The Nomonhan Incident Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union

The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet UnionAuthor(s): Katsu H. YoungSource: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (1967), pp. 82-102Published by: Sophia UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2383224 .Accessed: 28/01/2011 02:04

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The Nomonhan Incident IMPERIAL JAPAN AND THE

SOVIET UNION

by KATSU H. YOUNG

(I INTRODUCTION

A DECADE after the establishment of relations, the Soviet Union came to be looked upon as the primary threat to the security of Imperial Japan. The Chief of Staff of the

Kwantung Army expressed this opinion in a talk with Arita Hachir6, who became Foreign Minister in the Cabinet ofHirota K6kii a few days later (April 2, I936). On this occasion it was observed that in recent years the national power of the Bolshevik state had been increasing steadily, and that it now possessed an army of over one million four hundred thousand having ideal organization, equipment, and so forth. It was also observed that there had been an especially remarkable increase of Soviet military strength in the Far East. It was thought that, as a natural result of this fact, Soviet diplomacy toward Japan had assumed an aggressively "hard" line-in contrast to the "soft" and passive line of earlier years.2

(II BACKGROUND TO NOMONHAN

THE Soviet Union had pursued a rather conciliatory diplomatic policy toward Japan since the two countries opened relations in I925. However, conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany in November, I936, marked the beginning of a rapid de- terioration in Soviet-Japanese relations. As the China Incident developed, relations between the two nations became ever more difficult and complex. Continual and numerous border disputes erupted along the frontiers of Manchukuo facing the Soviet Union and Mongolia;

MTHE AUTHOR is currently completing her dissertation at the University of Washington. It is tenta- tively entitled "TheJapanese Army and the Soviet Union, I936-4I." This article is a portion of that dissertation. She wishes to acknowledge with gratitude a grant (the Shirley Farr Fellowship) from the American Association of University Women which supported her research during the year i965-66.

1 4E,a/Ji A W e 2 Harada Kumao , eAi' it4, Jutsu d& Saionji kd

to seikyoku x5 Z F & (Prince Saionji and the Political Situation), 9 vols., Iwanami shoten M it

t A, Tokyo, I950-5i and I956, V, 44; "Kanto- gun no nimmu ni motozuku taigai shomondai ni kansuru gun no iken" A *_ f- ) * I < 13'11 # - - v M

- 69 * 7 , I J (The KwantungArmy's Opinion on the Various Problems of Foreign Rela- tions from the Point of View of the Duties of the Army), in Nihon gaiko nempyo narabi ni shuyo bunsho Ei *t*+ A-)- X t (Chronological Tables

and Major Documents Pertaining to Japan's For- eign Relations), Gaimush6 S1*d- , ed., 2 vols., Nihon kokusai reng6ky6kai El 4I1I 14, Tokyo, I955, II, 330-335.

YOUNG. "The Nomonhan Incident" 83

old issues such as the northern seas fisheries and Japanese exploitation rights in northern Sakhalin continued, and a new problem was posed by Soviet assistance to the Chinese.3 The border disputes, which were often accompanied by military action, were reported con- stantly in the newspapers. This served as a constant reminder of the Soviet threat to the "life line" of the Japanese Empire, the Kanch'atzu affair of the early summer of I937 being used as but one example.4 But the first really large-scale military struggle to develop from disputes over the ill-defined Manchukuoan frontier was the Changkufeng5 Incident. This broke out in July, I938, at the juncture of the frontiers of Manchukuo, Korea, and the Soviet Union.

On July i i, a group of about forty Soviet soldiers climbed a hill on the Manchukuoan frontier, after which they constructed a fortified position. The Japanese Army regarded this as a violation of the frontier. Fighting soon began, and reinforcements were dispatched by both sides. The Japanese forces engaged eventually included one full division from the Korean Army and reinforcing units from the Kwantung Army, while the Soviets employed at least two artillery divisions. From the outset the position of the Kwantung Army Head- quarters was that the employment of forces was absolutely necessary; that the Soviet forces must withdraw from Changkufeng; and that at that time the Soviet Union would not dare to enlarge the theater of operations even if theJapanese used military forces to dislodge them from the disputed hill. This judgement was based upon military intelligence reports stating that there was no sign of any Soviet intention to dispatch large-scale reinforcements, as well as the belief that bitter strife existed between the Red Army and the Soviet Secret Police (G.P.U.).6 The manner in which the Kanch'atzu affair had been settled the previous summer also promoted this judgement.

3 China and the Soviet Union concluded a five- year Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact in Nanking on August 2I, I937, one month and a half after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. At about the same time rumors of a Sino-Soviet military alliance and secret treaties were also circulating. See Tanaka Bun'ichiro el t A - O, "Nis'so kosho shi" El / Rz

)f a (A History of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union), Gaimush6 Oakyoku dai ikka.* F K rt .A,97 g- , Tokyo, April, I942,' originally classified as "Secret," p. 233. This is one of the items listed in Cecil H. Uyehara, Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, I868-I945. Microfilmed for the Library of Congress, I949-5I, Photoduplica- tion Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., I954. Its number in the microfilmed collection is SP 4, Reel SP 3. Hereafter this reference will be cited as JFOA, SP 4.

4 On June I9, I937, Soviet troops occupied Kanch'atzu ts --, an Amur river island. Japa-

nese and Manchukuoan troops fought with the Soviet forces and sank a Soviet gunboat. Shige- mitsu Mamoru * + A, the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, presented an official protest to the Soviet government, and as a result negotiation took place between himself and the Soviet Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov. Litvinov promised that the Soviet troops and gunboats would be withdrawn from the island and its neighboring waters. The Red Army withdrew from the island on July 5, I937. JFOA, SP 4, pp. 37- 72; Asahi shimbun 4YEl AMJ, June 22 and July 4, I937; and Hata Ikuhiko t4 , "Nitchui sens6 no gunjiteki tenkai, I937-4I" El t' A 0) X

ASnA I937-4I (Military Development of the Japa- nese-Chinese War, I937-4I), in Taibeiyd senso e no michi k;* A+ a)i (The Road to the Pa- cific War), TsunodaJun A W 'III, ed., 8 vols., Asahi shimbunsha, Tokyo, I963, IV, 80-8I.

6 Harada, vii, 55-56

84 Monumenta Nipponica, XXII, I-2

Despite this initially optimistic view, as the fighting grew more intense its issue began to swing in favor of the Soviet forces because of their advantageous topographical position and superior equipment, organization, and tactics. Accordingly, the Kwantung Army Headquarters decided to mobilize its forces for an attack upon the Soviet flank, thereby dis- tracting them from the original point ofdispute. The entire Kwantung Army forces stationed in the Eastern Frontier Zone were put on emergency alert,7 while in Tokyo on July 2I the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff requested imperial sanction for the use of all forces. The Emperor, however, refused to comply with the request. This naturally frustrated and infuriated the Kwantung Army authorities tremendously.8

By early August, both the War Ministry and the General Staffwere clamoring for an early settlement by diplomatic means. The military even agreed to abandon the disputed hill. The army's anxiety for an end to hostilities was evident in the decisions of a Three Minis- ters' Conference (War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs) held on August 5. The conferees agreed that the negotiations would be based on the Hunch'un9 Treaty of i886, as the Soviet Union insisted, and that it was essential to conclude a truce speedily in order to avoid large-scale hostilities. Japan must therefore be prepared to give up Changkufeng. Shigemitsu Mamoru, then Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was notified ofthe decision. On August IO Shigemitsu met with Maxim Litvinov and presented a draft proposal for a truce. This document contained the stipulation that theJapanese forces would withdraw one kilometer from the effective line of fighting as of midnight of August io, while the Soviet forces were to remain in the positions they held at that hour. Litvinov replied that in the interests of equitability both sides should merely cease military operations at the suggested hour while maintaining their existing positions. The Japanese ambassador readily accepted this Soviet counterpro- posal, an agreement was reached, -and a truce effectuated on August II, I938.10

Less than a month prior to the Changkufeng Incident, Major-General Ishiwara Kanji, acting for the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who was then absent, sent a secret telegram entitled "Matters Relating to Various Troubles on the Soviet-Manchukuoan Border" to the Vice-Minister of War, Lieutenant-General Toj6 Hideki. I In essence, this telegram was a request from the Kwantung Army that the War Minister grant it a carte blanche respecting any future problems which might arise between the Soviet Union and

7 Tsuji Masanobu itiA:1, Nomonhan / e v - ', T6a shob6 tA -, Tokyo, I9So, p. 39.

8 Harada, VII, 48-54; Yabe Teiji l41 , Konoe Fumimaro it* ;&, 2 vols., K6bund6 A A

t, Tokyo, I952, II, 537-558; Hata, pp. 84-85. 9 g * 10 For the development of the Changkufeng

Incident, see JFOA, SP 4, pp. 376-378; Hata, pp. 82-94; Harada, VII, So-SI, 55-56, and 65-66; and Kyokutikokusai gunji saibansokkiroku t -?$ -f A 1it* (Stenographic Record of the Interna- tional Military Tribunal for the Far East), No. go,

p. i6. (Hereafter referred to as IMTFE, Sokkiroku. This is the official Japanese transcript.) For the truce negotiations, see JFOA, SP 4, pp. 377 and 379-380; Harada, vii, 58-6o, 68-69, and 74-7S5 An extract of the record of the talks between Litvinov and Shigemitsu is to be found in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, "Transcript of Proceedings," pp. 7760-7763, 7825-7826, and 78i8. (Hereafter referred to as IMTFE, Transcript. This is the official English transcript.)

11 R1 ,A--A

YOUNG. "The Nomonhan Incident" 8S

Manchukuo, especially border disputes. The message also touched on the problem of future coordination between the Kwantung and Korean Armies, the lack of which in the past had hindered the satisfactory solution of border disputes with the Soviets.12 This telegram makes it clear that the Kwantung Army desired to have the power to settle the frequent border disputes, and furthermore, to end the competitive attempts of the Korean Army to participate in the settlement of such disputes. These facts suggest that the outbreak of the Changkufeng Incident on the Korean-Manchukuoan-Soviet frontier less than one month after the telegram may have been more than just accidental. At any rate, the evidence seems to suggest that since the time of the Kanch'atzu affair a year before, the attitude of the Kwantung Army had been very provocative, and its leading officers had been firm in their conviction that the Soviet Union would not strike at Japan while she was engaged in her war in China. Another factor behind the Changkufeng Incident may have been the prospect of the transfer of some powerful units of the Kwantung Army to the China front. From the point of view of the Kwantung Army, this was highly undesirable. Therefore, it is quite plausible to assume that the Kwantung Army intended to prevent this development by one means or other. A small-scale war with the Soviet Union would be the most effective way to persuade the army authorities in Tokyo of the absolute necessity of a strong and intact Kwantung Army for the defence of Manchukuo. In short, it would seem that the purpose of the Kwantung Army in beginning the Changkufeng affair was not only to test the strength and preparedness of the Red Army in the Far East, but to convince the army authorities in Tokyo of the importance of its existing mission in Manchukuo.13 As it turned out, the encounter ended in a disastrous defeat for the Japanese forces, and cost approximately I,3 50

casualties. 14

Thus, relying on intelligence reports which assured them that the Soviets would not strike back in force at that time, the Japanese armies in Manchukuo and Korea committed a grave blunder in determining upon hostilities with the Red Army. What, then, was the explanation of the unexpected reaction of the "enemy," a reaction which dealt the Japanese forces a dishonorable defeat? Both army and government circles believed that the formidable

12 T-779, Reel I09, Frames I87I7-I97I9, Manso kokkyd kan no kakushu shogai jiken ni kansuru ken -A V @g

; / - @ P"4 ---J - M A )/f+t (Document Con- cerning Various Violations of the Manchukuoan- Soviet Border), June i6, I938, from the Acting Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice- Minister of War, Man ji dai nikki (mitsu) ;A a k W

t&(t), 34 volumes, I938, xiv, No. 29, U.S. National Archives No. I6046. The above is one of the items included in John Young (comp.), Checklist of Microftlm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the 7apanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, I868-I945, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., I959. The number at the head

of this note constitutes the item number of this source in the Checklist. Sources cited from this documentary collection will be given in the above form when they are included for the first time.

13 An affidavit dated February 22, I946, from Major-General Akikusa Shun {kX &PA4t, in IMTFE, Transcript, p. 78I6, and IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. go, p. I7.

*14 The Japanese troops suffered 450 dead and goo wounded, while the Soviet casualties were I,200 dead, 2,000 seriously wounded, and 2,200

slightly wounded, according to one Japanese source. See JFOA, SP 4, p. 38I.

86 Monumenta Nipponica, xXu, I-2

response was motivated by a desire to divert Japanese forces and attention to the northern border at the very time when the Imperial Army was about to begin the campaign for the reduction of Hankow in China. 15 This undertaking was considered to be the most important operation since the opening of the struggle in China. Thus, both the Soviet reaction and the resulting estimate of Soviet intentions were factors in the army's anxiety to localize and terminate the Changkufeng affair at all cost.

The encounter was a great shock, and taught theJapanese forces in Manchukuo and Korea a lesson respecting the actual strength and determination of the Soviet forces in the Far East. The shock, however, was not severe enough to alter the views and policies of the leading elements of the two Japanese armies (as is shown by Nomonhan less than a year later). On the contrary, it only served to deepen their conviction that the Soviet Union was the principal enemy of the Japanese Empire in the Far East, and that an all-out war with the Soviets was inevitable-a mere matter of time and favorable opportunity. It was with this conviction in mind that, four months after the settlement of the Changkufeng Incident, the Kwantung Army compiled a lengthy, confidential study entitled "The Influence of the Changkufeng Incident on the Popular Feelings of the Manchukuoan People." The Staff Office of the Kwantung Army had based the study on various intelligence reports received during and after the incident. The report was sent to the War Ministry as an important reference work. Its introduction showed that the command of the Kwantung Army looked upon the incident as a miniature model of what a full-scale war with the Soviets would be like, and that the behavior of the various ethnic groups within Manchukuo was thought to constitute a very important factor in the development of such a war. After a detailed treat- ment of the incident and its effects on the populace of Manchukuo, the authors of the document summed up their views in the following manner:

"With numerically small forces but great endurance and prudence, the Japanese Army was able to crush the mighty material power of the Soviet Union, and maintain the Manchukuoan border line securely. All quarters [of the Manchu- kuoan people] are equally impressed by the great capacities of the Japanese Army, and in particular, the confidence of the Manchukuoan people in the Japanese Army was greatly enhanced."

This document was marked "top secret," and never intended for public distribution. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did not frankly admit its defeat. Rather to the contrary, it indulged in more self-praise than self-criticism. Thus, the report may have been an attempt to propagandize the High Command and the War Ministry, thereby enhancing the prestige of the Kwantung Army within the Imperial Army as a whole. Only the phrase "the mighty material power of the Soviet Union" gave some evidence of actual reevaluation and apprehension. There is no doubt, however, that the command of the Kwantung Army had become very much aware of the necessity for greater effort and expense to equip themselves

15 Loc. cit. See also the following note.


with modern mechanized arms in order to be able to match the Red Army in the future.16 The year I938 was slipping away as the China campaign continued rolling on with

little hope of an end. At home the Japanese government was painfully torn over the issue of strengthening treaty relations with Germany and Italy. The leaders ofthe Konoe Cabinet had agreed that an anti-Soviet military alliance with those powers-as an extension of the Anti- Comintern Pact-would be conducive to a speedy and favorable disposal of the China Inci- dent. It was felt that such treaty relations would alleviate the Soviet threat from the north, thereby allowing Japan to shift a part of the Kwantung Army from Manchukuo to the military theater in China. 17 When it was discovered that the Germans desired a general military alliance directed against other unspecified powers in addition to the Soviet Union, the army quickly expressed its willingness to accept this proposal. The civilian leaders and the navy, on the other hand, steadfastly opposed it, insisting that the new treaty could have no other nation than the Soviet Union as its object. Unable either to conclude the China Incident or resolve the disagreement over the proposed alliance, the Konoe Cabinet resigned en bloc, and the new year witnessed the birth of a cabinet headed by Baron Hiranuma Kiichir5.18 During the tenure of the Hiranuma Cabinet over seventy sessions of the Five Ministers' Conference (the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) were held in a seven-month period. These constant meetings were an effort to settle the disagreements inherited from the Konoe government respecting the proposed alliance. War Minister Itagaki Seishiro continued to insist that the German proposal be accepted, and was sharply opposed by the Foreign and Navy Ministers, Arita Hachira and Yonai Mitsumasa,19 respectively. (All three of these ministers retained their portfolios when the change of cabinet took place.) Germany annexed Czechoslovakia in March, I939,

thereby greatly intensifying the antagonism between the Axis and the western powers, as well as the apprehensions of the opponents of an Axis alliance within Japan. Within the context of such international developments the problem of the proposed alliance was becoming ever more difficult to resolve. The army began to busy itself with activities calculated to bring about the early conclusion of the alliance. It employed various rightist groups to stir up public opinion during the T'ientsin Incident (a consequence ofJapanese military operations in China), and various Manchukuoan border disputes were prominently publicized.20 All this was intended to make public opinion favorable to the Axis, and to force the government

16 T-783, Reel I09, Frames I874I-I8796, Chokoho jiken no Manshbkoku minshin ni oyoboshitaru eiky5 ni kansuru ken M A * 4t - / Afj Ag , _: A

, -/ A, -V # _ M 7 A'/ 4+ (Document Concerning the Effect of the Changkufeng Incident on the Psychology of the Manchukuoan People), Decem- ber I, I938, from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice-Minister of War, Man ji dai nikki

Cmitsu9 34 vol., I938, xxxiv, No. 20, U.S. National Archives No. i6o65.

17 IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. 74, p. 8. 18 f. _ -f

19 4ki k , 4t 20 The army, especially the Military Affairs

Section of the War Ministry, was supplying funds to various rightist groups, and the kempeitai T,- (Military Police) gave such groups guidance on the conduct ofanti-British demonstrations. See Harada, VIII, I$, I7-I8, 2I-22, and 39.

88 Monumenta Nipponica, xxIi, I-2

to conclude the desired tripartite alliance. Amidst these foreign and domestic circumstances the Nomonhan Incident erupted.

(III NOMONHAN

RECORDED violations of the frontiers of Manchukuo with the Soviet Union and Mongolia by both Soviet and Mongolian forces gradually increased from I937 through I939. In I937,

also the year of the Kanch'atzu Incident, the Japanese government recorded II3 such violations. In I938, the year of the Changkufeng affair, the total number rose to i66. Finally, in I939 the number of violations reached its apogee, I95 being recorded by the Japanese authorities.21 The Nomonhan Incident, which took place from the late spring through the autumn of I939, was by far the most large-scale and serious of all the border incidents between Japanese forces and the Red Army. Its effect on the views of the Japanese military was immeasurably far-reaching.

In April I939, one month prior to the outbreak of the Nomonhan Incident, the Kwantung Army authorities devised a document entitled "General Principles in Dealing with Man- chukuoan-Soviet Border Disputes."22 This was transmitted as a directive to the frontier forces under the command of the Kwantung Army. It stated that in obscure areas where the actual demarcation of the border was unclear, the local Kwantung Army commanders in such areas were to establish and authorize a line "independently," and then notify the frontier forces. Subsequently this action was to be reported immediately to the Commander of the Kwantung Army. If and when such a borderline was violated, the frontier force in the area was to chastize the violators without delay. Further, the Kwantung Army Commander authorized the frontier forces to advance into Soviet or Mongolian territory temporarily, if the protection of the frontier or the chastisement of frontier violators required it. The frontier forces were informed that in the future they were expected to defend the border in a "positive" fashion, and any consequences deriving from such defense would be the responsibility of the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

As already noted, in June I938, some ten months prior to the issuance of the "principles"

21 The figures cited are taken from JFOA, SP 4, p. 370. The Soviet record ofJapanese violations of Soviet territory by air, sea, and land during the period I932-45 is to be found in IMTFE, Tran- script, pp. 7744-45, and IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. go, p. 4. Chronologically, the Soviet data correspond in their peak to those presented in the Japanese source noted above. Thus, the Soviet Prosecutor declared before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East: ". . . these violations reached their highest level during the years I937-39, when the Japanese aggressors expected to attain their objectives by provoking a large-scale war with the Soviet Union.... "See IMTFE, Transcript, p. 7747.

22 "Man-So kokkyo funs6 shori yoko" A 1v )t;*t+4ff] (General Principles in Dealing with Manchukuoan-Soviet Border Disputes), in Nitcbi senso E 4P 43 + (The Japanese-Chinese War), 3, Gendaisbi shiryo, x, ed. Tsunoda Jun et al., Misuzu shob6 8 - 9 4 t, Tokyo, I964, pp. I06-I07 (Document 4). Hereafter this source is cited as Gendaisbi sbiryo, X, with relevant page and document number cited. See also Hayashi Sabur6 +Ik : , TaibeiyJ senso rikusen gaishi -I-i# +4 fA

AP (An Outline History of Land Operations in the Pacific War), Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, I960, pp. 2I-22; and Tsuji, pp. 46-47.


of frontier defense, Major-General Ishiwara Kanji of the Kwantung ArmyStaffhaddispatched a secret telegram to the Vice-Minister ofWar requesting that theKwantungArmyCommand be given discretionary power to dispose of border disputes between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo. This request of the Kwantung Army was essentially granted in the early spring of I939, after the Changkufeng Incident. The defense of the Hunch'un region (which included Changkufeng) was put under the command of the Kwantung Army, and the Korean Army was made responsible for defense within Korea only.23 Thus, the directive on the "principles" of border defense issued in April I939 actually represented the realization of the long-cherished desires of the Kwantung Army authorities. Despite the bitter experience which they had gained at the hands ofthe Red Army in the Changkufeng affair in the summer of I93 8, they were exhibiting an extremely provocative and belligerent attitude by the spring of I939.

The Nomonhan affair began in May with a clash between Japanese and Outer Mongolian troops in the neighborhood of the village of Nomonhan, which was near the Khalkha river (Khalkin-Gol). The Mongolian People's Republic was associated with the Soviet Union, the two countries having concluded a mutual assistance pact in April I936. The area of the fighting was one of the numerous "obscure" places where the border had never been clearly defined. TheJapanese held that the border ran along theKhalkhaRiver, while the Mongolian- Soviet frontier guards claimed that it ran through the village of Nomonhan, thirteen kilometers east of the river.

On May I2 Kwantung Army frontier guards observed about 700 Outer Mongolian cavalry crossing the Khalkha River. TheJapanese immediately decided that this was a frontier violation.24 In accordance with their instructions in the directive of April, they attacked and repulsed the "invaders" in order to "chastize" them. Then the Mongolian forces reinforced themselves and counterattacked in order to defend what they regarded as their

23 Tsuji, p. 40. 24 "Nomonhan jiken kimitsu sakusen nisshi"

JT^ v - v -t t44 $* Q (Secret Diary of Military Operations during the Nomonhan Inci- dent), with attached documents, compiled after the incident by the Operations Section of the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, includes the Army's account of the affair as well as I04 documents, mostly telegrams. These were exchanged between the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army and its subordinates at the scene of battle on the one hand, and the military authorities in Tokyo on the other. See Gendaishi shiryo, X, 7I-I49. For an almost day-by-day account of the development of the Nomonhan affair from the Japanese point of view, see Gaikojiho 4t, xc, No. 828, June i, I939, pp. 2I2-2I3; No. 829,June IS, I939, pp. 200- 202; and xci, No. 830, July I, I939, pp. 2I7-2I8

and 224-225; No. 83I,July IS, I939, pp. I9I-I95; No. 832, August I, I939, pp. i98-203; No. 833, August IS, I939, pp. I9I-I94; No. 834, September I, I939, pp. I85-I87; No. 835, September iS, I939, pp. 207-208; and No. 836, October i, I939, pp.

374-375. Other Japanese accounts may be found in JFOA, SP 4, pp. 5I3-520; Tsuji, pp. 45-224; Hayashi, pp. 22-23; Shigemitsu Mamoru, Showa no doran 8 fw, X khiL (The Sh6wa Upheavals), 2 vols., Chfi6k6ron sha 1' < =z g1I, Tokyo, i952, I, 242-245; and Ashida Hitoshi w Jt, Dai niji sekai taisen gaikosbi i _ (The Diplomatic History of World War ii), Jiji tsuishin sha Q+

- A4, Tokyo, I959, pp. I24-I27. For the

Soviet version, see IMTFE, Transcript, p. 7846- 7849. (The Russians claim that the Nomonhan Incident started on May ii.)

go Monumenta Nipponica, xxI, I-2

rightful frontier. Thereafter there ensued a series of small-scale attacks and counterattacks in which the Japanese forces were repeatedly defeated. On May 28 a Japanese force of 200

men and ten light armored cars was wiped out by enemy tanks. Later, on June i8 and I9,

Soviet bombers raided Japanese outposts, and their infantry penetrated Nomonhan under the cover of Soviet artillery and mechanized forces. The Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Kwantung Army then decided independently, without referring the matter to Tokyo, to commit almost all their forces (without transferring the forces in the Eastern and Northern Border Zones). Accordingly, the entire 23d and a part of the 7th Division were sent to the Nomonhan area as reinforcements. Shortly after this (on June 25), the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army (General Ueda Kenkichi) sent a telegram to the Vice-Minister of War (Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka) and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff (Lieuten- ant-General Nakajima Tetsuzo) in Tokyo requesting that the ninety fighter planes of the Kwantung Army be supplemented with thirty more, so that the operation could continue.25

This request was made despite a telegram received on the previous day from the Vice- Chief of the General Staff instructing the Kwantung Army to prevent the fighting from spreading, and prohibiting any advance into Outer Mongolia. This telegram was dispatched when the General Staff learned of the Kwantung Army's plan, which was leaked by a staff member of the said army on a mission to Tokyo. It specifically warned against air-raids on Mongolian territory which the Kwantung Army indeed had planned in secret in retaliation for the earlier Soviet bombardment. The General Staff Office in Tokyo also informed the military forces in Manchukuo that the Chief of the Operations Group of the General Staff (Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru) was being sent to the scene of the fighting.26 The telegram had an effect contrary to its intention, however, for the Kwantung Army Command was determined to conclude the affair successfully before the Tokyo people could arrive. Early in the morning ofJune 27, sixty bombers and eighty fighters oftheKwantungArmy raidedTamusk, Sambez, and other Soviet outposts in Outer Mongolia, and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. Lt. Colonel Arisue of the Tokyo Office arrived in Hsingking in the afternoon of the same day.27

To the triumphant telegram of the Kwantung Army to the Tokyo General Staff, the answer was cold and admonishing. A series of telegrams from the Chief and Vice-Chief of the General Staff prohibited the Kwantung Army from any operation outside the Man- chukuoan border, and their activity was restricted to ground operations.28 By the end of June, however, all of the 23d Infantry Division, a part of the 7th Infantry Division, two tank regiments, and several Bargut Mongolian cavalry regiments had been concentrated

25 44 il t Z t A. T-786, Reel IO9, Frames I8873-I8874, Hoji hikoki shikyfi hairyo no ken 7 4, -. AEr t *., o) e f (Document Con- cerning the Request for the Speedy Supply of War- planes), June 25, I939, from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice-Minister of War and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Man ju dai nikki

(mitsu), 34 vols., I939, XIII, No. I9, U.S. National Archives No. I6079.

26 Ib id . Gendaishi shiryo,x, I24 (Document 37). 27 Ibid., p. I24 (Documents 35, 36, and 38);

and Tsuji, p. iii. 28 Gendaishi shiryo, x, I25-I26 (Documents 39,

4I, 42, and 43).


in the Nomonhan area. When all of the forces mobilized were concentrated, the core of the Japanese forces was supposed to consist of thirteen infantry battalions, 112 anti-tank guns, seventy tanks, 400 motor vehicles, and i8o warplanes.

At this point the command of the Red Army concluded that the Kwantung Army planned to smash the Mongolian defenses suddenly, and then break forth with its main forces into the rear communications zone of the Soviet troops. Therefore, the Red Army also reinforced itself, so that its forces now amounted to three rifle divisions, five mechanized and armored regiments having 86o tanks and armored cars and two Mongolian cavalry divisions.29

While the Kwantung Army was severely restricted in its operations, the Soviet planes freely raided the Japanese forces on the bare ground, causing great damage. In the light of this development, on August 7 the Chief of the General Staff reversed his order and authorized the Kwantung Army to raid the enemy air bases in the neighborhood of Tamusk and further east if such action was absolutely necessary for the successful execution of ground operations.30 In order to meet with the greatly reinforced enemy forces, on August I0 a 6th Army was newly organized under the command ofLt. General Ogisu Rippei31 for the specific purpose of dealing with the Nomonhan fighting. Its core was the 23d Infantry Division.

From about August 20 the Soviet forces launched a full-scale offensive. Employing superior tanks and artillery as well as more flexible tactics, the Red Army dealt the Japanese forces a crushing defeat. The major part of the 7th Division was sent to reinforce the 6th Army, but by the end ofAugust the 23d Infantry Division was almost completely destroyed, having sustained over II,000 casualties. The fighting continued into September.

Its complete defeat notwithstanding, the Kwantung Army prepared for a new offensive in early September. The 2nd and 4th Divisions were ordered into the battle area, and the overall forces of the 6th Army were apparently increased about threefold. On September 2 the Commander of the Kwantung Army (General Ueda) issued the following directive to boost the morale of his troops: "The present engagement is entirely different from earlier border disputes; it is a decisive battle between Japan and the Soviet Union. The destiny of our Empire depends on its outcome... ." On the fifth the commanding general of the 6th Army (Lt. General Ogisu) also issued a proclamation to all his subordinates. Its purpose was similar to that of General Ueda. It opened with the statement that the Army's "glorious" task of defending the northwestern area had failed because an earlier order for the reorgani- zation of the Japanese forces had been poorly executed, and the Army had been cast thereafter into a "whirlpool" of irregular warfare on the Manchukuoan-Mongolian border. Respecting the shattered 23d Infantry Division the pronouncement said: "Thanks to the brave and resolute action of all ofthe units under the command ofLt. General Komatsubara,32 disorder in the course of the battle was kept to a minimum." The commander then continued on the subject of the Army's future plans and the significance of the conflict:

29 IMTFE, Transcript, pp. 7847-7848; Tsuji, p. I04; Hayashi, p. 23.

30 Gendaishi shiryo, x, i28 (Document 48).

31 42 A1 _r 32 ,4

92 Monumenta Nipponica, XXI<, I-2

"The Army is now preparing for a new offensive in the Dzindzin Sume area. At this critical moment the Commander of the Kwantung Army has decided to aid us by sending the best troops in Manchuria. He will transfer them to the future battle area, place them under my command, and plan urgent measures for the settlement of the conflict .... The matter is now beyond the stage of a mere frontier conflict. We are now waging a sacred war in China, and any change in our position here will acquire extremely grave implications for our country because of the complex situation at home and abroad."

The main point of the proclamation then followed: The effort of the Army had to be concentrated on united determination to strike immediate and crushing blows against the enemy. Thus, the "growing insolence" of the Soviets would be annihilated, and Japan would have shown the world the "might of the flower of the Imperial Army."33

Thus, as late as September 5-almost four months since the beginning of the Nomonhan Incident, after repeated defeats and heavy losses, and contrary to directives from Tokyo- the Kwantung Army remained extremely belligerent, "full of brave and decisive spirit, and certain ofvictory." In part, this attitude had its origin in the psychology ofthe commanding echelons of the Army. After repeated losses and heavy defeats, the Nomonhan affair had become a decisive test of the Army's prestige. They prided themselves upon being the cream of theJapanese Army, and it is not surprising that the more numerous and disastrous their defeats, the more stubborn and belligerent their attitude. However, on September iS a truce agreement was reached in Moscow before theJapanese reinforcements could reach the Nomonhan area. The truce was negotiated by the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Togo Shigenori,34 and the new Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. On September i6 hostilities ceased at Nomonhan, over four bloody months after they had begun.35

However, the extremely belligerent stance of the military in Manchukuo did not neces- sarily correspond with that ofthe General Staffand the War Ministry in Tokyo. These organs possessed a more broad and dispassionate view of national defense problems. They did not

33 This directive of the Commander of the Kwantung Army is to be found in Gendaishi shiryo, X, I42 (Document 83); for the text of the proclamation issued by the Commander of the 6th Army, see IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. 9I, pp. 7-8; and IMTFE, Transcript, pp. 7858-7860. For the order of battle of the 6th Army, see Gendaishi shiryo, x, IoS-io6 (Document 3).

34

35 On May 3, I939, after eighteen years of service as Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov was suddenly dismissed. Rumors of his possible dismissal had begun as early as January of I938, when Andrei Zhdanov had openly

attacked Litvinov in the Supreme Soviet, criticiz- ing his diplomacy as a "soft" line. (At the time of his denunciation of Litvinov, Zhdanov had just been appointed as the first Chairman of the newly established Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs in the Supreme Soviet.) See William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, I960, revised edition, pp. I036-I037. For a representative Japa- nese observation on the change in Soviet policy, see End6 Ichiro 4 U- O, "Soren sekishoku gaiko no daitenkan" v t_ L.a1Z o) *U& (The Volte- face of Red Diplomacy), Gaikojiho, LXXXVI, No. 8oo, April I, I938, pp. I77-I85.


desire a conflict with the Soviet Union at a time whenjapanwas already mired in the bottom- less pit of China. Furthermore, unlike the Kwantung Army, the military authorities in Tokyo were well aware that the Red Army in the Far East had some thirty divisions under its command, while the Japanese forces in Manchukuo in May I939 amounted to only eight divisions. This situation derived from the prospect of a long war in China.36 Thus, in contrast to their attitude at the time of the Changkufeng Incident (when the War Minister and the Chiefof the General Staffhad requested imperial sanction for the use of force), by the summer of I939 the General Staff wished to keep the Kwantung Army fully under control. They endeavored to do so at all cost, as was evident from their directives urging the Kwantung Army authorities to prevent the spread of the conflict. However, the Tokyo authorities failed to accomplish this.

Three major factors explain this failure of the central authorities to control the Kwantung Army. The first was the long-established tradition of strong, defiant, and independent armies stationed outside Japan. The Kwantung Army was itself the most notable example of this. The Manchurian Incident had been glorified, and, consciously or unconsciously, the Kwan- tung Army tried to maintain this precedent. But it had been disappointed and frustrated by disapproving directives from Tokyo. The Kanch'atzu affair and the Changkufeng Incident were cases in point, and the highest echelons of the Kwantung Army felt that their prestige and authority over their subordinates had suffered as a result. By the time of the Nomonhan Incident they were determined to carry out "positively the duty and responsibility of the Kwantung Army, even if it were against the will and commands of the Chief of the General Staff." The air-raid on June 27, I939, on the Soviet-Mongolian bases of Tamusk and Sambez was executed in this spirit. Their justification was that it was strategically necessary to the execution of their duty, and therefore, it was within the proper authority of the Commander of the Kwantung Army, and there was no necessity to request imperial sanction. Extreme caution was taken to keep the air-raid secret, because "if reported, they [i.e., the Tokyo authorities] would undoubtedly oppose it." As the result of an order, on July 20 the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army (Lt. General Isogai Rensuke)37 flew to Tokyo, where he was confronted with an "Outline Policy for Dealing with the Nomonhan Incident" in the presence of all the important General Staff and the War Ministry people. Developed by the War Ministry and approved by the Chief of the General Staff, the essence of this policy was an early conclusion of the struggle, honorably or dishonorably. Having studied this policy, the Command of the Kwantung Army disagreed and decided to "ignore" it.38 A defiant attitude was thus strikingly evident throughout the course of the Nomonhan Incident.

The second factor in the failure of the central authorities to control the Kwantung Army was the army General Staff's acceptance of the Kwantung Army's claim of the authority

36 Hattori Takushir6 Lt4-fI- -'9 O, Dai t5a senso zenshi * t - AA +? -k (A Complete History of the Greater EastAsia War),4vols., Masu shobo 4 t -,

Tokyo, I949, I, 44-45.

37 ,& &, 38 Gendaishi shiryo, x, 8o-8i; Tsuji, p. 2I7; Hata,

p. I02.


to define the frontiers of Manchukuo. As the "General Principles in Dealing with Border Disputes" had indicated, the Kwantung Army was determined to exercise this authority in all cases in which the actual frontier was obscure or poorly delineated. In the case of the Nomonhan region, it was asserted that the Khalkha river was the "natural" frontier between Mongolia and Manchukuo. The military authorities in Tokyo readily accepted this claim, and so all quarters in the capital-whether military or civilian-took the view that this border must be defended against Soviet and Mongolian encroachments. Therefore, although the General Staff ordered the Kwantung Army authorities to limit the fighting and not to advance into Mongolia, it also ordered the defense of the border as defined by the independent decision of the Kwantung Army.39 Since it was the obscurity of the frontier which was the root of the conflict, in accepting the definition of the border according to the Kwan- tung Army authorities the General Staffnot only failed to reduce the possiblity of hostilities, but probably enhanced it.

The third factor behind the General Staff's failure to control the Kwantung Army was the general opportunism of the Tokyo military. That is, they wished to utilize the Japanese- Soviet crisis to force the government to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy. This opportunism was characteristic of both the War Ministry and the General Staff Office. The anti-British propaganda encouraged by the military organs had as its objective the creation of a public opinion which would coerce the cabinet into an Axis alliance. Thus, as long as the Tokyo military felt that the Nomonhan Incident was under their control and no real danger of a full-scale war existed, they had little reason to oppose its continuation. Indeed, its existence was a political advantage. However, when they began to lose confidence in their control of the affair, apprehension quickly replaced their previously complacent opportunism. In the Five Ministers' Conference ofJuly i8, War Minister Itagaki urged that the incident be turned over to the Foreign Ministry for early diplomatic resolution. Yet, even on this occasion he did not forget to propagandize the army's objectives by pointing out that the current incident underlined the absolute necessity for a tripartite alliance with the Axis powers.40

The Nomonhan affair also highlighted another aspect of the opportunism and rancor which prevailed between various governmental groups; namely, the conflict between the army on the one hand, and the navy and the civilian ministers on the other. In early August, even before the main Soviet offensive and while Japanese military units were still in the process of being concentrated in the area of hostilities, the War Minister repeated his earlier appeal for a diplomatic settlement. But the reaction of the other ministers, and especially that of the Navy Minister, was most unfavorable to the request. Admiral Yonai utilized the occasion to rebuke the War Minister, saying that the army should have consulted the government before beginning hostilities. "It is far from agreeable," said the Navy Minister, "that you started the incident while concealing it from us, and then once you fail you bring

39 Harada, VIII, 9. 40 Ibid., VIII, 24.


it up to us for remedy. Why don't you continue fighting until you recover the frontier line?"41 This statement of Admiral Yonai is extremely interesting. It probably can be taken to reveal its author's personal disgust and antipathy toward the War Minister and the army, but it also reflected the attitude of the navy as a whole, and, judging from their lack of enthusiasm for the War Minister's plea, of the civilian ministers as well. Exactly as in the case of the beginning of the China Incident, a matter of grave national importance and serious international consequence was handled not from the point ofview of a coolly calculated diplomacy of national interest, but from the point of view of personal antagonism, jealousy, and group rivalry. Yet, regardless of this low quality of motivation in formulating policy, once determined, policy became the "immovable course of the Empire." Later, if revision occurred at all, it was more often than not too late.

When the Nomonhan affair began, the Japanese government's initial policy was to treat it as a local problem between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo. Caution was also exercised to avoid giving recognition to the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact of I936, or to the actual Soviet domination over Outer Mongolia.42 However, Soviet bomber raids on Japanese bases in Manchukuo onJuly i6 were an ominous sign that the fighting might spread beyond the Nomonhan area, so the consensus ofJapanese governmental opinion gradually came to favor an early solution of the conflict. As mentioned already, in the Five Ministers' Conference of July i8, it was decided to begin negotiations with the Soviet government at "an appropriate moment," and therefore a directive telegram was dispatched to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. This action was in compliance with the request of War Minister Itagaki. It was hoped that the "appropriate moment" would arise after theJapanese forces in the Nomonhan region had repulsed the enemy from the area to the east of the Khalkha river. However, the Japanese government waited in vain for this to occur, and in the interval the General Staff became ever more apprehensive and repeatedly urged the government to expedite the conclusion of an agreement with Moscow. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Togo to sound Soviet opinion without specifically indicating that Japan was eager to settle the affair by diplomatic means. Yet another month filled with disastrous defeats and heavy losses slipped by, to the desperation of the General Staff.

Following the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, I939,

a change of cabinets took place in Japan. The new government was headed by General Abe Nobuyuki,43 and it was decided to focus foreign policy on the two objectives of resolving the China Incident and coordinating relations with other powers in a manner calculated to realize the goal of a "New Order in East Asia." In parallel with this principle of foreign policy,

41 Ibid., VIII, 8S. 42 The Japanese government had not recog-

nized the mutual assistance treaty between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, concluded in I936. The following portion of the

text dealing with the Soviet-Japanese negotiations for the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident is based primarily on information from JFOA, SP 4, PP. SI7-535.

43 [ 4 4ti


it was also decided to "coordinate" relations with the Soviet Union. The settlement of the Nomonhan Incident was to be a pivot for the reorientation of Soviet-Japanese relations. Then the Second World War broke out in Europe on September 3, and this caused yet another revision ofJapanese policy toward the Soviet Union. This new policy was to take the form of a proposal to the Soviets for general diplomatic negotiations aimed at improving the relations of the two countries. Meanwhile, the basis for the application of the new policy was to be laid through the speedy settlement of the Nomonhan affair.

In accordance with instructions from the Foreign Ministry, on September 9 Ambassador T6g6 initiated negotiations with Molotov. Tog6 began by proposing the establishment of international committees for the peaceful resolution of border disputes and the demarcation of frontiers. He proceeded on the assumption that the Nomonhan Incident had begun with a violation of the territory of Manchukuo by Outer Mongolian forces, and proposed that the disputed area be demilitarized until the boundary was clearly established. T6g6 then argued that since the Japanese Army was now concentrating new forces in the area of battle for a new offensive, when a greater armed clash occurred in the future, the prospects for the proposed coordination of relations between the two nations would then become much less favorable.

Therefore, in order to avoid this, he said, it was mandatory that an agreement be reached quickly between Molotov and himself. But the Soviet Foreign Commissar did not comply with these proposals readily. After prolonged talks in which individual sessions sometimes lasted for several hours, a compromise was finally reached for a truce at Nomonhan on September i5, I939. At 3 PM on the following day a joint communique on the compromise truce was issued. It stipulated that: (i) The Japanese-Manchukuoan and Soviet-Mongolian forces should cease all military activi-ty at 2 PM on September i6 (Moscow time); (2) the forces of the antagonists would remain in the positions which they had occupied as of I PM

on September I 5; (3) the military representatives of both parties should implement immediately the stipulations contained in (i) and (2) above; and (4) prisoners of war and dead should be exchanged, and for this purpose the military representatives of both parties should consult mutually toward an agreement which should then be executed immediately. The joint communique also included a resolution providing for the organization of an international committee to define the frontier in the disputed area. The committee was to be com- posed of two representatives from each of the four countries concerned (i.e., Japan, Manchu- kuo, the Soviet Union, and Outer Mongolia).

All of the provisions of the truce agreement were speedily effectuated excepting the ex- change of prisoners of war, which was delayed considerably by Soviet efforts to link the matter to other unresolved problems between the two nations. This Soviet attempt was understandable because the Japanese prisoners in their hands numbered ii6, while the Japanese military held only two Russian prisoners. When the prisoners were finally exchanged in late April of I940, the Japanese Foreign Minister laughingly commented to an unofficial gathering that he would not have dared to have the number of prisoners held


by each side printed in the Japanese newspapers.44 The demarcation of the frontier between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo also proved to be a difficult matter. After protracted negotiations in Chita, Harbin, and then Moscow-the whole process extending over nine months-a compromise agreement was reached on June 9, I940. This newly defined border corresponded approximately to the original Soviet claim.

The defeat which it suffered in the Nomonhan Incident shocked theJapanese Army greatly, and the after-effects endured for a considerable time. Nomonhan was also the army's first encounter with an enemy furnished with the most modern equipment and trained in the latest tactical theory.

While the incident was in progress it was widely believed, both in military and other governmental circles, that the Soviets had become very provocative since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in I936, and that their attitude toward the problem of border disputes was politically motivated. It was believed that the Soviets had not only been assist- ing the Chinese militarily in order to aid their resistance to Japan and thus protract the war in China, but that they had been provoking the many border clashes in order to dissipate Japanese military power in relation to that of the Soviet Union.45 This conviction was but the reflection of their own apprehensions. It revealed that they feared the prospect of any serious, large-scale, or prolonged border incidents because such developments could well dissipate much of Japan's actual reservoir of military capability. The Nomonhan Incident demonstrated the validity of their apprehensions.

After the conclusion of the incident many of the Kwantung Army's leading officers were held responsible and were called to account by the General Staff, which effected their re- moval.46 On September 7, even before the hostilities had been terminated, General Ueda, the Commander of the Kwantung Army, and Lt. General Isogai, its Chief of Staff, were forced to retire. Ueda was replaced by General Umezu Yoshijir6.47 He instituted a new policy for the prevention of future border disputes and incidents soon after the end of the Nomonhan fighting. Kwantung Army units stationed in areas where the frontier was unclear were withdrawn slightly. Also, it was ordered that when Soviet or Mongolian forces advanced into areas where the border was inadequately defined, the Commander of the Kwantung Army alone would make the decision for or against military action versus the intruders. This was a complete reversal of the policy laid down in the "General Princi- ples in Dealing with Border Disputes" issued in the previous April. The "positive"

44 Harada, VIII, 226. 45 JFOA, SP 4, p. 370; and Hayashi, p. 23. 46 Some members of the General Staff also were

forced to retire. The staff members of the First (Operations) Section of the Kwantung Army were mostly transferred to other posts. However, before long they were again in the most responsible Tokyo military posts, and many were leaders during the

MN: XXII, I-2 G

Pacific War. See Hayashi, pp. 25-26. Some commanders of the Nomonhan battles chose suicide rather than return to Japan as defeated soldiers. See Okada Keisuke, Okada Keisuke kaiko-roku P11 a1

i44-v7 ijK (Memoirs), Mainichi shimbunsha -X

E AM M1, Tokyo, I950, p. I45; and Gendaishi shiryo, X, I48-I49 (Documents I02 and I04).

47


attitude formerly encouraged in the frontier forces was now no longer permitted.48 The Nomonhan Incident also gave the Japanese military leaders a basis for the reevalua-

tion of the relative power of the Red Army and their own forces. If the Changkufeng In- cident of the previous summer had not taught the military (especially the Kwantung Army) any lesson, the Nomonhan Incident most certainly did so.49 It remained deeply engraved in their thoughts on the future course of the Empire in the international scene. Both governmental and military authorities were deeply concerned respecting the effect of Nomonhan on public opinion in both Japan and Manchukuo. In September of I939 one Diet member observed that the Japanese defeats had a very adverse effect upon the outlook of the Man- chukuoan public, and that the Manchukuoan soldiery who had witnessed personally the superior power of the Red Army were now propagating this effect to the public at large, much to the dismay and chagrin of the governmental authorities in Manchukuo.50

It was the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet mechanized forces which most impressed the Japanese military leaders. On October 3, I939, at a Conference of Provincial Governors, War Ministry authorities made public a statement in which they implicitly acknowledged the defeat which the Japanese forces had suffered. This was a most unusual event. The statement said that "our army continued the struggle to the death with inferior forces, and staged repeated daring offensives against the superior Soviet and Mongolian forces, especially their overwhelming mechanized troops, and inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy." However, the military authorities continued, the recent incident had been fought with the latest in modern military technology, and it had taught them the serious lesson that in modern warfare the material aspect of equipment was of equal, if not superior, importance to the spiritual or mental aspect of military preparation and training.51 This appeared to be a basic revision of the traditional views long held in Japanese military circles. However, the reports cited below, as well as the subsequent Pacific War, show that this change of viewpoint was more apparent than actual.

Following the truce, the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army established an "Investigating Committee for Research into Military Preparations." In late November I939 this organ completed a report on the Nomonhan Incident.52 This was a lengthy document "based on

48 Hayashi, p. 24.

49 In June of I939 the Emperor remarked to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Yuasa Kurahei WA kf, that the Japanese Army was not indicating that it had learned anything from its experience in the Changkufeng Incident a year previously. See Harada, VIII, 4.

50 Statement to Harada by Sakurauchi Yukio a Minseit6 Ptt man and former

Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Harada, viiI, 89-go.

51 Statement of the War Ministry authorities on October 3, I939, at a Conference of Provincial

Governors held in Tokyo. See Asahi shimbun, October 4, I939.

52 T-803, Reel I09, Frames I9024-I9127,

Nomonhanjiken kenkyiibhkoku / -E- >" V : 1;% t t +- (A Report on the Investigation of the Nomon- han Incident), Gunji kimitsu * * T- (Military Secret), November 27, I939, from the Chairman of the Investigating Committee, Kwantung Army (Kant6gun heibi kenkyiu ch6saiinch6 FA. ;%fl ; A 4X A ), to the Vice-Minister of War, Riku man kimitsu dai nikki a k. Q X I, 1940,

No. 42, U.S. National Archives No. I4550.


the lessons gained directly from the Nomonhan Incident" and copies were forwarded to the War Ministry. The conclusions presented in the report were essentially the same as those put forward in the War Ministry statement of October, though they were presentedin greater detail. The traditional emphasis upon "moral" training was reaffirmed, but the factor of material equipment was also given great stress. In the light of the recent incident, the report noted, it was indubitably clear that the spiritual (or moral) factor was the most important element in achieving military victory, as traditionally held. Therefore, it was of cardinal importance to stress this factor not only for the moral advancement of individual soldiers, but also for the purpose of strengthening the unity, and the sense of responsibility and obe- dience, within military organizations. However, to have its maximum effect, the moral element must also be accompanied by the material, or physical element of equipment and preparation. The report also acknowledged that the principal lesson gained in the Nomonhan Incident was that the Japanese forces had to combine these two elements in order to defeat the great material strength of the enemy.53

The report then went on to reassess the Red Army in the light ofits demonstrated strength in modern weapons and equipment. The authors were particularly startled, to the point of admiration, by the demonstrably immense resources of the Soviet forces in ammunition; by the amazing capability in transport which enabled the Red Army to supply all war materials plentifully despite the location of the battle area more than 6oo kilometers from the nearest railheads; and by the incomparable superiority of the Soviet artillery and tanks, a factor which gave them much greater fire power than the Japanese forces. Stress was also laid on the extreme tactical flexibility of the Soviet forces, which, it was noted, was quite unlike the rigidity and cumbersome qualities formerly characteristic of the Tsarist armies. Finally, contrary to Japanese expectations, the Soviet troops had proven to be both coura- geous and tenacious in battle.

In contrast to this estimation of the Red Army, the authors of the report were painfully conscious of the material inferiority of the Japanese forces. Naturally, therefore, the Kwan- tung Army study warned of the dangers of a long war with the Soviet Union. If the Japanese Army were to be able to fight a successful war with the Soviets, it would be necessary to conduct the war so that it could be concluded within a desired length of time.54

The central military authorities in Tokyo also constituted a committee for research into the Nomonhan affair. They wished to reevaluate Soviet power as well as the armament of the Japanese Army and the strategy to be followed in planning a future war against the Soviet Union. The findings of this committee were similar to those of the Kwantung Army organ. However, the focal point of the argument of the central committee was the basic question of whether the Japanese Army, poor in modern equipment and deficient in fire power, should be thoroughly remodeled and reorganized, or merely should be strengthened with new and additional equipment in a supplemental manner. The difficulty of the first alternative was

53 T-803, Reel I09, Frame I9029. 54 Ibid., Frame I9I09; and Hayashi, p. 24.

IOO Monumenta Nipponica, xX, I-2

clearly seen by the authorities: It might require such a fundamental degree of reform that the foundations of the existing political and economic system would be shaken. In other words, it would be more than a revision of the military status quo. This was the ultimate dilemma which ceaselessly haunted the rulers of Imperial Japan. Therefore, after extensive discussion, the question was settled in favor of the latter alternative. This was a victory for the traditional school of thought which emphasized the spiritual factor over the material as the basis ofwar potential. It was in line with the traditional values of the existingJapanese social system.55

The Nomonhan Incident thus gave rise to immeasurably great repercussions within the Japanese Army. Regardless of what the Soviet Union may have intended to achieve, this demonstration of the might of the Red Army and the ignominy of the defeat suffered by the highly considered Kwantung Army had the effect of causing the Japanese military authorities to restrain the previous militancy of the forces stationed in Manchukuo. After the Nomonhan Incident border disputes along the frontiers of Manchukuo declined sharply. The cause to which both the military authorities and theJapanese public attributed this was the recently concluded Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.56 It is of course true that this development both radically altered the power situation in Europe and placed Japan in a state of political isolation. However, the Nomonhan affair basically altered the estimate of the Soviet Union held by the Japanese military, as well as their estimate of their own capa- bilities vis-dv-is those of the Red Army. After Nomonhan the keynote of the attitude of the Japanese military leaders was caution, and the change of policy toward the Soviet Union, a change characterized by the attempt to reduce friction between the two countries, was basically the result of this new attitude of the army.

CIV AFTERMATH OF NOMONHAN

WE HAVE emphasized that the principal and most durable consequence of Nomonhan was a loss of confidence on the part of the Japanese military. Their attitude became much more circumspect in matters concerning hostilities with the Soviet Union. This reticence was mirrored by later diplomatic policy, which became opportunistic in the extreme. Anxiety produced the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the fall of I940, while on the other hand the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was concluded in the spring of I94I.

Both military and civilian leaders were not only acutely conscious of the danger of Soviet territorial encroachments, but-and even more so-of ideological penetration. In this

55 Hayashi, pp. 24-25. Hayashi attributes this decision to the fact that theJapanese Army had not been thoroughly indoctrinated with the concepts of modern fire power which were developed in the course of the First World War. Consequently, the army leaders were unable to escape from the older concepts of fire power and its employment which

had prevailed at the timeoftheRusso-Japanese War. 56 For example, see Tachibana Yoshimori Ai , "Morotofu gaik6 no kyokut6 e no hattei" e a

1- 9- ov > e o) 4-e (TheExtensionofMolo- tov's Diplomacy into the Far East), Gaiko jiho, xcii, No. 840, December I, I939, pp. I7I-I82.

YOUNG. "The Nomonhan Incident" IOI

analysis I have not dwelt upon the ideological aspect, but it cannot be emphasized too much that the fear of Bolshevism in both military and civilian circles of leadership gave a special quality toJapanese relations with the Soviet Union-a quality not possessed by her "power" relations with other antagonists such as the United States and Great Britain. To many of the most influential military and civilian leaders the threat posed by Bolshevik ideology was the most fearful for the "National Polity." For the military there had always existed the strategic dilemma expressed by the slogans "defend the north, advance to the south" and "defend the south, advance to the north." After Nomonhan it seemed that the latter course was im- possible without allies. Still, the dilemma became ever more acute as the endless China affair brought Japan into confrontation with the United States as well as the Soviet Union.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, I94I, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke57 urged an immediate attack on the Bolshevik enemy. Matsuoka's entire diplomacy was based upon the assumption of a German victory in Europe, and in the light of rapidly de- teriorating relations with the United States he was eager to hasten the realization of his calculations. But with the experience of Nomonhan fresh in their memory, the army leaders were not able to overcome their irresolution. From the middle of July, the General Staff began a large-scale mobilization with the view of strengthening the Kwantung Army for an attack on the Soviet rear at "an advantageous moment." In practice, this meant whenever the German attack seemed to be certain of success. The mobilization continued into September, and the effective manpower of the Kwantung Army was almost doubled (from about 400,000

to 700,000 troops organized into I6 divisions, with 600 warplanes and I40,000 horses). All manner of war material and equipment was concentrated in Manchukuo and Korea. All these preparations were cloaked under the designation "Kwantung Army Special Ma- neuvers."58

But the brief months of the Manchurian summer slipped away hurriedly as the military command awaited a favorable opportunity. They were torn painfully between their strong desire to attack the Bolshevik state-long held to be the ultimate enemy of the Empire-and the fear that they would be defeated. Meanwhile, the crisis with the United States turned strategic thought to the south. In early August an evaluation ofthe situation prepared by the Russian Section of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff Office was presented to the Chief of Staff. August 9, I94I,witnessed the quiet disappearance from the army's timetable of the plan to invade Soviet territory. Instead, the army was now to return to the other area

57 4 t

58 The policy decision of July 2, I94I was considered, of course, to be extremely secret, and every precaution was taken to prevent its dis- closure. Despite the extreme care exercised, however, the entire matter was known in Moscow almost immediately via the famous Sorge espionage organization. Shigemitsu, pp. 92-99; Hattori, i,

i58; and Hayashi, pp. 3I-32. At the time of the

German attack upon the Soviet Union, the Far Eastern forces of the Red Army consisted of approximately thirty divisions, 2,300 tanks, and I,700

warplanes. Hattori, I, i59. Additional information on the "Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers" (Kantdgun tokubetsu enshb M.t f 1,4V, ab- breviated as Kantokuen) can be found in IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. 86, pp. I2-I6; No. 93, pp. 5-i2; and No. 227, pp. 4-I6.

I02 Monumenta Nipponiica, XXII, I-2

with which it had long been preoccupied: the South Seas. This was the latest product of the ever-dominant interaction of anxiety and opportunism.

Thus the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact survived the summer of I94I -if only because there was apparently no favorable opportunity to break it. However, even after the plan to attack the Soviet Union was abandoned, the Japanese forces facing the Bolshevik state were never substantially decreased, and a continuous effort was made to equip them with ever better and more modern equipment. The military facilities of Korea and Manchukuo, such as railways, armories, and military bases were continually improved and expanded. This was true even at the height of the Pacific War, when Japan was ever more desperately in need of increased military forces and materiel in the South Seas theater of war.59

Prior to and during the period with which we have been concerned the army's traditional fear of and hostility toward the Soviet Union was unalterable. The Bolshevik neighbor was always looked upon as an ever-present threat to the "life-line" of the Empire, not to mention its ideological principles. This was so despite all vicissitudes ofpolicy and attitude based upon the variable "power positions" of the two states as seen from Tokyo. The anti-Bolshevism of Japanese governmental leaders-whether military or civilian-was implacable and in- variable. It was the ultimate and unchanging foundation of Imperial Japan's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

But on the level of pragmatic policy, after the summer of I94I the Japanese-Soviet Neu- trality Pact became the indispensable premise ofJapan's ability to deal with the problem of the South Seas. It is one of the most sublime ironies of history that under the pressure of later events the Imperial Japanese Government was forced increasingly to rely upon the hated Bolsheviks for the maintenance of the conditions laid down in the Neutrality Pact.

59 Hattori, I, I60-I62; and Tanemura Sak6 S

*ttt, Daihon'ei kimitsu nisshi k * t * J!NlQ (The Secret Journal of the Imperial Headquar-

ters), Daiyamondo sha Y 4 -e & v 1V 4, Tokyo, I952, pp. 73-76.