The Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism ...hksa/rone.pdfethno-national explanation, likely to appear regardless of socio-economic disparities (Connor 1987; Mikesell

The Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism, Deprivation and Regionalism amongArabs in IsraelAuthor(s): Oren YiftachelSource: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1997),pp. 91-110Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with theInstitute of British Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/623053Accessed: 19/04/2010 02:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Blackwell Publishing and The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) arecollaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Institute of BritishGeographers.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/623053?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black

91

The political geography of ethnic protest: nationalism, deprivation and regionalism among Arabs in Israel

Oren Yiftachel

Past research on protest and conflict among 'homeland' ethnic minorities has concentrated mainly on ethno-national and socio-economic deprivation and has focused only rarely on the influence of politico-geographical factors such as planning policies, ethnic geography, the human reconstruction of social and political space, and the emergence of ethnic regionalism. This paper shows that Arab protest in the Galilee has been influenced by the former set of causes as well as by the region's evolving ethnic geography and by Israel's discriminatory planning policies. The combination of these factors and the continuing (social, cultural and political) reconstruction of Arab space as 'Israel' are spawning Arab regionalism on both state-wide and regional-specific levels. Arab regional protest is focused on national, deprivation and regional land issues, and on recent Arab calls and actions for increased ethnic autonomy which have taken concrete-territorial form in Arab places and regions. These phenomena represent the foundation of a new Arab-Palestinian collective identity in Israel.

key words ethnic protest ethnic regionalism spatial policy Israel Arab-Jewish relations Palestinians

Department of Geography and Environmental Development, Negev Centre for Regional Development, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel 84105

revised manuscript received 2 November 1995

Introduction

Ethnic minorities around the world have recently increased their political self-assertion, thereby generating a wave of research into the causes and consequences of ethnic protest and conflict (see Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Lichbach 1989). The voluminous work on the subject has, however, focused mainly on political and socio-economic aspects, and touched only sporadically on the influence of geographical factors such as spatial state policies and the dynamics of ethnic geography. A particular void exists in studies of the links between the social and political construction and reconstruction of ethnic geography, and the evolution of ethno-political relations (for a notable exception, see Jackson and Penrose 1993).

This paper aims to make a geographical contri- bution to the study of ethnic protest and minority self-assertion. It begins with a theoretical discus- sion on the causes of ethnic protest in general and on the impact of geographical factors on the development of that protest in particular. It then documents, analyses and interprets the evolution of protest staged by the Palestinian-Arab minority in the Galilee region, paying particular attention to the impact of spatial planning policies and the region's ethnic geography. The Arabs in the Galilee constitute a 'homeland' regional minority within a unitary 'ethnic (Jewish) state'. As such, the findings and analysis may be widely relevant and com- parable to a large number of regional ethnic minorities within similar politico-geographical circumstances.

Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 22 91-110 1997 ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) 1996

Oren Yiftachel

Key:

Arab town > 20 000

Arab settlement > 5000

Arab settlement < 5000

Jewish rural settlement (pre 1978)

Jewish settlement (post 1978)

Jewish development town

Regional service centre

Industrial estate

Major road

Boundary of Misgav Council

International border

01 23 45km . I .

Figure 1 Arab and Jewish settlements in the Galilee, 1993

The Galilee region was chosen as a case study because it forms the main regional concentration of Palestinian-Arab citizens in the biethnic state of Israel. In 1994, the region accommodated some 415000 Arabs, who formed 78 per cent of the

region's population (Fig. 1). The Israeli government has attempted continuously to counter the Arab character of the region by increasing the

region's Jewish population. Thus the study of Arab protest in the Galilee addresses the dynamic relations between public policy, ethnic regional geography and political mobilization.

The term 'minority' is used in this paper inter-

changeably with 'ethnic minority', denoting a

culturally distinct group of people, united by a belief in a common past (Smith 1992). Likewise,

the 'Arabs in Israel' and the 'Palestinians in Israel' are terms referring to the same group (with 'Arabs' being generally used in the paper in order to be unequivocally inclusive of sub-groups such as the Druze and the Bedouins). The 'state' is the sovereign body over a given territory, forming a network of institutions and authorities which formulate and implement public policies. 'Plan-

ning (or spatial) policy' is the combination of state activity and regulation dealing with all land-use changes, including settlement, development, infrastructure and building matters. It is, of course, acknowledged that all categories and definitions used in this paper are socially constructed and that their use reflects my own biases.

0 0

0 o

DII

92

The political geography of ethnic protest

Explaining ethnic protest

Public protest is a declaration of disagreement, dissent, objection and unwillingness to comply (Lofland 1985). On a political level, it is one of the most commonly used vehicles of change in a democratic society, ranging from rhetoric to illegal action and violence (Hermann 1995). Minority protest is defined here as the combination of all

anti-government and anti-majority acts of demonstration, dissent and violence staged by a minority group (Gurr 1993). Clearly, a large part of societal

protest rhetoric and activity is a legitimate ingredi- ent of the 'tug and push game of democratic policy making' (Lindblom 1973, 154). However, in bi-ethnic (or multi-ethnic) democracies like Israel, protests staged by an ethnic minority against the

government have been used as an early indicator of potential political instability (Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Lane and Ersson 1991). This is illustrated by the examples of Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka where outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence were pre- ceded by lengthy periods of minority demonstrations and protest (Douglas 1983; Manogaran 1987). The study of protest is thus of critical importance for students of ethnic relations and for public policy-makers.

Most commentators agree that collective ethnic

protest constitutes a stage in the political mobilization of deprived ethnic minorities, reflecting a

challenge to the existing sociopolitical order within their states. However, the more specific causes for ethnic minority protest, particularly among 'homeland minorities' (those residing in the area perceived as their collective 'historical cradle') have been the subject of an ongoing and yet inconclusive debate. A wide range of theories and approaches has been suggested in the literature.1 It should be remembered, of course, that these scholarly approaches are often influenced by the ideological affiliation of specific commentators. In other words, the interpretation of ethnic protest is socially constructed - just like ethnic protest itself!

Nevertheless, in the prevailing scholarly discourse, three main approaches have been prominent: group deprivation, ethnic nationalism and ethnic regionalism (Connor 1987). Analytically, these interpretations can be placed along an imagined continuum stretching between state unity at one end and state illegitimacy at the other. How- ever, they should not be seen as mutually exclu- sive, for ethnic protest - as will be shown later - is

93

often driven by a multitude of fluctuating causes in

particular times and places.

Relative deprivation, ethnic nationalism and ethnic regionalism

The relative deprivation approach claims that

persisting gaps and disparities between minority and majority create increasing tension between the groups, born out of a 'frustration-aggression nexus' (Gurr and Lichbach 1986, 3). Ethnic conflicts often revolve around the distribution of national resources. Ethnicity is perceived as instrumental, forming an effective core around which to mobilize

support for civil struggles (see Glazer 1983; Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985). Accordingly, protest will be

staged mainly against issues of socio-economic

deprivation and will not generally challenge the

prevailing structure and character of the state. In situations of perceived relative deprivation,

the state becomes a key target for minority protest. Given the assumed link between socio-economic

deprivation and public policies, protest against ethnic deprivation may frequently form a reaction to public policies in general and the distribution of

public resources in particular. In that context Gurr (1993), in the most comprehensive study to date on

global patterns of minority protest, finds a direct link between state policy, ethnic deprivation and levels of ethnic conflicts. He also finds that in most reform-orientated regimes, ethnic protest and violence are usually limited. However, the relative

deprivation approach underplays the specific ethnic or cultural nature of homeland group mobilization. It is therefore often found to be particularly applicable to societies where some process of ethnic assimilation or integration is taking place and where ethnic minorities can be categorized as 'ethnoclasses' (Connor 1987; Gurr 1993; Lichbach 1989).

The ethno-national approach for explaining minority protest claims, on the other hand, that ethnic differences in 'homeland societies' are intrinsically embedded in human group behaviour and that ethnic protest and political mobilization are first and foremost expressions of a permanent desire for ethnic self-determination. This approach (which is elsewhere termed 'ethnic phenomenon' or 'ethnic revival') perceives ethnicity as primordial and even 'biosocial' (van den Berghe 1981),

94

and sees ethnic protest as part of a global process of political mobilization among homeland ethnic groups, leading to ever-increasing ethno-national demarcations in multi-ethnic states. Accordingly, ethnic protest is likely to focus increasingly on national, cultural and territorial issues, and less on socio-economic grievances.

Minority challenge to the fundamental structure and legitimacy of the state is, according to the ethno-national explanation, likely to appear regardless of socio-economic disparities (Connor 1987; Mikesell and Murphy 1991; Smith 1981,1986, 1992). However, ethno-national interpretations do not ignore the socio-economic factor: they claim that, during the state-building process which is

generally led by a dominant ethnic majority, peripheral ethnic minorities usually suffer discrimination, exclusion and control 'from above'. Ethnic protest may thus begin with issues of local and general deprivation and move later to demands for territorial and self-determination. Given the 'primordial' ethno-national identity, however, ethno-national issues are likely to generate the most intense levels of protest, as has occurred, for example, in Northern Ireland or Kashmir among numerous other cases of recent nascent 'ethnic-nations' (see Smith 1992).

Ethnic regionalism constitutes the third main

approach for explaining the development of ethnic

protest. Ethnic regionalism denotes the mobilization of regional-ethnic interests within a state, with the aim of maximizing benefits from public resources for the regional group while protecting and enhancing its distinct identity and territory (Kofman 1985; Markusen 1987; McCrone 1993). Examples of such ethnic movements abound, in-

cluding the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Walloons in Belgium or the Scots in Britain. Such

groups usually demand (and often receive) a large degree of ethnic autonomy but they differ from

fully fledged national movements by their lack of

explicit demands for full political independence. The process of ethnic regionalism often reflects

the formation of a group which is neither a fully fledged 'ethnic-nation' (marked by demands for secession or self-determination), nor a mere ethno- class vying mainly for resource mobilization.

Growing ethnic regional protest can be seen as a surface expression of emerging ethnic regionalism. Accordingly, protest is likely to focus on a rela-

tively even mixture of national, territorial and

Oren Yiftachel

socio-economic issues without long-term dominance of any of the above (see Hechter and Levi 1979; Kofman 1985).

Previous studies on the political behaviour of ethnic groups have highlighted a range of goals, from rebellion and irredentism, on the one extreme, to assimilation, on the other (Kofman and Williams 1989; Smith 1981). Ethno-nationalism marks a position which challenges the legitimacy of the existing state, whilst movements based on 'relative deprivation' condone that structure but

challenge the nature of its policies and resource distribution. Ethnic regionalism is positioned somewhere between the two, with a challenge being posed against both the legitimacy of the state and the nature of its public policies.

Given this dual orientation, ethnic autonomy is a common goal of ethnic regionalism. This

goal entails - to varying degrees - ethnic

self-government in 'internal' matters, such as local government, education, culture and urban and regional development. The arrangement of ethnic autonomy can manage the vexing issue of

legitimacy of the state, as members of minority communities often focus on their cultural and

regional affairs, thereby sidestepping many authorities and institutions dominated by other ethnic groups. Arrangements for autonomy may be individual, cultural, religious or territorial

although, in most cases, the minority tends to territorialize its autonomy through the spatial practices of local governments, regional councils or special-purpose authorities (Keating 1988).

Significantly, the situations in which ethnic

regionalism and demands for autonomy emerge are usually complex, with conflicting forces at work from within the ethnic group and from external forces. In the context of a globalizing economy taking place alongside a pervasive drive for ethnic self-determination and 'nation-statism' (Anderson 1991; Taylor 1994), national elements in most homeland ethnic groups - wherever they are - are likely to push for independence. However, other elements within the group, usually those

benefiting from incorporation into the existing state, are likely to resist such a move and to opt to

stay within the state and struggle for better economic and political conditions. In addition, external forces and 'objective' circumstances, such as the

group's size, the capabilities of its leadership, its resources and the geopolitical and economic interests of the surrounding states, may limit

The political geography of ethnic protest the political options available to ethnic groups (Keating 1988; McCrone 1993).

As Keating (1988) argues, ethnic regionalism should be seen as a product of the parallel forces of nationalism and capitalism, and the imperfect nation-state system created by these two forces. In that system, state administrations have assumed control over the economic development, the culture and the political power of the regions under their sovereignty (Taylor 1994). States, however, distribute resources, power and rights unevenly, thereby causing new disparities and tensions. Quite commonly, ethnic regionalism will emerge as a reaction to these relatively new conditions within states. While usually drawing on long-standing traditions and cultures, ethnic regionalism is not, therefore, necessarily a 'throwback to the past' but rather a renewed collective identity born out of recent political, territorial and economic circumstances.

Subsequently, as Penrose (1994) and Williams (1988) show, ethnic regional-political demands (as opposed to explicit nationalist or deprivation goals) may vary over time in response to changing social, economic and political conditions. Ethnic

regionalism and autonomism should therefore be

perceived as political demands that emerge from a

specific balance of forces and not as a fixed and

ever-lasting ethno-political goal. Ethnic regionalism often constitutes the most expedient compromise between the combination of internal and external forces, and thereby provides a solid political cause around which the community can

successfully unite. Clearly, though, there are no 'essential' or 'natural' prerequisites for the emer-

gence of ethnic protest because it is a socially constructed phenomenon shaped by constant inter- action between human actors and social structures at specific places and historical periods.

Regionalism and protest Given the complexity of ethnic regionalism, the various causes of ethnic regional protest often intersect, with protest activities incorporating a range of different (though related) explicit and implicit motives. Ethnic protest therefore reflects the changing nature and emphases of ethnic demands, as a key instrument for rallying and demonstrating support for these demands vis-a-vis the state. However, beyond mere reflections of other events and problems, ethnic protest also acts as a symbol and a generator of collective identity.

95

The process of planning, preparation and the act of

protest itself have often fuelled and accelerated the

emergence of ethnic and other social movements (Lofland 1985; Weller and Guggenheim 1982). Key protest events, particularly those occurring in

highly conflictual circumstances, often find their

way into the group's collective memory, thereby forming a key role in the shaping of its communal

identity. In this vein, Gelvin (1994) notes that protest

activity can be analysed as 'collective ceremonies' used by certain groups in their attempts to define, strengthen and expand a political community. In this way, protest acts as a societal model, representing both a model of reality (where social soli-

darity and common struggle are demonstrated) and a model for reality (where the desired future is sketched and promoted). The study of protest activity can thus reveal a great deal about the situation of a given group, as well as its ongoing identity formation and aspired future. However, as

Routledge (1992) shows, the politics of ethnic iden-

tity, and its position vis-a-vis the state, must take into account the mediation of place and space.

Planning policies, ethnic geography and

regionalism Critically, the various political goals of ethnic minorities highlighted above, and the way in which protest activities interact with these goals, cannot be divorced from the geography of ethnic relations and the way in which this geography has, and is, being created. However, these critical factors - without which no understanding of ethnic

protest can be complete - have received only scant attention.

Almost all the large-scale comparative studies on ethnic protest2 (which have generally attempted to create all-encompassing models explaining ethnic and minority insurgency) have largely ignored or underplayed the geography of the cases in their studies. In Gurr's (1993) most comprehensive attempt to survey ethno-political conflicts globally, for example, the conceptual model developed to explain the main causes for minority political mobilization includes a range of political and social variables, such as past and present autonomy, political and economic discrimination, cultural differences and perceived social and cultural rights. Only one variable in the model - termed 'ecological and demographic stress' - refers indirectly to geographical or spatial factors.

96

Further, in a sweeping review of the link between ethnic inequality and political conflict, Lichbach (1989) ignores almost totally the key spatial dimension of uneven urban or regional development, the impact of regional ethnic concentrations or the globalization of capitalist ac- cumulation in his otherwise powerful analysis. As Routledge (1992, 589-90) notes

research tends to unify the heterogeneity of collective action by either the use of key analytical concepts such as class struggle, or through empirical generalisations ... without due consideration of particular spatial and cultural contexts.

This deficiency is somewhat surprising because a rich geographical literature on ethnic relations does exist.3 However, this literature has also rarely ven- tured into an empirical examination of ethnic protest and insurgency. An interdisciplinary approach becomes essential here because the mobilization of ethnic political activity is profoundly shaped by both social and geographical reconstruction of

living space. Two specific (and related) geographical factors are particularly important if a full

understanding of the emergence of ethnic protest and political mobilization is to be achieved: state

spatial planning policy and the structures and

dynamics of ethnic geography. Ethnic relations within any multi-ethnic state are

intimately linked to the spatial planning policies pursued by its government. Such policy controls, regulates and, at times, even initiates the location, character and timing of development within the state boundaries; it is an arm of the state with a

powerful potential to shape the relations between the various groups making up the polity. Planning policies possess three key dimensions which influence ethnic relations: territorial (influencing the

ownership and control of land), socio-economic

(affecting the distribution of positive and negative externalities) and procedural (influencing patterns of exclusion and inclusion in the policy-making process) (Friedmann 1992; Yiftachel 1992a).

The territorial dimension of spatial planning policies is particularly important for the explanation of protest by homeland regional minorities. This dimension governs issues such as public land

ownership, ethnic land control (through the demarcation of administrative and planning boundaries) and ethnic settlement patterns. Given the centrality of territory and territoriality to the

process of collective identity-building and political

Oren Yiftachel

mobilization experienced by regional ethnic

groups (see Sack 1986), this dimension of planning policy is critical to affected groups and has been the

subject for persistent rallying, protest and violence. This will be illustrated in the Israeli case study later in the paper.

Furthermore, in multi-ethnic societies, particularly in 'deeply divided' states (those occupied by homeland, non-assimilating communities), governments have often used the more subtle socio- economic and procedural dimensions of planning policy (and not only the explicit territorial dimension) as a tool deliberately to reshape ethnic relations. The ability to determine the location of key land uses (with their negative and positive externalities), the allocation of financial benefits to particular regions and the appointment of planning bodies and authorities from selective sections of the population have all become instruments in state attempts to establish a desired pattern of ethnic social and political relations (see Friedmann 1995; Mikesell and Murphy 1991; Yiftachel 1992a).

Given these links, it is noteworthy that the

impact of planning policies on ethnic relations has remained relatively under-researched. While the links between economic public policy and ethnic

deprivation have been studied (for example, Gurr 1993; Lichbach 1989), the more specific area of

spatial, regional or land-use planning has hardly figured in these studies. Here, again, the lack of serious attempts to bridge the analytical and

empirical gap is mutual, as very few studies on

planning history, theory or practice have seriously investigated the link between planning policy, protest, politics or regional movements (for notable

exceptions, see Friedmann 1995; Thomas 1993). Yet both ethnic and planning studies could benefit

greatly from this mutual engagement because, as noted above, no understanding of evolving social relations or policy practices can be complete without recognizing the role of social construction and human intervention through which policies and social relations are constantly being reshaped. The

empirical sections below will attempt to build on

previous non-planning studies (such as Keating 1988; Mikesell and Murphy 1991) and decipher how policy, geography and protest interact in the

process of minority regionalism. The structure and dynamics of ethnic geography

is the second spatial factor often underplayed by literature on political mobilization and protest. Needless to say, that geography is (at least partially)

The political geography of ethnic protest an outcome of the state's planning and development policies discussed above. There is no need to repeat here the extensive work of previous studies,4 beyond mentioning that geographical factors, such as the

proximity to ethnic communities outside the state, the existence and activity of diasporas, the political- geographical structural of the state (be it federal, unitary or a combination of the two), the degree of

spatial and regional concentration of ethnic communities and the level, direction and nature of ethnic settlement and migration all exert a significant influence on the politics of ethnicity in general and levels of minority protest in particular.

The last factor, namely ethnic settlement and

migration, usually receives only little attention, even amongst geographers. However, the dynamics of regional settlement in general and ethnic

regional mix in particular are of critical importance to the understanding of ethnic regional behaviour. Needless to say, mixed regions are seldom created 'naturally' and are often the result of government planning and settlement policies which attract

majority populations to peripheral regions dominated by ethnic minorities (Yiftachel 1994). These minorities are often subject to adverse government policies which reduce their land resources, change their cultural milieu and dramatically alter the

development process of their regions (see also Friedmann 1992, 1995; Keating 1988).

The specific impact of ethnic regional mix on minority protest and insurgency is, however, yet to be seriously studied. Most work of that nature focused on an urban scale (see Boal 1987; Eyles 1990), leaving the consequences of ethnic regional mix relatively unexplored.5 The events of recent years in Croatia, Bosnia and Azerbaijan further stress the problematic nature of ethnic regional mix in the context of democratization. The case study presented below aims to provide a modest contri- bution to this evolving understanding.

Before moving to this study, it must be stressed again that the various causes of minority protest noted above are not necessarily contradictory and that protest is not guided by a set of 'essential' or 'natural' driving forces. The forces which generate ethnic protest should rather be seen as components which ebb and flow in response to specific social and political circumstances in time and place. In a similar vein, the interpretation of protest (by public and scholarly discourses alike) is significantly shaped by ideologies, ethnic affiliation and other social constructions.

97

The Palestinian-Arab minority and public policy in the Galilee

Palestinian-Arabs in Israel Arabs in the Galilee form the largest regional concentration of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel (within its pre-1967 borders), which includes all Arabs with Israeli citizenship. It is a non- assimilating community which, in 1994, numbered some 810 000 people and constituted 16 per cent of Israel's population. Arabs in Israel reside in three main regional concentrations (of which the Galilee is the largest) as well as several mixed cities (see Fig. 1).

The historical and political background to Arab- Jewish relations in Israel is covered extensively elsewhere (see Smooha 1989; Yiftachel 1992b). It should, however, be noted that the evolution of these majority-minority relations has been strongly influenced by the middle eastern conflict in general and by the Jewish-Palestinian struggle for control over Palestine/Israel in particular (Portugali 1993). Palestinian-Arabs who remained in Israel (on their own historical land) following the 1948 war have therefore been considered by many Jews to be a 'hostile minority' in a context of ongoing political and military tension between Arabs and Jews. Indeed, it is through a rapid and radical process of social and political reconstruction, orchestrated by the Jewish majority, that the Arabs have found themselves marginalized and disempowered. This process has led to their intense political mobilization.

Rather than migrating to the cities, Arabs in Israel and in the Galilee have generally remained in their urbanizing villages. In recent decades, they have also experienced an occupational change from peasantry to hired and self-employed labour (Khalidi 1988; Zureik 1979), a shift towards the political left (Smooha 1989) and a rise in the influence and strength of Muslim movements. These changes have been accompanied by a steady rise in living and educational standards, and a growing participation in Israel's politics and economy (al Haj 1988; Rouhana and Ghanem 1993; Smooha 1992). However, as a result mainly of the ongoing Arab-Jewish conflict, the minority has also been subject to continuous policies of control and discrimination, including military rule from 1948 to 1966, a forced transfer of an estimated 50-60 per cent of its lands to the state and a persistence of socio-economic and power disparities between

98

Arabs and Jews in Israel (Haidar 1991; Yiftachel 1992a; Zureik 1993).

In recent years the Arabs have become increasingly organized politically and have staged a campaign for civil equality in Israel. This has caused, at least in the short term, some decline in the level of control and discrimination, especially after the return of a Labour government to power in 1992 (Sikkuy 1994). The growing militancy of the Arab political campaign gave rise to various scholarly interpretations, representing two main competing approaches: (i) the politicization approach, which claims that the growing assertion and militancy of the minority reflects, first and foremost, a struggle for better terms of Arab-Jewish coexistence in Israel and an acceptance of life as an ethnic minority within a Jewish 'ethnic democracy' (Ginat 1989; Lehman-Wilzig 1992; Smooha 1990, 1992); and (ii) the radicalization approach, which argues that the strengthening Arab struggle for civil rights masks a deeper process of Palestinian nationalism likely to lead towards Arab separatism (Landau 1993; Regev 1989; Softer 1988, 1992).

In reference to the ethnic mobilization theories discussed earlier, the politicization school is close to the 'relative deprivation' interpretation, claim- ing that most Arab protest can be attributed to the gaps and disparities experienced vis-a-vis Israel's Jewish population, while the radicalization

approach is closer to the 'ethnic nationalism' inter-

pretation, postulating that growing Arab protest is

part of a universal and inevitable process experienced by minorities around the globe, regardless of their socio-economic position. Despite its im-

portance and centrality to the understanding of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel, I have previously criticized the politicization-radicalization debate as presenting a false dichotomy (Yiftachel 1992b). The analysis of Arab protest below shows that neither politicization nor radicalization can

adequately explain the evolution and nature of Arab protest.

The Arab political campaign in the Galilee and in Israel has been led by several key voluntary bodies. These include the National Committee of the Heads of Arab Councils (the National Com- mittee) and the National Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands (the Lands Committee), which began operating in the mid-1970s and, later, the Following Committee (which is closely associ- ated with the National Committee), the Druze Committee, the Association of the 40 and several

Oren Yiftachel

Muslim movements (for details on these organizations, see Rouhana and Ghanem 1993). While subject to ongoing struggles for hegemony within Arab society, these organizations have remained at the helm of Arab protest during the last two decades. More recently, the Muslim Movement has been active within individual villages (Ghanem 1992).

Israel's policies and ethnic geography in the Galilee Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the state has pursued a policy of 'Judaising the Galilee' as a response to the decisive Arab majority in the region. The dominance of Arabs in the region has been perceived by Israeli policy-makers as a threat to state security, a perception spawning continuous efforts at increasing its Jewish population in order to create a 'better population balance' between Arabs and Jews (Softer and Finkel 1989). These efforts resulted in the establishment of several Jewish towns during the 1950s and 1960s, and assumed increasing urgency during the mid-1970s (Carmon et al. 1991; Kipnis 1987; Softer and Finkel 1989). Subsequently, a Jewish settlement pro- gramme was implemented in the Galilee during the late 1970s and early 1980s, creating 62 new small Jewish settlements (known as mitzpim) and

enlarging the existing Jewish towns. In addition, several industrial estates were created with a range of new industries and a road network developed to serve the new settlements. The government con-

tinuously attempted to attract Jewish migrants and investors into the region with a range of financial benefits, available only for Jews, and a promise of a better quality of life (Carmon et al. 1991; Falah 1990).

At the same time, the Arab population in the region was expanding rapidly due to high rates of natural growth. Many small villages have grown into small- and medium-size towns, and have

dramatically increased their physical size as a result of low-density suburbanization (Schnell 1994). The two Arab cities - Nazareth and Shfa'amer - have also grown, forming the main administrative, economic and political centres for the Arabs in the region. The settlement geography in the Galilee has therefore changed markedly since 1948, particularly from the late 1970s. The

region currently consists of a complex mixture of Arab villages, towns and cities; a range of

dispersed small Jewish mitzpim and agricultural


settlements; three Jewish towns and two Jewish cities (Fig. 1).

Israeli policy in the region is discriminatory. It has

deliberately attempted to control, contain and de-

prive the Arabs by policies of land seizure, contain- ment of village housing construction, location of

virtually all government-assisted economic development in Jewish areas and the persistent exclusion of Arabs from most forums of regional policy-making (see Yiftachel 1992a, 1995, 1996). Arab protest should therefore be understood not as a 'natural' or 'inevitable' activity of a regional minority but rather as caused by intense human intervention expressed through central government policies and a con-

stantly changing regional geography. Given the dis-

criminatory nature and spatial outcomes of Israeli

policy, Arab protest in the region has been shaped largely as a form of social and political resistance to Jewish and state domination and control.

Arab protest in the Galilee, 1975-1991

Methodology Data on Arab protest in the Galilee were collected for the 1975-91 period, during which a profound political mobilization of the Arab minority in Israel had started to occur (al Haj and Rosenfeld 1990). These data pertained only to collective protest activity (not rhetoric). Protest was considered

'regional' only if it had participants from at least five of the region's Arab villages. Data were com-

piled from a search of three newspapers, archives of Arab organizations, records of state authorities and personal interviews. Data on protest events were translated into an index of 'protest intensity'. The quantification of this index was based on three key features of protest activity: (i) duration (measured by days); (ii) size (measured by number of participants); and (iii) strength (measured by level of violence, arrests or conflict with authorities; see Appendix). This procedure broadly fol- lows the methods used by Gurr (1993) and Hibbs (1973). In addition, Arab protest was broken down into the main protest issues, based on a systematic content analysis of related publications.

The evolution of protest Figure 2 traces the evolution of Arab protest in the region on a six-monthly basis, in terms of number of events and their respective intensity (see Appendix). The main peaks in the graph denote

99

the periods of most intense Arab protest which

usually culminated in the declaration of state-wide

general strikes, during which business, work, municipal and education activities in the Arab

community ceased. Eleven such strikes were

staged during the study period (in addition, of course, to many local and regional strikes), as listed in Table I.

Although these general state-wide strikes constituted the peaks of Arab protest, 156 other regional strikes and events also took place. Only the combination of state-wide activities (like the general strikes) and more local or sectoral events can

accurately portray the overall pattern of Arab protest in the Galilee shown in Figure 2. This figure highlights three related trends. First and foremost, Arabs in the Galilee have used political protest increasingly in an attempt to attain their goals in Israeli society. Given the relative lack of Arab

protest in the long period prior to 1976, it is clear that since that date the Arabs have transformed their political behaviour, drawing on their numbers and on various methods of political protest as a

strategic tool of the first order.

Secondly, there is a steady (if fluctuating) rise in the number of protest events: while in the late 1970s, after the sudden burst of protest due to the first 1976 Land Day, the annual average was around two to three events, during the late 1980s and early 1990s this figure increased to between fourteen and twenty, with some decline in 1991.

Beyond the research period, it may be of interest to note that the 1991 level was broadly maintained in 1992 and 1993 but a rise in the number of protest events was registered again in 1994.

Thirdly, a more consistent rise is notable in the intensity of Arab protest: the relatively small increase over the study period in the number of annual events is somewhat misleading when the dramatic rise in the annual intensity of protest is taken into account. In other words, Arabs in the Galilee have staged longer, larger and more militant protests as time progressed. This longitudinal trend is further emphasized in Figure 2, where a three-year mean of Arab protest intensity is plot- ted. A consistent rise in regional protest intensity is clearly evident from 1975.

Despite years of frustration and discrimination in Israel, Arab protest has, in general, taken democratic forms and remained within the non-violent confines of the law. However, violence has exploded occasionally, especially in recent times.

100

120

100

80

c e

Oren Yiftachel

60

40

20

0 I) O - CO 0) 0 C X C) l LO X c0 ) COa o - I' ̂ - r- oo co CDooo o co co co CD co Cob o

Year

---- No. events [ Intensity - --- 3-year intensity mean

Figure 2 Arab protest in the Galilee, 1975-91, by event numbers and intensity (six monthly) The large numbers denote national (Palestinian) events, as detailed by the corresponding events numbers in Table I

Table I General strikes staged by Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, 1975-1991

1 March 1976: first Land Day (protesting against land expropriation) 2 September 1982: strike in protest of the massacre in Sabra and Shatila (during the Lebanon War) 3 June 1987: Equality Day (protesting against discrimination of Arabs in Israel) 4 December 1987: Peace Day (striking in support of Palestinian uprising in occupied territories - the Intifada) 5 March 1988: thirteenth Land Day (protesting over Israel's treatment of Palestinians during Intifada) 6 November 1988: Dwelling Day (protesting against the demolition of unauthorized dwellings and against Israel's planning and

land policies 7 March 1989: fourteenth Land Day (protesting against Israel's Intifada policies and against discrimination, municipal financial

allocations and continuing land expropriation in Israel) 8 February 1990: strike against discrimination in municipal budgets 9 March 1990: fifteenth Land Day (protesting over Intifada events and against land policy following arrival of mass migration

from USSR) 10 May 1990: strike in protest of the killing of seven Arabs by a Jewish reserve soldier 11 October 1990: two-day strike in protest over the killing of 21 Arabs in Temple Mount, Jerusalem

Violent demonstrations and clashes with Israeli

police, during which hundreds of arrests and tens of injured police and demonstrators were reported during November 1988, March 1990, May 1990, October 1990 and again in February 1994 (when an Arab was killed by police during a demonstration in the Negev). Arab leaders often claim the violence is induced by the large presence of police

at their protest events but, while this argument is partially accepted, the growing incidence of

anti-police violence appears to have a more profound significance. It brings to light the potentially explosive nature of Arab protest, as a regional ethnic minority experiencing both material deprivation and a rise in ethno-national sentiments.


Key influences on Arab protest Ethnic regional protest is usually driven by national, regional and deprivation issues in a range of combinations mediated by state policy and dynamic spatial circumstances. Accordingly, content analysis of the reporting of Arab protest and its accompanying material (leaflets, press releases and interviews) shows that three groups of causes un- derlay most Arab protest in the region: (i) national issues (mainly pertaining to the Palestinians outside Israel); (ii) socio-economic and bureaucratic deprivation; and (iii) regional land, territorial and building issues (hereafter termed 'planning' issues). In the latter two categories, protest was staged mostly against Israel's policies in these areas which have generally worked against Arab interests.

Inevitably, the breakdown into these three categories is somewhat artificial because issues have often overlapped in their explicit and implicit use. When particular protest events were declared for more than one issue, the 'intensity score' allocated to that event was divided according to the assessed importance of the issue in the particular event. Thus, while this methodology may obscure certain subtleties, it does represent the main thrusts of Arab protest and political mobilization in the Galilee.

National issues Figure 2 demonstrates the dramatic impact of national 'events' on the evolution of Arab collective protest, with most 'peaks' in protest intensity corresponding to (usually traumatic) events in recent Palestinian history. However, longitudinal quantitative analysis of the three main protest issues (measured by their intensity score) shows a fairly even distribution: 35.1 per cent of protest was staged over planning issues, 34.3 per cent over socio-economic deprivation and 30.6 per cent over national-Palestinian issues.

Protest has been most intense over national- Palestinian issues. The average mean of a protest event on national issues was 11-1 points, compared with 3.8 points on planning and land issues, and 3-3 points on socio-economic deprivation (Appen- dix). The importance of national issues was especially pronounced during events in the Lebanon War of 1982-3 and the Intifada (1987 onwards) (Fig. 2). This demonstrates the unparalleled power of national-ethnic issues to mobilize the Palestinian- Arab population in the Galilee, as well as in the rest of Israel. Apart from the first Land Day in 1976,

101

the most intense and violent protest events (Peace Day, the thirteenth and fourteenth Land Days, and the mourning over the victims of Sabra and Shatila) were all events of an unambiguous national-Palestinian nature.

The events over which 'national' protest was staged occurred outside Israel, which further illustrates the potency of the national cause to ignite ethnic protest, even from afar. This lends support to the 'ethnic nationalism' explanation of mobilization and protest. The power of this issue was illustrated once more in February and March 1994, following the murder of 29 Palestinians at a sacred grave in Hebron, when the Arab minority in Israel staged a two-day general strike accompanied by large-scale demonstrations and violence. However, the national-Palestinian issue is far from being the only significant generator of Arab protest in the Galilee.

Deprivation and policy Beyond the pronounced impact of national issues, matters of relative deprivation and of land and territory have also shaped Arab protest during the research period (Fig. 3). These issues are directly linked to Israel's planning and socio-economic policies in the region - many of which have caused or exacerbated the deprivation of Arabs in the region - and by consistent (if recently declining) programmes of state control.

In such a context, the temporal association between Israeli policies and Arab protest in the region is revealing. Several notable peaks in Arab protest can be attributed to reaction and opposition to 'control' (planning or socio-economic) policies. The periods of these peaks include early 1976, with events surrounding Land Day and the intense Arab protest against widespread land expropriation; the late 1979/early 1980 period, with a combination of protest against the establishment of mitzpim in the Galilee, a lack of development in the Arab sector and financial discrimination against Arab villages; the 1985-6, period, with protests on the issue of local authority budgets; mid-1987, with the Equal- ity Day general strike and broad Arab support for the struggle of the Bet Jan village to regain control over its lands; late 1988, with the Dwelling Day general strike; and early 1989, late 1990 and early 1991, with waves of Arab protest against inequality in municipal budgets. The timing of these peaks in Arab protest followed policy initiatives by the government (usually with adverse impacts on the

Oren Yiftachel

60

50

40

o 30 - | | ] \ ii | 11 Planning

-O------Deprivation

20 -

Control

/ / Year / /

/ / / / budget agreements policy promises / Misgav compromise Area 9 return

Mitzpim end housing equality

Figure 3 Intensity of protest on planning and socio-economic deprivation issues among Arabs, 1975-91 (showing key policy events)

Arabs), or periods of conflicts over the legacy of these control policies.

Like the peaks identified above, the troughs in Arab protest depicted in Figure 3 can also be related to the introduction of 'compromising' policies by the Israeli government. In 1977 and 1978, for example, no major new policies detrimental to the Arab minority were introduced and the

government promised to initiate more positive programmes in the Arab sectors (al Haj and Rosenfeld 1990), explaining the lull in protest action. Another trough is evident in late 1983, following a compromise and settlement of the

Misgav conflict. Likewise, the decline in protest activity in late 1986 followed the return of Arab land in the Galilee ('Area 9', near Sakhnin; Fig. 1) from army use to its original owners (Fig. 3).

Finally, a relative decline in Arab protest inten-

sity can be discerned during 1991 (even though absolute levels remained quite high). This, again, is a reflection of several policy achievements of Arabs in Israel and the Galilee. These include a public promise to minimize the expropriation of Arab land for the absorption of Jewish immigrants; the

equalization of government housing assistance between Arabs and Jews; and, most significantly, a

government decision in August 1991 to provide equal services in Arab and Jewish municipalities and the subsequent transfer of funds to Arab local

authorities. However, this decline has been tem-

porary, with protest increasing again after the research period in 1994 over a range of national and municipal issues.

In general, then, while the growing importance of the national Palestinian cause in generating Arab protest is recognized, there is a close tem-

poral association between 'control' and 'compromising' policies and changes in levels of protest. This association clearly demonstrates the key role of public policies in determining the extent of

minority deprivation and, subsequently, of levels of protest and violence.

Ethnic geography and ethnic regionalism The geography of ethnic relations and the emer-

gence of ethnic regionalism are often neglected in

analyses of protest. In general, and against the context of Arab deterritorialization and waves of Jewish settlement in the Galilee, it is not surprising that many protest events had a distinct geographical content. These can be interpreted on conceptual and empirical levels.

On a conceptual level, the Palestinian-Arabs in the Galilee constitute a homeland ethnic group, with a long tradition of rural living and a strong bond to their land (Schnell 1994). Land is an

important element in Palestinian culture, illustrated by the use of a folk song My land as the

102

The political geography of ethnic protest Palestinian anthem, as well as by many other land-related images and titles in Palestinian public life (see Grossman 1992; Rubinstein 1990). Clearly, then, policies which deliberately threaten the Arabs' ties with, and control over, land and territory (as Israel's policies have) are likely to be strongly opposed.

On a more empirical level, the most obvious link between geography and protest is the constant Arab opposition to, and protest against, Israeli policies to contain and control Arab settlements and to fill the region with many Jewish villages and towns. Israel has created a new ethnic geography in the region (see Fig. 1), transforming it from an Arab regional enclave into an ethnically mixed region. Many Arab acts of protest - beginning with Land Day in 1976 and continuing to Land Day 1991 and beyond - have explicitly and implicitly challenged the creation of this new regional geography. The following quote from a leaflet published before a Land Day demonstration in 1980 illustrates the point:

The Arabs in Israel have demanded the allotment of land before it was appropriated for the purpose of housing, development and agriculture ... instead of allocating our lands to the use of Arab villages which badly need them, they have been given by the government for the large number of mitzpim being currently built in the Galilee. These mitzpim are aimed at strangling our villages and preventing their free development. (Lands Committee, March 1980)

A less direct, yet profound geographical influence is also evident in Arab protest on national issues. Prior to 1948, the Galilee was an integral part of the geographical unit of Palestine. The subsequent division of the Palestinians between Israel and Jordan could not stop the development of a collective 'homeland' political identity. How- ever, two such identities have developed in parallel: one explicitly national (in the West Bank) and the other local and regional (within Israel). The former focuses mainly on national liberation, while the latter places more emphasis on land, place and resources. Protests on national issues, therefore, were also influenced by the strong attachment of Arabs in the Galilee to their land as a main core of collective Palestinian identity and pride (Rubinstein 1990; Schnell 1994). Needless to say, the Galilee is also situated in close proximity to the main Palestinian concentrations in the West Bank (only 30-150 km to the south), facilitating close contacts, despite the existence of the 'green line' which separates these communities into two administrative and political units.

103

Even the protest over social and economic issues is influenced by the geography of ethnic relations. In the main, the increasing mix between Arabs and Jews in the study region has made the social and economic disparities between the two communities more visible. This has given Arab leaders potent 'ammunition' around which to mobilize protest, as illustrated by the following statement given in an interview with the mayor of a large village in central Galilee:

These new Jewish settlements all around us have brought home the double meaning of our discrimination in Israel. Not only don't we have a say in the planning of our own region, we also have to see the good-looking Jewish mitzpim every day through our windows, and thus see - and not only feel or hear - our pathetic existence in this society.

Finally, juxtaposing the data presented above and theories of ethnic protest reviewed earlier, there are indications that a process of ethnic regionalism is at work among Arabs in the Galilee. The development of Arab protest in the region has been caused by three forces: national sentiments, socio- economic deprivation and land issues. It is postu- lated here that the relatively equal impact of these three forces reflects a fledgling regional (rather than purely class or national) Palestinian identity in the Galilee. This process is being shaped differ- ently than the more open Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories, demonstrating the dif- ference between nationalism and regionalism spelt out earlier (see Keating 1988; McCrone 1993).

Ethnic regionalism reflects the particular set of circumstances whereby ethno-nationalism is geo- politically constrained and full integration into the main state system is structurally impossible. As such, it represents a compromise between opposing forces within the ethnic community. The processes at work in the Galilee resemble those amongst other regional minorities in 'ethnic majority' states, such as the Tyroleans in Italy or the Scots in Britain (Keating 1988).

The emergence of Arab regionalism in Israel, however, is discernible on two levels: state-wide and regional. Although the data documented above relate only to the Galilee, 79 per cent of all protest events, including all the general strikes listed above, have been staged jointly with Arabs from other regions in Israel, especially the 'Triangle' (Fig. 1). As such, the reading of Arab protest in the Galilee as a surface reflection of

104

ethnic regionalism can be extrapolated to the entire Palestinian-Arab community in Israel. This is

appropriate for the interpretation of political mobilization among Arabs in Israel and is consistent with other political activity data (Ghanem 1995; Lehman-Wilzig 1990; Smooha 1992).

State-wide ethnic regionalism within the three main regional concentrations of Arabs in Israel

appears to be the main level on which Arab regionalism is taking place. The findings of Khalidi (1988) and Schnell (1997), and the protest data analysed above suggest that a fractured 'Arab-Palestinian

region' is emerging within Israel, with a growing 'enclave economy', a distinct culture and its own set of political and social institutions. Recent calls

by several leading Arab intellectuals and scholars to move towards a higher degree of cultural and

political autonomy of Palestinian-Arabs in Israel are also examples of that process. The form of

autonomy demanded is still vague, although it

may be expressed in Arab localities and regions (see Bishara 1993; Osatzki-Lazer and Ghanem 1991).

Beyond the state-wide process, Arab regionalism involves the development of more specific (sub-state) regional identities, reflected in growing variations in the location and causes of Arab protest. Accordingly, the data show a growing propor- tion of protest events of a regional (rather than state-wide) nature during the last five years of the research period, with 34 per cent of protest events between 1986 and 1991 focusing on 'Galilee only' issues, as compared to 24 per cent between 1981 and 1985, and 21 per cent between 1976 and 1980.

To illustrate, a series of demonstrations were

staged between 1990 and 1992 demanding the

recognition of unauthorized (Bedouin) settlements. Even though such settlements (which receive very few state services) exist both in the south and in the north of the country, protest was staged almost

entirely in the Galilee, mainly because the organiz- ing body (the Association of the 40) is located in Haifa. Another example was provided in 1994 by a wave of intense Arab demonstrations following the

killing of 29 Arabs in Hebron by a Jewish settler. This time, Arab protest was most violent and

persistent in the south, where close contacts exist with the Hebron community, while in Galilee

protest on the issue was relatively calm. Other indications of the process can be derived from the

comparatively minor role of Muslim issues in Galilee protest while, at the same time, such issues

Oren Yiftachel

have featured more prominently in other Arab regions in Israel, especially in the Triangle but also in the Negev (Meir 1994; Rekhes 1991).

The findings of other studies also confirm the

emergence of Arab regionalism in the Galilee, with

patterns of increasingly cohesive emotional and functional links between Arab villages in the

region and a growing ability to mobilize support and participation on regional issues (see Falah 1989; Fenster 1993; Schnell 1994). As Schnell (ibid., 78) observed, when studying the territorial awareness of the Arabs in Israel,

Israeli-Arab territoriality is developing from a newly evolving territorial awareness ... territorial awareness is reaching a higher level of generalisation ... towards larger regional territorial units.

Paradoxically, in some respects Israel's attempts to deterritorialize the Arabs - which were sup- posed to stop the process of ethnic regionalism - have had the opposite effect. They provided Arab leaders with a strong rallying cause around which to mobilize political support. Further, the loss of land and regional cohesion raised Arab concerns about losing their ethnic identity and spawned the

development of survival strategies which strongly emphasized the bond to the land at local and

regional levels (see Rubinstein 1990). This fledgling Arab regionalism draws on deep

historical roots in the region and on long-standing regional variations evident in Palestinian culture, in the fields of folk music, art, dress and speech dialects (ibid. 1990, 55-69). It has taken four decades for this regionalism to re-emerge following the disaster inflicted on the Palestinians in 1948.

Significantly, the growing regional awareness of Arabs in the Galilee has not included any attempts to create an inter-ethnic regional movement in

cooperation with the region's Jews. Jews in the Galilee have established well-organized regional organizations of their own and there is little, if any, common representation of regional issues by the two communities (Peled 1990; Yiftachel 1994). To be sure, the emergence of a regional Palestinian

identity in Israel and in the Galilee is still in its

infancy but the process has the potential profoundly to influence the relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel during the critical years to come.

Finally, it may be noted that the demonstrations

staged by Arabs played a key symbolic role not

only in articulating their political grievances and

aspirations but also in shaping their nascent


ethno-political identity. In that way, Land Day - the first major protest event in the history of the Arab minority - has become an annual day of commemoration and celebration. The persistent campaign for rights and against dispossession by the state has provided key dates, common memories and community practices, as important foundations for a new Arab regional identity.

In general, then, an understanding of the evolution of Arab protest in the Galilee must take account of the role of geographical processes and factors, beyond the powerful national and socio- economic circumstances. Hence, the growing Arab-Jewish mix, the intensifying competition over ownership and use of land, the massive loss of Arab land to the state, the higher visibility of socio-economic inequalities and the physical proximity to the core of Palestinian identity have all exerted an influence on Arab protest. The combination of the above processes has spawned the

emergence of Arab regionalism, around which a Palestinian-Arab identity in Israel and the Galilee is being reconstructed.

Conclusion

The analysis of Arab protest in the Galilee has shown that the volume of protest has steadily increased since 1976, with a notable rise in inten-

sity since 1987; that there were three main issues around which protest evolved: national events, socio-economic deprivation and land use and territorial issues; that national issues ignited the most intense protest but there was a relatively even distribution in the overall magnitude of protest on all three key issues; that Israeli spatial and socio- economic policies have had a pronounced impact on patterns of Arab protest; and that geographical factors, particularly the emergence of ethnic regionalism, have played a key role in shaping Arab protest.

In reference to theories on ethnic protest, events in the Galilee have demonstrated the salience of both relative deprivation and ethnic nationalism explanations, and their 'Israeli equivalents' of Arab radicalization and politicization. The national- Palestinian cause has illustrated the potency of the ethnic nationalism approach. Arabs have increasingly rallied around the national issue with growing intensity and militancy. This can be interpreted as a process of radicalization which may lead to demands for self-determination and possible

105

irredentism. However, the relative deprivation approach is also valid: Israeli public policy and

subsequent socio-economic deprivations have created a major cause for Arab protest, with

changes in Israeli policy mirrored by fluctuations in protest levels.

Given the picture emerging from the data, however, support cannot be lent either to the politicization or the radicalization approach. To reiterate, the 'politicization' view holds that 'the Arabs fight independently, peacefully and rigorously to better their lot in Israeli society' (Smooha 1992, 11), or that 'Arab protest has no intent of toppling the

government in power, but rather demand equal treatment to that given to Jewish populations' (Lehman-Wilzig 1990, 57). These interpretations equate the Arab minority to an 'ethno-class', vying for a larger share of Israel's public resources.

However, the emergence of Arab regionalism in the Galilee, and the intensifying antigovernmental protest in that region, are early signs that material

gains and even material equality with the region's Jews are not the main, let alone the only, purpose of Arab protest. Only a consideration of the complete milieu of Arab existence in the region, which combines feelings of deprivation, bonds with and

protection of ancestors' land and territory, group autonomous ambitions fuelled by political reac- tions to discriminatory policies, and a constantly changing regional geography can provide an adequate account of Arab protest in the region to date. Further, a full understanding must recog- nize that Arab protest is a socially constructed phenomenon, born out of specific human inter- ventions, ideologies and practices, and not an 'inevitable' or 'natural' process of a marginalized ethnic minority.

The evolution of Arab regional protest is equally at odds with the ethno-nationalist (or radicalization) approach. This sees the Arabs as moving towards ethnic separatism, a process feeding on their increasing contact and emotional bond with Palestinians in the occupied territories and their frustration with persistent deprivation in Israel (Landau 1993; Soffer 1992). However, the data provide little support for this interpretation. While national events ignited the most intense protest, they were relatively few and the nature of that protest signalled support to the Palestinian cause without involvement in the struggle against the Israeli state. Further, in only a handful of the 168 protest events reviewed here was there any

106

rhetoric or suggested action which supports Arab separatism, irredentism or physical assault on the Israeli social and political system or the Jewish majority. Despite the sharp criticism evident in Arab protest towards the Israeli state, there is no evidence for an explicit move towards ethnic nationalism.

The third interpretation of Palestinian-Arab

regionalism is consistent with politico-geographical theories (see Mikesell and Murphy 1991; Williams and Kofman 1989) and provides a collective core around which a newly defined ethnic identity is

being reconstructed. That identity is born out of the Arabs' national identity as Palestinians and their

particular politico-geographical circumstances within the Israeli (Jewish) state, where the options of irredentism or separatism bear intolerable costs. It builds on the Arabs' unambiguous (but unful- filled) Palestinian identity, on their involuntary but firm inclusion into the Israeli political system and on the grievances generated by socio-economic

deprivation. According to theories of ethnic regionalism,6

Arab political activity is likely to press for land

rights, cultural and territorial autonomy, as well as the closing of Arab-Jewish social and economic

gaps. The Arabs will neither accept the Zionist character of the state, nor confine their struggle merely to 'better terms of coexistence' (Smooha 1992, 11). Arab regionalism represents a clear alternative to the Israeli state, intensifying the cam-

paign against its Jewish character and applying consistent pressure to fragment its highly central- ized structure.

This fragmentation (envisaged by the Arabs as autonomous minority arrangements - endowed

by the state or limited 'from below') increasingly takes a territorial form, through the daily practices, policies and activities of Arab local governments and ethnic organizations. In this light, the explicit demands and protest over issues of land control and spatial development should be perceived as territorial whilst the long and militant campaign for local government funding is, in effect, a collective rallying to improve the resources flowing to the (territorially defined) 'Arab Region' within Israel. To be sure, these regionalization and state-

fragmentation efforts are not likely to be easily accepted by the Israeli state, where Jews enjoy near total control. The process has been born, and is

likely to continue, as an expression of clear inter- ethnic conflict over resources, land and power.

Oren Yiftachel

However, Arab regionalism is not likely to trans- late into attempts to separate the minority totally from Israel. This is because of both the perceived high cost of separation vis-a-vis the intransigent Jewish majority but also because emerging Arab

regionalism in Israel is laying the foundations for a nascent ethnic collective identity, which will not

easily mesh with its Palestinian national core in the West Bank and Gaza. The social and political reconstruction of policy, place and region within Israel has caused the emergence of a new ethnic

identity. This new regional identity is set to come into sharp focus as the reconciliation process in the middle east continues, with the attention of both Jews and Arabs increasingly drawn to internal Israeli issues.

To be sure, these conclusions are preliminary. They must be taken cautiously and be further examined with other political, attitudinal and social data. They highlight, however, the importance of geography and planning in the evolution of minority-majority relations and the constant human reconstruction of what appear to be age-old social identities and relations. Further work on these subjects will no doubt contribute useful new

insights into the processes experienced by the Palestinian-Arab regional community in Israel and

enlighten students of ethnic relations in similar

settings around the globe.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the useful comments received on earlier drafts from Professor Yehudi Gradus, Professor Avinoam Meir, Dr Yoav Peled, Dr Sarit Helman and for the never-ending help coming from Amanda. The comments of the anonymous referees and the editor of Transactions were also

extremely useful in giving the paper its final shape. The responsibility for the paper's contents, needless to say, is totally my own.

Appendix: the measurement of Arab

regional protest

The measurement of Arab protest activity was based on the detailed documentation of all regional protest events and the derivation of a 'regional protest intensity index'. Protest was considered

'regional' only if at least five of the region's villages participated in it. Only collective protest activity

Protest activity Value Protest activity Value

a) National Arab general strike 10 d) Violent demonstrations/riots/terror b) Local authorities (national or) regional strike no persons wounded but significant damage to

one day or less 2 property and/or up to ten arrests 5 two-seven days 4 under twenty wouonded and/or ten arrests 5

eight-fourteen days 6 20-40 wounded and/or arrests 15 fifteen days or more 8 over 40 wounded and/or arrested or an incidence

c) Peaceful demonstrations/rallies of deaths 20 under 2000 participants 2 over 2000 participants 3

Source: Data were derived from a review of the records of the National and Lands Committees, personal archives of Arab leaders, a review of the daily newspapers Ha'aretz and Al Ittihad, and the local weekly newspapers Kol Hatzfon and Hed Hatzfon, as well as the archives of the Jewish-Arab Centre of Haifa University and the Institute for Arab Studies Centre in Giva'at Haviva.

Table AI Arab regional protest in Galilee, 1975-91

Planning/ Other National Year Event Total land policy policy issues

Year half no. intensity (intensity) (intensity) (intensity)

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Total events Total intensity Intensity/event

1 2 1 2 1

2

1

2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1

2 1 2 1 2 1

2

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2

0 0 0 0

3 0 0 0 8 48 48 0 2 2 0 2 2 3 3 0 1 3 3 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 12 0 4 12 12 0 3 17 12 5 3 8 0 6 2 4 4 0 1 4 0 4 3 22 3 0 5 39 0 0 7 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 5 14 6 8 4 11 0 11 4 15 3 12 6 21 0 21 3 11 9 2 2 9 0 9 7 37 13 24

17 70 15 16 7 33 12 16 5 23 21 2

10 57 22 13 14 41 10 6 15 103 9 58 7 45 7 6 7 40 0 27 7 32 9 14

168 168 69 78 762 267 262

4.5 3-8 3-

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0

19 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

39 5 0

22 35 26 32 13 8

21 233

11.1

The political geography of ethnic protest 107

108

(not rhetoric) was included in the index. The

quantitative derivation of the intensity index followed the methods used by Grenier (1988), Gurr (1993) and Hibbs (1973), as detailed on p. 107.

Table AI summarizes collective regional protest, presented in six-monthly periods, calculated ac-

cording to the above index. The table specifies three types of protest activity: against the government's planning/land policy, against other

government policies and on national-Palestinian issues.

Notes

1 See Hermann (1995); Keith and Pile (1993a, 1993b); Laclau (1994); Lofland (1985); and Routledge (1992).

2 See, for example, Grenier (1988); Gurr (1970, 1993); Hibbs (1973); and Lichbach (1989).

3 See, among many, Jackson and Penrose (1993); Johnston et al. (1988); Keith and Pile (1993a, 1993b); and Williams and Kofman (1989). We should

acknowledge here the recent emergence of another

approach - resource mobilization. However, this too

largely ignores the impact of space and geography. 4 See, for example, Agnew (1987); Jackson and

Penrose (1993); Johnston et al. (1988); Mikesell and Murphy (1991); and Williams and Kofman (1989).

5 See Anderson (1990); Keating (1988); Mikesell and

Murphy (1991); and Williams and Kofman (1989). 6 Some useful explorations of particular mixed

regions in multi-ethnic societies were made by Anderson (1990), Coakley (1990), Murphy (1989), and Rudolph and Thompson (1985), all pointing to some problems in maintaining peaceful coexistence in such regions within democratic states.

References

Agnew J 1987 Place and politics Allen & Unwin, London al Haj M 1988 The socio-political structure of Arabs in

Israel: external and internal orientations in Hofman J ed. Arab-Jewish relations in Israel - a quest in human

understanding Wyndham Hall Press, Bristol, Indiana 92-122

al Haj M and Rosenfeld H 1990 Arab local government in Israel Westview, Boulder, CO

Anderson B 1991 Imagined communities: reflections on the

origins and spread of nationalism (2nd edn) Verso, London

Anderson J 1990 Separatism and devolution: the Basques in Spain in Chisholm M and Smith D eds Shared space, divided space: essays on conflict and territorial organization Unwin Hyman, London 135-56

Anderson J and Goodman J 1994 European and Irish

integration: contradictions of regionalism and nationalism European Urban and Regional Studies 1 1 49-62

Oren Yiftachel

Benziman U and Mansur A 1992 Subtennants: the Arabs in Israel: their status and government policy towards them Keter, Jerusalem

Bishara A 1993 On the question of the Palestinian minority in Israel Theory and Criticism (Teoria Vebikoret) 3 7-20 (in Hebrew)

Boal F 1987 Segregation in Pacione M ed. Progress in social geography Croom Helm, London

Carmon N Czamanski D Amir S Law Yone H Kipnis B and Lipshitz G 1991 The new Jewish settlement in the Galilee: an evaluation Center for Urban and Regional Research, Technion, Haifa (in Hebrew)

Coakley J 1990 National minorities and the government of divided societies: a comparative analysis of some European evidence European Journal of Political Research 18 437-56

Connor W 1987 Ethnonationalism in Weiner W and Huntington S eds Understanding political development Little Brown, Boston

Douglas J N 1983 Political, integration and division in

plural societies - problems, measurements and salience in Kliot N and Waterman S eds Pluralism and political geography Croom Helm, London 47-68

Eyles J 1990 Group identity and urban space: the North American experience in Chisholm M and Smith D eds Shared space, divided space: essays on conflict and territorial

organization Unwin Hyman, London 46-66 Falah G 1989 Israeli Judaisation policy in Galilee and its

impact on local Arab urbanisation in Political Geography Quarterly 8 229-53

Falah G 1990 Arabs versus Jews in Galilee: competition over resources Geojournal 21 325-36

Fenster T 1993 Settlement planning and participation under principles of pluralism Progress in Planning 39 3 169-242

Friedmann J 1992 Empowerment: the politics of alternative

development Blackwell, Cambridge Friedmann J 1995 Borders, margins and frontiers: notes

towards a political economy of regions in Gradus Y and Lithwick H eds Frontiers in regional development Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland

Gelvin J 1994 Demonstrating communities in post- Ottoman Syria Journal of Interdisciplinary History 25 23-44

Ghanem A 1992 The peace perception of the Islamic movement in Israel in Pappe I ed. Islam and peace Institute of Peace Research, Giva'at Haviva 83-99

Ghanem A 1995 Political mobilisation among the Arabs in Israel in The Arab minority in Israel Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv

Ginat Y 1989 Voting patterns and political behaviour in the Arab sector in Landau J M ed. The Arab vote in Israel's parliamentary elections, 1988 The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Jerusalem 3-21 (in Hebrew)

Glazer N 1983 Ethnic dilemma: 1964-1982 Harvard

University Press, Cambridge


Gradus Y 1984 The emergence of regionalism in a central- ised system: the case of Israel Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2 87-100

Grenier C E 1988 Violence, inequality and development at the national level: a comparative analysis International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 25 127-40

Grossman D 1992 Present absentees Hakkibutz Hameuhad, Tel Aviv (in Hebrew)

Gurr T 1970 Why men rebel Princeton University Press, New Jersey

Gurr T 1993 Minorities at risk: the global view of ethno- political conflict Institute of Peace Press, Arlington

Gurr T and Lichbach M 1986 Forecasting internal conflict Comparative Political Studies 9 3-38

Haidar A 1990 Arabs in the Israeli economy International Centre for Peace in the Middle East, Tel Aviv

Haidar A 1991 Social welfare services for Israel's Arab population Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford

Hechter M and Levi M 1979 The comparative analysis of enthnoregional movements Ethnic and Racial Studies 2 260-74

Hermann T 1995 Social movements and political protest Open University, Tel Aviv (in Hebrew)

Hibbs D A 1973 Mass political violence: a cross-national causal analysis John Wiley and Sons, New York

Horowitz D L 1985 Ethnic groups in conflict University of California Press, Berkeley

Jackson P and Penrose J eds 1993 Construction of race, place and nation UCL Press, London

Johnston R Knight D and Kofman E eds 1988 National- ism, self-determination and political geography Croom Helm, London

Keating M 1988 State and regional nationalism Harvester & Wheatsheaf, New York

Keith M and Pile S 1993a Introduction Part 1. the politics of place in Keith M and Pile S eds Place and the politics of identity Routledge, London 1-21

Keith M and Pile S 1993b Place and the politics of identity Routledge, London

Khalidi R 1988 The Arab economy in Israel: the dynamics of a region's development Croom Helm, London

Khameissi R 1992 Planning, housing and the Arab minority in Israel Westview, Boulder, CO

Kipnis B 1987 Geopolitical ideologies and regional strategies in Israel Tijdchrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 78 125-38

Kofman E 1985 Regional autonomy and the one and indivisible French Republic Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 3 11-25

Kofman E and Williams C 1989 Culture, community and conflict in Williams C and Kofman E eds Community, conflict and nationalism Routledge, London 1-23

Laclau E ed. 1994 The making of political identities Verso, London

Landau Y 1993 The Arab minority in Israel: political aspects, 1967-1991 Am Oved, Jerusalem

109

Lane J E and Ersson S O 1991 Politics and society in western Europe Sage, London

Lehman-Wilzig S 1990 Stiff-necked people in a bottle-necked system: the evolution and roots of Israel public protest, 1949-86 University of Indiana Press, Bloomington

Lehman-Wilzig S 1992 Copying the master? Patterns of Israeli-Arab protest, 1950-1990 Paper presented at the conference on Arab Politics in Israel Dayan Institute, University of Tel Aviv

Lichbach M I 1989 An evaluation of 'Does economic inequality breed political conflict?' studies World Politics 61 431-70

Lindblom C E 1973 The science of muddling through in Faludi A ed. A reader in planning theory Pergamon, Oxford 151-69

Lofland J 1985 Protest: studies of collective behavior and social movements Transaction Books, New Brunswick

Manogaran C 1987 Ethnic conflict and reconciliation in Sri Lanka University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu

Markusen A 1987 Regions: the economic and politics of territory Rowman & Littlefield, Totawa, NJ

Massey D S 1985 Ethnic residential segregation: a theoretical synthesis and empirical review Sociology and Social Research 69 315-50

McCrone D 1993 Regionalism and constitutional change in Scotland Regional Studies 27 507-12

Meir A 1994 Territoriality among Negev Bedouin in transition: from nomadism to sedentarism in Fabietti U and Zalzman P eds The anthropology of pastoral societies Ibis, Como, Italy 159-81

Mikesell M and Murphy A 1991 A framework for comparative study of minority aspirations in Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81 581-604

Murphy A B 1989 Territorial policies in multiethnic states Geographical Review 79 410-21

Osatzki-Lazer S and Ghanem A 1991 Autonomy for the Arabs in Israel: the beginning of a debate The Institute for Arab Studies, Givaat Haviva (in Hebrew)

Peled Y 1990 Ethnic exclusionism in the periphery: the case of oriental Jews in Israel's development towns Ethnic and Racial Studies 13 345-67

Penrose J 1994 'Mon Pays ce N'est pas un Pays' full stop: the concept of nation as a challenge to the nationalist aspirations of the Parti Quebecois Political Geography 13 2 161-81

Portugali J 1993 Implicated relations: society and space in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Kluwer, Dordrecht

Regev A 1989 The Arabs in Israel: political issues Jerusalem Institute for Israel's Studies, Jerusalem (in Hebrew)

Reiter Y and Aharoni R 1992 The political life of Arabs in Israel The Institute for Israeli Arab Studies, Beit Berl (in Hebrew)

Rekhes E 1986 The Arab village in Israel: a renewing national political centre Ofakim Begeographia 17-18 145-60 (in Hebrew)

Rekhes E 1991 The Moslem movement in Israel Paper presented to a conference on 'The Arab minority in

110

Israel: dilemmas of political orientation and social change' Dayan Centre, University of Tel Aviv

Rouhana N and Ghanem A 1993 The democratisation of a traditional minority in an ethnic democracy: the Palestinians in Israel in Kaufman E and El Abed A eds Democracy and peace in the Middle East Westview, Boulder, CO

Routledge P 1992 Putting politics in its place Political

Geography 11 6 588-611 Rubinstein D 1990 The fig tree embrace: on the Palestinian

right of return Keter, Tel Aviv

Rudolph R R J and Thompson R J 1985 Ethnoterritorial movements and the policy process: accommodating national demands in the developed world Comparative Politics 17 291-311

Sack R 1986 Human territoriality: its theory and history Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Schnell Y 1987 The chrysalisation of Arab settlement

systems in Israel Ofakim Begeographia 19 65-90 (in Hebrew)

Schnell Y 1994 Perceptions of Israeli Arabs: territoriality and

identity Avebury, Aldershot Schnell Y 1997 Arab industrial frontiers in Yiftachel O

and Meir A eds Ethnic frontiers and peripheries: land-

scapes of development and inequality in Israel Westview, Boulder, CO 311-32 (in press)

Sikkuy 1994 Report on the achievement of the government in

promoting Jewish-Arab equality in Israel, 1992-4 Sikkuy, Jerusalem (in Hebrew)

Smith A D 1981 The ethnic revival Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Smith A D 1986 The ethnic origins of nations Basil Blackwell, London

Smith A D 1992 Ethnicity and nationalism International

Journal of Contemporary Sociology 33 1-2 1-5 Smooha S 1989 Arabs and Jews in Israel: conflicting and

shared attitudes in a divided society Westview, Boulder, CO

Smooha S 1990 Minority status in an ethnic democracy: the status of the Arab minority in Israel Ethnic and Racial Studies 13 3 389-412

Smooha S 1992 Arabs and Jews in Israel: change and

continuity in mutual intolerance Westview, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford

Soffer A 1983 The changing situation of minority and

majority and its spatial expression in Kliot N and Waterman S eds Pluralism and political geography Croom Helm, London 80-99

Soffer A 1988 The demographic and geographic situation in the Land of Israel: is it the end of the Zionist vision?

University Press, Haifa

Oren Yiftachel

Soffer A 1992 Israeli Arabs toward autonomy: the case of the sub-regional system of the Galilee Studies in the Geography of Israel 12 198-209 (in Hebrew)

Soffer A and Finkel R 1989 The mitzpim project - interim evaluation Centre of Settlement Research, Rehovet (in Hebrew)

Taylor P 1994 The state as a container: territoriality in the modern world-system Progress in Human Geography 18 2 151-62

Thomas H 1993 Race equality and planning The Planner 79 3 17-21

van den Berghe P L 1981 The ethnic phenomenon Elsevier, New York

Waterman S 1990 Involuntary incorporation: the case of Israel in Chisholm M and Smith D eds Shared space, divided space: essays in conflict and territorial organisation Unwin Hyman, London 178-93

Weller P and Guggenheim S eds 1982 Power and protest in the countryside: studies of rural unrest in Asia, Europe and Latin America Duke Press, Durham

Williams C 1985 Minority groups in the modern state in Pacione M ed. Progress in political geography Croom Helm, London 111-57

Williams C 1988 Minority nationalist historiography in

Johnston R Knight D and Kofman E eds Nationalism, self-determination and political geography Croom Helm, London 203-21

Williams C and Kofman E eds 1989 Community, conflict and nationalism Routledge, London

Yiftachel O 1992a Planning a mixed region in Israel: the

political geography of Arab-Jewish relations in the Galilee

Avebury, Aldershot Yiftachel O 1992b The Arab minority in Israel and its

relations with the Jewish minority: a review essay Studies in Comparative International Development 27 2 57-83

Yiftachel O 1994 Regional mix and ethnic relations: evidence from Israel Geoforum 25 1-55

Yiftachel O 1995 The dark side of modernism: planning as control of an ethnic minority in Watson S and Gibson K eds Postmodern cities and spaces Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Yiftachel O 1996 The internal frontier: territorial control and ethnic relations Regional Studies 30 5 (in press)

Zureik E T 1979 Palestinians in Israel: a study of internal colonialism Routledge & Kegan Paul, London

Zureik E 1993 Prospects of the Palestinians in Israel Journal of Palestine Studies 27 4 73-93

Documents

The Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism ...hksa/rone.pdfethno-national explanation, likely to appear regardless of socio-economic disparities (Connor 1987; Mikesell