The Political Economy of Military The Political Economy of Military Occupations and Leadership Changes: Occupations and Leadership Changes:

an Empirical Evaluation 1900-2000an Empirical Evaluation 1900-2000

Carmela LutmarCarmela Lutmar

Princeton UniversityPrinceton University

November 18, 2006November 18, 2006

Outline Outline MotivationMotivation Research QuestionsResearch Questions Goals of the StudyGoals of the Study Literature ReviewLiterature Review ArgumentArgument HypothesesHypotheses Variables -- MeasurementVariables -- Measurement DataData Findings, Problems, and Future ResearchFindings, Problems, and Future Research

Motivation IMotivation I

““An overwhelming majority of 72% of American troops serving in Iraq An overwhelming majority of 72% of American troops serving in Iraq think the US should exit the country within the next year, and nearly one in think the US should exit the country within the next year, and nearly one in four say the troops should leave immediately” (Zogby Poll, August 2005)four say the troops should leave immediately” (Zogby Poll, August 2005)

““89% of reserves and 82% of those in the National Guard said the US 89% of reserves and 82% of those in the National Guard said the US should leave Iraq within a year, 58% of Marines think so”should leave Iraq within a year, 58% of Marines think so”

“…“…the US no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-the US no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free supporting oil industry or a society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges… what we expected to from serious security or economic challenges… what we expected to achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground” (Washington Post, August 14, 2005)ground” (Washington Post, August 14, 2005)

Motivation IIMotivation II

We know quite a lot about the causes of war BUT...We know quite a lot about the causes of war BUT... Not much on what ‘happens’ in bilateral relations once the guns stop Not much on what ‘happens’ in bilateral relations once the guns stop

shootingshooting We know quite a lot about how different regime types ‘behave’ We know quite a lot about how different regime types ‘behave’

in interstate wars BUT…in interstate wars BUT… Not about how they treat defeated adversariesNot about how they treat defeated adversaries

We know quite a lot about the incentives regime types have in We know quite a lot about the incentives regime types have in making decisions about war BUT…making decisions about war BUT…

Not about the foreign policy behavior of each state in the postwar period Not about the foreign policy behavior of each state in the postwar period and the way to measure this ‘behavior’ (compliance).and the way to measure this ‘behavior’ (compliance).

Majority of literature are case or region specific analyses.Majority of literature are case or region specific analyses. We know quite a lot about trade patterns between various regime We know quite a lot about trade patterns between various regime

types BUT…types BUT… Not about trade patterns after defeated leaders have been deposed.Not about trade patterns after defeated leaders have been deposed.

Motivation IIIMotivation III

Leaders lose power in various waysLeaders lose power in various ways IR literature focuses only lately on leaders as unit of analysisIR literature focuses only lately on leaders as unit of analysis Empirical evidence to link between leaders, tenure, and Empirical evidence to link between leaders, tenure, and

domestic institutionsdomestic institutions Focus on military occupations aimed (and following) Focus on military occupations aimed (and following)

depositions.depositions.

Research QuestionsResearch Questions

Is forceful leadership change the underlying Is forceful leadership change the underlying mechanism to promote friendlier bilateral mechanism to promote friendlier bilateral relationships?relationships?

What has been the average duration of interstate What has been the average duration of interstate military occupations? What is the ‘right’ time military occupations? What is the ‘right’ time occupying forces should stay in a state? And how do occupying forces should stay in a state? And how do the answers to these questions vary across regime the answers to these questions vary across regime types of the occupier and the occupied states?types of the occupier and the occupied states?

Is foreign forceful leadership change prolonging or Is foreign forceful leadership change prolonging or shortening a military occupation?shortening a military occupation?

Goals of the StudyGoals of the Study

Determining whether deposition is indeed a useful tool in Determining whether deposition is indeed a useful tool in achieving greater cooperation by comparing the set of cases in achieving greater cooperation by comparing the set of cases in which a defeated leader has been deposed with those cases in which a defeated leader has been deposed with those cases in which the vanquished leader continues to stay in power after which the vanquished leader continues to stay in power after

the war or the foreign interventionthe war or the foreign intervention. . Looking at military occupations in a more systematic way, and Looking at military occupations in a more systematic way, and

in the longer run – at the ways law is restored after military in the longer run – at the ways law is restored after military occupation, how do these patterns change in various regime occupation, how do these patterns change in various regime types, what components of governance are faster to be restored types, what components of governance are faster to be restored following military occupations, and are depositions a useful following military occupations, and are depositions a useful way to restore governance and law faster?way to restore governance and law faster?

Military OccupationsMilitary Occupations

Rosecrance (1986)Rosecrance (1986) Carlton (1992)Carlton (1992) Lieberman (1996) – Does conquest pay?Lieberman (1996) – Does conquest pay? Edelstein (2004) – Why some military occupations Edelstein (2004) – Why some military occupations

succeed while others fail?succeed while others fail? Rand (2005)Rand (2005) Enterline and Sarli (2005) – Large-N study of Enterline and Sarli (2005) – Large-N study of

duration of interstate military occupationsduration of interstate military occupations Many historical case studiesMany historical case studies

Military Occupations in International LawMilitary Occupations in International Law

Benvenisti (1993) – examples of military occupations Benvenisti (1993) – examples of military occupations ranging from the German occupation of Belgium ranging from the German occupation of Belgium (WWII) to more recent occupations in Afghanistan (WWII) to more recent occupations in Afghanistan and Grenada, and the Israeli occupation of the West and Grenada, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.Bank and the Gaza Strip.

ArgumentArgument

We should observe variation across regime types when it We should observe variation across regime types when it comes to ways of losing tenure and to incentives in behavior comes to ways of losing tenure and to incentives in behavior when it comes to military occupations. Those variations are when it comes to military occupations. Those variations are consistent with the selectorate theory and with the various consistent with the selectorate theory and with the various expectations we have from leaders in democracies and non-expectations we have from leaders in democracies and non-democracies even though they are motivated by the same democracies even though they are motivated by the same desire – staying in power.desire – staying in power.

Military Occupations -- DefinitionMilitary Occupations -- Definition

The presence of foreign military forces on one’s soil The presence of foreign military forces on one’s soil as a result of either an interstate war or an as a result of either an interstate war or an intervention (in civil war but not restricted to that) intervention (in civil war but not restricted to that) for at least 15 days.for at least 15 days.

This definition excludes border clashes between This definition excludes border clashes between states.states.

Includes interventions for the purpose of deposing Includes interventions for the purpose of deposing leaders.leaders.

W/S/N Approach W/S/N Approach (BdM, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (BdM, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow

2003)2003) WW – group that – group that

keeps leader in keeps leader in powerpower

SS – those who – those who contribute to contribute to choosing leader choosing leader

NN – society – society W<S<N by W<S<N by

definitiondefinition

N = society

Selectorate

Winning Coalition

Universal Political InstitutionsUniversal Political Institutions

Every country has rules that define interactions Every country has rules that define interactions within its borders. Institutional arrangements define:within its borders. Institutional arrangements define: Who is part of the selectorateWho is part of the selectorate What constitutes a winning coalitionWhat constitutes a winning coalition

SelectorateSelectorate = set of people with legal right to = set of people with legal right to participate in selection of the governmentparticipate in selection of the government

Winning CoalitionWinning Coalition = portion of selectorate (often = portion of selectorate (often majority) whose support is needed for the incumbent majority) whose support is needed for the incumbent to remain in officeto remain in office In most democracies, this is a majority of the selectorate –In most democracies, this is a majority of the selectorate –

largelarge In autocracies, it is generally quite a small group of people In autocracies, it is generally quite a small group of people

WSN Key PredictionsWSN Key Predictions

Leaders supported by small W pay off their Leaders supported by small W pay off their coalition with private goodscoalition with private goods

Leaders supported by large W pay off Leaders supported by large W pay off coalition with public goods coalition with public goods

HypothesesHypotheses

The more non-democratic a regime is, the more likely its leader to be replaced by The more non-democratic a regime is, the more likely its leader to be replaced by non-constitutional means.non-constitutional means.

The likelihood of occupation increases after defeat in war and if the states are The likelihood of occupation increases after defeat in war and if the states are neighbors.neighbors.

The likelihood of occupation decreases as time goes by after a previous occupation.The likelihood of occupation decreases as time goes by after a previous occupation. The smaller (in size and population) a state is, the less likely it is to be an occupier.The smaller (in size and population) a state is, the less likely it is to be an occupier. The more democratic a regime is, the shorter the occupation.The more democratic a regime is, the shorter the occupation. Bilateral trade in post-depositions periods increases the more non-democratic the Bilateral trade in post-depositions periods increases the more non-democratic the

occupied country is.occupied country is. A leadership change in the occupying state will shorten the duration of the A leadership change in the occupying state will shorten the duration of the

occupation.occupation. Deposing a (defeated) leader prolongs the occupation.Deposing a (defeated) leader prolongs the occupation.

Research DesignResearch Design

Time frame (for depositions) – 1800-2000Time frame (for depositions) – 1800-2000 US Depositions – 22 casesUS Depositions – 22 cases General Depositions – 91 casesGeneral Depositions – 91 cases Unit of analysis – country year – 2181 observations (for the US cases)Unit of analysis – country year – 2181 observations (for the US cases) Unit of analysis – country year – 7429 observations (for all cases)Unit of analysis – country year – 7429 observations (for all cases) Set of military occupations in the 20Set of military occupations in the 20thth century century Dependent variable – Duration (days), Occupied (or not)Dependent variable – Duration (days), Occupied (or not) Independent variables – W, defeat in war, populationIndependent variables – W, defeat in war, population 223 military occupations in the 20223 military occupations in the 20thth century century Depositions – subset of all military occupationsDepositions – subset of all military occupations

Case SelectionCase Selection

Temporal Domain for Descriptive Statistics – 1800-2000 Temporal Domain for Descriptive Statistics – 1800-2000 (Depositions)(Depositions)

Temporal Domain for Inferential Statistics – 1900-2000Temporal Domain for Inferential Statistics – 1900-2000 Spatial Domain – All Independent StatesSpatial Domain – All Independent States Deposition = Deposition = allall cases in which a leader has been removed cases in which a leader has been removed

forcefully from power by military forces of a forcefully from power by military forces of a foreignforeign state state Interstate wars and foreign interventions in civil warsInterstate wars and foreign interventions in civil wars Interventions aimed at deposing leadersInterventions aimed at deposing leaders Cases in which a leader resigned Cases in which a leader resigned followingfollowing a foreign military a foreign military

invasion – WWI and WWIIinvasion – WWI and WWII Cases of alliance – the ‘main’ actorCases of alliance – the ‘main’ actor

Measurement Measurement

W W based on the Polity IV data set. Ranges based on the Polity IV data set. Ranges between 0 and 1. The closer to 1, the “better” or between 0 and 1. The closer to 1, the “better” or more democratic the state. The closer to 0, the more more democratic the state. The closer to 0, the more non-democratic the state is.non-democratic the state is.

Defeat in war Defeat in war Dichotomous variable Dichotomous variable Population Population in hundreds of thousands in hundreds of thousands Neighbors Neighbors Number of contiguous neighbors Number of contiguous neighbors Time since last occupation Time since last occupation Days Days

““It’s not that I’m It’s not that I’m afraid to die. I afraid to die. I

just don’t want to just don’t want to be there when it be there when it

happens.”happens.”Woody AllenWoody Allen

Fate of Leaders 1900-2000Fate of Leaders 1900-2000

ConstitutionalConstitutional ElectionsElections

Re-electedRe-electedNot re-electedNot re-elected

Non-ConstitutionalNon-Constitutional External DepositionExternal Deposition Domestic DepositionDomestic Deposition AssassinationAssassination Natural DeathNatural Death None of the aboveNone of the above

Some Numbers…Some Numbers… 91 External Depositions91 External Depositions 51 Assassinations51 Assassinations

43 Shot43 Shot 4 Explosion4 Explosion 1 Lynched1 Lynched 3 Stabbed3 Stabbed

None of the Above – 16None of the Above – 16 8 Plane Crashes8 Plane Crashes 2 Poison2 Poison 1 Riding Accident1 Riding Accident 1 Skidiving Accident 1 Skidiving Accident 1 Fire1 Fire 1 Car Accident1 Car Accident 1 Gun Battle1 Gun Battle 1 Bitten by a Monkey1 Bitten by a Monkey

290 Coup d’etat290 Coup d’etat 257 Exile257 Exile

CoupD’Etat

CoupD’Etat

ExternalExternal

AssasinationsAssasinations

WeirdWeird

Constitutional Change and Domestic Constitutional Change and Domestic InstitutionsInstitutions

.05

.1.1

5.2

.25

.3P

roba

bilit

y of

Con

stitu

tiona

l Cha

nge

0 .2 .4 .6 .8Size of Winning Coalition

External Deposition & Domestic External Deposition & Domestic InstitutionsInstitutions

.005

8.0

06.0

062

.006

4.0

066

.006

8P

roba

bilit

y of

Ext

erna

l Dep

ositi

on

0 .2 .4 .6 .8Size of Winning Coalition

Assassination & Domestic Assassination & Domestic InstitutionsInstitutions

.002

.004

.006

.008

Pro

babi

lity

of A

ssas

sina

tion

0 .2 .4 .6 .8Size of Winning Coalition

Natural Death & Domestic Natural Death & Domestic InstitutionsInstitutions

.008

.01

.012

.014

.016

.018

Pro

babi

lity

of N

atur

al D

eath

0 .2 .4 .6 .8Size of Winning Coalition

Fate & Competing RisksFate & Competing Risks

Dependent VariableDependent Variable Independent VariablesIndependent VariablesLeader’s fateLeader’s fate WW TenureTenureConstitutional Constitutional 2.095 2.095 -.0015-.0015

(.23)***(.23)*** (.0002)***(.0002)***External DepositionExternal Deposition -1.46 -1.46 -.0052 -.0052

(1.24)*(1.24)* (.00084)***(.00084)***

Domestic DepositionDomestic Deposition -2.86-2.86 -.0011-.0011(.493)***(.493)*** (.0005)**(.0005)**

AssassinationsAssassinations -3.59-3.59 -.0036-.0036(1.922)**(1.922)** (.002)**(.002)**

Natural DeathNatural Death -1.075-1.075 -.0006-.0006(1.166)(1.166) (.0011)(.0011)

‘‘Weird’ WaysWeird’ Ways 3.44 3.44 -.0002-.0002(3.85)(3.85) (.0022)(.0022)

Note: Note: Standard errors for coefficients appear in parentheses. All tests for statistical significance Standard errors for coefficients appear in parentheses. All tests for statistical significance are two-tailed. are two-tailed. *p <.*p <.01; 01; **p**p < .05; *** < .05; ***pp<.001 <.001

Leaders Killed in ‘Weird’ WaysLeaders Killed in ‘Weird’ Ways

Leader NameLeader Name StateState YearYear DeathDeath Tancrede AugusteTancrede Auguste HaitiHaiti 19131913 PoisonPoison Alexander Alexander GreeceGreece 19201920 Bitten by Bitten by

his monkey his monkey GhaziGhazi IraqIraq 19391939 Car Car

Accident Accident Jose EstigarribiaJose Estigarribia ParaguayParaguay 19401940 Plane Plane

crashcrash Boris IIIBoris III BulgariaBulgaria 19431943 PoisonPoison Don SenanayakeDon Senanayake Sri LankaSri Lanka 19521952 Riding Riding

accidentaccident Ramon MagsaysayRamon Magsaysay PhilippinesPhilippines 19571957 Plane Plane

crashcrash Abdul Salam ArifAbdul Salam Arif IraqIraq 19661966 Plane crashPlane crash Harold HoltHarold Holt AustraliaAustralia 19671967 Drowned Drowned

skidivingskidiving BenediktssonBenediktsson IcelandIceland 19701970 FireFire Teferi BantiTeferi Banti EthiopiaEthiopia 19771977 Gun battleGun battle Ahmed BouceifAhmed Bouceif MauritaniaMauritania 19791979 Plane crashPlane crash Omar HerreraOmar Herrera PanamaPanama 19811981 Plane crashPlane crash Samora MachelSamora Machel MozambiqueMozambique 19861986 Plane crashPlane crash Mohammed Zia ul-HaqMohammed Zia ul-Haq PakistanPakistan 19881988 Plane crashPlane crash HabyarimanaHabyarimana RwandaRwanda 19941994 Plane crashPlane crash

Descriptive StatisticsDescriptive Statistics

1919thth Century Century France and Austria main deposersFrance and Austria main deposers All deposing states = non-democraciesAll deposing states = non-democracies All targets – non-democraciesAll targets – non-democracies

2020thth Century Century US and USSR main deposersUS and USSR main deposers US deposes twice as many cases as the USSRUS deposes twice as many cases as the USSR 39 out of the 91 deposing states were democracies39 out of the 91 deposing states were democracies The preferred targets were still non-democraciesThe preferred targets were still non-democracies 45% of deposing states were democracies; 12.2% of target 45% of deposing states were democracies; 12.2% of target

states were democraciesstates were democracies

Logit Model for Interstate Military OccupationsLogit Model for Interstate Military Occupations

War DefeatWar Defeat 1.87***1.87***(.356)(.356)

ContiguityContiguity .157**.157**(.062)(.062)

Time since Last OccupationTime since Last Occupation -1.26***-1.26***(.147)(.147)

WW -1.43***-1.43***(.054)(.054)

Log-likelihoodLog-likelihood -687.88-687.88NN 12,84912,849NoteNote: Robust standard errors in parentheses.: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* = 10%* = 10% ** = 5%** = 5% *** = 1%*** = 1%

Gravity ModelGravity Model

Independent VariableIndependent Variable Dependent VariableDependent Variable ConstantConstant 2.3072.307

(.383)***(.383)*** TrendTrend -.011-.011

(.0059)*(.0059)* DeposeLevelDeposeLevel -.194-.194 (.098)**(.098)** 1/DeposeRate1/DeposeRate .492 .492 (.35)(.35) W1W1 -1.21-1.21

(.54)**(.54)** wtrendwtrend .051.051 (.0074)***(.0074)*** LnpopbLnpopb .474 .474 (.033)***(.033)*** LnencapbLnencapb .513 .513 (.0314)***(.0314)*** DistanceDistance -.0002-.0002 (.00002)***(.00002)***

ObservationsObservations 15301530 R-squaredR-squared .757.757 ..

Note: Note: Standard errors for coefficients appear in parentheses. All tests for statistical significance are two-tailed. Standard errors for coefficients appear in parentheses. All tests for statistical significance are two-tailed. *p <.*p <.05; 05; **p**p < .01; < .01; ***p***p<.1<.1

FindingsFindings The more non-democratic a state is, the more likely its leader to end up her The more non-democratic a state is, the more likely its leader to end up her

tenure in an ‘unpleasant’ manner…tenure in an ‘unpleasant’ manner… Defeat in war increases the likelihood of a state to be occupied by the Defeat in war increases the likelihood of a state to be occupied by the

victor or any other foreign rival. victor or any other foreign rival. the more contiguous neighbors a state has the more likely it is to be the more contiguous neighbors a state has the more likely it is to be

occupied.occupied. the more non-democratic a state is the more likely it is to be occupied.the more non-democratic a state is the more likely it is to be occupied. the more time passes since a previous occupation, the less likely the same the more time passes since a previous occupation, the less likely the same

state to experience another military occupation.state to experience another military occupation. Bilateral trade increases in the short run after depositions the more non-Bilateral trade increases in the short run after depositions the more non-

democratic the occupied state is. But in order for this level to be democratic the occupied state is. But in order for this level to be maintained, or to increase, the state has to democratize.maintained, or to increase, the state has to democratize.

Results robust under different specificationsResults robust under different specifications

Problems & Future ResearchProblems & Future Research

How does the length of occupation affect How does the length of occupation affect bilateral trade?bilateral trade?

How do various ways of ending tenure affect How do various ways of ending tenure affect bilateral relationship?bilateral relationship?

A model – under which conditions you’d A model – under which conditions you’d rather depose a leader vs leave an existing one rather depose a leader vs leave an existing one (policy implementation trade off)(policy implementation trade off)