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12/19/2016 1
The Perils of
Technological
Transformation
A Case Study of
the Japanese Attack on
Pearl Harbor
Dr. Alan D. ZimmCDR USN (ret)
Pearl Harbor and the
Perils of Technological Transformation
• What can go wrong:
– Failure to view a new technology holistically
– Failure to accept or adapt to successful technology
– Reliance on faulty technological studies
• The bizarre world of testing
– Distrust of new technology
– Social consequences of new technology
• Authority, decisionmaking, changing power hierarchies
Shea's Law: “The ability to improve a design occurs primarily at the interfaces.
This is also the prime location for screwing it up.”
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A “Brilliant” Attack
• “brilliantly conceived and meticulously planned”
• “The attack was almost textbook perfect." • The plan was “bold and original.”• “The Japanese aerial attack was an unqualified success.”• “The attack plan was brilliant.” • “…like a flashing samurai word [the Japanese at Pearl Harbor] decapitated
the U.S. Fleet.”[4]
• Really?
#
Attack Potential
• 8 Battleships
• 8 Cruisers
• 40 Torpedoes
• 50 800-kg AP Bombs
• 81 250-kg GP Bombs
• 27 Torpedo hits
• 5 - 8 AP bomb hits
• 49 GP bomb hits
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Priority Targets
Expectations
Battleship
Cruiser
AP = Armor Piercing
GP = General Purpose
Weapons
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Attack Potential
• Torpedo hits: 4 to sink BB
2 to sink CA/CL
• AP bomb hits: 43% per bomb hit v. BB
• GP bomb hits: 4 to sink cruiser
• 4 BB, 4 Cruisers inaccessible to torpedoes
• With perfect fire distribution, expected value of attack =
4 BB torpedoed, 2 BB sunk / crippled by bombs, 8 cruisers sunk
14 of 16 targets destroyed or crippled
PLUS 11 torpedo hits & 17 GP bomb hits “overkill”
(1/3rd more hits than needed: 3 BB + 4 cruisers, 21 targets total)
BB = Battleship
CV = Carrier
CA / CL = heavy or light cruiser
AP – Armor Piercing
GP = General Purpose
Expected
Hits:
27
5
49
Hits to Kill
Meager Results
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5 targets sunk
(Killing ordnance
on only 3 targets)
1 (Nevada) sunk due to damage
control error
1 (California) sunk after ship
was abandoned due to burning
oil
Attack achieved
20%of its potential
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Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor:
Japanese Technological Advances
• Mass employment of carriers
– Command and Control and Aircraft Radios
• Aerial Torpedo Warheads
– Defeating BB underwater protection
• Bombsights
– Precision attack dive bombers
– High altitude level bombers
• Armor Piercing (AP) bombs
– Penetration of armor - Testing
– Fuzing and manufacturing
• General Purpose (GP) Bombs
– Fuzing and Manufacturing
• A6M Zero – high performance fighter
Much of the Japanese
poor performance at Pearl
Harbor came from poor
assimilation of new
technology
As
Planned
IP
North
South
SURPRISE:Fighter lead to “seize
control of the air”
Torpedo bombers descend,
head for IP
Dive Bombers orbit, delay
17 November 1941
• Admiral Yamamoto on board Akagi:
• “Although we hope to achieve surprise, everyone should be prepared for terrific American resistance … in this operation we will meet the strongest and most resourceful opponent of all.”
• Japanese preparations and training
were all based on surprise.
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Meeting while at Sea
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CDR Genda
First Air Fleet Air Officer
Lead Planner
CDR Fuchida
Commander of the
first wave
Planner
LCDR Murata
Leader of the torpedo
bombers
Two plans
• One flare: Surprise
– Torpedo bombers lead
– Fighters offensive counter-air
– Dive Bombers wait to hit Ford Island
• Two flares: No Surprise
– Dive Bombers “distract” AA by attacking Ford Island
– Torpedo bombers attack close behind
• Murata Overruled
• Japanese application of bakuryo
– “officers behind the curtains”
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Fuchida’s Tale
• “[Fuchida] fired a single Black Dragon [flare]. Murata saw it and
swung low toward the target. But Lieutenant Masaharu Suginami,
a fighter-group leader, kept his aircraft in cruise position. Thinking
he had missed the first [flare], Fuchida fired another. Then he
groaned – Takahashi, mistaking the second [flare] for the
double signal … swooped in with his dive-bombers. Fuchida
ground his teeth in range. Soon, however, he realized that the error
made no practical difference.”• Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. God’s Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor Page 34.
• “That blockhead Takahashi”
– Killed at the Coral Sea
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Approach to Target
Strategic Bombing Survey Chart
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Decision to use
FLARES to
communicate
Approach to Target
Later Testimony from Veterans
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Dive Bombers
depart first
Torpedo Bombers
depart
Torpedo bombers
loose formation,
extended
intervals,
no fighters,
some get lost
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C2 Issues: Deconfliction
CV Group (16 Kate) briefed profiles
BB Group (24 Kate) briefed profiles
North
Radio to the Rescue?
Japanese Radio Innovation
• 1940 – Capability to install radios in aircraft
• Full fleet installation by late 1941– Installation problems
Captured A6M Zero.
Note position of pilot’s head
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Comparison Cockpits
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USN F4-F “Wildcat” German FW-190 “Shrike”
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Japanese Radio Innovation
• 1940 – Capability to install radios in aircraft
• Full fleet installation by late 1941– Installation problems
Captured A6M Zero.
Note position of pilot’s head
12/19/2016 19
A6M Zero Cockpit Installation
Soryu 8Nagai
Mori
Tadashi
Kimura
Nakajima
Fujiwara
Sato
Kawashima
Hiryu 8Matsumura
Oku
Yanigimoto
Urata
Takahashi
Kasajima
Kadono
Sugimoto
Akagi 12Murata
Murakami
Katsuki
Goto
Ikumoto
Yasue
Negish
Kaido
Hanai
Suzuki
Tateyama
Goto
Kaga 12Kitajima
Yoshikawa
inknown
Sato
Nakagawa
Kitahara
Suzuki
Tanaka
Kumamoto
Iwata
Ohashi
Nagai
Time ~0755 ~0756 ~0757
Attack CV anchorage
Attack CV anchorage
Attack Battleship Row
Attack Battleship Row
= Formation Change
= Attack
Time – Event Plot
Japanese Torpedo Attack
Time
Soryu 8Nagai
Mori
Tadashi
Kimura
Nakajima
Fujiwara
Sato
Kawashima Nagai, Mori
reject Utah
Nakajima,
S6, S7, S8
detach to
attack Utah S3, S4 join
Nakajima
6 attack Utah;
2 hits on Utah
1 Hit Raleigh
Nagai attacks
Helena
Mori aborts
v. HelenaHiryu 8
Matsumura
Oku
Yanigimoto
Urata
Takahashi
Kasajima
Kadono
Sugimoto
Kadono, Sugimoto,
Yanigimoto, Urata,
Takahashi, Kasajima
miss turn, orbit Ewa
Matsumura, Oku
turn south
Kadono sees
Nagai attack,
all turn to
attack HelenaMori attacks
CA mixed w/
Kaga groupMatsumura, Oku
target BBRow
4 attack
Helena
Kadono, Sugimoto
see Mori abort
Akagi 12Murata
Murakami
Katsuki
Goto
Ikumoto
Yasue
Negishi
Kaido
Hanai
Suzuki
Tateyama
Goto
Kaga 12Kitajima
Yoshikawa
inknown
Sato
Nakagawa
Kitahara x
Suzuki x
Tanaka
Kumamoto x
Iwata
Ohashi x
Nagai x
Murata and
Goto’s shotais
keep together
500 meter
intervals
6 A/C strung out
~ 1500-1800
meter intervals
12 Kaga A/C
strung out
~ 1500-1800
meter intervals,
Trail Akagi A/C
by 3 miles
Soryu 8 Hiryu 8Claims
6 BB basket mast
3 BB
2 BB
3 heavy cruiser
Katsuki and Yasue
nearly collide; Yasue
torpedo jettisoned
Target OK and WV
Mori sees
Hanai
attack BB
Row
Mori aborts
v. CA
Matsumora aborts due
to Suzuki propwash
Oku attacks WV
Go around, join
end of Akagi’s
string
Kitahara (jettison,
shot down), Ohashi
shot down, Nagai
(jettison) shot down,
Suzuki blown upKumamoto
blocked by
Mori,
attacks NV
Shot
down
~0755 - 0757~0810
~0809
11 Akagi attack
BBRow
7 Kaga attack
WV, OK
Akagi 12Claims
11 hits on 3 BB
Kaga 12Claims
8 hits on 2 BB
Underway claims reports from Rengo Kantai
~0757
~0759
~0802
Hanai hit, possible go-around
Attack
WV
2 attack OK
As Executed
12/19/2016 22
Japanese Torpedo Attacks#
6
3
5
1
9
12
Technology to Sink a Battleship
Technology: Offense v. Defense
• Torpedo defense:• Outer hull
• Four torpedo bulkheads
• Alternate air- and liquid-filled
voids
• Inner holding bulkhead
• Are Japanese aerial
torpedoes powerful enough?
12/19/2016 23
New Mexico-class cross section
Plate thicknesses in millimeters, 25.4mm = 1 inch
356 = 14” 152 = 6” 63 = 2.5”
51 = 2” 38 = 1.5” 19 = .75”
Tosa Full-Scale Destructive Tests
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Actual Torpedo Damage
• No inner holding bulkheads were
breached
What Went Wrong?• Subscale experimental errors
• Calculated “fudge factors” off
• Assumption regarding voids
12/19/2016 25
Nevada
California
West Virginia
Tosa
Lessons for Historians: Tech Reports cannot always be trusted
Assumptions Drive Results
Technology Advance: Bomb Sights
12/19/2016 26
Course Setting Bomb Sight
(CSBS1 - Japan)
Norden(“Hit a pickle barrel from 30,000 feet”)
Japanese v. US Bomb Sights
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CSBS Norden
Pearl Harbor
49 Bombs:
10-14 hits(4 on collateral targets)
Midway
291 Bombs
0 hits
Technology Advance: Armor Piercing Bomb
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•1940 - No AP bombs
available
•Converted 41cm AP shellsNagato-class BB
•Exceeded max payload
• Shaved off ~ 181 KG
(400#)
•Tested by dropping
against armor plates from
4,000 and 3,000 meters
altitude
Technology Advance: Armor Piercing Bomb
• 10 confirmed hits
• 6 duds, malfunctions, or low-
order detonations – Dreadful!
– 2 Penetrated turret tops at seams
– Several broke up on entry
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Bomb hits armor at seam
Rear of bomb slaps armor plate,
weakened section shatters
73
deg
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•250-kg General Purpose bomb,
0.2 second delay fuze (“carrier killer”)
•Facts:
•Bomb & Hit counts
•Witness reports
•Evaluation:
•high dud / Malfunction rate
•Causality:
•poor manufacturing and testing
•Suggests poor manufacturing and
testing
Technology Advance: General Purpose Bombs +
D3A “Val” Dive Bomber
Facts, Events,
Sequence
Evaluation and
Analysis
Causality
Gap: Weapons-to-Target Matching250-kg GP bomb crater, 0.2-sec fuze, Ford Island Dispensary
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Poor Weapons-to-Target Match550-pound GP bomb crater, 0.2-sec fuze, Wheeler Field
12/19/2016 32
Bomb achieved 6-25% of superquick fuzed weapon
Technology Advance:
Dive Bomber Bombsights, Command and Control
• D3A “Val” dive bomber
12/19/2016 33
Type 96 Sight Sight Picture
Dive Bombing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
12/19/2016 34
60-degree
dive
Sight on top
of mainmast
30-45 second intervals
Following bombers
adjust aimpoint
based on leader’s fall
of bomb3,000
meters
altitude
initiate
dive
Sight Picture
Splash
Adjust
Japanese achieved
60-80% hits during
training
Later, up to 90% under
combat conditions
Poor Performance
• Japanese expected 49 hits
• Hit what was aimed at: 9 hits– 12%
– Only one hit on cruiser
– 6 “collateral damage” hits
• DD Cassin and DD Downes: 3
• DD Shaw: 3
• Not one hit of strategic
importance
• QUESTIONS
– Why so few hits?
– Why did the attack take so long?
12/19/2016 35
Time Magazine Pearl Harbor Photograph
12/19/2016 36
90% Cloud Cover at 3,500 to 5,000 feet
12/19/2016 37
Cloud Cover
12/19/2016 38
Dive Bombing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
12/19/2016 39
60-degree
dive
Sight on top
of mainmast
30-45 second intervals
Following bombers
adjust aimpoint
based on leader’s fall
of bomb
Sight Picture
Splash
Adjust
10,000 meters
altitude
Dive Bombing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
12/19/2016 40
60-degree
dive
Sight on top
of mainmast
30-45 second intervals
Following bombers
adjust aimpoint
based on leader’s fall
of bomb
This technique
doesn’t work with a
1,000 meter cloud
deck!
Sight Picture
Splash
Adjust
10,000 meters
altitude
12/19/2016 41
3 Dale
3 Dobbin
6 Curtiss
8 Shaw
9 Pennsylvania
3 Raleigh
4 Helena
3 California
10 Navy Yard
5 Tangier
2 Helm
1 Solace
1 Aylwin0840 – 0920, 7 Dec 1941
Outside entrance
buoy
Dive Bomber Attacks # Target
Nevada14 Nevada
Dale2 Dale
2 Neosho
1 Pyro
Cruiser targets
Results: far less than Potential
12/19/2016 42
5 targets sunk
Killing ordnance
on only 3 targets
2 by Torpedoes, 1 by AP bomb
1 (Nevada) sunk due to damage
control error
1 (California) sunk after ship was
abandoned due to burning oil
78 Dive bombers
made no substantive
contribution
Attack directly achieved
20% of expectations
15% compared to
capacity
Lessons
Introducing a new technology does not guarantee
proper employment Doesn’t guarantee people will even think about how to best use it
New technology may require (or lead to) new
approaches
Human Proclivities trump technology!
You have to convince them on the deck plate/cockpit
level
12/19/2016 43
12/19/2016 44
Stump the Chump Time
Questions?
Someone in the
audience has the
question that will
prove that the
speaker is a
Bloody
Idiot
Just quit actin’ like a
know-it-all and
answer the dam’
questions, OK?
Good Reads
• Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. At Dawn We Slept– Standard, Comprehensive Account
• Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. Pearl Harbor: the Verdict
of History– Excellent analysis
• Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. God’s Samurai– Biography of Fuchida. Does not include recent research
• Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. The Pearl Harbor Papers– Some dry documents but also first person accounts
• Walter Lord. Day of Infamy– Readable account
• Michael Slackman. Target: Pearl Harbor
• Daniel Madsen. Resurrection: Salvaging the Battle
Fleet at Pearl Harbor
• Mitsuo Fuchida. For that one Day– Memoire – but with exaggerations and limited truthfulness
• Kinoaki Matsuo. How Japan Plans to Win– Japanese intel officer, translation of 1940 book
• Lambert and Polmar: Defenseless– Excellent assessment of US air defenses before the attack
• Ron Werneth. Beyond Pearl Harbor– Accounts from surviving Japanese aviators, many post PH
• Paul Stillwell. Air raid: Pearl Harbor!– Recollections of a day of infamy
• Burl Burlingame. Advance Force Pearl Harbor– Japanese submarine deployment
• Roberta Wohlstetter. Pearl Harbor warning and
Decision– Good information, a bit of a slog to read
• Some Supplemental Reading:
• Akira Yoshimura. Build the Musashi– Full of insights on the Japanese approach to naval warfare,
technology, culture, carriers v. battleships
• Akira Yoshimura. Zero Fighter– New Zeros being towed by water buffalo
• Evans and Peattie: Kaigun: strategy, Tactics, and
Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887 –
1941
• Evans and Peattie. Sunburst: the Rise of Japanese
Naval Air Power, 1909 – 1941.
• John Stephan. Hawaii Under the Rising Sun:
Japan’s Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor.
12/19/2016 45