The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction among the Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 10)1(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

N.B. The reader will note that Scribd does not support my SGreek Font.

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Being a supplement to my paper Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements of Language (Papers In Poetics 9).

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CONTENTS I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION. II. ON HERMENEIA [INTERPRETATION], PHASIS [WORD], AND SYNCATEGOREMATA OR CONSIGNIFICANTIA [CONSIGNIFYING WORDS]. III. ON THE SIGNIFICATIVE AND CONSIGNIFICATIVE PARTS OF SPEECH

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I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION. 1. The doctrine with respect to the name or noun and the verb. Cf. Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26) (insertions {between curved braces} by B.A.M.):Porphyry,142 for his part, both in his [commentary] To Gedalius and in his [commentary] By Questions and Answers, says that the [25-26] goal ( skopos) of the book is about predicates. These are simple words significant of realities, qua significant, and not qua simple expressions {= lexeis?}. For qua expressions, they have other fields of study, which are dealt with by Theophrastus in his work on the elements of speech, 143 [10,25] as well as by his followers, who wrote [on such topics as] whether nouns and verbs are the [sole] elements of speech, or whether articles, conjunctions, and other such things are also these, too, are parts of vocabulary (lexis {= language}), but the parts of speech ( logos) are nouns and verbs.144142 143

Porphyry fr. 46, 35-6 Smith. en ti Peri tn tou logou stoikhein . Kalbfleisch assumed this was the title of a lost work by Theophrastus (c. 370-288 BC), the student and successor of Aristotle, while other schoolars interpret it as reference to Theophrastus elsewhere attested work Peri lexes (On Expression).... 144 cf. Boethius Introductio in syllogismos categoricos, PL 64, 766A-B; In Perihermeneias2, 14.25ff. Meiser; De syllogismo categorico, PL 64, 796Dff.; cited by G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, Amsterdam and London 1973, 124.

N.B. While Simplicius attributes the doctrine at issue here to Theophrastus...as well as his followers rather than to Aristotle, as we shall see, there is much evidence supporting the view that the Philosopher himself is the source for these distinctions. In particular, a remark by Boethius, shortly to be cited, attributes to the Poetics essentials of this teaching.1 Likewise, passages from Apollonius Dyscolus, Priscian of Caesarea, and Ammonius Hermeias among others support the same conclusion. Cf. ibid., p. 27:Porphyry also adds the remarks of Boethus, which are full of sharp-wittedness ( ankhinoia) and tend in the same direction as what has been said. He too says that with regard to nouns and verbs, the division takes place in so far as the elements of speech ( logos), but [25] according to the categories the division takes place in so far as expressions ( lexeis) have a relation (skhesis) to beings, since they are significant of the latter. This, he says, is the reason why conjunctions (sundesmoi), although they are found within the vocabulary ( lexis), fall outside of the categories. For they do not indicate any being, not substance, nor the qualified, nor anything of the kind. 152 It is thus clear from what has been said that these men do not define [30] the goal (skopos) as being about mere words ( phnai), nor about beings themselves in so far as they are beings, nor about notions (nomata) alone.1

To be sure, he may owe this observation, as well as the doctrine he hands on, to one or more intermediate texts or authors otherwise unknown to us, be it a commentary or doxographical report, but such a provenance does not preclude the possibility that its ultimate source was the Philosophers books About the Poetic Art.

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Instead, because it is a prelude to the study of logic, 153 [the Categories] is about simple words (phnai) and expressions (lexeis); but [it deals with these] qua significant of primary and simple beings, and not in so far as they decline 154 or are transformed in order to accord 155 [with certain words], or undergo such-and-such modifications ( path) and have such-andsuch forms (ideai),156 all of [35] which the domain of the investigation of expressions qua expressions. [12,1]152

B. was apparently replying to the objection that the Cat. is incomplete, because it leaves out conjunctions and thus does not deal with all lexeis; cf. Athenodorus and Cornutus (below, 18,24-19,1); Lucius, below, 64,18-65,3. [N.B. Boethus is at fault here. Conjunctions, like all syncategorematic words, come under the category of toward something or the relative (pros ti) insofar as they indicate the way in which something has itself or stands toward something else. What this early Peripatetic should have said was that conjunctions, although they are found within lexis (= language, not vocabulary), fall outside of logos (= speech) because they do not signify anything by themselves, but only when conjoined to other words, as the authorities shortly to be cited attest. (B.A.M.)] 153 cf. above, 1,4-6; 9,9; cf. Ammon. In Cat. 10,9-10. 154 paraskhmatizontai. 155 suskhmatizontai. Cf., with Ph. Hoffman, Ammon. In De Interp. 65,7-9; Apollonius Dyscolus, On Pronouns, 15,24; On Adverbs, 128,25; 131,3. 156 On grammatical path and ideai, see above, nn. 128, 130.

Cf: Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp. 19-20). One might think there is a problem as to why, when he treated of simple vocal sounds [phonai] at length in the book of the Predicaments he here again undertakes to speak about the name and the verb, each of which is obviously a simple vocal sound. The answer is that a simple vocal sound, a name, a verb, a thing said [ phasis], and a term [horos]50 are the same in subject [toi hupokeimeni] and differ only in relation [ tei skhesei],51 like [an apple considered as] the seed and the fruit, or the ascent and the descent. 52For when we consider that simple vocal sounds are significant [smantikai] of the things [pragmata] to which they have been assigned [tisthesthai], this is all we call them, simple vocal sounds, since we do not in this distinguish names from verbs. But when we have seen some lack of correspondence [diploe] among these, and find that some of them are combined with articles and others are not, or also that some signify a certain time in addition, while others do not, we distinguish them from one another and call those which are combined with articles and do not consignify time names, and those which cannot be combined with articles but are said according to a certain time we call verbs. But when, on the other hand, we do not take each of these kinds of vocal sound by and for itself but rather insofar as it is part of an affirmation and denial, then we call it a thing said [ phasis], as Aristotle will clearly teach us in what follows [cfr. 16b 26]. And when he examines vocal sounds insofar as they are used in a syllogism, we call them terms [ horoi], as will be said in the proem of the Analytics.53 This is also how Plato spoke in the ninth book of the Laws [878b]54.50 51

These represent the four stages of Porphyrys semantic theory.... [remainder omitted] The difference in relation ( skhesis) is a favorite device of Porphyry and later Neoplatonists in general. 52 [footnote omitted] 53 An. Post. 1.1, 24b16. 54 Laws 9.878B.

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Cf. ibid,, pp. 20-22 (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.): [11,1] But why, one might ask, when what the grammarians call the parts of speech [ tou merou logou] are various, does he now teach us only these, the name and the verb? Because, we shall say, these alone, without all the others, can make an assertoric sentence, 1 as when we [5] say man is healthy. Therefore Aristotle conducts his investigation in this only about these, which of necessity are used in every assertoric sentence and suffice to generate the simple assertion. 5656

cf. Boethius II 14.7-30.

Cf. ibid., p. 67:One should not be surprised if we do not call the parts of the names and verbs parts of speech consisting of them, strictly speaking. However, the names and verbs themselves, which effect not only the pronunciation but also the signification ( smasia) of speech through their own combination (sunthesis) and which are the most primitive parts to have semantic force, are rightly said by us to be [20] first parts of speech. Hence, Socrates in the Cratylus also says that the smallest part of speech is the name, 223 by which, of course, he means both the name properly speaking and the verb.223

cf. Cratylus 385C.

N.B. For an additional witness to the provenance of the foregoing teaching in Plato, cf. Plutarch, Quaest Plat. Question X (= Moralia 1009 c):2The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions. (tr. William Watson Goodwin) [Greek Added by B.A.M.] Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C1011 E. (In: Plutarchs Moralia In Seventeen Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C1032 F. With an English Translation by Harold Cherniss. Platonic Questions X, 1009 ff. QUESTION X. Question X a

WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS (1009) 1. What was Platos reason for saying b COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? that speech is a blend of nouns and verbs? (Platos Sophist, p. 262 A.) For he seems to make no other parts of speech but them. But Homer in a playful humor has comprehended them all in one verse:1

For it seems that except for these two Plato dismissed all the parts of speech whereas Homer in his exuberance went so far as to pack all [C] together into a single line, the following:

That is, only these produce statement-making, or enunciative, speech; cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.): And so only enunciative speech in which the true or false is found is called interpretation. Hence, what Blank calls the assertoric sentence I call enunciative speech. On the enunciation in the perspective of the logic of the second act, see further below on the meaning of hermeneia. 2 N.B. I give both translations of this text in full below (the appended notes being by Cherniss), but cf. the remarks of Anneli Luhtala immediately following.

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au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr eu)= ei)d$=j. (Iliad, i. 185.)

Tentward going myself take the guerdon that well you may know it.c

For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and verb, the particlede being put instead of the preposition ei)j; for klisi/nde, TO THE TENT, is said in the same sense as Aqh/naze, TO ATHENS.a

In this there are in fact a pronoun and a participle and noun and verb and preposition and article and conjunction and adverb,d for the suffix ward has here been put in place of the preposition to, the expression tentward being of the same kind as the expression Athensward.e

This question is translated and discussed by J. J. Hartman in De Avindzon des Heidendoms (Leiden, 1910), ii, pp. 22-30 and translated in part by A. von Mrl in Die Grosse Weltordnung (Berlin/Wien/Leipzig, 1948), ii, pp. 85-89; it is commented on in detail by O. G ldi, Plutarchs

sprachliche Interessen (Diss. Zrich, 1922), pp. 2-10.b

Sophist 262 c 2-7; cf. Crat. 425 A 1-5 and 431 B 5-C 1, Theaetetus 206 D 1-5, and [Plato] Epistle vii, 342 B 6-7 and 343 b 4-5; O. Apelt, Platonis Sophista (Lipsiae, 1897), p. 189. and F. M. Cornford, Platos Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp. 307-308.cd

Iliad i, 185.

For these eight parts of speech cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica 11 (9. 23 1-2 [Uhlig]). As the Homeric line containing all of them the grammarians cite Iliad xxii, 59 (Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 58, 13-19 and p. 357, 29-36 [Hilgard]); Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem 1256, 60-61; and there the noun is du/sthnon, for the adjective (noun adjective in older grammars [cf. O.E.D. s.v. noun 3]) was considered to be a kind of noun, o)/noma e)pi/qeton (Dionysius Thrax, op. cit., 12 [p. 33, 1 and pp. 34, 3-35, 2]) with Scholia...., p. 233, 7-33 and p. 553, 11-17....). e Cf. Etym. Magnum 761, 30-32 and 809, 8-9 (Gaisford) and further for mo/rion as prefix or suffix 141, 47-52.

Cf. A. Luhtala, Imposition of Names in Ancient Grammar and Philosophy [In: Stephanos Matthaios, Franco Montanari, Antonios Rengakos (ed.), Ancient Scholarship and Grammar: Archetypes, Concepts and Contexts. Trends in classics supplementary volumes, 8. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2011. pp. 483-484]:3. The Philosophers versus Grammarians Parts of Speech The status of the grammarians eight parts of speech as opposed to the philosophers two parts was discussed in several philosophical and grammatical works, starting with the Middle Platonist Plutarch (46-120 AD). Inspired by the Sophist, he raised the question why Plato should have recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and dismissed all the other parts of speech, if Homer had included them all in a [483-484] single verse (Quaest. Plat. [X] 1009c). He drew a distinction between two kinds of words, (1) those which form significant expressions with one another, and (2) those which signify nothing either by themselves nor (sic) in association with one another. 1 Such are conjunctions, articles and prepositions. He defends the view that only the noun and verbs are parts of speech, because they can signify and form a proposition without the other parts. According to him, the other parts do contribute to speech, but in a different way, just as salt contributes to a dish of food and water to a barley-cake (1010c). 121

Cf. the texts of Boethius cited in sec. 3.

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In accordance with the Sophist, he maintains that the noun and the verb were first invented in order to signify agents and patients as well action and undergoing action (1009d).

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.):Therefore the parts of speech according to the Dialecticians 1 are two, the name [5] and the verb, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or co-signifying words].2

2. The several considerations of speech and the meaning of complete speech. As we have seen, Simplicius distinguishes the consideration of simple words significant of realities, qua significant from their consideration qua simple expressions. Likewise, speech considered as complex has a manifold consideration, as Aristotle makes clear:Yet every instance of speech is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is speech, but is neither true nor false. [5] Let us therefore dismiss all other types of speech but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.3

The consideration of speech that is neither true nor false, then, is proper to rhetoric and poetics, whereas the first is proper to the logician strictly so called. St. Thomas Aquinas lays out these distinctions, together with an additional one, in the following text:Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration. The reason for this is that the consideration of this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the soul of man is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing; and so to this end the demonstrator uses nothing except enunciative speech which signifies things according as truth about them is in the soul. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing but also through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to move their hearers by arousing certain passions in the them as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric (cf. Bk. I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; Bk. III, 1, 1403b 12). And so the consideration of the species of speech mentioned, which pertains to the ordination of the hearer toward something, falls to the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its sense; but to the consideration of the grammarian as regards a fitting construction of the vocal sounds is considered in them.41

As Priscian goes on to cite the Stoics as holding five parts of speech, the Dialecticians cannot include them, contra Philotheus Boehner, Medieval Logic, excerpted below. 2 Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant. These being words which signify only when joined to the others, as will be made clear below. 3 Aristotle, De Int. (On Interpretation) I. 4 (17a 2-7) (tr. E. M. Edgehill; slightly rev. B.A.M.). 4 In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 6. (tr. B.A.M.): sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est. cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed

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We can see, then, that there is also a consideration of speech proper to the grammarian. Now as is clear from elsewhere in St. Thomas commentary, the subject of the grammarians consideration is oratio perfecta, perfect speech, which we call a sentence, being that which completes a thought [perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam], and make[s] perfect sense in the soul of the hearer [ (facit) perfectum sensum in animo audientis] (cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4).1 On this matter, consider the following: Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike (tr. B.A.M.):Speech is a composition of words disclosing a thought. 2

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. ii. 4. 14 (tr. B.A.M.):Speech is a fitting ordering of words, expressing a complete thought. 3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):Then when he says But not in every, etc. he shows that through this definition the enunciation [or statement] differs from the other speeches [= kinds of speech]. And indeed in the case of imperfect speeches it is obvious that they do not signify the true or false since they do not make perfect sense in the soul of the hearer, [and] it is [also] obvious that they do not perfectly express the judgement of reason, in which the true and the false consist. Therefore, with these things having been determined, it must be understood that of perfect speech, which completes a thought, there are five forms [ species], namely, enunciative [= making a statement, signifying the true or false], deprecative [= expressing a prayer], imperative [= issuing a command], interrogative [= asking a question] and vocative [= addressing a person].4

Cf. also Plato, Crat. 431b (tr. Jowett; slightly rev. B.A.M.):Speeches are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns.

Cf. Plato, Sophist 262 A (tr. Benjamin Jowett):etiam per dispositiones audientis. unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis, quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae, ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio. 1 Such speech possessing both a subject and a predicate; a subject being that about which we speak, a predicate that which we say of the subject. See further under sec. II further below.2 3

logo/j e)sti le/cewj sun/qesij dia/noian dhlou=sa.

Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans . Note how Prisicians definition improves on that of Thrax: the whole making up a sentence is more accurately described as an ordering than as a composition. It is further specified as fitting, an attribute of the sentence that is the proper concern of the grammarian; and the thought expressed is described as complete, which serves to distinguish the sentence from the phrase. 4 deinde cum dicit: non autem in omnibus etc., ostendit quod per hanc definitionem enunciatio differt ab aliis orationibus. et quidem de orationibus imperfectis manifestum est quod non significant verum vel falsum, quia cum non faciant perfectum sensum in animo audientis, manifestum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium rationis, in quo consistit verum vel falsum. his igitur praetermissis, sciendum est quod perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam, quinque sunt species, videlicet enunciativa, deprecativa, imperativa, interrogativa et vocativa.

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Str. That which denotes action we call a verb. [262] Theaet. True. Str. And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

Cf. the following, excerpted from an Internet article called The Greeks:Plato (Sophist 262a3ff.) discusses onoma as the deloma, disclosure, of pragma, that which is dealt with, and the rhema as the deloma of praxis, the disclosure of the dealing with. Therefore logos must always be an entwining ( symploke) of onoma and rhema, such that neither a string of nouns alone, nor verbs, can constitute a disclosive sentence.

N.B. I return to this subject below, but before proceeding, it will be helpful to consider two additional texts which handle several of the issues broached above, beginning with the following: Cf. Dexippus, On Aristotle Categories. (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle.) John M. Dillon (tr.) (London: Duckworth, 1990) Book 1, 32,17, p. 66:SELEUCUS: They also raise the question as to why he left out conjunctions. 115 DEXIPPUS: Because, we say, the employment of them is not a primary but a secondary use of language, nor are they complete, but incomplete, nor really parts of discourse ( lektik), but act as symbols (symbolik); nor do they signify primarily [20], but rather in a subsidiary way, even as we are accustomed to use marks of punctuation ( diplai),116 which in combination with the text contribute to the signifying of breaks in the thought, but on their own they mean nothing. So, also, then, conjunctions signify in a subsidiary way, in combination with the other parts of speech, but they in themselves are not significant on their own, but are like glue.1 [25] It is for this reason that we do not class them as elements of speech, but, if anything, as parts of speech. Even if these do signify, they signify only in combination, like, for example, the syllable ba, 2 and we say that the present subject of discussion is words without combination which are significant by themselves, and for the primary uses of language, not the secondary ones.115 116

[footnote omitted] Diplai are really marginal marks, used by grammarians and scribes to indicate such things as a variant reading, a rejected verse, or a change of speaker, but this translation preserves the sense well enough.

Cf. The Reception of Aristotles Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Greek and Latin Language and Literature (Classics) 30 March 2009. Michael J. Griffin, pp. 300-301:The Co-Significant Dexippus 11,11 and the related passage 32,17 ff. are relevant in exploring the attribution of Simplicius 64,18-65,13. Dexippus tackles the (evidently Stoic) argument that the Categories should include conjunctions among other grammatical elements by remarking that the Categories considers only what is significant and conjunctions are co-significant (T2b.2):1 2

On this comparison, see the multitude of witnesses assembled below. The reader would do well to keep in mind this comparison of the syllable with the conjunction as agreeing in being non-significative, as we shall meet it again in excerpts from Boethius and Averroes below.

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If we take an element of speech which is non-significant in itself, such as blityri, or if something is significant by reference to something else, as in the case of so-called pronouns... or if a term is co-signicant () with something else, as is the case with articles and conjunctions ( ), in no way would it be proper to include these among the predicates ( ). [300-301] This term co-signicant () is unusual. In our record, it first occurs in Plotinuss treatment of the categories (6.1.5,14), where voice is divided into the impact on air and the movement, one of which signies as the other co-signies. It recurs later in Dexippus at 32,17, the passage mirroring the text of Simplicius ascribed to Lucius above. At 11,11, under a chapter-heading dedicated to the Stoics, Dexippus mentions the term briefly during his defense against the arguments of Athenodorus presumably an epitome of the arguments of Porphyry in the Ad Gedalium. At 32,17 we are given much more detail about the reason why conjunctions are such co-signifiers they specifically co-signify breaks in thought ( , 32,22), but on their own they mean nothing.1

Doctrinal Summary: According to the foregoing writers, who are either Peripatetics or witnesses to its tradition, in addition to their treatment in the Categories, there were several considerations of these simple parts of speech proper to other sciences; the doctrine of concern to us being that the name and the verb are to be considered the sole parts of speech because these two alone produce complete or enunciative speech. Moreover, according to Priscian, the other sorts of words were known as syncategoreumata or consignificantia, terms the meanings of which we shall have occasion to explore below. Again, as has been noted above, the latter are components of speech which do not signify by themselves, but only in combination with the other parts of speech, that is, only when joined to others, namely, the name and verb, a doctrine to which we next proceed.

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As may be seen by a careful reading of the passage in question, the author has clearly misunderstood Dexippus here: signifying breaks in the thought being proper to diplai, which are merely comparanda, not sundesmoi, the co-signification of which is made perfectly evident by the witnesses we cite next.

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3. The propria of the conjunction and preposition as conjunctive parts of speech. Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis . Liber Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):Wherefore, since among the parts of speech there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call interpretations. 1

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself . But not every vocal sound is interpretation; for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not included under the word interpretation. Neither is every locution interpretation because, as has been said, there are certain utterances which lack signification and, although they do not signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined with the others do signify, like conjunctions. Interpretation, however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signifying by themselves. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good, that whatever is an interpretation, that signifies, and whatever signifies is named by the word interpretation. That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.]. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves. 2 In this book, however, he has established the name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves. And nevertheless it cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound joined from parts which are significative, does not lack signification. Wherefore not of speech alone, but also of the name and the verb, and not of locution alone, but also of significative locution, which is interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and as the name interpretation designates verbs, names, and significative utterances as well, this book is entitled On Interpretation from the common name of the things which are treated in this book; that is, interpretation.31

Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus . Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem., n. 3, excerpted below. 2 Needless to say, no such statement concerning conjunctions is to be found in the text of the Poetics which has come down to us, whereas his preceding remarks, as noted, are witnessed to therein. That is to say, of the three things he asserts about the constitution of the text, the first two are undeniably true. 3 Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est, sunt enim caeterorum animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec omnis locutio interpretatio est, idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per se quaedam non significent, juncta tamen cum aliis significant, ut conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis per se significativis et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut quidquid sit intepretatio, illud significet. Et quidquid significat, interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur . Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit, locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit, quarum syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino significant. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem possunt, per se vero nihil designant . Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et verbum, quae scilicet per seipsa significant. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et ipsa cum vox sit et significativis partibus juncta, significatione non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed etiam de nomine et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa locutione, quae est interpret-tatio, in hoc libro ab Aristotele tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et significativis locut-ionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur, a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est interpretatione, ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus est .

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Doctrinal Summary: According to Boethius, the conjunction and the preposition agree in signifying nothing by themselves, but only when conjoined to the others, namely, the name and the verb; both being parts of language, according to the second text, and so are not be reckoned interpretations, as he understands the term. (Rather, as we have noted above, his contemporary Priscian holds that they are syncategoreumata or consignificantia.) 4. That as parts of language, connectives are like certain kinds of supports or bonds. Cf. Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico. Liber Primus (ed. Migne, PL 64 796C-D; tr. B.A.M.):The name and the verb are reckoned to be the two sole parts, for the rest are not parts of speech but rather supports: for as the bridle or reins of a chariot are not parts, but are in a way certain ligaturesand, as has been said, supports are not even partsso conjunctions and prepositions and other things of this sort are not parts of speech but certain bonds. 1

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., GL II, 551 18. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004) p. 132):Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and the others as having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides [or planks], the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together.2

Cf. Scholion on Dionysius Thrax (Grammatici Graeci I 3, p. 515, 19; tr. B.A.M.):The Peripatetics believed the parts of speech to be two, the name and the verb; but the rest they did not say were parts of speech, but were added for the sake of binding and gluing. . 3

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (In: Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank; slightly rev. B.A.M., pp. 21-22):1

Nomen et uerbum, duae solae partes sunt putandae, caeterae enim non partes sed orationis supplementa sunt: ut enim quadrigarum frena uel lora non partes sed quaedam quodammodo ligaturae sunt et, ut dictum est, supplementa non etiam partes, sic coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non partes orationis sunt sed quaedam colligamenta. For an elaboration of this comparison, see the text of Plutarch below. 2 Quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationem, cetera vero admincula vel iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula et conglutinationes partium navis [hoc est tabularum et trabium], non partes navis dicuntur . A more literal translation of the foregoing Latin reads as follows: Some philosophers were agreed that the name and the verb were the sole parts of speech, but the rest their supports or bindings, in the way in which the parts of a ship are planks and beams, but the rest, for instance, tow (or oakum) and spikes (or nails) and similar bonds and joinings of the parts of a ship [that is, of the planks and beams], are not called parts of the ship.3

oi( Peripathtikoi\ du/o me/rh lo/gou e)do/casan ei)=nai, o)/noma kai\ r(h=ma, ta\ de\ a)/lla ou) le/gousin ei)=nai me/rh lo/gou, a)ll e(/neken sunde/sewj kai\ ko/llhj paralamba/nesqai . [N.B. For

this last sentence, see Gabriel Nuchelmans Theories of the Proposition, excerpted below. (B.A.M.)]

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For just as the planks of a ship are properly [25] speaking its parts, while bolts, sailcloth1 and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, 64 in the same way in the sentence conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts,[2] but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on their own produce a [30] complete speech. So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse].65 And these are useful for the [21-22] specific sorts of composition (sunthesis) and construction (suntaxis)66 of the parts of speech with one another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things bound and glue to things joined by it.67 [35] But these are not parts of the things bound or glued, and neither are conjunctions, articles, prepositions or adverbs particles (moria) of speech.6864

This is a common simile, known already to Apollonius Dyscolus in the early second century as Peripatetic; cf. R. Schneider (ed.) Apolloni Dyscoli Quae Supersunt, Grammatici Graeci II 3 Librorum Apolloni Deperditorum Fragmenta, Leipzig 1910, 31.26ff. = Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam [Sch. Lond.] 515,19ff. Hilgard; Schneider (30) attributes this discussion to Apollonius lost work on the division of the parts of speech ( peri merismou). It was probably used also by Porphyry (Ebbesen, Porphyrys legacy to logic, in Aristotle Transformed, op. cit., 156f.), as it appears here, in Boethius in Int. II 6 Meiser, and elsewhere as well. 65 Poet. 20, 1456b20; cf. below. [Missing from our Poetics. (B.A.M.)] 66 Sunthesis and suntaxis may be used as synonyms; where they are not, however, the former refers to the way letters, syllables and words as sounds are used together, while the latter refers to the combination of the meanings of words to create larger units such as the sentence. 67 For the various bonds and joins used in this paragraph, see Metaph. 8.2, 1042b17f. [N.B. For this and related texts, see further below. (B.A.M.)] 68 The long discussion of this Peripatetic argument in our fragment of Apollonius Dyscolus On Division is concerned solely with the question whether name and verb are the only parts of logos; that all the word-classes together are the parts of lexis is never mentioned. The discussion of Theophrastus On the Elements of the Sentence by Simplicius (in Cat. 10,20-11,2 = fr. 683 Fortenbaugh) makes it clear that Theophrastus did not actually make this distinction, for the words as expression ( lexis) were discussed by him in that work. It seems likely that the Stoics used the term elements of expression ( stoikheia lexes) to refer to the letters and elements of the sentence to refer to the word-classes (Diogenes Laertius 7.56; Galen, On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates 8.3). I believe that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be traced back further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic may have inspired him to interpret Aristotles usage in this way; note that it is with Porphyrys book To Gedalius and By Question and Answer that Simplicius introduces the note which cites Theophrastus. Boethius, who is dependant upon Porphyry, gives a fuller account of the distinction (II 6.15ff.): like Ammonius, he cites Poet. 20 to the effect that the parts of expression (locutio = lexis) are syllables or also conjunctions, neither of which are significant by themselves, while the parts of the interpretation ( interpretatio, one might translate speech) he establishes in this book as name and verb.1

The underlying Greek being linon, flax, one kind of which is tow, either of these two words would have been acceptable translations, whereas sail-cloth, being a composing part and no bond, is impossible. 2 ' , , . [added by B.A.M.]

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He ends with the explanation: hence in this book Aristotle deals not merely with the sentence (oratio), but also with verb and name, nor indeed with mere expression ( locutio), but actually with significant expressions, which is speech (interpretatio).

Cf. Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp 136-137I will now proceed to highlight one more author, who attests to the continuous interest shown in this topic by philosophers of Late Antiquity, namely, Ammonius. The parts of speech are described somewhat similarly as by Priscian and the Scholiasts, as will emerge from the passages quoted below: Now somebody might say: Seeing that there are more parts of speech as the grammarians call them, why does he speak to us of only two, onoma and rhema? Because, we shall say, only these two of them all can form a proposition, for instance: Man thrives. () Now it is worth knowing that of the often-named eight parts of sentence 1 some signify substances (physeis), or persons or doings or sufferings or a combination of them like noun and pronoun and verb and participle, which alone suffice to constitute a proposition like Socrates walks or I walk or The runner walks Socrates is running, the one being used as subject, the other as predicate, whereas the other parts [136-137] of sentence have no such signification: they designate a relation or the predicate to the subject, like most of the adverbs, sc. how the predicate inheres in the subject, or when or where, or how often, either definitely or indefinitely, in what position to another, more or less, or intensely inheres, or how we think something is or is not. () With how the predicate inheres I mean the adverbs of the intermediate kind ( mesotes) and of quality, like: Socrates disputes well, Melanthius kicked Ulysses with the foot. The bees fly in clusters and the adverbs which indicate whether the predicate inheres in those we speak of altogether or not altogether. () Those parts of speech then which signify substances or persons or doings or sufferings or a combination of person and action or passion Aristotle divides them all into onomata and rhemata, calling those with indication of time and used as predicates in propositions rhemata and those without temporal relation and taking the function of subjects onomata, whereas those not used in either of these functions though they belong to the propositions in other ways, denoting inherence or non-inherence or when or why or how often a predicate inheres in a subject, or some other mutual relation, he does not call parts of sentence in the proper sense, for just as the planks are the proper parts of a ship, while nails, flax, and pitch are used for holding together the parts and for the union of the whole, so the conjunctions, articles, prepositions and even the adverbs in a sentence have the function of nails and so they are not rightly called parts of the sentence being not fit to form a complete sentence if joined to one another alone. These then are not parts of sentence (logos), but parts of speech (lexis) () (tr. Arens 1984: 66-67) [= Arens, Hans, 1984. Aristotles Theory of Language and its Tradition. (= Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, III.29). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.]

Cf ibid., p. 133:Schneider edited a discussion on this topic among Apollonius fragments, which are preserved by the Scholiasts.2 The discussion elaborates on the notion of the parts of speech from various viewpoints, and contains many Apollonian themes; yet it cannot be regarded as genuinely Apollonian.1

For sentence one should read speech. Likewise, lexis below should be translated language.

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2

Quare non dubito totam illam egregiam disputationem, quae in scholiis Londinensibus ad Dion. Thr. 515, 19-521, 37 Hilg. servata est, ut desumptam ex Apollonii de merismo libro, transcribere (CG II.3, 31, 23-25).

Cf. ibid., pp. 134-136:The following passage involves elements which are distinctly Peripatetic and cannot therefore be ascribed to Apollonius Dyscolus. It is said that the Peripatetic philosophers recognized two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and claimed that the others are not parts of speech, but are merely used for the sake of binding and gluing. Moreover, just as a boat can be made of a single piece of wood, without glue or binding agent, so a sentence can consist of just a noun and a verb, without words of any other type. But a sentence cannot be formed with no noun or with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there are ships made of one piece of wood only, he argues, similarly there are sentences which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei Soc-rates is walking, Socrates flourishes ( GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural union between the noun and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this is why they do not need binding. Form and matter are concepts pertaining to Peripatetic philosophy. In Apollonius surviving works, Peripatetic philosophy is not used.No doubt even other parts of speech have their own meanings, which are not those of the noun and the verb, and they never bind together verbs with nouns. For when we say ho anthropos peripatei, the article is joined to the noun only, not the verb. Similarly in ho anthropos kalos peritpatei well pertains to the verb only, not the [134-135] noun. And those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and the verb, for nobody says Tryphon and reads. They bind either two nouns or two verbs: Theon and Tryphon, I read and write. For conjunctions combine similar parts by themselves: I, you and Apollonius. If even those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and the verb, it is clear that these parts are not used for the sake of binding, but rather have a meaning of their own, which is not that of binding and gluing. For the article indicates reference, which is expressed neither by the noun nor the verb. And the pronoun indicates reference or anaphora, and neither of these functions pertain to the noun or the verb. Saying baino is not the same as saying katabaino or hyperbaino, for the preposition changes the meaning. Similarly the adverb. When it is said A man is walking or A man is walking well, the meaning changes, for in the latter even quality is expressed by the adverb. Even conjunctions have the effect of changing meaning. The expression I write is complete because it is an assertion, but the expression And I write is a confirmation and is not independent. Neither are grapho men and grapheis de independent. It has thus been proved that the parts of speech are not used for the sake of binding, but for such a meaning as is not contained in the noun and the verb. As for the view that the sentence cannot exist without a noun and a verb, it can be said that some parts of speech are more venerable than others, as is also the case with man. Mans body parts are his hands and feet and brain and heart; he can live without a hand or a leg, but not without the brain and heart, and therefore a complete sentence cannot occur without a noun and a verb ( GG I.3, 516, 28-36). A further problem is inherent in the following argument: If those, that are said to be parts of something, are missing, they cause effects, as is the case with man. When he has lost a leg or a hand, he has suffered something. Given that the sentence has eight or seven or five parts, how can a complete sentence consist of two or three or four parts? Therefore they are not parts of a sentence.

The Scholiast then presents a long digression on the two modes of being deficient ( GG I.3, 517, 4ff.), which will not be quoted. He concludes that this is an argument against the Peripatetics, and it is immediately clear that its orientation is Platonic. Thereafter the Scholiast discusses the ordering of the parts of speech definitely showing Apollonian influences; but this is quite an independent elaboration of the Apollonian argument.

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The noun and the verb are to be placed before the other parts, since they can form an independent clause without the others, e.g. Socrates is reading. It is justified to place them first, as they are nearly the only parts and the others exist for their sake. That which exists for the sake of something else is secondary. The noun holds the primary position because it expresses the substance, and the verb accidents, the substances being prior to accidents. Or because when the noun is refuted, even the verb is refuted. Or the noun is brought along, while the verb brings along; those that are brought along are prior to those bringing along. And because the noun makes (a construction) complete, and the verb is made complete; those that make complete are prior to those that are made complete. [135-136] Since the participle is nothing more than the noun and the verb, it is placed before (the other five parts of speech). The article precedes pronouns since articles are used with nouns and pronouns are used instead of nouns, and that which is used with something precedes that which is used instead of something, and because the pronoun is not only used instead of the noun, but even instead of the article which is attached to the noun. The preposition precedes the adverbs, since the preposition is used with the nouns on its own. The adverbs are joined to verbs in their own right: I write well. Nouns precede verbs; it is therefore appropriate that the preposition which is associated with the noun should precede the verb which is associated with the verb. The conjunction holds the final position, since its function is to bind together the prior mentioned parts of speech (GG I.3, 515, 19-29).

But the Scholiast proceeds to claim that the function of these parts of speech is not to bind the noun and the verb, but each part has a meaning of its own, and they do not bind together nouns and verbs. Thus in The man walks about the article the bears a relationship to the noun, but none whatsoever to the verb. Conversely, in the man walks about beautifully the adverb kals bears a relationship to the verb but none whatever to the noun and so forth ( GG I.3, 515, 35). The second objection is to the argument that only a noun and a verb are needed to form a complete sentence. That is so: but similarly a man, for example, may be without hands or feet but cannot be without a brain or a heart. One does not then say that hands or feet are not parts of a man. Likewise it does not follow that the other elements are not parts of a sentence; merely that the noun and the verb are the pre-eminent parts. 1 Again, it appears unlikely that this discussion is authentically Apollonian, as it explicitly refers to Plato ( GG I.3, 517, 10).

Cf. also Apulieus of Madaura. The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius. sec. IV. [In: David Londey and Carmen Johanson. The Logic of Apuleius (Brill, 1987, p. 85)]:IV. A proposition, as Plato says in the Theaetetus, consists of two very special parts of speech, the noun and the verb,2 e.g. Apuleius argues, which is either true or false, and so is a proposition. From this, some men have thought that these two are the only parts of speech because a complete utterance can be made from these alone that is, because they express a meaning very well.3 Indeed, adverbs, pronouns, participles, conjunctions, and other such things which grammarians list are no more parts of speech than ornamented curved stems are parts of ships or hair of men; or at least they are fit to be classed in the general structure of speech like nails, pitch and glue.41

On this matter, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle): Now, since what is properly called a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the whole, and not that which is a part of a part, some parts should be understood as the parts from which speech is immediately formed, i.e., the name and verb, and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or letters. But neither should their various bindings and joinings be considered parts, properly speaking. 2 More literally, the statement reads, Moreover, as Plato says in the Theatetus, a proposition minimally (paucissimus) consists of a noun [or name] and a verb. See the Latin given below. 3 That is to say, a name composed with a verb sufficiently comprehends a thought. 4 Ceterum propositio, ut ait in Theateto Plato, duabus paucissimus orationis partibus constat, nomine et verbo, ut: Apuleius disserit, quod aut verum aut falsam est et ideo propositio est. Unde quidam rati sunt has duas solas orationis esse partes, quod ex his soli fieri possit perfecta oratio, id est, quod abunde

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):Or it may be said that only the name and the verb are [the] principal parts of speech. For under names are comprehended pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless determine a person, and therefore are put in place of names. But under the verb, the participle, because it consignifies time, although it have an agreement with the name. But the others are more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship [ habitudo] of one thing to another, than parts of speech [themselves], just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this kind are not parts of a ship, but conjunctions of the parts of a ship. 1

On the various bonds and gluings mentioned in the foregoing texts, cf. Ineke Sluiter, Parapleromatic Lucubrations, from footnote 30, p. 242:2The more general usage of and in Aristotle 3 also points in this direction. and are two of the means by which unity is achieved, e.g. Ar. Met. 2, 1042bl6ff. (, , , , ); Met. 1, 1052a24 . Interestingly, these metaphors are picked up and applied to all the lesser parts of speech by Ammonius In Ar. int., CAG IV 5.12.25ff.: ' , , ;4 cf. 13.3ff. Obviously, in none of these cases does the application of the metaphor envisage the parapleromatics.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. VIII. 2 (1042b 15-19) (tr. H. G. Apostle):But many differences appear to exist. For example, some things are spoken of as being combinations of matters, as in the case of things formed by fusion, such as honey-water, others as being bound together, such as a bundle, others as being glued together, such as a book, others as being nailed together, such as a casket, others in more than one of the ways.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. X. 1 (1052a 151052b 2) (tr. H. G. Apostle):[15] That one is used in many senses has been stated previously in our account of the various meanings of terms.1 Although one has many meanings, things which are called one primarily and essentially, but not accidentally, can be summarized under four heads.sententiam comprehendant. Adverbia autem et pronomina et participia et coniunctiones et id genus cetera, quae grammaticii numerant, non magis partes orationis quam navium aplustria et hominum pilos aut certe in universa compage orationis vice clavorum et picis et glutinis deputanda . (excerpt from Apuleius Liber Peri ermeneias) More literally: or at least they are as a whole assigned the role of conjoining [the parts] of speech like nails, pitch, and glue [conjoin the parts of a ship]. 1 vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes. sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones. 2 (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/retrieve/4156/347_017.pdf+parapleromatic&hl=en [11/11/05]) 3 Desmos, bond, fetter; kolla, glue. I give next the passages Sluiter cites from Aristotle. 4 Cf. Ammonius Hermeias supra: For just as the planks of a ship are properly speaking its parts, while bolts, [tow], and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in speech conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts....

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(1) Things are one if they are continuous, either simply 2, or in the [20] highest degree by nature, and not by contact or by being bound together, and of these, those whose motion is more indivisible and more simple are one to a higher degree and are prior. 31 2

1015b161017a6. That is, just continuous, without any restrictions or regardless of the cause. 3 1016a5-17.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIV. 5 (1092a 22-28) (ed. & tr. W. D. Ross):Those who say that existing things come from elements and that the first of existing things are the numbers, should have first distinguished the senses in which one thing comes from another, and then said in which sense number comes from its first principles. By intermixture? But (1) not everything is capable of intermixture, and [25] (2) that which is produced by it is different from its elements, and on this view the one will not remain separate or a distinct entity; but they want it to be so. By juxtaposition, like a syllable? But then (1) the elements must have position; and (2) he who thinks of number will be able to think of the unity and the plurality apart; number then will be thisa unit and plurality, or the one and the unequal.

Doctrinal Summary: Unlike the name and the verb, which, being conjoined, by themselves produce complete speech, conjunctions (along with prepositions, or the conjunctive parts of speech generally) are more like bonds of the parts of speech than parts themselves; the former being like the composing parts of a ship, its planks and beams, etc.; the latter, as with pitch, tow, and nails, their bindings or gluings. One may therefore distinguish the proper parts of speech being those which immediately enter into its constitutionfrom the restconjunctions, prepositions, articles and the like. In sum, just as one could not construct a ship out of pitch and tow and wax, or nails and bolts and the like, so neither can one produce speech out conjunctions, prepositions, articles, or adverbs. 5. An overview of the foregoing witnesses. Cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland: Amsterdam and London, 1973), sec. 6.2.5, pp. 96-97:It is evident that the importance assigned to the noun and the verb as the indispensable ingredients of a self-sufficient utterance that can be true or false has certain consequences for the treatment of the other elements of speech. It seems that the Peripatetics took the most radical attitude and refused to admit other parts of speech ( mer tou logou) than nouns and verbs. In his commentary on the De interpretatione (ed. Busse p. 12, 29) Ammonius says that it would be wrong to call conjunctions, articles, pronouns, and adverbs parts of speech, because no combination of these elements alone can yield a perfect utterance. This is confirmed by the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax (ed. Hilgard p. 515, 19), where we read that the Peripatetics recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb. The other words are not parts of speech but are used only as a means of binding the actual parts together, as a kind of glue. The noun and the verb may be compared to the sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails.

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Others took a less extreme course: they admitted the other kinds of words as parts of speech but drew a borderline between the nouns and verbs, which are necessary components of a complete statement-making utterance, and the rest. Nouns and verbs are the parts of speech in the most proper and genuine sense, being as it were the body and soul of the utterance (Anecdota Graeca, ed. I. Bekker II, p. 881, 2; cf. also Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, ed. Hilgard p. 216, 13). Apollonius Dyscolus ( De adverbiis, ed. Schneider p. 121, 5) says that the noun and the verb are the most important ( thematiktera) parts of speech and that the other parts only serve to make them function in a ready way. Elsewhere ( De syntaxi, ed. Uhlig p. 28, 6) he calls the noun and the verb the most vital ( empsychotata) parts of speech; if the speaker does not make them known, he will cause the hearer to ask questions about them. One of the criteria for drawing a distinction between two groups of parts of speech, then, is the contribution they make to the completeness of an utterance. Another criterion is reminiscent of what Aristotle ( De int. 16 b 20) says about the difference between the copula and other verbs. As we saw in 3.2.2, verbs by themselves do not yet signify something is the case or not, but most of them have a meaning on their own in the sense that the speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses. The copula, on the other hand, is nothing by itself, but it additionally signifies some synthesis, which cannot be thought of without the components. This criterion whether or not the word is accompanied by a thought which is relatively distinct and self-sufficient is also applied by Plutarch ( Platonicae quaestiones 1010a), [96-97] as we already noted in 4.1.4. The verbs beats and is beaten and the nouns Socrates and Pythagoras make us think of something; but if such words as men, gar, peri are pronounced in isolation, they are not associated with any distinct thought or either a pragma or a sma. Unless they are uttered in combination with nouns and verbs, they are like empty noises; by themselves they signify nothing. In the same vein is the remark made by Apollonius Dyscolus (De syntaxi, ed. Uhlig p. 27, 10) that a conjunction does not signify in an independent way, just as binding material is useless if there are no objects which it binds together.1 In De syntaxi (ed. Uhlig p. 13, 1) he draws a parallel between words and sounds. Just as we can distinguish between vowels (which by themselves form a sound) and consonants (which cannot form a sound without a vowel), so we can distinguish between, on the one hand, verbs, nouns, pronouns, and some adverbs (for instance, Very well) and, on the other hand, prepositions, articles, and con-junctions, which are more like consonants in so far as they have no meaning on their own but signify only together with the other parts of speech (syssmainein, a term which is also used of conjunctions in De coniunctionibus, ed. Schneider p. 222, 12).2 As the completeness of an utterance is determined by the completeness of the thought expressed by it, it is not surprising that the two criteria lead to much the same result: nouns and verbs are the essential components of a complete utterance because they contribute those parts of the complete thought which can also be conceived in isolation.

Cf. ibid., sec. 8.1.1, pp. 123-124:Boethius identifies the simple interpretationes with verbs and nouns among which he includes also participles, pronouns, adverbs, and some interjections and contrasts them with conjunctions and prepositions, which by themselves do not signify anything but designnate something only in combination with other words and are, therefore, not interpretati1

Cf. ed. Householder, p. 27, cited above: 28. After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjuncttion, which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect]. Note how this explanation agrees both with what Aristotle says about the copula, as well as with the Peripatetic tradition on conjunctions as being bonds of the parts of speech. (B.A.M.) 2 For this text, and the corresponding passage in Priscian, see below.

19

ones. While the [123-124] grammarians distinguish eight parts of speech ( orationis partes), the philosophers consider the parts of speech only those expressions which have a full signification (quidquid plenam significationem tenet ), namely the verb and the noun, with which participles, adverbs, pronouns, and conventional interjections may be aligned. Conjunctions and prepositions, on the other hand, are not parts of speech for philosophers but merely means of holding the actual parts together, comparable to a chariots reins and strips of leather (In P. herm. (II) p. 14, 28; Intr. 766 A-C; De syll. cat. 796 D). The copula est or non est is said to signify or designate the quality of a statement, just as the words omnis, nullus, and quidam signify the quantity (Intr. 769 A-B). As the signs of quality and of quantity are distinguished from the termini, which are the nouns and the verbs serving as subjects and predicates, their signification must be of the same kind as the signification of conjunctions and prepositions: they signify only in combination with interpretationes. Boethius does not yet have a technical term for all those words which are not interpretationnes. That such a technical term already existed is shown by a remark of his contemporary Priscian (Institutiones grammaticae, ed. Hertz I, p. 54, 5): according to the dialecticians there are only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, since they alone make a combination of words complete even if it consists of nothing else; the other parts they called synkatgoremata, that is, consignificantia. That the dialecticians cannot be the Stoics is clear from the next line, in which Priscian says that according to the Stoics there are five parts of speech. As to the meaning of the Greek term synkatgoremata, it is advisable, I think, to follow Priscians explanation, namely that it literally means things which co-signify. There is good evidence that katgorein was used in the sense of indicating, revealing, signifying, and katgorema in the sense of indication or sign. It is therefore plausible to assume that synkatgorein could be a synonym of such verbs as prossmainein (Cf. 3.2.2)2 and syssmainein (Cf. 6.2.5). It is from this passage in Priscians grammar that the technical terms syncategorema and consignificans, which often occur in medieval writings, originate.[1]2

In his translation of De interpretatione Boethius uses the verb consignificare to render prossmainein.

6. The foregoing doctrine according to Priscian. Cf. Priscian, Inst. gram. GL II 549-551. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 132-133]:Nec solum participium non ab alique propria vi, sed ab affinitate nominis et verbi nominatum est, sed aliae quoque quinque partes orationis non a sua vi, sed ab adiunctione, quam habent ad nomen vel verbum, vocabulum acceperunt: pronomen enim dicitur quod pro nomine ponitur, et adverbium, quod verbo adiungitur, et praepositio, quae tam nomini quam verbo praeponitur, et coniunctio, quae coniungit ea, et interiectio, quae his interiacet. Not only the participle but even the other five parts of speech are named according to their connection with the noun and the verb rather than on account of some property of their own. For the pronoun is so named because it is used instead of a noun, and the adverb because it is joined to the verb; and the preposition, as it is joined to both nouns and verbs; and the conjunction, since it joins these two parts, and the interjection, because it lies between them.

1[]

On the meanings of the terms Nuchelmans considers, see further below.

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Unde est dicendum, quod, si non sit nomen et verbum, nec alia pars orationis constare poterit. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationis, cetera vero admincula vel iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est tabularum et trabium), non partes navis dicuntur. sed est obiciendum ad hoc, quod cera et stuppa non ex eadem constat materia, ex qua tabulae et trabes, coniunctiones autem et praepositiones et similia ex eadem sunt materia, ex qua et nomen et verbum constat, hoc est literis et syllabis et accentibus et intellectu. itaque etiam per se prolatae, quod partes sunt orationis, ostendunt. quid enim est aliud pars orationis nisi vox indicans mentis conceptum, id est cogitationem? quaecumque igitur vox literata profertur significans aliquid, iure pars orationis est dicenda. quod si non essent partes, numquam loco earum nomina ponerentur, cum loco cerae vel stuppae in navi tabula fungi non potest; invenimus enim loco adverbii nomen, ut una, multum, falso, qua, et pronomen similiter: eo, illo, et loco coniunctionis tam nomen quam pronomen: quare, ideo, et adverbium loco nominis, ut mane novum et sponte sua et euge tuum et belle et cras alterum. sed si, quia compaginem videntur praestare nomini et verbo, non sunt partes orationis dicendae, ergo nec partes corporis debemus accipere nervos, quia ligant membra et articulos, quod penitus videtur absurdum. multo melius igitur, qui principales et egregias partes nomen dicunt et verbum, alias autem his nominis et verbi, nihil mirum, cum inueniuntur quaedam nominationes etiam ex abnegatione nascentes, ut neutrum genus, quod nec masculinum est nec femininum, et infinitum verbum, quod personam non habet.

Therefore, it must be said, that without the noun and the verb, no other part would exist. Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and the others as having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together. But to this it must be objected that wax, tow and nails are not made of the same material as the sides, rudder and the sail; but conjunctions and prepositions and their like are made of the same material, as even the noun and the verb, that is of letters, syllables, accents and meaning. Therefore, even when pronounced as such, they prove to be parts of speech. [For what is a part of speech unless a vocal expression which signifies a mental concept, namely a thought? Whatever is expressed by means of a literate vocal form, which signifies something, is a part of speech.] Were they not parts of speech, nouns could not be used instead of them, whereas pitch and tow cannot replace the sides of a ship. For the noun is used instead of the adverb, e.g., una, multum, falso, qua; and so can the pronoun: eo, illo; both the noun and the pronoun can be used instead of the conjunction (quare, ideo), and the adverb instead of the noun, e.g., mane novum and sponte sua and euge tuum and belle et cras alterum. For if they are not to be called parts of speech because they seem to bind the noun and the verb, neither must sinews be regarded as parts of a body, because they join together limbs and joints, what [read which] seems totally absurd. It is therefore much preferable to say that the noun and the verb are the principal and most eminent parts, the others being adjuncts. It is no wonder that the participle should receive its name from the noun and the verb, since even some names derive from a negation, e.g. neuter gender, which is neither masculine nor feminine, and infinite verb, which lacks person.

21

participium est igitur pars orationis, quae pro verbo accipitur, ex quo et derivatur naturaliter, genus et casum habens ad similitudinem nominis et accidentia verbo absque discretione personarum et modorum.

[Therefore the participle is a part of speech which is taken in place of the verb, from which it naturally derives, having gender and case similar to the noun and accidents to the verb without distinction of persons and moods. (tr. B.A.M)]

6. Note on the foregoing. The reader will note that the objections raised against the doctrinal point at issue in the foregoing passage are exceedingly weak and quite easily disposed of. With respect to the first objection, to claim that, inasmuch as they are made of the same stuff, conjunctions and the like are therefore the same kind of thing as the name and the verb is like claiming that a table is the same kind of thing as the chairs surrounding it because they happen to be made of the same kind of wood; it being the form of a thing rather than its matter which gives it its species. As for the second objection, were one so-called part of speech to be used as another, it would no longer taken as that part of speech. Conversely, just as a pair of pliers would not become a hammer if someone were to manage to use them to drive in a nail, so neither would a noun become a conjunction were someone to find a way to use it to conjoin the other parts of speech, supposing such a thing even possible.

22

7. The copulative conjunction according to Averroes. Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae interprete Hermanno Alemanno, textum receptum revisit L. M.-P (ap. Aristoteles Latinus XXXIII, editio altera, De Arte Poetica. Translatio Gullelmi De Moerbeka. Ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello), p. 66. [eng. tr. B.A.M.]:DIXIT. Copulatio est vox composita non significativa separatim, ut est et, deinde, atque, et universaliter dictiones consignificative, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad se invicem; et hec autem in principio sermonis, ut quoniam, quidem; et dictiones conditionales que significant continuationem, ut si, quando et consimiles. DIXIT. Disiunctio vero est etiam vox composita non significativa separatim disiunc-tiva dictionis a dictione, ut aut, vel,* sive, et consimiles; et dictiones exceptive, ut preter, preterquam, et consimiles; et adversative ut sed, verum, verumtamen, et consimiles. Et iste aut ponuntur in principio orationis aut in fine [B 236] aut in medio. Et intendimus hic per sermonem nostrum vox non significativa separatim voces simplices que, quando coniunguntur aliis, consignificant ut dictiones sincathegoreumatice, non voces simplices ut sunt littere; quoniam voces significative separatim composite ex vocibus pluribus aut tribus aut quator aut amplius secundum [L 33] figures compositionum sillibicarum, sunt nomen et verbum. HE SAID. A copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately, as is and, then, and also, and in general consignificative words, which are like bonds of the parts of speech with one another; and these, however, [are placed] at the beginning of speech, such as seeing that, indeed [or now]; and conditional words which signify continuation, such as if, when, and the like. HE SAID. But a disjunctive is also a composite vocal sound not significative separately that disjoins a word from a word, such as either or or, and the like; and exceptive words, such as except, except for, and the like; and adversative [words], such as but, however, but indeed, and the like. And these are placed either at the beginning of speech, or at the end, or in the middle. And by our remark vocal sound not significative separately here we mean simple vocal sounds which when conjoined to others consignify as syncategorematic words, not simple vocal sounds like letters [or elements] , seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately composed from many vocal sounds, whether three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of syllables, are the name and the verb.

* N.B. Minio-Paluello is wrong to treat vel as an example; rather it must be taken formally as joining the other two words in the example, as is the case with the Preminger translation (for which see elsewhere) and the corresponding passage as translated by Butterworth. See my separate discussion.

8. Note on Averroes text. 23

The reader will note here that the text of Averroes explanation requires revision, as it makes no sense as it stands. Taken generally, the sense of his remarks is clear: those simple vocal sounds which do not signify something by themselves are said to consignify as syncategorematic words; such vocal sounds being called simple in a sense different from that of letters. To understand this last observation, it must be borne in mind that the letter or elementum is distinguished from the syllable inasmuch as the former is indivisible, whereas the latter, being composed of two or more letters, is composite. 1 But a similar distinction is made with respect to a vocal sound significative by itself, it being either simple, like black or bird, or composite, like blackbird. 2 Now if we emend the text in the light of these distinctions, we can arrive at the following (intelligible) reading:seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately, < being either simple, or> composed from many vocal sounds, whether three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb.

That is to say, those vocal sounds which are significative separately are the name and the verb, and these are either simple or are composed from many vocal sounds, whether two or three or four or however many, etc. Still, it must be pointed out that, as explained elsewhere, even syncategorematic words, though called simple here, can be composite, as Averroes own (Arabic) examples show.3 But a further emendation regarding the mention of letters in the preceding member is called for by Averroes reference to the composition of the syllables in the present clause, as well as by the role played by the syllable in the definition of speech, as at De Int. I. 4 16b 30.4 In light of these considerations, I read the letters (i.e. elements) . Moreover, as we have seen from our discussion on the forms of name, there is a reason why Aristotle would have drawn a distinction between syllables and conjunctions on the one hand, and the name and the verb on the other, seeing as how the former agree in not signifying something by themselves, whereas the latter do. But then he would have had to have noted the difference between them in this regard, inasmuch as the former, as parts of compound names, signify in a certain respect, whereas the latter only consignifythat is, when conjoined to the others, as our witnesses attest, Averroes statement, however, still appears incomplete, but may be perfected by supplementing it with the relevant parts of other witnesses cited above, as we shall endeavor to show in our separate reconstruction of the definition of the conjunction. 8. Note on the provenance of the foregoing doctrines: As we have seen, with regard to the doctrine under discussion, namely, that the name and the verb were considered to be the two sole parts of speech , David Blank, the translator of Ammonius Hermeias, states:1 2

Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 20 (1456b 22-25; 34-35) And note that this difference of being either simple or composed is addressed by Aristotle in his various accounts of the double name (for which, see elsewhere in this paper). 3 And why is he calling them simple when he has just defined them as composite? 4 And cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.): But because that is properly called a part of some whole which immediately enters into the constitution of the whole, but not the part of a part; therefore, this must be understood about the parts from which speech is immediately constituted, namely, from the name and the verb, but not about the parts of the name or the verb, which are syllables or letters .

24

I believe that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be traced back further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic may have inspired him to interpret Aristotles usage in this way....

Now inasmuch as it is inextricably bound up with other teachings that are undeniably those of the Philosopher himself, one is left to wonder what sort of evidence Blank would require in order to accept Aristotle as its ultimate source. As the reader will have observed, essential components of this complexus are directly attributed to the Poetics by Boethius, Ammonius, and Averroes; the last reporting essentials of the same doctrine in the text of the Poetics he was commenting upon. Those witnesses who do not mention Aristotle, but are in evident agreement with them, such as Apollonius Dyscolus, the Scholiast, and Priscian, it is reasonable to believe must ultimately derive from the same source. 1 Consequently, I see no reason to resort to a work of Porphyry, or of any similar predecessor, whether influenced by the Stoics or otherwise, to account for the provenance of this teaching. Now in light of the fact that our versions of Aristotles book or books About the Poetic Art are incomplete, it is not unreasonable to presume Aristotle and the Poetics to be their fons et origo. Indeed, unless one discover some manifest incompatibility with the Philosophers assured teaching, the most reasonable course is to treat these witnesses as preserving otherwise lost portions of the text. Of course, the reader may agree with this view of things without taking my reconstructions as definitive; but then, as this sort of undertaking could never be more than provisional, I make no such claim on their behalf. 9. Some additional texts supplementing the foregoing. Cf. Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotles Poetics. Translation by Charles E. Butterworth, from the Arabic MSS, p. 11881. He said: the conjunction is a compound sound that has no meaning when taken by itself. In general, they are the letters binding one part of discourse to another....

Cf. The Middle Commentary of Averroes of Cordova on the Poetics of Aristotle. Translated by Alex Preminger, O.B. Hardison, & Kevin Kerrane, p. 373:Aristotle says: A conjunction is a composite sound that does not mean anything by itself, ...and in general words of like meaning that are like the cords tying the parts of the statement together.

Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae [sc. Aristotelis], ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 66 (tr. B.A.M.):HE SAID. A copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately, ...and in general consignificative words, which are like bonds of the parts of speech with one another....2

1

And I know of no route by which Latin authors such as Boethius and Priscian could have reached an Islamic philosopher like Ibn Rushd, for which reason the simplest hypothesis to account for their evident agreement is a common source: but two of these three witnesses explicitly cite the Poetics for their doctrine. 2 Dixit. Copulatio est vox composita non significativa separatim, ut est et, deinde, atque, et universaliter dictiones consignificative, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad se invicem ....

25

Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (= The Syntax or Peri Suntaxes [De Constructione] of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n. 28, p. 28:After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect].

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):For they always consignifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not.1

On the parts of speech in general, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos, init. (ed. Migne, PL 64, 766 A-B; tr. B.A.M.):Restat igitur ut de oratione dicamus sed prius uidetur esse monstrandum utrumne nomen et uerbum sola in partibus orationis ponantur, an ut grammatici uolunt et reliquae orationis partibus debeant aggregari. Grammatici enim considerantes uocum figuras, octo orationis partes annumerant. [766B] Philosophi uero, quorum omnis de nomine uerboque tractatus in significatione est constituta, duas tantum orationis partes esse docuerunt, quidquid plenam significationem tenet, siquidem sine tempore significat, nomen uocantes, uerbum uero si cum tempore: atque ideo aduerbia quidem atque pronomina nominibus iungunt, sine tempore enim quiddam constitutum definitumque significant, nec interest quod flecti casibus nequeunt, non est hoc nominum proprium ut casibus inflectantur. Sunt enim nomina quae a grammaticis *monoptota* nominantur, participium uero quia temporis significationem trahit, etsi casibus effertur, uerbo tamen recte coniungitur. Accordingly it remains for us to speak about speech, but first it seems that whether the noun and the verb alone are [to be] placed among the parts of speech must be shown, or whether, as the grammarians wish, the remaining parts of speech ought to be included. For grammarians, considering the (various) arrangements of words, enumerate eight parts of speech. [766B] But philosophers, all of whom have treated the noun and the verb as being established in signification, have taught that there are only two parts of speech, calling whatever has a complete signification a noun if it signifies without time, but a verb if (it signifies) with time: and so accordingly they join adverbs and pronouns to nouns, for some of them [being so] constituted and defined signify without time, which are not inflected for case; for this is not unique to the noun, that they be inflected for cases. For there are nouns which are named monoptota by grammarians, but the participle because it draws to itself the signification of time, even if it is put forward with cases, is nevertheless rightly conjoined to the verb.

1

eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non . Cp. Boethius remarks just cited to the effect that conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves unless joined to the others; statements manifestly bearing witness to a common tradition of doctrine.

26

Interiectiones autem siquidem, naturaliter significent, nec uerbo, nec nomini copulandae sunt; uerbi enim ac nominis definitiones non habent esse [766C] naturalia sed ad ponentis placitum constituta, atque ideo nec in orationis partibus numerabuntur.

But interjections in fact signify naturally, [and so] are to be coupled neither to the noun nor the verb. For the definitions of the verb and the noun need not be natural but are established at the pleasure of the one imposing the name, and so accordingly they [interjections] are not to be numbered among the parts of speech.1

For more a particular observation relevant to the foregoing, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos (ed. Migne, PL 64, 762 D ff.; tr. B.A.M.):...uelut quod nomen designatiua uox dicitur. Sunt enim uoces quae nihil designant, ut syllabae, nomen uero designatiua uox est, quoniam nomen designat id semper cuius nomen est. Quae uero ipsa, quidem nulla propria significatione nituntur, cum aliis uero iunctae designnant, ut coniunctiones atque praepositiones, illae ne partes quidem orationis esse dicendae sunt; oratio enim ex significatiuis partibus iuncta est. Quocirca recte nomen ac uerbum solae orationis partes esse dicuntur. ...just as a name is called a designative vocal sound. For there are vocal sounds which designate nothing, like syllables, but the name is a designnative vocal sound since a name always designnates that of which it is the name. But those which themselves depend on no signification of their own, but designate when joined to the others, like conjunctions and prepositions, are not in fact to be called parts of speech; for speech is joined from significative parts. For which reason the name and verb are rightly said to be the parts of speech.

Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Secundae Editionis, Liber Primus [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.):Quamquam duae propriae partes orationis esse dicendae sint, nomen scilicet atque uerbum. Haec enim per sese utraque significant, coniunctiones autem uel praepositiones nihil omnino nisi cum aliis iunctae designant.... Therefore two things are to be called the proper parts of speech, namely, the name and the verb. For these two signify by themselves; but conjunctions or prepositions signify nothing at all unless they are joined to the others....

1

If the Latin text is correct, I confess I do not understand the point being made here.

27

10. The Peripatetic tradition on the conjunctive parts of speech in relation to the name and the verb: a compendium of texts.(1) A copulative is a [simple or] composite (2) After all the parts that have been listed we vocal sound not significative separately, 1 as is take the conjunction, which conjoins, and canand, then, and also, not convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, and in general consignificative words, which just as physical bonds are no use if there are no are like bonds of the parts of speech with physical objects [to connect]. (Apollonius Dysone another.... (Averroes) colus) (3) But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but (4) For they always consignifythat is, they signify nothing by themselves. (Boethius) signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not. (Priscian) (5) Therefore two things are to be called the proper parts of speech, namely, the name and the verb. For these two signify by themselves; but conjunctions or prepositions signify nothing at all unless they are joined to the others.... (Boethius)

[cf. Poet. ch 20, where Aristotles definition of the name makes it clear that, unlike the syllables some of them are composed of, as with Theodoron, it signifies by itself]

(6) Therefore the parts of speech according to (7) But why, one might ask, when what the the Dialecticians are two, the name [5] and the grammarians call the parts of speech (tou verb, merou logou) are various, does he now teach us only these, the name and the verb? since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. Because, we shall say, these alone, without all the others, can produce enunciative speech, as when we [5] say man is healthy. (Ammonius Hermeias)

But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or co- [On these technical terms, cf. (9) infra] signifying words]. (Priscian) (8) Wherefore, since among the parts of speech there are certain ones wh