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 The Pakistan Aid Dilemma

Historical Efforts at Conditionalityand Current Disputes Converge in the U.S. Congress

Colin Cookman and Bill French

 

December 2011

Introduction

 Aer a year o successive blows o he U.S.-Pakisan relaionship and growing muual

misrus, he prospec o coninued American miliary and economic aid o Pakisan in

he coming scal year is now increasingly conenious. Tis monh Congress is consid-

ering how much money o provide o Pakisan as well as wha kind o srings o atach

or scal year 2012, which began in Ocober bu is now being unded by Congress on

a monh-by-monh basis. Inorming he debae over record-level aid o Pakisan are

dispues beween Washingon and Islamabad over he ransiion and reconciliaion

processes in Aghanisan, he discovery o Osama bin Laden’s presence in Pakisan and

Pakisan’s anger over muliple unilaeral acions on is erriory, and a renewed American

domesic poliical ocus on cuting governmen spending coss a home.

Tis sor o conroversy is by no means new. American aid o Pakisan has gone hrough

a series o peaks and valleys over he pas 30 years as American sraegic prioriies

shied rom nuclear counerprolieraion (beginning in 1979) o cooperaion agains

he Sovie Union (1980 o 1989) o concern over miliary rule (1999 o 2008) o coun-

ererrorism and he conic in Aghanisan (2001 onwards). Along he way a variey 

o laws and amendmens o hose laws have dicaed how Congress and he execuive

 branch deal wih his aid: someimes boosing i, oen cuting i, occasionally ending i

only o kick-sar i again as oreign policy prioriies swily shied in he region.

Tis issue brie oers a hisory o U.S. assisance o Pakisan, wih a paricular ocus on

he legislaion in Congress ha suppored and in some cases orced hese shis o occur.

 As we deail, he provision or resricion o aid isel has hisorically resuled in only 

limied success in aligning U.S. and Pakisani sraegic prioriies over ime. Te inconsis-

en applicaion o condiions on U.S. assisance o Pakisan produced misrus on boh

sides despie he high level o American aid overall over he pas hree decades. Add

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o his U.S. and Pakisani suppor or opposing sides in he Aghanisan conic,which

has raised ensions considerably over he pas wo years, and here now is he increased

chance o a oal breakdown in he relaionship.

Tis breakdown is possible despie coninuing cooperaion on counererrorism and a

muual ineres in preserving he sabiliy and inegriy o he nuclear-armed Pakisani

sae. Amid he laes ensions and he increasing risk o escalaing conic over diver-gen views abou he uure o Aghanisan in Washingon and Islambad, he Unied

Saes mainains an ineres in engagemen wih Pakisan, and mus be careul in consid-

ering how i srucures and enorces new promises o assisance or hreas o a cuo.

Cold War era of cooperation and concern

In April 1979, upon conrmaion by he Cenral Inelligence Agency o he exisence o 

Pakisan’s nuclear enrichmen program, Presiden Jimmy Carer erminaed U.S. economic

and miliary assisance o Pakisan, which a he ime oaled $85 million (approximaely $250 million in curren dollars) and was weighed principally oward economic aid.

Presiden Carer’s move was pursuan o he 1976 Symingon amendmen o he Arms

Expor Conrol Ac (Public Law 90-629, Secion 101), which banned U.S. economic and

miliary assisance o any sae engaging in cerain nuclear-enrichmen aciviies.

Presiden Carer’s suspension o aid was no sricly mandaory. Te law included a

“necessiy o coninued assisance” clause ha allowed he presiden o coninue aid i is

cessaion “would have serious adverse eecs” on U.S. naional securiy and i “reliable

assurances” had been received ha he sae in quesion “will no acquire or develop

nuclear weapons,” or help ohers o do so.

Less han a year laer, aer he Sovie Union’s invasion o Aghanisan brough U.S. and

Pakisani sraegic concerns closer in alignmen, Presiden Carer exercised ha clause.

 A $400 million assisance package (more han $1 billion in curren dollars) was iniially 

oered o Pakisan o help couner Sovie inuence and und Aghan guerrilla orces,

 bu was rejeced by Islamabad as insufcien. Pakisan Presiden Muhammad Zia ul-Haq

characerized he oer as “peanus,” adding ha “Pakisan will no buy is securiy wih

$400 million.” Zia calculaed ha he U.S. ineress a sake were o greaer value, and in

1981 incoming Presiden Ronald Reagan rewarded ha calculaion wih a six-year, $3.2

 billion aid package (approximaely $7.6 billion in curren dollars) spli evenly beween

miliary and economic assisance. By he end o he decade, Pakisan had received over

$5 billion (in curren dollars) o assisance rom he Unied Saes under Presidens

Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

 Ye he surge o aid o Pakisan as i parnered wih he Unied Saes in suppor o he

rebels in Aghanisan did no enirely ameliorae American concerns over Pakisan’s

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ongoing nuclear program. A 1985 amendmen sponsored by Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD)

o he Foreign Assisance Ac (Public Law 87-195, Secion 620) condiioned boh

miliary and economic assisance on an annual presidenial cericaion ha “Pakisan

does no possess a nuclear explosive device” and required ha any proposed assisance

“will reduce signicanly he risk” ha Pakisan will develop a nuclear weapon. Despie

muliple warnings rom U.S. diplomas o he consequences or ongoing aid, Pakisan

coninued wih is weapons programs. In he wake o he 1990 Sovie wihdrawal rom Aghanisan and increasingly clear evidence o coninued Pakisani nuclear weapons

eors, Presiden George H.W. Bush wihheld his cericaion and allowed he Pressler

 ban o engage, eecively erminaing U.S. assisance o Pakisan.

 As a resul $570 million (roughly $900 million in curren dollars) in aid auhorized or

FY 1991 was haled, along wih he delivery o 28 F-16 Falcon gher jes or which

Pakisan had already paid. Tose jes were evenually resold o New Zealand. Pakisan

 would subsequenly be repaid over $460 million or he cos o hose ghers and heir

mainenance in a 1998 deal, bu Pakisani poliical leaders and securiy analyss rou-

inely cie he Pressler amendmen cu-o as a nadir in he “ransacional relaionship” beween he wo counries.

Like many Cold War-era parners Pakisan was able o successully leverage signi-

can assisance rom he Unied Saes in exchange or is help in conaining he Sovie

Union. Neiher side was inclined oward a deeper alignmen o ineress, however, and

U.S. atenion o Aghanisan’s ae quickly evaporaed in he wake o Sovie wihdrawal,

allowing nuclear prolieraion concerns o reasser prominence. Te Unied Saes’s

cuo o aid o Islamabad in he waning days o cooperaion in Aghanisan coninues

o reverberae in Pakisani views o he Unied Saes as an “unreliable ally” unwilling o

accep he legiimacy o Islamabad’s concepion o is securiy needs.

Wrestling with nonproliferation

By he mid-1990s he Whie House under Presiden Bill Clinon was seeking o move

away rom he resricions o he Pressler amendmen. DeenseSecreary William Perry a

he ime described he law as a “blun insrumen” ha made he Pakisanis “mad as hell”

and “undermined he inuence we ormerly had.” Clinon adminisraion ofcials argued

hese poliical coss were being incurred wihou any eecive bene; Pakisan’s concep-

ion o is sraegic prioriies and compeiion wih India mean almos any atemp “o roll

 back heir nuclear programs” hrough coercive aid cus was going o be unsuccessul.

For hese reasons he Clinon adminisraion suppored amendmens wihin he

FY 1996 Foreign Operaions Appropriaions Ac (Public Law 104-107, Secions

559) ha would ease aid consrains. Firs, he language o he Pressler amendmen

 was modied so ha only miliary aid was condiioned on presidenial cericaion,

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hereby liing bans on economic assisance. Second, cerain orms o miliary assis-

ance were allowed o resume, including raining, miliary-educaion programs, and

counernarcoics and counererrorism cooperaion. Also auhorized was a one-ime

delivery o $368 million (approximaely $506 million in curren dollars) in weap-

ons or which Pakisan had paid prior o he imposiion o he Pressler resricions,

alhough he reeze on delivering he 28 F-16s was susained.

Pakisan’s May 1998 nuclear ess reversed suppor in Washingon or any easing o 

resricions on Islamabad. Presiden Clinon condemned he ess (and hose ha India

had conduced during he same ime period) or creaing a “dangerous new insabiliy 

in [he] region.” In doing so Presiden Clinon moved o implemen he se o prohibi-

ions legislaed in he Glenn amendmen o he Arms Expor Conrol Ac (Public Law 

90-629, Secion 102), named aer is sponsor Sen. John Glenn (D-OH). Passed in

1994, prior o he eors o loosen Pressler resricions, he Glenn amendmen man-

daed ha any “non-nuclear weapons sae” ha deonaed a nuclear device be prohib-

ied rom receiving U.S. miliary and economic assisance no o a humaniarian naure.

Consequenly U.S. assisance o boh India and Pakisan was haled. In addiion, U.S.

 banks were prohibied rom providing loans o he wo governmens, and he U.S. gov-

ernmen became obligaed o oppose exending loans o Pakisan and India on he par

o inernaional nancial insiuions such as he World Bank, Inernaional Moneary 

Fund, and Asian Developmen Bank.

 Almos immediaely aer hey were imposed, however, Congress again moved o mod-

erae he resricions in he Glenn amendmen. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) quesioned

 wheher “an unsable Pakisan wih nuclear weapons,” which he eared could be a conse-

quence o he Glenn prohibiions, “is in our ineress.”

Bu a much more dominan concern was ha any damage o he Pakisani economy would

endanger U.S. agriculural expors o Pakisan, which was a he ime he hird-larges

oreign buyer o American whea. Te chairman o he House Agriculural Commitee,

Rober Smih (R-OR), warned, “Pakisan is no a rading parner we can aord o lose.”

By Ocober, Congress passed he India-Pakisan Relie Ac (Public Law 105-277, ile

IX), which gave he presiden he auhoriy o issue a one-year waiver on he resric-

ions and condiions conained in he Pressler, Glenn, and Symingon amendmens. In

November Presiden Clinon parially exercised ha auhoriy  , waiving economic and

nancial resricions, making he aoremenioned repaymen or he bulk o he undeliv-

ered F-16s, and allowing Pakisan access o U.S. agriculural credis, alhough he Unied

Saes remained commited o oppose nonhumaniarian loans o Pakisan rom inerna-

ional nancial insiuions. Prohibiions on miliary assisance were also only parially 

 waved; U.S. raining programs wih he Pakisani miliary resumed while he reeze on

arms sales and oher miliary assisance remained in place.

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 Aer he Pakisani backlash over Pressler, Congress was willing o gran he execuive

 branch greaer leeway over he use or waiver o sancions, bu aid hrough he 1990s

remained a relaively low levels, conned o limied agriculural rade and miliary sales.

Eors o reesablish sraegic ies were urher complicaed by muliple shis in Pakisan

 beween successive governmens led by Benazir Bhuto and Nawaz Shari. Pressler resric-

ions ailed o compel Pakisan o hal he developmen o is nuclear weapons program,

and heir subsequen moderaion proved equally unsuccessul a enicing Pakisan orerain rom engaging in an arms race wih is immediae neighbor and rival, India.

Musharraf’s coup and the 9/11 terrorist attacks

Te miliary coup ha insalled General Pervez Musharra as presiden o Pakisan in

Ocober 1999 resuled in anoher swing in U.S. assisance o Pakisan. Pre-exising pro-

 visions conained wihin Secion 508 o he Foreign Assisance Ac were engaged, which

mandaed ha “none o he unds appropriaed” or oreign assisance “shall be obligaed

or expended o nance direcly” any governmen “deposed by miliary coup or decree.”Te law held ha assisance could resume only when he presiden ceries o Congress

ha a “democraically eleced governmen has aken ofce.”

In he same monh ha Musharra assumed power, Congress passed he FY 2000 Deense

 Appropriaions Ac (Public Law 106-79), ile IX o which gave he presiden auhoriy 

o again waive he Pressler, Glenn, and Symingon prohibiions, his ime permanenly.

 Wihin weeks o imposing Secion 508 sancions agains he miliary regime, Presiden

Clinon exercised ile IX, bu only o permanenly remove he bans on U.S. governmen

agriculural loans and privae commercial loans. (A he same ime, he bulk o he sanc-

ions previously imposed on India or is nuclear ess were lied permanenly.) All oher waivers rom he previous year issued under he India-Pakisan Relie Ac were allowed o

expire, leaving Pakisan sill acing layers o resricions on miliary and economic assis-

ance based on is nuclear aciviies under he Symingon, Pressler, and Glenn amend-

mens, as well as Secion 508 sancions based on Musharra’s miliary coup.

Following he Sepember 11, 2001 atacks on New York Ciy and Washingon D.C.,

U.S. naional securiy prioriies shied once again. Faced wih concered U.S. diplo-

maic pressure, Pakisan opened is airspace and ground lines o supply o U.S. orces

in Aghanisan, and began inelligence cooperaion in he hun or Al Qaeda, alhough

Islamabad ook only limied seps o disavow is ormer aliban proxies. In Sepember

2001 Presiden George W. Bush exercised he ull waiver auhoriy conained in ile

IX, which Presiden Clinon had previously only parially enaced, ciing he “naional

securiy ineress o he Unied Saes.”

 While Secion 508 resricions on direc aid o governmens ha assumed pow-

ers hrough miliary coup sill prohibied miliary and much economic assisance o

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Pakisan, U.S. arms sales, miliary-raining programs, and counererrorism cooperaion

 were auhorized o resume immediaely. Secion 508 resricions were also abandoned

aer Congress passed a new measure (Public Law 107-57) ha graned he presiden

auhoriy o waive Secion 508 “wih respec o Pakisan” hrough Sepember 2003, aer

 which annual congressional approval would be required. Presiden Bush exercised his

 waiver o Secion 508 immediaely, noing Pakisan’s criical paricipaion in eors o

“respond o, deer, or preven” errorism.

Te Pakisan miliary akeover haled nascen eors o resume aid in he wake o earlier

nuclear sancions, bu Musharra’s decision o cooperae in he invasion o Aghanisan

and hun or Al Qaeda helped o remove Pakisan’s pariah saus. By 2004 he counry 

had been awarded “major non-NAO ally saus” by Presiden Bush, joining he ranks

o Ausralia, Japan, Souh Korea, Egyp, and ohers. Even he disclosure o Pakisani

nuclear scienis Abdul Qadeer Khan’s clandesine nuclear prolieraion nework in

2004—ofcially disavowed by he miliary esablishmen—was no me wih signi-

can resricions on aid. Pakisan once again beneed rom “ronline sae” saus in

 American regional inervenion, bu is miliary ’s own ineres in reaining access o mili-an proxy orces or use in boh Aghanisan and India remained eecively unchanged.

Post-9/11 shifts in assistance to Pakistan

In he years since Presiden Bush’s pos-9/11 waivers on aid resricions, U.S. policymak-

ers signicanly increased miliary and nonmiliary assisance o Pakisan. U.S. annual

 bilaeral aid oals rose o more han $4 billion in 2010 rom $798 million in 2002 and

only $5.3 million in 2000 (all gures hisorical dollars). More han wo-hirds (68

percen) o he $20.73 billion in oal assisance appropriaed over he pas eigh scal years has gone o securiy-relaed aid. Pakisan also purchased approximaely $3.3 bil-

lion worh o U.S. arms, equipmen, and raining wih is own unds during his period,

including new F-16 sales, delivery o which began in 2010.

Te bulk ($8.88 billion) o U.S. assisance ook he orm o Coaliion Suppor Funds , or

CSF, a program inauguraed in 2002 ha is inended o reimburse Pakisan or miliary 

operaions conduced agains milian groups along is border. As a orm o reimburse-

men CSF money is no ofcially designaed as oreign assisance, and despie he

addiion o reporing requiremens in subsequen legislaion, Congress usually deers

o he Secreary o Deense in seting sandards or evaluaing Pakisani claims. Tose

sandards have been reporedly been applied wih greaer scruiny in recen years, slow-

ing some o he ow o unds.

In 2009 Congress also esablished he Pakisan Counerinsurgency Fund, a program

on op o exising aid inended o providing raining and equipmen or Pakisani

miliary and paramiliary orces acing insurgens in he counry ’s unruly norhwes.

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Dispues wihin he U.S. governmen over wheher he Deense or Sae Deparmen

 will conrol he money, and wih Pakisan over he presence and role o U.S. rainers,

appears o have limied he amoun o unds acually disbursed. Te expulsion o U.S.

rainers in he wake o his year’s Raymond Davis inciden—when Davis, a Cenral

Inelligence Agency conracor, killed wo armed men in Lahore while in rafc and was

subsequenly released aer a diplomaic uproar—resuled in he emporary suspen-

sion o approximaely $800 million in miliary aid in July 2011, coming primarily romCoaliion Suppor Fund and Pakisani Counerinsurgency Fund accouns.

Upon aking ofce he Obama adminisraion atemped o rebalance is bilaeral aid rela-

ionship beyond an almos-exclusive ocus on miliary assisance hrough he Enhanced

Parnership wih Pakisan Ac o 2009, co-sponsored by Sens. John Kerry (D-MA), Lugar,

and Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA). Te bill auhorized $1.5 billion annually, over ve

 years, or a broad range o nonmiliary iniiaives including agriculure, energy, economic

developmen, waer, educaion, public healh, and expansion o he rule o law.

Te Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislaion requires ha any securiy assisance, includingarms sales, be linked o he secreary o sae’s cericaion ha Pakisan is assising U.S.

eors o “dismanle supplier neworks relaing o he acquisiion o nuclear-weapons

maerials” and “is making signican eors oward combaing erroriss groups.” Te

secreary o sae mus also ceriy ha Pakisani securiy orces are no “maerially and

subsanially” subvering he poliical process o he counry. Economic assisance is

largely ree rom condiions, alhough he Whie House mus provide Congress wih

a sraegy documen on how his aid will be spen (which was submited in December

2009) and ceriy ha any proposed assisance will advance ha sraegy beore unds

are disbursed. Boh economic and securiy condiions may be waived i he secreary o 

sae ceries doing so is in he naional securiy ineres o he Unied Saes.

Despie he relaively ligh resricions placed on his sizable increase in nonmiliary 

assisance, a he ime o ac’s passage he Pakisani miliary esablishmen reaced

sharply agains language i saw as inerering wih is conrol over he counry’s securiy 

policy. In pracice he disbursal o Kerr y-Lugar-Berman money has been slowed by 

debaes over how o prioriize U.S invesmens and how o channel he money, drawing

urher criicism rom Pakisani leaders.

Te pos-2001 parnership reopened he pah or a resh ood U.S. miliary assisance,

subsequenly mached by pledges o civilian assisance. Bu his would prove inca-

pable o papering over deep dierences beween Pakisani miliary leaders and he

Unied Saes over how o srucure a pos-invasion poliical setlemen in Aghanisan.

Memories o pas cuos in relaions, difculies in achieving imely disbursemen o he

promised money, and muual misrus over he ohers’ regional inenions would come

o overshadow boh he nancial commimen made by he Unied Saes and he wo

counries’ ongoing cooperaion agains Al Qaeda, raising prospecs or a uure break.

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Current proposals

ensions are now high beween he Unied Saes and Pakisan over he later’s suppor

or insurgen spoilers in Aghanisan and inconsisen cooperaion on U.S. counerer-

rorism objecives, promping greaer congressional skepicism over he value o con-

inued aid. Mos major legislaion currenly under consideraion does no subsanially 

aler he dollar levels o assisance sough by he Obama adminisraion, bu some o he bills being considered in he House and Senae or scal year 2012 do propose new cer-

icaion requiremens or oher resricions ha could limi he acual levels o miliary 

and nonmiliary aid being disbursed going orward—should he adminisraion choose

no o exercise waivers on hose condiions or make he cericaions demanded.

 All o hese deense and oreign-operaions bills remain works in progress as o his wri-

ing because hey are all ransiing he annual appropriaions and auhorizaion process

in Congress. Bu here is a brie overview o major Pakisan-relaed provisions now 

under consideraion by Congress, as he wo chambers seek o reconcile auhorizaion

language and agree upon he amoun o appropriaions o be spen by he Unied Saeson miliary and nonmiliary assisance o Pakisan his scal year.

Omnibus defense and foreign appropriations

 An omnibus appropriaions bill o und ederal governmen operaions or he remain-

der o scal year 2012 passed he House on December 16 and appears likely o clear

he Senae in shor; i consolidaes previous House and Senae bills on boh deense

and oreign-operaions spending. Te bill oers only $850 million or he Pakisan

Counerinsurgency Capabiliy und, less han he $1.1 billion sough by he adminisra-ion, and $1.69 billion in Coaliion Suppor Funds, less han he adminisraion’s $1.75

 billion reques. Te adminisraion’s reques or economic assisance was me, and may 

oal approximaely $1.36 billion.

Te bill requires economic assisance o Pakisan and mos orms o miliary assisance

(wih he apparen excepion o Coaliion Suppor Funds) o be condiioned on a

cericaion rom he adminisraion ha Pakisan is cooperaing on nuclear nonproli-

eraion; invesigaions ino Osama bin Laden’s presence in Pakisan; eors o couner

he prolieraion o improvised explosive devices; he provision o visas or U.S. visiors

“engaged in counererrorism eors and raining”; and in operaions agains Al Qaeda,

he aliban, he Haqqani nework, and Lashkar-e-aiba, among oher groups.

Tese condiions would add an explici reerence o he Haqqani nework o he exising

cericaion requiremens o he Kerry-Lugar-Berman law and expand he applicaion o 

ha cericaion requiremen o aec economic assisance as well as miliary aid. Earlier

dra appropriaions bills in he House did no oer a waiver o he adminisraion on hese

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cericaion requiremens, which he new version does provide or. Te bill also requires

he developmen o a spending sraegy repor and regular progress updaes on how U.S.

miliary and nonmiliary assisance o Pakisan is being spen, bu does no speciy or he

adminisraion he benchmarks by which he aid should be assessed.

House and Senate defense authorization

 Aer previous dras passed he House in May and he Senae in early December, a

compromise bill released earlier las week by he join congressional conerence com-

mitee included language ha prohibis he release o any more han 40 percen o unds

appropriaed or FY2012 or he Pakisan Counerinsurgency Fund, or PCF, pending a

repor rom he secreary o deense on U.S. sraegy oward Pakisan, how he PCF will

conribue o ha eor, and oulining wha merics will be used o rack Pakisani coop-

eraion. Ta repor also is specically direced o include “a discussion” o Pakisani

cooperaion agains he prolieraion o improvised explosive devices in Aghanisan,

alhough earlier Senae language requiring a cericaion o cooperaion was dropped.

Separaely he Deense Deparmen mus submi a repor on paymens made o Pakisan

hrough he Coaliion Suppor Fund and assess he oucomes o Pakisani operaions

reimbursed under his program. No waiver is included on eiher reporing requiremen.

House foreign relations authorization

 A  bill passed he House Foreign Aairs Commitee in June bu is sill awaiing a ull voe

in he House. I adds an annual cericaion requiremen ha assisance o Pakisan is“making measurable progress” oward he “principle objecives” o he Unied Saes

as oulined in he adminisraion’s Pakisan assisance sraegy repor prepared under

he Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislaion, and requires regular annual submissions o such

repors going orward, among oher reporing requiremens.

Te legislaion adds mos o he cericaion requiremens included in he aoremen-

ioned appropriaions bills, and like hose bills now places hese resricions on eco-

nomic as well as securiy assisance. I explicily srikes he waiver power o he secreary 

o sae on hese condiions as currenly oered under Kerry-Lugar-Berman. No Senae

Foreign Relaions Auhorizaion bill has ye been released.

Conclusion

For he pas decade Congress largely deerred o he execuive branch on aid o Pakisan,

graning i waivers and he power o se is own sandards or cericaion, paricularly in

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regards o miliary aid. Bills inroduced his year in he House would begin o challenge

ha leeway. As he value o Pakisan’s coninued counererrorism cooperaion becomes

overshadowed by American diploma and miliary personnel’s coninuing clashes

 wih milian orces suppored by he Pakisani miliary esablishmen, congressional

paience wih he curren paterns o assisance is markedly alling.

Bu he review o he cycles o aid spikes ollowed by cu-os hroughou he pas30 years o he U.S.-Pakisan relaionship shows ha condiions on he provision o 

assisance have rarely been enorced consisenly or a lengh. Te basic reason or his

signal ailure in U.S.-Pakisani relaions is he inabiliy o he wo counries o esab-

lish an enduring basis o common sraegic purpose. U.S. prioriies have shied rom

nuclear prolieraion o he conainmen o he Sovie Union o he condemnaion o 

miliary rule o counererrorism cooperaion o curren ensions over he oucome o 

he Aghanisan conic. In conras Pakisan is consumed wih is regional rivalry wih

India, a concern or a relaively sable and pliable neighbor in Aghanisan, and is own

inernal poliical and economic crises.

Successive U.S. legislaive eors o make Pakisan hew more closely o U.S. sraegic

prioriies have been complicaed by his basic disconnec in sraegic viewpoins and he

limied leverage aorded by U.S. assisance. Furher, muliple U.S. poliical acors drive

U.S. policy oward Pakisan, and reec in he enduring divisions wihin Congress over

 wheher and how o provide inernaional assisance o he counry. In insances where

Congress has sough o resric he execuive branch’s leeway, he legislaive branch has

oen reversed isel in subsequen years as new securiy prioriies reasser hemselves,

urher complicaing relaions wih Pakisan.

Te poliical consequences o hese repeaed disconnecs in U.S.-Pakisani relaion-ship are real, however, because hey have produced a popular narraive in Pakisan

ha minimizes he value o U.S. conribuions o is economic and miliary develop-

men, suppors he belie ha he Unied Saes is an unreliable ally wih a dieren

inernaional agenda, and views atemps a cooperaion wih suspicion—a view 

 widely mirrored in Washingon as well.

Policymakers in Washingon, however, have o remember ha U.S. aid dollars o

Pakisan serve as only one componen o a larger relaionship. Te Unied Saes is one

o Pakisan’s larges donors or boh miliary and economic assisance, providing large

amouns o aid as an incenive and hreaing is cuo as a disincenive—a sraegy ha

has had only limied success in decisively alering he Pakisani poliical-miliary leader-

ship’s own concepions o heir sraegic environmen. Meanwhile, Pakisan has gone

abou developing is own sraegies or proecing isel in he region, developing nuclear

 weapons and supporing milian proxy groups aimed a neighboring counries o coun-

er he inuence o more powerul rivals.

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11 Center for American Progress | The Pakistan Aid Dilemma

Te curren sraegic course in Aghanisan is no a susainable one, and achieving some

measure o sabiliy here requires negoiaion o a poliical setlemen beween all he

major conic acors. Alhough Pakisan canno guaranee he success o such a process,

is consrucive suppor (or a minimum acquiescence) will be a necessiy. Near-erm

U.S. naional securiy ineress wih Pakisan coninue o suppor engagemen wih

Pakisan, no an escalaion o he curren conic over he Aghanisan endgame. Tere

are serious concerns abou how o spend U.S. aid dollars eecively, bu aid incenivesand disincenives will no subsiue or his more complicaed diplomaic process.

Going orward, Congress and he Obama adminisraion mus be careul when consid-

ering how o srucure new aid erms, as well as promises o assisance or hreas o a

cuo, while sill mainaining a serious level o engagemen wih Islamabad.

Colin Cookman is a Research Associate on the National Security team at the Center for 

 American Progress. Bill French is an intern at the Center.