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THE POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES:

INTRODUCING THE CRIMINAL AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYST FOR EFFECTIVE

POLICING.

Joel Vargas

JULY 25, 2012

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I. INTRODUCTION

Many books and journals have been written about reforming the Intelligence Community

(IC) but little has been written about the policing practices in the United States (US). Policing

models in the United States have been under pressure are by government managers to reduce

their policing costs, which absorb a considerable amount of their budgets. In other words, chiefs

of police all over the US are forced to adopt practices from the private sector to cut costs. While

it sounds like a great idea, policing in the US continues to be managed as it has been with

policing models invented decades ago. Even with the invention of recent policing models, the

implementation has not shown any real successes.

In many forms the police departments in the US take form similar to the military

organizations. Police models represents the culture inside the police department that shapes

decision making, structures and hierarchies, paramilitary mindsets, recruiting and hiring similar

personnel that look like them, but nothing on effectiveness or efficiencies that would cut crime

and costs significantly. In most cases, police departments that serve communities of 100,000

residents or less have not implemented intelligence divisions successfully. A problem found in

traditional police models is that promotions of officers into a specialty division are based on time

in the police department and not for the skills, education, and value for the division. This creates

a real problem as the candidates coming into the more promising models are not the best

qualified. Another issue when adopting a more intelligence-led policing model is that wrong

association of the word “Intelligence” with espionage. This miss-association of the word causes

police departments to avoid the word intelligence as much as possible, without considering its

potential when it is properly implemented in a different context.

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The police models come down to the following programs:

A. The Traditional Policing Model is observed in the majority of the cases in smaller towns in

the US. The model is reactive that is the officers are trained to respond to calls, service the calls,

and little smiles or contact with the community is seen from the police officers. This model is

very militaristic. Police officers are mostly military or ex-military.

B. The Problem Solving Policing Model is focused on preventing crime and solving problems in

the community. This model is better than the Traditional Model. However, the detective division

in most police departments is overwhelmed with cases and little attention is given to the different

programs that must be running in order to make this model effective.

C. The Community Oriented Policing Model is a model that brings the community involvement

so community and police can work together to fight crime. This latest invention appears to be the

alternative from the previous two models but has significant limitations and mainly because

police chiefs have adopted the philosophy but forgot to train their personnel on ways to actually

work the model effectively.

D. The Intelligence-Led Policing Model is a creation of the 911 attacks in New York. This

program in many ways combines the Community Oriented Policing Model and Problem Solving

Policing Model. However, this model brings intelligence to be the main driver of how police

patrol and solve crime. This model has been actively in the field but has been the cause of a lot

of criticism.

Policing in the US falls under any of the programs above or a mix of programs. While the

programs are accepted by the community in the U.S., England is experiencing a shift from the

costly policing programs and moving into a more effective model by outsourcing some of the

policing to the private sector. In a recent interview by Chris Cubbage of the Australian and Hong

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Kong Security Magazines, Jay Grant, Secretary General and Chief Executive of InterPort Police

Global Force, stated:

The world has become smaller and communication channels have changed and made

transnational crime which has no borders or jurisdictions. InterPort Police is to be able to bring

information, intelligence, identity identification programs, management, counterterrorism,

operational programs and exchanges to members all over the world. Mr. Grant says that police

departments do not have to reinvent the wheel but actually just learn from what other police

departments are doing well and InterPort Police offers the platform to meet these needs

(InterPortPolice.Org).

Organizations such as InterPort Police should experience a tremendous opportunity in the global

security market place as austerity programs and budget constraints continue to dominate how

policing and security are performed in the world. Adding to Mr. Grant’s statement, the private

sector strives to bring efficiency and cost effective programs in order to make a profit, a different

paradigm not normally found in the public sector. These pressures in the UK are now putting

more pressure in the US for police departments to re-invent their policing models and provide a

superior service to the community.

This research will analyze a factor added to the Community Oriented Policing program

that has been running for the last 3 years in Bensenville, Illinois, a suburb outside Chicago,

Illinois (Western side of O’Hare Airport), and creates not a model per say, but creates the factor

that makes the difference in any of the police models used in the US. This model introduces the

criminal and intelligence analyst for effective policing.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to highlight the Traditional Policing Model, a recent article published by The

Raw Story, titled Report: Israeli model underlines militarization of U.S. Police, by Muriel Kane

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explains how the militarization in the U.S. of police forces is something being modeled by other

countries in this case Israel. Kane explains that police departments in the U.S. are adopting the

Israeli aggressive and ruthless suppression tactics (Kane, 2011). Kane states that New York has

not only adopted Israeli programs but now works with Israel closely in other to develop their

police departments into a “military-intelligence apparatus” (Kane, 2005). The traditional police

model provides a false sense of security but the moment the citizen has the first encounter with

the police a perception about police takes a different turn from safety to fear and oppression

coupled with a lack of service. This model is costly.

In the paper titled Policing in the United States: Developing a Comprehensive Empirical

Model, by L. Edward Wells and David N. Falcone, the authors discuss the community oriented

policing model (COP) and provide a complete research on this model in the US and its problems

while being implemented (Wells, 2005). Wells and Falcone performed a research and narrowed

the premises of this model to three: (1) structural; (2) contextual or “Open Systems”; and (3)

universal premise (Wells, 2005). After the extensive research that covered small to large police

departments adopting this model, the authors came up to several conclusions. The police

departments vary their implementations of alternative police models and they found out that the

three premises above can not be used to measure a standard. The authors concluded that using

these different premises failed to produce any meaningful results and concluded that it is

impossible to find a standard model in police departments (Wells, 2005). This is more evidence

that there is no standard in any police model.

In the program designed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance titled Intelligence-Led

Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, by Marilyn Peterson, the newest policy model was

designed with the help of some of the brightest minds in law enforcement-post 911. Peterson

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writes, “effective intelligence operations can be applied equally well to terrorist threats and

crimes in community, homeland security and local crime prevention are not mutually exclusive.

Officers ‘on the beat’ are an excellent resource for gathering information of all kinds of threats”

(Peterson, 2005). The program consolidates two programs the community oriented policing

models and the need to obtain intelligence from the community (Wells, 2005). An issue that

came up in the NYPD, when a journalist discovered the NYPD and CIA were running a program

that showed significant flaws when the activities moved to the espionage side. The NYPD case

will not be studied in this paper but it is recommended for further study.

Privatization of police activities is something being explored in the United Kingdom

(UK). This also must be explored in the US as it brings certain benefits. In article by The

Economist Online published on July 2, 2012, titled The thinning blue line, the article discusses

how controversial the privatization of police to the private sector has become in the UK. The

article details how Lincolnshires is hiring G4S to provide civilian police services. In total a 575

of them are being transferred to do this work (The Economist, 2012). The article also discusses

how budget cuts is changing how policing is done and that the private sector can use specialty

skills they have and bring efficiencies into the police department not found in the public sector

(The Economist, 2012). The concept is a new concept. The US is watching closely as they also

encounter their own money problems. The author writes “police numbers do, in some

circumstances, matter. So more fundamental reforms must be in order” (The Economist, 2012).

The additional factor is in consideration is the sharing of resources from police departments so

they don’t all have to have duplication of personnel. This is a great idea s they can all share in

the costs. The introduction of the private sector to perform activities normally by personnel

inside police departments is the right move.

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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While the police models provide a possible ways in which a police department can depart

from the Traditional Policing Model, the research here will not focus on inventing a police

model. The policing models in general provide different variables from the originally proposed

police model design. This poses a significant challenge for any research to provide a workable

definition or standard for these models. This research will not discuss extensively the different

theories and models but actually will introduce a factor that can be implemented in any

environment, in any police structure, in any police model. This research will answer the

question: Is the introduction of a criminal and intelligence analyst the missing factor for effective

policing?

IV. HYPOTHESIS

In this research, I hypnotize that police models can not provide effective policing while

they attempt to get away from the Traditional Policing Model, but what is needed is the

introduction of the criminal and intelligence analyst for effective policing. Unlike the models, the

analyst can be given training and development to support any policing model and can be the

primer for crime reduction and effective policing.

V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The methodology that will be applied in this research while collecting information

sources will be to deduce conclusions or deductive reasoning method. It will also use a mix

research method, as the introduction of some real data compiled in Bensenville, IL will be used.

The variables are the following: the policing models currently in the US, the different variations

from the proposed policing models, the relationship and adoption of mission statements from

other dominant intelligence or law enforcement bodies that conflict with the mission, the

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communities and its demographics that must be addressed, and the lack of intelligence analysis

to policing. Lastly, the focus on this research will be to aid communities with less than 100000 in

population. The larger cities can adopt the same program to a larger scale. The problems seen

today are affecting communities large or small in terms of policing are very much similar.

VI. BACKGROUND OF RESEARCHER/ANALYST

In the last quarter of 2009, Joel Vargas, Freelance Security Contractor for Contingent

Security Services, Ltd., was working in the Bensenville Police Department observing and

creating significant research on police practices, while waiting for an assignment. Chief Frank

Kosman invited Joel Vargas to stay and implement and develop Crime Prevention Programs. The

opportunity appeared to be very attractive. The opportunity to work in a diverse community such

as Bensenville and to develop and implement the programs and concepts would be of great value

for the research, the town, and the government.

V. DEMOGRAPHICS OF BENSENVILLE

Demographics in Bensenville: 20,703 population; 47.8% Hispanics; 42.8% White (Non-

Hispanic), the rest black and other races (US Census, 2010). While colleagues in the Security

and Intelligence industry questioned the sanity of Vargas, Vargas began the program and began

to compile considerable amounts of data.

VI. THE PROGRAMS DEPLOYED

In January 2010 the programs began to be implemented one by one beginning with the

residential program. The programs currently have the following characteristics (other elements

can be added or taken away from the comprehensive program):

A. Residential and Multi-Family. A Customized Neighborhood Watch Program was

created. As of July 25, 2012, the program has 450 residences and 55 groups.

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B. Business and Commercial Interests. A Business Watch Program was created to serve

the businesses in town. These businesses employ about 25,000 employees daily

(estimated). Currently the program has 210 businesses out of over 2000 businesses

(estimated).

C. Multi-Housing. The town has about 35% of the residents into multi-housing

properties. Historically these buildings also produce a high percentage of police services

calls. A customized program was created called Crime Free Multi-Housing Program,

modeled after a traditional program in force in many cities and towns. Only this is

customized.

D. Student Watch Program. The town has two school districts. District 2 and

district 100. A program was created to interact with teachers, employees, parents,

clubs, and students. The DARE program was not one of the programs in force.

The goal was to interact with as many of these groups as possible and create

networks of people.

E. Organizations Watch Program. Churches, Civic, Social Organizations, non-

profit organizations, etc., needed a liaison person with Bensenville. This program

serves and facilitates anything they need. This program creates soccer leagues,

launches educational programs with partnerships, assists organizations in any

events, etc.

F. Transportation. Transportation is a key vulnerability in any homeland security

program. Bensenville is on the western side of Chicago O’Hare International

Airport (ORD). It serves close to 90,000, 000 passengers a year. A customized

program was launched with the help of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and

its Criminal Intelligence liaison Sergeant. The program coordinates a club of

airport and airplane enthusiasts. There are 130 members and they come from 60

different towns. They also receive anti-terrorist training.

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The program also creates a network of Federal, State, Local and Security agencies in the US and

other countries with similar interests to learn from each other. Currently DHS, TSA, Chicago

PD, US Customs & Border Protection, RCMP, Federal Police of Australia, and several other

countries. The programs require a significant amount of time to be spent analyzing intelligence,

activity with the entire police department, communities, networking with other law enforcement

and security agencies in the network.

VII. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The analyst may be sworn or civilian. The fact that the police departments in their quest

to change the culture and cut costs by reducing crime and providing the highest quality of service

to the community may not require a complete change but the addition of the criminal and

intelligence analyst. The following is the analysis of the results broken down in several sections:

A. THE ANALYST

There are a number of factors when deciding the right analyst for the job. In many cases,

this discussion will focus on the hiring of a single analyst. The hiring of management will require

similar qualities only experience in the management of groups of people. Depending on the size

of police department, the analyst may also possess the ability to collect intelligence and create

networks that bring intelligence. In Bensenville the analyst takes also the collection of

intelligence as part of his job description. In November 2004, The International Association of

Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. published a paper titled “Law Enforcement

Analytic Standards” (Law Enforcement, 2004). The recommendation of this research suggests

their suggestion can be followed. The paper states the following:

1) The analyst should have a four year degree and commensurate experience. Or no less than

five years of previous research/analysis/intelligence-oriented experience with a minimum of a

two year degree or no less than 10 years of previous research/analysis/intelligence-oriented

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experience with a two year college degree. The experience can be documented and the degrees

can be in appropriate areas but the suggested ones are social sciences, English, journalism and

criminal justice. Other areas can be business and social sciences degrees (Law Enforcement,

2004).

2) Previous law enforcement experience is not necessary. However, the ability to understand and

as stated in number one and the ability to adapt to the criminal intelligence analysis is required.

3) Ability to understand demographics and subject himself to a six month program in which will

include ride along with the different divisions of the police department, at least one 8 hour shift.

4) The analyst must be able to analyze police activity, trends, and forecast the needs for directed

policing in certain areas. The analyst must be able to obtain a low level security clearance to

access the criminal records database in the state. The good moral character and extensive

background check must be also passed according to police standards.

5) The analyst must be able to set up networks as described above. The analyst must be able to

communicate clearly, have excellent communication and people skills. Having experience

publishing papers and journals is highly desirable. Possessing skills to network in the community

and other professionals is required. It is recommended to learn about the analyst networks to

identity the amount of social media involvement (personal and professional).

6) Public speaking and ability to create presentations are required. However, experience can be

acquired. The analyst will present to community and professionals.

7) Lastly, the analyst must be able to either learn from his or her own networks, or become part of

an existing network of analysts. Contingent Security Services, Ltd. provides a complete solution

which includes: management of analyst(s), coaching, implementation, and development of

intelligence networks on a flat fee. Contracts are flexible (contingentsecurity.com). There are

programs such as embedding analysts into existing police departments or just contracting and

training.

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In terms of education, American Military University provides a great number of programs such

as bachelors and master degrees in the intelligence field and homeland security. It is highly

recommended the analyst secures a higher level of education, while in the program.

The Society of Certified Criminal Analysts (SCCA) offers a certification but requires a 4

year college degree and a minimum of 10 years of experience (Law Enforcement, 2004). Further

research is recommended in the area of how to bring a criminal and intelligence analyst

especially if the police department never had one. In the article by Policing & Society titled “The

effective analyst: A study of what makes an effective crime and intelligence analyst” Janet M.

Evans and Mark R. Kebbell studied what makes an effective analyst. They discovered that the

analyst must be recognized as effective. They add “The findings illustrate a change from the

analyst being seen as a technical specialist to a growing understanding of the analyst as part of a

support structure for decision-makers” (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). They also highlighted the need

to implement sound recruiting, training and development as discussed in their findings. The

system, training, and development of these individuals are necessary for a successful

deployment. This paper does not expand into the areas of training and development. However, it

provides the evidence of what an analyst can do given the right system and the right training.

B. THE ENVIRONMENT

One of the most important parts in this research has been finding out what the right

environment is for the analyst to produce results. In the Bensenville Police, there are several

divisions: The Patrol, Records, Evidence, Detective, and Community Oriented Police Division

(COP) (www.bensenville.il.us). Larger police departments may have their own criminal and

intelligence division and be more complex structures. In Bensenville the analyst was placed

inside the COP with direct report to a commander in the COP, direct access to the Commander in

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the Detective Division and the Chief of Police. Intelligence gathered of economic impact would

be reported to the Village Manager. The patrol division would only receive certain information

as recommendations but no directives from the analyst. Recommendations requiring directives

will go to the Chief of Police and follow proper chain of command. Schedule can be flexible to

accommodate day and afternoon shifts. The program requires a six months of preliminary

information gathering on what is needed in the community followed by a total of 2 ½ years of

development and implementation.

C. THE OBJECTIVES

The research revealed that police departments’ objectives and goals are not all common.

Management may want effective policing, superior service to the community, at a reasonable

cost. The common denominators were “serve and protect” and it appears stakeholders agreed

with this premise. Therefore, the program produced the base line of security and crime

prevention as the common denominator in the implementation of the community programs. With

this in mind, the analyst can move into the criminal activity factor and statistics of what happens

in the city or town. A minimum of six months and maximum of 2 years should be analyzed.

Appendix A provides a good idea of what crimes and calls for service to analyze.

For this research, a six months complete analysis of calls for service to the police

department were documented and double checked for accuracy. See Appendix A. The program

has already been in operation since January 1, 2010 so the numbers would need to be from the

previous 6 months without the program. In this case, the analyst is trying to identify the calls that

are crime prevention related. The analyst must be able to create the intelligence networks

necessary to produce at minimum a 30% of the calls to be directed by the community networks

created i.e. crime prevention calls. In this case, see Appendix B, shows Bensenville is

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performing at 54% crime prevention related calls compared to the two categories of crimes

(crimes against the person and property crimes).

In the journal titled “Policing, Situational Intelligence & The Information Environment:

A Report to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary” by professor Martin Innes and Dr.

Collin Roberts, they make the argument that the current police intelligence practices tend to

focus on tow areas: 1) Criminal Intelligence and collecting data on the usual suspects and 2)

Criminal Intelligence on currently presenting priorities and problems (Innes and Roberts, 2011).

In the Bensenville research it was found that by creating and nurturing networks in the

community to collect intelligence it completely challenged the traditional paradigm and provided

access into the unknown sources of intelligence not found by the traditional intelligence sources

such as informants involved in crime and/or targets and brought the community to participate as

sources for intelligence. The program as implemented in Bensenville did not change the structure

of the police department or required a different police model. The research of 12 months and the

six months included in this report show that the patrol division is going to calls generated by the

community over half the time—producing a shift from reactive to proactive. This paradigm shift

should be the primary driver of any deployment to measure reactive or proactive engagement.

D. THE NETWORK INSIDE THE EMPLOYER

An additional element that the analyst must be able to exploit is the ability to recruit into

the program sources of information and actionable intelligence from within the police

department community. This research will just provide a glimpse of a huge possibility. The

assumption is that the police structure and organization is going to be left intact. Therefore, the

options are to recruit from the existing organization the right people to provide the intelligence

necessary. Example, shifts from patrol, other divisions, and civilian employees can become part

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of a network. The information can be classified as actionable intelligence, rumors, and opinions.

The analyst must be able to gather this information and protect the sources as much as possible

and reward them when it is appropriate. After implantation of the program, the analyst and the

department may formalize the “Intelligence Unit” formed from different divisions and

departments. Some additional sources of intelligence are from the civilian employees in other

departments inside the employer such as public works and other personnel. The relationships

must be nurtured and a connection uninterrupted must be implemented.

E. THE PROFESSIONAL POLICE OFFICER

This research would not be complete without the conversation about what a police

department looking to enhance its ability to serve and protect should also consider to create a

professional police force. The Intelligence Analyst can be the producer of rapid results but

without developing a professional police force the results may be temporary. In the March 2011,

issue of Harvard Kennedy School titled “Toward a New Professionalism in Policing”

Christopher Stone and Jeremy Travis explain in detail what it takes to take a paradigm shift in

policing. They say that leaders inside these police departments must be willing to adopt new

ideas, policies and practices that look to the future and not stay in the past (Stone and Travis,

2011). This is an ambitious endeavor but one that should be explored. Tradition will not work 5

years from now as criminals interact with their victims with technology but the human contact

more than ever continues to be the difference between high cooperation, low cooperation or no

cooperation.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR FURTHER STUDY

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Law enforcement is facing challenges like never before. Crime is changing and criminal

are becoming more sophisticated. Today, a police department must have a criminal and

intelligence analyst in their police department in order to meet the goals of their superiors. The

professional analyst surveys, researches crime and also researches economic conditions to

support the over all mission of employer/client (in the intelligence community referred as “All

Sources Intelligence”). In the article titled “Why does public cooperate with law enforcement?

The influence of the purposes and targets of policing” by Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tayler and

Stephen J. Schulhofer, in the publications Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (Aug 2011), the

authors address the issue of public perception and contexts in which different populations

cooperate with law enforcement. They discovered that groups of people in communities

cooperate in different forms depending if they are the target of police or not. This means the

targeted person or community may cooperate but the police must be able to create the link so

these groups can cooperate best (Hug and et al, 2011). In Bensenville, the Hispanic community

did not trust the police, when the programs were launched. The initial phase of the program

required some police operation in order to gain trust. Today Bensenville enjoys a significant

level of cooperation from the Hispanic community in police cooperation.

An issue that is also requires further study is the anti-social behavior police officers may

have in existence inside the police department structure. The research discovered that the patrol

division showed the most anti-social behavior (ASB) and had considerable challenges adapting

to change. In paper published in 2010 titled “Re-thinking the policing of anti-social behavior” by

the Cardiff University, the researchers discovered evidence that anti-social behavior with police

forces impact negative on victims and the public. Additionally, that most police forces do not

practice relationship building in the community and only want the public to bring information

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but refuse to create bond with the community, thus limiting what could be obtained from the

crowds (Innes & Weston, 2010). This ASB attitudes and behavior can also translate in

discrimination against groups of people, co-workers, and the public they are there to serve. The

criminal and intelligence analyst in Bensenville challenged the traditional police model and

brought a significant shift in police operations, crime reduction, cooperation, and collaboration

from the community. As a final thought, the analyst can produce results of high impact that

reflect in a high level of what means to serve and protect, while creating the possibility for

effective policing and a more radical transformation to policing in the United States.

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APPENDIX A

CRIME PREVENTION UNIT 6 MONTH REVIEW (11/21/20/11 TO 5/21/12).

INFORMATION UPLOADED TO RAIDS ONLINE (CRIME MAPPING PROGRAM IN

THE VILLAGE’S WEBSITE).

Incident Type Totals

ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN Count 1

ACCIDENT INVOLVING I Count 39

ACCIDENT INVOLVING O Count 1

ACCIDENT INVOLVING P Count 67

ACCIDENT –NON-TRAFFI Count 1

ACCIDENT PRIVATE PRO Count 2

ACCIDENT PROPERTY DA Count 13

AGGRAVATED BATTERY-S Count 1

AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL Count 1

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY Count 1

AGGREVATED CRIMINAL Count 1

ARMED ROBBERY Count 3

ASSAULT Count 4

AUTO ACCIDENT PDO Count 341

BATTERY Count 38

BURGLARY Count 15

BURGLARY BUSINESS Count 1

BURGLARY FROM MOTOR Count 35

CREDIT CARD FRAUD Count 7

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO M Count 20

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO P Count 67

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO V Count 28

CRIMINAL DEFACEMENT Count 31

CRIMINAL SEXUAL ABUS Count 5

CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO Count 5

DECEPTIVE PRACTICES Count 17

DISORDERLY CONDUCT Count 76

DISTURBANCE Count 19

DOMESTIC Count 17

DOMESTIC BATTERY Count 22

DOMESTIC TROUBLE Count 22

DRIVING UNDER THE IN Count 63

DRUNKENNESS Count 74

EMBEZZLEMENT Count 1

FIGHTS, RIOTS, BRAWL Count 17

FORGERY Count 2

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FRAUD Count 18

HARASSMENT BY PHONE Count 37

HIT AND RUN Count 95

IDENTITY THEFT Count 21

INSURANCE FRAUD Count 1

LOUD NOISE COMPLAINT Count 213

MISCHIEVOUS CONDUCT Count 8

MISSING PERSON – UND Count 1

MOTOR VEHCILE THEFT Count 17

NEIGHBORHOOD DISTURB Count 21

NEIGHBORHOOD TROUBLE Count 25

NOISE COMPLAINT Count 1

ORDINANCE ARREST Count 6

OTHER TROUBLE Count 165

POSSESSION OF A CONT Count 1

POSSESSION OF CANNAB Count 3

PUBLIC INDECENCY Count 1

PURSE-SNATCHING Count 1

RECKLESS DRIVING Count 8

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY Count 30

RETAIL THEFT Count 2

RETAIL THEFT-SHOPLIF Count 33

ROBBERY Count 3

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION Count 1

SIMPLE ASSAULT Count 1

SIMPLE BATTERY Count 1

SUSPICIOUS AUTO Count 167

SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT Count 83

SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT/ Count 5

SUSPICIOUS NOISE Count 67

SUSPICIOUS PERSON Count 153

TEEN,DRUNK,FIGHTS,RI Count 4

TELEPHONE THREAT Count 13

THEFT FROM COIN OPERATED MACHINE Count 1

THEFT FROM MOTOR VEH Count 17

THEFT OF LABOR OR SE Count 3

THEFT OVER Count 49

THEFT UNDER Count 90

THEFT-FRAUD Count 2

THEFT-UNDER Count 6

VIOLATION OF ORDER O Count 1

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Grand Count 2455

VISUAL CHART

1

39

1

67

1

2

13

1

1

1

1

3

4

341

38

15

1

35

7

20

67

28

31

5

5

17

76

19

17

22

22

63

74

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN Count

ACCIDENT INVOLVING I Count

ACCIDENT INVOLVING O Count

ACCIDENT INVOLVING P Count

ACCIDENT -NON-TRAFFI Count

ACCIDENT PRIVATE PRO Count

ACCIDENT PROPERTY DA Count

AGGRAVATED BATTERY-S Count

AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL Count

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY Count

AGGREVATED CRIMINAL Count

ARMED ROBBERY Count

ASSAULT Count

AUTO ACCIDENT PDO Count

BATTERY Count

BURGLARY Count

BURGLARY BUSINESS Count

BURGLARY FROM MOTOR Count

CREDIT CARD FRAUD Count

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO M Count

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO P Count

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO V Count

CRIMINAL DEFACEMENT Count

CRIMINAL SEXUAL ABUS Count

CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO Count

DECEPTIVE PRACTICES Count

DISORDERLY CONDUCT Count

DISTURBANCE Count

DOMESTIC Count

DOMESTIC BATTERY Count

DOMESTIC TROUBLE Count

DRIVING UNDER THE IN Count

DRUNKENNESS Count

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APPENDIX B

Crime Prevention Calls During the six month period by the community.

Incident Type Totals

DISTURBANCE Count 19

DRIVING UNDER THE IN Count 63

LOUD NOISE COMPLAINT Count 213

NEIGHBORHOOD DISTURB Count 21

NEIGHBORHOOD TROUBLE Count 25

NOISE COMPLAINT Count 1

OTHER TROUBLE Count 165

RECKLESS DRIVING Count 8

SUSPICIOUS AUTO Count 167

SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT Count 83

SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT/ Count 5

SUSPICIOUS NOISE Count 67

SUSPICIOUS PERSON Count 153

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS 990

COMPARING CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY & THE PERSON VS CRIME PREVENTION CALLS 11/21/11 TO 5/22/12

PROPERTY CRIMES 608

CRIMES AGAINST PERSON 240

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS 990

PROPERTY CRIMES

33%

CRIMES AGAINST PERSON

13%

CRIME PREVENTIO

N CALLS 54%

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS VS CRIMES 11/21/11 to 5/21/12

VARGAS22

This chart shows that 54% of the activity is for prevention against the two types of crimes.

This chart shows the number of calls for service compared in numbers.

PROPERTY CRIMES,

608

CRIMES AGAINST PERSON,

240

CRIME PREVENTIO

N CALLS, 990

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS VS CRIMES 11/21/11 to 5/21/12

VARGAS23

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