The performance evaluation of public managers in Portuguese public administration

8/8/2019 The performance evaluation of public managers in Portuguese public administration

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EGPA Annual ConferencePublic Managers under Pressure between Politics,Professionalism and Civil SocietyItaly, September 2006

Should public managers be trusted or evaluated?

The performance evaluation of publicmanagers in Portuguese public

administrationCSAR MADUREIRA1, MIGUEL RODRIGUES2

IntroductionIn public as in private organisations, change and consequently reforms depend on thetransformations of the value systems and reference frameworks of everyone thatworks in them. In the case of Portuguese public administration, where pyramidalhierarchical structures prevail and where decisions and rules are dictated from thetop, the role of managers in the reform process is decisive (Rocha, 2001; Madureira,2004). The debate on methods of evaluation and control of civil servants andmanagers has therefore become more relevant in public administration, in politics, aswell as in civil society.

Western organisational patterns as well as performance evaluation models areextensively influenced by local social, cultural and political history of administration,and the development of administrations is therefore anchored in traditional culturalmatrices. The Portuguese process of administrative reform, as any other, musttherefore be aware of the cultural environment, as its direction, speed andsustainability will depend on it.The reform process must take into account the specific characteristics as well as itmust set attention in foreign experiences and equilibrium between these two aspects isessential to avoid immobility or crystallisation of administrative procedures and behaviours. Because politics, economy and society (and consequently, publicadministration) are dynamic, we have been observing in recent years the emergenceof some novelties concerning performance evaluation in Portuguese publicadministration (Tavares, 2004).

1 PHD in Business Management- Lusada University, Lisbon, Portugal; Researcher at the National Instituteof Administration (Portugal); Professor of Organisational Sociology at Lusada University2 Graduate Degree in Business Management and Organisation, Instituto Superior de Cincias do Trabalho e

da Empresa (ISCTE), Lisbon, Portugal; Researcher and Trainer at the National Institute of Administration(Portugal)


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The creation of the Performance Evaluation Integrated System for PublicAdministration (SIADAP)3 in 2004 has contributed to the systematisation andharmonisation of the Portuguese civil servants performance evaluation system butleaving out top managers. 2005 Legislation seemingly pretends to formalise somecontrol measures in terms of evaluation of top managers in public organisations.However, and despite several developments, some aspects still lead to incongruencesin administration as an organisational and functional whole.

Performance evaluation of civil servants in the Portuguese public

administrationDuring the 1980s and 1990s, the main criticisms made to performance evaluationunderlined an excessive attention given to valuation instruments, an indifference tothe diversity of organisational frameworks and a disregard towards individualmotivations, abilities and relationship (both formal and informal) between evaluatorand evaluated (Murphy & Cleveland, 1991). Therefore, opinions on the validity andimportance of a coherent and integrated evaluation system, as well as on its weight onresults and productivity have diverged, both at the academic and organisationallevels.A report published by OECD (1993) that reviews a considerable number of

approaches and scientific studies on performance evaluation suggests the possibilitythat the yet lacking functionality of performance evaluation systems is possible due tothe fact that the approach is based on false questions (sometimes, scientific paradigmsthat are weakly applicable to the problems felt by managers within the real operationof organisations). One could start with the simple assumption, which may lackscientific sense but is very relevant in practice, that one of the main problems inperformance evaluation would be the fact that it often measures and evaluatesperformances without worrying with the real reasons behind them. In thisperspective, one would be studying consequences without the effective determinationof its causes, analysing results without identifying the genesis. However, literatureproduced over the last two decades has been focusing on the importance of variables

like the nature of inter-personal relations or work environment in the determination ofindividual performance (Mohrman & Lawler, 1983; Murphy & Cleveland, 1991;Caetano, 1999). In this sense, some authors have been developing the study ofparticularities of performance evaluation and management in the context of humanresources strategic management in public administration (OECD, 1996; Pollitt, 2002;De Bruijn, 2002; Tompkins, 2002; Guillaume, Dureau & Silvent, 2002; Poister, 2003;Lecture, 2005; Moynihan, 2005).In what concerns the reality of the Portuguese public sector, in terms of performanceevaluation, although there is a general consensus whereby politicians, publicmanagers and civil society leaders claim for justice, equity and meritocracy, there are

3 March 22nd 2004 Law n10


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very few in these same groups that really accept to risk the existent system anddiscuss the real possibilities of change in organisational culture and behaviouralpatterns in public administration. Such a discussion is absolutely necessary to openway to the implementation of a performance evaluation system that can have effectiveconsequences in the context of administrative reform. Many authors suggest that thefear of loosing privileges or control (which may result from the reorganisation of astructure and its functions), the uncertainty of the future and the loss of competenceshegemony (resulting, for example, of a new technological system that workers do notmaster) often lead workers and managers to resist organisational change (Kanter et al.,1992; Rocha, 2001; Madureira, 2004) and consequently the creation of a system that

tends to evaluate as objectively as possible the performances of everyone. Thisphenomenon of resistance is particularly relevant in the context of an excessively bureaucratised and regulated public administration like the Portuguese, where careerpromotions are still mainly linked to seniority.

In another perspective, one must not forget that like any organisation, publicorganisations are essentially a construct of people and not only its physical structuresor its formal organisational chart. In fact, consistent administrative reform andmodernisation models are always dependent to a large extent on workers, their behaviours and performances (Maddock, 2002). In fact, without diagnosing theperformance of administrative actors and consequently promoting more efficiencyand effectiveness, it will be difficult to successfully implement any administrative

modernisation and reform (Rocha, 2001; Madureira, 2004). De Bruijn (2002) arguesthat if the conditions for bilateral trust and natural interaction between hierarchicallevels are not set, there will be no harmonious performance evaluation ormanagement.Attentive to this long discussed problem in Portuguese public administration, the 15thconstitutional government approved in 2003 the guidelines for the administrativereform in the 2003 Ministers Council Resolution N.95, and put into effect by the 2004Resolution N.53. The reform outlined in these documents, which has not beeninterrupted by following governments, establishes a new idea of performanceevaluation of both public services and public employees, as well as the adoption of anew system of management by objectives as the main matrix for change. It is in thiscontext that the 2004 Law N.10 is published, thus creating the Integrated EvaluationSystem for public administration (SIADAP) and revoking the prior model.Although this new system sets two evaluation levels the individual and theorganisational, only the former has been regulated and put into practice. However,the introduction of this new evaluation model has proven to be quite difficult, as itencountered resistance in both employees and managers, mostly during its first yearof application. Two main differences from its predecessor can explain this resistancetrend. First, it privileges a result-oriented evaluation and second, it limits the highestgrades through a quota system. The comprehension, acceptance and apprehension of


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these novelties imply a cultural change, for which no information or training planinvolving all public workers was prepared4.

Apparently, the new Portuguese administrative paradigm is management byobjectives, which naturally implies the involvement of all the hierarchical structure inthe definition and control of objectives and results, starting with each organisationstop manager. Such an involvement has proven to be scarce and incipient, and thismay have pushed the government to publish the December 29 Ministers CouncilResolution N.199 that unmistakably determines the responsibility of top managers toestablish strategic objectives, which are the base for the objective definition in thesubsequent organisational units. On the other hand, the implementation of

management by objectives implies the existence of specific competences as well as,according to Drucker (2004), a technical and behavioural updating dynamic inmanagers. The fact is that in Portugal, a recent study shows that many publicmanagers disregard questions related to cultural and behavioural change (Madureira,2004).

The conjunction of all these factors no evaluation of organisations; no generalisedinformation/training about the new model; tacit introduction of a new managementmodel; resistance to cultural/behavioural change; and no involvement of topmanagers in defining objectives makes the implementation of SIADAP too complexand difficult, which in reality has resulted in the non-application in many publicorganisations.

Although the creation of a performance evaluation system is of extreme importance toachieve a participated and sustained administrative reform, SIADAP must beregarded as an experimentation instrument, and thus subject to revisions that wouldcorrect failures and deficiencies that still remain.

Performance evaluation of public managers in the Portuguesepublic administrationIn changing environments, public organisations depend greatly on their human andsocial capital and in Portugal as in any other State, the role of managers in a reformprocess in public administration is absolutely essential. However, they often appear asone of the most resistant groups to change, mainly because of the possibility that newoutlines in organisation and management can lead to decreased personal importanceor status and increased accountability for them (Madureira, 2004).Managers that are not a part of the reform do not have place in an administrativemodernisation process (Correia de Campos, 2001). On the contrary, in order for areform or renovation process to be effective, it is important to choose managers on the

4 In 2004, the authors were part of a consulting team that assisted the introduction of the SIADAP system inthe National Housing Institute (INH) in Portugal. During this period, several questions were raised by

employees and managers (some very pertinent, due to the systems ambiguities and imperfections), but theresistance to change was very noted in important hierarchical positions.


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basis of objective criteria, delegating tasks, powers but also responsibilities, andexpecting the fulfilment of concrete and appraisable goals and results. Only then apositive and active participation of managers is made possible in a process of changeand administrative reform.Beyond the political, structural, organisational, technical and procedural changes, theneed to change bureaucratic-administrative mentalities is an important variable inany solution of public administration reform. Trained for decades within a logic ofcentralisation and overvalued rules and procedures, and being inattentive to theneeds and criticisms of the public, public managers promote the previouslyconvened in detriment of the risk of innovation. On the other hand, the Portuguese

experience demonstrates that the proximity to the political power has inhibitingeffects in managers behaviours. The excessively cautious way in which they issueadvice, defend their positions or avoid objective responsibilities are examples of this(Ganho, 1994). This way, all decisions that can have ambiguous non-standard contentare frequently forwarded to their hierarchical superior. In the case of Portugal, thisissue is even more visible when, throughout history, the majority of managingpositions have been under a political appointment regime. This fact strengthens thefears of managers that avoid acting outside the previously determined boundaries,under the implicit threat of loosing privileges.

According to Teixeira da Cruz (1992:18), the Director-General or equivalent5 is thelink between government and public administration. It is a position of political trustand therefore, individual choice is the most appropriate method, independently of thespecific academic training he may have (1992:18). Today, however, differentadministrative science tendencies, from the New Public Management to Governance,tend to consider top managers not only as executers of public policies but also asactive agents of change, having results to achieve (that can be quantified and thereforemeasured) and goals to fulfil (it would be senseless to establish objectives, goals andperformance indicators for civil servants and not for top managers).The fundamental task of a manager is effectiveness. But to evaluate it, it is necessaryto measure managers performance, by establishing plans as well as control anddeviation detection and correction patterns. A recent OECD study (2005) points out

the fact that politicians do not use performance information in decision-making. Thisdata reveals that in general, the real performance of public top managers is not takenin consideration in political decisions. According to Schedler (2004), rarely arepoliticians guided by performance measures or evaluations when taking politicaldecisions.

Nevertheless, one must not forget that the decision to choose a top manager in publicadministration and consequently to evaluate him, can be considered as, more than apolitical decision, a pragmatic decision upon which can depend the globalperformance of a public entity. Moynihan (2005) believes that in order for

5 Director-General is the highest level top manager in central State organisations; in other type of publicorganisations, there are equivalents to that position, e.g., President in a Public Institute.


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administrative reform to transform public administrations into organisations thatactively seek results, it is necessary that performance evaluation becomes part of aparadigm that is reproduced, multiplied and apprehended by the entire organisation.

In Portugal, the implementation of the new Integrated Evaluation System for publicadministration (SIADAP) suggests that an effective evaluation implies the adoption ofa cascading goals approach, from the hierarchy top to the operational base. In fact,notwithstanding any demerits it may have, this new system has the merit of trying to break with a predominantly passive cultural pattern, rehearsing an evaluativeintervention that is progressively more oriented towards meritocracy and not onlyseniority. It is self-evident that its weaknesses are still multiple, but that is not the

centre of our debate. In this present analysis, it is more important to understand: IfPortuguese public managers are evaluated on the basis of the organisations results,why dont these have objectives, goals and performance indicators?One can find different answers of statutory, functional, empiric or scientific origin to justify the differentiation of instruments and methods of evaluating the performanceof top managers (Director-general, sub-director and equivalents)6. Section II of January 15th 2004 Law n2 establishes the Principles of action for managers. Article3 describes the Mission, Article 4 the Principles of General ethics and Article 5 thePrinciples of management. This Article states that managers should promote aresult-oriented management, according to annual objectives. The evaluation of thisresult-oriented management is later partially revisited in Article 14 which states thatmanaging personnel will be evaluated in terms to be defined in proper legislation,with the intent of appraising the performance in their respective responsibility areas.This 2004 Law only perpetuates the non-existence of top managers evaluation.

Only the August 30th 2005 Law n51 presents news in relation the evaluation of topmanagers in Portuguese public administration. Article 14 states that first degree topmanagers [Director-general] are evaluated according to the level of fulfilment ofobjectives established in the mission statement to which refers Article 19-A. Thisarticle, added to the Law reads as follows:

Article 14 Mission Statement

1. When appointed, the competent member of government and the first degree topmanager sign a mission statement, which constitutes a management agreement whereobjectives to be attained over the appointment period are explicitly defined,quantified and scheduled.

2. The mission statement can establish, in terms to be regulated, the attribution ofmanagement awards for services or entities and/or for the manager, according to theprogressive attainment of the defined objectives.

The 2005 Ministers Council Resolution n199 also refers the importance of the missionstatement of the top manager of a public institution, mainly because it should act as

6 In actual Portuguese public administration, intermediate managers (service director and head of division)are evaluated according to SIADAP rules.


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the base element for establishing cascading objectives for the remaining managers aswell as for all workers.

One could say that in legal terms there is a considerable evolution in respect to theevaluation of the highest hierarchical level in public administration. In fact, little sensewould the existence of SIADAP have without a rigorous performance evaluation ofthe highest levels of management. The binding of objectives, goals and evenperformance indicators can only be possible in a scheme of linkage andinterdependency between the performances of the different hierarchical grades.

However, one must not forget that the absence of a sanction factor for top managers,assuming that they eventually may not attain the objectives, emerges as a relativeinjustice factor when looked upon by civil servants which have more adverseevaluation conditions in this matter.

ConclusionPerformance evaluation has undeniably become a key instrument in modernmanagement as well as in the process of administrative reform. However, this centralrole has been put at risk in Portugal by the last three decades of succeeding approachesto the modernisation of public administration. In fact, if different interpretations of thisrole have risen in different times by different governments, the truth is that it hasgrowingly gained importance in modern administration. According to Paige & Wright(1999), the trust factor is at the origin of managers selection in all westerncountries, as it is in the Portuguese case, but in order to gain some transparency andobjectivity, this system must be tied to a rigorous evaluation system.

On the other hand, the introduction of SIADAP to evaluate civil servants constitutesan important novelty, as it symbolises a shift in organisational culture in Portuguesepublic administration. In fact, this is the first attempt to create an evaluation culture inadministrative organisational environment. Although this recently conceivedinstrument has some imprecisions, only its continued improvement will insert thedesired evaluation culture in the administrative reality, thus contributing to the reform.

Finally, it is important to understand how the performance evaluation of top managers

in Portuguese public administration will be made. As demonstrated before, theinvestment in rigorous performance evaluation would have little sense withoutclarifying the ways (or methods) of evaluation of the highest levels of management. Infact, the fulfilment of cascading objectives (as established by SIADAP) can only bepossible in a scheme of linkage and interdependency between performances of allhierarchical levels. In order for SIADAP to function harmoniously, the rights andobligations, the objectives, goals and performance indicators, as well as the realconsequences of success or failure must be specifically expressed. Only then can themoralisation and productivity of public administration be assured in the context of administrative reform.

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The performance evaluation of public managers in Portuguese public administration