Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25(3), 2004, 261-280 Copyright 2004 Department of Geography, National University of Singapore and Blackwell Publishers Ltd

INTRODUCTION

Most developing countries rely on intensivenatural resource use as the basis of theireconomies. In the second half of the twentiethcentury, pressure on the natural resource baserose dramatically due to high demographicgrowth rates and a world economy increa-singly predicated on the free flow of trade andinternational financial transactions. In the1980s, as the harmful environmental conse-quences of this development path catapultedenvironmental issues onto the world stage,stakeholders elaborated the concept ofsustainable development. The concept

assumed that environment and developmentwere inextricably linked rather than separatechallenges (Brundtland, 1987:37). It combinedsocioeconomic development and environ-mental concerns, and focused on how policyaffected the sustainability of not onlyconsumption and production, but also theresource base and the livelihoods dependenton that resource base (Redclift, 1987).

Although general agreement exists thatpolicy must balance ecological and humanneeds, there is still no consensus on how to

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREST POLICY INMEXICO AND CHILE

Eduardo SilvaDepartment of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis,

Missouri, USA

ABSTRACT

Widespread agreement exists on the broad outlines of the concept of sustainable development fordeveloping countries. This calls for a development model capable of meeting basic needs withoutdepleting natural resources at a rate that robs future generations of their use. In this regard, citizenparticipation is also considered key to legitimise such policy choices. However, there is considerabledisagreement over the substance and meaning of the major components of the concept and therelationship between them. This paper argues that positions in policy disputes over the sustainabledevelopment of the forest cluster in two distinct approaches: market-friendly initiatives andgrassroots development. Since market economies prevail almost everywhere, the question that isposed concerns the conditions under which the grassroots development approach is included asa significant complement to market-friendly initiatives. This is a political question, requiring anexamination of actors, interests and power resources. The paper thus applies a political economyframework to a paired comparison of Mexico, where grassroots development approaches(community forestry) had notable successes, and Chile, where market-friendly forest policy crowdedout alternatives.

Keywords: sustainable development, community forestry, politics, forest policy, social structure, economic structure

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accomplish that goal. A wide range of policyparadigms offering differing diagnoses of “theproblem” as well as corrective policy recom-mendations vie for recognition in the publicpolicy process (Dryzek, 1997). In this context,most of the literature on environment anddevelopment is highly normative and pre-scriptive. Comparatively little work hasaddressed the vexing, but crucial, question ofuncovering the factors that influence whichprescription prevails in policies for naturalresource extraction (Hurrell, 1991; Klooster,2003).1 Political economy offers an analyticframework to do so given that the questiondirectly concerns political decision-makingwith respect to the distribution of economicresources among unequal social groups, orwho gets what and why.

Forest policy offers a useful window intothe politics of sustainable developmentbecause it has been a fulcrum of politicalconflict over the use of renewable naturalresources. Policy positions have tended tocluster around the market-friendly and grass-roots development approaches to sustainabledevelopment. Since most contemporaryeconomies run on market principles, my paperaddresses the conditions under which agrassroots development orientation is includedin the policy mix as a significant complementto market-friendly initiatives. The paired casesof Chile and Mexico provide an opportunityto explore this: in Chile, a market-friendly forestpolicy crowded out alternatives, whereas inMexico, grassroots development approaches– in the form of community forestry – havehad notable successes.

My paper proceeds in four parts. First, abrief characterisation of the two contendingpolicy approaches to sustainable developmentemphasises the consequences for forestpolicy. The second part specifies a politicaleconomy approach to understanding thepolitics involved in natural resource extraction.The third analyses the Chilean and Mexicancases, and the concluding part compares thetwo cases and explores their significance for

other cases in tropical areas. Although theanalysis draws on the political economy ofpublic policy literature, many of the coreconcepts resonate with the geographicalconcepts of livelihood, scale, place andnetwork.

TWO APPROACHES TOSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTAND FOREST POLICY

The literature on sustainable developmentposits a strong relationship between economicgrowth, environmental quality and poverty.Bad economic performance makes it impossibleto meet basic needs or to improve theenvironment. Thus, in developing countries,a deteriorating economy increases the numberof poor people who put pressure on naturalresources such as forests and leaves preciousfew resources to research and develop meansfor the sustainable use of nature. For thisreason, the consensus on the need forsustainable development calls for a deve-lopment model capable of meeting the basicneeds of a country’s population withoutdepleting the stock of natural resources in away that robs future generations of its use(Brundtland, 1987; Mitlin, 1992). This wouldentail stable economic growth, sustained-yielduse of renewable resources, minimising use ofnon-renewable resources, protecting local andglobal sinks, and meeting human needs (WorldBank, 1992; 2003). Citizen participation indecision-making is also considered a keycomponent to ensure the legitimacy of policychoices.

Advancing beyond this broad consensus,however, is widespread disagreement on howto define the components of sustainabledevelopment and the relationship betweenthem. Nevertheless, contemporary environ-mental policies, programmes and projectstypify two distinct views of the relationshipbetween economics, the environment, socialequity and participation. Although thesecontending market-friendly and grassroots

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development approaches are not necessarilyincompatible, the tension between them offersa useful analytical lens through which toanalyse fundamental policy conflicts in thisissue area.2

The market-friendly, large-scale industrialdevelopment approach assumes both rapideconomic growth based on free market econo-mics and expanding world trade as necessaryto raise standards of living to the point whereindividuals have sufficient leisure to developenvironmental awareness (World Bank, 1992).Further, large-scale firms, which have thefinancial wherewithal to invest in bothdevelopment and environment, are perceivedto be the best vehicle for achieving rapideconomic growth. The main task, then, is topersuade companies to engage in sustained-yield practices, pollution abatement andenergy efficiency. Social sustainability flowsfrom the private sector’s capacity to generateemployment among the poor, thus easing thepressure on the environment. The marketapproach endorses private property rights andminimal government intervention (Repetto &Gillis, 1988) in order to open opportunities forlarge-scale private firms to relieve econo-mically strapped governments of respon-sibilities that they cannot meet. A focus onnational parks and protected area systems toensure biodiversity preservation complementsthis approach to environmental sustainability.Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) andcivic associations are the preferred mode forcitizen participation in environmental policy-making in the market approach, especially atthe implementation stage.

For the forest sector, the market approachadvocates large-scale commercial logging andindustrial plantations. Usually involved in thepulp and paper industry, but also the wholelog extraction business, these firms guaranteeample financial, technical and organisationalcapabilities. Their investments and exportshave an immediate impact on a nation’s balanceof payments and they offer employment in themost marginalised rural poor areas. Well-

managed native forest stands and plantationspromote environmental sustainability becausetrees play a vital role in watershed protection,and in controlling greenhouse gases and soilerosion.

Advocates of the grassroots developmentapproach to sustainable development recog-nise that healthy economic growth isnecessary but question whether the marketalone is the best path (Commoner, 1990;Redclift & Goodman, 1991; Annis, 1992; Painter& Durham, 1995). In terms of social sustain-ability, for example, large companies anddeepening market mechanisms frequentlyreinforce the intense wage labour exploitationprevalent in deeply impoverished areas. Thesepopulations often put great pressure on parksand other ecological reserves, thus subvertingenvironmental sustainability. Moreover,citizen “participation”, at best refers toproviding labour in implementing projectswhose objectives and designs are establishedby technocrats seeking to facilitate thefunctioning of markets, not communities. Atworst, “participation” involves creating NGOswith little if any connection to the community,and whose primary function is to implementand supervise top-down projects created tosatisfy the environmental component of adevelopment plan.

The grassroots development approachpromotes the values of local autonomy,solidarity, self-regulation and citizen parti-cipation in decision-making (Ghai & Vivian,1992; Friedmann & Rangan, 1993; Ghai, 1994;Hall, 1997). Advocates argue that economicgrowth and the egalitarian, ecological andparticipatory goals of sustainable develop-ment in rural contexts require organising localcommunities and small-scale economic activitybased on sustained-yield practices. Underthese circumstances, more of the incomegenerated stays in the community in the formof higher wages, social benefits (health andeducation) and capitalisation. In short,economic and social sustainability depend oncooperative behaviour to pool resources and

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know-how, and to balance the employment,redistributive and investment needs of thecommunity. In this schema, participationfocuses on organised communities under theguidance of recognised local leaders as thevehicles to promote the self-determination ofsubordinate class- and ethnic-based socialgroups. Participation may also extend todeliberation by organised civil society indefining policy agendas, prescribing solu-tions, formulating as well as helping toimplement policy. With respect to environ-mental sustainability, as nature is appreciatedfor its intrinsic and instrumental values, thegrassroots development approach focuses onsmall-scale use and appropriate technologythat mimic natural processes to reduceenvironmental harm.

Where the sustainable development of theforest is concerned, the grassroots deve-lopment approach advocates communityforestry and reforestation (Klooster, 2003).Here, organised peasants help design, imple-ment and manage timber extraction throughsmall-scale and low impact sustained-yieldpractices. Because forests have multiple uses,communities are encouraged to mix forestrywith agroforestry, intercropping and non-timber extractivism. Equally important, thefocus on low intensity use of timber and non-timber products takes into account the broaderenvironmental benefits of forests and worksto preserve biodiversity via the conservationof the complexity of the forest (apart from thefunctions stressed by the market approach).

These ideal-type constructions of the maincontending policy approaches to the sustain-able development of forests are not unrelatedto the geographical concepts of livelihood,scale, place and networks (Gwynne & Silva,1999; Bebbington, 2004). The difference is thatin comparative policy studies these tend to bethe source of implicit and explicit assumptionsand concepts informing policy prescriptions,rather than the central focus of analysis.Livelihood – understood as survival strategiesof the poor – stands at the core of the grass-

roots development approach; thus, improvingthe mechanisms by which, in this case, therural poor in forested areas secure theirlivelihood is the main goal. Comparative policystudies, however, usually assume that goal ofsecuring livelihood and focus instead on thepolitical fortunes of actors who support it.3

Scale features prominently in bothapproaches. The market approach assumes anational and international scale in the circuitsof finance and exchange. Concern for the localfocuses on specific requirements forproduction (labour, natural resources andinfrastructure) while the household, likecommunity or sense of place, is of littleconcern other than as strategic considerationsin where to locate an industrial complex, suchas a locale with high levels of unemployment.In the grassroots development approach, scalefor forestry focuses on rural communities,usually villages. Satisfying the primary needs(income, education, health and general welfare)of households in the context of specificlocalities are key concerns. In this context,forging networks of communities, NGOs,international organisations and stateinstitutions are the assumed conditions forsuccess. As communities become successful,scale shifts to the regional and national levelsas they link up with markets, distribution andfinancing networks, and political andorganisational allies in regional and nationalcapital cities. The grassroots developmentapproach also assumes that place – the textureof life as perceived by different local actors –is significant for understanding actors’motivations.

THE POLITICS OF NATURALRESOURCE EXTRACTION

I have posed sharp contrasts between themarket-friendly and grassroots developmentapproaches to sustainable development tohighlight central points of political conflict.Ideally, a policy framework would integrateelements of both, that is, ensuring necessaryresources for healthy economic growth at the

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national level while at the same time directlyaddressing the problems of rural poverty,strengthening rural communities and socialrelations, and preventing wholesale environ-mental degradation. However, scarcity offinancing and the logic of globalisation, whichfavours expansion of the market and thereforethe market-friendly approach to sustainabledevelopment, pose formidable barriers to arounded integration. The fact that forests are astrongly contested economic resource amongdominant and subordinate social groups –business people and peasants, smallholdersand indigenous peoples – means, ultimately,that political decision-making (the authoritativeallocation of value) determines the degree towhich the market and grassroots approachesare integrated, or whether one (usually market)predominates.

Therefore, a political economy approach witha strong international dimension offers a goodstarting point to understand the politics ofsustainable development and providesconcepts useful for organising complicatedsocial, economic and political realities intoanalytically relevant categories (Smith, 1989).These include, for example, the characteristicsand interests of the relevant actors, theirrelationships to each other, and the precisenature of the political, economic and social basesof the power they wield (Hurrell & Kingsbury,1992). It should be emphasised that all these,as well as their outcomes, are empirical mattersthat cannot be established from principles ofgeneral theory – though where similar featuresand relationships are present, one would expectto find similar dynamics and outcomes.

International structure has both a politicaland an economic dimension. Internationalactors, including governments, transnationalcorporations (TNCs), multilateral develop-ment banks and international organisations(Haggard, 1990), possess significant politicaland economic power, which they can bring tobear in policy debates. Their interestsregarding the environment and developmentdepend on the political parties that control the

executive branch, the country’s situation inthe international division of labour, the logicof international business and the balance ofpower among states.

Domestic political-economic structuredefines state actors and most social groupsas well (Gourevitch, 1986). State actors includethe presidency, ministries and agencies of theexecutive branch and the political partiesrepresented in the legislature. Their powerdepends on the degree to which different stateinstitutions have shared objectives (theircohesion), the tightness of policy-makingteams, their place in the bureaucratic hierarchyand their porosity to social forces. Socialactors range from large-scale economic inte-rests to peasants, smallholders and indigenouspeoples. Their power flows from both theireconomic and organisational capabilities andtheir connections to the state apparatus(executive branch and legislature) (Migdal,1994). State actors are motivated by the policyplatforms of incumbent political parties, bybureaucratic interests, and by ideas about therelationship between environment anddevelopment. The policy stances of business,farmer and peasant groups tend to be guidedby economic interest, which may also dovetailwith more intellectually driven platforms;peasants locked in struggles over land tenure,for example, may be drawn to actors whobelieve that secure property rights are the keyto sustainable development (Keck, 1995).

International and domestic structures,however, do not define all of the key actors.Environmental NGOs can be important advo-cates of contending approaches to forestpolicy. When these are organisations madeup of professionals, their policy stancesgenerally derive from the intellectual andscientific beliefs of their staff; when they havea business or peasant base, their economicinterest produces a mixture of market-friendlyand grassroots development postures (Keck,1995). Their power depends on their financialand organisational capabilities as well as thequality of the expertise available to them.

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Mapping configurations of actors, interests,ideas and power thus provides a good startingpoint for uncovering how state institutions, socialgroups, intellectuals and a country’s relationshipto the world political economy influence itspolicies regarding environment and development(Hurrell & Kingsbury, 1992). However, this staticapproach only offers a partial account. Policyoutcomes usually depend on the dynamics ofcoalition formation between domestic (social andstate) and international actors on the one hand,and on the other, the historically specificinternational and domestic structures in which theyare enmeshed. These alliances and structuralconditions define the sum of power that competingcoalitions muster in support of alternative policystances (Gourevitch, 1986; Frieden, 1991;Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Collier, 1999).

Again, the geographical concepts of scale,livelihood, place and network infuse the politicaleconomy approach to policy studies. When thefocus is on highly contentious issues incentralised states, the scale tends to be national,frequently to the exclusion of other levels unlessvital to the political struggle at hand. Moreover,when the scale is national, many policy studies(as in this paper) assume that the local actors,such as community producers’ organisations,have sufficiently developed networkingcapabilities to catapult their concerns into thenational arena.4 Some of these relationshipssurface in the analysis of forest policy in Mexicoand in the Chilean case, where both the stateforest agency and the peasant unions aggregateinterests of a more regional and local scale. Inthe end, political economy approaches to publicpolicy focus on national-level political strugglesthat are about livelihood, locality and place.Perhaps future studies should reflect further onthe direct contributions of those dimensions fornational politics.

CHILE: THE MARKETFRIENDLY, LARGE-SCALEINDUSTRIAL IDEAL

Chile exemplifies the market-friendly, large-scale industrial approach to sustainable

development and it has a plantation-basedtimber industry that is the envy of LatinAmerica (Silva, 1997a). As a result of the freemarket economic policies of Augusto Pino-chet’s military government (1973-89) and,ironically, substantial state subsidies, anumber of powerful Chilean conglomeratesinvested heavily in export timber plantations(Gwynne, 1993). Joint ventures with inter-national corporations or wholly owned subsi-diaries of international foreign companies alsoentered the market (Gwynne, 1996). The bulkof the wood, mainly radiata pine, was exportedas pulp, whole logs and newspaper stock(Clapp, 1998). In 1994, forest sector exportstopped USD 1.5 billion, making this one ofChile’s leading export industries, and itemployed about 95,000 people or about 2 percent of the economically active population.

Despite the timber industry’s economicsuccess, its growth and organisation violatedmany of the principles of sustainable develop-ment. The rapid expansion of pine plantationsled to the clear-cutting of large tracts of nativespecies (Clapp, 1998), which became knownas the forest substitution issue. Plantationexpansion endangered biodiversity, invitedplagues typical of monocrop cultivation andcreated a pesticide pollution problem.Although the industry provided some employ-ment, it did not foster social equity: it displacedmany communities, disrupted the rural socialfabric and, even by local standards, offeredpaltry wages under highly exploitive laboursystems. In other words, at the local scale theindustry negatively affected place. Given theclosed nature of policy-making under militaryrule, civil society participation in the policyprocess (other than industrialists) was nil.

Changes in political regimes alter generalpower relations in society and thereforepolitical opportunities for policy reform(Tarrow, 1998; Sabatier, 1999). So when Chilere-democratised in 1990, there was a surge indemands for policies to address issuesignored by the military government, includingmeasures to stimulate the sustainable

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development of native forests andplantations. Various policy initiatives soughtto integrate the interests of smallholders,peasants and indigenous peoples and createincentives for native forest management,biodiversity conservation and small-scalemultiple use of the forest. These were theNative Forest Recovery and DevelopmentBills (Proyecto de ley de recuperación delbosque nativo y formento forestal)(Ministerio de Agricultura, 1992; 1995), theReform of Decree Law (DL) 701 (Ley quemodifica el DL 701 de 1974 sobre formentoforestal) (Congreso de la Nación, 1998) andvarious informal proposals to expand theNational System of Protected Areas (Sistemanacional de áreas silvestres protegidas). Thefate of these bills offers an opportunity toexamine the political obstacles to designinga well-rounded approach to sustainabledevelopment which integrates the market-friendly and grassroots developmentapproaches.

Several background conditions areimportant to the analysis of the Chilean case.First, forest policy was a high-saliency issuein Chile in 1990, given the strong regulatoryimplications for private property rights, whichunder the military government had becomevirtually inviolable. Second, external pressurein the form of bilateral and multilateralorganisations, for example the World Bank orUnited States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), was not significant.This made forest policy almost entirely amatter of domestic politics, thus diffe-rentiating Chile from other well-known casessuch as Brazil, Indonesia or Cameroon (Keck,1995; Ekoko, 2000; Silva et al., 2002). Third,unlike the situation in Brazil, or even, as weshall see, Mexico, social conflict over landtenure was low.5 Thus, policymakers did nothave to balance pressures from subordinatesocial groups against other policy objectives,a situation that augmented the power of thoseopposed to change against those whosupported the new policy initiatives (Mann,1993).6

The Native Forest Bill emerged in 1990 asone the first environmental initiatives forconsideration after re-democratisation. Its fatehighlights the difficulties of establishing evenmild pro-grassroots development policieswhen powerful timber interests which are alliedwith veto-holding conservative political partiesin the Chilean legislature vehemently opposeit. This, even in the face of strong politicalwill, including from the presidency, in favourof the proposed legislation. The analytic pointhere is that the specific institutional charac-teristics of a country can be crucial. The otheranalytic point involves the construction ofcounterfactuals: would the outcome have beendifferent if the executive had connections withwell-organised social groups in support of thepolicy initiatives? Might that have forced acompromise?

Potential support for the Native Forest Billwas strong at the outset. In principle, itsbackers within the Chilean Ministry of Agri-culture could count a majority in the Chamberof Deputies; potential opponents had fewerallies in the government and uncertainprospects for cobbling together a majority inthe Senate. These power configurations weregrounded in a centre-left reformist governmentmade up of the political parties that hadopposed military dictatorship – the Concer-tación de partidos por la democracia (CPD).The first CPD government of Patricio Aylwin(1990-94) was committed to a strong all-encompassing reform platform that includedenvironmental issues (Silva, 2002). Staffersfrom Corporación Nacional Forestal (CONAF),the low ranked forest department within theMinistry of Agriculture, initiated the processof forest policy reform with every reason toexpect ministerial approval once theycompleted drafting their bill. At its core, theBill addressed the plight of native speciesforests put under pressure by the rapidexpansion of pine plantations and sought toinstitute subsidies for native forest manage-ment. This was intended as an incentive notonly to conserve native forests, but also tostrengthen weak markets for industries that

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used native woods; it also implied support forthe medium and smallholders that held muchof the land covered by native forests.

The conflict over the Native Forest Billescalated in several stages, each one involvinglarger coalitions and counter coalitions. Thefirst scrimmage highlights the key analyticpoint about power relationships in the Chileancase – that in a highly asymmetrical relation-ship, where a minor state agency confrontspowerful business groups, all other thingsbeing equal, business interests stand to winbecause they can enlist the help of stateagencies that can trump those lower in thehierarchy. The timber industry had becomeaware of the bill while it was still under internalagency review and immediately set aboutdevising a strategy to take control of the policyformulation process. Industrial plantation-based timber interests were economically andpolitically very strong social actors and wereamong Chile’s leading conglomerates. Theircore interests centred on unrestricted propertyrights over their land and the absence ofgovernment intervention in national land andtimber markets. In other words, they zealouslyguarded their control over land and the rightto do with it what they pleased. The NativeForest Reform Bill threatened these propertyrights as well as state interference in marketsthey controlled (Infante, 1991; CIPMA, 1992).

Here we find an example of how economicpower connects to political power. Once weabandon conceptions of the state as a unitaryactor, we can concentrate on how the econo-mically powerful use political connections tomobilise strong supporting coalitions withinthe state to neutralise weak state agencies thatpose a threat to their interests. In the Chileancase, to cast doubt on the technical design ofthe Reform Bill, the timber industry enlistedthe support of the Forestry Institute of Chile(Instituto Forestal de Chile), a more prestigiousagency than CONAF within the Ministry ofAgriculture, and one with which the industryhad developed close ties under militarydictatorship. Timber interests also used the

Ministry of Economy and the GeneralSecretariat of the Presidency – more powerfulministries than agriculture – to split theCONAF team that sponsored the bill. Hadthey succeeded, the industry could havereshaped the bill to their liking, all the whiledeveloping a strong market-friendly discourseof sustainable development (Clapp, 1998).

But, in an example of how coalitionalbehaviour can drive the policy process, theformation of an even more powerful countercoalition trumped the timber industry and theirstate allies when CONAF unexpectedly gainedthe support of both the Minister of Agri-culture and the President of Chile. TheMinister’s intervention defeated the ForestryInstitute’s and industry’s manoeuvrings whilethe President’s intervention neutralised thepositions of the Ministry of Economy and theGeneral Secretariat. Because of this verticalline of authority from the President to theMinister of Agriculture and to CONAF, theagency in charge of policy initiation, theNative Forest Bill was sent to the legislaturewhere it cleared the Chamber of Deputies withsupport of the government’s majority partycoalition (Silva, 1997a).

The next stage of the policy processhighlights the significance of institutionaldesign for the power resources of contendingactors and policy outcomes. In centralisedunitary political systems, direct presidentialsupport for a bill with a strong majority in oneof the legislative chambers should suffice forat least a compromise bill. However, in theChilean case, timber interests mounted aneffective second line of defence in the Senate,a bulwark that stood firm and eventually killedthe Native Forest Bill. Given the peculiaritiesof Chile’s transition to democracy from militaryrule, conservative interests held a majority inthe Senate. Moreover, institutional rules gavethat conservative majority absolute veto powerover any legislation that threatened the coreinterests of the social groups that hadsupported the dictatorship and its neoliberaleconomic model. These groups allied with the

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timber industry against the state actors andenvironmental NGOs that supported theNative Forest Bill. As a result, the billlanguished through two presidential terms, lostpresidential and ministerial support and diedin committee circa 2003, all but forgotten(interviews in April 1997 and November 1998with Aarón Cavieres, a former head of forestcontrol in CONAF, Santiago).

The Reform of DL 701 (1994-98) was themajor forest policy initiative of the second CPDgovernment (the analysis here draws on Silva,1999). DL 701 was issued in 1974, during thefirst year of the military government (Gwynne,1993; 1996; Clapp, 1998). Timber interests hadcollaborated with government officials to craftthe generous state subsidies and tax breaksfor the development of plantation forestry,which covered 75 per cent, and in some casesup to 90 per cent, of the cost of establishingcommercial tree plantations. Consequently, 20years later, the industry was a leading exportsector, its companies among the largest inChile. The design of the decree had ensuredthat only large-scale industries benefited fromthe subsidies to the de facto exclusion ofsmallholders and peasants. Because the CPDwas committed to redressing the mostegregious social inequities of the militarygovernment, the Frei administration (1994-2000) introduced a bill to redirect the subsidieswhere they were needed, towards smallholdersand peasants, while discontinuing them forlarge corporations.7

From the very beginning, the government’sposition was more robust than in the case ofthe 1990 Native Forest Bill where supportershad only built a cohesive coalition of stateactors in reaction to mounting opposition. TheBill for the Reform of DL 701 counted on acohesive coalition of state actors that verticallyintegrated authority from the Chilean Presidentto the lead department within the Ministry ofAgriculture, the Instituto Nacional de Desar-rollo Agropercuario (INDAP). Stronger andmore established than CONAF, this depart-ment had close links to the organised peasant

sector because it was historically charged withrural extension work (INDAP, 1993; 1994;Aburto et al., 1995). As a result, the initialcoalition also included a significant social actorin support of the reform, Movimiento UnitarioCampesino y Etnias de Chile (MUCECH), themovement of Chilean peasants and ethniccultures. MUCECH contributed to the refor-mulation of many regulations that had impededaccess to subsidies by smallholders in theoriginal decree. The movement also helped todefine the smallholder category and terms ofaccess to incentives to prevent corporationsbeing able to claim subsidies through the backdoor.8

Timber interests did not mount strongopposition to the DL 701 Reform Bill becausethey were merely mildly disgruntled, not up inarms, the main analytic point being that theytherefore did not seek to form powerful countercoalitions. Instead, with aid from conservativepolitical parties, they successfully negotiatedfor an extension of tax breaks embedded in the1974 decree, a measure that had not beencontemplated in the DL 701 Reform Bill.9 Theywere less successful in negotiating access toa portion of the subsidies, in large measuredue to MUCECH vigilance.

What explains the relative lack of oppositionby the timber industry in this case? As occurswith powerful private economic actors in marketsocieties, the main reason was that the ForestBill did not threaten control over property(resources and profits) or markets. Due to thesuccess of industrial policy under the termsof the original DL 701, by the 1990s, timberfirms had ample access to private credit,markets were relatively stable and thetechnology well established. Moreover, unlikethe defeated Native Forest Bill, the DL 701Reform Bill was limited in scope and onlyapplied to denuded and marginal lands suitablefor reforestation; therefore, there was nostruggle over control of a natural resource orconflict over property rights. Furthermore, thestate actors that initiated the policy reform weremuch stronger from the beginning, another

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disincentive to mount a strong resistance,especially since timber interests did not feelvery threatened by the bill.

Chile exemplifies the political economy ofsustainable development in countries with awell developed and large-scale timber industry.Where timber interests have felt that coreinterests are at stake, such as property rightsand access to raw materials, they have hadthe economic and political muscle to enlist thedecisive support of powerful allies to obstructapproaches to the sustainable use anddevelopment of the forest that integrate themarket-friendly and grassroots developmentvariants. Given the institutional peculiaritiesof checks and balances in Chile’s politicalsystem, timber interests were able to enlist sup-port from the conservative majority in theSenate and effectively kill the Native ForestBill. These characteristics highlight theanalytic utility of relaxing unitary conceptionsof the state, of examining state institutions interms of a hierarchy of authorities, and ofconsidering the presence or absence of keysocial groups, their degree of organisation andvital interests, and their connections to stateinstitutions. Finally, the structure of politicaland economic institutions, such as thedivision of powers in democracies and thestrength of market society, also emerge ascrucial analytical elements.

In Chile, the timber industry’s relativepolitical success has meant that pressures tosubstitute native forests for eucalyptus andpine plantations and other land uses continueunabated. Moreover, given the industry’sinsistence on cheap labour, social equityissues and livelihood concerns are onlytouched on at the margins. In the otherinstance, business interests permitted forestpolicy centred on denuded lands in the northas this did not threaten their access to eitherresources or market-driven economic or socialrelations. At best, smallholders wouldeventually become marginal suppliers of rawmaterials to the timber companies. Further-more, subsidies are requested by and granted

to individuals, not organised communities.Therefore, collective forms of organisation thatbusiness finds threatening are avoided.Nevertheless, all this, at least, does offer somelivelihood options to individual families andreinforces commitment to a (now) moreattractive place.

Habitat protection via inclusion in parks canbe another tactic to achieve a more integratedapproach to the sustainable development ofthe forest. Unfortunately, efforts to expand thenational system of protected areas have notprospered much in Chile.10 The problem is oneof funding rather than opposition by the timberindustry, which is relatively neutral on thisissue since the areas under consideration arefrequently remote. Incentives for private-public sector partnerships are too weak to drawmuch interest, and resources from internationalorganisations have been insufficient.11

MEXICO: GRASSROOTSDEVELOPMENT FINDS ANICHE

In a world that has embraced neoliberaleconomic reform, the case of Mexico offershope that the grassroots developmentapproach can find a place next to marketoriented policies and provides some cluesregarding conditions under which moreintegrated policy mixes are possible. Comparedto Chile, the Mexican case underscores theanalytic importance of the composition andstrength of key social actors. Mexican indus-trial timber interests were relatively weak andthe forest peasant sector was much stronger,with the result that timber interests could notdominate forest communities as they could inChile. In addition, the forest sector did notcontribute substantially to export earnings, nordid most Mexican timber companies belong tothe country’s most prominent conglomerates,or if they did, they were not flagship companies(for the structure and main actors of the forestsector see El Cotidiano, 1992; Snook, 1993;World Bank, 1994). Firms tended to be ineffi-

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cient and were, until recently, highly depen-dent on import protections. In Mexico, theforest peasant sector was larger and betterorganised than in Chile due to a number offactors (Bray, 1995; Bray & Wexler, 1996).Peasant communities legally held usufructrights to over 80 per cent of the nation’s forestsin the form of ejidos – the communal landgrants to peasants established after the Mexi-can revolution, between the promulgation ofthe 1917 Constitution and the government ofLazaro Cardenas (1934-40). The ejidos landtenure system provided a platform fororganising political and economic activity notavailable in Chile. Moreover, peasant unionshad been encouraged and had institutio-nalised channels of representation in thepolicy-making process (Cornelius & Craig,1991).

Mexico also draws attention to the crucialdifference that the nature of state interventionin markets and social organisation makes inthe policy process. Even after neoliberalreforms, the state has always been more inter-ventionist than in Chile, especially in socialorganisation. Therefore, state support forspecific social groups has a significant impactin struggles over economic resources. (In Chile,for example, the state upholds a market society,hence most social conflicts over resources takeplace in the market and are settled by marketpower.) This explains why, despite theirpotential strengths, Mexican forest peasantcommunities did not control their resourceuntil the mid-1980s. Because the state ownedlands held as forest ejidos, peasants weresubordinate to the state and (through the state)to timber interests. Given this situation, theAgricultural Secretariat and the Federal ForestService were pivotal state actors in forestpolicy. Nevertheless, even within Mexico’ssemi-authoritarian political system, theirautonomy had limits. The patron-clientrelationship between state institutions andofficially recognised organised social groups(state corporatism) often resulted in benefitsfor those social groups. As a result, in Mexico,policy formulation required complicated

alliances between state actors and socialgroups, and policy reform required coalitionsstrong enough to break up established ones.

The Mexican state, and through it, timberinterests, exercised strong control over forestresources until the late 1980s. The state hadallocated large-scale concessions to timberindustrialists and state foresters had gained amonopoly on the provision of technical ser-vices. Meanwhile, peasants received meagrestumpage fees and provided cheap labour(Bray, 1995; Bray & Wexler, 1996). In short, analliance between the Federal Forest Service,foresters, state governors and timber interestssupported a policy that wrestled control offorest resources from the ejidos.

The grassroots development approach tosustainable development flourished in Mexicobetween the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Duringthe administration of José López Portillo (1976-82), peasants received more support from thestate and the concession system crumbled dueto sunset laws (see Chapela, 1992). The Agri-culture Secretariat established an Office forPeasant Affairs staffed by professionalscommitted to grassroots development in theforestry sector. This provided peasants withthe state institutional power which they hadpreviously lacked. At this early stage, the newagency aimed to fortify forest ejido organi-sation and introduce forestry projects thatallowed the communities to appropriate forestresources. This was the socioproducción(social-production) model of sustainableforestry.

Although the concession system wasbreaking down, the Peasant Affairs Officefaced considerable resistance from regionalalliances of timber interests, state governorsand foresters. Where those alliances werestrained, however, the agency built counteralliances with peasant organisations and a fewstate governors.12 This exemplifies theimportance of linkages between national andregional scale in Mexican politics. The bestknown of those alliances – and examples of

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socioproducción in action – took place in thedry tropical southern state of Quintana Roo,centred in the Nohbec community ejido(Argüelles, 1991; Snook, 1991). Though thatalliance included international cooperationfrom a grassroots oriented branch of theGerman development aid agency, internationalactors were important at the regional projectlevel but not in the national policy-makingarena. The pattern was repeated elsewhere inQuintana Roo as well as in Oaxaca andDurango, among other states.13

The scaling up of these regional grassrootsdevelopment efforts culminated in the 1986Forestry Law during the administration ofMiguel de la Madrid. The passage of the lawdraws attention to several important factors:the significance of cohesive state supportfrom the Agriculture Secretariat, governingparty dominance in the legislature (absenceof divided government), and the weakness ofprivate interests dependent on the state.Hence, timber interests were unable to mobiliseallies within the executive or the legislature tomodify the policy. The 1986 law significantlystrengthened peasant rights over the forest.It marked the end of the concession system(which had legally expired) and returned con-trol over the forest to peasant communitieswho were also given priority and resources topurchase public forest enterprises (Bray, 1996).Employment, income, the development ofhuman capital and delivery of social servicesall prospered in ejidos that had developedimportant community forest projects. Forestinventories in the early 1990s suggested thatsustained-yield harvests were more likely tobecome reality than under the concessionsystem which had led to the ruinous over-logging of commercial species. Furtherenvironmental benefits included sensitivity towildlife habitat, the establishment of con-servation areas and watershed management(Klooster, 2003:1109-11).

Changes in Mexico’s position in theinternational (political) economy in the 1980sand the concomitant shift in industrialisation

policy generated strong challenges tocommunity forestry (Randall, 1996). The LatinAmerican debt crisis had rendered the import-substituting industrialisation model ofMexico’s nationalist domestic-market orientedwelfare state incapable of generating sustainedeconomic growth. This altered the politicalopportunity structure for pro-market forces.In 1982, just as the debt crisis exploded, afaction of the ruling party that supported anexport-oriented free market economic modelgained control of the presidency. PresidentMiguel de la Madrid (1982-88) emphasisedeconomic stabilisation policies but, partiallyin the interest of maintaining social peace, didnot appoint zealous free market administratorsto the Agriculture Secretariat, which explainswhy the state did not oppose the 1986 ForestLaw. In that same year, however, in a movethat had repercussions in the followingpresidency, the government arranged forMexico to join General Agreement on Tradeand Tariffs (GATT). Socioproducción cameunder strong attack in 1988-94, the presidentialterm of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (the architectof Mexico’s sweeping free market economicreforms) which was crowned by the signingof the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) in 1994. After 1988, these new direc-tions resulted in policy designs for a Chilean-style large-scale, export-oriented industrialplantation forestry model of sustainabledevelopment (Bray, 1996). Community forestrywas left to languish, and thus, from thesubsequent policymakers’ perspective, todisintegrate.

The Salinas administration signified a keyshift in the degree and cohesiveness of statesupport for market-friendly forest initiativesand hence its alliances with social actors inthe forest sector. Within the state, a strongaxis of vertical authority articulated thepresidency, the Finance Secretariat (toppingthe cabinet hierarchy) and the AgricultureSecretariat. These state actors favoured analliance with Mexican and international timberinterests (Chapela, 1991; 1992). Mexico’s entryinto GATT allowed this powerful coalition to

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gut key articles that promoted communityforestry. Worse was to come for grassrootsdevelopment approaches to sustainable forestdevelopment when the Salinas presidencyappointed a team of policymakers to rewritethe forest (and land tenure) legislation toaccommodate both the terms of NAFTA andthe broader transition to a free marketeconomic model. The team drew up a bill thatfavoured large-scale plantations and crippledcommunity forestry, cutting its organisationsoff from necessary government supports suchas extension work, credit, and protectedmarkets.14 After the bill became law in 1992,the free market reform alliance introducedgovernment incentives for plantation forestrythat eliminated the threat of expropriation,increased the legal size of land holdings andincluded an array of tax incentives andsubsidies to attract foreign direct investmentin plantations (Bray, 1996; Klooster, 2003).

Finally, the reform of Article 27 of theMexican Constitution had a great impact onforest policy (Cornelius & Myhre, 1998). Thisarticle had established the ejido land tenuresystem, and its reform allowing ejidos to sellland to promote joint ventures betweenejidos and private firms was necessary toestablish private markets in agricultural land.In the forest sector this meant arrangementsto lease land to set up plantations. Forestejidos, in particular, were encouraged tobecome more independent from the state andto enter the market by freely contracting thetechnical services necessary for forestmanagement.

Despite this onslaught, grassrootsdevelopment advocates fought back, andthrough their efforts Mexico now exemplifiesthe conditions under which communityforestry may coexist with a free-market orientedpolitical economy. Several important factorssupported this outcome. First, the organisa-tional and economic strength attained by manycommunity forestry projects sustained anetwork of leaders as well as going economicconcerns, proving that the experiences were

not as fragile as their detractors claimed.Second, community forestry activists regaineda foothold in the state in the mid-1990s, thusrestoring a measure of state institutional powerwith which to promote their policy proposals.Initially, they only headed a small agency inthe Solidarity Secretariat that had oversightfor parks and nature reserves but littleinfluence over forest policy (Silva 1997b).However, in the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo(1994-2000), they gained more leverage whenthey were appointed to the EnvironmentNatural Resources and Fishing Secretariat.Third, a network of NGOs replaced the ser-vices, funds and lobbying capacity withdrawnby the state. Fourth, joint ventures betweenpulp and paper corporations and ejidos to sowplantations did not flourish as expected, whichanalysts believe was due more to the con-fusing legal property rights rules than toinadequate material incentives by the state(Klooster, 2003). Because companies have toenter into legal arrangements with ejidosdirectly, whether to buy land or to extractresources, the absence of clear and precedingrules makes it very problematic to completetransactions. Hence, lawsuits and conflictingsituations that affect production, labourrelations and profits abound. When comparedto Chile, the weakness of Mexican privatetimber interests magnified the importance ofthe organisational, economic and stateinstitutional conquests of pro-grassrootsdevelopment oriented forest communities.

What has this coalition of forest peasantorganisations, their supporters in the state andinternationally funded NGOs achieved to sus-tain the grassroots development approach?Their main accomplishment was the subsidyprogramme to promote community forestryadopted in the 1997 Forestry Law (Klooster,2003) – programa para el desarrollo forestal(PRODEFOR) – which was modelled after anexisting support programme to help maizeproducers adjust to international competitionwithin NAFTA. The 1997 Law also mandateda subsidy for plantation forestry, the programade apoyos para el desarrollo de plantaciones

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forestales comerciales (PRODEPLAN). Aftera vigorous policy struggle, PRODEFORreceived a funding ratio of 1:2 vis-à-visPRODEPLAN which, while unfavourable, wasmuch better than the original ratio of 1:10.PRODEFOR subsidies paid for forestmanagement plans, managerial training andtechnical forest education. In 1998 the WorldBank expanded PRODEFOR’s reach by partiallyunderwriting a large project in community-based resource management and conservationin the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero andMichoacán. The Vicente Fox administration(2000-06) has basically maintained thesefunding ratios and priorities.

CONCLUSION

The Chilean and Mexican cases offer anopportunity for paired comparisons to explorethe question of when grassroots developmentapproaches to the sustainable developmentof the forest are likely to be included in forestpolicy and when do market-oriented ap-proaches crowd them out. The politicaleconomy approach applied here introducesuseful concepts for answering that questionby sorting out how national (as well asinternational) economic and politicalstructures determine the relevant actors, theirinterests and their power resources. Muchdepends on the characteristics of the two socialactors involved: large-scale timber interestsand forest communities. Their relative strengthrests on their economic wherewithal, organi-sational capacity and the support they receivefrom the state and other organised socialgroups (such as unions or employers’ asso-ciations), NGOs and international actors. Forforest dwellers, assuming they have secureland tenure, it is important to determinewhether they have a sense of themselves as acollective force – either as individuals whosecollective action is organised in peasantunions, or as a community acting throughvillage-based organisations. Moreover, in ademocracy, their linkages to political parties,as well as the specific features of politicalinstitutions that distribute power among class-

based social groups, must also be taken intoaccount. Finally, the degree of state inter-vention in the economy and society has greatsignificance for the relationships amongactors. Where the state is more interventionist,it tends to be more active and influential indisputes. Where the role of the state isdiminished by a pro-market orientation, powerrelations dictated by the market tend to setthe tone for policy debates and state insti-tutions.

In Chile, in the context of a strong freemarket economy, economically powerfulprivate domestic and international pulp andpaper companies advocated a market-friendlyplantation-based approach to sustainableforestry and adamantly opposed grassrootsdevelopment approaches. They won; but notsolely because of their economic power accru-ing from export earnings. Domestic pulp andpaper companies were part of Chile’s largesthorizontally diversified conglomerates thathad a vital interest in maintaining strict privateproperty rights. This assured support fromChile’s powerful business associations. As aresult, the heads of Chile’s most influentialbusiness groups and employers’ organisationseffectively lobbied the executive and thelegislature. After timber interest manoeuvringsin the executive branch failed, conservativesenators rallied behind them and blocked theattempts of the CPD majority in the chamberof deputies to include elements of the grass-roots development approach in national forestpolicy. By contrast, social forces in communityforestry were weak; as far as the Native ForestRecovery Bill was concerned, they wereunorganised, had little economic impact,lacked alliances with organised labour andwere therefore not an active social force in thepolicy debates. Instead, indirect demand forgrassroots development in the forest sectorcame only from minor agencies of the stateand from political parties in the lower house ofthe legislature, not a sufficient pressure toovercome the Senate’s veto power. The morepositive fate of the DL 701 Reform confirmsthe importance of these conditions,

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specifically, the lack of intransigent oppositionby timber interests to smallholder plantation-style reforestation projects in denuded areas,and the greater organisation of those northerncommunities and alliances with rural unionsand the Ministry of Agriculture. The absenceof property rights contentions influenced thetimber industry’s relative acquiescence; atissue were denuded lands that they neitherowned nor aspired to control, not standingforests that they could exploit.

By contrast, in Mexico, the ejido systemprovided a basis for communal land tenure,organisation and action, and offered thepossibility for a much stronger social force toadvocate for social forestry. Where suchorganisation existed, forest ejidos demandedit; they found allies in an interventionist state,in the international sector and among politicalparties. As a result, social forestry flourishedbetween 1970 and 1986. Meanwhile, privatetimber interests were economically and organi-sationally weak; they did not export much, fewbelonged to large conglomerates and businessassociations were not strong supporters.However, once the presidency decided infavour of markets, large-scale timber interestsgained significant support in the 1990s. Butby then, community forest interests had gainedsufficient social force through their economicand organisational success to be able tosurvive, retain a presence in the state andinfluence policy, counting support from NGOs,rural unions and international actors.

The cases of Chile and Mexico also providesignificant insight into the conditions neededfor the inclusion of grassroots developmentconcerns in national forest policy elsewhere.For example, political structure matters. InIndonesia, as in Chile, grassroots developmentapproaches to forestry were not feasible underthe authoritarian presidential regime of Suhartothat supported only timber interests. Underre-democratisation, however, communityforestry has fared better in Indonesia than itdid in Chile because local, customary andindigenous communities had social organi-

sation (such as cooperatives and localauthority structures) and entered into allianceswith other important actors (World Bank,NGOs, and political parties), and because ofdifferences in the political institutions (nolegislative chamber held absolute veto power)(see Manurung, 1997; Silva et al., 2002). Thesame conditions have shown to be importantin other tropical countries where timber is animportant economic resource, such as Came-roon, and lately Bolivia. Here, alliances of stateforestry departments and international actors,principally the World Bank, sponsored market-friendly forestry policy reform (Pavez &Bojanic, 1998; Ekoko, 2000; Cleuren, 2001).However, once the policy formulation processinvolved the legislature, community forestrymeasures were eventually included in thepolicy package. Again, the reasons for thiswere that the forest communities themselvespossessed some legal rights, had some levelof organisation, and connected with politicalparties at the local and national levels. Hence,legislators from those districts lobbied for theinterests of their constituents.

Although “democracy” and the socialorganisation of forest communities are impor-tant to the future of social forestry, underpresent market-oriented trends in the worldpolitical economy, social forestry has strug-gled to retain a significant place on nationaland international policy agendas. In part,better conditions for social forestry hinge onthe ability of communities to organise andbuild closer connections to national (and inter-national) social, political and economicinstitutions. Mobilisation along these lines,especially at the national level, might put somepressure on international donor institutionsto offer more support for social forestry. Thisinvolves conceptualising community participa-tion as a means to build social power, measuredby opportunities for communities to formnetworks, gain know-how, create projects andlink themselves to regional, national andinternational institutions capable of suppor-ting their development. Linking these variousscales offers hope for the improvement of

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livelihood and conditions of place in forestcommunities, as well as for protecting bio-diversity.

ENDNOTES

1 Relatively more efforts have appeared with respectto the formation of international regimes for wildlife,(Haas, 1990; Young, 1994; Gibson, 1999).

2 There is a strong temptation among analysts tofocus on a wide range of strategies that straddle bothapproaches to sustainable development, such as theclean development mechanism (CDM) projects oncarbon credits in Chiapas, forestry-based ecotourismin the El Triunfo Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas, andthe Tompkins conservation project (a privatereserve) in southern Chile. These indeed interesting“projects” are primarily just that – individual projectsin which the state may or may not be a partner, andin which international agencies, most frequently theWorld Bank through the global environmentalfacility, are the main policy architects and fundingsources. In other words, they are not the focus ofnational policy, where the struggle I posit is muchstronger, precisely because it concerns nationwideaccess to resources. If anything, one could hypo-thesise that national governments in the developingworld have “abdicated” their responsibility byinternationalising and privatising the environmentalissue area, especially in biodiversity conservation,under which forestry is subsumed. This fits well withthe concerns of conservation biologists who tend tohave a “crisis” or “critical” area focus on specificecosystems (Grumbine, 1994). Meanwhile, theseprojects still face the perennial problem of scalingup – as even the World Bank (2003) – recogniseswithout offering strategies for achieving that goal.In any case, a global “hot spots” approach is not thesame as national policy. This much should beacknowledged, because national policy offersopportunities to a much broader range of people asthey pursue environmentally sensitive livelihoods.

3 This places grassroots development in sharp contrastto the market-friendly approach, which is not sensitiveto livelihood because it does not link employment (atany wage) to the broader pattern of life of poorindividuals and households.

4 Culture and ethnicity may also define social groups.

5 A monograph would be able to specify how thatprocess occurred, with full attention to the nuances oflivelihood/place and the reciprocal influences oflocality and national levels in formulating policy.

6 The situation heated up somewhat in the late 1990s

as the Mapuche Indians began to contest timbercompany claims over land in south-central Chile.

7 See Silva (1997a) for the important contributionsof two NGOs to the contending policy coalitions –Centro de Investigación y Planificación del MedioAmbiente (CIPMA), in support of timber interests,and Comite Nacional Pro Defensa de la Flora y Fauna(CODEFF) in support of CONAF.

8 For peasant participation in the Reform, seeInforme Comisión (1994); Chile Ambiente (1995);MUCECH (1995a; 1995b); and Díaz, et al. (1995).My analysis of the reform also benefited frominterviews conducted in Santiago in July 1996 withMiguel Díaz, director, project management, Fondode Inversiones Sociales (FOSIS), a Chilean socialinvestment fund; Victor Venegas, head of forestdevelopment, CONAF; and Osvaldo Jofré, directorof research and projects, MUCECH.

9 Insights gleaned from my interview with EduardoCarrillo, a senior attorney of the Ministry ofAgriculture, and a core member of the team to revisethe native forestry law (Santiago, July 1996).

10 There have been instances, however, where thetimber industry has abandoned expansion projectsdue to complications arising from the requirementfor environmental impact reports before newindustrial projects can be permitted.

11 Because this is an analysis of proactive publicpolicy, it leaves out controversy over privateconservation initiatives. I refer to the efforts ofmillionaire Douglas Tompkins, who has bought988,000 acres of land in the 10th Region and declaredthem protected areas – Parque Pumalín, a Yosemite-sized private ecological reserve. He has encounteredstrong political opposition from timber interests (andother landowners) and their allies in national andregional governments. So far, Ricardo Largos, thethird CPD president, has not bowed to that pressure.

12 Confirmed by field interviews (in Mexico City,July 1994; Durango, March 1995) with León JorgeCastaños, former Undersecretary for Forestry in theAgriculture Secretariat and his right hand assistantVíctor Suárez, key policymakers of the period.

13 Participant views informing this were obtainedfrom interviews (St. Louis, Missouri, March 1992;Mexico City, March 1995) with Alfonso Argüelles, aprominent Nohbec community leader; and withAntonio Carrillo, director of the Deutsche Gesellschaftfuer Technische Zusammernarbeit (GTZ) project(Caracas, Venezuela, July 1993). Key leaders of peasantcooperatives also made spontaneous reference to thesefactors in open-ended interviews conducted in Jaliscoand Quintana Roo in July, August and October 1994,and in Oaxaca and Durango in March 1995.

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14 Insider views from an interview with GerardoSegura, a member of the technical team that workedon the bill (Mexico City, June 1994); various drafts ofthe bill as well as the preamble of the final bill reflectthe same views (see Presidencia de la República, 1992).President Salinas appointed Luís Téllez, an advocateof neoliberal economic restructuring, to head thetechnical team, and another neoliberal, ClaudioGonzález, as his right hand man; they handpicked therest of the team, largely from universities, on aconsultancy basis.

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