The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited

8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited

1/46

The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited

Author(s): Baki TezcanSource: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2009), pp.460-504Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25651182 .

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2/46

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|7eSHo|

<

*

Journal

of

the

Economic

and

WiPw

BRILL

ocial

History

of

the

Orient

52

(2009)

460-504

brill.nl/jesh

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis of

1585

Revisited

Baki

Tezcan*

Abstract

In

1585-8,

the

Ottoman

silver

currency,

the

akge,

was

officially

devalued

by

100%

against

theVenetian

gold

ducat

and

foreign

silver

currencies,

and

its

silver

content

was

reduced

by

44%.

Some

scholars

have

interpreted

this devaluation

and debasement

as

a

consequence

of

the silver

influx

from

the

Americas,

whereas

others have referred

to

the

difficulties

that

the

Ottoman

state

had

to

face

in

financing

its

war

effort

against

the Safavids

in

Persia.

This

study

suggests

that the

unification of

a

number

of distinct

regional

monetary

zones

in

an

interregional

imperial

economy

by

the second

half of the sixteenth

century

must

be

regarded

as

an

important

factor

that

contributed

to

the

monetary

crisis of

1585.

En

1585-88,I'akge,

la

monnaie

d'argent

ottomane,

fut

devaluee

officiellement de

100%

par

rapport

au

ducat

d'or

venitien

et

les monnaies

d'argent

etrangeres,

et

le

pourcentage

d'ar

gent

en

fut reduit de 44%.

Certains

chercheurs

interpretent

cette

devaluation

et

cette

depreciation

comme etant

la

consequence

de

l'influx

d'argent

venant

des

Ameriques,

tan

disque

d'autres

attribuent

les

problemes

de

l'etat

ottoman

au

financement

des

guerres

contre

les

Safavides d'Iran.

Cette contribution

suggere

que

l'unification

d'un

bon

nombre

de

zones

monetaires

regionales

qui

differaient

entre

elles

en une

seule

economie

imperiale

interregionale

dans

la

seconde

moitie

du

XVT

siecle

doit

etre

regardee

comme

un

facteur

important ayant contribue a la crise monetaire de 1585.

Keywords

Ottoman

Empire,

devaluation,

debasement,

economic

integration,

monetarization

One of

the

enigmas

of

early

modern

Ottoman

history

has

been

the

debase

ment

of the

main

Ottoman

silver

currency,

the

akge,

around

1585.

Almost

425 years

after

the

event

neither

the

exact

date

of the

debasement

nor

the

dynamics

that

brought

it

about

can

be

established

with

any

precision.

Although

most

scholars

acknowledge

the

existence

of

a

relationship

*)

Baki

Tezcan,

Assistant Professor

of

History,

and

Religious

Studies,

Department

of

History,

and

Religious

Studies

Program,

University

of

California,

Davis,

USA,

btezcan@

ucdavis.edu.

?

Koninklijke

Brill

NV, Leiden,

2009

DOI:

10.1163/156852009X458223


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3/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

AG

between

the influx of

Spanish

silver

from

the

Americas

into

theOttoman

Empire

and

the

debasement,

the

reason

why

an

abundance

of

silver should

bring

about such a debasement of the silver currency is not

quite

clear.

According

to

Bernard

Lewis,

[t]he

Ottoman

rulers,

accustomed

to

crises

of

shortage,

were

quite

unable

to

understand

or

meet

a

crisis

resulting

from

an excess

of

silver,

and

thus took

the

same measures

that

they

would

have

taken

if

they

faced

a

shortage,

hence

the

debasement.1

Halil Inalcik

asserts

that

the

devaluation

and debasement

were

a

conse

quence

of

the

flood

ofAmerican

silver.

The

relationship

he

creates

between

the

two events

is

based

on

the

theory

of

a

general

price

increase

caused

by

the influx ofAmerican silver followed

by

a devaluation and debasement

which

was

inspired

by

Earl

Hamilton's

work.2

Using multiple

sets

of

data,

Omer

Lutfi

Barkan demonstrates

that the

Ottoman

economy

experienced

a

general

price

increase

which

was

very

similar

to

the

changes

in

the

Euro

pean

economy.

According

to

Barkan,

the

rise

in

prices

and

the

devaluation

of the akce

were

parallel developments

that

were

brought

about

by

inter

national

movements

in

precious

metals,

changes

in

trade

patterns,

the

tremendous

expenditures

of the

Ottoman

government

for

various

wars

undertaken

at

the

time,

and

a

great

population

increase

which

took

place

in

most

of

Europe,

as

well

as

in

the

remainder

of

the

Mediterranean

world,

during

the

sixteenth

century. 3

?evket

Pamuk

has

recently

revised Barkan's

price

indices

and

found

an

error

in

his

calculations

for

the

years

1555

and

1573,

the

only

years

in

the

sixteenth

century

prior

to

the

devaluation

for

which

Barkan

had

price

data.

After

Pamuk's

correction,

the

price

increases

between

1489

and

1573

expressed

in

grams

of silver

were

reduced

to

31%

from

60%.

After

this

1)

Bernard

Lewis,

Some

Reflections

on

the Decline of

the

Ottoman

Empire.

Studia

Islamica

9

(1958):

119-20.

2)

Halil

Inalcik,

Notes

on

a

Study

of

the

Turkish

Economy

during

the

Establishment

and

Rise of

the

Ottoman

Empire.

Tr.

Douglas

Howard

[revised

translation of

Osmanh

Impa

ratorlugunun

kurulus

ve

inkisafi

devrinde

Turkiye'nin

iktisadi

vaziyeti

iizerinde

bir

tetkik

munasebetiyle.

elleten

15

(1951): 629-90].

In

The

Middle

East

and

the alkans

under he

Ottoman

Empire:

Essays

on

Economy

and

Society,

Halil

Inalcik

(Bloomington:

Indiana Uni

versity

Turkish

Studies,

1993):

241,

243-4;

Earl

J.

Hamilton,

American Treasure

and

Andalusian

Prices,

1503-1660:

A

Study

in

the

Spanish

Price

Revolution.

Journal

of

Economic

and

Business

History

1

(1928):

1-35

3)

Omer L.

Barkan,

The

Price

Revolution

of

the

Sixteenth

Century:

A

Turning

Point

in

the

Economic

History

of the

Near East.

Tr.

Justin

McCarthy

[abridged

translation with

revisions

of

XVI.

asnn

ikinci

yansinda Turkiye'de fiyat

hareketleri.

Belleten

34

(1970):

557-607].

International

ournal

f

iddle

East

Studies

G

(1975):

13.




4/46

462

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

correction,

the debasement

and devaluation

appear

to

have

preceded

the

rise

in

prices,

rather

than

followed

them.4

Actually,

prices

of

barley,

rye,

and wheat taken from inheritance records inEdirne by Barkan in another

study

also

indicate

that,

despite

some

fluctuations

in-between,

the

prices

of

1543

and

1582

are

almost

identical,

which

suggests

that

the

sharp

infla

tion

actually

started

in

the

mid

1580s,

in

other words around

the

time

of

the devaluation.5

These

findings

support

Niels

Steensgaard

s

argument

that

the

increase

in

prices

should have

started

after the devaluation

and

not

before.

Both

Steensgaard

and

Pamuk

suggest

that the

debasement

of the

currency

has

to

be

explained

in terms of the

scarcity

of funds available to the treasury.

More

specifically,

Pamuk

states

that

[w]ith

the

outbreak

of another

war

with

Iran

in

1578,

the

treasury

began

to

experience

shortages

of silver

for

payments

to

the

soldiers. 6

It

is

definitely

true

that the

long

wars

of

the late

sixteenth

century

created

a

burden

on

theOttoman

treasury.

The

extent

of

this

burden,

however,

seems

to

be

somewhat

exaggerated.

According

to

the balance

sheet

of the

imperial

treasury

for

the

fiscal

year

1582-3,

four

years

after the

outbreak

of

the

Ottoman-Safavid

war,

Ottoman

finances

actually

seemed to be

doing

well.

Despite

the fact thatMurad III

appropriated

all of

the

revenues

coming

from

Egypt,

which

was

more

than

520,000

gold

ducats,

or

31,200,000

akces,

for

his

personal

treasury,

the central

treasury

had

a

surplus

of

2,071,212

akces.7

This

surplus

was

4)

?evket

Pamuk,

A

Monetary

History

of

the Ottoman

Empire (Cambridge:

Cambridge

Uni

versity

Press,

2000):

122;

compare

Barkan,

Fiyat

Hareketleri :

569.

See

also

?evket

Pamuk,

The

Price

Revolution

in

the

Ottoman

Empire

Reconsidered.

International

Journal

of

Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 69-89; ?evket Pamuk,

Prices

in

the

Ottoman

Empire,

1469-1914.

nternational

ournal

f

iddle

East

Studies

>G

2004):

451-68;

?evket

amuk,

Istanbul

ve

Diger

Kentlerde

500

Yilhk

Fiyatlar

ve

Ucretler,

1469-1998

(Ankara:

Devlet

Ista

tistik

Enstitusu,

2000).

5)

Omer

L.

Barkan,

Edirne

Askeri

Kassami'na

ait

tereke

defterleri

(1545-1659).

Belgeler

3.5-6

(1966):

87,

155,

447.

6)

Niels

Steensgaard,

The Asian Trade

Revolution

of

the

Seventeenth

Century:

The

East

India

Companies

and

the

Decline

of

the

Caravan

Trade

(Chicago:

The

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1974):

79; Pamuk,

A

Monetary

History of

the ttoman

Empire:

125, 132,

137.

7)

The

deficit

of

12,830,005

akces

noted

by

Baki

(Jakir,

Geleneksel

donem

(Tanzimat

oncesi)

Osmanh

biitce

gelirleri.

In

Osmank

Maliyesi:

Kurumlar

ve

Butgeler,

eds

M. Gene

and

E.

Ozvar.

2

vols.

(Istanbul:

Osmanh

Bankasi

Arsiv

ve

Arastirma

Merkezi,

2006):

vol.

1:

171,

is

misleading.

First,

there

is

a

calculation

error,

the

deficit

according

to

(fakir's

numbers

should

have

been

8,841,285

akces.

Second,

(Jakir

did

not

include

the

treasury's

profit

of

4,912,497

akces

from

tefdviit,

an

income

item

that

is

constituted

by

the difference

of

exchange

rates

in

receiving

and

expending

funds

in

currencies other

than

the

akce. While




5/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

463

achieved

at

a

time

when

a

total

of

38,207

soldiers,

including

auxiliary

troops

and

cadets,

received

regular

salaries?9,000

more

than

in

1574.

Moreover, 10,000,000 akces were sent to

Ozdemiroglu

Osman Pasha in

Shirvan

for the

payment

of his

troops,

numbering

at

least

another

4,000.8

Thus

as

late

as

1583,

in

the

midst of

the

Safavid

wars,

while the

number of

people

who

received

salaries from the

treasury

had

increased

by

almost

50%

in

the

previous

ten

years,

the Ottoman

central

treasury

was

able

to

deal

with the

situation,

despite

the

fact

that

more

than

11

%

of

the

reve

nues,

which

totaled

279,649,967 akces,

were

transferred

to

the

personal

treasury

of the

sultan and

were

thus

not

available

to

cover

expenditures.

It is therefore

justified

to ask

why

theOttoman

government

devalued

the akce

by

100% and debased

its

silver

content

by

44%

almost

immedi

ately

afterwards,

if the

financial

picture

was

this

rosy.

Following

the lead of

Halil

Sahillioglu,91

argue

that

theOttoman

government

responded

to

the

dictate of

market

forces,

which

had

already

practically

debased the

akce

as

a

result

of the

unification of the

Ottoman

currency

zones.

As will

be

shown,

the treasury counted most

gold

ducats for 59 akces when it received them as income, for

instance,

it

valued

them

at

60

akces when

it

spent

them;

on

this

practice

and

its

later

evolu

tion,

see

Baki

Tezcan,

Tefavut.

Osmanh

Ara?ttrmalan

I

Journal

of

Ottoman

Studies

24

(2004):

333-44.

The

6,000,000

akce

credit

the

treasury

received from

the sultan

is

also

not

included

among

the

income

items

although

its

repayment

is

noted

among

the

expendi

tures.

If

one were

to

revise

the total

income

accordingly,

it rises

to

279,649,967

akces,

producing

a

surplus

of

2,071,212

akces;

Halil

Sahillioglu,

III.

Murad

donemine ait

1582

83

(hicri

990)

tarihli

biitce?ceviriyazi.

In

Osmanh

Maliyesi

Kurumlar

ve

Biitceler,

eds

M.

Gene and

E.

Ozvar.

2

vols.

(Istanbul:

Osmanh Bankasi Arsiv

ve

Arastirma

Merkezi,

2006):

vol.

2:

33, 46. The surplus of 36,165,890 akces for the

same

year that is shown in Pamuk,

A

Monetary History

of

the

Ottoman

Empire:

133,

is

the

amount

of

money

carried

over

to

the

next

fiscal

year,

which

includes

funds

worth

34,094,678

akces

that

were

carried

over

from

the

previous

year;

the

difference

between

them,

2,071,212

akces,

is

equivalent

to

the

actual

surplus.

8)

The

figures

or

1583

[and 1574]

are:

16,905

[13,599]

janissaries,

,346

[5,957]

cavalry

soldiers

(altt

boluk),

3,736

[2,124]

auxiliary

troops

(cebeciydn,

tobciydn,

arabaciyan-i

fob),

and

9,220

[7,495]

cadets

(acemiydn),aking

a

total

f38,207

[29,175]

souls.Since

16,905

janissaries

received

39,008,019

akces,

10,000,000

would be

enough

to

pay

the

yearly

sala

ries

of

another

4,000

janissaries.

Yet since

most

probably

Osman

Pashas

soldiers

were

recruited

to

become

janissaries

after

a

few

years

of

service,

their

pay

scale

should have been

lower,

so

he

may

have

had

more

than

4,000

troops;

for

1583

figures

see

Sahillioglu,

1582

83

tarihli

iitce :

5;

for

1574

figures,

ee

Koci

Bey,

ogi

Bey

Risalesi,

d.

Ali

Kemali Aksiit

(Istanbul:

Vakit,

1939):

27-8.

9)

Halil

Sahillioglu,

Kurulustan

XVTI.

asnn

sonlanna

kadar

Osmanh

para

tarihi

uzerinde

dir

deneme.

Ph.D.

dissertation

(Istanbul

Universitesi,

1958).




6/46

464

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

the different

currency

market

zones

of

the Ottoman

Empire operated

on

different

gold?silver

ratios.

The

debasement

of the akce

was

closely

related to the unification of these zones and the consequent

disappearance

of

arbitrage

opportunities

as

the

different

gold?silver

ratios

moved

closer

to

each

other.

The

first

section

of the

study

focuses

on

the former

Mamluk

lands

and

demonstrates

that

the

gold?silver

ratio

in

the Levant

and

Egypt

was

different

from the

one

in

the central

lands

of the Ottoman

Empire

in

the

early

sixteenth

century.

Yet

by

the

mid-sixteenth

century

this

ratio

had

come

much closer

to

the

one

prevalent

in

Istanbul.

The

second

section concentrates on the former Safavid lands of theOttoman

Empire

and

argues

that

a

Persian

devaluation

in

themid-sixteenth

century

changed

the

gold?silver

ratio

in

these

lands,

making

silver

more

valuable

in

terms

of

gold

and

creating

an

Ottoman silver

currency,

the

sahi,

that

was

overvalued

in

terms

of

its

silver

content.

As

the

connections

between

the sahi

zone

and

the

Levant increased

as a

result

of

their

unification

under

the

Ottomans,

the

monetary

issues

related

to

the

sahi affected the

Levant

as

well.

In

the

third

section,

I

will

point

out

that

the

arrival

of

Spanish

silver

from

the

Americas

intensified

the

expansion

of the

sahi's

use

in

the

empire

by

providing

ample

supplies

to

mint

overvalued

silver

coinage

which

liter

ally

invaded

theOttoman

domains,

threatening

a

change

in

the

gold?sil

ver

ratio

at

the

center.

Consequently,

the

value

of silver

increased

above the

level

that

could

support

the

weight

and

fineness

of the

akce.

In the

last

section

I

will

argue

that

these

results

proved

to

be

disadvantageous

for

the

Ottoman

center

as

theOttoman

treasury

had

a

vested

interest

in

keeping

gold

more

expensive

in

relation

to

silver

in

the

capital.

Thus

in

1585

the

Ottoman

administration

not

only acknowledged

a

situation created

by

market

forces

but also

made

an

effort

to

intervene

by

trying

to

increase

the

value

of

gold

against

silver.

Yet the

effort

of

the

administration

failed,

and

in

1600

the

Ottoman

center

finally

revalued

silver

in

relation

to

gold.

I

When

the

Ottomans

conquered

a

new

region,

the

Ottoman

administra

tion,

at

least

initially,

did

not

endeavor

to

unify

its

dominions

under

a

single

law;

theymostly

continued

to

follow

the

local

traditions

of

the

areas

that

were

brought

under

Ottoman

sovereignty

in

matters

relating

to




7/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

465

taxation

and

land

laws.Whether

this

was a

conscious

policy,10

or

just

a

matter

of

necessity

in

the relative absence

of efficient central

political

tools of enforcement, is

open

to debate. Different

regional

currencies were

among

the local

practices

that

the

Ottoman

administration continued

to

allow

in

its

eastern

and

southern

provinces.

Thus the

empire

was

divided

into

a

number

of

currency

zones

in

which

coins

of

different

weights

con

stituted

the

major

denomination

in

daily

use.

As

will be shown later

in

this

study,

the

Ottoman

center

benefited

from the

existence

of these

zones

as

long

as

gold

was

comparatively cheaper

in

them than

it

was

in

the

capital.

The limits of these

zones were

probably

dictated

by

the

geographical

limits of the economic units rather than

by

political

boundaries. For

instance,

despite

its

political

unity,

the Safavid

Empire

included

two

dis

tinct

currency

zones.

Similarly,

although

both

greater

Syria

and

the

Hejaz

had been

part

of the

Mamluk

Empire,

the

two

regions

had

slightly

different

units

of silver

currency.11

Thus,

as

the

political

inheritor of

different

eco

nomic

zones,

the

Ottoman

Empire

consisted

of

different

currency

zones.

Although

the

akce

reigned

supreme

in

the central

lands of the

empire,

that

is

to

say

in

the Balkans

and

in

western

as

well

as

central

Anatolia,12

the

eastern

and

southern lands that

were

conquered

in

the

sixteenth

century

used

quite

a

number of

different

currencies.

As

will

be

discussed

below,

the

exchange

values

of these

currencies

among

themselves

seem

to

have been

determined

by

the

regional

gold?silver

ratios.

Thus rather

than the

silver

content

of

the coins

in

question,

their

varying

values

against

theVenetian

ducat,

or

the

Ottoman

sultani^

seem to

have

been the

decisive

factor

in

10)See Halil Inalcik, Ottoman Methods of

Conquest.

Studia Islamica 2

(1954):

103-29.

n)

Stephen

Album,

A

Checklist

of

Islamic

Coins,

second

ed.

(Santa

Rosa:

Stephen

Album,

1998):

126. The silver coins

of

Aleppo

and

Mecca,

for

instance,

are

valued

differently

in

an

inventory

of

the Ottoman

imperial

treasury

from

1518;

Halil

Sahillioglu,

The

Role of

International

Monetary

and Metal

Movements

in

Ottoman

Monetary

History,

1300

1750.

Tr.

liter

Turan and

Rhoads

Murphey

[translation

of

Osmanh

para

tarihinde

diinya

para

ve

maden

hareketlerinin

yeri

(1300-1750).

Geli?me

Dergisi

Special

Issue

(1978):

1-38].

In

Precious

Metals

in

the Later

Medieval

and

Early

Modern

Worlds,

ed.

J.

F.

Richards

(Durham:

Carolina

Academic

Press,

1983):

297,

Table 4a.

12)

Iwould suggest that thewidespread use of the akce inAnatolia and the Balkans by the

beginning

of

the

sixteenth

century

must

have

been

the

result of

a

long

process

of

economic

integration

and

a

certain

degree

of

monetarization,

which,

if

studied,

may

shed further

light

on

the

various

debasements

under

Mehmed

II.

13)

In

the

period

under

study

the

two

gold

coins,

the

Venetian

ducat

and the Ottoman

sultani,

were

identical in

weight

and

fineness.

Since

I

use

a

number of

Ottoman

terms to




8/46

466

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

the

establishment

of

their

exchange

values

among

themselves

in

their

respective

regions.

In the formerMamluk lands of

Egypt

and greater

Syria,

for instance,

the

standard

coin in

circulation

was

heavier

than the

akce.

Among

a

sam

ple

of

67

extant

coins

struck

during

the

reign

of

Selim

I

(r.

1512-20)

right

after

the

conquest

of the

Mamluk

Empire

in

Jidda

(1),

Damascus

(23),

Aleppo

(33),

Hudayda

(1),

and

Egypt

(9)?if

one

excludes our

oins

the

weights

of

which

were

equal

to

or

lower than

0.73

g.,

which

was

the

stand

ard

weight

of the

akce

at

the time?the

average

weight

of

the

remaining

63

coins is

0.89

g.14

Although

these

weights

cannot be relied on to

judge

the standard cur

rency

weight

of the

region,

as

the

coins

may

have

been

clipped,

they

do

suggest

that the

standard silver

currency

of the

area

was

heavier than the

akce.

This

is

supported

by

archival

evidence

to

the

effect that the silver

coins

struck

in

Aleppo

were

worth

2

akces

in

1518

and

were

called

pare

or

para

(piece),

most

probably

after the

??/Xhalf),

or

qita (piece),

theArabic

terms

used

to

denote the

standard Mamluk silver

coin

introduced

by

the

Mamluk ruler

al-Mu'ayyad

(r.

1412-21),

the

muayyadi,

which the

Europe

ans

called maidinP

This

difference

in

the

silver

standard

of the

region,

as

well

as

the

name

given

to

the

local

coins

by

the

Ottomans,

suggests

that

the Ottoman

local

currency

in

the

area

was

modeled

on

the

one

used

in

Mamluk

times.

At

the

time

the

Ottomans

conquered

the

Levant

and

Egypt,

the

cur

rency

situation

in

the

Mamluk

Empire

seems

to

have been

in

disarray.

Although

it is

asserted that

theMamluk

gold

coins

were

of the

same

stand

ard

as

the

Venetian

ducats

and

theOttoman

sultanis,

the archival and

liter

ary

evidence

suggests

otherwise.

The

weight

of theMamluk

gold

ashrafi

seems to

have varied

from

one

Mamluk sultans

reign

to

the

next,

and

from

Egypt

to

Syria.

This

difference

in

weight

was

also

reflected

in

the

exchange

value

of the

ashrafi,

which

at

times

fell below

that of the

Venetian

ducat.16

denote

the

different

silver

currencies

in

circulation,

I

prefer

the ducat

to

denote

the

stan

dard

gold

coin

of the

region

in

order

to

prevent

further

confusion

by

introducing

yet

another

Ottoman

term.

14)

Ciineyt

Olcer,

Sultan

Yavuz Selim

?ah

bin

Bayazid

Han

Donemi

Osmanli

Sikkeleri

(Istanbul:

enilik,

1989):

182-6.

15)

On the

origins

of the

designation

nisf,

see

Paul

Balog,

The

Coinage of

the

Mamluk Sul

tans

of

Egypt

and

Syria

(New

York:

The

American

Numismatic

Society,

1964):

47,

387.

16)

Pamuk,

A

Monetary History

of

the

Ottoman

Empire:

95;

Sahillioglu,

Osmanli

para

tarihi :

96,

n.

9;

Ahmed

Akgiinduz,

ed.,

Osmanli

Kanunnameleri

ve

Hukuki

Tahlilleri.




9/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

467

Although

the

weight

of

the

Mamluk

gold

coin

was

less than the

Otto

man

one,

that of the

standard

Mamluk

silver

coin

was

more

than theOtto

man akce,

weighing

around 1.4-1.5 g. in the late fifteenth century, and ca.

1.1

g.

in

the

early

sixteenth

century,

if

one

were

to

rely

on

the

weight

of

extant

coins.

When

Selim

I

conquered

the

area,

the

gold

coins

struck

in

his

name

followed the

standard

of the

ghawri

ashrafls,

which

were

the

most

recent

and

the

least

valuable

in

terms

of silver

currency.

Yet

the

silver

coins

struck

in

the

name

of Selim

I

by

the first ttoman

governor

of

Egypt

seem

to

have lowered standards

even

more,

and

probably

continued

the

trend

of

debasement

visible

since the late

fifteenth

century.17

Around 1522, new silver coins were struck thatwere decreed to be

equivalent

to

the

value

of

two

and

a

half of the

former

coins,

meaning

those that

had

been struck

by

the

firstOttoman

governor.

Twenty-five

of

the

new

silver

coins

were

to

be worth

one

gold

ducat.

Although

there

seems to

have been

quite

a

bit of

opposition

to

this

policy,

the

Ottoman

administrative code

(kanunname)

of

Egypt,

dated

to

1524-5,

sanctioned

it.

According

to

this

code,

out

of

a

100

dirhems

(307.2

g.)

mix

of

silver and

copper,

which

was

to

contain

84%

silver,

250

paras

were

to

be

struck. Thus

each

para

was

supposed

to

weigh

1.23

g.

and

contain

1.03

g.

of

silver.

Not

surprisingly,

the

average

weight

of

a

sample

of

4

silver

coins

struck

in

Egypt

in

the

name

of

Siileyman

I

(r. 1520-66)

is

thus

1.22

g.

Moreover,

25

of

these

paras

were

to

equal

the value of

a

gold

coin

struck

in

accord

ance

with the

standards

of

Istanbul,

and the future

gold

coins

to

be struck

in

Egypt

were

to

follow that

standard,

that

is

ca.

3.55

g.

of

pure

gold

for

a

sultani.18

Although

there

is

no

conclusive

evidence,

what

seems

to

have

happened

in

1522,

and

was

indeed sanctioned

in

1524-5,

was

a

restoration

of

the

9

vols.

(Istanbul:

Osmanh

Arastirmalan

Vakfi,

1990-6):

vol.

3:

260,

272;

Sahillioglu,

Ottoman

Monetary History :

297,

Table

4a;

Halil

Sahillioglu,

1524-1525

Osmanh

biit

cesi.

Istanbul Universitesi

Iktisat Fakiiltesi

Mecmuasi 41

(1982-3):

434,

437-8.

17)

Norman D.

Nicol,

Raafet

El-Nabarawy,

and

Jere

L.

Bacharach,

eds,

Catalog

of

the

Islamic

Coins,

Glass

Weights,

Dies

and Medals

in

the

Egyptian

National

Library,

Cairo

(Malibu,

CA:

Undena

Publications,

1982):

95,

98;

Sahillioglu,

Osmanh

para

tarihi :

96-7,

n.

9,

11;

Olcer,

Osmanh

Sikkeleri:

159;

Stanford

J.

Shaw,

The

Financial

and Admin

istrative

Organization

and

Development of

Ottoman

Egypt,

1517-1798

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1962):

65.

18)

Sahillioglu,

Osmanh

para

tarihi :

97,

n.

11;

ibrahim

Artuk,

Kanuni

Sultan

Suleyman

Adma Basilan

Sikkeler

(Ankara:

Turk Tarih

Kurumu,

1972):

64-65;

Akgundiiz,

Osmanh

Kanunndmeleri;

vol. 6:

139.




10/46

468

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

Mamluk

standards,

as

the

administrative code refers

to

the

exchange

rate

of

25

paras

to

the

ducat

as

the

old

law

(kanun-i

kadim) 19

Unfortunately,

we do not know the exact weight and fineness of the lastMamluk silver

coins,

but

Eliyahu

Ashtor,

relying

on

the

account

of

a

contemporary

Euro

pean

traveler,

suggests

that

25

made

a

ducat

in

1507,

and

that the

gold?

silver

ratio

accompanying

this

exchange

rate

was

1:8.5,

which

signifies

a

sharp

increase

in

the value of silver

against

gold

hence

implying

a

silver

scarcity,

as,

according

to

Ashtor,

the

ratio

in

1497

had been

1:11.1.

The

gold?silver

ratio

instituted

by

the Ottomans

in

1522

and

sanctioned

in

1524-5

was

1:7.25.20

Thus either the

Ottomans

had

further increased the

value of silver

against

gold,

or this increase had

already

taken

place

between

1507

and

1517,

the date

of the

Ottoman

conquest.

Actually,

Balog

sug

gests

that

the

Mamluk

silver

coins

struck

during

the

reign

of

Qansawh

al

Ghawri

(1501-16)

were

drastically

reduced

to

a mere

1

gram.

If

this

last

reduction

had

not

changed

the

value

of the

ducat,

the

gold?silver

ratio

at

the

time

theOttomans

conquered Egypt

might

have

been around

1:7.14,

which

is

quite

close

to

the

one

instituted

by

the

Ottomans.

It is

beyond

doubt, however,

that

the Ottoman

administration

sanctioned

a

gold?

silver ratio thatwas

quite

different from the one

prevalent

in

Istanbul,

which

was

1:11.3

at

the time.21

These

varying

gold?silver

ratios

point

toward

the

existence

of

great

arbitrage

opportunities

which

resulted

from

the

large

discrepancy

between

the value

of

gold

in

Istanbul

and

Egypt.

In

Istanbul

a

gold

ducat

was

worth

55

akces,

each

containing

0.73

g.

of

silver,

which would

make

a

little

more

than 40

g.

of

silver,

while

in

Egypt

the

same

gold

coin

could

be

obtained

with less

than 26

g.

of silver. Thus

26

g.

of silver

coinage

exchanged

with

gold

in

Egypt

was

worth 40

g.

of silver

in

Istanbul.

Apparently,

silverwas

much

more

valuable

in

Egypt

than

in

Istanbul,

or

gold

was

much

cheaper,

which

suggests

that

silverwould

have

moved south

to

Egypt

while

gold

would

have headed

north

to

Istanbul.

The latter

part

of

this

equation

is

19)

Akgiindiiz,

Osmanh

Kanunnameleri:

vol.

6:

124.

20)

Eliyahu

Ashtor,

Les

metauxprecieux

et

la balance

despayements

du

proche-orient

a

la

basse

epoque

Paris:

EVPEN,

1971):

49.

The

gold?silver

ratio

may

be

calculated

bymultiply

ing

the

silver

content

of the

silver

currency

with

its

exchange

rate

against

the

gold

currency,

and

then

dividing

the

result

by

the

weight

of

the

gold

currency:

(1.03

x

25):

3.55

=

7.25.

21)

Balog,

The

Coinage

of

the

amluk

Sultans:

43.

At

that

time

420

akces

were

struck

from

100

dirhems

(307.2

g.)

of

pure

silver,

so an

akce contained

0.73

g.

of

silver.

55

akces

made

a

ducat.

Thus

(0.73

x

55):

3.55

=

11.3;

Sahillioglu,

1524-1525 :

434;

Sahillioglu,

Osmanh

para

tarihi'>:

42,

64.




11/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

469

verified

by

the

fact

that

Egypt

sent

its

tribute

to

the

Ottoman

capital

in

gold

coins,

a

point

that

will be

revisited

below.

It is also

interesting

to note thatwhile the

Egyptian

para contained

only

1.03

g.

of

silver,

it

was

valued

at

2

akces

in

relation

to

theOttoman

akce,

which

was

supposed

to

contain

0.73

g.

of silver

at

that time.22

Intrinsically,

the

para

should

have been worth

1.4

akces,

or

1.5

akces

at

the

most.

Thus

the

Egyptian

para

was

definitely

overvalued

in

terms

of

its

silver

content.

This

only

makes

sense

when the

exchange

value of the

para

and

the

akce

against

the

gold

ducat

is

taken

into

consideration.

Using

the

gold

ducat

as

a

measure

according

to

which

25

paras

equaled

55

akces,

one

would

expect

the

para

to be worth 2.2 akces

(55/25).

This is

significantly

closer to the

official

exchange

rate

of

2

akces

to

the

para.

The

respective

values

of

the

para

and the akce

against

the ducat

must

therefore

have

been

decisive

for

establishing

their

exchange

values

against

each

other?not

a

comparison

of

their

silver

contents.

The

available

evidence thus

suggests

that

Egypt

and

the Levant

which

constituted the Ottoman

para

zone,

on

the

one

hand,

and Anatolia

and

the

Balkans,

where the akce

reigned

supreme,

on

the

other,

had

different

gold?silver

ratios in

the

early

sixteenth

century.

Although

these

two

regions

are

close

to

each

other,

this

difference

was

not

new.

For

instance,

for the

Middle

Ages,

the

ratio

of

gold

to

silver

is

suggested

to

have

been 1:14

in

the

Muslim

Middle

East

while

it

was

1:18

in

Byzantium.23

What

this

meant

in

practice

was

that

one

could

get

a

unit

of

gold

in

exchange

for

14

units of

silver

in

Cairo,

go

to

Constantinople,

exchange

that

unit

of

gold

for

18 units

of

silver,

bring

the

silver

to

Cairo,

convert

it

to

gold again,

and

keep

an

extra

4 units

of silver

as a

28.6%

profit

created

by

arbitrage

opportunities.

This

same sort

of

opportunity

apparently

also

existed

in

the

early

sixteenth

century,

as

the

gold?silver

ratios in

Cairo

and

Istanbul

were

1:7.25

and

1:11.3,

respectively.

Arbitrage

opportunities

occur

when

two

market

zones

function

rela

tively

independently

from

each

other;

due

to

less

developed

market rela

tions

zones

are

either

not

well

informed

about

each

other's

respective

22)

For

the

value

of

the

para

in terms

of

the

akce

in

Egypt,

see

Akgiinduz,

Osmanli

Kanun

ndmeleri'. vol.

6;

111.

Three

financial

regulations

from

the

Adana

area

that

date from

ca.

1526,

1536,

and

1547

give

the

exchange

rate

of

the

para

as

2

akces

as

well;

Akgunduz,

Osmanli

Kanunndmeleri: vol.

5:

608,

613,

vol.

7: 191.

23)

K. N.

Chaudhuri,

The

Economic

and

Monetary

Problem

of

European

Trade

with

Asia

during

the

Seventeenth

and

Eighteenth

Centuries.

The

Journal

of

uropean

Economic

History

4

(1975):

343.




12/46

470

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

conditions,

or

they

are

not

engaged

in

a

sufficient

number of

transactions

to

have

an

influence

on

each

other.

If,

on

the

other

hand,

these

two

zones

had been economically well-connected to each other, themovement of

silver

to

the

place

where

it

was

more

valuable

in

terms

of

gold

would

even

tually

alter

the

gold?silver

ratios

in

both

regions,

bringing

them

to

the

same

level,

at

which

point

arbitrage

profits

would

no

longer

be

possible.

It

seems

that such

a

development

did indeed take

place

with

regard

to

the

Levant

and

the central

lands of

the Ottoman

Empire

during

the first half

of the sixteenth

century.

Andrea

Berengo,

whose

letters

from

Aleppo

written

in

1555-6

have

been

published, provides

some data to establish the

weight

and the

exchange

rate

of the

para

during

this

period.

He

states

that 6

maidins,

or

paras,

were

worth

a

mocenigo,

a

Venetian

silver

currency

of

almost

pure

silver

that

weighed

6.52

g.

To

be

more

precise,

Berengo

notes

that

47

mocenigos

were

exchanged

for

300

maidins

in

terms

of their

weight,

which

suggests

that each

para

contained

1.02

g.

of silver. This silver

con

tent

is

quite

close

to

the

prescribed

silver

content

of the

para,

1.03

g.

Yet

the

exchange

value

he

assigns

to

the

ducat

is

40

paras,24

which

is

well above

the

prescribed

rate of

25

paras

in the administrative code of

Egypt.

At 40

paras

a

ducat with each

para

containing

1.03

g.

of

silver,

a

ducat

was

worth

41.2

g.

of silver

in

the

Levant

in

1555,

which

gives

a

gold?

silver

ratio

of

1:11.6.

However,

in

Istanbul,

the

ducat

was

worth 60 akces

around

the

same

time.

With

each

akce

containing

0.73

g.

of

silver,

this

would

make

43.8

g.

of silver and indicate

a

gold?silver

ratio

of

1:12.34.

Thus,

in

the

thirty

years

between

1525

and

1555,

the

gold?silver

ratio

prevalent

in

the

Levant

apparently

came

much closer

to

the

one

in

the

central lands

of theOttoman

Empire,

most

probably

as a

result of

increas

ing

commercial

connections

that evened

out

the differences

which

had

created

the

arbitrage

profits

in

the

first

place.

Moreover,

the

exchange

rate

of

the

akce

against

the

para

changed

to

reflect the

new

value

of the

ducat

in

paras.

Whereas

the

para

was

valued

at

2

akces

in

1525

when

25

paras

made

a

ducat,

later

rates

suggest

that

1.5

akces

were

counted

as

the

equiv

alent

of

one

para,

which

makes

sense

since

now

40

paras

and

60

akces

equaled

each

other

in

terms

of the

value of

the

ducat.25

24)

UgoTucci,

ed.,

Lettresdun

marchandvenitienAndreaBerengo,

1553-1556(Paris:

SEVPEN,

1957):

95,

354,

355,

359.

25)

Walther

Hinz,

Islamische

Wahrungen

umgerechnet

in

Gold

(Wiesbaden:

Otto

Harrassowitz,

1991):

13,

42-3.




13/46


14/46

472

B. Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

the

Levant

had

been

an

independent

currency

zone

in

which

a

different

gold?silver

ratio

operated

at

the

time

of

the

Ottoman

conquest,

by

the

middle of the sixteenth

century

this area had become far better

integrated

into

themarkets of the

central

Ottoman

lands

as

indicated

by

the

change

in its

gold?silver

ratio,

which

came

quite

close

to

the

one

prevalent

in

Istanbul.

Thus

it

seems

justified

to

claim

that

the

forces of themarket

oper

ated

against

the

will

of

the

administration

by

bringing

the

different

cur

rency

zones

closer

to

each

other,

a

point

to

be

discussed

further below.

Finally,

the

Egyptian

debasement

of

ca.

1565

and the

Ottoman

one

around

the

same

time,

which

were

not

accompanied

by

a

devaluation

of

the

coinage

in terms

of

the

official

value

of

the

ducat,

imply

that

a new

currency

zone

in

which silver

was

relatively

more

scarce

and

valuable

in

terms

of

gold

was

in

close

contact

with the

rest

of the

empire.

According

to

the

correspondence

between

Cairo and

Istanbul

in

1552,

silver

was

moving

toward

this

unidentified

area,

and the

way

to

stop

this

movement

was a

debasement

of the

coinage.

In

the

next

section,

I

will

argue

that this

area was

Persia.

II

Another

currency

zone

in

the

Ottoman

Empire

can

be characterized

as

the

realm

of

the

sahi,

originally

a

Persian

silver

currency

that continued

to

circulate

in

Safavid

Persia

even

after

the

Ottomans struck their

own

sahis

following

the

conquest

of

the

western

Safavid

lands

during

the

reign

of

Suleyman

I.

The market

value

of

the

Ottoman

sahi

in

terms

of the

akce

and the para has a lot to do with the Persian shahi?*which was introduced

by

the

Safavid

ruler Shah

Ismail

in

the

early

sixteenth

century.

The

Safavid

coinage

went

through

a

number

of

debasements

during

the

sixteenth

century,

but

only

those

that

happened

in

the

second

half

of

the

sixteenth

century

seem to

have

had

an

impact

on

the

Ottoman

akce. Around

1501,

at

the

outset

of

the

reign

of Shah

Ismail,

the

Safavid

50

dinar

piece

called

shahi

weighed

9.4

g.29

According

to

Stephen

Album,

in

1518

the

weight

of the

shahi

was

reduced

to

7.88

g.

Around

1530,

it

28)

In

order

to

distinguish

the Persian from

the Ottoman

coin,

the

former

will

be

referred

to

hereafter

as

shahi,

the latter

as

sahi.

29)

H.

L.

Rabino

di

Borgomale,

Coins,

Medals

and Seals

of

the

Shdhs

of

Iran,

1500-1941

(Hertford:

Stephen

Austin

and

Sons,

1945):

Table

II

(following

p.

8);

see

Tezcan,

Search

ing

for

Osman :

315-6

(n.

46),

for

a

discussion

on

the

accuracy

of this

weight.




15/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

473

was

further

reduced

to

6.22

g.

Some

ten

years

later,

the shahi

weighed

5.25

g.

Around

1547,

the

shahi

was

debased

once

again

to

4.67

g.30

Thus, ifAlbum's conclusions are correct, between 1501 and 1550, the

Safavid

shahi lost

half

of

its

silver

content.

The Ottoman

akce,

however,

did

not

go

through

any

debasements

between

1491

and the

reign

of

Selim

II

(1566-74).

Consequently,

one

could

claim that the

Safavid debase

ments

of

the

first alf

of

the sixteenth

century

did

not

have

an

impact

on

the

Ottoman

akce.

This

picture,

however,

changes

in

the second

half

of

the sixteenth

cen

tury.

Berengo,

our

Venetian merchant

in

Aleppo,

provides

some

valuable

information

regarding

a Persian debasement in his letters of 1555. That

year

no

silk arrived from

Persia since

the Safavid

shah himself

had

bought

500

loads

of

it

for

export

to

India.

Yet the shah

paid

themerchants

half

the

price

because

he has made the

money

the half

ofwhat

they

were

worth

in

spite

of

the

protests

of the

people,

i.e. his

coins

are

called

saie

[shahi]

they

are

worth

here

18

soldi

a

piece,

and

he

has

made

two

out

of

one

and

given

them

out

as

good

coin. 31

In

a

subsequent

letter,

Berengo

states

that

the

new

shahi that

the

shah

had

struck

was

worth half the value of the old

one,

i.e.

9

soldi. At this

time,

18

soldi

were

worth

approximately

0.11

gold

ducats.

Thus

one

would

expect

the

former

Persian

shahi

to

be worth

4.5

paras,

and

the

new one

2.25

paras

at

40

paras,

or

maidins,

per

ducat.

Berengo

cites

the

very

same

values.32

Berengo

is

not

the

only

source

which

suggests

that

the

Safavids

under

took

a

major

debasement before

the

Ottoman

one.

Fernand

Braudel

states

30)

Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins: 126-7; Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 59-61, relying

on

Rabino di

Borgomale,

Coins,

Medals

and

Seals

of

the

Shahs

of

Iran,

1500-1941:

28, 30,

regards

the

denomination of these

coins

differently,

yet

he does

agree

that

the shahi

lost

a

lot of

its

silver

content

during

the

reign

of

Tahmasp.

I

took

Albums

western

Safavid

stan

dard

into

consideration here.

The

Safavids

also

had

an

eastern

standard

in

the

provinces

of

Khorasan

and

Gurgan,

while

the

province

of

Mazandaran

had

its

own

standard;

see

Album,

A

Checklist

of

Islamic Coins:

126,

n.

138.

31)

Quoted

by

Steensgaard,

The

Asian

Trade

Revolution

of

the

Seventeenth

Century:

419;

this

particular

letter

is

dated November

3,

1555.

32)

Tucci,

Lettres

d'un marchand

venitien

Andrea

Berengo,

1553-1556: 92

(letter

#86,

dated

November

15,

1555),

101

(#93,

ovember

17),

113

(#100,

ovember

17),

126

(#109,

November

18);

see

also letters

#87,

88,

91,

96,

pp.

93,

95, 98,

106.

20

soldi made

a

lira,

and

in

1533

a

Venetian

gold

ducat

was

valued

at

7

lire

and

18

soldi;

in

1562,

its

value

is

recorded

as

8

lire;

W.

A.

Shaw,

The

History

of Currency,

1252

to

1894,

third

ed.

(New

York:

G.

P. Putnam's

Sons and

Clement

Wilson,

1896):

317.

If

we

take

8

lire

as

the value

of the

ducat

in

1555

as

well,

we

would

arrive

t

(18: [8

x

20]

=)

0.1125.




16/46

474

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

that the

Ottoman

devaluation

of

the

mid

1580s

followed

a

similar deval

uation

in

Persia,...

which

had

devalued

the

currency

by

50

per

cent at

a

stroke. Inalcik,who

perhaps

relied on Braudel, states that a 50% devalua

tion

occurred

in

Persia

in

1585.

However,

Steensgaard

asserts

that he

did

not

find

any

evidence

in

support

of

Braudel

s

statement,

although

he

was

aware

of the debasement that

Berengo

refers

to,

which

he

prefers

to

regard

simply

as

a

50%

devaluation

in

terms

of

money

of

account.

Pamuk,

on

the other

hand,

believes

that

there

might

have

been

a

devaluation

in

Iran

in

1584,

and

suggests

that,

if

proven,

this devaluation

would have been

a

major

factor

in

contributing

to

the

Ottoman

devaluation

and

debasement

of

the later

1580s,

yet

he

adds

that the

evidence isnot clear.33

Although

twentieth-century

studies

tend

to concentrate

on

the

1580s

to

date

the Safavid

devaluation,

which

is

probably

due

to

Braudels

wording,

the

primary

source

of

Braudels

source

carries

us

further

back.

Braudel

cites

J.

W.

Zinkeisen,34

but

the

ultimate

source

is

an

Italian

physician,

Minadoi

(1540-1615),

who,

after

taking

his medical

degree,

traveled for

seven

years

in

the Ottoman

dominions.

In

his

book

on

the

Ottoman-Safavid

wars,

which he

wrote

in

1587

with

an

account

of the

events

of the

war

through

to

the

end of

1586,

he

states:

Touching

the

reuenues

of this

kingdome

[Safavid

Persia],

the

common

opinion

is,

that

in

the

dayes

of

Kinge

Tamas

[Tahmasp

(1524-76)]

the

crowne

did

yearely

receaue

into

the

Chamber

of

Casbin,

foure

or

Hue millions

of

gold,

which

afterward

he caused

to

be worth

eight

millions,

by

a

sudden

enhaunsing

of the

value

of his

coyne,

geuing

in

commandment

by

most

seuere

Edictes,

that

ouer

all his

Empyre,

for

a

certayne

space,

all the

money

that

he had

receaued,

should bee

taken and

accompted

for

asmuch

more

as

it

was

worth, and accordingly

made

pay

to

his souldiers

and

Sultans,

& all other

that

were

in

his

pay.

Which

example

(mee-thinkes)

was

well

followed

by

Amurat

the

now

king

of

the

urkes

[Murad

III

(1574-95)],

who

receauing

t

the

Citty

ofCairo

the

Cechino of

gold

[sequin]

for xliii.

Maidini,

he

put

it

out

againe

in

Constantinople,

to

pay

his

Capigi

and

Ianissaries,

withall

lxxxv.

Maidini,

commanding

that

it

should

be

of

that

value

ouer

all the

Citty,

and

countryes

subiect

vnto

it.35

33)

Fernand

Braudel,

TheMediterranean

nd

the

editerraneanWorld

in

the

Age

of

hilip

I,

tr.

Sian

Reynolds.

2

vols.

(New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1972):

vol.

1:

540,

vol.

2:

1195;

Inalcik,

Notes

on a

Study

of

the Turkish

Economy :

253,

n.

109;

Steensgaard,

The

Asian

Trade

Revolution

of

the

Seventeenth

Century:

419;

Pamuk,

A

Monetary

History

of

the

Ottoman

Empire-.

137.

34)

J.W

Zinkeisen,

Geschichte

des osmanischen

Reiches

in

Europa.

7

vols.

(Gotha:

F.

A.

Perthes,

1840-63):

vol.

3:

802-3.

35)

Iohn-Thomas

Minadoi,

The

History of

the

Warres

hetweene the

Tvrkes

and

the

Persians,

tr.

Abraham

Hartwell

(London:

Iohn

Wolfe,

1595):

76.




17/46

The

Ottoman

Monetary

Crisis

of1585

Revisited

475

Minadoi's

account

of the

Persian

devaluation thus

suggests

that

it

hap

pened

during

the

reign

of Shah

Tahmasp,

i.e.

before

1576,

and

not

in

the

early

1580s. The information

provided

by

Minadoi, who

apparently

had

not

witnessed

the

devaluation but had heard about

it,

is in

linewith

Ber

engo's

account.

Since

the fiscal reforms

of

the Ilkhanid

ruler

Ghazan

Khan

(r.

1295-1304),

Persia

had

a

regulated

system

of

money

of

account,

accord

ing

to

which

10,000

dinars

made

a

toman

(Mongol

for

10,000).

Silver

coins

came

in

different

denominations with their

values

assigned

in

dinars.36

What

Berengo

refers

to

as

the

old

shahi

was

equivalent

to

the

50

dinars

piece

of

ca.

4.6

g.

The

information

provided

by

both

Berengo

and Minadoi

suggests

that

Tahmasp

increased the value of this coin to

100

dinars and struck smaller

coins

of

ca.

2.3

g.

that

he

valued

at

50

dinars.

The numismatic

evidence

supports

this

hypothesis

to

a

large

extent.

Album,

whose work

represents

the

latest

research

on

Safavid

coinage,

argues

that

the

2.3

g.

coins

were

worth half

a

shahi,

i.e.

25

dinars,

in

the

period

1547-52,

while

the shahis of

50

dinars

weighed

ca.

4.7

g.

Around

1553,

the

denominational

value of

the former

shahi

was

increased

to

80

dinars,

and

that of

the former half

shahi

to

40 dinars.

In

976

/

1568-9,

the

denominational values of these two coins were further

increased

to 100

and

50

dinars

respectively,

fixing

the

50

dinar

shahi

at ca.

2.3

g.,

a

standard

that

survived

well

until

1596.37

Album,

however,

does

not

provide

any

justification

for

his choice

of

80

and 40

dinars,

which

is

based

on

the

assumption

that

the

bisti,

i.e.

20

dinars,

was

the

main

denominational

value

in

the

period

1553-68.

However,

Berengo's

testimony

from

1555

quoted

above

indicates

that the

main unit

of the

Safavid

currency

in

circulation

was

the

shahi.

Moreover,

Arthur

Edwards,

an

English

merchant

who

worked

under the

umbrella of

the Russia

Company,

wrote

to

his

superiors

from

Shirvan

on

April

26,

1566

stating

that

200

shaughes

is

a

tumen.

Edwards

also

quotes

most

prices

in

shahis,

which

confirms that

the shahi of

50

dinars

was

the

main

unit

of

denomination

at

the

time.38

Thus

if

Albums

bisti

standard

for

1553-68

were

corrected with

the

shahi,

the

Safavid

debasement

of

1553,

36)

Walther

Hinz,

The

Value of the

Toman

in

the

Middle

Ages.

In

Ydd-ndme-ye Irdni-ye

Minorsky,

eds

Mojtaba

Minovi

and

I.

Afshar

(Tehran:

Publications

of

Tehran

University,

1969):

90-5.

37)

Album,

A

Checklist

of

Islamic

Coins:

127-8;

I

omit

Albums

discussion of

the

eastern

standards

within

the

Safavid

Empire,

which

would

not

have

had

much of

an

influence

on

the

Ottomans.

38)

E.

Delmar

Morgan

and

C.

H.

Coote,

eds,

Early Voyages

to

Russia

and

Persia.

2

vols.




18/46

476

B.

Tezcan

JESHO

52

(2009)

460-504

established

by

numismatic

evidence,

would corroborate the

report

of

Ber

engo

from

1555

and

Minadoi's reference

to

the

reign

of

Shah

Tahmasp

as

the time of the Safavid devaluation.

Unfortunately,

Berengo

does

not

provide

any

information

about the

exchange

rate

between the Persian

shahi of

50

dinars and the Ottoman

akce.

Yet

the

exchange

rate

he

quotes

for the

old

Persian

shahi,

i.e.

4.5

paras,

suggests

that the

old

Persian

shahi

should have been worth

ca.

7

akces

or

5

paras

prior

to

its

devaluation.39

Not

surprisingly,

the

Ottoman

sahi

was

also

valued

at

7

akces

and

5

paras

as

will be

discussed below. The

new

Persian

shahi, then,

should

have been worth

3.5

akces.

There

is

addi

tional evidence which

suggests

that the new Persian shahiwas worth the

equivalent

of

4

akces

in

Iran.40

The

Ottomans,

after their

conquest

of

the

western

Safavid lands

in

the

1530s,

struck

coins

that

were

larger

than the

akce

and

were

meant

to

take

the

place

of the former

Persian

shahis.

According

to

the

numismatic evi

dence,

these

coins

originally

seem

to

have

weighed

4.4

g.,

which

is

quite

close

to

the

Documents

The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited