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The Political Economy The Political Economy of Gender in Service of Gender in Service Sector Economies Sector Economies Torben Iversen Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth Frances Rosenbluth

The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

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Page 1: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

The Political Economy The Political Economy of Gender in Service of Gender in Service Sector EconomiesSector Economies

Torben IversenTorben Iversen

Frances RosenbluthFrances Rosenbluth

Page 2: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

“Men respond to their fear of other men by increasing their own ability to control and dominate, gradually making this a central focus of social life.” Allan Johnson, The Gender Knot: Unraveling our Patriarchal Legacy

“Men are more inclined to take risks, more oriented towards attainment of status and resources, and more single-minded in achieving these goals. Women, on the other hand, are more nurturing and empathic, and more centered on maintaining a 'web' of relationships than on being at the top of a hierarchy.” Kingsley Brown.

Page 3: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Efficiency, Bargaining, Efficiency, Bargaining, and Patriarchyand Patriarchy

The efficiency of household sexual division The efficiency of household sexual division of labor varies by economic system of of labor varies by economic system of production.production.

High levels of household division of labor High levels of household division of labor weaken women’s bargaining power in the weaken women’s bargaining power in the family by reducing her outside options.family by reducing her outside options.

Patriarchy, or general the subordination of Patriarchy, or general the subordination of women in the private and public spheres, women in the private and public spheres, is the result of weak female bargaining is the result of weak female bargaining power.power.

Page 4: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Male

Female

1

1 0

O M = ( G M -S M )

O F = ( G F -S F )

Rubistein bargaining outcome

Contract line

1-O F

O m

P m

Page 5: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Modes of Production Modes of Production and Intra-Family and Intra-Family BargainingBargaining Women in hunter gatherer societies Women in hunter gatherer societies

could survive on their own, giving could survive on their own, giving women outside options to “marriage.”women outside options to “marriage.”– Scholarly opinion differs as to the Scholarly opinion differs as to the

importance of male-supplied protein to importance of male-supplied protein to female and child survival, but females female and child survival, but females supplied ¾ of the community’s caloric supplied ¾ of the community’s caloric intake.intake.

– Female economic viability removes the logic Female economic viability removes the logic of hard wired desire for males with of hard wired desire for males with resources.resources.

Page 6: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Agrarian Economies Agrarian Economies and Patriarchyand Patriarchy The premium on male brawn in The premium on male brawn in

agricultural production and protection agricultural production and protection increased the efficient level of household increased the efficient level of household division of labor.division of labor.

Females’ lost role in food production Females’ lost role in food production made her less viable outside the made her less viable outside the marriage.marriage.

Patriarchal values are strongest when Patriarchal values are strongest when families raise their daughters to play the families raise their daughters to play the marriage market.marriage market.

Page 7: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

IndustrializationIndustrialization

Labor saving devices in food and Labor saving devices in food and material production created a demand material production created a demand for female labor outside the home.for female labor outside the home.

Outside options to marriage gave Outside options to marriage gave females bargaining power in the home. females bargaining power in the home.

Female bargaining power undermines Female bargaining power undermines patriarchal values by altering families’ patriarchal values by altering families’ strategies for socializing their strategies for socializing their daughters.daughters.

Page 8: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Service Sector Service Sector EconomiesEconomies

Demand for female labor further Demand for female labor further expands in service sector economies expands in service sector economies because of the proliferation of general because of the proliferation of general skills jobs that do not penalize career skills jobs that do not penalize career interruption.interruption.

We expect value change to accelerate We expect value change to accelerate in service economies, with the increase in service economies, with the increase in female labor force participation.in female labor force participation.

Page 9: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80 F

em

ale

LF

pa

rtic

ipa

tion

30 35 40 45 50 55 Service employment as pct of WAP

USUKCan

NLBel

Fra

Swi

GerAut

Ita

Fin

Swe

Nor

Den

JapAus

Page 10: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

30

35

40

45

50

55

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Services as pct of WAP (left axis)

Female LF participation (right axis)

Page 11: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

    Demand for non-manual labor

    Low High

Demand for hard physical labor (“brawn”) and household-specific skills

Low

Hunter-gatherer: 

High equality between the sexes (P≈1/2)

Postindustrial society:  High equality in bargaining power (P≈1/2). Modest division of labor, and equitable gender norms

High

Agricultural society: Male dominance (high P). Sharp division of labor, and patriarchal norms.

Industrial society: Sharp division of labor, but emerging opportunities for women outside the family (intermediate P)

Page 12: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Bargaining Power and Bargaining Power and Mate SelectionMate Selection We expect mate preferences to We expect mate preferences to

change with female labor force change with female labor force participationparticipation– As females gain stronger bargaining As females gain stronger bargaining

power, males have weaker expectations power, males have weaker expectations of a strict sexual division of labor.of a strict sexual division of labor.

– The importance of a virgin bride The importance of a virgin bride diminishes as families place less pressure diminishes as families place less pressure on their daughters to play to the on their daughters to play to the marriage market.marriage market.

Page 13: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Mate preferences as a function of economic sector

Dependent variable

Good cook and housekeeper

Desire for home and children

Chastity

Industrial employmentService employment

Western culture

Fertility rateConstant

-0.003 (0.005)-0.014**(0.004)--2.293**(0.160)

0.002 (0.008) -0.014 (0.004) 0.084 (0.170)0.085 (0.054)1.858 (0.332)

-0.004 (0.009) -0.016*(0.006)--3.006**(0.259)

0.013 (0.013)-0.011*(0.007)-0.348 (0.278)0.100 (0.089)2.325***(0.544)

-0.018 (0.010)-0.027***(0.007)--2.823**(0.289)

-0.001 (0.013)-0.017**(0.007) -0.923***(0.280)-0.069 (0.089)2.584***(0.547)

Adj R-SquaredN

.45131

.48131

.26231

.29731

.57631

.65131

Page 14: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

(3) Chastity

(2) Good cook and housekeeper

(1) Desire for home and children

Impo

rtan

ce o

f at

trib

ute

Year

(3)

(2)

(1)

Industrialization Deindustrialization

Page 15: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Female Labor Force Female Labor Force Participation and Participation and Political PreferencesPolitical Preferences All else equal, females prefer All else equal, females prefer

government policies, such as child government policies, such as child care and other services, that enable care and other services, that enable them to supply their labor.them to supply their labor.In specific skills economies, the In specific skills economies, the public sector is a crucial source of public sector is a crucial source of female employment that enables female employment that enables women to maintain outside options.women to maintain outside options.

Page 16: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Support for Public Employment Support for the Left

The Gender Gap in Support for Public Employment and Left Parties

Married woman with no labor market participation in a general skills or low divorce country

Married woman with full-time job in a general skills or low divorce country

Unmarried woman with full-time job in a general skills or low divorce country

Unmarried woman with full-time job in a specific skills country with high divorce rates

Page 17: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Asset Specificity

Low High

Ski

llsLo

wH

igh

Banking

Many females in transactional banking, law; nursing.

Few females in client-based banking, law, politics

Many females in transactional retail

Few females in client-based retail

Where is Female Labor?

Page 18: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Skills

Low High

Pro

duct

ivit

y

Low

Hig

h Some retail and banking

Nursing, teaching

Where is Female Labor?

Retail and clerical work

Some professional occupations

Page 19: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

10

20

30

40

50

60

70 P

erc

en

t wo

me

n

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Skill specificity

Clerks

Service andsales workers

Professionals

Techniciansand associateprofessionals

Legislators,senior officialsand managers

Elementaryoccupations

Craft andrelatedworkers

Plant andmachineoperators

Skilledagriculturalworkers

r = -.74

Skills and occupational gender segregation

Page 20: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Fem

ale

Lab

or

Forc

e

Part

icip

ati

on

Low

Low

Hig

hAsset SpecificityLow High

LMEs: Substantial gender voting gap over public daycare, etc.

Scandinavia: Gender voting gap follows public sector vs. private sector employment

Christian Democratic CMEs:

Relatively small gender voting gap; household as unit

Consequences for Political Preferences

Page 21: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Public-Private Sector Public-Private Sector in Scandinaviain Scandinavia Pierson (2000) argues that because Pierson (2000) argues that because

Scandinavian men in the private Scandinavian men in the private sector tend to be married to women sector tend to be married to women in the public sector, the disputes over in the public sector, the disputes over wage differentials will be muted.wage differentials will be muted.

Relaxing the assumption that the Relaxing the assumption that the family is a single utility maximizing family is a single utility maximizing unit shows why this conclusion does unit shows why this conclusion does not follow.not follow.

Page 22: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Gender Gap on TradeGender Gap on Trade

Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that the gender gap on trade will attenuate the gender gap on trade will attenuate as females gain more economic literacy.as females gain more economic literacy.

We think it is more likely that the We think it is more likely that the gender gap on trade reflects the fact gender gap on trade reflects the fact that more females are employed in the that more females are employed in the public sector, and therefore have a public sector, and therefore have a greater fear of government downsizing.greater fear of government downsizing.

Page 23: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Consequences for Consequences for Political CoalitionsPolitical Coalitions The gender voting gap in Scandinavia is The gender voting gap in Scandinavia is

mediated by the willingness and ability of mediated by the willingness and ability of governments on the left to protect male governments on the left to protect male jobs and wages.jobs and wages.

Center-left parties are less able to woo Center-left parties are less able to woo women for fear of making male workers women for fear of making male workers less secure.less secure.

In LMEs, the growth in FLFP pulls the In LMEs, the growth in FLFP pulls the center of gravity towards more public center of gravity towards more public spending. spending.

Page 24: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

Gender, Inequality, Gender, Inequality, and Political and Political PreferencesPreferences Women in low labor-productivity Women in low labor-productivity

industries are more likely to vote on industries are more likely to vote on the left because of limited the left because of limited opportunities.opportunities.

If there is a tendency for LMEs to use If there is a tendency for LMEs to use low-wage labor as a way to low-wage labor as a way to economize on capital, the gender economize on capital, the gender wage gap in LMEs may exceed that wage gap in LMEs may exceed that in CMEs.in CMEs.

Page 25: The Political Economy of Gender in Service Sector Economies Torben Iversen Frances Rosenbluth

ConclusionsConclusions

The demand for female labor in The demand for female labor in service sector economies should service sector economies should undermine patriarchal norms.undermine patriarchal norms.

The gender gap in political The gender gap in political preferences reflects an attempt to preferences reflects an attempt to make opportunities more equal make opportunities more equal still.still.