produced a consensus among the different groups of respondents. For the other items, the differences among the business, state, and labour groups were much larger - the eta values varied from .37 to .51 - than the differences within the capitalist class - for which none of the eta values exceeded .25 and more typical values were about .15.

Responses to the questions about the power of large corporations demonstrated sharp differences among the four groups: only one quarter of the executives said the corporations had too much power, compared to 63 per cent of the politicians, 74 per cent of the civil servants, 91 per cent of trade union leaders, and 74 per cent of the general public. Civil servants were more likely than politicians to believe that business was too powerful and corporations too lightly taxed.

There were large differences between the executives of medium-sized companies, four in five of whom believed that large corporations had too little power, and the executives of large corporations, about half of whom took that position. A similar difference appeared in evaluations of taxes paid by small business. Over one third of the executives of medium-sized companies believed that large corporations had too little power in Canadian society, compared to one quarter of the executives of large corporations.

The responses to the questions about taxation reflect rivalries among industries, since the executives of each branch of industry described their own taxes as too high and the taxes of other branches as too light. For example, only5 per cent of the executives of the financial corporations said that banks were too lightly taxed, as compared to 30 per cent of industrial executives; 84 per cent of transportation and

TA

BL

E V

A

mT

UD

ES

ON

TH

E P

OW

ER

AN

D T

AX

AT

ION

OF

BU

SIN

ESS

BY

GR

OU

P,

TYPE

OF

FIR

M,

AN

D S

OC

IAL

OR

IGIN

Tax

burd

en

Tax

burd

en

Tax

burd

en

Tax

burd

en

of s

mal

l of

lar

ge

of b

anki

ng,

of r

esou

rce

busi

ness

in

dust

rial

s fin

anci

al

fim

s

Perc

enta

ge

Perc

enta

ge d

istr

ibut

ion

Gro

up

Cap

italis

ts

Civ

il Se

rvan

ts

Polit

icia

ns

Labo

ur

Gen

eral

Pub

lic

Size

of F

irm

Med

ium

La

rge

Indu

stry

In

dust

rial

R

esou

rces

Tr

ansp

ort,

utili

ty

Mer

chan

disin

g Fi

nanc

ial

Nat

ion

of C

ontr

ol

Can

ada

Fore

ign

27

28

61

74

56

73

63

43

73

91

81

62

67

74

-

37

26

81

24

28

55

21

29

58

32

33

45

31

23

62

27

33

53

20

20

50

21

24

45

26

33

66

1

4 2 4 -

2 1

0 2

59

50

38

68

41

65

65

65

33

64

89

66

65

40

10

56

34

24

58

17

13

24

63

46

39

51

10

65

33

2 43

41

16

60

35

47

18

50

43

7 28

38

35

28

94

6

0 90

10

0 82

18

0

57

23

47

30

39

46

15

16

29

55

34

6 59

35

20

63

17

13

22

65

35

7 61

32

30

58

12

15

27

58

30

9

48

43

5 70

25

5

24

71

67

8 54

38

18

55

27

8

8 84

36

0

43

57

23

46

31

29

7 64

11

5 79

16

5

84

11

5 26

69

34

8 51

41

18

59

23

11

18

71

33

5 67

28

24

67

9

15

27

58

TA

BL

E v

(con

clud

ed)

~~~

~ ~

Neo

-Sta

ple

Theo

ry

Can

adia

n - 'M

erca

ntile

' Fo

reig

n - P

rodu

ctiv

e C

anad

ian - P

rodu

ctiv

e Fo

reig

n - '

Mer

cant

ile'

Cla

ss o

f Fa

ther

Bo

urge

ois

Petit

bou

rgeo

is

Wor

king

Cla

ss

Indu

stry

Gro

up (e

xclu

ding

publ

ic)

Size

of f

irm

Indu

stry

Nat

ion

of c

ontr

ol

Stap

le th

eory

indu

stry

Sa

les t

o as

sets

ratio

(Fea

rson

r)

Cla

ss o

f fat

her

24

26

18

30

14

26

24

.47'

* .1

9"

.14

.14

.01

.08

.10

21

47

0 71

29

5

32

62

2 68

30

5

27

41

0 59

41

12

40

80

04

45

6

0

22

42

0 77

23

8

22

65

2 67

31

11

33

55

0

58

42

0

eta

valu

es fr

om a

naly

sis

of v

aria

nce

.37"

.1

2'"

.18'*

.01

.32

.18*

.0

7 .1

5 .2

8'

.07

.15

.28

.10

.20

.03

.08

.20

.17*

* .10

-.16*

-.1

4

65

30

14

71

24

25

35

53

22

44

56

1

53

39

19

60

29

22

63

37

19

.49'*

.1

5'

.21

.20

.07

.04

.15

67

19

11

69

6 13

50

28

12

57

29

22

65

16

9 63

15

21

60

21

8

.43*

* .1

3 .2

5 .2

5 .1

7

.07

-.07

16

73

30

57

21

67

11

67

17

74

26

53

25

67

.51"

.0

7 .1

9 .1

9 .1

1 -.1

9 .20

'sign

ifica

nt a

t .0

5 '"

signi

fican

t at

.01


utility executives said resource firms were too lightly taxed, as compared to 58 per cent of industrial executives.

Executives of foreign-controlled corporations were less likely than those of Canadian-controlled corporations to believe that they were too highly taxed. In spite of the high level of foreign investment in the resource industry, 71 per cent of the executives of Canadian-controlled corporations, compared to 58 per cent of the executives of foreign-controlled corporations, described the resource sector as too highly taxed. The belief that industrial firms are too heavily taxed was strongest among Canadian firms in the sphere of production; strongest among foreign- controlled corporations in the sphere of circulation.

Within big business, executives of more labour-intensive corporations tended to give stronger support to small business on both the taxation and power issues. This probably reflects the fact that, among large corporations, the labor intensive firms are the most similar to smaller businesses and are likely to operate in industries with considerable numbers of small and medium-sized firms. Class background had little effect on responses to these issues.

SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

The major elements of the ideology of the capitalist class include I/ strong opposition to redistribution of income and support for cuts in assistance to the unemployed, combined with a traditional, paternalistic support for greater aid to the poor; 21 the belief that trade unions are too powerful and strong opposition to legal changes favouring the labor movement; 3/ opposition to most forms of government investment; 4/ strong support for foreign investment, outside of banking; and 5/ support for small business. Whatever its past role in the enactment of social reforms, these data show plainly that the Canadian business community opposes virtually all efforts at further social reform and given the power would roll back many present programs.

The survey revealed very large ideological differences between business executives and the state officials. Not only are these differences substantively meaningful, but they are much larger than the differences between major fractions of the capitalist class. At least at the time of the survey, policy making involved substantial conflicts between capital and the state with different strategies for managing a capitalist economy and society. While these findings run counter to the instrumentalist stress on the influence of business on the state, the survey results do not permit us to choose among alternative explanations of the ideological conflict between capital and the state, including pressure from subordinate classes, the state’s legitimation role, and fiscal imperatives.

There were some ideological distinctions between the monopoly and competitive sectors; executives of medium-sized companies took more liberal positions on income redistribution and the appointment of employee representatives to company boards and the CDC, but they were also more fearful of the power of trade unions. While the last of these findings is in keeping with the general argument that larger corporations can better accommodate the higher wages and higher taxes produced by more liberal state policies, our data suggest that corporations in the competitive sector are generally more and not less supportive of state intervention


- precisely the opposite of what monopoly capitalist approaches would predict. This suggests that, increasingly, small business executives have come to recognize that state intervention is required to protect them from the power of large corporations. However suggestive these results, the magnitude of these core- periphery differences should not be exaggerated. On many issues ideological differences cannot be discerned between the executives of large and medium-sized corporations, and, for the issues on which differences occur, the magnitudes are smaller than the differences between the business, state officials, and labour leaders.

Similarly, there are some ideological differences between executives of corporations in different industries and between the executives of Canadian and foreign-controlled corporations. As suggested by Clement’s finding that they have experienced more occupational mobility than their counterparts in Canadian- controlled corporations, the executives of foreign-controlled corporations proved somewhat more liberal. This difference disappeared when a statistical control for family background was introduced. However, these effects of family background and nation of control were largely confined to items dealing with social welfare programs and with taxes, and did not extend to labour relations issues and foreign investment. The industrial differences also did not extend across the different aspects of ideology.

The relative weakness of ideological differences between major sectors of the capitalist class testifies to the power of the economic and social mechanisms uniting the capitalist class. Those mechanisms include the capital mobility between sectors, interlocking directorates, and business executive participation in various educational, charitable, and social institutions. Whatever its internal divisions, the Canadian capitalist class shares a common ideology that can serve as the basis for its political mobilization.

One political implication of these findings is that efforts to incorporate weaker fractions of the capitalist class into populist political alliances will not likely succeed. The competitive fraction of the capitalist class is distinguished by its strongly anti-union ideology, and on other issues it is only slightly more liberal than big capital.

N O T E S

I On the basis of studies by Jobin (1978) and Nelles (i974), Noisi (1981) argues that the origins of nationalized hydro-electric power reflect the interests of provincial capitalist classes, which used their provincial governments as protection against the monopolistic power producers.

2 The first general discussion of the two sectors is by Averitt (1968). Theories of segmented labour markets, which link sectoral divisions among firms to variation in rates of pay also find their basis in this distinction between economic sectors (Cain, 1976).

staple theory. For conflicting views of the similarity between Naylor’s and Marxist approaches see Drache (n.d.) and McNally (1981).

3 This paper does not consider the relationship between Naylor’s work and Innis’s

4 Clement’s and Porter’s characterization of Canada as a ’low mobility’ society rests


entirely on their observations of the low levels of mobility into the tiny group consisting of the executives of the largest corporations. However, most mobility in Canadian society occurs within the broad occupational structure. There is good evidence that rates of mobility in Canada are very similar to those in other advanced capitalist nations (Turrittin, 1974; Pineo, 1976; Ornstein, 1981; McRoberts and Selbee, 1981).

5 Among the executives of large corporations, thirty-four were from bourgeois backgrounds, forty-five from petit bourgeois and small employer backgrounds, and fifty-four from working-class backgrounds. It is difficult to imagine how methodological differences could account for the very large difference between this distribution and Clement’s and Porter’s findings about the social backgrounds of what they describe as the corporate elite. Therefore there must be a large difference between the class origins of the topexecutives, who served as respondents in this study, and Clement‘s ’corporate suggests elite,’ which includes the directors of dominant corporations, many of whom inherited their wealth and directorships.

6 The responses to all the items were trichotomized: ‘depends’ answers were placed in the medium category and ‘strongly (dis)agree’ and ’(dis)agree’ responses were collapsed, as were ’much more (less) effort’ and ’more (less) effort’ responses. The eta values given in the bottom of the tables were computed using the full range of responses, scored linearly.

7 The Foreign Investment Review Act, passed in 1973, provided for the screening of new foreign investments and takeovers by foreign firms. The Canada Development Corporation was established in 1971 in order to increase Canadian ownership in industry. The federal government and the governments of Ontario and Alberta purchased shares in the Syncrude tar sands extraction plant in 1975 when the withdrawal of one of the original partners in the project, Atlantic Richfield, threatened the project‘s continuation. The federal government purchased Canadair Limited in 1975 from General Dynamics Corporation when its future was in jeopardy. Beginning in 1976, the Saskatchewan government embarked on a program to secure ownership of one half the potash industry in the province.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, Michael M., and Marsha M. Chandler 1983 The Politics of Canadian Public Policy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press Averitt, Robert 1968 The Dual Economy. New York: Norton Barton, Allen H. 1974 ’Consensus and conflict among American leaders.’ Public Opinion Quarterly 38:

507-30 1980 ‘Fault lines in American elite consensus.’ Daedalus 109: 1-45 Bliss, Michael 1974 A Living Profit: Studies in the Social History of Canadian Business. Toronto:

Block, Fred 1977 ‘Beyond corporate liberalism. ‘ Social Problems 24: 352-61

McClelland and Stewart


Cain, Glen C. 1976 ’The challenge of segmented labor market theories to orthodox theory.’ Journal of

Carroll, William, John Fox, and Michael D. Ornstein 1981 ‘A network analysis of interlocking directorates among the one hundred largest

Economic Literature 14: 1215-57

Canadian corporations. ‘ Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 19: 44-69

Clawson, Dan, Allen Kaufman, and Alan Neustadtl 1983 ’Which class fractions fund the new right?’ Paper presented at the 1983 annual

Clement, Wallace 1975 The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power. Toronto: McClel-

1977 Continental Corporate Power. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Coleman, William D., and Henry J. Jacek 1983 ‘The roles and activities of business interest associations in Canada.’ Canadian Jour-

Dosman, Edgar J. 1975 The National Interest: the Politics of Northern Development. Toronto: McClelland

and Stewart Drache, Daniel n. d. ‘Canadian capitalistic development: the Innis paradigm. ‘ Unpublished manuscript Eldersveld, Samuel, Sonja HubCe-Boonzaaiger, and Jan Kooiman 1975 ‘Elite perceptions of the political process in the Netherlands looked at in historical

perspective.’ Pp. 129-61 in Mattei Dogan (ed.), The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants. New York: Sage

meeting of the American Sociological Association, Detroit

land and Stewart

nal of Political Science 16: 257-80

Finkel, Alvin 1979 Business and Social Reform in the Thirties. Toronto: Lorimer Fournier, Pierre 1976 The Quebec Establishment. Montreal: Black Rose Fox, John, and Michael Ornstein n.d. ’The Canadian State and Corporate elites in the post-War period. Canadian Review

of Sociology and Anthropology. Forthcoming French, Richard D. 1980 How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy-Making 1968-1980. Toronto:

Lorimer Galbraith, John Kenneth 1973 Economics and the Public Purpose. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Hanninen, Sakari and Leena Paldiin 1983 Rethinking Ideology: A Marxist Debate. New York: International General Higley, John, Desley Deacon, and Don Smart, with the collaboration of Robert C.

1979 Elites in Australia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Hodson, Randy, and Robert L. Kaufman 1982 ’Economic dualism: a critical review. ’ American Sociological Review 47: 727-39 Holloway, John, and Sol Picciotto 1978 State and Capital. London: Edward Arnold

Cushing, Gwen Moore, and Jan Pakulski


Jenkins, J. Craig, and Teri Shumate 1983 "'Cowboy" capitalists and the rise of the "new right": Capitalist segments in Amer-

ican politics.' Paper presented at the 1983 annual meeting of the American Socio- logical Association, Detroit

Jobin, Carol 1978 Les enjeux economiques de la nationalisation de I'ClectricitC. MontrCal: A. St.

Martin Larrain, Jorge 1979 The Concept of Ideology. London: Hutchinson Macdonald, L. R. 1975 'Merchants against industry; an idea and its origins.' Canadian Historical Review

56: 263-81 Mandel, Ernest 1970 Marxist Economic Theory. New York: Monthly Review Press 1975 Late Capitalism. London: New Left Books Marx, Karl 1956 Capital (vol. n). Moscow: Progress 1959 Capital (vol. 111). Moscow: Progress McKie, Craig n.d. 'An Ontario industrial elite: the senior executive in manufacturing industry.' Uni-

versity of Toronto, unpublished doctoral dissertation McNally, David 1981 'Staple theory as commodity fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian political econo-

McRoberts, Hugh A., and Kevin Selbee 1981 'Trends and occupational mobility: Canada and the u.s.' American Sociological

Mellos, Koula 1978 'Developments in advanced capitalist ideology.' Canadian Journal of Political Science

Merleman, M. 1968 'On the neo-elitist critique of community power.' American Political Science Re-

Naylor, Tom 1972 'The Rise and fall of the third commercial empire of the St Lawrence.' Pp. 1-41 in

Gary Teeple (ed.), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

my.' Studies in Political Economy 6: 35-63

Review 46: 406-21

XI: 829-61

view 62: 451-60

Nelles, H.V. 1974 The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power Develop-

Niosi, Jorge 1978 Le Controle financier du capitalisme canadien. Montreal: Les presses de 1'UniversitP

1981 Canadian Capitalism: A study of power in the Canadian Business Establishment.

O'Connor, James 1973 The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press

ment in Ontario, 1849-1941. Toronto: Macmillan

du Qu6bec

Toronto: Lorimer


Offe, Klaus 1974 'Structural problems of the capitalist state.' Pp. 3i-57 in Klaus von Beyme (ed.),

Ornstein, Michael 1981 'The Occupational mobility of men in Ontario. ' Canadian Review of Sociology and

1983 'Extensions of the network of corporate interlocks.' Paper presented to the American

Oster, Gerry 1979 'A Factor analytic test of the theory of the dual economy.' Review of Economics and

Panitch, Leo 1977 'The Role and Nature of the Canadian State.' Pp. 3-27 in Leo Panitch (ed.), The

German Political Studies. London: Sage

Anthropology 18: 183-215

Sociological Association annual meeting, Detroit

Statistics 61: 33-9

Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Pineo, Peter 1976 'Social mobility in Canada: the current picture.' Sociological Focus 9: 109-23 Porter, John 1965 The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Poulantzas, Nicos 1975 Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: New Left Books Semmler , Willi 1982 'Theories of competition and monopoly.' Capital and Class 18: 91-116 Sweezy, Paul M. 1968 The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly Review Press Turrittin, Anton H. 1974 'Social mobility in Canada: a comparison of three provincial studies.' Canadian

Useem, Michael 1981 'Business segments and corporate relations with U.S. universities. ' Social Problems

Wright, Erik Olin 1976 'Class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies.' New Left Review 98: 3-42

Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Special Issue: 163-86

29: 129-41

Documents

The political ideology of the Canadian capitalist class