International Studies Association. ISA Asia-Pacific Confrence

Honk Kong, June, 2016

The Pacific Alliance: Improving trade and cooperation between Latin

America and Asia-Pacific

Juan Pablo Prado Lallande Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. Juanp.prado@correo.buap.mx

Introduction

Since its creation in 2011, the Pacific Alliance (PA) has been one of the most

discussed topics in the area of cooperation and integration processes in Latin

America. The PA, as an exercise in open integration through free trade, together

with a range of cooperation schemes, has the principal aim of encouraging closer

ties between its four member countries, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Based

on these ties, and focusing mainly (although not exclusively) on the Pacific Rim,

these four partners aim to achieve a stronger position on the international stage.

After five years in operation, the Alliance has increased its presence on the

political, economic and academic stages in Latin America and other regions. This

is the result of growing interest from a range of actors in understanding its aims,

actions, challenges and results. In consideration of the above, this article will

analyze the PA’s most noteworthy actions and results over its first five years of

existence The paper also reviews the foreign relations if this integration

mechanism and in this sense the current political links of the PA with Asia Pacific

countries, mainly through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2

General aspects of the Pacific Alliance

On April 28, 2011, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru signed the Presidential

Declaration on the PA. This document expresses the agreement to “advance

progressively toward the objective of achieving the free movement of goods,

services, capital and persons.” To achieve these aims, the Declaration states that

the PA seeks to create an “area of deep integration, through a process of political

and economic articulation, cooperation and integration in Latin America.”1

On June 6, 2012, the Framework Agreement of the PA was signed in

Paranal, Chile. This document instructs the relevant authorities from signatory

countries to advance a range of integration strategies, such as trade, conflict-

resolution, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, academic and cultural

exchanges, migration, and so on.2 Although the Framework Agreement did not

officially take effect until July 20, 2015, following the integration mechanism’s

pragmatic approach, the Alliance began to take shape as of mid-2012, from that

time generating a growing set of collective activities in the spheres listed above.

As part of these unfolding events, on February 10, 2014, during the Eighth

PA Summit in Cartagena de Indias, all four Presidents signed the Additional

Protocol to the Framework Agreement. Its content stipulates the immediate trade

liberalization of 92% of all tariffs, once the Protocol takes effect (expected to

happen in April 2016), with the remaining eight percent following more gradually

over a period of approximately seventeen years. In other words, in keeping with the

exercises of open regionalism, and based on other free trade agreements signed

1 The Pacific Alliance, Lima Declaration, April 28, 2011.

2 Pacific Alliance, Paranal Declaration, June 6, 2012.

3

previously between them, the members of the PA aim to homogenize, boost and

deepen said agreements by way of a single set of regulations.

Consistent with the rhetoric of new regionalism, the institutional scaffolding

of the Alliance is minimalist in nature, tending toward pragmatic facilitation of

interactions between members in trade and cooperation settings. Following the

lead of the presidential summits (organized around a pro tempore President who

serves a term of one year), the Council of Foreign and Trade/Economic Ministers

forms the main authority on the integration process. At the same time, the High

Level Group (made up of Vice Ministers for the same portfolios) is responsible for

orchestrating integration and collaboration activities.

In all these cases, as explained elsewhere in greater detail,3 to date the Alliance

has not provided for any kind of permanent, autonomous agency, let alone a

supra-national one, to govern decisions and actions. Instead, the work of the

Alliance has been carried out through intergovernmental structures, driven by

consensus between the respective authorities of each country, regardless of their

political/administrative level.

Trade in the PA: steps toward greater integration?

Trade is the main focus of the PA’s actions, seeking to create deep integration

between participants and, in doing so, strengthen ties to other countries and

regions. As set out in the PA’s Additional Protocol, trade and other exercises in

cooperation are carried out as a means to “improve the well-being and living

3 Juan Pablo Prado Lallande, “La Alianza del Pacífico: integración vía comercio y cooperación Sur-

Sur”, in B. Ayllón, T. Ojeda and J. Surasky (eds.), op. cit. pp.146-162.

4

standards of inhabitants and promote sustainable development in their respective

territories”.4 Based on the latter, and leaving aside the issue of whether it is even

possible to promote sustainable development using free trade, it becomes

necessary to analyze trade transactions within and outside the PA over recent

years, in order to review the Alliance’s evolution and current status in this respect.

At the outset of such an analysis, it must be pointed out that while the PA

represents close to fifty percent of total goods exports from Latin America and the

Caribbean,5 Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have recorded low rates of trade

with other members, which average three percent of the total. As noted by

Rosales, Herreros and Durán, this situation cannot be explained by the presence

of high barriers to trade between partners (bearing in mind that close to ninety

percent of all trade between Member States is already tariff-free due to already-

binding free trade agreements). Rather, it is a result of the fact that Alliance

members are not natural trading partners, meaning that the bulk of their trade is

aimed at countries beyond the PA’s space, as shown in Table 2, Graphs 1, 3 and,

for Mexico, 4.6 Therefore, it is of note that trade between PA members in 2010, as

a percentage of the total, was 3.77% (in other words, 96.23% of trade by all four

countries was with countries outside this cooperation and integration mechanism);

in 2011, it was 4.17%; in 2012, 3.96%; in 2013, 3.59%, and in 2014, 3.47%.

4 Pacific Alliance, Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance,

Preamble. 5 Pacific Alliance, Abecé. Alianza del Pacífico, 2015, p. 6, at

https://alianzapacifico.net/?wpdmdl=4441 (retrieved: February 16, 2016). 6 Osvaldo Rosales Villavicencio, Sebastián Herreros Ugarte and José Durán Lima, “La Alianza del

Pacífico: comercio, inversión y desafíos a futuro”, in A. Roldán Pérez (ed.), op. cit. 2015, p. 68.

5

This is relevant because, while the Additional Protocol (which aims to increase

trade between signatories) has not yet come into effect (although this is expected

to happen soon), the percentage of trade within the PA (the sum of imports plus

exports) from the year 2010 (prior to the Alliance) to 2014 showed an upward

variation that can be considered significant, of around 20.11%.7 In other words,

although the percentage of trade between PA members comprises only a small

part of total trade (taking global trade as a reference, excluding the Alliance), the

last five years have seen an increase in trade from 16,012,256 million US dollars

(USD) in 2010 to 19,258,955 million in 2014.

However, despite the increase, the main characteristic of trade between

members of the Alliance is its low proportion of total trade and trade with Latin

America and the Caribbean, as shown in the following graph, which considers

exports from 2010 to 2014.

Graph 1. Exports from PA members to other members, to Latin America and

the Caribbean and to the rest of the world, 2010–2014 (in billions of US dollars)

7 Accordingly, the 20% increase in gross terms is explained by the fact that over the same period of

time, trade by members of the Alliance grew from 843,475 million US dollars (USD) in 2010 to 1,104,930 million in 2014; in other words, it increased by 31%. This suggests that from 2010 to 2014 the increase in trade between PA members was less than the growth in total foreign trade by all four.

6

Source: Created by the author, based on: Central Bank of Chile, “Balanza comercial por países, anual”, Santiago, 2015; Bank of Mexico, “Exportación total por países (incluye maquila)”, Mexico. 2015; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Interactive Graphic System of International Economics Trends”, Santiago, 2015; National Administrative Department of Statistics, “Colombia, principales destinos de las exportaciones, 2008p - 2015p (noviembre)”, Bogotá, 2015; National Superintendent for Customs and Tax Administration, “Cuadro N° 27: Ranking 150 países destino 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 y 2014”, Lima; UN, UN Comtrade Database, Geneva, Switzerland, 2015.

Of course, trade within the PA certainly drives the majority of interactions between

the four partner countries, which vary depending on the benchmark and the

partners involved, as well as the year in question. Graph 2 offers a clearer

understanding of fluctuations in trading ties between the Alliance’s members, as it

shows the variations in trade flows in terms of imports and exports between

Member States from 2010 to 2014.

Graph 2. Exports and imports between members

of the PA, 2010-2014 (millions of USD)

16,012 21,380 21,403 19,390 19,258

45,147 56,005 57,938 58,552 54,170

383,942

456,785 475,709 479,941 492,629

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Billions

of

USD

Year

Exp. AP Exp. ALyC Exp. Resto del mundoPA Exp. LA + C Exp. Rest of Wld Exp.

7

Source: Created by the author, based on: Central Bank of Chile, “Balanza comercial por países, anual”, Santiago, 2015; Bank of Mexico, “Exportación total por países (incluye maquila)”, Mexico. 2015; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Interactive Graphic System of International Economics Trends”, Santiago, 2015; National Administrative Department of Statistics, “Colombia, principales destinos de las exportaciones, 2008p - 2015p (noviembre)”, Bogotá, 2015; Ministry of the Economy, “Importaciones de la Alianza del Pacífico”, Mexico; National Superintendent for Customs and Tax Administration, “Cuadro N° 27: Ranking 150 países destino 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 y 2014”, Lima.

The 60% of the Alliance’s GDP is provided by Mexico, the country which, while

being the least integrated of the four as shown on Graph 3, appears ironically to be

the only country with a trade surplus among alliance members.8 The results shown

here, and then connected to trade outside the PA, are relevant given that “the more

successful the creation of an integrated economic space between its members, the

more the PA will be validated as an actor in dialogues between the main Asian

economies and integration mechanisms.”9

Inversely proportionate to total trade within the PA, transactions outside the

PA assume the larger sum of trade, in the order of 96.53% of the total in 2014. This

8 While Venezuela is the driving force behind the Alba (75% of the bloc’s GDP) and Brazil the

mainstay of Mercosur (80% of GDP), at the heart of the PA it is Mexico that replicates this dominant role, although certainly to a lesser extent than Venezuela and Brazil in their respective blocs. See Bruno Hendler, “A Aliança do Pacífico e os rumos da América Latina: desafios de integração, relações especiais com os Estados Unidos e aproximação com a Ásia,” in Mundorama. Revista de Divulgacao Científica em Relacoes Internacionais, Issue. 70, June 2013, p. 33. 9 O. Rosales Villavicencio and A. Roldán Pérez, “Introducción”, in A. Roldán Pérez (ed.), Loc. cit., p.

24.

Imports/USD Exports/USD

Year

8

is consistent with previous studies,10 which point out that the PA’s main partners

are the United States, China and the European Union,11 and even Mercosur.12

Graph 3 gives an indication of the proportion of exports and imports by the four

members of the Alliance among themselves, with Latin America and the Caribbean

and with the rest of the world, from 2010 to 2014.

Graph 3. Exports and imports per PA country with other PA countries,

with Latin America and the Caribbean and with the rest of the world, 2010-

2014 (millions of USD)

Source: Created by the author, based on: Central Bank of Chile, “Balanza comercial por países, anual”, Santiago, 2015; Bank of Mexico, “Exportación total por países (incluye maquila)”, Mexico. 2015; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Interactive Graphic System of International Economics Trends”, Santiago, 2015; National Administrative Department of Statistics, “Colombia, principales destinos de las exportaciones, 2008p - 2015p (noviembre)”, Bogotá, 2015; Ministry of the Economy, “Importaciones de la Alianza del Pacífico”, Mexico; National

10

Each of the countries in the Alliance is party to separate trade agreements with Washington DC and the European Union. 11

Adrián Blanco Estévez, “La Alianza del Pacífico: Un largo camino por recorrer hacia la integración”, in Woodrow Wilson Center, Latin American Program, January 2015, p. 4, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/La_Alianza_del_Pacifico_Blanco_0.pdf (retrieved: February 16, 2016). 12

As corroborated by Blanco, who points out that both Mexico and Chile are more integrated with the Mercosur that the PA, especially due to economic relations with Brazil. See ibid., p. 7.

Exp. Rest of world Exp. LA & C Exp. PA Imp. Rest of world Imp. LA & C Imp. PA

bill

ion

s o

f U

SD

Countries/years

9

Superintendent for Customs and Tax Administration, “Cuadro N° 27: Ranking 150 países destino 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 y 2014”, Lima; United Nations, “UN Comtrade Database”, Geneva, 2015.

Finally, with regard to the Mexican situation, all that remains is to reiterate that its

close trade relationship with the United States leads it to show a lower rate of

integration with its other three associates, given that 98.5% of its foreign trade

takes place with non-PA countries.

Foreign Relations by the Pacific Alliance

In its role as a mechanism of international cooperation and integration, one of the

PA’s most important, challenging and least-studied aspects13 is its approach to

Foreign Relations. On this subject, Article 9 of the Framework Agreement

(“Relations with Third Parties”) indicates that the Alliance will “promote initiatives

and guidelines for action on issues of regional or international interest, seeking to

consolidate mechanisms for building ties with States and international

organizations.” On what factors does the Alliance’s foreign policy depend? What

actions in this area are most noteworthy, where are they aimed and what issues do

they address?

The PA’s foreign policy, meaning its position as a group in response to

international third parties, depends firstly on the capacity for political coordination

among its members in this sphere. This coordination comes to fruition in the

implementation of a variety of practices with different aims and degrees of

relevance, ranging from the celebration of approximately one hundred joint trade

13

Recommended reading on this subject is “IV. La Alianza del Pacífico frente al globo”, in Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Hubert Gehring (eds.), Alianza del Pacífico: mitos y realidades, Bogotá, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung/Universidad Santiago de Cali, 2014, pp. 381-538.

10

and cultural fairs in 30 countries, to internal agreements with a broader scope,

such as joint diplomatic missions and trade representation (see Table 6), which

has been an unqualified success for all four foreign ministries.

Table 6. Joint diplomatic missions among PA members

Type of mission Country Participants Site owner Date of

operation

Embassy Ghana Chile, Colombia,

Mexico and Peru

Colombia November 2013

Embassy Singapore Mexico and

Colombia

Mexico Second half of

2014

Embassy Azerbaijan Colombia and

Mexico

Colombia Second half of

2014

Representation to

OECD

France Chile and

Colombia

Chile April 2014

Trade

representation

Turkey Chile, Colombia,

Mexico and Peru

Colombia September 2013

,

Trade

representation

Morocco Chile, Colombia,

Mexico and Peru

Mexico Second half of

2014

Source: Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “La Alianza del Pacífico”, Mexico, SRE, 2014, p. 10.

In the Preamble to the Framework Agreement, signatories express their “desire to

build the Pacific Alliance as a space for dialog and convergence, as well as a

mechanism for political dialog and projection toward the Asia-Pacific region.” This

makes the Alliance “the only Latin American integration mechanism (apart from its

predecessor, the Pacific Arc Forum) that explicitly includes reinforcing ties with

another region (the Asia-Pacific) among its objectives.”14

In light of this, and given that the Alliance’s legal statutes show that the

economic and trade spheres constitute its main priority, with the Asia-Pacific region

being its main geographical focus abroad, active promotion of trading ties with the

14

O. Rosales Villavicencio, S. Herreros Ugarte and J. Durán Lima, op. cit., p. 98-99.

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latter region is to be expected. As such, in 2014 and 2015, within the framework of

the United Nations General Assembly in New York, a series of ministerial meetings

were held between the PA and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN).15 The aim was to establish mechanisms to identify topics and strategies

intended to strengthen relations between both blocs.

While no PA members have so far given any indications – at least official

ones – of interest in negotiating joint trade agreements with Asian partners (or from

other regions),16 in October of 2015, during an academic conference, the

government of Thailand, through its Director General for the Americas and the

South Pacific from the country’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Songsak Saicheua,

showed itself to be favorable to the negotiation of a free trade agreement between

the PA and ASEAN in the future, which would be built on a market of around 900

million people.17 However, it is also true that, due to conditions of geography,

history, politics, culture and trade, the PA’s approach to foreign affairs is aimed

primarily at the United States,18 the EU and other Western powers.

The 2014 collaboration agreement between the PA and the Organisation for

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to promote better integration

15

ASEAN was created in 1967 and is made up of Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. 16

Ibid., p. 97. 17

“Tailandia apoya un TLC de la ASEAN y la Alianza del Pacífico latinoamericana”, La Vanguardia (Madrid), October 19, 2015. 18

The close relationship between Washington and the countries in the Alliance is built on common ground concerning their model of development: “there is visible commonality between them and the countries of the North, in the sense that all of them believe in neoliberal open-market models, where topics of trade and investment are the central focus.” Óscar Simmonds Pachón and Paula González Mateus, “El papel de Estados Unidos frente a la Alianza del Pacífico”, in E. Pastrana Buelvas and H. Gehring (eds.), op. cit., p. 531.

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and competitiveness in small and medium business, the “International Diaspora

Engagement Alliance” (IDEA) signed with the United States, begun in 2015 and

aimed at promoting youth entrepreneurship, and the United Kingdom’s Chevening

Scholarships, aimed at assisting PA students in studying at the best British

universities from 2015 on, could be seen as indications of members’ predisposition

to building ties with powers belonging to the global North, over those situated in the

South and East.

Following the rise of Michel Bachelet to the Presidency of Chile in December

2013, the country proposed to promote systems for convergence between the PA

and Mercosur. These efforts, reflected in two ministerial meetings between both

blocs, can largely be explained by Chile’s interest in practicing a kind of foreign

policy that distinguishes itself in some way from its predecessor, and,

understandably, in improving relations with Argentina and Brazil.19

With regard to common statements by the Alliance on issues of relevance to

the international agenda, which could be said to identify the degree of cohesion or

the capacity for political coordination between members in response to such

issues, the PA has released only two. The first is the PA’s Presidential Declaration

on Climate Change at the COP 20 on December 10, 2014. This document, among

other things, mentions the Peruvian President’s support for the success of the

caucus held the same year in Lima, as well as PA countries’ commitments to

sustainable management of natural resources. The PA called on “developed

19

Carlos Malamud, “Integración y cooperación regional en América Latina: diagnóstico y propuestas”, Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano (Working Document, 15/2015), October 2015, p. 18.

13

countries to meet their obligations to increase financial support for fighting climate

change, through significant capitalization of the Green Climate Fund.”20

The PA’s second Declaration, although not at the Presidential level, was

given on January 19, 2016. The declaration states that the PA “welcomes the

establishment of the ASEAN Community on December 31,” expressing its

confidence in the Community’s success. The Alliance also “reiterates its

commitment to strengthening dialog and cooperation in such a way that the work of

both mechanisms can be translated into the institutionalization of their relationship

and into the advancement of cooperation for the benefit of their peoples.”21

These two statements, in contrast to the more than forty common positions

established during Ecuador’s presidency of the CELAC, for example, offer a view

of the PA’s profile. This is in the sense that, as already pointed out, as a

mechanism for political dialog the PA is not, unlike the CELAC, an exercise in post-

hegemonic integration aiming to contribute to “a nascent regional governance”

which attempts to somehow create synergies through annual meetings between a

range of Latin American organizations and sub-regional mechanisms, presenting

positions agreed upon between Member States in multilateral settings.22 One

eventual step that may aid in this situation would be for the PA to present common

20

Pacific Alliance, Declaración de los Presidentes de la Alianza del Pacífico en Materia de Cambio Climático en la COP 20/CMP 10, Lima, Peru, December 10, 2014. 21

Pacific Alliance, “Alianza del Pacífico felicita el establecimiento de la comunidad ANSEA”, January 19, 2016, at https://alianzapacifico.net/alianza-del-pacifico-felicita-el-establecimiento-de-la-comunidad-ansea/ (retrieved: February 16, 2016). 22

B. Ayllón, “La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños: diálogo político, concertación diplomática y gobernanza regional”, in Pensamiento Propio, Issue 42, July-December, 2015, pp. 223 and 235.

14

positions to the CELAC, a hypothetical exercise which, if done, would bring greater

political weight to the Alliance within the Community. One aspect which should be

considered is the Alliance’s list of Observer Countries, numbering 42 so far; in

other words, nearly eleven times more than the four partners – an unusual balance

in the history of international organization.23

Map 1. The PA, candidate and observer countries

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “México y la Alianza del Pacífico”, internal document, Mexico, 2016, p. 3.

23

Germany, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, South Korea, Costa Rica, Denmark, Spain, United States, Finland, France, Guatemala, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Uruguay. The Slovak Republic, Egypt and Norway have also expressed an interest in becoming candidates.

Member States

Observer States

Observer States that are Candidates to become Member States (Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama)

15

With a range of initiatives by a number of Observer Countries to establish actions

for collaboration (such as triangular cooperation),24 the PA works by designing

mechanisms for building ties with these countries that can, through exercises of

mutual benefit, result in the privileged status conferred by the Alliance at the

candidates’ request. To date, Costa Rica, Panama and Guatemala are candidate

countries.25 In 2013, Canada expressed an unofficial interest in forming part of the

Alliance (without submitting any formal proposal). Similarly, in 2015, New Zealand

and Honduras also expressed an interest in becoming candidates, although so far

this has not yet been translated into a formal state of intent.

Final considerations: the Pacific Alliance’s main challenges

Supported by initiatives in open regionalization, and with a clear ideological basis

in liberal economics, the PA was created five years ago as a means to foster a

process of deep integration between Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico. The aim of

this strategy is to promote economic growth among members and activate

24

During the Mexican pro tempore presidency of the PA alone (June 2014 to July 2015), over fifty proposals for cooperation were received from Observer Countries, as pointed out by Socorro Flores Liera in her article “La Alianza del Pacífico: una apuesta para la libre movilidad y la integración,” included in this same issue of the Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior. 25

In both Article 2 and 11 of the Framework Agreement, the only articles regulating the entry of new members, no precise, specific requirements are given concerning the latter’s geographical location. In other words, a candidate country that is not located on the Pacific Rim could become accepted as a member, in line with the open nature of this bloc of countries. See Juan Fernando Palacio, El sentido de la Alianza del Pacífico, Medellín, Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT, 2014, p. 57. In the same regard, while Article 11 of the Framework Agreement states that the Alliance is open to entry by “requesting States who are parties to a current free trade agreement with each of the members,” the PA’s official website indicates that “if an Observer State has free trade agreements with at least half of the Party States, it may apply for candidacy to enter the Pacific Alliance.” Pacific Alliance, “Lineamientos sobre la participación de los Estados Observadores de la Alianza del Pacífico”, at https://alianzapacifico.net/paises/#paises-observadores (retrieved: February 16, 2016).

16

development processes in their favor26 and, in addition, achieve a better position

on the international stage.

In this respect, the authors agree with Vieira Posada’s analysis in terms of

the need to identify what is meant by “deep integration,” to which he responds by

pointing out that this precept must address, “in addition to the areas of economics

and trade, [processes] in the political field, the social scene, international

cooperation and joint actions in international contexts.”27 This stance, that

coincides with the claim that “deep integration can be defined as the creation of a

multi-dimensional system of integration involving the political, economic, social,

cultural and spatial spheres,”28 must constitute the Alliance’s underlying purpose

and, therefore, be one of the main focal points for studies conducted on this topic.

Guided by these precepts, and based on the PA’s functionality as analyzed

in this article, it must be highlighted that while this mechanism of integration has

shown significant progress on the trade front, it also faces the challenge of

continuing to develop and improve strategies to strengthen ties between members

26

Within the framework of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, through a memo released through Chilean channels (read: not those of the Alliance), the presidents of the four PA countries made the following statement: “We firmly believe that the main objective of the Pacific Alliance is to improve the well-being of all our citizens and promote economic growth and development, as well as improving the competitiveness of our economies.” Michelle Bachelet, Juan Manuel Santos, Enrique Peña Nieto and Ollanta Humala, “Chile, Colombia, México, Perú: mejor juntos”, at DIRECON – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chile), September 21, 2014, at http://www.direcon.gob.cl/2014/09/chile-colombia-mexico-peru-better-together/ (retrieved: February 16, 2016). As the authors pointed out at the beginning of this article, the unavoidable underlying issue is that of whether, in reality, free trade along with other cooperation exercises between Member States are indeed able to fulfil such aims. 27

Edgar Vieira Posada, “La Alianza del Pacífico, ¿integración profunda hasta qué grado?,” in Isabel Rodríguez Aranda and E. Vieira Posada (eds.), Perspectivas y oportunidades de la Alianza del Pacífico, Bogotá, Colegios de Estudios Superiores de Administración/Universidad del Desarrollo, 2015, p. 64. 28

Alberto Rocha Valencia and Daniel Efrén Morales Ruvalcaba, “Geopolítica de la Alianza del Pacífico en América Latina, el continente americano y Asia Pacífico”, in I. Rodríguez Aranda and E. Vieira Posada, op. cit., p. 109.

17

in the economic, social and cultural spheres. This speaks to the need to continue

building, gradually but with certainty, the foundations necessary for increasingly

broad, meaningful interactions between Member States; that is, between their

governments, private organizations and even on an interpersonal level. In this

respect, there is no doubt that the free movement of people between these four

countries constitutes the fastest, most dynamic route available.

However, while the aim is to perfect the mechanisms necessary for guiding

the relationship between PA countries down the path to greater integration, and

given the steps already taken toward this objective (visible in the Alliance’s

increasingly dynamic and substantial agenda), the pragmatism shown by the

agencies in charge of the Alliance is insufficient to sustain its ever-more ambitious

internal agenda or its external dimension.

What is relevant, given the implication inherent in light institutional structures

(such as the PA), where versatility reigns in the context of more ambitious

regulatory and structural frameworks, is the eventual weakening of the internal

cohesiveness of integration, which may then affect its depth.29 This situation may

impede the Alliance’s proper evolution, broadening and external relationship-

building, or even reduce its capacity to face internal and external challenges testing

the cohesion between its members.

International Relations theorists such as Stephen Krasner agree with the

above in the sense that international regimes allow the convergence of interests

29

J. A. Sanahuja, “Cambio de ciclo en el regionalismo y la integración regional en América Latina: enfoques diferenciados y búsqueda de marcos comunes”, in Adrián Bonilla and María Salvadora Ortiz (comps.), De Madrid a Santiago: retos y oportunidades. Balances y perspectivas de las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América Latina y el Caribe, San José, FLACSO/SEGIB/AECID, 2012, pp. 145-146.

18

between participants in institutionalized collaboration exercises, which increases

the probability that the expected results and subsequent expectations are more

predictably achieved.30 In other words, deepening multi-level integration between

the Alliance’s member countries can only follow a renewal of its institutionalization,

as in, for example, addressing the need to establish a Secretariat General.

Similarly, the gradual establishment of permanent collective institutions with

growing autonomy, which are able to influence the direction of a range of the PA’s

activities, is a key condition that may lead to greater maturity in the Alliance in the

near future. In this respect, one especially important challenge is the need for its

members to continue increasing trade between themselves, acknowledging the

vital role played by production chains. The case of Mexico, the country least

integrated with its three partners, despite its trade surplus in terms of the balance

of trade between all four, represents a particularly important challenge.

In the area of cooperation, the entry into effect of the PA’s Agreement to

Establish a Fund for Cooperation is a necessary step, and appears to be imminent,

once Colombia ratifies the document. When this occurs, the four countries’

Technical Groups on Cooperation will once again need to be reinforced (or, better

still, merged to form a single, joint body focused on a single purpose), in order to

enable proper management, monitoring and evaluation of initiatives that are

orchestrated using the assigned funds.31

30

Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell Unversity Press, 1983, p. 2. 31

This need is a constant factor in a range of cooperation exercises between developing countries (regardless of the agency in charge of orchestration), in the sense that “what is needed, often urgently, is the development of proper institutions, rules and proper procedures to stimulate appropriate financing of these activities.” Francisco Simplicio, “South-South Development

19

With regard to the Alliance’s external relationships with other countries,

integration mechanisms and multilateral organizations, criteria and overall

strategies must be established to face the current dilemma over what must be

done, how it must be organized and what criteria must be used to prioritize

initiatives and cooperation proposals aimed at and received from different parts of

the world. In terms of ties with the Asia-Pacific region, there is merit in the claim

that “progress on the definition of this strategy represents an unavoidable

challenge for providing meaningful content to the idea of making the AP the main

bridge between Latin America and Asia.”32

In summary, over its first five years of existence, the PA has made progress

on a number of its aims. The 20% increase in trade among its members represents

the most significant of these. Similarly, the migratory concessions offered that favor

freer movement of individuals, leading to an exponential increase in contacts

between Member States across a range of spheres, the increase in which is

around thirty-five percent from 2011 to 2015, also represents a positive result for

the Alliance in support of greater integration. Furthermore, the cooperation put into

practice between the four countries is still in its initial stages, with the Student and

Academic Exchange Platform, which has benefited over a thousand scholars (at

the end of 2015), as its most successful endeavour.

Cooperation: A Contemporary Perspective”, in Renu Modi (ed.), South South Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 20. 32

O. Rosales Villavicencio, S. Herreros Ugarte and J. Durán Lima, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

20

Beyond the results mentioned above, the Alliance’s “main challenge is to

meet the expectations it has created,”33 firstly in terms of consolidating stronger

ties and political commitments between its members in support of the Alliance, and

then in creating a consolidated space for trade and cooperation for the benefit of

their citizens. The former depends inevitably on explicit political will at the highest

level to speed greater political articulation between the four countries and, where

appropriate, dispel eventual past or present disagreements. The latter (as a result

of the former) requires a redesign in the Alliance’s institutional structure, in order to

reinforce its ability to deepen integration and cooperation between its members.

As such, further studies of the Alliance are needed, given that its

experiences in stimulating trade and cooperation for the purposes of integration will

go on to hold increasing importance for Latin America, the Pacific Rim and other

geographical areas.

33

Carlo Dade and Carl Meacham, “The Pacific Alliance: An Example of Lessons Learned”, Washington, D. C., Center for Strategic and International Studies (Americas: A Closer Look), July 2013, p. 11.