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•
The Peronist
Labor
Movement
nd the Alfonsin Government:
An Uneasy Relationship
for
Argentina s Democracy
(1983-1989)
by
Anne-Julie Perrault
Department of Political Science
McGlli University Montreal
September 1992
Copy
1
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The
Peronist Labor
Movement nd
the
Alfonsin Government
1983-1989)
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•
Acknowle gements
1wish to thank
my
thesI3 SupervlSOr Professor Philip Oxhorn for hls
Invaluable support and thorough advlce whlch he gave
me whlle my
research was
bemg
completed 1
would
also Ilke
to
thank
ail
the
professors who taught me dunng my M A studles
at
McGill and helped
me to
Improve
my
research endeavors
1
have
also recelved considerable mtellectual stimulation
from
two
professors dunng
my
undergraduate studles
Professor
Ducatenzeller
and Professor Korany
to
whom 1 am very grateful
Flnally but
not
least. the encouragement and love of
my
parents.
Annlk and Mark
have
been a source
of considerable support
and
strength throughout
my
studles and research
For the completlon of my M A Studl9S 1 have been fortunate to have
the flnanclal support of the Fe A R fellowship
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•
The
alm of
the
thesis IS
to
3nalyw
the
Perorllst
labor
movemenl's
lolf
the
Argentine
democratlc consclldatlon
process
Sl) I l lP scholill s.
1S
Valenzuel3 have underlmed the IrnDortant role of 1 1l1l1r 1ll0Vt:l 1Wl1ls
thp
consolidation of the
"leW
democratlc If'Qlmes rmE'rqlng frum thl) ( nd of
authorltarran r u l , ~ This role
consists
Irl t p l ln l
l
idtloll of I,lbor s
mobillzationai actlvltles and militant dernJIK. s
Ilowcvf l.
t t 1 l ~ , t ~ c t OldrS
have
not sufflclently emphasl7ed
th·e
weakness
and
t h l ~
r ( ~ c i u c t - c i
w t . I ~ J h t
of
some labor movements after mliltalY repressron dJld fX'OnOT1lIC structural
transformations The Ihesls eX3mlnes the A r ç ~ f > n t l l H
dSP
dl1d
demonstrates how the several general
strrkes
org;H1I7ed bv thf' CCI
T
durrng Alfonsrn s
government dld
not
hlnder
Ar
gentlne
dt)tnocri1tlc
consolidation ln the short term The thesls underllnes the wcakenlllg of
the
Peronlst
labor movement
and
explarns
Ils
mlnor role ln
the
consolidation
process
Ce mémoire analyse
le
rôle
du
mouvement
ouvrier
Péronlste
d3ns
le
processus de consolidation démocratique en
Argentine
Certains auteurs,
tel
Valenzuela.
ont souligné
l Importance
du rôle des orqanlsLltlom,
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•
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
THEORETICAL ANAL YSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ORGANIZED LABOR AND DEMOCRATie
REG
IMES 9
1 l abOJ
y 1 o v e m ~ [ t s
and Pol1tlcal Regimes 10
1 The Incorporation of labor movements Into Latin American polltlcal
s y ~ m s
10
1 2 The legacy of popullsm and of corporatlsrn. a hlghly organlzed
labor
mavement, the pohtlclzed state and the emergence of
bureaucratlc-authontanan reglmes 15
2 D ~ J t l O C r a c y and Labor Movements 23
2.1 Post-authorrtanan labor movement contribution to democracy 24
2 2
Post-authorrtarran labor weakness 30
22 1 Valenzuela's framework of analysls 31
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•
III OPEN CONFRONTATION UNDER DEMOCRACY
60
1. The LRS ProJect A
D l f f l ç ~ I L S . l Ç l L l J Q . 8 _ 3 . - 8 A 61
1 1
UeR
~ ~ o v r n m n t pnorlty union democratlzatlon 61
1 2 Union no rmallzatlorl 67
2 Atternpts Of
S o C J a L C ~ n c e r t a t I 9 _ 1 J
j \ n g J : . h e J 3 $ ~ t
QLl)b_éI{d1(7/ f11o
71
2 1
The Mesa de Concertaclon and wage
pollcles
3
22
Analysis
of
the objectives of
CGT s
fllst
general
stnkes, the ascent
of Ubaldlnl
and
the Imposslbllty
of
concertation
/7
23
Results
or
the September
1984 and
May
1985
general stnkes
81
3. Plan Austral And UnlQ_n ~ : e ç l o J L Ç l U : - : J E i l l O J L a t l ) f l S _1985-1986 83
3 1 The
Implementation
of the Plan ustral and CGT s strategy
of
confrontation 84
3.2 Sectonal negotlatlons, labor leaders divergent tactlcs
87
4. Attempts Of Cooptlon And Peronlst CGI Weakness
. ~ m J : 8 9 9
4 1 Government strategy of labor fragmentation 91
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INTRODUCTION
Labor moveménts hlstoncally have been
both
strong and Important
actors ln Latin Amencan polltlCS and
economlc
development. especlally
smce
the popullst penod
of the 1930s and 1940s
1
Organlzed
labor's
attitude and behavlOr have mfluenced conslderably the stabllity
and
legltlmacy of the
reglon's
polltlcal
reglmes The
long hlstory of labor
mobillzatlons wlth destablllzlng effects, such as natlon-wlde strikes,
work
stoppages and demonstratlons, reveals ItS contlnuous struggle against the
rulmg classes'
unwlllmgness
to share political power However, recent
mliltary reglmes
.:;,.trove
to
change
the
labor
unions'
predominant raie
and
undermrne labor's strenglh through massive repression and restrictive
pohcles, such as
dlsadvantageous
labor
leglslatlon
and regresslve wage
pollcles Although Latin Amencan labor movements have been extremely
debrlitated by the represslve pollcles of authorJtanan regimes, as weil as by
the debt and general economlc crises of the 1970s and 1980s, they
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•
labor movements' Intense mobillzatlonal actlvltles agaillst autholltanan rule
either facliitated
or
hrndered the process of
polltlcal
change toward
democracy As a result. Latlll Amencan Irlbor rl'lovernt'nts playerl
significant raie ln recent transitions
to
rlernocrdcy Yet, It lerndlllS to hl sepr1
what
role labor
movements will and
Céln
play
ln
thp (;()IlS01Ida IC)fî
p r l ) c e s ~ E s
of
the
new
democratic reglmes
Most Latin American countnes have expellenced dr amatie polltlcal
changes
dunng
the 1980s After a prolonged perrod of authorrt3r r il rule,
transitions
to
democracy exposerl the
varrOLlS
socral and polrtlcal aetors
10
the progressive
learnlng
of
how to
corn
promise and reach consensus
through the use of democratlc Instltut ons However, these forms ot polllicai
practice are often recent and still fragrle Transitions have not sllrrnounlorl ail
the polttlcal
problems
of
the
past The
new
democracles have Inhented
many unresolved soclopolltlcal hurdles tr m the authorrtéHlan and pre-
aut'1oritarian reglmes WhlCh must be overcome to gUélmntee democratlc
consoliaatlon Among these
obstacles, the
legacy
ot strong lélbor
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•
Valenzuela has demonstrated
ln
"Labor Movements m Transitions
to
Democracy'· a theoretlcal Interp.:;t
ln
the
question
of
democracy
and
labor
movements·
1
The
author arqued tha the labor
movement s
attitude
and
behavlor
delermmed
the form and
pace
of
polltlcal change
trom
authontanan
rule
to a oemocratlc reglme
He
stressed that the restralnt of
labor's sectonal demands
IS
a necessary step
to
guarantee the success of
democratlzatlon H0wever, the labor movement's polltlcal and economic
welght
was
dlHerent
and
weaker after
the
authontanan expenence Whlle
the self-limitation of labor's sectonal demands can facilltate democratlzation,
It S
not necessanly a determmant
f.qctor
for democratlc consolidation
as
asserted
by
Valenzuela Since organlzed
labor has
been
weakened Where
labor adopted a combative stance
and
dld
not reduce
ItS
mobillzationai
actlVltles, as
It
IS the case ln Argentma under President Alfonsln's
government, democratlc consolidatIon has
not
been Jeopardlzed The thesis
will
argue that
the
weakness
of
post-authontanan
labor
movements reduces
the
Impact
of
thelr behavlor
on the
consolidation process
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The
Peronlst
CGT has
probabty
been the mast
powedul ,met P,HtISJn
labor movement
ln
Latin America. playmg
bath c1n
Irnport3.nt econOrlllC
c1l1d
politlcal role n the country until 31
le,bl
the 1976 rnllit<lry C O l l ~ î Sifln \ the
advent
of Peronlsm ln the S8corld hait ot thl"' 1940s, .md
e s p l ~ c l d l l y
,lftPI
H'
,
Peronlst govel nment
was
oVE'lthrown 1955. Arq('nllllcl h;Hi hcrr1
charactenzed
by
escalatmg socl,ll
3nd
polltlc3.1
Instabillty ,llld
pconOrlllC
stagnation
The major legacy
of
Peronlsm
was
a stronqly
:nstltutlonalllNj
and
polltlclzed
labor movement and Inefflclent popullst
p ( ) I I C l e ~ , ~ J P I 1 ( ' r a t l n q
antagonlstlc alliances
over dlstllbutlonallssues
After 1955, other SOCI3 1 and
polltlcal actors percelved the strong labor rnovement as one of thp m,llol
factors obstructrng
Algentlne
developmen and
thue;
tlttemptcd
tCl
eradlc<lte
it Argentine pO/ltiCS and econornlcs were tl ~ 1 n s f o r m E ' r J Int ) ;1Il drRnd of
struggle
between
Peronlst
forces and
antl-Peronlst orws,
ent<llllllg
i n ~ r e s e d tnstabtllty and the
well-kllown
sWing
b ~ ' w n ( ' n
CIVlllélll and
authontanan
reglmes
Slnce
the
Peronlst
party
héid
often
been
prOSlrtbf}O
fram partlclpatrng ln ctvllian electlons
fram
1955 onw3rds anrl nxclurled fram
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•
dlfferent governments ) Therefore, the Peranlst organized
labor
had greatly
shapeu the configuratIOn and rnfluenced the maintenance of political
reglmes between 1955 and 1976
The 1976-1983 authontanan reglme dellberately sought to annlhilate
Peronlst strength by severely attacklng the plllar of the movement : the
polttlclzed CGT Although not valiquished, the labor movement had been
repressed considerably and weakened The welght of the Peronist
orgamzed labor
ln
Argentlna's polttlcal and economic systems was distinct
n 1983 than ln 1976
Argentlna IS an interestlng case to analyze organized labor's role in
the new democracles for two reasons On the one hand, President Raul
Alfonsln, elected democratlcally n October 1983, recogntzed the problem
posed by
the
labor movement for democracy. The Alfonsin government
stressed that the authorrtarian tendencies and the hlstorically pOlitical
raie
of
Argentine Unlonlsm were one of the princIpal stumbling blocks to the
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•
the first time slnce 1928, a democratlc transfer of power occurred trom one
civilian government to another. Has democrélcy survlved becéluse of labor's
role or desplte It?
The thesls
WIll
attempt to understand why and how the new Argentine
democratlc regime was able to mamtam Itself and show
sorne
slgns of
consolidattng itself, desplte the perslstence of strong protests
and
OpposItIon
by the Peronlst labor movement to PresIdent Alfonsm's governmellt S
As
a
working hypothesls, we will suggest
that
the
Alfonsm government was able
to initia te the democratic consol/dation pro cess because the Peromst unions
were consider bly weakened by the polrt/cal nd adverse economlc
conditions durmg nd after the last mil/tary reg/me
Whlle labor's partlcular
vision of democracy and ItS tense relatlonshlp wlth the government could
lead one to belleve that Its consequent confrontatlonal behavlor would play
a determinant role ln hampering ArgentIne democratlc Instltutlonallzatlon as
argued by Valenzuela, the emphasis on the analysls
of
ItS weakness leads
to different conclusIons On
the
one hand, organlzed labor could not be
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•
expected to have a slgnlflcant
role ln
the democratlzatlon process
in
terms of
restralnlng
tS
sectonal demands
to
the benefit of polltlcal instltutionallzation.
However, on the other hand, the authontarian legacy and the return to
democracy transformed
the
hlstoncal
role
and position of the labor
movement ln the polltlcal and economlc spheres The weakness of the post-
authontarian labor movement and the dlfferent polltical context brought
some changes
ln
tS organizatlon and weight
ln
the polltical system. These
changes should lead us ta reconsider labor s raie and impact in the new
democracles
The research will flrst discuss sorne theoretlcal Issues concerning
labor s raie in the formation and maintenance of political regimes ln Latin
America to assess its dlfferent raie ln the new democracies after recent
transitions fram authoritarian rule It will focus
in
particular on the politlcal
and destabllizmg role of labor
movements in the
past. Valenzuela s
theoretical framework of analysis on labor s position in transition phases will
a/low us to also understand its position and role
ln the
consolidation
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•
relative strength and organizational capaclties were distmctly weaker than
those m 1976.
ln order to examine the Peromst labor movement s evolution and role
in the new Argentine democracy, the research
ill
then analyze the four
broad periods of Alfonsin s mandate, each of them representmg the UeR
government s use of different strategies toward the labor movement and the
latter s changing response to them. Flrst,
trom
1983
to
1984 the government
attempted to democratlze the unions to undermme Peromst control over the
unions From 1984 to 1985, it then sought accomodatlon wlth the labor
movement and to integrate it mto the tripartite negotlatlons to resolve the
country s economic crisis Thirdly, fram 985 to 1986 the government
circumvented the unions to impose its economlc stabillzation program, the
lan
Austral Finally, in the last two years
of
his mandate, between 1987
and 1989, Alfonsin tried to coopt one sector
of
the labor movement Into the
government to fragment
it
further more
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1. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOR
AND POLITICAL REGIMES
The theoretlcal section will flrst examine how labor movements have
been analyzed ln
the
polltlcal Iiterature on Latin merica t will
be
emphaslzed that
It
IS necessary to study the attitude and role of the
organlzed labor ln order
to
understand the poIJtical evolutlon of the region.
More speclflcally, th,s section Will concentrate
on
how labor's confrontational
attitude and strong mobillzatlonal actlvltles could threaten the legitlmacy and
stabllrty of past reglmes.
The second section of the theoretical part will discuss labor
movements' role and position in
democracles
after transitions from
authorrtarian rule
t
Will analyze and qualify the
work
of Valenzuela,
Fishman and Rial for evaluating labor movement's role in democratization
processes
)
These authors argue that unless labor movements pursue a
favourable strategy
of
mobllizatlonal restramt durtng the transition and
consolidation periods, the prospects for successful political change and
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•
1. Labor Movements
and
Politlcal Regimes
The
polltlcal Iiterature on Latin America has emphaslzed the
slgniticant role played by labor movements ln the formation and stabl ty of
politieal reglmes slnce the popullst penod
As
argued by Ruth B COlliN and
David Collier, the errlergence of the labor movemenls and the Ir
incorporation Into po
"tiCS
have Influenced Latin Amencan
polltlCLlI
reglrnes
orgamzed labor has been l
pivotai
actor, and tlle cllolcos
made y otllt r
clclo, ln
posltlonlng themselves
vis-à-VIS
orgafllzed labor
has had l crllCI;11 Ifnpact 011 n;1llof1al
pohtlcs (our emphasls)
ln order to appreciate the impact of labor movements on Latin Amenrdn
polltieal regimes, thls section will tlrst examine how the y have been
propelled to the forefront of several eountnes' polltlcal and economlc IIfe
Populism, Industnallzation and state corporatlsm have Incorporated the
working classes ln the polltlco-economlc realms and have had far-reachtng
consequences for the labor movements and thelr relation
to
the polltlcal
systems of the reglon The second part of thls section will concentrate on
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•
and Instltutlonallzatlon 12 ThiS penod corresponded to
the
expansion of the
Slze, role and responslbllities of the Latin Amencan state, whlch often
cOlnclded wlth populrst polltlcal systems
Popullsm refers to the multlclass urban-based
movements
which
appeared on the poiltlcal scene between the 1930s and the 1960s.1
3
Popullst
movements
emerged tram the breakdown of
the
traditional
ollgarchlcal hegemany Braadly, rn the early decades
of
the 20th century,
Latin Amencan countrres expenenced a shlft from an agrrcultural export
orrented economy to
an
rncreaslngly urbanrzed and Industnalized one. The
two
most
pramment changes were the rapid Increase of urban workers
and
the emergence of a large mlddle class Whlle workers were denred access
to polltrcal pawer by the ohgarchlcal elltes, desplte the major socioeconomic
structural transformations, the mlddle sectors were gradually incorporated
rnta the politlcal system However, these new
state
elltes percelved the
growlng workrng classes as a potentlal poiltlcal resource
to
use against the
oilgarchy's domination They sought to challenge
the
politlcal monopoly of
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•
integrated essentlally through state corporatlst mechanlsms The state elltes
sought
to
structure, control, regulate and sanction labor organlzallons
ln
a
vertical way
As deflned by Schmltter, corporansm IS charactenzed as
a system of Interest representatlon
III
Wlllcll tlle COflstltlll'nt lIllIls
ar
or q,lIll/ec1 IIlln
,\
hmlted number of singular, compulsory,
non
competitive, hlel <1lctllcally
ordere<1
,111c1
functlOnally dlfferentlated categorres, fP.cogllflecl
01
hWllspr (If
Ilot crt',-ltnd)
hy
tH'
state and granted a dehberate representallonal monopoly
WIIIlIIl th('1r
rpspocllvo
categories
III
exchange for obsmvmg
certaIn
controls
on 111l 1I
st'Inclloll
nf
In,Hh'ls
,Incl
articulation of demands
and
supports
14
State corporatlsm thus IImlted the development of autonomous labor
orgamzations whlch could have threatened
the
Interests of the new elltes
ln
power Unions were tled to
the
governments through the intervention
and
scrutmy of the Labor Mlnistry
The
governments h ad Intf d L J c ( ~ d labor
legislations
that granted
state wlth considerable
power ln
union affarrs
Unions were legally recognized by the state and the latter could Interfere ln
ail
union actlvltles and control
the
nghts
to
organlze,
10
stnke and
to
bargaln
with employers,I5
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•
urban labor movements
The
popullst political program was accompanled
by
a new economlC model whlch substantlally Improved labor's worklng
and
living conditions The enhancement of workers' role ln the polltlcal
and
economlc realms Increased thelr expectations, and thls will later explain
thelr reslstance
to
subsequent antl-popullst governments
Most popullst governments promoted the economlc program of
1 8 1
(import-substltutmg Industnalizat/on) 16 The world Depression had strongly
affected export eeonomles
of
the reg/on Latin Amencan economies turned
inward
and
began manufactunng goods they had formerly Imported. The
popullst state actlvely promoted mdustnal growth through protectionlsm.
Protect/onlst polleles, such
as
the erectlon of tarnff barners, subventions to
lacallndustnes and the creation of government-run flrms, largely favored
the
labor force and the new entrepreneunal class. In the initiai phase, populist
governments used
the
excedentary resources of mdustnal growth to finance
protection and ralse real wages However, these governmental policies
inereased internai consumptlon, leading to an mflationary spiral Ta hold
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mdustrlallzatlon process However, these elites percelved the Incorporation
and growmg power
of
the urban labor as a threat to thelr own interests.
The
mterests of the national bourgeoIsie and the worklng classes, advantaged
under the proteetlve tutelage of the stat8,
we e
rartly fultilled at the expense
of the elltes linked to international capital and to the external market ln order
to Implement thelr own economlc program IInked to the international market,
elltes would support mllitary intervention to overthrow popullst and
protectlonlst coalitions Thus, the incorporation of the labor movement,
popuhsm
and
the 1 1 eeonomlc pro gram sowed
the
ground for the
confrontation of antagonlstlc alliances The followlng section
will
analyze n
more detall
how
populism generated such confllctlng interests
1.2 The illgacy of popullsm and of corporatism. a hlghly organized labor
movementl.- the polltlc lzed state and the emergence of bureaucrat ic
authontanan
reglm es
Popullsm,
the
S 1 model of economlc development,
and
the workmg
class Incorporation through corporatlst mect,amsms had two major impacts
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adopted by most Latin Amencan countnes presented some df flr.18ncles
Stable state corporatlsm wou
d
have reqUired strong Institutions and/or the
continuous growth ln Income for labor movements to accept subordrnéllion
to
the state Most countnes lacked both. and consequently
ttw
stale lost Its
corporatlst control on labor movements Incluslonary corporatlsm worked
against its Initial purpose
of
subordlnatlng the labor
rnOV rnent 10
state
control Instead,
It
created a more autonomous. orgafllzed and polltlclzed
labor movement. Labor leaders pnvlleged tles wlth the state
ln
the populist
era had glven
them
a real taste of
power
and had Increaseci thelr
expectatlons
VVhen
anti-populist governments came to power. labor
movements
had
acqUired sufflclent orgamzatlonal strength to élggresslvely
defend thelr interests Moreover, unions had more than mere syndlcallst
functions: they
were
converted IIlto the polltlcal representatlves of the
working classes ln certam countnes,
such
as Argentma and Peru, n
addition to state regulatlon, workers had been rnobillzed and Incorpomted
through a polltlcal party or polltical movement, the Peronlst movement ln
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Popullsm
also
created adversary alliances
and
contnbuted to politlca
Jnstabliity
s
analyzed abov8, popullst governments had satlsfied the
polltlcal and economlc Interests of the worklng class and domestic
bourgeoIsie to
the
detnment of export elltes This arrangement entalled
balance
of
payment deflclts that eventually led to mllitary Intervention to
overthrow the popultst governments and solve distnbutlonal conflicts When
confllcts Over
the
scarcer surplus Increased, most populist reglmes
collapsed and were replaced by authoritanan ones.
ln
ail
81ght
countnes [Argentma, Brazll, Chlle, Colombla, MexIco, Peru, Uruguay,
Vene7uela] the incorporation penod produced a strong pohtlcal reactlon, and ln most
countnes thls reactlon culmmated ln the breakdown of the national pohtlcal reglme
uoder WhlCll
the
Incorporation polreles
h d
been Implemented
R
These authontanan reglmes ln the 1950s and 1960s (those
precedlng the bureaucratlc-authontanan reglmes dlscussed further below)
reacted agamst
the
prevlous social and polttlcal order The armed forces,
ailled wlth the export-onented elttes, vlewed labor movements' polltical
activatIon as hampertng ove rail development. They had to overcome capital
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these stabillzation pragrams could not be fully IInplemented sl 1ce they
generated strong reslstance fram labor movements
and
some sectors
of
Ole
national bourgeoIsie whose mterests were
damaÇJed
Glven labor
movements' organlzatlonal and polltlcal force, as weil l1S tllelr pl t'domillant
position ln LatIn Amer/can economles, they destabllized gov81 nments thl1t
Implemented stabillzation and antl-popular polleles Then, a nE"W pellod nf
economic reactlvatlon was launched wlth Increases of
wl1ges,
of
II1dUStllcll
production, pnces freeze mevltably followed by Inflation and forelgn
exchange reserves depletlon Although thls cycllcal pattern of pconoJnlc
crises and polltlcal Jnstabliity mostly appl18s ta the Argentine case, othel
Latin Amencan countrres also experrenced, to a lessel dpgree, sharp
conflicts between the elltes Imked to international market and 111bor
movements eventually leadlng ta the reversai of reglmes
The presence
ot
hlghly mobllized and antagonlstlc social forces, none
strong enough to Impose
Its
rules of
the
game on the o hers, Impeded thû
institutlonallzatlon of legltlmate norms or rules to resolve dlstnbuflonu/
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own rules for the pol/t/cal game The polltlcal cycle seemed to fluctuate
simu1tr,neously wlth
the
economlc cycle Economlc policles satlsfied short
term mterests and constantly altered the share of the Income dlstributif'ln by
rewardlng the groups
ln
power and excluding other sectors This situation
led to polanzatlon, praetonanlsm and the pohtlclzed nature of the state
21
Douglas Chalmers mtroduced the concept of the pohtlclzed state after
observlrrg the several and recurrent changes of reglmes in most Latin
American countnes
22
This polltlcal Instabliity was related ta the
tentatlveness of pohtlcal Institutions
23
Slnce the latter were perceived by
the
major pohtlcal actors
as
mere Instruments for politrcal power, Latin
Amencan reglmes have been charactenzed
by
the lack of Institutionallzed
medl8tlons between the state and civil society Chalmers argued that there
were no institutions because there
was
no consensus in Latm America as ta
what a good government
IS
Vanous conflictlng social groups of slmilar
welght were unable
to
create the necessary consensus for a stable regime.
Thus, social groups acted outslde the Institutions and, as a result, they
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redlstributive populist polleles. v n though they were eoncelved at the
expense
of
other groups' Interests. led them
to
pressure the state dlrectly
wlth
no
intermedlanes and delegltlmlze any governrnent that was
not
responslve to labor's sectonal Interests Union leadership was confident
enough
to
defend the economlc and social gr/evances of Its rnembers by
any means. Labor organlzed strong mobillzationai actlvltles (wlldcat stnkes,
work stoppages. demonstratlons,
etc)
to threaten governments wlth thelr
destabllizlng power ln order to
have
thelr demands satlSf 8d .
This
pattern lof tabor pohtlcal incorporation] had a number of consequences t ~ t
probably have, over the years, undercut any predispositions on the part of labm
leaders and other ehte groups to glve pnmacy ta democratlc
modes
of
rule
1
On
the other hand, Latm Amencan elltes' international
entrepreneurial class ~ m the agncultural exporters) and mlddle classes'
behavior contributed to pushing labor leaders
ta
act outslde the Institutions
and radicalize their movements By denymg labor's demands and/or by
excluding them fram the pohtical system, they forced labor ta
act
outslde
the
legal institutions. Elites saw the proper functlomng of democratlc polltlcal
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labor strikes.2
5
Especlally the ln the 1960s and 1970s countries such as
Brazll, Chlle, Uruguay,
and
Argentma expenenced an escalation of labor
mobllizatlOns
and
stnkes Labor had suffered
in
these years the costs of
worsened economlc cnSIS, low growth
and
hlgh mflatlon rates
The
policles
Implemented
to
resolve economlc cnsis had lowered wage earners'
standards
of
living Labor Increased the mihtancy of the
rank
and
flle to
defy
governments that were recalcitrant ln meeting their demands Elites
percelved increasing labor indiscipline
and
social unrest
as
major threats to
thelr mterests.
6
ln the same penod, they actively supported milltary
intervention and the Implementation
of
bureaucratic-authontarian regimes in
order to defmitively annihllate labor's destabilizing role and economically
devastating strikes Hlghly repressive regimes emerged to destroy the
collective power of workmg class
The thorough scholarly work of Guillermo O'Donneli on bureaucratic
authontananism
(BA)
and the general literature
on
regime breakdown have
emphasized
the role
of labor mobihzations. t stressed elites' perception of
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America, ln the 1960s untll the 1970s (Brazii 1964, Argentlna
1966
and
1976, Chile 1973, Uruguay 1973)
has
been
to dlsrupt the pieexlstll1g
pattern of development based on popullst policles whlch gave considerable
power to the worklng-classes Analyzing the orrgll1s of burenucratlc
authoritanan reglmes, begtnlllng
wlth
the
1964
mliitary coup Brazll,
O Oonneli asserts that.
the
declslve antecedents to the BAs Implemented
ln ArÇJentllla
and other Latlll
American countnes dunng the 19605 and the 1970s. (began) wlth the emerqüllc.ü
1
the popular sector [pnnclpally composed by the worklng classes) as an Important actor
dunng the penod that followed the collapse of ollgarchlc dOlntnatlon
Labor movements were held responsible of the soclopolttlcal crises affectlng
their countries Therefore,
the
core
of
B
polrtlcal
and
economlc program
focused on organized labor as a prrmary target of exclusion and represslon
Without proceding to an overvlew
of
BA regimes, the pOll1t to remember IS
that
the attention given to labor movements revealed thelr considerable
weight
and
capacity
to
influence and destabilrze the polttlcal systems
of
the
region as demonstrated by thelr radicallzatlon ln the 1960s and 1970s ln
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hardshlp and dlssatlsfaetlon The power of organized working classes hao
generated fears among Latin American elltes who sought
to
exclude labor
movements and restriet the Ir actlvltles n order to proteet their vested
Interests ln the wake of transitions
to
democracy, what Will be the claims of
long-tlme repressed labor movements r pohtlcally opened and legitimated
democracles? Will labor s accumulated demands be a destabilizing element
for the new democratlc regimes, especlally ln the context
of
severe
economlc
crrses?
Or
has
labor
be
weakened under the last perrod
of
labor
repressive authoritarran r :Ie so that ItS eventual mobilizational activities will
not hamper dernocratlc consolidation?
2 Democracyand Labor Movements
This section Will analyze two major arguments on the issue of labor
movements and democracy Both arguments will take into account the
context of reeent transitions trom authoritarran ru le and the authoritarian
legacy Flrst, It will examine Valenzuela s and other scholars argument on
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The second section will quallty Valenzuela's argument and question
the impact
ot
labor's behavlor
on
the consolidation process
By
stresslng the
weak
pOSition of labor movements ln the nascent democracles
we will
argue that while labor restr l,rt an facliitate the democratlc
Instltutlonallzatlon, the lack of restralnt Will not necessanly destabillze
democracy. Democracles
emerged trom
hlghly
labor-represslve
authoritarian regimes. The latter severely attacked labor's strength and as a
result weakened unions' organlzatlonal potentlal and welght as an
economic and polltlcal actor ln the early consolidation process, even
If
labor
movements do not support democracy and engage ln mobillzationai
activities,
do
they still have
the
capaclty to destabillze governments as
ln
the
past?
2.1 Post-authontanan labor movement's contribution to demQQJflçy
Speciahsts on Latin Amencan polltlcs have shown growlng Interest
ln
democratization processes and on the Issue of democratlc C' ,sohdatton
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be
aware) that thelr momental y confrontations, expedlent solutions, and contingent
compromises are ln effect defmmg rules whlch may have a lasting but largely
unpredlctable effect
on
how and by whom the "normal" pohtlcal game will
be
played in
the
future
lI
The collapse of mliitary reglmes and the general antl-authoritarian
consensus that prevalled dunng the transition penod were necessary, albeit
not sufflClent, conditions for the consolidation of polltlcal democracy.3\
Uncertalnty was related
to
the often fragile commltment
by
key actors
to
new
"rules of
the
game" and to the very eXistence of soclopoiltical problems
nerther solved by the authontanan reglmes nor by the transition. Garreton
has emphaslzed,
ln
hls analysis on
the
distinction between transition and
consolidation processes, that "transition to democracy does not solve the
many deep-seated and longstandlng problems of a soc:ety."32 Transition
covers the penod startlng wlth the terminatlon of the military reglme until the
tlrst democratlc electlons It refers
to
the "shlft trom one type of regime to
another whlch need not
be
accompanied by any substantive social
changes
n
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overtlme
and
command
the
alleglance of cltlzens
q The
new constltutlonal
governments have ta establlsh new rules ta overcame the resistance
of
certain groups whlch struggle
ta
mamtaln thelr prtvllüges and have
to
contront thelr polltlcal tradition of resolvlIlg social confllcts through channels
other than democratlc Institutions (through
the
polltlclzed state) Labor
movements that had hlstortcally bypassed democratlc Institutions to satlsfy
their demands would appear to
be
one
of the
Important reslstant social
groups demacratlc gavernments had ta face for the cansaltdatl0n process
The
prevlous
section has hlghllghted the centrallty of labor
movements for the legltimacy
and
stablltty of former reglmes
ln
the past
when labor
was
politlcally
or
economlcally dlssatlsfed,
Il
engaged strong
mobihzational actlvltles for the governments
to
meet thelr demands
However, transitions to democracy dld not solve labor dlscontent Labor
has
lost a lot dunng the last hlghly represslve authontanan reglmes Therefore,
with
the
return
of
polltlcal freedom,
It
can
be
expected that an explosion
of
pent-up demands could occur ln
the
post-authontanan penod and that labor
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Valenzuela's principal Ihesis 18 that unless the narrow objectives of
the labor movement
are
compatible wlth
the
general support for democratlc
consolidation, the latter could be hampered Democracy's success
IS
dlrectly
Irnked to the relative welght labor movements asslgn to thelr sectonal
rnterests, on
the
one hand, and to thelr efforts 10 sustain democratizatron,
on
the other hand 1')
And
the latter lmpiles the dellberate restramt of labor s
mobillzat/Onal actlvlt/es and moderation of
the
sectorial demands,
sornethlng
whlch
has been lacklng hlstoncally
ln
Latin Amenca The excess
of
labor demands
can
clash wlth democratic Institutlonaltzatlûn The latter
reqUlres negotfatrans and moderatfon
amol,)
the var/ous soc/al actors ln
order ta deflne
the
rules
of
polit/cal bargarnlng Contrary ta the "pol/tlclzed"
state ln whlch conf lctrng Interests confronted each other dlrectly and
generated constant Instabllrty, democratlc institutlonalizatlon requires a
soclopolrtlcal consensus over new
mechanlsms
of polltlcal confllct
resolut/on Each soc/al actor must I m t some of
ItS
sectorral demands
rn
arder ta reach a common agreement and promote larger l o n g ~ t r m polrtical
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Thus, Valenzuela ascnbes a fundarnenta: role ta labor rnovements ln
democratlzation
pro
cesses
He
argues that the
labor
rnovement's attitude
toward democracy and ItS behavlor
durmg
the transition pro cess will
determine the democratlc outcomes
Therefore, a combinaI/on of hlgh labor dnd popular
mol)lli;
Itlon
dl
CPI
.llll clltlcal
moments
of
breakdown of the authontanan Iflstltutlons (that IS, whell the option fOI
,i
course of redemocratlZî\tlon becomes possible but Stllle elltes have Ilot yat COllllTlitteo
Ihemselves
10
Il), followed by Ihe declme
of
Ihat
mobllizallon and by the
wllhngness
and
capaclty of
the
labor movement's union and polltlcal
leadershIps
to
show
restralnt
when
the
pollt lcal
agenda
shlfts ln
favor
of
redemocratlzation, would seem 10 provlde the Ideal ITliX III Imm')
lI
I,Ü)()I's
contnbutlon 10 ensunng
the
latter's success (our cmpllasls)
1 jTranslttons
are
most successful ln lerms
of
produclng il consolid.lln<1
dOfllocrdtu:
reglme
when
there IS a compatlbllity between the narrow oblectlves of 111 slqlllllC,lIll
segments
of
society
and the
newly evolvlng overall politlcal IllslllutlOm, 1(,
Two
other authors corroborate Valenzuela's argument Fishman and Rial,
analyzing the Spanlsh and Uruguayan democracles, respectlvely, undE;, :,ne
the
Importance of examtntng labor movement's polltlcal VISion and attitude
toward
democracy
37
ln
Uruguay and m
;)pam,
labor's support
of
democracy
and
the
dellberate limitation of
labor
demands
plaYHd
a
signlficant part
ln the
democraltzatlon
pro
cess of both countnes If orgamzed
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the
labor leadership ln tact wounded
ItS
own orgamzatlonal potentlal
ln
pursUit of a
pohtlcal strategy
of
moderatlon 9
ln order to secure polltlcal transition, Spanish
and
Uruguayan labor
leaders constralned thelr organlzatlonal objectives, that IS seeking support
of
workers by defendrng thelr Interests (through strikes to obtain wage
Increases for example) for economlc
and
polltlcal reasons ln a context of
economlc cnsls and hlgh unemployment, labor leaders limlted thelr sectorial
demands to assure Job secunty and economic recovery They
also
adopted
a positive attitude toward regime transition
and
followed a strategy of
moderatlon to reach consensus wlth other social actors for broader political
goals feanng a return of authoritanan
rule
Ali three scholars concluded that organized labor s moderation and
commltment ta democracy were essential for
and
contributed directly to the
consolidation of the new reglme For example. In the Spanish case,
the
capaclty of labor, to the extent necessary,
to
IImlt demands ln arder to advance a
broad
and
long-term pohtlcal agenda, ln thls case the consolidation of democracy ln a
country wlth a hlstory of repeated authontanan rule [andl Labor s moderatlon
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confrontational force to democratlc governments They restralned thelr
demands in order
to
partlclpate
rn
the
democratlc
Irlstltutlonallzatlen
process Rial underlrned that the Uruguayan laber movement's restrarned
Its
moblltzational activltles because it was a strong supporter of the dernocratlc
politlcal order
Whlle conttnUlng w th thelr d/scourse of social/sm and revollitlOnary ch,lIlqe thpsû
sectors [predommant Communlst sect ors
of
the
labor
movomontl
lIonûtholnss
sought to
be
part of
the
democrat c order
and
gave
sorne assllr lIlces
of
loyalty and moderat/on
for
the future 4 (rny emphasls)
However
some
labor movements
do
not percelve democracv as the besl
regime alternative
and
therefore are less wllllng to restraln thelr demands,
as
It
was the case of
the
Argentme CGT
ln
1983
Only
ln
these cases laber
movements could
represent
a reslstant actor to the democratlc
governments. Yet, before concludlng that these labor movements' behavlor
could
be
a determlnant factor ta the consolldatton process, the analysls
should concentrate on the relatIve capacltles of these labor movements to
destabilize the reglmes they do not support ln a state of dlsorganrzatlon
and
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capaclty
to
defend workers demands
was
reduced. Furthermore,
the
transitions have opened
the
way
to
the
competition among polltical parties
wlth no proscrrptlon he labor movement s political functlon is no longer
justtfled since popularly legitimated politlcal parties could channel labor
dlscontent If the labor movement has
been
considerably weakened
by
the
represslve authori tarian rule
and
plays a less important
role
in the political
arena
wlth the
emergence of alternative institutionalized channels
of
expression (mostly political parties), its behavlor will not destabilize
new
democratic reglmes Therefore, it
IS
important to analyze not only
the
attitude
of labor movements toward democracy, but also theïr position in the new
democracles ln order
to
assess their contribution
to
the
latter. Valenzuela s
framework of analysis offers a good starting point for understanding labor s
impact on the consolidation process.
2.2 1 Valenzuela s framework of analysis
Valenzuela s theoretlcal comparative
framework
provides important
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role durlng the transition and consolidation processes By contrast,
If
they
are weak, elltes may Ignore thelr demands during the transition
his
situation may lead
to
labor radlcallzatlon
ln
the long-term and
to the
delegltlmatlon t the new reglme If the movement regains strength.
Therefore Il should be Important
ta
analyze the relative strength
or
weakness of the labor movement ln the consolidation process ln order ta
examine If thelr demands will be satlstled by the democratic government
and
If
not,
If
they Will engage
in
destablllzing actlvltles However, ln the
short-term
It
should be equally Important to analyze the relative weakness of
the labor movement ln order ta assess the Impact of thelr eventual
mobllrzatlonal actlvltles If thelr demands are not met by the democratic
governmant
If
labor
S
too weak
to
defend thelr mterests and do es not
receive massive support from the rank-and-file,
ItS
militant demands will not
hamper the early consolidation phase
2
he
centralizat on or decentralization
nd
polit cal unity or division
of
the
labor movement
If labor movements
are
decentralized (those with a
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•
negotlations
and
have a greater Influence
ln
the transition and consolidation
proeess, these labor movements
Will
hmlt
thelr sectorial demands ta assure
labor peaee
and
facllltate multisectorial negotlatlons However, as S the
case in Argentina, even though the labor movement S centrallzed and
politlcally united, labor leaders'
poltt/cal tact/cs
can
be
a source of divIsion
within labor movement and lead to the use of Increaserl moblllzatlOn
McGulre underlined that internai union dissenSion can be related
to
the
vanous politleal tactles used by ItS leaders ln order to establlsh relations wlth
the government in power and gain power wlthm the labor movement over
their rivals.
45
Analyzing the Argentine labor movement,
MeGUIre
observed
that tensions and divISions arose among labor leaders desplte the
hegemony
of the
Peronlst ideology. Thus, even though the Argentine labor
movement is relatively centralized and united Ideologlcally, thls dld not
restram its mobihzational aetlvlties because tensions among labor leaders
existed
on
the cholce
of
tactlcs
ln
the consolidation phase the centrallzatlon
or decentralization and polltlcal unit y
or
divISion of the labor movement Will
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•
consolidation penods CJ Transition to democracy IS not IIkely to reverse the
long trend of decllnlng worklng
and
living conditions of wage earners
in
a
context of sharp debt and economlc crises Thus,
ln
he consolidation
process, workers Will continue
to
press the government
to
have thelr
repressed demands satlsfled and be compensated for ail the losses they
suffered under the authorttartan reglme Nevertheless, military reglmes'
treatment of labor movements Influence the nature of labor organization that
Will eXlst and operate ln the transition and consolidation phases Most labor
movements expertenced a state of disorganization and of economic
weakness after authontanan repression The long-term effects on Latin
American labor movements of the dlsadvantageous labor leglslation and
other antl-Iabor policles, as weil
as
the structural transformations of the
economy and of the labor market - ail deliberate policies followed by
authontarian reglmes -
Will
have
to
be analyz d ln order to understand the
labor movements' position and capacity of action ln the new democracies
The modalities of transitIOn to democracy nd l bor movement s
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various segments of the labor movements Will confllct wlth secLlrlng the
transitions
ln
the longer term
48
By
contrast.
In
the
reform
type
of
change.
the mobi llzation followed by
1
estramt sequence
IS
more probable
Mobilizations are often Inltlated dunng the Ilberahzation of authorltanan r
ule
and labor movements can have sorne of thell sectonal derlé1nds reallzed
By the tlme the democratlc the transition beglns. labor leaders are therefore
more likely
to
moderate their orgamzatlon's moblhzatlons ln order to sec ure
the overall politlcal change
ln addition to the ruptur or a reform models, the analysls should
also distingUish between countnes whlch followed transitions wlth
or
wlthout
negotiated pacts
t9
Labor movements ln countnes whlch have undergone a
political reglme change wlth transltlonal pacts,
as ln
the Spanlsh and
Uruguayan cases,
are
more hkely to adopt a strategy of restr alnt to ensure
the objective of democratlzatlon stlpulated
ln
the paets they endorsed The
lack of a transItion pact blndmg different actors, partlcularly labor.
1
established
ru
les of the game, as in Argentlna, Imphes Ihat the prronty to
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The labor movement's attitude dunng the transition and consolidation
phase
IS
also Influenced by
ItS
relationshlp
wlth
the elites of transitions and
the governmental elltes of consolidation As asserted by Valenzuela, the
labor movement should feel more commltted to contnbute restramt to the
transition If
the
process IS led by elites wlth whom labor has a good worklng
relationshlp because the labor movement's sectonal goals are less likely to
be Ignored
by
the elltes of transItion 5 On
the
contrary,
If
the process is led
by elltes that labor dlstrusts, the latter may build a hlgher confrontational
attitude and be less Incllned
to
compromise and moderate its mobilizational
activities for the
t r n s ~ t l o n
project Valenzuela underltnes that
for
the
Argentlnlan
and
Peruvlan transltlonal elltes,
the
most confrontational forces
they
had
to face were labor leaders.
The same applies to the consolidation period Unions may support or
dlscredlt the newly democratir government's projects according to their own
perception
of
democracy
é.nd
to
the
satisfaction of their own sectorial
demands. However, the government may use strategies to fragment the
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labor movement restrained tS organlzatlonal mterests
to
facliitats
democratlc consolidation? If not.
f
the narrow objectives of the labor
movement clashed wlth the process of democratlc Instltutlonallzatlon. why
dld this not destabllrze the consolidation process? Valenzuela. Fishman and
Rial argued that the labor movements have
Ll
determlnant role
ln
the
consolidation process wlthout emphaslzrng the state of general weakness of
most labor organlzatlons after the authontarran rule The study of the
Argentine case will reveal that the we kness of the Peronlst labor
movement reduced the Impact of
tS
behavlor on the democratlc pohtlcal
project and did not Impenl the consolidation process, at least ln the short-
term. The analysis of the Argentine labor s role
n
democracy
Will
thus stress
the weakness of the labor movement by studymg the four van ables
presented in Valenzuela s framework of analysls
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•
THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY
The section will analyze the charactenstlcs of the Argentine labor
movement before and after the roceso m order to assess ItS relative
strength and distinct role
ln
the new democracy It will flrst examme the labor
movement's strength before the dlctatorshlp through the study of Its
mobillzationai capacltles and the polltical power of
ItS
leadership Then It
Will
analyze how labor's power has been undermlned and
ItS
organizatlon
weakened between 1976 and 1983. The thlrd section will then focus on
labor n the transition phase uSlng Valenzuela's four variables offenng new
mSlghts on Peronlst labor's changed welght
and
weaker role
in
the
Argentine consolidation process.
The Peronlst Labor Movement's Power Before The
roceso
5
Argentme labor movement's strength before 1976 was expressed in
Ils capaclty to mobillze workers n order to hamper government policies that
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movement's organlzatlonal charactenstlcs and leglslatlon. 3) the labor
movement's assets, and
4)
structural aspects of Argentlna's economy
1) Union leaders acted as both th economlc and polltlcal
representatives of the worklng class
S2
Along wlth thelr syndlcJ.lIst functlon
of channellng workers' economlc demands. labor leader
S
t'ssentlally
fulfilled a pohtlcal role on behalf of the Peronlst rnovement
T h ~
100tS
of
unions' polltlcal role are to be found
ln
the pohtlcal InCOlporatlon of
the
worklng classes by Peron and
ln
the Peronlst party's proscription after
195[)
The reorganlzatlon of the CGT by Peron ln
1945
under a new set of rules
had stimulated a sharp Increase
ln
union membershlp whlch Increased the
welght of organlzed labor 5 Between
1946
and
1955.
Peron had granted
labor leaders the nght
to
polltlcal participation by provldlng them wlth
Important positions ln hls government
By
Incorporatlng the worktng class
through state corporatlst mechanisms, Peron recelved the polltlcal support
he needed
to
Implement hls popultst program
By
the same token, Peron
instilled the taste of authontanan power
ln
labor leaders
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votes of workers for dominant positions in the government ln 1958, for
example, the "62" mobihzed workers' votes
for
the electlon of Arturo Frondizi
and obtamed major positions wlthln hls administration However, as soon
as the government's economlc and union pollcles hampered the labor
movement's Interests, the CGT urged workers to partlclpate
III
militant
mobllizatlons
to
undermme government's power and make the country
ungovernable.
59
Between Peron's ouster
ln
1955 and hls retUi n ln 1973, the
CGr labor leadership orchestrated several Planes de Lucha ("struggle
plans") whlch consisted of wlldcat stnkes, mobllizations and factory
occupations ln order to destabillze the successive antl-Peronlst
governments and have thelr Interests satlsfled
6
To
mention only a few
examples, the CGT camed out a massive wave of stnkes and
demonstrations in 1959 agalnst the Radical Frondizi government hl The
CGr also opposed Radical president IIha dunng hls whole term, 1963-1966
This opposition was manlfested through IIlcreased moblhzatlon and
It
created the favorable conditions for the 1966 coup d'état, whlch It Inltlally
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of
Argentlna determmed the fate of General Onganla's reglme.
6
Therefore,
the functlonmg
of
a polltlcal party system distorted by Peronism's exclusion,
as weil
as the legacy of corporatlsm
and
popullsm, gave too much political
power to the labor movement
2 The labor movement's strength also derived
from
ItS orgamzational
structure and the favorable labor legislation.
The
Argentine labor movement
was organlzed
ln
a pyramidai structure wlth the declslon maktng power
concentrated
at the
top of the
hierarchy.64
The power
was
monopolized
by
a
small group
of
leaders which gradually began a process of oltgarchlsation .
Labor leaders' control of union electlons procedures contributed to the
maintenance
of
the verttcal
and
central/zed structure
of
the organization,
s
weil as Impedlng any challenge from internai opposition. This abllity of
leadershlp's control of elections was based on the Law 14 455.
65
The latter
estabhshed
that the
wlnntng list took control \
t
ail unions of
the
Industrial
branch Wlth such a system, there
w s
no provision for minority
representatlon t was dlfflcult to dlslodge lhe eXistent leadership because il
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The fundamental labor leglslatlon whlch conferred Instltutlonal power
to
the CGT was the Law of Professlonal AssOciations
no
14 445 passed
ln
1958. The Law establtshed the system of smd/cato
Un/CO
that IS
It
legally
recognized only one union for each economlc sector Three levels of union
organizatlon
and
structure were taken Into consideration The unions of flrst
degree organlzed workers of
the
same Industnal branch The unions of
second degree were the federatlons whlch united the unions of flrst degree
trom ail provinces. Ftnally, the thlrd level of organlzatlon was the
confederation comprrsing ail the federatlons'
the
CGT Nevertheless, s'nce
the law allowed for elther a federatlve or centrallzed structure, the most
important unions in Argenttna adopted the last form Unions ln metal
working (UOM), rallroads, textile and construction had strongly centrahzed
structures This centralizatlOn gave the bulk of power ta the central
leadership eleeted at the national level
3
ThiS type
of
organlzational structure was Important
ln
ftnanelal
terms. The Perontst labor movement
ran
its own expanded welfare system,
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fmanclal w e ~ l t h labor leaders sought to protect Peronlst Interests
and
their
own
power by
ail
means
to
the detnment of the country's politlcal stablhty:
union bosses [ 1 played a declslve role ln the orientatIOn toward short-term
considerations and dlsregard for Instrtutlonal consolidation
69
ln addition to ItS polltlcal role, the ownersh.p of considerable
economlc assets had allowed the leadership substantlal control over the
rank and flle.
7o
Leaders had won the allegiance of the rank and file by
prom.s.ng the defense of thelr economlC, social and pohtlcal Interests
Workers JOlned unions to benef.t trom the extended welfare programs but by
the same token
fell
under the authontanan rule of
ItS
leaders. Money was
also
a source of patronage and of personal corruption at the internai level,
.ncreaslng union leadershlp's authonty over the rank and file. Both the high
level of centrahzatlon and frnanclal power had facllttated th e labor
movement's moblhzatlonal capacitles. Workers had no
other
politlcal
representatlves than the powerfully orgamzed Peronlst labor movement.
The Improvement of the.r working
and
living standards depended entirely
on
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political Impact of unions' mobillzationai actlvltles slIlce employers could not
count on a large reserve of unemployed workers ready to
act
as
strikebreakers.
72
Second, the denslty of
w o r k r ~
ln the capital 'l'as tllgh
More than 50 percent of unlonlzed workers were concentrated ln Buenos
Aires, enhanclng the capaclty for mobillzation Thlrd, as mentloned above.
the most powerful unions headed by the 62 Organrzallons , belonged to the
most prospero us economlc sector' Industry Therefore, the mythlcal slogan
when the CGT stops workmg, ail the country S paralyzed
was an
ongotng
reallty in Argentlna.
7J
2. The Labor Movement and the
ProcesQ
Se/dom m
tS
hlstory had the Argentme workmg
class suffered a bloodlel offensIve than the one
unleashed between 976 and 983
74
The last Argentine mlhtary dlctatorshlp has drastlcally undermmed the
labor movement's strength The 1976 mlhtary coup d état had overthrov'n
Isabel Peron's government ln whlch unton leaders
had
galned considerable
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Argentlna's economy by openlng the country
to
the international capital and
market
This
restructunng
Implled the eradlcatlon of Peronlsm and
especlally Its backbone that perpetuated ItS eXistence
the
Unions, also
known
as
Peronlsm's columna vertebral
-.,
The
Argentine labor movement
has
undergone several forms
of
represslon under the last dlctatorshlp
The
Proceso sought to infllct a
permanent defeat on the Peronlst organlzed labor To accompllsh ItS
obJective, the armed forces not only used physlcal represslon against the
labor
movement. but also intervened
ln
both the polltlcal
and
economlC
rea/ms
to
erode the bases of unions' power 76 The mliitary reglme radlcally
modltled labor leglslatlon and
the
labor market through the transformatIOn of
Argentlna's productive structure m order to reduce the socIal welght of the
workmg class and Its "combative capaclty" 77
Two major mliltary decrees, no
22 105
and no
22
269, shaped the
new Argentme represslve labor leglslatlon
78
The latter expressly prohibited
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The new Law dlssolved ttle CGT, restncted ttle attributions of fet1era lons, 1 J
Increased the power of the Mlnlstry of
Labor
wlth reqard
to
unions
took over
Hum
economlc
assets and
prohlbrted ail pohtrcal ac rvrty
on
part
of
labor
l
The abolition of the CGT, the pillar of the Peronlst labor movement.
gave
a
senous blow to ItS organlzatlon and actlVItles A few rnonths later, August
1980,
the new
Law
of
Social Services decree
no 22
269, removed labor's
control
of
ail union social services
and
securlty funds By Intervenlng
the
obras socIales, the milltary reglme cut the labor movement off fram ItS most
Important flnanclal resources
The
Argentine labor movement has
also
been weakened by major
structural economlc changes The
Proceso
's major ec
n
r'0mlC objectIve was
to
transform
the Argentine market ln arder
to
annlhllate populrsm
According to the armed
forces
and the economlC elltes, papulism had
produced a tao powerful
labor
movement, a bloated public sector
and
protected Industnes he==ivlly
subsldlzed
by the state, dnvlng the Argentine
economy and society downward To resolve these economlc and social
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The monetary and economlc reforms implemented by the mihtary's
economlC team transfered economic activity fram the productive sector
ta
the
financlal sector
of
the economy The Immediate consequence was
the
dlsmanthng of the Argentine Industnal sector. Vanous Indlcators underhne
this dramatlc phenomenon of detndustrialization.
81
The manufacturrng
sector's
share
of gross domestlc product shrank under the dlctatorshlp'
ln
1974, manufactunng Industry accounted
for
o\ler 29 percent of gross domestlC
production, after 1976, Industry's share fel l to 26 6 percent ln 1979, to
25
4 percent ln
1980,
and to
only 22 1 percent ln 1981
8
This phenomenon of del'ldustnalization increased
the
levels of
unemployment and underemployment. By the end of 1981, the number
of
unemployed was estlmated
at
around 1 5 million, the equivalent of
2 ta 25
percent of
the
labor force.
83
These sharp ris es in
the
levels
of
unemployment denved trom
an
important contraction
of
industrial
employment The number
of workers employed
in
manufacturing Industry
declined from 1 030 000
ln
1976
ta
790
000
in 1980.
84
High levels
of
unemployment created a larger reserve
of
unemployed workers, therefore
_
..
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of new
Job
creation between 1970 and 1980 corresponded to Independent
worker jobs
86
Wage earners' purchaslng power
and
living standards also dWlIldled
as the consequence of the wage reductlon pollcy After the 1976 coup,
wages were reduced by 50 percent
n
less than a
year
x A drastlc
regressive income dIstribution poltcy was
also
designed
to
wlden wage
differentlals.
This process of atomisation of the labor movement has
especially affected Industrial wage earners who lost thelr heretofore
important position ln the wage dlstnbutlon
These structural economlc changes entailed important modlflcattons
in the social structure of labor organlzatlons. By the same token they
debilitated unions' economlc and polltlcal power The most
VISible
change
has been the decltne of tndustnal employment affectlng
the
heretofore
hegemonic unions of thls sector Since the 1950s, the number of Industrral
unions had outnumbered service unions ln the labor movement H .) Industnal
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percent m 1965 to 3 percent ln 1984/86.
In
the same penod, the
participation of unlonlzed workers
ln
commerce
and
services increased
from
4 to 5 percent
9
Other sources mdlcate that
ln
1976, Industnal workers
constltuted 52 percent
of
the workers of
the
10 blggest Argentme unions. In
1986,
the
Industnal wage-earners only represented 35 percent of the same
population }
The
creation of a segmented labor market and
the
alteratlon of
the social compositIOn of union membershlp contnbuted
to
increase the
heterogenelty of the workmg cl ss nd consequently reduced its
mobillz tion i c p cltles The heterogenelty
contnbuted
to the
dlsorgamzatlon
of
the labor movement untll then under the hegemony of
large tndustnal unions The loss of homogenelty and the wldenmg
differentlals among unions due to dlfferent expenences contributed
to
the
ernergence of new union tendencies wlth dlfferent orientations nd
clai
ms
than the tradltlonal Industnal ones Thus, the support to the mdustnal unions'
tradltlonal
use
of militant stnkes was lessened glven the increasmg
divergence
of
interests (and to the m"itary represslon)
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important polltlcal groups of the country seemed to have laid down dlfflcult
bases
for
Argentma s democratlzatlon However.
the examlnatlOn of
Valenzuela s three other variables. labor s relative strength or weakness.
labor s politlcal diVISion or unit y and the authorltanan legacy. IS essentlal to
quallfy the extent of labor s Influence over the polltlcal system
3 1
The UCR-Peron/st confrontation
The Argentme Proceso collapsed after ItS defeat m the 1982
Falklands/Malvmas war
Facmg
shattered self-confidence
as
weil
as
undermined legltlmacy, the armed forces
called for
Immediate clvlltan
electlons and for the restoratlon of
democracy
Between 1982 and 1983
political
parties
reorganlzed themselves and competed for the scheduled
October 1983 democratlc electlons
One
of the
key elements ln
the
UCR candidate Raul Alfonsln s
electoral
campalgn
success was hls denunclatlon, ln April 1983,
of
the
eXIstence
of
a mllrtary-unron pact 9
Aifonsin
asserted that a s e c r ~
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union normallzatlon that would lead
to the
election of a new labor
leadership
This denunclatlon was used to severel}> dlscredlt Peronlsm ln the
electoral campalgn Alfonsln presented
that
pact
as
a threat
to
Argentine
democracy
9
The Radlcals thus Irnked Peron/sm to authontarianism,
somethlng the population deeply shaken by seven years of dlctatorship
strongly rejected
By
denounclng the Peronist union leadership the UCR
related Peronrst's polttlcal strength not to
its
party
but to
ItS labor movement.
Therefore, Alfonsm adopted a confrontatlonal attitude toward those who
supported the adversary party' the Peronist union leaders By stresslng the
authontanan and polttlcal nature of
the
Peronist Union apparatus, Alfonsin
underltned that Its transformation
Into
a
more
democratlc organization would
constltute one of the flrst efforts of
the
UeR government
ln
the labor area.
Furthermore, th,s denunclatlon offered shaky grounds for a UCR-Peronist
agreement or polttlcal pact
to
support the
new
democratlc regime.
At the same tlme, sorne labor leaders attacked the legltlmacy of the
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ln 1983 what was labor attitude toward democracy? The Argentine
case reveals
labor
leaders' amblguous attitude toward democracy
ln
the
transition penod. thus addlng another element of uncertalnty for democratlc
consolidation Whlle most labor leaders malntamed a clear anti-mllitary
position, thelr commltment to democracy was undetermmed Thelr stance
against military dlctatorshlp was
undoubtedly
related
to
the
strong
represslon the labor movement expenenced dunng the ro
ce
a
1 /
The
labor movement's antl-authontananlsm was expressed
ln
the April 1979.
July 1981 and March 1982 general stnkes and demonstratlons agamst the
military government.
98
Nevertheless, union leaders backed Peronlst
president ai candIdate, Italo Luder, and the candIdate
for
the governorshlp
of Buenos Aires, Hermmlo Igleslas, both of whom were Ilnked to
the
violent
events of the mld-1970s.
99
The last Peronlst government's (1973-1976)
corrupt
and authontanan management had aggravated the country's social
and political Instability. Its sad performance
had
offered the Argentine
electorate weak expectations on the capaclty of Peranlsm to sustaln
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Luder's
4
percent
1 1 The
October 30,1983, elections eVlnced major
politlcal changes
n
Argentlna It seemed
ta
mark the end of bath the
hlstoncal confrontation between the Peronlsts and the Radlcals and
of
the
myth
of
Peronlst InvmclbllJty
ln
fair and open electlons.
102
The results
represented the
flrst Peronlst defeat
n free
democratlc electlons
1 3
Peronlsts could no longer clalm
ta
represent the natlon's sole legltimate
maJonty
party or protest agamst an "llIegltlmate" government
104
ln 1983,
they would have to face a popularly elected non-Peronlst government and
confme themselves ta
the
unaccustomed raie
of
democratlc
OPPos tlon.
Although the sWlftness and the modalities of
the
transition process left
many Issues unresolved for
the
consolidation period
and
the tense
relatlonshlp
ot
the labor movement
wlth
the UCR's future govermng elites
forebode a dlfflcult start for the consolidation process, the major politlcal
changes unvelled
n
the October 1983 electlons underhned the weakness
of
Peronlsm and of extra party modes of polttlcal actlvlty
It
IS
true that
no
pact
had
been
forr,lUlated between the clviltan elltes
of
the transition
and
the
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underlined the lack of a common agreemerlL among these two actors Thus .
no
formai consensus on the commltment to the same new ru les to resolve
social
and
dlstnbutlonal confllcts
had
been reached The support
of
the
pnncipal social and polltlcal groups for the new government s polltlcal
program, especlally to the democratlc instltutlonallzatlon proJect. remamsd
an
undetermmed factor. Nevertheless, the defeat of Peronlsm m democratlc
elections underllned the lack of legitimacy of thelr pol/tlcal
rulmg
and the/r
relative weight ln the pohtlcal system
3.2 Labor s weakness
The harsh repression experienced by Argentine organlzed labor
under the dictatorsh/p and the transition to a democrat/c reg/me opened the
way for strong mobllizations around pent-up demands.
In
1983, the
mlhtary
government was obliged to abrogate the law prohlb/tlng the
rtght
to
stnke
and allow the formation of national union orgamzatron (the CGT IO l With
the return
of
democracy and after suffenng from seven years of
harsh
repression, the Peronlst laboT movement could demand relief for thelr
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defeat on the labor movement.
I06
Two
general strikes were organized by
the combative sector of the CGT
ln
1979 and 1981, as weil
as
a
demonstratlon on March 30th 1982 against the dlctatorshlp. But it did modify
the
tabor market, weakemng the leadlng sectors of the labor movement and
reducmg union membershlp ln 1983, the labor movement had
appraxlmately 3.5 to 4 million members compared
to
7 million in 1975.
1 7
Milltary labor leglslatlon and economlc pollcles also fragmented the
labor movement The armed
forGes
maintained relations with certain labor
leaders in order to heighten Internai divIsions withln the labor movement.
108
ln 1982-83, the labor movement was dlvided Into two broad wings. One
sector,
the
hardhne Peromst
CGT-BYazll,
headed by Saul Ubaldlnl (leader of
the beer workers and
of
the umon sector rupo de los 25) and by Lorenzo
MIguel (leader of the
UOM
and of the 62 Organizatlons ) firmly reslsted any
negotlations wlth the dlctatorshlp and used unions' mobilization power to
contrant the government
ln
order
to
satlsfy their ImmedIate interests (such
as
wage rncreases) On the other side, the more conc,IIatory CGT-Azopardo
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Factions, however, were not created around Ideologlcal Imes both
groups
supported Peronism. Peronlst labor leaders' nvalry stemmed
essentially from thelr dlsagreement over the adoption
of
polltlcal tact/cs for
gaimng access to the government ln power, whether
by
negotlallons wlth
the authorities or by open confrontation
110
ln the democratlzatlon process,
how would
these
tensIons among leaders affect labor s contribution
to
democracy? Glven
the
expected pent-up
labor
demands rn the post
authoritarian
period and
the diVisions among labor leaders, would
one
sector of
the
leadership still use the capaclty of workers' mobllrzatlon agamst
the government to satlsfy thelr demands
and
to solidlfy the support for Its
own organization?
And
how would the mobllizationai capacltles
of
the
confrontational
labor
sector
be
affected
by
the changmg relatlonshlp
between state and labor in the democratlc reglme and
by the non support of
rival labor
sectors?
ln the context of a
democratlcally
legltlmated
government with
legitlmate
polltlcal institutions to
channel
dlfferent
demands, how would the use of labor threats ta destabllrze an unpopular
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foreseeable and could conflict wlth the restoration of democracy what
would
e
the
Impact of
the
mobillzation activlties of a labor movement which
h d been conslderably deblhtated?
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III.
OPEN CONFRONTATION UNDER DEMOCRACY
The democratlc consolidation process
tn
Argenttna
has
been
charactenzed by sharp conflicts between the Alfonsln government and the
unions The Alfonstn government s polltlcal
and
econornlc programs
constantly clashed wlth
the
Interests
of
the labor movement
On t
le one
hand, the Radical government placed pnonty on democratlc polttlcal
institutionalizatlon ln order to overcome the chronlc polttlcal Instablltty the
country had expenenced slnce 1955 This polltlcal task reqUired union
democratlzatlon, whlch
met
wlth strong labor leadership reslstance.
According to
the
UeR
government, Ule union question was one
of
the malor
determinants
of
the tnstltutlonal stabiltty and democratlc consolidation
of
the
country.
n
the other hand, it could not avold workmg out solutions to
resolve the
debt
and economlC crises hampering Argentlna s development
The authontarian regime s financlal and economlc reforms had squandered
the country s wealth
and
bequeathed an unprecedented forelgn debt
to
the
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SOCial
economlc and polltlcal expectatlons
ln the
new democracy with very
Ilmlted resources to satlsfy
them.
The resources left
to
the
new
democratic
government to satlsfy sectonal Interests were weaker than
at
any time in
Argentlna's hlsto ry.
Valenzuela, Fishman
and
Rial argued that
ln
the countnes where
democratlc consolidation
was
successful (Spain, Uruguay) labor leaders
dellberately restralned thelr organrzatlons' sectonal Interests ln order to
promote pohtlcal democratlzatlon However
the
Argentine organized labor
dld not seem to actlvely support democracy and nevertheless did not
threaten democracy The CGT dld adopt a confrontational attitude toward
the UeR government. The thlrteen national stnkes agamst the
SOCloeconomlC
pollcles of the government were indicators of
the
hlgh level
of conflict between both actors Yet the labor movement's capacity for action
and to defend workers' demands
was
weakened because of
the
authontanan legacy and Internai rivai
ries
and
It
became further fragmented
under Alfonsm government.
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government as incompatible
wlth
democraey One crucial pnonty
on
Alfonsin's polltical agenda was to demoeratlze the Argentine labor
movement and transform
It
mto
an
apolitlcal movement by breakmg Its
historical link with Peronism.
112
A few days after assummg power, the
government sent
to
Congress
the
Law of Union Reorganlzatlon,
LRS
Ley
de
Reordenamiento Smdical ), also ealled the Mueel law (beanng the
name of the government's first Labor Mlnlster) III Alfonsm asserted that
Argentine democracy eould be strengthened by Increasmg the participation
of workers ln their union organizations and assunng the competition among
dlfferent candidates to select representative leaders The project was wntten
unilaterally
by
the government, but still
had
to
be
approved by the
legislature. The Mueei team had been opposed to any sort of negot/ahon
with the unions since
It
dld not recognize the representatlvlty
or
legltlmacy of
the Peronrst
CGT 114
The project of LRS focused on the neeessity
of
formlng demoeratlc
unions
and
attaeked the authoritarian tendeneies of the labor movement Il )
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The UCA government proJect called for Immediate elections at ail
union levels. The
LAS
establlshed new regulations for internai union
electlons
ln
order to democratlze the mechamsms of regulatlon and control
of union organlzatlons The electlons would proceed from the bottom up ,
startlng wlth the electlon of enterpnse delegates and endlng wlth the
alactlon of the leadership of national unions The criteria for candidate
selection were IJberallzed, only a minimum number of signatures was
raqUired
to
be a candidate The LRS stressed
the
necesslty of minonty
representatlon.
Any
of the mlnontles that obtalned more
th
an 20 percent of
the votes would be represented Flnally, union electlons would be controlled
by the Labor Mlnlster to avord union fraud
116
The UCR's proposed labor
law promoted democratlc practlces wrthln the labor movement to Increase
workers' participation ln union affalrs Internai union democratlzation was
expected to undermlne Peronlst exclusive control of the unlons.
117
Regular
and competitive alectlons and the guarantee of mlnopty representatlon
would allow for greater union pluraltsm. Union democratlzatlon would
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Whlle the LRS
proJect
was debated
ln
Congress, the labor movement
started a reunrflcatlon process
ln
January 1984
l S
The two broad wlngs of
the labor movement temporanly reconclled thelr dlfferences
to
form a four
r.1ember labl 'r leadership The new labor direction had a provisionai
character untll the deflnltlve normaltzatlOn of the
CGT
(that would take
place ln November 1986, after the resolutlon of the dlsputed proJect on
union electlons)
119
The CGT Umflcada (CGT-U) was composed of
representatlves of 35 untons, 18 belonged to the CGT-A.lopardo and 17 to
CGT-Brazll 12
The
leadershIp was constltuted of four general secretanes,
two for each former organlzatlon, Saul Ubaldlnl and Osvaldo Borda (of the
CGT-Braztl) and Jorge Tnaca and Antonio Baldasslnt (from the CGT
Azopardo). The process of unification was determlned by two factors The
first was the necesslty to present a untfled labor front agalnst the UeR
government's proJect for union reorganlzatlon The CGT-U wanted the
norrnalizatlOn of unions wlthout state Intervention or the represslve laws of
the
Proceso
They demanded the abolition
of
ail labor laws dlctated by the
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authontanan rullng These new labor grouplngs, such
as
AGA
Asamblea
Grem/al Argentma ),
ENTRA
Encuentro Nac/onal de TrabaJadores )
and
MNRS
Mov/m/ento NaclOnal de RenovaclOn Smdical ),
supported the
officiai
proJect
of union normallzatlon
121
They argued that those leaders
who were agamst Alfonsln's proJect were ln fact opposed to the
democratlzatlon of the labor movement Peronist leaders feared losing thelr
positions, sometlmes acqurred under the mlhtary government.
122
Although
these new union orgamzatlons were
yet
numencally marginai ln relation to
old Peronlst unions, thelr eXistence underhned the begmnmg of changing
attitudes concermng the role of the labor movement in Argentlna's society.
ln
addition
to
the emergence of new non-Peronist umon groupings
that could eventually challenge the Peromst CGT's control of labor, some
internai dlsagreements dlvlded and weakened the labor movement.
Lorenzo MIguel and the 62 Organlzatlons he headed were excluded from
the CGT-U.I21 Lorenzo Miguel had been dlscredrted
by
hls peers for the
Peromst party's electoral defeat The leadership of the 62 Organizatlons
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democratic procedures than the orthodox sect0r and It challenged labor
unit y in the long-term
The proJect
of LRS was unacceptable for Peronlst unions
It
slgmfled
the loss of control over the e'ectoral process and consequently the
POSSlbllity of lostng thelr positions ln democratlc electlons ln alliance wlth
Justlclalist deputles, the CGT-U mounted a strong campalgn agalnst the
proposed Union bill Early ln 1984 the CGT-U submltted
to
the Justlciallst
deputles a prOpO.5ltlon of union normaltzatlon
Ih
The major pOints of
confltct between the UCR government's proJect and the labor movement's
proposai concerned the provIsion
for
mlnonty representatlon and state
intervention ln union internai affalrs. Labor leaders argued li lat the LAS
restricted union autonomy and went agalnst
the
statutes of most
organlzations.
26
However, the statut es of the maJority of unions had been
established under Peronlst governments and allowed Peronlst leadership
excessive power over the rank-and-flle
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percent of the electlons the Opposition Iists won over the eXistent ol
Peronlst leadership Il') And
ln
50 percent of union electlons, mtnortt,es
succeeded ln wlnntng over
30
percent of the votes and obtatned some
representatlon (however representatlon was not proportlonal to the votes
obtatned) J \l> Yet. most eleetlons were won by the Peronlsts who
malntalned thelr hegemony wlthln the labor movement J 7 The competition
took place malnly between Peronlst candidates Nevertheless the Peromst
labor movement had lost Its homogenelty and was dlvlded tnto three distinct
tendencles a the orthodox whlch represented the hard-llne Peronlst
unions
b
the renovators and c the dlalogulst
The orthodox sector
was
led by the 62 Organizatlons whlch had
constltuted the hegemonlc force of the labor movement
As
mentloned
above, the 62 had matntatned the authontanan structure of Peronlsm t
supported the vertlcallsm
of
labor leadership and ellmlnated competltors
through an authontanan exerclse of power Hovvever,
It
had been polttlcally
weakened
by
the electoral fallure of Peronlsm ln 1983 The orthodox
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the dictatorshlp t was constltuted of former leaders of the 62 and of the
combative unions of the 1960s and 1970s that were struggllng agamst the
authontanan and hlerarchlcal nature of the Peronlst labor rnovement Aftar
Peronlsm's 1983 defeat, the 25 started differentlatlllg tllemselves from the
orthodox sector and presented an alternative
ta
reorgamze the labor
movement. They were fundamenta y upposed ta the leaders of union
orthodoxy who had contro ed the electoral campalgn and had hlstoncally
prevented
the
democratlzatlon of the labor movement The 25 supported
the renewal Peronlst wlng ln the Perontst party that advocated Internai
democratlc rules The latter resulted trom the split
ln
1984 between the pro
Miguel faction
and
the antl-Mlguel faction, the orthodox versus renewal Il
revealed the eXistence of internai struggle agamst the ollgarchlzatlon and
authontanan practlces by the old Perontst guard and sorne tendencles
toward more democratlc forms of union organlzatlon
Flnally. the
dialoguist
sector was mamly formed
by
leaders of
estion
TrabaJo that would later form the Grupo de los 15
estion
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negotiatlons between both actors ln the economlc and social
flt1lds
The
Alfonsin government made efforts
to
encourage the labor movement's Input
ln
concerted polleles to resolve the economlc crrsls and eonsolldate
democracy by changlng labor's role Faelng a monthly average Inflation rate
of 18% since the beglnnlng of 1984, the Alfonsln government stressed the
necessity of findrng new mechanlsms for negotlatlons and confltet resolutlon
wlth the prrnclpal socIal actors
1 N
Begrnnrng rn August
1984
the UeR
government called for trrpartlte negotlatlons
ln order to
restraln the
maxlmahst demands of each sector, especlally to lmlt the labor movement's
demands of wage Increases,
and
reaeh a common agreement on pollcy
formation.
140
The
Mesa de Concertacfon
was
thus rnaugurated
However, concertation proved unworkable The falled attempts of
concertation ongrnated
rn
the dlfflcult relatlonshlp between
the
Alfonsln
government and labor, and the latter's partlcular conception of democracy
Wage pollcfes
became the major theme of confltet between both actors and
thls untll the end of Alfonsln's mandate
The
CGT and espeelally
Its
most
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polltlcal Opposition under the CGT's aegls and question the UCR
government 's legltlmacy Were the purpose of union stnkes to defend
workers' real demands
or
were they polttlcal stnkes Intended to weaken
the UCR government? What was Ubaldlnl's VISIon of democracy? And what
was
the Impact of the general stnkes? After analyzlng the two general
stnkes, thelr results and the attItude of the labor movement toward the
government and democracy, new Iight will be shed on t ~ l Impossibiltty
of
concertation between the UCR government and the CGT but also on the
latter's weakness.
2.1
Ihe
Mesa de Concertacion
and wage pollcles
ln 1983,
the
democratically elected Alfonsln government inhented a
staggenng economy
ln
deep recesslon burdened with the huge foreign debt
problem. Several years of low and Inadequate levels of Investment and the
Ineftlclency of hlghly protected Industnes had generated a structural
economlc cnsls 142 ThiS cnsls was aggravated by the authoritarian legacy of
a 46 billion forelgn debt that represented 80% of the The debt
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of
negotlatlons
147
Dlstnbutlonal confllcts refer
ta
a situation
ln
which each
sector defends
ItS
maxlmallst demands (for labor movement, wage
Increases and
for
business sectors, hlgher prlces) regardless of the resulting
negatlve consequences on economlc growth
and
on rnflatlon The hlgh
Inflation rates were fueled by dlstnbutlonal confllcts between employers and
labor organlzatlons rn a context
of
an unprecedented economic and
debt
crrses The government's objective conslsted ln transforming the unions
into
a "responslble" actor Ilmltlng Its sectonal demands for national concerted
polle les Concertation could thus open sorne space for negotlatlons and
participation to make the country more govern ble than ln the past
Furthermore,
ln
a context
of
acute economlc
cnSIS,
concertation
nd
the
wllllngness of key actors to share economlc responsibllities and costs (by
IImltmg thelr partlculanstlc demands) could help the democratlc government
ta legltlmlze unpopular austenty pollcles
148
However, thA CGT suspended Its participation several tlmes trom the
Mesa de ConcertaclOn when
Its
demands for wage Increases were not
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307 sanctloned by the mlhtary government
141}
It conferred
ta
the Executive
the monopoly of fixing wages wlthout labor's participation The government
was flrmly
opposed
to reestabllshlng
the mechanlsms of
collective
bargalnrng (Law 14
250
of the last Peronlst government) clalmeci by
the
labor movement ISO
For
the government.
free negotlatlons
wlth no
government control, could hlnder stabillzation pollcles that were necessary
to hait splrallng Inflation The
government
thus flxed wages Increases by
decree. In early 1985, a new system of wage adJustment was drawn by the
economlc team Wages were
ta
be adJusted ta 90 percent ot
the
rnflatlon
rate of
the
prevlous month ln
that
situation,
real
wages suftered Cl steady
decline 151 Unions were dlssatlsfled wlth government wage polreles and
more generally wlth the overall economlc pollcles that Impair ed workers
standards of irving
n February 1985, the Mesa e ConcertaclOn became a sprrngboard
for
a temporary alliance between bUSiness groups and CGT ta flght agalnst
government economlc pollcles and unrlateral decls'f')n-makmg They formed
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strategy culmlnated r the second general stnke launched
ln
May 1985
The
latter clearly mdlcated labor's radical Opposition
to
the government polltlcal
economlc program and ItS unwlllingness ta compromise
2.2 ~ n Ç l t y ~ ~ _ o t
t t l e . - 9 J 2 1 ~ ~ 1 . y e s
of CGTs
f l r ~ e n e r a l
stnkes. the ascent of
UbgJdJfll ano the
I m . . Q J ) ~ s J Q l 1 y . of concertatlQ.D
The
CGT
used the threat of wlthdrawrng
ItS
support fram concertation
and
of
launchlng mobillzation actlvltles
Plan de Lucha)
If ItS demands were
not satlsfled by government pollcles
The
CGT called for two general stnkes
ln Sept\lmber 1984 and May 1985 The major objective of the two general
stnkes
was to
protest agalnst and change the government's
SOCloeconomlC
program
1 1) The
CGT dld not to partlclpate ln the antl-Jnflatlonary officiai
pollcy, but Ils strategy was to contront It completely The strategy of labor
confrontation toward the government was essentlally deslgned by
one of
CGTs combative leaders. Saul Ubaldlnl
The prrnclpal rnstlgator of the general stnkes, Saul UbaldJnl, came
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power
rnterests
55
HIs populanty allowed
hlm
to undermll1e Tnaca's
position as CGT leader (one of the four secretary generals and fOI mer
leader of
the
concrllatory sector Gestion y Trabajo)
ln
September 1985.
Ubaldrnl
was
appornted as the CGT's srngle secretary-gener
al
,,, 0
The
objective of Ubaldlnr was
to
transform the CG
r nta
the main
(Joie
of
pohtlcé,ll
opposition to the democratlc government
Ubaltdml's d/scourse and organ/zatlon of
the
two general str/kes led
the Alfonsrn government to underlrne the polltlcal charaeter and
destabllizlng objective of CGT's moblllzatiOnal aetlvltles
It
cntlc/zed the
flrst
general stnke as resultlng tram the sole decision of leaders and not
supported by the rank and flle 1') J Thus the government questroned the
leg/tlmacy
of
lhe
CGT
that was not
yet
nnrrnallzed and the real union
content of the stnke The UeR government denounced the rnethod of para
activo
of the CGT by companng
It
ta
t ~ e
polrtlcal stnkes
useeJ
by the labor
movement
ta
struggle aJarnst authorrtarran qovetrl,lients
l »);
For
the
government, the para activa was not Justlfled ln a demoeratlcally eleeted
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Ubaldlnl openly declared
10
the government durmg the second general
stnke- elther
they
can change the SOClo-economlC program
or they
have ta
leave
tt 1 ) )
It seemed as
If
the CGT was threatenlng the UCR government
If It
dld not respond
to
labor's dernands, elther the government had te modlfy
ItS
economlc pollcles to satlsfy labor's Interests or resign
Labor's questlomng of the legillmacy of the popularly elected Aifonsin
governrnent ralsed the Issue of labor's conception of democracy For the
labor movement, democracy was not based
on
t'le functlonmg
of
polltlcal
institutions,
but
was equated wlth
Ihe
satisfaction of workers' Immediate
economlc mterests We are struggllng for a democracy that can guarantee
us the liberty li live wlth economlc Independence and social Justice and
Democracy ':'; SOCial Justice " CIl The CGT dld not
conslder
the
consolidation
of
new Instltutlonal mechamsms
as
essentlal to democracy,
Democracy was Ilmltee to the satlsf2ctlon of wage mcreases
However concertation could work only as long as there was
1)
an
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bUylng
power was lower than
ln
1975 The Index had fallen from 100 m
1975 to 63 9
ln
1983 and to 69 1 ln 1985 166 ln a context of economlC
recesslon and hlgh inflation the tensions between the government and
unions Increased Both union intransigeance vis-à-vIs economlc pohcles as
weil
as
the penchant of the Alfonsln government for unilateral decislon
makmg ln the economlc realm Impeded any attempts
of
concertation
Involvmg government. busmess organtzatrons and labor leaders 167
The success of both stnkes was Irmlted 16 - The partial results and
Impact underhned labor's weakness Frrst of
ail,
there has been a relatlvely
low adhesron to bath stnkes The evaluatlon of workers' participation ln
gbf:eral slnkes by the government and the CGT dlffered,
as
It dld for the
followmg ones The CGT always percelvea
:ts
general strrkes as an éXlto
total (complete success) wlth the participation of more than 95% of the
worker On the contrary, the government s calculatrons Ilmlted to
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economlc
Cr/SIS 171
The successive falJures of concertatIon and the
confrontatlonal attitude
of
the CGT
had
led
the
government
to
govern
wlthfl Jt
the
latter's Input Could the labor movement mamtaln ItS strategy of
confrontmg the government through general
stnkes
to obtam wage
Increases or dld the tnvlal success of ItS mobillzationai actlvltles underllne
ItS weakness and push sorne union organlzatlons to adopt a more
concllmtory attltude
r
)
3
P I ~ J J
AlJsJr_é Ll\Jld UnIon Sector/al Negotiatlons: 1985-1986
The Plan Austral,
an economlc stablllzatlOn
program, was
Implemented by the government's economlc team ln June 1985 The
new
Altonsrn government economlc program had been negotlated wlth some
Important business organlzatlons Unions however had been excluded tram
ItS
elaboratlon 1/4 The government thus clrcumvented the CGT and acted
mdepenclently
fram
labor's demands
175
The
CGT
completely reJected the
Plan Austral Between August 1985 and January 1987, the
CGT
organlzed
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3 1
The
implementatlon of the
Plan Austral
and _ QTs_
strgtegy
Of
confra ntation
The depth of the economlc CriSIS and the restrictions Imposed by the
negotiatlon of
the
external debt had Impeded
the
UeR government trom
reachmg
Its
objectives
of
hait mg mflatlon. reactlvatll1g the economy and
Improvlng wage redistribution
ln
the flrst yeal and a hait of ItS Rdrnmlstratlon
President Alfonsln appomted a new Econo,nlc Mlnlster
n
February 1985,
Juan
Sourou"le,
who was flrmly declded to . ~ 1 n c \ î a
war
agalllst
mflatlon 176
The Plan
Austral
was
a government Initiative
to
(;ut off the
mflationary spiral through a priee and wage freeze Tho econornlc packagE-}
also Ineluded a pollcy to cut the fiscal deflclt (by ralslng tax(;\s), a rnonet3ry
reform, a new currency, the austral. and a program
for
the forelqn debt
renegotlatlon The Initiai success of the Plan Austral was perceptlblf:, III the
slgnlflcant reductlon of the mflatlon rate ln the flrst
SIX
months of the:
program's ImplementatIon,
the
monthly inflatIOn dld not
exceed
3 2
percent.
ln
The early effectlveness of the economlc program allowed the
government
ta slgn
a
new
agreement wlth
the IMF ln
July 1985 IX
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nature of the stnkes culmlnated ln January 987 wlth the elghth general
stnke, whlch was dehned by Ubaldlnl as a plebiscite of the workers agamst
the Plan Austral 1xo
ln
August 1985, the CGT called for Its thlrd national stnke, sinee the
begtnntng of Alfonsln's mandate, to entlelze
the
government's
eeonomlC
program ln whlch labor had no Input and ask for a moratorium on the
extel nal debt payment 1x1 However labor falled
ta
convlnce the government
to alter any of ItS economlc goals Moreover the Aifonsin government
was
confident ln the contlnuous ImplementatIOn of the Plan Austral after the
populatlon's endorsement of Its pragram ln the
September
1985
congresslonal electlons The
UeR
outpolled ItS rivai, the Peronlst party,
by
wlnntng 43 percent of the votes agalnst 34 percent for the Peronlsts
182
The
government's wage freeze was th us matrltamed desplte labor's oppostlon
Wage poltcy st,II constltuted a thorny Issue between the government
and the CGT Sy early 1986
the
QOve
r
:lment began
to use
more flexiblltty in
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launched on the wage Issue, Alfonsm stressed that
the
governrnent would
not respond to CGTs demand
ln
order to avold a new dlsastrous Rodngazo
as had occurred under Isabel Peron's governrnent
1S·I
The Alfonsm
government rnamtamed the flxat , , .. of wages by decree and subordmated
the mcreases to the objectives of the antl-tnflatlonary program
Sy March 1985. the government tntroduced
new
mechantsrns
to
tlX
wages. The percentage of wage Increases would
be
hnked to
the
estimation
of the next month's tnflatlon rate and would be done between a "tloor" and a
"ceiling"
185
The "floor" and the "celllng" represented respectlvely the
mmlmum
and the
maximum percentage dllowed for wage Increases
Furthermore, a partial translation of these Incmases to the priees would be
conceded. Smce the CGT was unwllllng ta negotlate on the establishment of
the "floor" and "celltng" wlth the government. the latter flxed thern by decree
The CGT called for flve general stnkes,
ln
January. March . .June, October
1986 and January 1987
ta
express
Its
dlscontent
on
ail wage Increases
offlclally decreed.
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3 2
Sec191lalJllliLQtlatjQns
labor leaders' dIvergent tactlcs
Several unIon leaders came to the conclusIon by 1986 that the CGTs
general strlkes and cOllfrontatlonal strategy
had
not been successfui 1 1
Improvrng workers' Ilfe condItIons The use
of
stnkes
had
not brought any
posItIve effects for workers ln
the
two flrst years of Alfonsm's mandate nor
any substantlal change or concessIons fram the democratlc government.
Real wages
had
dropped slnce 1983 and general workers' lIving standards
deterrorated between 1985 and 1986
as
a consequence of governrnent
polrcles
IX I Sorne
bIg union sectors began to use a positIon of moderatlon
wlth the government and to cntlclze the confrontatlonal behavlor of Ubaldlnl.
Labor's dIvIsIon between a conf ontatlonal and more moderate sectors was
the reflectlon
of
profound internai dlsagreements. The analysls of these
rnternal conflrcts WI" glve a new sense to the real objectIves and
effectlveness of CGT's general strrkes
By
mld-1986, sorne bIg unIon sectors became less supportlve of
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year 189
Sy
the end
of
January 1987, after the elghth general stnke had
been undertaken, 25 unions representmg approxlmately half million workers
had signed wage
agreements respectlng
tho tloor dnd c811Ing
estabilshed by
the
government 190 The
logle
of
wage
negotlatlofl seemed ta
gain strength over the logle of po tlcal confrontation wlth the government To
what extent were
Ubaldlnl's stnkes
ulllOnlst strlkes?
he
polltlcal
objectives seemed
to
predomlnate
over the
saClo-economlC objective
of
defendrng workers' Interests. slnce these were better satlsfled wlth the
strategy of negotlatlons
ln fact, the
stnkes
had been
led ln
a context of Internai labor
fragmentation. Labor leaders dlsagreed on whether to pessure the
government from Inslde , by seekrng Instltutlonal forrns of Influence, or trom
outslde , through extra-Instltutlonal channels
such as
the national stnkes
and mass demonstratlons.
9
Whlle Ubaldtnt and sorne of the n?5
supported the strategy of confrontation,
the
62
and
leaders of the orthodox
sector (Tnaca, Miquel) malntalned the
Will ta
negotlélte wlth the qovernment
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to break the dialogue wlth the government
IIH D u n n ~ l
the
str
Ikes. Ubaldlrll
also cntlclzed the relations of certain labor leaciers wlth government
officiais
94
The October 1986 stnke generated further diVISions wlthln the
labor movement. especlally between the "62".
the 25
and the
ubaldll1lstas
The stnke
was
reallzed one month before
the
normahzatron congress
ot
the
CGT Although the No\/ember 1986 electrons ln the CGT were mtended
to
elaborate the
new
general union strategy
and
ta
unlfy
the labor
m o v e m ~ . n t .
they could not hlde the mternal divIsions 9 The 62 and the "25' \Nele
skeptical about the effectlveness of general stnkes They
no
longer beheved
in the eventual positIve results of the stnkes that seemed to retlect
the
will
of
Ubaldlm to Impose himself
as
the hegemonlc leader
of
the labor movement.
The internai fragmentation of the labor movement and the success of
sectonal negotlations underhned orgamzed labor's weakness The CGT no
longer had the capaclty to defend workers' livrng standards Ubaldinl's
SIX
general stnkes had falled to alter the government's economlc pollcles
Moreover, the Increasmg lack of support for CGT's pursUit of general stnkes
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government ta get closer ta the more moderate unIon sectors ln order to
further fragment the
labor
movement and defeat CGT's confrontatlonal
strategy
4 U ~ m Q l ~ Qf CQ9J21J9ILAnO Peronlst CGT Weakness:1987-89
By the end of 1986, a new spIral of hypennflatlon had underlined the
fallure
of the
Plan ustral and had worsened the economlc crrsls The
government recognlzed that
ItS
Inablilty to cut ItS fiscal detlclt and cope wlth
the deepened economlc cnSIS had revealed the inefflclency of excessive
state Intervention ln the economy From 987 untll the end of
ItS
mandate,
the Alfonstn government would Implement yet another economic strategy to
restructure Argenttna's reellng economy
1< 7
The government followed a
neoltberal program by opentng Argentma's seml-autarklc economy to the
International market and support mg a massive
wave
of pnvatlzatlon of stat8-
owned enterpnses
and
of
r l ~ r e g u l t l o n
of
the market
199
ln concrete terms
for the labor movement, ',hese pollcres rmplled the
IOS5 of
jobs and drop in
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tactlc was Intended to further fragment tlle ' bor movement and obtaln some
labor support
to
Its new economlc pollcles
When the government s economlc mlsmanagement led ta the UCR's
defeat
ln
the
September 1987 electlons,
the
pact
betwetm
the qovernment
and the Peronlst union sector 15 broke
down
Il l Although the government
had
made sorne slgmflcant Instltutlonal
concessions
to
thE)
labor rnovemfmt
after the resignation
of
Alderete, Ubaldlnl called for tlve general
stnkes
between November 1987 and September 1988 agamst
the
governrnent's
economlc
program However, none
succeeded
ln changmg any of the
offiCiai poltcles
The
government contmued to Irnplement Its neoliberal
poltcles
that
mevltably
harmed
workers' wages
and buymg
power
And
desplte
CGT s
confrontation, the government carned out Its mandate untll
the
989 President ai electlons and guaranteed a democratlc transfer of
power
to another clvlhan
government
Why dld the CGT's mobillzationai
actrvltres
have
no Impact
on
the
UCR s
pol/tlcal proJect
It
dld
not seem to
support? And was CGT's support ta democratlc consolidation essentlal
for
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confrontation by negotmtlons 204 ln return the government conHlllttecl Ilself
to supportmg sectonal wage agreements as those reached III F el1ruary
1987 The government's strategy was relatlvely successful Slncp the"
15"
acted Independently of
the
CGT Ttle government underllneci t h l ~ dlfferences
between these two labor sectors and the mefflclency
of
CGl's strategy l
he
government's ratification of Its economlc measures of deregulatlon and
pnvatlzatlon
ln
July
1987
had generatect
an
hostile reactlon of the
ClîT
President Alfonsm accused the CGT of '3.doptlng a "reactlonary" and "antl-
worker" attitude whlle
the
Implementation
of
these oconomlc
pOllCl8S
were
almed at overcomlng the fiscal deflelt and Improvtng the dlstnbutlonal
capacitles 205 The government stressed that the strategy of the "15" was
more effective ln defendmg workers' Interests than CGT's confrontatlonal
behavlor.
206
However sorne bitter confllcts emerged between the new Labor
Mintster Alderete
and
the
Economlc Mlntster Sourouille concernmg the
implementatlon of the economlc and especlally wage pollcles Slnce Hle
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the stabillzatlon polle les
and
hls advocacy for pnval.zatlon and Ilberalization
of pm es, whlch Ilmlted the posslbilltles of
concIliation
wlth the Labor
Mlnlster and the labor movement Sourouille reJected Alderete s demands
of wage Increases and especlally of the restoratlon
of the
law on collective
bargalnlng The latter wouJd represent a major hlndrance to the government
stablillzation and economlc emmgency measures to hait 1nflatlon
By the end of 1987, glven the ImposslbJlty to compromise wlth the
economlc team of Souroullle, Alderete renounced
as
Labor Mlnlster.
Nevertheless,
Alderete
had demanded the approval
of
a senes of
parllamentary labor bills - the laws covenng free collective bargammg,
minImum wage and of Professlonal Associations - that became effective by
the end of 1987 and early 1988 after hls resignation
ln December 1987, the law covenng free collective bargaming
was
passed ln Parllament ThiS law Inltlally allowed negotlatlons between
unions
and employers
wlthout goverllment-lmposed restrictions
on wage
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Indlcated that the weakness and deep rlivisions
of
the labor movement
underlmed tS decreaslng welght
ln
the Argentine economlc and polltlcal
systems
Desplte
the
restoratlOn of Instltutlonal mechanlsms
to
negotlate labor
Issues
and
the Peronlst party vlctory
ln
the
September
1987
electlons, the
G still used the tactlc of polltlcal stnkes to have
ItS
dema nds satlsfled.
After the renunclatlor of Alderete,
new
labor divIsions emerged around the
Issue of labor representatlves ln the forthcomlrig Presldentlal
989
electlons These dlsagreements affected
ItS
reorganlzatlon and weakened
the orgamzed labor ln splte
of the
contlnuous use
of
mobillzationai
actlvltles.
the
stnkes
had no
rerercusslons on the governablilty of the
country and gcnerated
no
positive beneflts for the workers They revealed
the Ineffectlveness
of
labor's confrontatlonal strategy ln
the
context
of
democracy and
an
acute economlc cnsis
wlth
hypennflatlon.
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continue Implementlng
the
deflned wage pollcles
II
And the
CGT's
use of
stnkes slnce
the
beglnnmg of Alfonsm's mandatt? dld not entail positive
results for the workers Were
the
strlkes only
3 taetle
llsed
by
sorne Inbor
leaders ta Increase thelr power over
ttwlr
labor rivais anl1 to prtlsent <
polltlcal alternative ta
the gavernmenP
Labor's mter nal contllcts were
clearly reflected ln the stnkes and conflrmed the lack of J comlllon labor
strategy and the fragmentation
of
the labor movement over pol/tlcal Issues
ln the Deeember 1987
stnke,
an 31lianee was formed between the
25 and the
ubaldmfstas
ta
present an
altmnatlve to the 62 1 1
Nt"lw
allgnments were formed wlthln the labor movement wlth ttle preparation of
the
1989 Peronlst party
E
leetoral eampalgn l
he
leader of the pohtlclzed
"6(>
Organlzatlons ,
Lorenzo
Miguel.
wanted ta
unlfy the Peronrst
labor
movement under hls hegemony and play a central role ln
the
eleetoral
process to aeqUire new polltleal space after the PJ tnumph 1Ir However, the
25
were opposed to the integration of
the
15 ln
the labor unification fhe
25 supported the Peronlst party and cntlclzed
the whlch h3d
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sharp c.onfllcts
ln
the union leadership
217
Ubaldmi was no
longer
supported
by
the 25 , the
62
and by the 15 , now k 1 .)wn as the
Mov m ento Smd cal
enem
Pres dente (MSMP) 21X The absence of these
union organlzatlons m the general stnkes
and
low levels of worker
participation (the percentage
of
labor partiCipation
was
lower than
ln
ail
precedent stnkes) revealed that the strategy of confrontation was used by
Ubaldml
to
leglt/mate hls personailst/c leadership
The
emergence and
growlng
power of the MSMP underlrned the
declme of
Ubaldlnl's
confrontatlonal strategy and of the orthodoxy of the 62 Organlzatlons . The
MSMP supported the Peromst candidate for the 1989 electlons, Carlos
Menem
21()
Menem and other Peronlst politlclans had dlstanced themselves
from union leaders ta strengthen the party's polltlcal wrng and reorganlze
internai democratlc rule
to
present a viable polltlcal alternative to the
UeR 220
ln a slmllar vern, the MSMP sought to act independently trom the
62 Organ/zat/ons and the CGT 221 The MSMP pursued ItS strategy of
sectonal wage agreements through negotlatlons and was wllllng to discuss
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CGT.
to
assure a democratlc transition
of
powei Ali
the
polltlcal partlcs were
wlllmg to make effolts to support
the
contlnUity of UCR governélllCf' untll the
electlons 222 ln May 1989. Menem becarne the new President of Arqentlna
ln fair
and
democratlc electlons The Aifonsill
ç J o v e r n m t ~ n t
had
accompllshed
an Important
step
ln democratlc
consolld ltlon by
guaranteelng a democratlc transition tram one constltutlonal governrnent to
another The CGT played no slgmflcant raie
ln
these electlons
To what extent dld the lack
of
restramt of the
CGT
under the Alfonsm
government affect the stabliity of the reglme? The CGTs Incapaclty ta
defend workers' demands revealed
Its
profound state of dlsorgamzatlon and
the inefflclency of ItS hlstoncal strategy of confrontation m a country that
guaranteed regular democratlc electlons and that offered other channels of
polltlcal representatlon to the workers Varrous
factors
of weal-.ness
underllned that the labor movemer.t was no longer a powerful actor ln the
economlc
and polltlcal
balance
These factors of
weakness
will
be
recapitulated through Valenzuela's framework of analysls
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unemployment and underemployment Increased slgnlflcantly trom 11 2 ln
1985 to
16
ln
1989 thereby reduclng the level of union membershlp 225
d) The drop ln real wages am purchaslng power underlined
the
decllnlng
living standards
of
the
Argentine workers and the Incapaclty of the CGT to
defend Ils rank-and-flle Interests From 100 ln
1983 the
real wages fell to
92.2 ln
1986
and ta 5 ln 1988 and the annual variation of purchaslng
power
was mostly negatlve
h
The levels
of
wages
and
purchaslng power
were eroded by the hlgh inflation rates of
the
penod
227 e)
DE3spite the
government s concession to labor wlth the commission on minimum wages
ln 1988
the urban
real
minimum wages annual average Index decllned
trom 100 ln 1980 to 956 ln 1988 and 69.9
ln
1989 228
The mdlcators
of
low levels of wages
and
of employment revealed
that workers fundamental Interests had not been protected by the CGT
under Altonsm s government The lack
of
labor homogenelty, direct result of
the econOnllC pollcles of the
last
authontanan reglme, Increased the
dlvergency of labor Interests and consequently reduced
the
participation
of
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sector
(UOM.
SMATA)
dld
not support
the
last general strlkes
-The
CGT
no
longer seemed to represent the malonty
of
Argentme workers
2 he centrallzatlOn
or
decentralrzatlOn and polit cal
urllty
or divIsIOn
of the labor movement The labor movernent expenencl3d I 1CredsmÇ1
fragmentation undel ttle Altonsln gaver nlllcnt
111bOI W S
dlvldeo hctwE'ell
four major sectors. the
"62",
the 25 ,
the uba dlrllstas
and thp 1
(01
MSMP
ln the last years) Although the Peronlst CGT contllllJE.'d o represent Ihe
central labor orgamzatlon under Alfonsln,
It
was rlven
by
Internai contllcls
The CGT and Its strategies weakened
as
sorne union sector s dlstanced
themselves fram the CGT and adopted other tactlcs On the one hand, I e
rise
of
the renovator wlng,
the
25 , ln the 1985 union elcC'tlons and the
Ir
support to mternal democratlc forms
of
organlzatlons challerH]0d the
Peronlst authontanan orthodoxy The declllltn9 of Ubaldtnl
<md
Miguel
power by the end
of
Alfonsm's mandate proved the weakentng
of
t h ( ~
orthodox sector
On
the other hand some unions such as the "1 and the
62 began by 1986 a proeess of negotlatlon wlth the governrnent and the
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consequence of the UCR government's Implementation
of
unpopular
stablhzatlon policles
to
resolve the economic cnsls The antl-Iabor pohcies
had severely debrlitated the labor movement and had represented a break
for
labor reorganrzatlon under Alfonsln. ft took flve years to the democratlc
government
of
Alfonsln to Implement a
new
labor leglslatlon and repeal
ail
the m,IItary labor laws
4
he
modalltles of transItion to democracy nd labor movement s
relationshlp wlth the elttes of transitIOn:
Although the lack
of
a transition
al
pact between the
key
social actors had added an element
of
uncertainty for
the consolidation process, the analysis
of
the three prevlous variables
underlmed that the weakness of the labor movement had reduced its
Influence
ln
the Argentme economlc and polltical systems. The tensions
between the UCR
and
Peronlst labor dunng the transition process (the
UeR
had denounced
the
eXistence of a mllitary-umon pact) led
the
government
to
negotlate
wlth
other unron ispresentatlves (under
the Mesa de Concertacion
and wlth the Incorporation of the
Grupo
de los 15 in 1987) in order to further
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legit imate polrtlcal channels for workers. weakened CGT s strategy
o
confrontation nd credlblhty s a labor organlzatlon
Contrary to Valenzuela s argument on the necesslty o labor s
restramt in the consolidation process. the several Argentine organlzed labor
mobihzatlons dld not Impede the democratlzatlon project of the Aifonsin
government ln the short term. labor s support of democracy was not
determlnant for the latter s consolidation
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CONCLUSION
The Peronlst labor movement
has
not played a slgmflcant role in the
Argentrne democratlc consolidation process ln splte of thlrteen general
strrkes organlzed agalnst the officiai polrtlcal economlc policles and the
democratlc Alfonsln government, the latter succeeded
in
undertaking the
democratlc transfer of power
to
another clvllran government
ln
May 1989.
Whereas Valenzuela, Fishman
and Rial
argued that the restralnt of labor's
sectorral demands was necessary to promote politlcal democratizatlon, the
Argentine study case leads us to qualify thelr argument.
The
Peronlst CGT has been hlstorrcally
one
of the strongest and most
polrtlclzed labor movements ln Latin Amerrca. The popuhst and corporatist
experiences had bequeathed a powerful labor organlzation but had also
generated the elltes' fear of the growing power
of
the worklng classes. The
post-populrst reglmes attempted but falled to eradicate the Peromst labor
movement and Impose thelr
own
rules of the game. After Peron's overthrow
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movement. The represslon that was mostly dlrected agamst the worklllg
class and its leaders, the antl-Iabor polleles and the slgmflcant structural
changes of the Argentine economy ail debliltated the organlzatlon and
capaclty of action of the CGT
ln the wake of transitions to democracy, several scholars stressed the
crucial role of the hlstoncally powerful labor movements The Inevitable
pent-up labor demands, after the authontanan represslon and
ln the
context
of an economlc
cnSIS,
were expected to confllct wlth the project
of
democratization Scholars such
as
Valenzuela, Fishman and Rial stressed
that labor's limitation of Its mobillzationai actlvltles was a positive
contribution to the consolidation
of
democracy Nevertheless these scholars
did
not emphasize the extreme we kness of the labor movements after the
expenence of authontanan rule and consequently the reduced Impact of
thelr behavlor on the polltlcal system rn the short term The study ot the four
variables of Valenzuela's framework of analysls on labor's role
ln
the
democratlzatlon process helps ln understandmg the changrng role and the
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slnce ItS electoral campalgn the problem posed by the Peronlst organlzed
labor to the new democracy
It
was a movement wlth authoritanan
tendencles that l c ~ e d elected and legltimate representatlves. The
government was determmed to democratize the unions and remove the
Peronlst control
of
the labor movement. Therefore the non-democratlc
nature of the orgamzatlon and the hostile attitude of the UCR government
toward the CGT antlclpated that the labor movement would adopt a
confrontatlonal behavlor
and
not restram its sectonal demands. In fact, the
Argentine Peronlst CGT dld not seem to support democracy and did
organlze several mobllizatlonal actlvities between 1983 and 1989.
However,
why dld
the lack of CGT's restralnt not hamper the beginning of
Argentine consolidation
to
democracy? The reasons are to be found
in
the
profound divIsions, disorgamzatlon and weakness of the labor movement
after the authontanan legacy that made It a less determinant actor in the
polltlcal system.
The labor leadership was
nven
by mternal confllcts and fragmented
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eVldent that the general stnkes falled ln convlnclng
the
government
t
alter
its economlc pollcles and entalled
no
beneflts to the workers The
government's economlc pollcles had done IIttie to bolster workers' real
income. Wage-earners' living standards detenorated under the Aifonsin
government and underllned the Incapaclty of the CGT
ta
defend workers'
Interests. Although the government had made some slgnlflcant Instltutlonal
concessions to the labor
movement
ln
1987 and 1988 wlth the restoratlon of
favorable labor laws such as those for free collective bargalnlng, minimum
wage and of Professlonal ASSOCiations Ubaldlnl contmued uSlng hls
strategy of confrontation and workers only obtalned small gains The
GT
stnkes seemed more polltlcal than syndlcahst ln nature and were used by
sorne
of
Its leaders to Increase thelr internai power By the end of Alfonsln
mandate, Ubaldlnl's and Lorenzo Miguel's pOSition wlthln the labor
movement had declined
The 25 had represented a democratlc challenge to the orthodoxy of
the 62 . It had won many votes ln the union electlons
ln
1984 and 1985
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negotlatlons underlinmg the weakemng of
tS
position
as
central organizer
of the labor movement The general httle repercusslon and small union
participation ln the three last general stnkes stressed that most union
leaders were no longer willing to support the CGT nor tS general stnkes as
form of protest to gov rnm nt
Thus,
ln
the aftermath of transitions to democracy, the consolidation
process could be Inltlated and sustamed because the histoncal unions
polltlcal role and strength had decllned By focuslng on
th
labor
movements weakness after the authontanan rule, the thesls underhned that
the success of the new democratlc reglme s consolidation
ln
the short term
at least,
no
longer seemed dependent on labor s role More speclfically,
labor mobillzationai actlvltles no longer seemed to compromise the stabihty
and legltlmacy of the democratlc reglme
Further research should be undertaken on the changing role of the
labor movements after the authontanan expenence
to
assess thelr relative
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democratic governments, they could become a source of dlsloyalty and
affect the consolidation process
If they
grow stronger
or
look for ailles and
for a destablllzlng coalition Whlle the lack of labor restratnt IS not essentlal
ln the short-term, It can become necessary ln the longer-term
The thesls would be ennched by further research
on
the development
of
new
non-Peronlst union grouplngs
and
the Peronlst union sectors that
have been differentlatlng tnemselves trom the CGT (the 25 and the MSMP)
and their attitude toward democracy _ ln the past forty-flve years, the labor
movement had been domlnated
by
Peronlst Ideology and authontanan
labor leaders. However, startlng
ln
the 1960s and 1970s, sorne new union
sectors began to cntlclze
nd
challenge the undemocratlc nature of the
labor leadership
nd
the subordination of workers' tnterests
to
thelr own
power Interests Will these rnovements contnbute to the reorganlzatlon of the
Argentine labor movement wlth more democratlc norms of functlonlng and
by democratlcally representlng and defendll1g workers' demands?
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strongly polltlclzed 80th labor leadershIps had polltlcal objectIves ln thelr
actions. The presence of a revolutlonary left wlthrn
the
Chllean labor
leadership could have hlndered the process of democratlc consolidatIon, as
argued
by
Campera and Cortazar However
tS
welght
has
decreased with
the emergence and growlng power of a market-onented union sector. The
latter S depolltlclzrng the labor movement and confrnrng it to tS
organlzatlonal and syndlcallst objectives The negotlatrng grouprngs
of
Argentine unlonrsm, such as those belonglng to the
rupo
e
os
15 or
MSMP,
may represent a more market-onented sector slnce they
are
aware
of the declinlng Impact of the polrtfcfzed CGT on the Argentine polltrcal
system and on workers' irving standards.
The emergence of more democratrc and less politicrzed union
grauprngs S presentlng new developments in the changrng raie of the labor
movements
ln
Latrn Amerrca The progressive reorganrzation of the labor
movement may transform t nto a key socral actor for the long-term
consolidation of the Latin Amerrcan democracies
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•
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he Polltlcal Economic and Labor Climate
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Paymg the Costs of
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KECK, Margaret
E
The New Umonlsm
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_____
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H.
WAISMAN, eds,
From Milltary
Rule to LIberai Democracy
ln
Argentma
Boulder, Colorado:
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the
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Extremo Occidente
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Latin Amenca Paper Senes, no.
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•
Periodicals
Latin American Weekly Report 1982-1989
El Bimestre Politico
y
Economlco
1983 1989
ewspapers
New York Times 1983-1989
La Nacion 1983-1989
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NNEX
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•
TABLES
Table
:
Table Il :
Table
III
:
Table
IV:
Table V :
Table VI:
Table
VII
:
Table VIII:
Selected Economlc Indlcators 1975-82
Dlstnbutlon of Argentine wage earners by sectors of
actlVlty Evolution
1949-1980
Distribution of Union Membershlp by economlc actlVlty
sector. Evolution
1936-1984
Unemployment and Underemployment
In
the Federal
Capital and Greater Buenos Aires)
1975-1989
Real Average Wages ln Argentma s Manufactunng Sector
1981-1989
The Evolution
of
Real Wages . 1982-1983
Real Wages, Inflation Rate and Purchasing
Power
1983-1988
Membershlp Trends
ln
the Pnnclpal Umon Federations
1960-1986
• •
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Table 1
Gross
domestlc
product
Industnal
production
Inflation
PubliC
deflclt ( of
GDP)
Real
per
caplta GDP
Selected Economic 1ndicators
1975 82
( varratlon)
1974
1975 1976
1977
65
1 4 -3 1
48
6 1
-30
-4 4
242
1827
44 176 2
82
162
11
2
52
40
1 8
-2 1
48
1978 1979 1980
1981 1982
-5 4
68
1 1 -61
5
2
-105
9 1 -37
-152
- 4 7
1754 1595
1008
1045
1648
72
8 85 90
80
-4 7
54
-05
-73 -69
Source. William C. Smith
Authontariamsm
and the
risis
of
the Argentine Polltical Economy Stanford,
Ca ifornla. Stanford University Press, 1989, p. 248.
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•
Table IV Unemployment and
Underemployment
(in the Federal
Capital and Greater Buenos Aires)
Unemployment
Underemp Qy.ment TotgJ
April
Oct.
April
Oct
Apnl Oct
1975 2.4 2.8 4.7
49
7.1
7.7
1976 4.8 4.0
4.7
5.0
9.5 90
1977
3.4 23
3.3 3.1 67 5.4
1978
3.9 1.9
5.4 3.0
93
4.9
1979
2.0 2.1
3.2
3.2
5.2
5.3
1980
2.3 2.3
4.7 4.5
7.0
6.8
1981
4.0 5.0
4.6 5.8
8.6
10.8
1982
5.7 3.7
6.4 56
12.1
9.3
1983 5.2 3.1
4.6 4.9 9.8 80
1984
4.1
3.6
4.5 4.7 86 83
1985 5.7 4.9
55
66
11.2 11.5
1986 4.8 4.5 6.4
6.3 11.2
108
1987
5.4 5.2
8.0 7.8 13.4
13.0
• •
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Table V Real
Average
Wages in Argentina's Manufacturing Sector
1981
1982
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Annual
Average
894
80 1 101 5 1295 107 2
108 1
996 95 7
81
5
Indexes
1980=1 ot
PercentageVanatlon
-106
-104 26 7 276 172
08
7 9 -3 9 -148
Source
tatlstlcal Yearbook For Latm Amenca
and
he Canbbean
1989 Edition Economlc
Commission
for
Latin
Amenca
and
The Canbbean
United NatIons Publication. 1990. p 27
Table VI
The Evolution of Real Wages
(Dec 1983
=
100)
Manufactunng
Public
Administration
t g t ~ Entergnses
Level Percent Level Percent Level
Percent
van atton varlatton
vanatton
1982
73.5
-52 823 254°/0
706
-224
1983
934
270 903 9
947
34 1
1984
1124 204
91
9 1 7
979
34
1985
903
-197
71
1
-226
865
-11.6
1986
922
2 1 67 1 -5 6
929
74
1987
867 -5 9
663 1
3 860
-7 4
1988
745 -125
787 332
900
-04
Source: William C. Smith. Authoritananism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political
conomy
Stanford. Caltfornia: Stanford UniversIty Press, 1989, p. 289.
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•
Table VII : Real Wages,
Inflation
Rate
and
Purchasing Power:
983· 988
Real Av Monthly
Purchasing Annual
Wages* Inflation
Power* Vanatlon of
Purchasmg
Power
( )
1983
934 150
1045
235
1984
112.4
188 123.3
180
1985 90.3
14
1 101 6
-174
1986
92.2
5.1
1090 74
1987
867
88
1004
-79
1988
82.5 14.1 92.8
-7.6
• •
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Table VIII
Membership Trends in the Principal Union Federations: 1960-1986
Orgamzatlon
Sector*
1960
1970
1980 1986*
Confederaclon
de
Empleados Commerce
200 000
171.000 260.000 450.000
de Comer:lo (Retail Workers)
Union Obrera Metalurgica
Industry
125,759
180,000
300,000
280,000
(Metalworkers)
Union of Workers of Educatlon*
Services
n a
n.a
na.
250 000
Union Ferrovlana (Railroad Transport 183 043
168.978 164.200
143.304
'.Norkers)
Asoclaclon Bancaria (Bank
Finance 75,000
77,620
83,000 137.707
Workers)
Union dei Personal Civil de
la
Services
106,041
50 100 75.835 133.188
Naclon (Government Workers)
Union Obrera de
la
Industry 75,000
75,000
250,000 128.507
Construcclon (Construction
Workers)
Asoclacion de Trabajadores dei Servlcas 150,000
70,000 115,000
86.000
Estado (Government Workers)
Union de TrabaJadores
Services
26 500 56 500 64 816 85,481
Gastronomlcos (Food Workers)
Source: David R Decker. he
Political Economie and Labor Climate in Argentina.
Multinational Industnal
Relations Series, No.
4:
Latin American Studies. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 1983,
p
84.
*
The
data for 1986,
the data for the Union of Workers of the Education and the classification of the economic sectors
to whlch each union belongs, have been taken from Graclela Ducatenzeller, Ouverture politique, transition
démocratique et classe ouvnère
en
Argentine. Politique no 12,1987,
p
78
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