The new russian bureaucracy: what is new about it?

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The new russianbureaucracy: what is newabout it?Pavel A. Makeyenko a , Vatche Gabrielian b &Marc Holzer ca Moscow School of Business , Economics, Lawand Political Sciences , 109193 , Moscow ,Russia , Vice Chancellor International Affairs26, 5th Kzhuhovskaya Streetb Graduate Department of PublicAdministration , Rutgers University , 07102 ,Newark , New Jersey , Campus at Newark 360King Boulevardc Graduate Department of PublicAdministration , Rutgers University , 07102 ,Newark , New Jersey , Campus at Newark 360King BoulevardPublished online: 26 Jun 2007.

To cite this article: Pavel A. Makeyenko , Vatche Gabrielian & Marc Holzer (1999)The new russian bureaucracy: what is new about it?, International Journal ofPublic Administration, 22:1, 13-37, DOI: 10.1080/01900699908525374

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INT'L. J. OF PUB. ADMIN., 22(1), 13-37 (1999)

THE NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY: WHAT IS NEW ABOUT IT?

Pave1 A. Makeyenko, Vice Chancellor

International Affairs Moscow School of Business, Economics, Law

and Political Sciences 26, 5th Kzhuhovskaya Street, Moscow, Russia, 109 193

and

Vatche Gabrielian Graduate Department of Public Administration,

Rutgers University, Campus at Newark 360 King Boulevard, Newark, New Jersey 07102

and

Marc Holzer Graduate Department of Public Administration,

Rutgers University, Campus at Newark 360 King Boulevard, Newark, New Jersey 07102

13

Copyr~gh t C 1999 by Marcel DehLcr. Inc

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14 MAKEYENKO, GABRIELIAN, AND HOLZER

ABSTRACT

The command administrative system of governance which existed in the former Soviet Union was based on bureaucracy as one of its key elements. Soviet bureaucracy was fully politicized. To be placed even in a minor managerial position was tantamount to becoming a political appointee: a person had to be approved by the Communist party's local committee. The term "nomenclature" is generally used to describe the senior management level in the former Soviet Union. Basically, it was an explicit list of top administrative posts to which only select people could have been appointed. These people (all, without exception, Communist Party members with the experience of several years) were on the lists of potential candidates that were maintained by the Communist Party. The "new Russian bureaucrat" is often a former nomenklatura member. To what extent do present governmental structures meet the goals of the transitional period? What, if any, can be done in order to improve the situation?

INTRODUCTION

The current transitional period in Russia is characterized by dramatic changes in the life of the society. One of the primary goals in Russia now is a shift from a totalitarian political regime to democracy. The command administrative system of governance which existed in the former Soviet Union was based on bureaucracy as one of its key elements. Obviously, there is no way that radical transformation of the system could not tackle this backbone of its structure. Institutional aspects of policy- making, conceptualization of decision-making processes, and understanding of the role the bureaucracy really plays and should play are being reconsidered.

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THE NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY 15

In Russia, several basic approaches are usually used to analyze bureaucracy. One is based on sociological ideas developed initially by Max Weber; it addresses the rational part of bureaucracy as a form of governance based on specialized training, competent professionals, formalized decision making procedures, promotion due to effective performance, etc. A second approach usually "matches " this ideal rational model with historical and social dynamics, and puts the analysis in a long- term retrospective. One of the examples of such analysis is comparison of the role of the bureaucracy in transformation of the societies in different stages of development and different national and cultural backgrounds (e.g. "Western type production system versus Asian type production system"). A third approach is rooted in Marxism and treats bureaucracy as a special privileged class monopolizing power in the society.'')

The Twentieth century brought such phenomena as totalitarian political regimes. Philosophers, political scientists and social scientists analyze it from different perspectives, including the unique role of bureaucracy in a society of this type. In the context of the Soviet system, one of the latest and most comprehensive writings addressing this subject is Mikhail Voslensky ' s Nomenklatura .(2) The term "nomenklatura" is generally used to describe the senior management level in the former Soviet Union. Basically, it was an explicit list of top administrative posts to which only select people could have been appointed. These people (all, without exception, Communist Party members with the experience of several years) were on the lists of potential candidates that were maintained by the Communist Party. Nomenklatura existed on all levels of the society-- from the all-union ministries to local factories. The approaches to analysis of bureaucracy, mentioned above, are useful in tracing the transformation of Soviet nomenklatura, which by the end of the 1970s was, without doubt, dominating the country. Table 1 summarizes the major features of the former

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MAKEYENKO, GABRIELIAN, AND HOLZER

TABLE 1. PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENTI ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES UNDER TRANSITION

Dimension1 characteristic

PUBLIC GOALS

ADMINISTRAT IVE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

Soviet Union

Total, Eentralized Eontrol of all Factions in society and of individual life based on a unified planning system, military and police forces, domination of communist ideology.

Unitarian, highly integrated-- both politically and economically.

Russia (transitional per104

Directing and governing economic and political reforms, shifts from centralized administrative planning and control towards economic deregulation and decentralization of power. Direct management in the public sector and control over government investments in market.

Formally federalist. Elements of political and economic disintegration.

"Western" (Axperican type) society

Maintaining existing system, adjusting it to a changing environment. Shift towards providing quality services to citizens. Direct management of public sector and economic regulation of private sector.

Federalist. High level of economic integration.

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THE NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY

IIFFERENT LEVELS OF f OVERNMENT

h i o n government executes decisions of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, manages directly all industries and all fields of social life, distributes resources to lower levels. awer levels are subjected to direct administrative control of higher levels. They manage local public transportation, communications, housing, social security, etc. Some local agencies report both to local authorities and central agencies (police, social security and others).

Federal government :xecutes iecisions of the President and (in ;ome rare cases) ~f the new Parliament, manages directly state-owned nterprises and industries, military and international affairs, some other fields. nwer-level governments have much more power to manage not only local public services but also conduct active regional and local policy. This power is still limited by financial pressure of the Center (federal taxation is still prevailing) and double administrative reporting.

Federal government regulates wide range of social, political and economic issues, partly funds health care, funds welfare and national priority R&D, education, etc. The federal government directly manages foreign policy, military affairs1 national security. Lower- level governments are administratively independent from upper levels. They manage programs of regional and local development, social issues and carry out their own fiscal policies. There is a strong emphasis on increasing the role of the state and local bodies as providers of services.

(continued)

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POSITION O F GOVERNMENT IN THE SOCIETY

DIVISION O F POWERS

POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS


Table 1 . Continued

Domination. Nomenklatura is the only ruling power.

Crises in old government structures. Loss of control in many fields. Search for new methods of regulation and control.

CPSU both formally and informally is the only ruling power in the state. Social organizations of all types fully controlled by CPSU.

Legislative and executive owers are form J ly separated on upper levels (union and republics) and formally united on lower levels (system of soviets). All branches on any level are totally controlled by CPSU and KGB.

A wide spectrum of parties and movements unable to form a political ma'ority on any ieve i' . New parties and political organizations must be registered with the Ministry of Justice.

- -- --

Stron executive branc on f federal level (presidential republic). Gradual decentralization of wer. Ju icial system 8" under complete reconstruction. Ineffective enforcement of laws and regulatory mechanisms.

-

Strong influence through the allocation of resources and implementation of regulatory mechanisms.

Division of powers is a key

princ?le under ying the constitution, which does in fact govern the operation of the political system.

De facto dual party system. Unlimited number of parties, social organizations and interest groups. D

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THE NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY

BUREAUCRACY

PUBLIC POLICY DECISION MAKING

"Nomenklatura" is an hierarchical, hifly integrated "lifetime employment" system. It is an instrument to control and rule the society.

Key decisions on all levels are made by party committees which include representatives of major politically significant elites (CPSU bureaucracy, KGB, military, industrial and agrarian leaders). The opinion of the party boss is the most important.

New bureaucracy" is partly disa gregated by leve f s, institutions and political assignments. Very strong and in many cases key force in society. Widespread corruption and cynicism.

Important decisions are made by the executive branch. Mechanisms for articulation and aggregation of political interests are not stable . In addition to political figures, the military, agrarian and old industrial "lobbies, " a set of new players are becoming important (bankers, businessmen, etc.). Organized crime has become active player in political and economic life.

Is formally disaggregated by levels of government and m e of organization (government, industry, non- profit).

--

Major decisions are made by all three branches of power under the influence of important interest groups (professional politicians, business communities, professional organizations, the military, labor unions, the clergy, etc.). Organized crime has significant but indirect influence.

(continued)

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Table 1. Continued

The slo an is: obey, a o not think. Direct stream of commands from the top to the bottom. What is not prescribed is prohibited.

Promotion is the only legal way to make one's standard of living better.

Based on the loyalty to the system and ability to create or imitate successful performance in accordance with preplanned mdicators.

Dominant mode is total control. There is some room for creativity. Any manager is a

art of universal ureaucratic

establishment.

Monitoring the situation constantly. Flexibility. Ad- hoc crisis management. Search fort new methods. Lack of any moral principles. Nothing is prohibited.

Taking advantage of the system one is in charge of to squeeze out as much personal benefit as possible.

Based on personal ties and ability to maintain personal control over constantly changing situation.

Process of making room for creativity. De facto lack of any kind of control over mangers of even state-owned enterprises.

Centered on human relations

KEG values and p,';;g1"s

participative management, teamwork, quality management. What is not prohibited is allowed.

An officials personal, high standard of living is accompanied by institutional and public recognition.

Based on the ability to make profitlimprove performance, and satisfy shareholderslsta keholderslconsu mers.

--

Government regulations are imposed to protect public Interests (safe environment, social security, etc.). Business management is supposedly more effective than public management.

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THE NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY 2 1

Soviet and present Russian bureaucracy, and compares them with the bureaucracy of a democratic system (which is supposed to be closest to Weber's ideal type).

Soviet bureaucracy was fully politicized. To place a person even in a minor managerial position, e.g. to become a political appointee, he or she had to be approved by the Communist party's local committee. That system was a universal one, whether it was an army regiment or a university, an industrial plant or a collective farm, a writers union or a kindergarten. As soon as a professional in any field was assigned to a managerial position, e.g. entered the lowest level of nomenklatura, he or she automatically became fully dependent on the opinion of the upper level boss and on that of the local party committee. Managerial positions in the former Soviet Union were not protected by labor legislation. There were fields of activities and institutions, such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, law enforcement agencies, etc. where not only managerial but all professional and some technical positions could be occupied only by CPSU members.

The system of government in the former Soviet Union was organized in such a way that there were no clear distinctions between executive and legislative branches. Only on the levels of the Union and republics were they formally separated, although in actuality both institutions (Councils of Ministers and Supreme Soviets) executed the decisions made by the Communist Party. As a result, even a notion of "professional bureaucrat" or "carrier diplomat" was questioned by the system under which political loyalty had the highest priority over all other criteria, including professionalism. As the monopoly of the Communist party was broken down, and there was no system of civil service in place), nomenklatura as a centralized, politicized, life time employment system was automatically destroyed; the bureaucracy is, therefore, undergoing large scale transformation.

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Presently in Russia the term "bureaucrat" can be applied to the officials of the executive branch of government. Those who are elected as deputies of the Duma (lower chamber of the Russian Parliament) have to quit their positions in federal executive offices. Only high level officials are now, in a sense, political appointees. At the same time, on different levels of management in governments, industries, and elsewhere, one can very often see the same people who previously occupied those offices under the old system. That is more likely the closer one gets to the local government level. Today, in the Federal government those who are known to be reformers occupy the highest positions only in the agencies which are responsible directly for economic reforms. These are mostly brand new agencies which had never existed in their current form before the reforms really started, and brand new people who had never before occupied and might occupy any positions in bureaucratic managerial hierarchies. Both agencies and their staffs are young. Predominantly, these are people in their mid-thirties to early- forties, well educated, some of them Ph.D.s, often with a lack of practical experience but willing to move forward quickly. Some of them are really fascinated with unprecedented tasks facing them, and some also see their present positions as a starting point for political careers. So called "power structures" (law enforcement agencies, Ministry of Defense), and agencies responsible for governmental policies in industries, are managed predominantly by former nomenklatura members. There is a similar picture is in the regions. One can see some new faces, but many office-holders have remained in the same slots they occupied under the Communists. The number of former nomenklatura members who actually hold key positions both on the top level (including President Yeltsin) and on the llower levels is still rather high. So very often people are the same, but the new system or, to be more accurate, lack of the old system, makes them behave differently.

What are these differences?

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Instead of the former strictly hierarchical system, glued together by the Communist Party, the present bureaucracy is mainly disaggregated by levels and types of organizations. In such circumstances, professionalism, at least in the future, will play a much more important role. Why "mainly" and why "in the future " ?

One can still see efforts to reconstruct strong vertical lines of governance. The present heads of regional administrations were, in the majority of cases, appointed by Russia's President. In addition, there are personal representatives of the President in every subnational administrative region. The upper chamber of the Russian Parliament was not elected, but was formed of subnational executive and legislative branch heads. The Russian Federation Security Council (which is not even mentioned in the present Russian Constitution) tends to become a major political decision making body, and speakers of both Chambers of the Parliament are members of that Council, which is a part of the executive branch. Often the Security Council is referred to by Russian and foreign observers as a substitute for the former Politburo.

These issues are widely discussed in Russia as a part of both electoral debates and of a much broader problem of decentralization of power. In fact, subnational governments (i.e. the governments of republics, states and regions, as well as municipal governments) gradually obtain more and more power in line with their greater responsibilities. For example, in present day Russia principal expenditure responsibilities in both primary and higher education, housing, water and sewerage, health care, roads, police, public utilities, and public amenities lie with the regional governments. Only social services and support of public enterprises are still the field of shared responsibility of the federal and regional governments. Tax sharing has become an important practice, and, as in Soviet times, takes place on a so

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called derivation basis-- i.e., revenues flow back to the locality where they were collected. The federal government shares with the regional governments the personal income tax, value added tax, corporate tax, and certain natural resources taxes.(3)

Severe economic depression definitely affects this process. Fiscal pressure on the federal government reduces discretionary apportionment of taxes to subnational governments, and sometimes even results in a negative transfer of such revenues, i.e. subnational governments do not receive the share of taxes to which they are entitled from the federal government. As a result, from time to time local governments completely stop the transfer of revenues to the federal level. This is one of the clear indications that a previously unified and disciplined bureaucratic machine has disintegrated, and that local public officials are becoming less and less dependent on the central burea~cracy.'~)

Another important dimension of such disintegration is the ongoing transformation of the industrial bureaucracy. As a result of the privatization process, and elimination of central industrial ministries, top management of enterprises has become independent from public bureaucracies. For the managers of privatized enterprises (by the end of 1994 more then 60% of previously public big and medium size enterprises were reported to be privatized) this is both a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge to the extent very many of them do know the rules of the game only inside the old bureaucratic machine. It is an opportunity to the extent those of them who were adaptive enough to find their own way in a new economic and political environment extract much more personal income than under the old system.

In the present environment of "wild capitalism" in Russia, "enriched" by hundreds of years of authoritarian rule, the personal interests of former industrial bureaucrats are not

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necessarily in line with the economic interests of enterprises they are in charge of. Power abuse and corruption are the features not only of public bureaucracy in today's Russia, but also of industrial managers, whose primary goal is still not the economic growth of the enterprise. If their previous priority was tot move quickly up the bureaucratic pyramid, today their priority is to extract as much personal revenue as possible. In the majority of cases such financial resources are not circulating further inside the Russian economy, but join tens of billions of dollars kept by Russian individuals and enterprises in offshore accounts. The uncertainty of the political and economic situation pushes them not to invest in Russia, but to save money outside its borders. Their relationships with local authorities and federal agencies are also changing. Elected officials and their political appointees are becoming economically dependent on the emerging business community and large public enterprises in electoral campaigns, and in improving personal wealth. At the same time, emergent market economy institutions and new legislation introduce new configurations of government regulatory agencies: revenue service and tax police, different inspections both old and newly created, etc. To obtain licenses, quotas, tax exemptions and so on enterprises have to deal with a growing number of bureaucrats in both federal and local offices.

The relationships between public officials and a transformed economic elite reflect new combinations of interests inside the country. "The new rich from financial circles offer their support for stability, providing credits to the federal budget in exchange for the right to become trustees for government control of semi- privatized industries. The sums involved are gigantic. For the oil companies alone, it is 26.6 trillion rubles [more then $5 billion U.S]. The bankrupt state will never return these sums even after five or ten years, although the state president will spend them on his election campaign." (')

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Remarkably, the number of employees on different levels of government has not decreased, but has increased since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The federal bureaucracy in Moscow now occupies all the office space which, under Communism, belonged to the Russian and Soviet governments (i.e. the Council of Ministers), Communist Party and multiple government agencies (by the mid 1980s there were about 100 such agencies only on the level of the Soviet Union Government). Local governments are also growing in size, justifying this expansion by new functions and responsibilities. Legislation defining who are considered to be "civil servants" on both federal and subnational levels is constantly changing, and it is hardly possible to find condensed information about the categories and number of federal government employees such as is presented, for example, under the General Schedule in the Executive branch of the United States federal government.(@

Federal and local bureaucracies in Russia still have a lot to distribute: governmental subsidies and contracts, tax exemptions and export licenses. The most valuable resource still controlled by government is land. Privatization of land is one of the hottest issues. In many territories, especially the largest cities, local legislatures unconditionally banned any forms of land privatization. The most favorable deal any business may have in Moscow is a 49-year lease. Such limitations, even being justified by quite reasonable considerations, constitute the basis for unprecedented corruption and abuse of power among public officials at all the levels of administration. This situation is perfectly well known to everybody and raises anger in terms of public opinion, thereby undermining any trust of public officials and political leaders. As just one example, the current Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was the last Soviet Energy Minister, created a state-owned monopoly, Gazprom, that controls one-quarter of the world's known gas reserves. At present it is exempted from virtually all taxes. Gazprom is a

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joint-stock company, and the Prime Minister is reported to be one of the largest shareholder^.'^) No doubt he totally denied that he owns even one share. But the major issue is not whether he owns them or not. The issue is that such information is not a surprise to anybody, although previously such an allegation would definitely have started an official investigation leading to possible resignation. That is not the case in present-day Russia. Both legislation and law enforcement mechanisms are unprepared to fight the corruption and power abuse in the manner in which that it is done in civil societies. On the other hand, the Communist Party and State control agencies which kept corruption and power abuse on a more or less (from nomenklatura point of view) moderate level do not exist any more.

That is just one illustration of drastic changes in the relationships between the professional bureaucracy and the political establishment. Political instability, which has spawned dozens of parties and groups, has made it possible for professionals inside government bureaucracies to escape from being totally politicized. Only elected officials, their political appointees and those who see their future in politics affiliate themselves with particular political organizations. An underdeveloped democratic system in Russia produces political activities which are very strange by the standards of western democracy. Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin, who, by the constitution, was not elected but appointed by the President and approved by Parliament, had formed an electoral block to influence the political composition of a future new parliament. Informally this block was now addressed as the "party of power" and many observers described it as an effort at nomenklatura revenge. Another label which wits in Moscow used for Chernomyrdin's movement, originally named "Russia is Our Home, " was "Our Home is Gazprom, " a reference to the backing his group has from big industrial monopolies and the old

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nomenklatura. Top government executives like Vice-Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais or Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who belong to a younger generation, for different reasons declared that they will not join the block, though Chernomyrdin initially said that all Cabinet members will enter it. In this case some members of the Russian parliament already claimed to conduct a special investigation as to how this block raised money, and charged that the Prime Minister uses governmental funds to support the electoral campaign of the block.@)

THE "NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRAT": A PROFILE

Let us then try to sketch a profile of the "new Russian bureaucrat: "

1. This is either a former nomenklatura member in his or her fifties to early sixties, or a young, well educated person, in their late thirties to early forties, who usually does not have a lot of experience inside the bureaucratic apparatus but is rather ambiguous in promoting reforms and obtaining his or her own place in administrative bodies, and sometimes the political establishment. In the majority of cases this person is a male. There is not one female member of the cabinet, or among the heads of subnational governments. It is also rather a rare occasion when females occupy key positions inside federal agencies or local administrations.

2. Cynicism is a characteristic feature of a new bureaucrat. People engaged in government feel free of any moral obligations both to the public and themselves due to an ideological vacuum, overwhelming corruption from top to the bottom, continuing cases of power abuse, partial loss of management control of upper levels over lower levels, and divergence between proclaimed goals and real practices. These are all clear signs of

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backward movement in the administrative system. Their personal goals, defined by an uncertain political situation and tremendous economic depression, are to obtain as much power as possible and to use it to make personal fortunes.

3. Politically, a new bureaucrat is either neutral, or a supporter (sometimes formal but more often informal) of that political party or group which seems to back up his or her aspirations for the future career. Their political views range from strong support of a transition to democracy and market economy to a hard-line communist ideology prescribing a move back to a totalitarian regime.

4. Their professional background is rather diverse due to the field of activities. On the subnational level key public officials are either former industrialists or former Communist Party officials. Only in some rare cases are the leading positions occupied by young professionals -- former scientists, lawyers, and economists, who usually lack administrative experience. Almost all of them were never trained to be public administrators, and only some of them have limited management training as industrial managers.

5. The average salary of the administrative bodies' employees is one of the highest in the national economy. This is dramatically different from what it used to be in the former Soviet Union. Except for high public officials -- members of nomenklatura -- real wages of this category of employees used to be among the lowest in the country in line with teachers, engineers, and those who worked for public organizations in the field of culture. The later categories are still the most poorly paid. Nevertheless, real payments even to administrators do not exceed the equivalent of a couple of hundred dollars (U.S.) at most. Present bureaucrats do not enjoy the benefits assigned to the nomenklatura in the past (special discounts, well-supplied stores, free quality health care

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and recreation, etc.), although there are now clear indications of the efforts to reconstruct the system of such benefits. In any case, the real low level of wages provides additional background for a highly corrupted environment on all levels of government.

6. A "new bureaucrat" has more rights to make decisions on his or her own, but at the same time in terms of responsibilities is less accountable for actions than under the Soviet system. Bureaucracy is more departmentalized and regionalized, informally more dependent on economic structures, than it was previously dependent on the central authorities. The former centralized control system is gone, but a new one is not properly established. Even on the federal level, purely constitutional efforts of the Parliament to get information specifying particular budget items, either revenues or expenditures, meet strong resistance from the government, which often simply does not respond. A lack of developed legislation about division of functions between branches of government, and a historical tradition of ignoring a legal system of any kind, contribute greatly to this situation.

7. Quantitatively, the "new bureaucracy" is larger in scale than under the Soviet system, if we include the bureaucracy directly engaged in execution of the functions assigned to the public offices in today's Russia.

8. Public opinion treats new bureaucrats and politicians no better or worse than in previous times. Through the centuries low public confidence in the government has become even stronger as information about growing corruption and abuses of power are regularly released through the media, while very little, if anything, is done to improve the situation. Russian citizens still prefer to look after their own personal survival. As in earlier times, they rely much more on personal connections and

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THE NEW RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY 3 1

networks than on a controversial legal and bureaucratic administrative system.

CONCLUSION

The description given above is a rather rough approximation, but it is self-evident that the new Russian bureaucracy is rather far from an ideal Weberian type. On the one hand, it has inherited hundreds of years of authoritarian, highly centralized bureaucratic tradition and seventy years of totalitarian, ideological, politicized communist rule. On the other hand it is heavily affected by the present instability and uncertainty, and lack of clear political leadership which deprives its behavior of rational foundations.

There are two important questions. To what extent do present governmental structures meet the goals of the transitional period? What, if any, can be done in order to improve the situation?

What are the basics of public policy for the transition? Among the public goals of the transition a very important one is missing, i.e. the goal that could be clearly socially attractive: equal starting conditions for the vast majority of the population (as in post-World War 11 Germany or Japan). Moreover, in a country like Russia, where several generations have lived under a wide welfare system, the reforms aimed at downsizing this system dramatically are treated as socially unattractive. Only recently, economic advisers from the U. S., international organizations, and especially the European Union, have started to stress the importance of safety nets for transitions in former Eastern block countries. In any case, the success of large scale reforms without public support is rather questionable; by forcing unpopular reforms, both individual public officials and the

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existing administrative system are facing additional difficulties and declining public support (i.e. lower public opinion).

Economic reforms led the economy of the country to the situation of a dramatic production decline and drop in investments. Liberalization of prices, in line with continuing domination of industrial monopolies, both privatized and state- owned, contributed substantially to the inflation processes. A controversial privatization process brought additional frustration to the population because of unfair redistribution of wealth. Although some of these developments are not due only to the economic reforms, in terms of public opinion they are associated with the policies of the present administration.

Foreign aid, in fact, supports not a transition process but transitional government, and is almost "privatized" by governmental structures (another example of corruption and abuse of power). No wonder that the traditional Russian idea of a "strong hand," reflecting the historically important role of a charismatic leader in the society, is obtaining growing support. There is a real possibility that either as a result of presidential elections scheduled for June 1996, or in a more "traditional" way (for Russia), a new dictatorship will emerge. If it happens, it would probably be an "enlightened dictatorship, " representing "capitalism without democracy." It would also bring a new shift of the role of the bureaucracy.

Another scenario, based on an ideology of so called "new realism," is preservation of the present state of affairs for those who have obtained or preserved their power both in public offices and industries. According to Piyasheva:

At its foundations lies the old idea of a strong state which can defend all the achievements of the 1991-95 period from "revolutionary" redivision, from below at the hands of those impoverished by reforms, and from above as a

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result of the coming to power of the opposition. . . . the "realists" want to form their ruling class out of the new rich and the remaining nomenklatura. . . . For some time, [Russia] will remain a country with a limited democracy, with a semi-state, semi-privatized economy. It will be anarchic, corrupt, and oligarchic. The nomenklatura aristocrats who have received, in the process of exchanging power for property, both power and property, will devote all their efforts to preserve what they have achieved, thus using their economic power for selfish ends .(9)

As we noted above, professional skills of public officials are in many cases inappropriate for the tasks of the transitional period. When everything was public, centrally planned and managed by the chain of command, nobody bothered about providing some special training for public managers and administrators. The situation now is quite different. Managers of public enterprises are in a different position than managers of both private and privatized ones. Public executives and legislatures on all levels of administration need new knowledge and expertise to build business-government relations, to manage public budgets and finance, public enterprises and services.

In the former Soviet Union theoretical guidelines for administrative activities were provided by "the theory of state and law," which was a highly politicized part of law theory dominated by very specific outlines of Marxist-Leninist ideology. More practical areas were represented by administrative law and, to the extent they related to production of goods and services, by economics. But even now there is no generally accepted translation of "public administration" into the Russian language. Programs and courses for public managers, delivered both by new, and slightly modified old, educational institutions in this field, are still often based on past ideas and are taught by the

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same teachers. This situation no doubt needs to be changed, but there is also no doubt that it will take a considerable time. And this is a field where foreign technical assistance can play a really important role. Some of the issues, such as municipal management or information systems for public administration, are highly applicable everywhere. American and European institutions with well established reputations in the field can also provide valuable expertise and assistance in establishing public administration in Russia as an academic field.

Both the Western academic community and practitioners in the field of public administration can be helpful in building a system of civil service. Historically, state officials in Russia were supposed to be servants not to the public but to the leader, whether it was the Czar or a dictator. Changes need to be backed up by building a new system of public service with a clear understanding that the public official is a servant not to the leader of the state and not to the state, but to every citizen and the public in general.

This goal cannot be achieved in a short period of time. If in Western democracies the issue today is "quality government, " i.e. "government which costs less and does more, " in Russia the issue is "honest and competent government." That is why cooperation in fighting corruption, using international and national structures, and providing guidelines and training for building up an effective civil service system is so important.

And not only civil service. Institution building for civil society also includes creation of non-governmental and non-profit organizations which constitute a very important part of a democratic society's structure, and are also covered by public administration expertise. For example, in Russia there is still no federal legislation regarding non- profit organizations.

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Any form of foreign assistance, especially in such a sensitive field as government and administration, encounters quite a variety of views inside the recipient country. That is why real changes are possible only after a critical mass of expertise, including political and economic innovations, is absorbed by those people who are doing things in the field. But accumulation of this critical mass can be dramatically accelerated by reasonable and tactful assistance from outside. The assistance which is provided now is in many cases absorbed by the representatives of the donor, or misused by Russian bureaucracy; as a result, there is a real threat that assistance might be dramatically reduced in the nearest future.

There are more issues, but all center around the three mentioned above: 1) changes in public policy, which can provide proper political guidelines for public officials, accompanied by strong political leadership in introduction of the reforms; 2) a new system of professional training for public administrators; and 3) establishment of civil service and other institutions which might gradually convert the society and government into a democracy. These tasks are of crucial importance. Old ideological dogmas, traditions of power abuse and corruption, and lack of understanding and professional knowledge among public officials are even greater obstacles than underdeveloped economic infrastructure and strong resistance of part of the population to the reforms. At long last the reforms can be operationalized at the level of public policy through public institutions. The ways in which those in public offices "think" and behave influence the transition and are not less important for the success of the reforms than the behavior of the new businessmen and entrepreneurs.

However, at present one is hard pressed to name one expert inside or outside of Russia who might forecast what will really happen only a year ahead, and what the combination of powers

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(i.e. political forces) will be after forthcoming elections. But in any case bureaucracy will play its traditionally important role in Russia. That is why this area, both as a field of academic studies and of practical efforts in a society under transition, should be of greatest priority.

REFERENCES

1. Characteristic to this approach is Milovan Djilas' work. See: Djilas, Milovan. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, Praeger , 1960. Because many in Russia were indoctrinated Marxist method of analysis, though, they came to apply similar kind of analysis to bureaucracy in the late 80s, although few had read Djilas who was banned in Soviet Union.

2. Voslensky, Mikhail. Nomenklalura. The Ruling Class in the Soviet Union. 2nd ed., Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., London, 1990.

3. Bird, Richard M., Robert D. Ebel and Christine I. Wallich. "Fiscal Decentralization In Transition Economies: A Long Way to Go." TRANSITION/ The Newsletter about Reforming Economies. The World Bank, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1995, pp. 7-10.

4. See also: Matlock, Jack F. Jr. "Russia's Center Does Not Hold. " The New York Times, June 20, 1995, p. A21.

5 . "A Silent Revolution/A Survey of Russia's Emerging Market. " The Economist. April 8th, 1995, pp. 1-22.

6 . In Russia "civil servants" did not and do not exist as it is understood in the West-- there are no specific exams, no

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lists, no tenure, with certain exceptions for law enforcement agencies. "Civil Servant" merely means employed in the government agencies that are not involved in industrial activity or services.

7 . Erlanger, Steven. "A Corrupt Tide in Russia From State- Business Ties: Problem Called Biggest Threat to Economy, " The New York Times, July 3, 1995, A1 .

8. Stanley, Alessandra. "On TV, Russian Party is More Equal than Others," The New York Times, December 6 , 1995, A3.

9. Piyasheva, Larisa. "The New "Realists" In Russia." PRISM: A Weekly On the Post-Soviet States., A Publication of The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 1, No. 3, May 19, 1995, pp. 3-4.

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Documents

The new russian bureaucracy: what is new about it?