Question: What events led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War, and how did both sides make their decisions leading up to Israel's strike on Egypt?

This is going to be long. And when I say long, I mean really long. So I'll put a tl;dr right up at the top, for readers. This will be 8 posts (7 will be very text-heavy), so don't expect a short response!

tl;dr: Water crises, fedayeen border flare-ups, false intelligence reports, fears of nuclear weaponry introduction, defense pacts, mobilizations, UN peacekeeping force expulsions, and back-and-forth raids/border clashes all contributed to the war and the decisions made in leading to the Six Day War (as well as history like the Suez Crisis, of course, but I don't go that far back).

As I said, I cannot explain them all, so I'll explain mostly the events of 1964-1967 as contributors, and describe how they contributed. I won't go as far back as the Suez Crisis, unless it's to reference vaguely things that related to the war's outbreak directly. You'll see what I mean as I go. Without further ado, let's begin!

The Water Crisis

No, I'm not referring to the water passage of the Straits of Tiran, or the Gulf of Aqaba. I'm talking about water for irrigation, drinking, crops, etc. The Middle East has perpetually suffered from crises related to water, some of which plague it today. Moshe Shemesh has an article on this that I feel is very important in explaining the prelude to the war, which I'll explain now.

While not directly responsible for the war by most accounts, the struggles over water led to deteriorations in the relations between Israel and the Arab states, which had already been strained, to say the least. The Arab world viewed the Jordan river as a key element in the overall Palestinian problem and Arab-Israeli conflict. It flows through what was a demilitarized zone (until the Six Day War) west of Israel's border with Syria, then flows down through the Sea of Galilee before forming the border between Israel and Jordan and the border between the West Bank and Jordan, ending at the Dead Sea. Until 1956, only fourteen percent of the river was used for irrigation. Due to Israeli attempts to divert the river to their advantage in 1953, there was a big hub-bub about the way to best divide it up, which I won't go too in-depth to. However, we pick up that story in January 1964, when the First Arab Summit came to three key conclusions:

1) An "Authority" would be set up to exploit the waters of the river and its tributaries. Dr. Ahmad Salim, the chairman of the "Authority" estimated that the cost would be roughly 70 million pounds for the plan he detailed, and that it would take 8-12 years to complete.

2) A Joint Arab Command would be set up as soon as possible to coordinate the Arab armies, and defend their diversion of the river. All Arab states would be obligated to help, and 154 million pounds would be set aside for arms procurements by Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. In September of 1965, the Arab Defense Council ratified the Joint Arab Command's strategy for defending the river.

3) The representative of the PLO to the Arab League (Ahmad al-Shuqayri, also chairman of the PLO as elected in May) would keep contacting member states of the Arab League and working with Palestinians on the plan to liberate "the national homeland" and make it a Palestinian state.

Basically, this whole plan was a response to Israel's attempt to divert the river themselves. The Arab states set up military defenses for this plan, and tried to avoid a war, but didn't want to lose out on water resources. However, they were unable to do this, mainly because they feared Israel's air superiority at the time, and found at the Third Arab Summit (September 1965) that the Arab leaders were in a dilemma; they wanted to keep trying to divert the river, but apparently couldn't pull it off over Israel's tactics.

Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, formulated a new plan to handle this problem. His plan, based on two stages, handled the diversion in the first stage and "the liberation of Filastin" in the second. The first stage was to strengthen the Arab armies to ensure they could defend their actions, especially in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The JAC commander said this would take roughly 3 years, being completed around late 1967 or early 1968. 150 million Egyptian pounds were earmarked for the task. The first stage also called for concentrating Saudi, Iraqi, and Syrian troops in Jordan and Lebanon in preparation for any attack (the plan also placed all troops on alert), and planned to immediately begin the technical aspect of diverting the river. Nasser hoped this stage would deter Israel, and prevent border struggles, while allowing diversion of the river.

The second stage, on the other hand, decided that the final objective was to "liberate Filastin from Zionist imperialism", and the JAC commander was told to draw up plans to destroy Israel. The plan was ratified at the Third Arab Summit, where 200 million pounds were budgeted to shore up the Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese armies so they could easily change from defensive to offensive positions after the first stage.

Lebanon, however, dawdled in implementing its part of the plan. They were criticized heavily for it by the Egyptians, but feared implementing the plan. They said they were ready to do so, but had not received the order from the JAC, among other things (they were really stalling because they didn't want to make the "Filastin Question" a bone of contention between their Christian and Muslim populations). It was only in March of 1965 (roughly 6 months after the Second Arab Summit had also resolved to start the diversions) that Lebanon began its plans. Lebanon once again dawdled around May of 1965, asking Nasser to cancel the plan for the diversion because of fear over Israel's response. Israel had made strikes against the diversion operations in March and May of 1965, leading Lebanon to fear further retaliation, and Nasser allowed it saying that "If the Arab states cannot face Israeli attacks then we have no [choice] but to postpone diversion of Jordan's tributaries until our military preparations are completed." Even still, Lebanon continued work until it called a halt on July 4, 1965, due to Israeli overflights/strikes, and intense U.S/French pressure. They blamed budgetary restrictions, and backed off.

Syria had even more trouble implementing the plan. On November 13, 1964, in a disputed border area, Syrians fired on Israeli bulldozers. Roughly a week earlier, November 3, Syrians had opened fire on an IDF patrol in the same area. The IDF responded with fire, including tank shelling (which missed by 700-800 meters). This escalated until the Israeli Air Force (IAF) intervened, in an event that was different...mainly because Israeli air forces had never entered deep into Syrian territory for daily security needs as they did then to silence the artillery (until November 13, 1964, this was unheard of since the 1950s). The Syrians, undeterred, continued their diversion attempts.

However, the next IDF action on March 17, 1965, changed that plan up a bit. An Israeli tractor driver was killed in escalating fire between the two sides, which peaked on March 16, and he'd been killed by artillery fire. The IDF had prepared a battle plan for this occasion already, and implemented it on March 17. The plan was to use any border attack as an excuse for tanks to fire on the diversion equipment being used close to the border, since tanks wouldn't have to cross the border to fire back. The air force was not used in the plan, though it was placed on alert in case of artillery fire. The idea was that a patrol would be fired on, as the Syrians had been doing since February, and that did happen on March 17. The Syrians failed to react to the tank fire (from 2000+ meters away, tanks fired and hit the diversion equipment, since they'd upgraded their tanks after the November failures), and the Syrians halted their work in the area as a result. The diversion operations were ceased until March 31, when they cleared 500 meters of the river, then removed all equipment. On April 15, they started again, and Israel decided they would provoke another attack to stop the diversion operations. They sent a patrol out, but the Syrians refrained from firing, so the Israelis opened fire. Despite the 5000-5800 meter range, in the ensuing firefight the tanks managed to take out three bulldozers among other equipment, and the Syrians didn't respond out of fear of the IAF. On May 22, Syria ceased operations again, and moved to another area. They worked there until July 15, before moving yet again, to an area 10km from the border. The Syrians figured the Israelis wouldn't attack, since they'd have to call in the air force to do it. On August 12, they began plowing work. When observers claimed the Syrians were pointing their weapons at Israeli forces, the Israelis opened fire (no air force used) and destroyed two bulldozers and three tanks. After this, the Arab diversion plan was effectively dead, though small amounts of work continued. On July 12, 1966, an Israeli security vehicle hit a mine, and two soldiers and a civilian were killed. These mines, among other sabotage attacks, were the work of Fatah, which was an organization the Syrians were supporting in border incursions (I'll talk about them later). This time, an attack on Syria was approved, using the air force as well. For the first time in aerial warfare, a Mirage shot down a MiG-21, and the Israelis destroyed Syrian equipment with great success.

Jordan, by the way, had implemented only the portions of the plan that Israel had presented in its own division plans (Israel's proposal, called the Johnston Plan, was rejected by the Arabs). Jordan therefore avoided any real issues over water at this stage.

As you can imagine, this was pretty significant. Tensions flared, water became a huge issue, relations deteriorated, and military buildups were encouraged. Now, let's look at other border issues.

The Fida'iyyun Organizations, and Border Clashes

Border clashes were not all centered around water. There were also numerous over the Fida'iyyun, otherwise known as the fedayeen. These guerrilla organizations triggered many Israeli retaliations, and greatly increased border instability, leading up to a raid on Jordan in November of 1966 and a strike on Syria in April 1967.

These fedayeen organizations organized numerous sabotage organizations, and grew rapidly in the period of 1965-1967. Fatah, the most prominent, was first noticed after an announcement of a sabotage operation against Israel on January 12, 1965. A Fatah squad had set off an explosive, that caused no damage whatsoever, but Israeli media gave it frenzied publicity. Israeli intelligence had actually learned of the plan two or three weeks before it was carried out, but the Israeli populace was shocked by it. Fatah, founded somewhere near the later end of 1956, had initial documents that stated their goal was to "...pave the way for a popular armed revolution and the organization of people and its leadership towards [the goal of] liberation". Crystallization of the organization took roughly two and a half years, and was completed around 1958-1959. The first year of Fatah sabotage operations was 1965, and they proceeded at roughly 3 operations a month. From 1966 to the Six Day War, they moved up to 5 operations a month, despite Jordanian and Lebanese obstructions of fedayeen operations on their territory. Syria, on its end, actively directed and supported Fatah, as well as other operations later on. Fatah greatly exaggerated the amount of damage it did to Israel, but the main point of their plans was that they were trying, not that they were succeeding.

Egypt, at first, vigorously opposed Fatah's operations. Its intelligence documents from early 1965 gathered that it had 2,000 members, was founded in 1960, attempted to get training in China and Albania, and was run by members who were suspected to be from the Muslim Brotherhood or associated with Britain. Egyptian intelligence actually thought, for some time, that Fatah had imperialist roots and was encouraged by Western powers who hoped to destabilize Egypt by giving Israel casus belli (reason to war) before Egypt was ready. They concluded this report saying that Egypt should keep watch on Fatah, and only recognize the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) as a legitimate movement. They viewed Fatah as challenging the PLO's authority, and didn't like it one bit.

From early 1965 to mid 1966, Egypt waged an overt and covert anti-Fatah campaign. They intercepted saboteurs operating from the Gaza Strip, avoided publicizing Fatah announcements/operations, and pressured other Arab states to clamp down on Fatah operations as well. They even waged a smear campaign on Fatah and their roots. However, in mid 1966, Egypt changed their policy on Fatah. It was not pleased with the timing of Fatah organizations, but it gradually chose to support them, or at least not interfere. They primarily changed views because of the characterization of the Palestinian problem as the main issue in the Arab Summit around July 1966, and because of the Arab world's positive reaction to Fatah operations. They still prevented operations being launched from the Gaza Strip, but their measures were less severe, and by the end of 1966 Fatah and Egypt tried to form a working relationship. This led to Egypt, in February of 1967, giving Fatah authorization to make operations happen on a limited basis, though not from Egyptian territory. This was because Egypt realized that Israel didn't appear to view the operations as a casus belli, and only replied in a limited capacity. The invigoration Fatah provided was far more important than limited responses, so Egypt figured it wasn't too big a deal. The PLO largely went along with Egypt's policy, deciding in May 1966 that they would support fedayeen operations, which thereby gave them the status of "revolutionary" or "fedayeen" as an organization themselves.

Syria, on the other hand, was another story entirely. Prior to the 1966 revolution, in which the Ba'ath party was overthrown by what would be known as the neo-Ba'ath, the Syrians had released a report in April 1965 on fedayeen organizations like Fatah. The report, among detailing what Fatah was, essentially recommended Syrian cooperation as they had already made contacts within Fatah. The Syrian media also served as a mouthpiece for many of Fatah's announcements, in conjunction with the Lebanese Ba'ath party (which also had strong ties to Fatah). However, the Syrians tried to effectively take Fatah under their wings, and Fatah wanted to retain its autonomy, which led to a temporary cooling of relations. The first time that Fatah crossed the Syrian border on an operation into Israel (August 1965), Syrian intelligence arrested leaders who were in Syria for negotiations, though it later released them. Later that year, they once again hauled in Fatah leaders, including Yasir Arafat, on suspicion of sabotaging a Trans-Arabian oil line, but freed them when charges couldn't be proven.

When the left-wing officers got into government in the February 1966 revolution, a new strategy formed. It viewed a "popular war of liberation" as the only solution for the "Filastin problem", and figured the Arab public had to be galvanized and prepared for action before the war. It thereby accepted the fedayeen, including Fatah, as an integral part of the operation and the popular war, and provided them with material and military aid. Syria publicly defended fedayeen actions, though they denied having any responsibility for them. Syria essentially managed all activities coming from the Syrian, Jordanian, or Lebanese borders, and even provided Fatah with training facilities. However, both sides were still apprehensive of the other's goals and ulterior motives, as the Syrians feared reprisals by Israel (and hoped to have Fatah adhere to its policy on incursions), while Fatah feared being controlled by Syria but needed Syrian support. Despite Egyptian pressure halting Syrian incursions after the Egyptian-Syrian military pact of November 1966, eventually operations resumed after the April 7, 1967 incident where Israel struck deep in Syrian territory and six Syrian jets were shot down.

In this incident, after sabotage operations on April 1, Israel authorized armored tractors to enter Syria to provoke Syria in the demilitarized zones, with Israel preparing to fire back. As Prime Minister Eshkol put it, "I believe that we have to punish the Syrians, but I don't want war and I don't want fighting on the [Golan] ridge". There was an exchange around March 31, but there was little damage. On April 7, when armored tanks entered the demilitarized zone, Syrians didn't greet them with small arms as before, but with 37-mm cannons. Both tractors were hit within instants, and Israeli tanks shot at the Syrian guns while the Syrian guns bombed Israeli settlements. This rapidly escalated into a mini-war, and by 1:30 in the afternoon it was estimated that 247 shells had hit Kibbutz Gadot, leaving several of its buildings aflame. The UN arranged a cease-fire that the Syrians accepted on the condition that Israel stop all work in the demilitarized zone, and Eshkol rejected these terms, though he scoffed at the idea of sending the IAF in. The Syrian bombardment intensified for an hour, and Eshkol relented, sending in IAF Vatour bombers covered by Mirages. They had barely begun their sorties when Syrian MiGs arrived, and a dogfight (involving as many as 130 planes) led to 6 MiGs being destroyed. Within 30 seconds, Israel established and reasserted its supremacy over Syrian skies, and the Syrian regime lied, saying that they had shot down Israeli planes. But the entire capital witnessed the truth, and the Israeli Mirages engaged in a victory loop around Damascus, humiliating the Syrians. All in response to guerrilla attacks.

Sabotage activity then resumed from the Golan Heights, and there was an improvement in operational effectiveness and devices employed thanks to Syrian support. This continued the border destabilization, leading to a hastening in the run-up to war.

On the Jordanian end, Fatah had run their first operation from Jordanian territory. While in February of 1965, King Hussein warned the other states about letting the fedayeen operate on their territory, they essentially ignored the fedayeen's operations for quite some time. They were tense with the fedayeen, as the fedayeen saw the Palestinians as locked in struggle with the Hashemites (exacerbated by the killing of a Fatah member returning from an Israeli operation in January of 1965). The Jordanians did have plenty of surveillance on Fatah, and did capture fedayeen after attacks on Israel (leaving some in indefinite detention for quite some time), since they saw Fatah as posing a threat to the Jordanian border. A May 1965 memo deemed them irresponsible and too dangerous as they operated outside JAC jurisdiction. In 1966, Jordan stepped up their operations against Fatah, as Fatah stepped up its work from Jordanian territory. Israel's Samu raid on November 13, 1966 didn't lead to a significant change in policy (Jordan actually feared the raid was the outbreak of war), as the Jordanians still arrested (but didn't prosecute) Fatah members until the outbreak of the actual war.

While we're on the subject, what was the Samu raid? As briefly as I can describe it, the IDF had grown tired of the fedayeen activities (specifically as on the night of the November 11-12, an IDF patrol went over a mine and 3 soldiers were killed), and launched an attack on the village of Samu on the 13 of November, south of Hebron. 15 military personnel were killed (and 5 civilians), 93 houses were destroyed, and one Jordanian plane was shot down.

So we know the fedayeen did a pretty important job in destabilizing the border, especially since Israel (rightly or wrongly) held the Arabs responsible. What about the nuclear facets?

Dimona: An Ongoing Issue of the Day

Virtually no accounts of the 1967 War actually take into account the nuclear dimension. In the 90s, new facts came to light. Among them was the fact that in May of 1967, Egyptian planes made at least two deep overflights of Dimona, one of Israel's two secretive nuclear research facilities. This alarmed Israeli officials, and likely had an influence on how they responded to the crises (in the later weeks of May) that followed. Also, it was revealed that Dimona and Nachal Soreq (the second Israeli nuclear research facility) were high-priority targets of Egypt (which Israel knew). Third, it was found that US policymakers were concerned about the possibility of an Egyptian pre-emptive strike on Israel's nuclear facilities. And lastly, it was found that during the crisis, Israel had a rudimentary but operational nuclear capability.

What does this mean? Well, quite a lot! In fact, I'm about to go into how Egypt viewed this nuclear capability as a serious threat, possibly leading to the war!

Muhammad Heykal, as early as 1960, had written (he was the editor for the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram) that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel was a matter of life and death for the Arabs, since it would fundamentally change the power balance in the Middle East. A few days later, Egypt's Nasser (in a public speech) said that the United Arab Republic (UAR) would invade Israel to "destroy the base of aggression before that base is used against us". Basically, Egypt said "If they get nuclear weapons, we'll attack and try to get our own". So...why didn't that happen, apparently?

Well, from 1961-1965, Dimona hardly got discussed in Egypt. The US constantly reassured (especially between 1963-1965) Egypt that there would be no issues arising from Dimona. It doesn't appear Egypt ever even raised the issue. This isn't because of a lack of care necessarily; it's likely that Nasser didn't see a point in bringing it up, since he had begun developing his own missile program and was attempting to recruit foreign scientists to help Egypt gain nuclear capabilities.

In this light, he kept quiet to avoid scrutiny on his own programs.

However, there was also an element of apathy. The Egyptians didn't actually see the nuclear program as a real, military threat. They didn't know how far the program had advanced, the objectives of it, and thought it was a bluff; a bluff he didn't think was worth calling. Also, Nasser didn't focus much on Israel before 1965 in his foreign policy talks according to Cohen, and instead worked on the motto that "Israel was in the icebox, and it could remain there" (a phrase used by Egyptian and American diplomats of the time). In fact, in early 1964 the US ambassador in Cairo (John Badeau) reported that he saw no danger of war in the coming years between Egypt and Israel, and said that Egypt was focusing merely on containing Israel. He did note, however, that the only case in which he foresaw military action was if the Egyptians became convinced Israel began producing nuclear weapons (he even acknowledged there might be a pre-emptive strike). Robert Komer, the senior Middle East member on the National Security Council (NSC), urged President Johnson to force Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to give permission for sharing Dimona progress (as judged by US inspections) with Egypt, to allay their concerns. However, Johnson decided he first had to get Egypt to halt their missile projects, and subject their attempts at nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards (to get Israel to do the same). Nasser responded to a letter saying as much to the effect of "We won't bring in nuclear weapons, but Israel is the real threat to the area". Though a mission in 1963 (McCloy Mission, it was called) failed to make any progress on stopping unconventional weapons from being produced in the area, McCloy (the presidential emissary) was sent again to Egypt. He met with Nasser in September of 1964, and Nasser promised to consider US proposals but didn't commit to them. Simply put, Nasser didn't see any benefit in stopping his missile program to stop the activities at Dimona (he hardly mentioned it in the meeting with McCloy, in fact), and he also didn't think he could reasonably halt the missile program since it had already been financed so heavily and internal politics were involved.

As late as April 1965, Nasser still didn't see Dimona as a top-priority issue to discuss. Nasser never brought up Dimona, not even in a two and a half hour discussion with Phillips Talbot (US assistant secretary of state), and Lucius Battle (US ambassador to Egypt). It was only brought up after the Americans mentioned it, at which point Nasser noted that it was outside of IAEA safeguards and therefore a concern to Egypt. Talbot reassured Egypt that it was inspecting the facilities, that "proliferation was a global problem", and that they were dealing with the issue in those terms. After that rather brief exchange, Nasser said (about the Arab-Israel conflict) that "UAR policy is not to have a sudden attack on Israel". At this point, it should be clear that the US feared a pre-emptive attack by Egypt more than the Egyptians were thinking about it.

However, through the second half of 1965, the Egyptians started paying attention again. Western reports said that Israel was making progress, and could have a nuclear weapon "by the late 1960s". This led the Arab press to focus on the Dimona issue once more, and Haykal once again wrote that "Israel was about to explode a nuclear device and would be capable of producing an atomic bomb within two or three years".

By the first half of 1966, it switched from just a press issue to a very real political issue as well. Egypt now began to fear that Israel would develop weapons ahead of them, which they could not compete with, and the Egyptians responded by using the Soviets. US diplomats received a rumor, which was thought to be credible (and still is thought to be so) that the Soviets had offered Egypt a nuclear guarantee (rather than weapons, as they asked for). In May 1966, Nasser said that the UAR was considering developing nuclear weapons, because "Israel is working in this field". He even said that if Israel were to produce an atomic weapon, the "only answer" would be to launch a preventive war, and wipe out Israeli nuclear capabilities before they could be used.

Now, when the Soviet intelligence report led Nasser to mobilize troops (I'll get to the report later), his choice to mobilize was the result of more than just the report. This decision, made on May 13, 1967, doesn't seem to have been influenced by the question of preventive war due to nuclear weapons. In August of 1966, Egyptian ambassador Mustafa Kamil met with President Johnson, carrying a message from Nasser saying that if any Middle Eastern country obtained nuclear weapons, it would create a "very serious situation". Johnson replied that the US was very adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, but that was the end of that as the discussion appears. Certainly not a huge concern if it was so shortly discussed.

There is much more reason to believe that Nasser didn't actually care much about Dimona when planning the mobilization of Egyptian troops. Nasser's conversation with Robert Anderson, former Secretary of the Treasury (who was sent as a special emissary to meet with Nasser on May 31/January 1, 1967), revealed that the tensions between Israel and Syria along the border had "left him no choice but to mobilize and send troops into the Sinai". He also made it clear he had no intention of compromising on the blockade of the Straits of Tiran (also something I'll discuss later) either, but there was no mention at all of Israel's nuclear capabilities or lack of IAEA cooperation.

However, this doesn't mean it didn't factor into the war. If it didn't, I wouldn't write about it, would I? (Okay, maybe I would, but still). The increases in tension in the Middle East, specifically between Israel and Egypt, are in part due to the speeches that Nasser made that asserted possible wars against Israel. However, there's more, which I mentioned before. When Nasser mobilized, Israel figured it was similar to a similar mobilization in the early 1960s, and Nasser would back off shortly thereafter. Israel attempted to de-escalate on the Syrian border to encourage this, and it was thought that it would lead to a resumption of peace. However, two things happened on May 18, 1967, that completely altered the situation. First, Egypt asked UNEF peacekeepers stationed in the Sinai to leave (will be discussed later!). Second, and related to this issue, the Egyptian reconnaissance flights were made over Dimona.

This was very serious to the Israeli establishment. Ever since the threat of preventive war made in 1960, the Israelis treated any threat to Dimona as a serious one, especially since a nuclear weapon could be considered a casus belli by Egypt. Coupled with the February 1966 increase in anti-Dimona rhetoric from Nasser, which Israel had responded to by strengthening defenses against Dimona (since they didn't know how much he knew about their progress), the overflights made Israeli policymakers very jittery. Dimona not only gained more attention in the days leading up to the war, this may have served to illustrate (alongside the UNEF eviction by Egypt) that this was not going to be like the earlier incident where Egypt backed down. When, on May 25, Egyptian military posture moved to an offensive position (in preparation for Operation Dawn, which I will also discuss), Israeli politicians were even more jittery. However, they still broke in a draw when voting on a pre-emptive war on May 27 (even after the blockade). It appears that while Dimona had a critical consideration, none of the events prior to May 30's defense pact with Jordan (which I'll look at too) were influential enough to start the war alone.

UNEF Expulsion: The UN Foresees War

So, you know I've got a lot to talk about still, and I'm not sure if anyone's going to bother reading this far. However, I refuse to shorten my wordiness and leave out interesting details, so I'm going to continue anyways in the same vein by discussing the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force.

The UNEF had been in place in the Sinai since 1958 (shortly after the Suez Crisis in 1956), and was seen as a significant deterrent to war between Egypt and Israel. Its survival until 1967 was seen as fairly significant, because many expected it to fail in its mission far sooner.

UNEF was created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Ordinarily, this would be handled by the binding UN Security Council (UNSC), which handles potential threats to the peace according to the UN Charter's Article 39. However, it chose to refer the question to the General Assembly as UNSC resolutions on the ongoing Suez Crisis of the time were vetoed by the British and French. An emergency session of the UNGA was convened on November 1, 1956, to deal with the crisis. A draft resolution was then set up to request that the UN Secretary General submit a plan for an emergency international UN force that would secure and supervise the end of hostilities. That resolution (Resolution 998 [ES-I]), giving the UN Secretary General 48 hours to come up with a plan that would be accepted by the parties involved, was adopted on November 4. The Secretary General submitted recommendations on November 5, which were adopted and included in resolution 1000 (ES-I). On November 6, a second and final report on the subject was submitted by the Secretary General, giving the guidelines and concepts of the force. The guidelines roughly said that it would be on Egyptian territory, be there only to monitor the cessation of hostilities, and to secure peaceful conditions. These were adopted in Resolution 1001 (ES-I), and it can be said that thus, UNEF was born. It still had details like financing to flesh out, but that was handled, obviously, and some say it was born on November 5, not 7, but this is just a matter of semantics and makes no difference.

One of the main problems with its creation was the question of consent, which came to be an issue in 1967 as well. General Burns, who led the UNEF mission, put it this way:

>By its terms of reference UNEF could not be an occupying force. It was therefore obvious, as soon as the problem was examined, that UNEF could only operate in its intended theater if Egypt cooperated by allowing free and unhampered use of base facilities and passage by road and air over the lines of communication. Thus, the military realities of the situation brought one to the same conclusion as the legal approach. The legal position, created by the General Assembly resolution, was that UNEF could enter and operate on Egyptian territory only with Egypt's consent. A United Nations force capable of acting without Egypt's consent -- that is, in spite of her possible hostile action -- would have had to be about the size and strength of the Anglo-French forces which had commenced the [Suez] invasion.

This legal and military reality was a big deal when push came to shove. The existence of UNEF as a deterrent was not just limited to its capability to stand between Israel and Egypt. It also signified that Egypt had remained a consenting party to peacekeeping forces along the borders. The removal of that consent to peacekeeping meant that, unless it had a very compelling reason for Israel, the removal of UNEF forces would likely signify Egypt's preparation to either defend against or attack Israel.

Thus, when Egypt began mobilizing its troops in the Sinai, and requested the withdrawal of UNEF forces a few days later, it was extremely worrying to the Israelis. This, as I'll expand on later, was done on the basis of faulty intelligence and communication on the Egyptian and Soviet side, but there is no doubt that UNEF's withdrawal was a very large contributor to the war.

Many, however, don't view UN peacekeeping forces as very effective because of their failures in places like Rwanda and Yugoslavia. However, it would be wrong to assume why they failed without study into those subjects (which I can expand on in a separate post, but that's another question entirely), and it would be even more wrong to apply that to UNEF. UNEF, which was the first real emergency force implemented by the UN, was seen as vital to peace. In fact, the Secretary General recognized this strongly. When Nasser asked him to remove UNEF, he said "UNEF cannot be asked to stand aside in order to enable the two sides to resume fighting...". Secretary General U Thant knew that there would be war without UNEF in the way, and did his best to convince Nasser that there was no impending Israeli attack to fear, and no reason to fear Israel. However, Nasser remained unconvinced, and evicted them (as was his right according to the UN resolutions) on May 18.

Now, you may be wondering "How did UNEF deter anything, if they could just be evicted like that?" Well, you may be right in a sense. The idea of a force you could just evict being a deterrent to war seems silly, almost like saying a knife is a deterrent to you attacking someone when you can force them to throw the knife away before you attack. However, there's an important facet to this: the indicator facet of UNEF.

I doubt even U Thant thought UNEF deterred conflict significantly. He knew that UNEF was a superficial peacekeeping force, and that the issues between the Egyptians and Israelis were getting more serious rather than being resolved. However, UNEF was a sort of early-warning system for the Israelis. If Egypt chose to evict them, Israel would be aware that war might be imminent. And Israel would be unlikely to attack when they had to get by UNEF, if only to avoid any unnecessary conflict (since they didn't have the authority to evict them from Egyptian territory peacefully, from a UN legality standpoint). Still, UNEF didn't appear to realize Egypt was moving into the Sinai until May 16 (3 days after mobilization began), so it's hard to say how effective they were in stopping Egyptian movements. When the Egyptians first asked UNEF to leave, the UN Commander of the mission flat-out refused, and said the UN Secretary General would have to intervene, leading to the discussion I mentioned above.

It's important to note here that UNEF stopped all activities on May 19. However, the eviction was made official around May 18. Even so, UNEF forces were not fully evacuated until June 17, after the 1967 War had already concluded. While there were criticisms of U Thant's acquiescence on the withdrawal, there was very little he could do quickly. Some suggest he should've talked to the UNEF Advisory Committee first, that he should've disputed the legal basis of the request for UNEF leaving, that he should've given the UNSC or UNGA the matter to decide...but there was very little chance of any conclusion happening through those channels, and the law was very clear that UNEF operated on host country consent. Also, these arguments ignore that UNEF posts were increasingly becoming isolated thanks to the Egyptian troop movements around their posts, which made their positions untenable. To further this point, Thant pointed to Nasser's insistence that Canadians leave first (and they were the first ones evacuated, too), because of their criticisms of UAR policy. So while there may have been more room for him legally to wiggle out of the eviction, he still faced very real factual problems with keeping UNEF in place, and these likely contributed to the decision to pull out.

Israel, of course, saw this as indication of war coming. This, coupled with the mobilization, the overflights, the May 30 defense pact with Jordan, and the blockade of the Straits, led Israel to believe attacks were imminent and that Israel would be destroyed if it waited. It used these events directly as justification for the pre-emptive strike in memos on the subject, whereas references to fedayeen, water issues, and threats against Dimona were less references in Israeli decisions to go to war. It can be said that the mobilization of May 13 was the first direct contributor to the act of pre-emptive attack itself, so it's that which I'll examine next.

The Egyptian and Syrian Mobilization

Arguably the first escalation that led to what is called the "May Crisis" was the mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian troops in mid-May. Nasser insisted, in a speech, that the mobilization of Egyptian troops came because of "accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces" of between 11 or 13 battalions. This intelligence, coming from the Soviets, was likely based on misinterpretations of minor troop movements north or a misjudged piece of information.

What would later be called "The Soviet Warning" filtered through to Nasser throughout the first half of May. Egypt, fearing that Syria would be caught unawares by an Israeli attack, began mobilizing. This act, characterized as one of solidarity with Syria, led to a partial reserve call-up (of roughly 15,000 reserves) in Israel on the evening of May 16. However, Israel stressed moderation, claiming it had no plans to attack Syria or any Arab nation, and that the reports were wrong. The day after Prime Minister Eshkol's speech denying the reports of mobilization (a full army reserve call-up had begun on May 20, but the troops did not take any positions offensively), Eshkol did asked Egypt to make similar pledges to avoid escalation. The next day, Nasser announced the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, as he clearly didn't buy the argument.

Why didn't he buy the argument? Well, he viewed the Soviet reports as very accurate, and had no reason to believe otherwise, even saying he still believed they were accurate in his resignation speech on June 9. Had Egyptian communication between agencies been better, he might have. Egyptian Chief of Staff Muhammad Fawzi left for Syria on May 14 to investigate the Soviet report, and ended up reporting, "that neither Egyptian nor Syrian intelligence could confirm any Israeli mobilization", but this report never reached the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.

Nasser received multiple requests to de-escalate, including from the Soviets after he announced the blockade. In fact, the Soviet leadership "requested to de-escalate, [stating] that this could be done only by reassuring the Americans that Egypt had no intention of starting a war and by agreeing to open the strait for oil shipments to Israel". Still, Egypt refused to believe that the Israelis were not planning war during these talks (between May 22 and ending on May 26).

Little-known fact: the Egyptians had been planning an attack on Israel during that time.

This operation, called Operation Dawn, was a plan to initiate war that was decided on as early as May 25 (and was to begin on May 27). Before the operation, Egypt oriented its troops offensively (Israel, noting this, was concerned), and tensions rose dramatically. The offensive came very close to happening, especially because Abdel Hakim Amer, chief of staff of the Egyptian army, believed they could win the war easily.

Just hours before the operation was set to commence, Nasser spoke with Soviet officials. The Soviet ambassador to Egypt at the time read to Nasser a message from Chairman (leader) of the Soviet Union Alexhei Kosygin. The message said this:

>One hour ago, President Johnson informed me that Egyptian forces are preparing an attack on Israeli positions and that this attack is about to be launched. If such a thing happens, then the United States will consider itself freed from the commitments it gave to the USSR to exercise restraints.

Pretty clear in its implications, I'd say. Pojidaev only added that a sterner warning had been sent to Eshkol. Nasser said that "...Egypt does not want war and is not heading in that direction..." Nasser, however, knew that Operation Dawn was a few hours from being launched, and the Soviets did not. So he rushed to cancel the operation (after final orders had already been given), and Nasser did cancel it over the protests of Amer, explaining that Johnson and Israel wanted them to attack so they could crush Egypt. Amer, on the other hand, said that "By waiting, Egypt loses even before the war starts".

Though Nasser was the leader of Egypt, he treated different areas of government as semi-autonomous areas all loyal to him, meaning that Amer had a very significant amount of influence in the military. It was for this reason that he strongly resisted Nasser's shift to defensive positions, and was able to encourage aggression until Israel before that point. Still, his dreams of an attack on Israel were not dashed, not in the slightest. In a phone conversation with PLO Chairman Ahmed Shuqayri on June 4, he expressed the hope "that soon we'll be able to take the initiative and rid ourselves of Israel once and for all".

Egyptian troops, for their part, remained mobilized even after the plan's cancellation. At this point, however, Nasser kept them mobilized because he still feared an attack by Israel. While he was confident that Egypt's mobilized forces would easily turn around any initial advantage given by an Israeli first-strike, he feared de-escalating when they had come so close to war, which likely motivated the decision to sign the defense pact I'll talk about later with Jordan. It's even possible the pact was meant to shore up support for a future war. Even so, the mobilization stayed in place.

On June 2, Nasser informed his senior military officers that war was imminent, and Israel was sure to strike. He was ignored, for the most part. The reason for this is partially because of Amer's influence, and partially because of what might be Egyptian arrogance. Amer had appointed more friends than competent commanders throughout the military, leading to a very inefficient bureaucracy that contributed heavily to Egypt's loss. Also, Egyptian officers believed that Israel would not dare strike without US consent (which they didn't think had been given), and that Egyptian forces would easily win once the initial tide of Israeli forces was stopped. They never expected that the initial strike would be as devastating as it turned out to be, and this led them to disregard threats, though they kept troops mobilized just in case.

There was also significant confidence among Egyptians because of their quantitative advantage militarily over the Israelis. In terms of ready, armed personnel, the Arabs outnumbered the Israelis 1.3:1. In terms of airpower, they had a 2.4:1 advantage, and in terms of artillery pieces, a 4.8:1 advantage. This, coupled with the defense pacts that meant the Arabs would all put this advantage to use, lulled Egyptian officers into a false sense of security. The Egyptians greatly underestimated Israel's superior training, leadership, motivation, intelligence, efficient lines of communication, and technology. While much of Egyptian technology was as advanced, their pilots logged far fewer flight hours and were far less able to handle the modern weapons they had only recently gotten ahold of. As it turned out, many of those same weapons were also unsuited for the desert terrain of the battle, making it even harder for the Egyptian quantitative advantage to provide them with a real edge. Moshe Dayan, one of the more prominent Israeli Cabinet officials in getting the pre-emptive strike going, saw one of Nasser's greatest flaws as overestimating his own troops and their weapons, and another one of the biggest flaws as underestimating Israeli technology and motivation. Many point to the example of the Mirage jets shooting down six MiG-21s that I cited above as Israeli air tech superiority, but this is arguable (from what I've read). It's more likely that Israeli training was simply superior, and that Israeli pilots were far more practiced in dogfighting.

It's also important to note that the Egyptians didn't have a great plan of defense, which was made even worse by their poor communications. Their lines were positioned poorly by most accounts, they failed to discuss between areas under attack, and they never dreamed the IAF would be so effective. In fact, even the Israelis (besides Dayan) doubted the plan they set up. When they heard that one IAF squad had taken out an entire base alone, they were shocked; even they hadn't believed this was possible. Even though Israeli pilots had been instructed since around May 30 on how this operation was going to go, it was still uncertain if Operation Moked (Focus) would be a success.

Their cause was helped, once more, by Egyptian inefficiencies. The Egyptian mobilization hadn't prepared Egyptians for defensive operations, nor did they expect to be caught pants-down as badly as they were. Israeli officials put out fake stories about how they were sailing, or otherwise out, and had no plans for war. They gave the impression that a war was absurd, and the crisis had passed, and Egyptian officers bought it. Further, though some officials had asked to put the planes that were exposed in the Sinai into more defensible positions so they weren't vulnerable to attack, there was a general sentiment that this would reduce morale among Egyptian troops and be superfluous. Lastly, the Egyptians effectively shut down their air defenses when the attack began, as they feared hitting a plane carrying Amer. This hardly mattered, since Israeli jets flew in below radar (sometimes as low as 15 meters off the ground) and below anti-aircraft missile range, but it certainly didn't help.

All told, the mobilization didn't help Egypt very much, but it definitely contributed to the outbreak of war. Dayan, in preparing a draft on the war, said it was meant to "liberate Israel from encirclement and [to prevent] assault by the United Arab Command". Israel, right or wrong, feared attack and launched its pre-emptive attack knowing that it was surrounded by hostile states who had oriented themselves offensively towards it (and mobilized) only days before their attack. A big part of this was also the blockade, which I'll get into now!

Blockading the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba

The blockade of the Straits of Tiran had happened in the past, as some may remember. Back in July of 1956, Egypt closed the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping, considered a major factor in the Suez Crisis. Israel had very big strategic interests in keeping the Straits open, as it provided one of Israel's two sea outlets to the rest of the world, the other being through the Mediterranean. Israeli oil came through the Straits, and it was viewed as vital for Israeli shipping.

Nasser knew this, and likely knew that the blockade would be considered a very aggressive action by Israel. Back in 1956, after the Suez Crisis, Israel had managed to secure free passage through the Straits. In 1957, Foreign Minister (at the time) Golda Meir made a speech to the UN General Assembly stating that Israel would consider any interference with Israeli ships in the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran as casus belli. Moshe Dayan would argue that Nasser must've known the implications of what he was doing, too, saying that "Nasser knew that in closing the Straits he was initiating war against Israel. Hassanein Heykal made this quite clear in a convincing article in Al-Ahram on May 26".

Nasser's decision to blockade the Straits followed Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol's speech pleading for a de-escalation of hostilities. This speech, described by Samir A. Mutawi in Jordan in the 1967 War, was a "model of moderation". Still, the blockade came about. It's fair to infer that Nasser hoped to use the blockade as a cover to position Egyptian troops in preparation for Operation Dawn, and to cripple Israeli capabilities and economic strength before the attack. Once again, it's important to note that Nasser ignored Soviet attempts to urge de-escalation, but this was not all that was ignored. After the blockade was announced, there was a frenzy of diplomacy, almost all of which failed unequivocally.

First, let's look at the international law regarding blockades. The most commonly cited case of international law (in modern times) regarding blockades comes from the UN Charters Article 42, which states that the Security Council may:

>Take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

In adopting this line, it can be inferred that the UN Charter provides the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with the authority to determine when a blockade is legal. This draws on UN Charter Article 39, which denotes that the UN Security Council will be the judge of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. However, the UNSC didn't say anything specifically about the blockade, so the question of legality remains. However, there are the Geneva Conventions as well, specifically the IV Convention, which says that blockades cannot restrict "consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians" in Article 23. However, these conventions are typically used to refer to acts during wartime, not outside of wartime, so it's difficult to say how you'd apply them here. Still, it's clear that Egypt was not abiding by this (turning away all shipping even if it had those goods, if it flew an Israeli flag), and it had ratified the Conventions in 1952. I will note here that violating international law doesn't necessarily mean one can just willy-nilly attack, so don't misconstrue this as me saying Israel was justified in attacking on international law. That's something I'll discuss later. Still, it's important to note the law.

Many nations around the world urged Israel not to attack Egypt, because they knew that Israel would definitely be considering it after the blockade was announced. Eshkol was actually inclined to "accept a forty-eight-hour consultation period during which the U.S. would consider mobilizing a multinational convoy to escort Israeli ships through Tiran". This attempt to organize a convoy went nowhere, and by May 30 when the defense pact was signed, it was seen as largely irrelevant and unlikely to occur. The blockade seemed to be there to stay, and Israel was getting increasingly nervous as a result of the blockade and defense pact, which made Egypt nervous because Israel was mobilizing and preparing for war in response.

To expand a little on the blockade's persistence, Israel placed a lot of pressure on the French, Americans, and British. Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister during this period (he succeeded Golda Meir in 1966), spoke on May 27 to press correspondents in Paris. He said that he made it "self evident that peace cannot co-exist with an illegal blockade" to the French, American, and British leaders. Despite my later note about de Gaulle's opposition to Israeli escalation, he also sent a message to Nasser urging moderation in the crisis, leading Nasser to threaten on May 28 to close the Suez Canal if war broke out and any nation interfered. Russia notified Egypt that it was planning to send ten Russian warships through the Straits on May 30, and Eban said at a press conference in Jerusalem that Israel would be prepared to accept any solution that guaranteed free passage for all ships through the Straits, but that Israel would act alone to break the blockade if they had to. The blockade having gone on that long was bad enough, and the Jordanian defense pact only made it worse. The pace of the hours following the agreement of the 48-hour consultation period on the international blockade was frantic. Haim Moshe Shapira (Israeli Internal Affairs Minister) spoke to Yitzhak Rabin (then chief of staff of the IDF), and said "Egypt will be fighting on a single front, but we will have to fight on at least two, perhaps three. Now we will be totally isolated, and we won't receive arms supplies if we run short during the fighting...Do you want to bear the responsibility for endangering Israel?"

The panicky nature of Israeli politicians underscored how scary the blockade was. They would have to break it to get more arms, oil, and other supplies quickly, and they were likely to fight a difficult multi-front war if they didn't do a damn good job from the get-go. They also viewed leaving the blockade intact as a loss of credibility and saw it as a way they'd lose their deterrent capacity, both of which were extremely important. Still, Eshkol held back on a pre-emptive strike. Rabin, under all the pressure of how to respond, actually collapsed. He had eaten almost nothing for nine days, hadn't slept, was smoking non-stop, and the army's chief physician diagnosed a case of acute anxiety and administered a tranquilizer. Rabin's collapse allowed Weizman, Rabin's deputy, to expand the army's attack plans on May 23. He actually made a plan of attack to launch on May 26, but the plan was nixed by Eshkol, who held back.

The blockade would persist until the outbreak of war, despite all attempts to stop it, but not all would agree that it was sufficient casus belli. Charles de Gaulle, leader of France, would argue that the first shot fired would be the one that started the war, and that the blockade was not an effective declaration of war. Other nations would, as I said, urge caution on the Israeli side, which it exercised. As you can see, the Cabinet voted against war even after the blockade began (and hadn't stopped after the 48-hour consultation period) on May 27. Still, there was a significant contribution to the tension resulting from the blockade, and the Israeli warnings to that effect made this tension very clear.

In a sense, all of this was preventable before May 30, it can be argued. On May 30, the final straw that led the Israelis to decide on war was added. That was the defense pact, which I'll talk about now.

Egypt-Jordan Defense Pact: The Final Act

Egypt, following the cancellation of Operation Dawn, had fears that the Israelis were planning an attack in response to the escalating situation. Rather than take steps to de-escalate the situation, which Nasser likely believed was impossible at that point, he moved to try and shore up Arab defenses and deter Israel. Unfortunately, his actions had the exact opposite effect.

Nasser had already signed a mutual defense pact with Syria in late 1966, which contributed to the feeling of encirclement that Israel had. When it signed the second pact with Jordan in 1967, so deep into the tension, it was viewed less as a defensive pact and more as a pact to work together to destroy Israel in short order. Israelis realized that if they were going to act, it would have to be then, because the Arab armies were perched on their doorstep. In fact, it's been argued by some that if Egypt had begun the assault merely days earlier, instead of allowing the Israeli pre-emptive strike, it would've had a cakewalk.

Even so, Nasser likely didn't predict what followed the defense pact being signed. As was mentioned, Israeli officials had already feared greatly the possibility of fighting on multiple fronts with the blockade ongoing. Nasser's pact with Jordan made that all but inevitable, as it put Jordanian and UAR forces under Egyptian command in the event of war, effectively establishing Egypt's ability to make a pincer movement in attacking Israel.

The pact itself, referred to by Eban and Allon (Minister of Labour), dictated the decision to fight being made on June 1. Prior to the pact, there was division in the Cabinet, but as Randall Churchill put it when discussing Eban's take on the lead-up, "...after May 30, war was inevitable. It was just a question of timing". Israel, whose army was 4/5 civilians when mobilized as it was, couldn't keep itself ready for war indefinitely. When the pact was signed, it saw it as a "now or never" moment, leading to the rapid decision to go to war. Before the pact had been signed, too, there was an exchange of fire on the Sinai border between an Egyptian patrol that was ambushed by Israeli paratroopers after it entered Israeli territory. Egyptian artillery shells rained down on Kibbutz Be'eri and Nahal Oz, but the IDF didn't send in reinforcements to avoid escalating to war. With this in mind, the defense pact seemed even more worrying, almost as though Egypt was prodding the line for weaknesses and preparing an attack again. Indeed, after the signing of the pact, Jordan's King Hussein declared "All of the Arab armies now surround Israel. The UAR, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Kuwait...There is no difference between one Arab people and another, no difference between one Arab army and another."

The signing of the treaty, as Oren puts it, "...all but erased Eshkol's hope for retaining the Defense Ministry", as there was now significant pressure to put Dayan (who was pushing a pre-emptive strike hard) in the defense minister position. Eshkol had been handling the defense portfolio until then, but was eclipsed by Dayan as soon as the decision to go to war was made.

Despite Jordan's statements and signing, Egypt was the main subject of blame in Israeli eyes. On June 7, 1967, Eshkol made the remark that "By its actions, the government of Jordan, with the agreement of Egypt and following upon pressure from Cairo, violated international law, the United Nations Charter, and the neighbourly relations between our two countries". He made this claim on the basis of Jordan's defense pact being support for the illegal blockade and unnecessarily aggressive. Right or wrong, it's clear that Egypt was the one Israel was blaming, and Egypt was the one to take the first hit in the war as well.

Allon, for his part, said on June 2, 1967, that "The military collision forced upon us against our will is inevitable; as long as the Arab concentrations of forces do not draw back from their attack positions, as long as the border is not secure against a resumption of terror, and as long as the Eilat Straits are blockaded -- the war is inevitable." As he would clarify, the Straits were to him a secondary concern, and the central problem was the offensive concentrations in the Sinai and the military pact Egypt and Jordan had signed.

So we know about the defense pact, and we know about the mobilizations. What else can I talk about? Well, I'm nearing the end, I promise, but there's just one or two more things to consider. The first is the timeline of Israeli mobilizations, which I've only vaguely touched on, and the second is the actual timeline of Israel's decisions on going to war. For the sake of expediency, I'll be putting both together in one.

The Decision to War, and the Moves Towards War

This last portion is probably the easiest to write, because I'm just going to detail the timeline relative to what was going on. Israel, in the years leading up to the war, had taken retaliatory actions I've already detailed. In the May crisis, I've already mentioned that Israel took a pretty moderate stance until making the decision to war at the end of May. So, how did Israel get to that point, and what did it do until then?

Despite preaching moderation, Israel had an unmistakable part in the escalation itself. While the Soviet Warning was out of Israel's control, the response to Egypt's mobilization of calling up army reserves on May 16 may have contributed to Egyptian fears. Rabin would claim that this was necessary, because if the Egyptians thought Israel was unaware of their preparations, it might invite an attack on grounds of vulnerability. He noted the delicate line being walked, however, as he pointed out that an overreaction on the Israeli part might nourish Arab fears that there were aggressive intentions and thus provoke a totally unwanted war. On May 13, Eshkol felt that a mobilization of reserves would be too risky (Rabin had recommended calling up a brigade or two), and so he only approved a first-level alert for the army and the transfer of several tank companies southward. As the Egyptians had continued to mobilize, and Cairo Radio blasted "our forces are in a complete state of readiness for war", Rabin did not seriously believe Nasser wanted war, he just felt the reserve call-up would be necessary to stay safe.

Between the nights of May 15 and May 16, though, the danger appeared to skyrocket. Rabin got the latest counts on Egyptian troops in the Sinai, and was baffled by how many there were. While they were defensively oriented, this was more than a mere power display like in the early 1960s (as I mentioned earlier). Eshkol, at this point, reluctantly agreed to call up as many as 18,000 men, and Israel made plans to quietly (and under darkness) transfer troops to bolster defenses around Dimona and the southern border. As the UNEF was evicted, and the mobilization in the Sinai continued, Eshkol refused to approve the pre-emptive strike. Rabin noted that on the Golan Heights, Syrian forces were at maximum strength and war footing, and figured that "It is now a question of our national survival, of to be or not to be".

When Eshkol was awakened before dawn to be notified of the Egyptians closing the Straits, Rabin argued that the IDF could either take Gaza as a bargaining chip or try to destroy the Egyptian army, as Weizman said they had to strike now, and swiftly. Eshkol saw the army advising pre-emption, but still refused, making the aforementioned appeal to Washington.

When the preparations for Operation Dawn were noted, Israel observed with near-panic. General Yariv was convinced that an Egyptian attack was only hours away, and intercepted communications suggested there was an "explosion" about to erupt. There were even calls for Ben-Gurion to come back as Defense Minister at this point, though Eshkol had resisted this because of internal politics. As he put it, "I won't form a government and go to war with a man who's called us liars and cheaters". As he was replying with this to Shapira, word of yet another overflight of Dimona came in, and Eshkol shouted "Egyptian fighters are flying over Dimona and here we're arguing over Ben-Gurion", then he stormed out of the meeting. Outside, he asked Weizman and Rabin if they wanted to attack that day. Weizman said they had no option to attack at once, but Rabin said they should wait until after Eban's meeting with Johnson.

Eban, who met with Dean Rusk (Secretary of State) on May 25 at 3:30PM, and expressed that an all-out Egyptian and Syrian attack could occur at any moment. Rusk was not surprised. He'd received similar intelligence from the Israeli Foreign Ministry that morning. The British and UN intelligence forces the Americans consulted during that time insisted that the Egyptian formations were defensive and there was no sign of imminent attack. Rusk figured it would be irrational for Nasser to invade. The irony of this is that the very morning of May 25, the Egyptian decision to launch Operation Dawn had already been made. Fortunately for Israel, Rusk still decided it was better safe than sorry (though it seemed all sources indicated no war was likely to break out) and got Johnson to send the warning to the Soviets that I quoted above, which led to Nasser scrapping the operation. The last words Johnson gave, before Eban left, were "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone". As mentioned, plans for war were not passed in a vote on May 27. All of this changed May 30.

With the introduction of Dayan to the new National Unity Government formed that day, the Cabinet gradually became more optimistic about war. Eshkol tried to avoid war, saying that the IDF was not established to conduct wars of choice, and its ability to make war couldn't be used as justification for launching one. Eshkol was arguing against the generals, all of whom saw war as inevitable and necessary to deter future aggression which they saw as imminent. When neither Rabin nor Allon stepped in to argue on behalf of Eshkol, he was wounded and enfeebled. At that point, Eshkol began to lose power, especially since the public heard of Eshkol's fumbled speech and called for him to step down. Dayan basically took over the Cabinet by his influence, and war was imminent. Undersecretary for Political Affairs (in the US) Eugene Rostow asked how long the Israelis would wait in early June. Ephraim Evron (Minister at the Israeli Embassy in Washington D.C) estimated about ten days. Ambassador to Israel Walworth Balbour estimated they'd do it as soon as the opportunity arose, if major terrorism was mounted. He was right.

Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense) would insist that the Israelis were told specifically not to pre-empt, but Amit (Mossad Chief) regarded what Johnson said as the United States "not telling Israel explicitly not to go to war". McNamara said "I cannot believe that he thought that" in response.

After this conversation, Amit felt even more concerned by American attempts to wait, and flew home more convinced than ever that Israel gained nothing by waiting. Even so, Johnson sent a note Sunday (June 4) urging Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. After numerous people spoke in favor of attack, Eshkol finally spoke with the final word. After immeasurable pressures and criticisms, after all the isolation and scorn he had received, he said "I'm convinced that today we must give the order to the IDF to choose the time and the manner to act."

Despite the objections raised, it was basically over. Shapira quoted Ben-Gurion saying Israel could never win a war without an ally, but Dayan cut him off, saying "Then let Ben-Gurion go and find us an ally, but I'm not sure we'll still be alive!" Others objected, including the religious affairs minister, who said "Better that one or two of our sailors get killed than that Israel get blamed for starting the war", explaining his demand that Israel instead send a ship through the Straits to establish a casus belli.

When Dayan put forth the proposal to make war though, the count came to 12 in favor and 2 opposed. It was done. By that evening of June 4, soldiers and airmen knew that the following morning they would be at war.

Because of the Israeli ambiguity on their aims with the US, and the lack of US knowledge of plans, Egypt had no idea that Israel would actually launch an attack without US consent. That likely surprised them more than anything. Still, there were other ample reasons for Egyptian surprise. On June 4, the Jerusalem Post quoted Dayan as saying it was too late for a spontaneous military reaction to the blockade, and too early to draw conclusions on the outcomes of diplomacy. They quoted Dayan as saying that the government had to give diplomacy a chance. Several thousand soldiers were put on leave to further the deception, and pictures of Israeli troops relaxing on beaches were sent to newspapers around the world. The deception worked marvelously, as Egyptian generals were seen on the tennis courts of Cairo, and no one realized how close to the final blow it was.

Conclusion

I'll keep this brief. I've outlined the events leading up to the war, the Israeli preparations, Arab preparations, and US/USSR takes on it, as well as some international law. If you have questions, I'd love to answer them, but this is 8 posts long and I can't really include it all here. There's much more I'd be able to talk about, like the raids on Syria by Israel, other cross-border incidents, and the war's outbreak itself in terms of the actual attacks on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. I encourage you to ask, if you've read this far, anything that comes to mind, and I will answer as best I can.

Hope you enjoyed this! If you'd like further reading, my recommendations are:

The Six Day War by Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill.

Six Days of War by Michael Oren

The Six Day War by Richard B. Parker

Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy by Michael Brecher

If I had to pick two, I'd say read the Oren and Churchill books, as they're more of an overview and a greatly detailed summary of it all.

Without further ado, my full sources/bibliography are below (yes, there are a lot).

Sources:

Barak, Eitan. "Between Reality and Secrecy: Israel's Freedom of Navigation through the Straits of Tiran, 1956-1967." Middle East Journal 61.4 (2007): 657-79. JSTOR. Web.

Brecher, Michael. Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy. London: Oxford UP, 1974. Print.

Byford-Jones, W. The Lightning War. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. Print.

Churchill, Randolph S., and Winston S. Churchill. The Six Day War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Print.

Cohen, Avner. "Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War." Middle East Journal 50.2 (1996): 190-210. JSTOR. Web.

"Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949." The Avalon Project. Yale Law Library, n.d. Web. .

Eshkol, Joseph. The Six Days' War. Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1967. Print.

Feron, James. "Eshkol Urges Mutual Troop Pullback: Sabotage Suspected." New York Times 23 May 1967: 16. ProQuest. Web.

Gat, Moshe. "On the Use of Air Power and Its Effect on the Outbreak of the Six Day War." The Journal of Military History 68.4 (2004): 1187-215. JSTOR. Web.

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