THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF CHILDREN'S … · The Neurophysiological Correlates of Children's and Adults' Judgments of Moral and Social ... Chapter 1 ... 7.5 Limitations

THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF CHILDREN'S AND ADULTS'

JUDGMENTS OF MORAL AND SOCIAL CONVENTIONAL VIOLATIONS

by

Ayelet Lahat

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Psychology

University of Toronto

© Copyright by Ayelet Lahat 2011

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The Neurophysiological Correlates of Children's and Adults' Judgments of Moral and Social

Conventional Violations

Ayelet Lahat

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Psychology

University of Toronto

2011

Abstract

Adults and young children have been found to distinguish between moral and social

conventional acts, which are considered to entail distinct domains of reasoning (e.g., Turiel

1983). Recently, research has begun to examine the neural basis of moral judgments (e.g.,

Greene et al., 2001), but these studies did not examine the development of neurocognitive

processing of judgments in these two domains. The present study focused on detection of

cognitive conflict as a neurocognitive process that distinguished judgments of moral and

conventional violations. The N2 component of the ERP was examined in order to determine

whether the two types of violation are associated with different neurophysiological correlates and

whether they change with development. In a series of five experiments, reaction times and ERPs

were recorded from 12- to 14-year-old children and undergraduates who read scenarios that had

one of three possible endings: (1) moral violations, (2) conventional violations, (3) no violation

(neutral acts). Participants judged whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable when a rule

was assumed or removed. Results indicate that reaction times were faster for moral than

conventional violations when a rule was assumed for both undergraduates and children, as well

as when a rule was removed for children but not for undergraduates. ERP data indicated that

adults’, but not children’s, N2 amplitudes were larger (i.e., more negative) for conventional than

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moral violations when a rule was assumed. Furthermore, source analysis indicated generators

for the N2 in dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. The results suggest that

judgments of conventional violations involve increased conflict detection as compared to moral

violations, and these two domains are processed differently across development. The findings

were explained by the idea that judgments of conventional violations are more explicitly

dependant on rules, whereas judgments of moral violations are based more directly on the

intrinsic negative consequences of the act.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor, Charles Helwig, for his dedicated guidance and support

throughout my graduate work at the University of Toronto. Thank you for being so responsive

and committed, even in times when personal circumstances made it very difficult. Thank you for

contributing your brilliance and expertise on children's moral development, for assisting with

designing and conceptualizing the study, and for keeping an open mind about it.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Phil Zelazo, for his devoted support throughout my graduate

studies. Thank for your very close supervision, even from afar. I am indebted for having the

opportunity to learn a great deal from your expertise in developmental neuroscience and to

become trained in ERP/EEG methodology. Thank you, for your brilliant ideas which contributed

to designing, writing, and interpreting the results of this innovative study.

I would like to express my gratitude to my committee member, Marc Lewis. Thank you for your

useful advice and comments along the way and for the assistance I received from you and your

ERP lab.

I would like to show my warmest appreciation to my research assistants, Heather Bragg, Lee

Unger, Vered Latman, Elvina Oey, and Janelle Singh for their hard work and assistance in data

collection and organization, as well as participant recruitment. I would like to thank my fellow

graduate students, Sarah Watson and Justin McNeil, for their support, comments, suggestions,

and for making our lab more than just a space that we share. Additionally, I would like to thank

our participants and their families for participating in this study.

Finally, I would like to thank the most important people in my life: my husband, Shai, my son,

Raz, and my daughter, Shani. Thank you, Shai, for sacrificing greatly to take this journey with

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me. I am grateful for your never-ending support and encouragement and for being a true partner

through this long process. I would also like to thank you for your very useful comments and

suggestions regarding this and other studies. Raz and Shani, I am grateful for having you in my

life, you inspire me every day. All the hard work would not be worth it without you. I love the

three of you dearly and I dedicate this work to you.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... iv

Table of Contents........................................................................................................................... vi

List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. x

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi

List of Appendices ........................................................................................................................ xii

Chapter 1..........................................................................................................................................1

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................1

1.1 Overview..............................................................................................................................1

1.2 Social domain theory and moral development.....................................................................4

1.2.1 Judgments regarding actual situations .....................................................................9

1.2.2 Developmental trends in moral and conventional judgments................................10

1.3 The neural correlates of moral judgments .........................................................................13

1.3.1 Evidence from neuroimaging studies.....................................................................15

1.3.2 Evidence from neurological and neuropsychiatric populations.............................19

1.3.3 The role of intentionality and theory of mind in neural correlates of moral

judgment ................................................................................................................21

1.3.4 Critique of neuroscience of morality .....................................................................23

1.4 N2 component of ERP .......................................................................................................25

1.5 The present study ...............................................................................................................30

1.5.1 Hypotheses.............................................................................................................31

Chapter 2........................................................................................................................................35

2 Experiment 1 .............................................................................................................................35

2.1 Method ...............................................................................................................................36

2.1.1 Participants.............................................................................................................36

vii

2.1.2 Procedure ...............................................................................................................36

2.1.3 Moral judgments task.............................................................................................37

2.2 Results................................................................................................................................38

2.3 Discussion..........................................................................................................................41

Chapter 3........................................................................................................................................43

3 Experiment 2 .............................................................................................................................43

3.1 Method ...............................................................................................................................43

3.1.1 Participants.............................................................................................................43

3.1.2 Procedure and task .................................................................................................44

3.2 Results................................................................................................................................44

3.3 Discussion..........................................................................................................................46

Chapter 4........................................................................................................................................48

4 Experiment 3 .............................................................................................................................48

4.1 Method ...............................................................................................................................48

4.1.1 Participants.............................................................................................................48

4.1.2 Procedure ...............................................................................................................49

4.1.3 Moral judgments task.............................................................................................49

4.1.4 ERP data collection and analysis ...........................................................................50

4.2 Results................................................................................................................................51

4.2.1 Behavioral results...................................................................................................51

4.2.2 ERP results.............................................................................................................53

4.2.3 N2 amplitudes: relations with behavioral performance .........................................56

4.2.4 Source analysis.......................................................................................................56

4.3 Discussion..........................................................................................................................59

Chapter 5........................................................................................................................................62

5 Experiment 4 .............................................................................................................................62

viii

5.1 Method ...............................................................................................................................63

5.1.1 Participants.............................................................................................................63


5.2 Results................................................................................................................................64


5.2.1.1 Children's data .........................................................................................64

5.2.1.2 Comparison of children's and adults' data ...............................................66

5.2.2 ERP results.............................................................................................................69

5.2.2.1 Children's data .........................................................................................69


5.2.3 Children's N2 amplitudes: relations with behavioral performance........................72

5.2.4 Source analysis.......................................................................................................73

5.2.4.1 Children's data .........................................................................................73


5.3 Discussion..........................................................................................................................76

Chapter 6........................................................................................................................................79

6 Experiment 5 .............................................................................................................................79

6.1 Method ...............................................................................................................................79

6.1.1 Participants.............................................................................................................79


6.2 Results................................................................................................................................80


6.2.2 ERP results.............................................................................................................81

6.3 Discussion..........................................................................................................................83

Chapter 7........................................................................................................................................85

7 General discussion ....................................................................................................................85

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7.1 Differences in frequencies and RTs...................................................................................85

7.2 Differences in N2 amplitudes ............................................................................................88

7.3 Differences in modeled source activation..........................................................................91

7.4 Non-normative-conventional and normative-conventional response orientations ............93

7.5 Limitations and future directions .......................................................................................95

7.6 Conclusions........................................................................................................................97

References....................................................................................................................................100

Appendices...................................................................................................................................110

Appendix 1. Moral judgments task .........................................................................................110

x

List of Tables

Table 1. Mean percentage of trials of normative judgments in Experiment 1…………… 39


Table 3. Mean number (and SD) of trials contributing to the N2 in each condition for

Experiment 3………………………………………………………………………….…..

51



Experiment 4……………………………………………………………………………...

64



Experiment 5……………………………………………………………………………...

80

Table 8. Mean percentage of trials of normative judgments for conventional violations

in the rule assumed condition and non-normative judgments for conventional violations

in the rule removed condition (Experiment 5)……………………………………………

81

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Example of trial structure of moral judgments task…………………………… 38

Figure 2. Median RTs for judgments of moral, conventional, and neutral acts as a

function of rule contingency in Experiment 1……………………………………………

41



46



53

Figure 5. Hydrocel electrode sites contributing to the N2 waveforms and data…………. 54

Figure 6. Stimulus-locked grand-averaged ERP waveform at electrode site 6 for

Experiment 3……………………………………………………………………………...

55

Figure 7. N2 amplitudes in response to judgments of moral, conventional, and neutral

acts as a function of rule contingency in Experiment 3…………………………………..

56

Figure 8. ROIs displayed using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) average

adult MRI scan for the peak N2 interval of 300–350 ms in (A) dorsomedial prefrontal

cortex (dmPFC) and (B) ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)………………………

57

Figure 9. Modeled source activations (in nA) for the peak N2 intervals of 250-300 ms

and 300–350 ms in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) as a function of violation

type and rule contingency………………………………………………………………...

58


function of rule contingency in children (Experiment 4)…………………………………

66


function of rule contingency in children and adults………………………………………

69


children (Experiment 4)…………………………………………………………………..

70

Figure 13. N2 amplitudes for judgments of moral, conventional, and neutral acts as a

function of age group and rule contingency……………………………………………...

72

Figure 14. Modeled source activations (in nA) for the peak N2 intervals of 250-300 ms

in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) as a function of age group, violation type,

and rule contingency……………………………………………………………………...

75

Figure 15. N2 amplitudes for judgments of conventional violations as a function of age

group, conventional group, and rule contingency………………………………………...

82

xii

List of Appendices

Appendix 1. Moral judgments task..……………………………………………………... 110

1

Chapter 1

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

One of the important abilities that children have to acquire in order to develop normative social

skills is an understanding of the different social expectations and rules that regulate interactions

in a given social context. Although morality regulates social interactions, not all social rules fall

within the moral domain; some rules may be essential in regulating social relationships but lack

the prescriptive and obligatory basis of moral rules (Smetana, 2006). The latter include rules that

fall within other domains of reasoning, such as the social-conventional domain. Research over

the past thirty years, within social domain theory, has shown that children develop an

understanding of the distinction between these two domains. It has been suggested that each of

these domains constitute an organized system of social reasoning that arises from children's

experiences of different types of regularities in the social environment (e.g., Nucci, 1981;

Smetana, 1981, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 2008).

One type of assessment that has been employed within social domain research is criterion

judgments, which pertain to criteria used in making moral and conventional judgments. These

criteria include judgments of rule-contingency, generalizabilty, and alterability of rules

prohibiting these acts. Judgments of moral violations (such as hitting and stealing) have been

found to be regarded as independent from rules (i.e., wrong even in the absence of a rule),

generalizable (i.e., wrong across different contexts) and unalterable (i.e., cannot be changed by

social consensus or authority). In contrast, judgments of conventional violations (such as wearing

pajamas to school) have been found to be regarded as contingent on the existence of an explicit

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social rule, relative to the social context, and rules regarding conventions are alterable by

authority or social consensus (Helwig & Turiel, 2002).

Recently, research has begun to examine the neural underpinnings of moral versus non-moral

judgments. These studies show that judgments about different types of moral dilemmas are

associated with activation in different brain regions (e.g., Blair, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell,

Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001; Koenigs et al.,

2007; Moll, Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001). These findings are in line with social domain

theory, in the sense that there are separable domains or information processing systems for

different types of social rules. Neuroimaging, as well as studies with neurological and

neuropsychiatric patients, have particularly implicated structures within the ventromedial

prefrontal cortex for certain kinds of moral dilemmas, such as whether to push a man to his death

in order to stop a runaway trolley from killing five other individuals (Blair, 2007; Greene et al.,

2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2001). These areas are known to be involved in emotional

processing and their activation points to the role of emotion in moral judgment. For other kinds

of moral dilemmas, such as whether to pull a switch in order to stop the same trolley, activation

was found in areas that are associated with cognitive control and cognitive conflict such as

dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, as well as parietal areas (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).

Although the previous research on the neural correlates of moral judgment has shown different

neural underpinnings for judgments of different moral dilemmas, these studies have not

examined the online processing when making moral and social conventional judgments.

Studying this process is important as it can provide further evidence from a neuroscientific

perspective for the idea that moral and conventional acts entail two separate domains, and allow

a better understanding of the development of this distinction. If judgments of moral and

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conventional violations do in fact correspond to separate domains of reasoning, studying the

online processing can reveal whether judgments about these two types of violation involve two

different patterns of processing. Furthermore, the studies examining the neuroscience of moral

judgment have been criticized for their definitions, theoretical groundings, and methods (e.g.,

Carpendale, Sokol, Muller, 2010; Killen & Smetana, 2008; Turiel, 2010, in press) and it has been

argued that developmental and neuroscience perspectives should be integrated in order to study

the development of moral reasoning (Killen & Smetana, 2008). In particular, studies examining

the neural correlates of moral judgment have been criticized for failing to take into account

epistemological considerations with regards to the moral domain and have not taken into account

relevant findings from developmental psychology. In other words, these neuroscience studies run

the risk of explaining a phenomenon that is very broad by reducing their analysis to

psychological or biological processes. Furthermore, these studies have emphasized emotionally

driven decisions and excluded the role of reasoning through the use of complex moral dilemmas,

in which individuals are required to endorse a distasteful decision (Turiel, 2010).

The present study takes a first step in addressing these issues and provides a developmental

cognitive neuroscience approach to study judgments of moral and conventional violations. If

judgments of these violations correspond to two separate organizing systems it is likely that they

are processed differently at a neurocogntive level, and this processing may develop with age. In

the present study, we propose that the processing of moral and conventional violations becomes

more differentiated with age. This proposition is in line with studies showing that functional

specialization of neurocognitive abilities develop with age (Cohen-Kadosh & Johnson, 2007;

Durston et al., 2002).

When individuals are required to make moral and conventional judgments and decide whether an

act is acceptable or unacceptable they are facing a problem which involves an evaluation of the

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act (i.e., whether the act is okay or not okay to perform). Such an evaluation may trigger the

activation of executive function abilities and may require more careful consideration in order to

solve the problem at hand (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). Such an assessment involving a

decision between the two response alternatives has been found to involve the detection of

cognitive conflict (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003;

Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004)

The present study proposes that the processing of cognitive conflict is involved differentially in

criterion judgments (such as rule-contingency) of prototypical moral and conventional violations.

The study, therefore focuses on simple straightforward moral and conventional violations, and

examines the N2 component of event related potential (ERP), which has been argued to be an

index of conflict (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). This will be carried out by presenting 12- to 14-

year-old children and adults with prototypical moral violations involving issues of harm and

fairness, such as those used in social domain theory. Using these scenarios instead of the

complex dilemmas that have been used in moral neuroscience allows studying both the online

processing and changes in development.

1.2 Social domain theory and moral development

Different theoretical approaches in psychology have attempted to explain the acquisition of

morality. These include behaviorism (Skinner, 1971), social learning (Aronfreed, 1968), and

psychoanalytic approaches (Freud, 1930). An alternative approach to moral development stems

from Jean Piaget's (1932) extensive study of children's moral judgments. This work was

extended later by Lawrence Kohlberg (1981). According to Piaget's and Kohlberg's approach,

moral development involves the construction of judgments about welfare, justice, and rights.

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Both Piaget and Kohlberg described a sequence for the development of moral judgments, in

which concepts of justice and rights are not constructed until late childhood or adolescence.

However, research over the past thirty years has shown that young children begin to develop

moral judgments distinct from other domains of social judgments (see Helwig & Turiel, 2002;

Smetana, 2006). Research within social domain theory has shown that children and adults do not

reason in the same way about moral and social conventional acts (e.g., Nucci, 1981; Smetana,

2006; Turiel, 1983). Moral acts involve intrinsic negative consequences for others, such as

physical harm or issues of fairness. In contrast, social conventions are behavioral uniformities

that serve to coordinate individuals' interactions in a social system. These conventions, such as

forms of address and modes of greeting, are symbolic elements of social organization. Moral

acts, such as hitting, lying, and stealing, are considered universal, independent from rules and

authority, and unalterable. In contrast, social conventions, such as eating with one's fingers or

wearing pajamas to school, can vary across different social systems, are contingent on societal

rules, and can be altered by authority or social consensus.

Children's distinction between moral and conventional acts is also evident from the justifications

or reasons they provide for these judgments. Reasoning about moral acts is characterized by

issues of harm, fairness, and rights, whereas reasoning about conventional acts is characterized

by references to rules, customs, authority, and social organization (Helwig & Turiel, 2002). It is

likely that when individuals evaluate moral acts they base their judgments on the intrinsic

negative consequences or wrongness of the act and social prohibitions are not relevant. In

contrast, when evaluating conventional violations, individuals consider social rules and contrast

the violation with these social prescriptions. Social domain theory proposes that reasoning about

each of these social acts constitutes a distinct organized system, or domain of social knowledge,

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that arises from children's experiences with different types of regularities in the social

environment (Smetana, 2006).

A large number of studies examining children's and adults’ judgments suggest that judgments of

morality and conventions entail two separate domains of social reasoning (e.g., Nucci, 1981;

Smetana, 1981, Turiel, 1983). For example, Nucci (1981) studied participants between 7 and 20

years of age and found that at all ages children and adolescents thought that moral acts were

wrong even if there was no social rule against these acts, whereas the vast majority of

participants thought that conventional acts were acceptable if there was no rule prohibiting these

behaviors. Additionally, different justifications were associated with different types of acts:

moral acts were justified with reasons of harm, fairness, and rights; while social conventions

were justified by references to the commands of authorities, the existence of social rules

prohibiting the act, or the act's effect on the social organization (Nucci, 1981).

In a different study, Weston and Turiel (1980) examined children ranging from 5 to 11 years of

age, and found that at all ages children did not accept a school policy according to which

children are allowed to hit each other (86% judged this moral policy as wrong). In addition, the

majority of children at all ages judged a school policy allowing children not to wear any clothes

to school as acceptable (68% judged this conventional policy as okay) (Weston & Turiel, 1980).

These findings demonstrate that for moral acts, children focus not on the governing rules or the

authority, but rather on the harmful features and the intrinsic wrongness of the act itself. In

contrast, for conventional acts, children shift to considering the authority and whether or not

societal rules exist, and judge the act to be acceptable because the rules allow it.

Turiel (1983) examined whether children between the ages of 6 and 17 would be able to

distinguish moral prescriptions from conventions according to the criterion of alterability of

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these social rules. Participants were asked whether moral prohibitions (such as stealing) and

conventional rules (such as game rules), could be altered or not. In addition, participants were

asked to describe actual rules in their own home, and the experimenter selected a moral home

rule and a conventional home rule to ask the participant about. Results indicate that the majority

of respondents thought that conventional game rules could be changed (86% said yes). However,

the rule about stealing could not be changed (79% said no). The same pattern was found for the

home rules that children generated. Namely, 68% of participants thought a moral home rule

could not be altered, while 73% thought a conventional home rule could. Moreover, there were

no age differences in judgments of the alterability or non-alterability of each of these rules

(Turiel, 1983). These findings indicate that children judged moral and conventional rules

differently with respect to their alterability. Thus, the findings lend support to the notion that

children can distinguish between the two domains.

The above findings indicate that children distinguish moral and conventional acts and support the

idea that morality and conventions entail two separate domains of reasoning. However, an

alternative interpretation may be that the differences between these two types of acts are derived

from quantitative variations in the importance or seriousness of the violations. Studies (e.g.,

Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981) have shown that across age, moral violations are considered more

serious than conventional violations. According to this finding, children’s distinctions in

reasoning about morality and conventions may merely reflect a quantitative continuum of

importance or seriousness.

In order to determine whether children’s distinctions between moral and conventional acts are

derived from a quantitative continuum, or rather from two separate domains, Turiel (1983)

presented school-aged children with a number of moral and conventional transgressions that

varied in level of seriousness. For example, participants were presented with a minor moral

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violation, such as stealing an eraser, and a serious conventional violation, such as a child wearing

pajamas to school. Participants rated the conventional transgression of wearing pajamas to

school as more serious than the minor moral transgression of stealing an eraser. However, in

their reasoning, respondents distinguished between the moral and conventional events, regardless

of their seriousness. Children judged the minor moral event as wrong even in the absence of a

societal rule. Moreover, it was perceived as wrong even in a country where there was no rule

prohibiting it, while the major social conventional act was acceptable, if no rule prohibited it, as

well as okay in other countries, if it was not against their rules (Turiel, 1983).

In a different study, Tisak and Turiel (1988) presented school-aged children (grades 1, 2, and 5)

with a forced choice between either committing a minor moral violation, or a serious

conventional violation. Findings indicated that most children would prefer to steal the eraser

(i.e., commit the minor moral transgression) than come to school in pajamas (i.e., commit a

serious conventional transgression). However, even though this was their preference, children

indicated that they actually should choose to come to school in pajamas. These findings

demonstrate that children recognized that the conventional violation was serious. However, they

also recognized the evaluative or moral aspect of even the minor moral violation in stating that

they really shouldn't perform this act (Tisak & Turiel, 1988). In conclusion, these findings

suggest that the moral-conventional distinction may not be based merely on importance or

seriousness. At least by the school-age years, children seem to treat these two domains

differently, regardless of how serious they perceive them to be.

An additional alternative explanation for children's distinction between moral and conventional

violations could be that these two types of violation differ in the level of familiarity that children

have with the violation. Davidson, Turiel, and Black (1983) asked children between the ages of 6

and 10 to provide criterion judgments and justifications about moral and conventional violations

9

that were either familiar or unfamiliar. It was found that when stimuli were unfamiliar, the

younger participants showed less differentiation between moral and conventional violations.

However, for familiar stimuli, participants at all ages showed a differentiated understanding of

moral and conventional violations. Thus, when familiarity of the situation is controlled for,

participants still showed a distinction between moral and conventional violations.

1.2.1 Judgments regarding actual situations

The research discussed thus far has focused primarily on individuals' judgments and

justifications in hypothetical, prototypical situations. These prototypical scenarios are designed

to depict moral and conventional violations in unambiguous or straightforward ways. However,

in actual situations social transgressions can often be ambiguous and more complex, as well as

entail mixtures of different domains, such as when the dictates of authority pertain to unfair

practices. These factors may all lead to variations in judgments of actual situations (Smetana,

2006).

Children's judgments of hypothetical and actual violations have been compared (Smetana et al.,

1993, 1999; Turiel, 2002). In one study (Smetana et al., 1993), preschool children made

judgments about moral and conventional prototypical hypothetical situations. Additionally,

preschool classrooms were observed until a moral or conventional violation had occurred and

witnesses to the violations were interviewed about the events. The results indicate that only few

differences in judgments of hypothetical and actual events were observed.

In a follow-up study (Smetana et al., 1999), the same method was employed but the interviews

were conducted with the actual victims and transgressors instead of witnesses. Children did not

differ in their ratings of the severity of hypothetical and actual violations, but they viewed

hypothetical violations as more deserving of punishment and were less able to justify why actual,

10

as compared to hypothetical, situations were wrong. Therefore, the hypothetical situations

appeared to elicit more clear-cut moral evaluations.

In a different study (Turiel, 2002), children between the ages of 6 to 13 were interviewed about

spontaneously occurring actual events in the school setting shortly after they took place, and they

were also interviewed about hypothetical moral and conventional violations about a month later.

For the actual events, the results indicate that criterion judgments for moral violations differed

from criterion judgments for conventional violations; across age, children thought that the

conventional acts would be acceptable in the absence of a rule and moral acts would be wrong

even if no rule existed. The findings for the hypothetical events corresponded with the actual

events, but several differences emerged; judgments about hypothetical situations were more

straightforward and clear-cut than judgments about actual events. For example, a larger

percentage of participants in the hypothetical than actual situations evaluated the moral and

conventional violations as negative. Taken together, these studies show that when children

encounter moral violations in their daily lives, the situations may be more ambiguous and the

features of the events may not be as well specified as in the hypothetical situations.

1.2.2 Developmental trends in moral and conventional judgments

According to Nucci and Turiel (1978) the development of the distinction between moral and

conventional violations stems from different aspects of the child’s social interactions and the

different types of knowledge systems constructed out of these interactions. These two domains of

social knowledge are seen as differentiated in early experience and following different

developmental trajectories (Smetana, 2006).

Research has shown that the distinction between judgments of moral and conventional violations

emerges by the preschool years (e.g., Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). In order to

11

determine at what age children begin to distinguish moral and conventional rules, Smetana

(1981) presented preschool children between the ages of 3 and 5 years with descriptions of

conventional and moral transgressions. Children were asked to rate the seriousness of the

violations, and they were also asked questions that correspond to the rule-contingency (whether

they are acceptable in the absence of a rule), and generalizability (whether they are acceptable in

different contexts) criteria. As expected, the moral transgressions were rated as more serious than

the conventional transgressions. This finding was taken as evidence that the moral-conventional

distinction emerges at an early age. In addition, the 4- to 5-year-olds treated the moral events as

non-contingent on the presence of governing rules, and they also regarded them as generalizable

across social contexts. The 3- to 4-year-olds also perceived the moral events as non-contingent

on governing rules, but they didn't regard them as generalizable. Therefore, it appears that for the

moral events, rule-contingency may be an earlier developing dimension than generalizabilty. In

this study, the results for the conventional events were not significant. Thus, it seems that

children at this age have not yet formed stable understandings of the types of conventions

examined in the study and that reasoning about moral violations may be an earlier-developing

dimension than reasoning about conventional violations.

In the moral domain, Zelazo, Helwig and Lau (1996) investigated the notion that concepts of

harm (rather than a simple association between moral violations and adult sanctions) underlie

moral judgments in the preschool years. Adults and preschool children were required to use

information about intention in order to predict an agent's behavior under normal or noncanonical

(e.g., hitting causes pleasure) act-consequence relations. In the normal situation, an animal

experienced pleasure from being petted and pain from being hit, whereas in the noncanonical

situation these causal relations were reversed. It was found that even 3-year-olds made moral

judgments based on harmful consequences, regardless of the normal or noncanonical status of

12

the act. Additionally, developmental differences were identified: behavioral prediction improved

with age and the younger children (ages 3-4) performed at chance level in the noncanonical

condition; when assigning punishment many 3-year-olds used a simple intention or outcome

rule, whereas older participants were more likely to use a conjunction rule (e.g., if outcome is

negative and intention is negative then punish).

A second study (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001) examined children's (3-, 5- and 7-year-olds)

and adults' moral judgments of psychological harm. The results indicate that participants of all

ages judged it wrong to inflict negative psychological reactions of fear or embarrassment in both

canonical and noncanonical situations. When assigning punishment younger children tended to

use an outcome rule, whereas older participants were more likely to use an intention or

conjunction rule. Taken together, these findings indicate both an early understanding of physical

and psychological harm, as well as age-related changes in the complexity of the rules that

children use to predict behavior and assign punishment.

Other studies have found developmental differences in children's justifications of judgments of

moral and conventional violations (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983; Helwig & Prencipe, 1999). For

example, Helwig and Prencipe (1999) examined children's (ages 6-10) conceptions of flags as

social conventions and their understanding of moral consequences associated with transgressions

toward flags. The findings indicate an increasing understanding of the symbolic features of flags,

whereby younger children focus on the material damage associated with flag-burning and the

loss of the flag's functional value. In contrast, older children referred more to the symbolism or

disrespect associated with violations toward flags.

In a different study, Davidson et al. (1983) presented 6- to 10-year-old children with familiar and

unfamiliar moral and conventional violations. The findings indicate that for both familiar and

13

unfamiliar violations, younger and older children were equally likely to explain that moral

transgressions were wrong because they cause harm, but older children were more likely also to

refer to conceptions of fairness in condemning these transgressions.

Taken together, these studies (Davidson et al., 1983; Helwig & Prencipe, 1999; Helwig et al.,

2001; Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Zelazo et al., 1996) suggest that children

distinguish between moral and conventional violations at an early age. However, their

understanding of these two domains continues to progress with age and they consider additional

criteria, including intentions, in their judgments. Moreover, older children in these studies have

been found to produce more elaborate and complex justifications.

1.3 The neural correlates of moral judgments

The conclusions of social domain theory have been drawn from research that examined

individual's judgments and reasoning about moral and conventional violations. If judgments of

these violations do, in fact, correspond to two separate domains, it is likely that they may be

processed differently at a neurocognitive level. In addition, the developmental trends described

in the previous sections may be evident in neurocognitive processing as well. Examining the

neurocognitive processing of these domains is important not only to further understanding how

individuals distinguish these domains and how this distinction develops with age, but it may also

have important implications for understanding moral (and immoral) behavior. In particular, this

would be important for cases where a discrepancy is found between individuals' moral judgments

and behavior. This inconsistency between judgment and behavior is evident in clinical

populations, such as children and adults with conduct problems (e.g., Blair, 1997; Nucci &

Herman, 1982; Tisak & Jankowski, 1996). Methods that examine neurocognitive processing may

14

be more sensitive than behavioral measures alone, revealing additional information that could

mediate the relation between judgment and behavior.

Research on the neural correlates of moral judgment has mostly been conducted with adults.

These studies (e.g., Blair, 2007; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll et al.,

2001) suggest that many cortical structures that have been shown to be important for both

emotion and cognition are implicated in moral judgment. Brain regions such as prefrontal cortex,

which receives important inputs from both sensory and limbic areas (Casebeer, 2003), have

emerged as central for social behavior and specifically for moral behavior (Adolphs, 2003). The

findings of activation in regions implicated in emotional processing have been interpreted to be

in line with the social-intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), according to which moral judgments are

driven primarily by rapid, affectively-based, intuitive responses, with deliberate moral reasoning

engaged only post hoc in order to provide rational justifications in response to social demands.

Alternatively, morality can be explained by constructivist models, which maintain that moral

development is constructed through social interactions and concepts generated out of reflection

on these experiences, including the emotional reactions surrounding moral events (e.g., Arsenio

& Gold, 2006; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 2008; see also Pizarro & Bloom, 2003, and Saltzstein &

Kasachkoff, 2004, for critiques of Haidt’s intuitionist model). Questions generated by these

contrasting positions on the origins of moral concepts are beyond the scope of the present study.

However it is clear from the work on social domains that children exhibit uniquely moral forms

of reasoning based on concerns with harm and fairness during the preschool years and perhaps

earlier (Helwig, 2008; Turiel, 2006). The present study will examine the underlying process of

this ability and how it develops with age.

15

1.3.1 Evidence from neuroimaging studies

Evidence that the prefrontal cortex is involved in moral behavior comes from a series of

experimental studies using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). For example, Moll

et al. (2001) presented participants with simple claims, some containing moral content (e.g. ‘they

hung an innocent man’) and some without moral content (e.g. ‘stones are made of water’).

Compared to statements without moral content, judgments in response to statements containing

moral content produced increased activity bilaterally in the frontal pole, the medial frontal gyrus,

right cerebellum, right temporal pole, superior temporal sulcus, left orbitofrontal cortex, left

precuneus, and posterior globus pallidus. In a different study (Moll et al., 2002a), viewing scenes

that evoke moral emotions (e.g. physical assaults, poor abandoned children) was found to

produce activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus.

Studies with adults that examined the neural basis of moral judgment have distinguished between

personal and impersonal moral dilemmas (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). According to Greene and

Haidt (2002) “a moral violation is personal if it is: (i) likely to cause serious bodily harm, (ii) to a

particular person, (iii) in such a way that the harm does not result from the deflection of an

existing threat onto a different party. A moral violation is impersonal if it fails to meet these

criteria.” (p. 519). An example of an impersonal dilemma is the trolley dilemma (Thomson,

1986), in which one has to decide whether to allow an out-of-control trolley to continue down a

track where it will kill five people, or whether to push a switch diverting it to a track where it

will kill only one person. However, in a variation of this dilemma, the footbridge dilemma

(Thomson, 1986), the only way to save the five people is to push a large person in front of the

trolley, killing him but saving the others. This latter dilemma is a personal dilemma as it is

introduced in an "up-close-and-personal manner" (Greene et al., 2001) and the bystander

witnessing the event now becomes a moral agent. Most individuals assert that it is acceptable to

16

sacrifice one person in order to save five in the case of the trolley dilemma, but not in the case of

the footbridge dilemma (Greene et al., 2001).

Greene et al. (2001) presented moral dilemmas, such as the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, to

participants while their brains were scanned with fMRI. These authors found that responding to

personal moral dilemmas, as compared with impersonal and non-moral dilemmas, produced

increased activity in areas associated with emotional-social processing; these include the medial

frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral superior temporal sulcus. By contrast,

impersonal and non-moral dilemmas, which did not differ from each other, produced increased

activity in areas associated with cognitive control; these include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

and parietal areas. This finding is in line with Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, and Eslinger (2003) who

found that in order to solve impersonal dilemmas, such as the trolley dilemma, higher-order

cognitive abilities such as planning, cognitive flexibility, and strategy application are needed.

In addition, Greene et al. (2001) measured participants’ reaction times in order to link these

imaging data to behavior. Participants were slower to approve of personal moral violations, yet

relatively quick to condemn them. In contrast, approvals and disapprovals took equally long for

impersonal moral and non-moral judgments. This pattern was explained by suggesting that

individuals have to overcome their prepotent negative emotional responses when approving of

personal moral violations. According to Greene et al. (2001), overcoming a negative emotional

response may be linked to a pattern of interference similar to that observed in cognitive control

tasks in which automatic processes can influence responses, such as the Stroop task (in which the

identity of a color word can interfere with participants' ability to name the color of ink in which

it is displayed; e.g., the ability to say "green" in response to the word "red" written in green ink).

These findings indicate the importance of affect for moral judgment, although they allow that

cognitive reasoning can play a restricted, but significant role as well (Greene & Haidt, 2002).

17

In a different study (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), the authors focused on

personal moral dilemmas only, and explored whether different patterns of neural activity in

response to these dilemmas are correlated with differences in moral decision-making behavior.

For this purpose, Green et al. (2004) made a further distinction within the class of personal

dilemmas. They differentiated between difficult personal moral dilemmas, and easy personal

moral dilemmas. Difficult personal dilemmas are a class of dilemmas that create cognitive and

emotional tension as compared with easy dilemmas. In response to these dilemmas, participants

tend to answer slowly, and they exhibit no consensus in their judgments. An example of a

difficult dilemma is the crying baby dilemma, in which an individual and other townspeople

have sought refuge in a cellar from enemy soldiers who have taken over the village. The

protagonist’s baby begins to cry loudly, and this will summon the attention of the soldiers, who

will kill the protagonist, his child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save himself and the

others, the protagonist must smother his child to death. This case contrasts with easy personal

moral dilemmas, ones that receive relatively rapid and uniform judgments. One such example is

the infanticide dilemma, in which a teenage mother must decide whether or not to kill her

unwanted newborn infant. The latter dilemma is considered easy in the sense that most

participants tend to agree that an unwanted infant should not be killed.

Greene et al. (2004) examined whether different brain regions are involved in judgments of

difficult and easy moral dilemmas. The dilemmas were classified as either difficult or easy

according to their reaction times. The findings indicate that judgments of difficult dilemmas, as

compared to easy dilemmas, involved increased activity bilaterally in both the dorsolateral

prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). This contrast also revealed

activity in the inferior parietal lobes and the posterior cingulate cortex.

18

Greene et al. (2004) also compared the neural activity associated with utilitarian judgments

(accepting a personal moral violation in favor of a greater good, such as smothering the baby in

the crying baby dilemma) to non-utilitarian judgments (prohibiting a personal moral violation

despite its utilitarian value, such as allowing the baby to live in the crying baby dilemma). The

authors found increased activity for utilitarian, as compared with non-utilitarian, moral

judgments bilaterally in the anterior DLPFC and in the right inferior parietal lobe. In addition,

they found increased activity for utilitarian moral judgments in the more anterior region of the

posterior cingulate (Greene et al., 2004).

These findings show that judgments of difficult dilemmas engage brain areas associated with the

detection of conflict and the operation of cognitive control (ACC and DLPFC). According to

Greene et al. (2004), when participants respond in a utilitarian manner, such responses not only

reflect the involvement of abstract reasoning, but also the engagement of cognitive control in

order to overcome prepotent social-emotional responses elicited by these dilemmas. These data

provide support for the view that both cognitive and emotional processes play important roles in

moral judgment.

In a different study (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002b) 'right' and 'wrong'

judgments in response to simple moral statements were compared with judgments in response to

emotionally evocative non-moral statements (e.g. ‘pregnant women often throw up’). A

comparison of these two conditions revealed greater activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex

for the moral condition, and greater activation in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex as well as the

left amygdala for the non-moral condition. These results suggest a functional dissociation

between neural networks within the orbitofrontal cortex and associated structures that specialize

in processing different kinds of social-emotional information relevant to moral judgments.

Although the non-moral social situations investigated in this study are not prototypical social

19

conventions, and some may include multifaceted situations, which involve a mixture of moral

and conventional concerns, these findings suggest that morality and conventions may have a

different neural basis.

As noted above, most of the work on the neuroscience of moral judgment has been conducted

with adults. However, a couple of studies have been conducted with children and adolescents.

For example, Pujol et al. (2008) scanned 14- to 16-year old adolescents during judgments of

moral dilemmas. The findings reveal increased focal activation in the posterior cingulate cortex

during moral dilemmas as compared to a control condition, in which participants were asked to

answer simple questions about facts presented in non-moral scenarios.

In a different study, Eslinger et al. (2008) presented 10- to 17-year-old children with moral-

straightforward, moral ambiguous, and non-moral scenarios. Results indicated at all ages a

cluster of activity in the most rostral-medial (frontal polar) prefrontal region, as well as left

lateral orbitofrontal, left temporoparietal junction, midline thalamus and globus pallidus. Trials

entailing ambiguous moral situations activated considerably more prefrontal and parietal regions

than straightforward moral situations, suggesting the need for more neurocognitive resources

(Eslinger et al., 2008). Although these studies have begun to examine the neurocognitive

development of moral judgments, they did not examine children's judgments of social

conventions, or the neurocognitive development of the distinction between judgments of

morality and conventions.

1.3.2 Evidence from neurological and neuropsychiatric populations

Two populations have been found to show dramatically impaired moral reasoning; neurological

patients with acquired lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and patients with

psychopathy, a developmental disorder that involves emotional dysfunction, characterized by

20

reduced guilt, empathy, and attachment to significant others, as well as antisocial behavior

including impulsivity and poor behavioral control (Blair, 2010).

Mendez, Anderson, and Shapira (2005) investigated the moral judgments of patients with frontal

lobe damage in response to personal versus impersonal moral dilemmas. These authors examined

patients with frontotemporal dementia and compared their moral judgments with those of

patients with Alzheimer Disease and normal control participants. Frontotemporal dementia is

characterized by difficulty in modulating social behavior, lack of empathy, and psychopathy.

Participants were administered an inventory of moral knowledge, as well as the footbridge

dilemma (personal) and trolley dilemma (impersonal). The findings indicate that all groups

retained knowledge for moral behavior and did not differ in their responses to the trolley

dilemma. In contrast, in response to the footbridge dilemma most of the dementia patients (58%)

responded that they would push the man onto the tracks to save the other five individuals. In

comparison only 23% of the Alzheimer patients and 19% of normal control participants would

push the man to his death. This difference in dementia patients may result from

neurodegenerative disease affecting vmPFC, a brain region necessary for the normal generation

of social emotions (Mendez et al., 2005).

In a different study, Koenigs et al. (2007) examined patients with focal bilateral damage to the

vmPFC. Personal, impersonal, and non-moral dilemmas were presented to these vmPFC patients,

a neurologically normal control group, and a brain-damaged comparison group, who had lesions

that excluded structures thought to be important for emotions (vmPFC, amygdala, insula, right

somatosensory cortices). The findings revealed no significant differences among the groups on

the non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas. However, for personal moral dilemmas, the

vmPFC patients were more likely to endorse the proposed action than either control groups. The

authors explain these findings by suggesting that for personal moral dilemmas, vmPFC patients’

21

consideration of a utilitarian calculation of how to maximize aggregate welfare (e.g., having to

sacrifice one person’s life to save a number of other lives) overrides the highly emotional

aversive behavior (Koenigs et al., 2007).

Studies examining patients with psychopathy showed that when this population was presented

with prototypical moral and conventional violations, they made less of a distinction between

moral and conventional violations, such that they were more likely than healthy individuals to

endorse moral violations in the absence of a societal rule (Blair, 1995, 1997). Similar impairment

has been reported in other aggressive populations who use antisocial behavior to achieve their

goals, such as behaviorally disruptive adolescents (Arsenio & Fleiss, 1996; Nucci & Herman,

1982).

These two populations are interesting in that although they show impairment in moral reasoning,

they fail to show impairment in nonaffect-based executive function tasks (unless the lesion

extends beyond vmPFC; see Blair, 2010). Similarly, individuals with psychopathy, who show

amygdala and vmPFC dysfunction (Blair, 2007), show no indication of impairment in executive

function tasks that are not considered to involve affect. Taken together these findings point to the

role of emotion in moral judgment (Blair, 2010).

1.3.3 The role of intentionality and theory of mind in neural correlates of moral

judgment

Research on the neural correlates of moral and social judgments has also examined the role of

intentions and theory of mind, or the ability to represent the mental states of others (e.g.,

Berthoz, Armory, Blair, & Dolan, 2002; Berthoz, Grezes, Armony, Passingham & Dolan, 2006;

Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007; Young & Saxe, 2008). For example, Young et al.

(2007) presented participants with scenarios in which protagonists produced either a negative or

22

neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome or the neutral

outcome. The right temporoparietal junction showed increased activation for cases of attempted

harm, where protagonists believed harm would be caused to others, even though the harm did not

occur. These findings provide neurophysiological support for the well-documented findings that

suggest that moral judgments are based not only on affective processes but on cognitive

processes as well, namely, the understanding of an agent's intentions.

In a different study (Young & Saxe, 2008), participants read descriptions of protagonist's actions

and then were provided with either moral facts about the action's effects on another person or

non moral facts about the situation. The findings show that the right temporoparietal junction, as

well as precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex, were activated more for moral than non moral

facts. These cortical structures have been found consistently to be recruited during mental state

understanding (e.g., Ruby & Decety, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), and the authors concluded

that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference.

In a study focusing on social conventions only, Berthoz et al. (2002) compared neural responses

to stories describing normal behavior and violations of social norms (embarrassing situations).

Violations of social norms elicited activation in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the medial

prefrontal cortex. This pattern of activation was more pronounced for intentional norm violations

than unintentional violations.

Other research (Berthoz et al., 2006) examined the neural correlates of moral transgressions that

were performed by either the participants themselves or by another individual, and were carried

out either intentionally or accidentally. Results indicate greater amygdala activation when

participants considered stories narrating their own intentional transgressions more than any other

condition. This result suggests the amygdala is important for affective responsiveness to moral

23

transgressions. These findings are in line with research (Schaich-Borg, Hynes, Van Horn,

Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006) showing that moral scenarios involving intentional harm

elicit more activity than moral scenarios involving unintentional harm in brain regions that tend

to be more associated with emotion (i.e., orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and less activity

in areas that tend to be more associated with cognition (i.e, angular gyrus and superior frontal

gyrus). Taken together, this line of work suggest that both affective and cognitive processes are

relevant to moral judgments.

1.3.4 Critique of neuroscience of morality

The present study integrates two important lines of work; research from moral development and

research from moral neuroscience. Thus far, however, research on moral development and moral

neuroscience has proceeded independently with very little interconnection (Killen & Smetana,

2008). Developmental psychologists (e.g., Carpendale et al., 2010; Killen & Smetana, 2008;

Turiel, 2010, in press) have criticized the neuroscience studies and argue that most of the moral

neuroscience studies do not acknowledge the definitions and findings from developmental

psychology (Killen & Smetana, 2008).

For example, according to Turiel (2010), the most frequent explanations of moral decisions

given by neuroscience researchers have failed to take into account epistemological

considerations with regards to the moral realm. Turiel (2010) argues that neuroscience studies

have emphasized intuitions and biologically based processes without acknowledging

epistemological issues. These studies often explain moral judgment by reducing their analysis to

psychological or biological processes. (Turiel, 2010). In contrast, according to Turiel (2010),

Kohlberg, and developmental psychologists that followed, have attempted to provide

definitional-philosophical groundings for a psychological analysis of morality (Kohlberg, 1971).

24

Turiel (2010) further asserts that the moral dilemmas presented to participants in the

neuroimaing studies are very complex and do not involve straightforward everyday moral

decisions. These dilemmas, such as the trolley dilemma, entail utilitarian calculations pertaining

to life and death, such as whether it is preferable to sacrifice one life in order to save a greater

number of lives. According to Turiel (2010) participants judging these dilemmas are essentially

posed with the problem of whether it is permissible for them to act as executioners, and they are

required to endorse a distasteful decision.

Carpendale et al. (2010) argue that is difficult to find clear-cut definitions for morality in the

neuroscience literature, and when explicit definitions are found they tend to offer fairly broad

conventionalized views of morality, often indicating that morality simply involved rule-

following or compliance. Therefore, the neuroscience studies fail to distinguish morality and

social conventions and mistakenly classify both types of acts as moral. Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-

Souza, Krueger and Grafman (2005), for example, state that “morality is considered as the set of

customs and values that are embraced by a cultural group to guide social conduct” (p. 799).

Casebeer and Churchland (2003) have similarly argued that “moral reasoning deals with

cognitive acts and judgments associated with norms…the groups’ local conventions, pecking

order, division of labor, and even who has what kind of knowledge” (p. 171). In addition,

according to Carpendale et al. (2010), the studies examining the neuroscience of morality have

often taken a reductionistic approach. Similar to Turiel (2010), these authors argue that instead of

reducing morality to the physical structures inside an organism, morality is irreducible to the

functioning of the brain, and a better approach would be to study the origins of morality in

human action and practices (Carpendale et al., 2010).

The present study will take a developmental neurocognitive approach and will attempt to address

the issues raised in these critiques. Previous studies examining the neuroscience of morality have

25

established that different types of moral judgments are associated with activity in different brain

regions. This finding is in line with the idea of separate domains, in the sense that there are

separate information processing systems associated with different types of judgments (Blair,

2010). However, these moral-neuroscience studies have not examined the online processing that

individuals engage in while making moral and social judgments. Studying the online processing

is important as it can allow a better understanding of how individuals come to differentiate

between morality and conventions and how this process develops with age.

Furthermore, the present study will employ definitions and social situations adapted from the

social domain literature that clearly separate moral issues from issues of social convention. These

types of prototypical straightforward moral violations, which involve issues of harm and fairness,

will allow examining the basic online process and are appropriate for child participants. The

present study will examine differences in the online processing of criterion judgments (such as

rule-contingency) of prototypical moral and conventional violations. Therefore, we will focus on

simple straightforward moral and conventional violations. This thesis, thus will attempt to draw

on investigations informed by epistemological distinctions between social domains to guide the

investigation of neuropsychological processes involved in judgments about social events of

different types.

1.4 N2 component of ERP

The present study will examine the online processing of judgments of moral and conventional

violations. One way of investigating online processing is by examining event-related potentials

(ERPs) that are measured with electroencephalography (EEG). An ERP is an electrical potential

associated with specific sensory, cognitive, and motor events (Luck, 2005). ERP is especially

good for studying online processing because of its excellent temporal resolution, which allows

26

cognitive processes to be monitored millisecond by millisecond (Thierry, 2005). Most studies

examining the neural correlates of moral judgments have used fMRI, but to the best of our

knowledge, none have used EEG/ERP for this purpose. EEG and fMRI detect two fundamentally

different physiological phenomena associated with brain activity. EEG is a remote measurement

of the electric potential directly generated by neuronal activity, while fMRI measures changes in

blood oxygenation secondary to neuronal activity. fMRI provides superior spatial resolution and

is better than EEG for localizing the brain structure that is activated during a given task.

Nonetheless, in EEG, transmission of the electrical potentials within the brain to the recording

electrodes on the scalp is effectively instantaneous, making the temporal resolution of ERP

superior to fMRI. In the latter technique the hemodynamic change is not immediate, thus the

observed signal change is delayed in time from the neuronal activity. Another advantage of

EEG/ERP over fMRI is that it is less sensitive to artifacts created by movement than is fMRI,

and thus better suited for studying children who may find it difficult to remain still during a

testing session (de Haan & Thomas, 2002).

An online process that can be studied with ERP and is relevant for prototypical moral and

conventional judgments is that of detecting and processing cognitive conflict. When individuals

make these judgments they need to decide between two alternatives (whether the act is

acceptable or unacceptable), and to varying degrees, they may need to examine the behavior in

light of a rule or standard that has been violated. It is likely that the conflict arises from the

difficulty in assessing the violation in relation to the societal rule. In the present study, we will

examine differences in conflict resulting from criterion judgments about prototypical moral and

conventional violations. These prototypical violations, as well as the conflict resulting from

these judgments, should be distinguished from conflict described in studies examining high

versus low conflict in personal moral dilemmas (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). Studies examining

27

personal moral dilemmas, have distinguished between personal dilemmas which result in low

conflict (e.g., the infanticide dilemma, where a teenage girl wants to smother her unwanted

newborn) and those that result in high conflict (e.g., Sophie's choice, where a mother must either

allow one of her two children to be tested in Nazi experiments or she will lose both children).

However, both of these high and low conflict personal dilemmas are not prototypical and very

complex. In the present study, for the purpose of distinguishing moral and conventional

violations in terms of conflict, we will not examine such complex dilemmas and only focus on

prototypical moral (e.g., hitting, lying in the school or playground context) and conventional

(e.g., addressing a teacher by first name, wearing pajamas to school) violations.

According to social domain theory (e.g., Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1981), judgments of prototypical

moral violations are independent of societal rules and authority and are made according to the

intrinsic negative consequences, or wrongness, of the act. Therefore, societal prohibitions do not

need to be considered, although they may be, and it is expected that prototypical moral

judgments would result in relatively low conflict. For example, a moral violation, such as

murder, would be considered wrong because of the negative consequences it has towards others,

rather than the law against it. In contrast, when individuals make judgments of social

conventional violations they are contrasting the violation with a societal rule, and their judgment

is based on deliberation and relatively explicit consideration of the rule-system and the context in

which the act takes place. For example, in North America it is customary to wear dark clothing

to a funeral. However, in other cultures this is not the case. Thus, when considering a

conventional violation, such as wearing a red T-shirt to a funeral, the social system, its rules, and

customs need to be contrasted against the violation. Therefore, it expected that conventional

judgments would result in relatively higher conflict than moral violations.

28

One well-studied ERP component that has been suggested to be an index of cognitive conflict

monitoring is the N2 (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). In children and adults the N2 is usually

observed at medial-frontal sites between 250 and 500 ms following stimulus onset (e.g., Lahat,

Todd, Mahy, Lau & Zelazo, 2010; Lamm, Zelazo, Lewis, 2006; Lewis, Lamm, Segalowitz,

Stieben, Zelazo, 2006; Todd, Lewis, Meusel, & Zelazo, 2008). N2 amplitude is usually larger

when conflict is high, such as in a go/no-go task, where a response must be withheld (no-go) in a

context in which there is a prepotent tendency to make an overt (go) response (Nieuwenhuis et

al., 2003). Source analyses of the N2 have identified cortical generators in both dorsomedial

prefrontal cortex (e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003) and ventral

prefrontal cortex (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex) (Bokura et al., 2001). Similar source modeling has

been obtained with children (e.g., Lahat et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2006).

Developmental studies focusing on the N2 using a go/no-go task have found that with age, this

component decreases in both amplitude and latency (e.g., Lamm et al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2006).

If the N2 is index of cognitive conflict, Lamm et al's and Lewis et al.'s findings can be

interpreted such that with age, cognitive conflict decreases.

The function of the N2 has been debated in prior research, although there is a general consensus

that it is associated with aspects of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Nieuwenhuis et

al., 2003). The higher amplitudes of the N2 on no-go compared to go trials have been argued to

reflect a cognitive inhibition mechanism needed to suppress the incorrect tendency to respond. It

is suggested that this inhibition operates at a processing stage prior to motor execution (e.g,

Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999). According to others (e.g, Nieuwenhuis et al.,

2003), the increased N2 amplitude on no-go trials represents an electrophysiological correlate of

conflict monitoring by the ACC. For example, Nieuwenhuis found that the N2 was localized to

the ACC and enhanced for low frequency stimuli, irrespective of whether these stimuli were

29

associated with generating or suppressing a response. This finding suggests that the conception

of the N2 as an index for response inhibition should be revised, and is consistent with the view

that the N2 reflects detection of conflict stemming from the competition between generating and

inhibiting a response, or alternatively, detection of a discrepancy that requires further effortful

processing.

The present study will examine differences in level of conflict for judgments of moral and

conventional violations. Therefore, a region of interest is the ACC, which has been found to

generate the N2 component and is activated in response to the occurrence of conflict (e.g.,

Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; Van Veen &

Carter, 2002). Moreover, the ACC is of interest as previous neuroscience research on moral

judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2004) has shown its activation for certain types of moral

judgments. Heightened ACC activity has been found to be associated with simultaneous

activation of incompatible response tendencies (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molffese & Snyder, 2001).

Two major subdivisions of the ACC, a dorsal cognitive division and a rostral-ventral affective

division (Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000), have been found to subserve slightly distinct functions.

The dorsal ACC has been found to be activated during cognitively demanding tasks and various

functions have been ascribed to this area, including modulation of attention or executive

function, monitoring competition, complex motor control, motivation, and error detection (e.g.,

Bush et al., 1998; Vogt, Finch & Olson, 1992). The ventral ACC, by contrast, has been found to

be activated by affect-related tasks and is primarily involved in assessing the salience of

emotional and motivational information and the regulation of emotional responses (Devinsky,

Morrell & Vogt, 1995; Vogt et al., 1992). Furthermore, it has been argued that it has a role in

making affective judgments (Paus, 2001). It is expected that the dorsal ACC would play a larger

role in judgments of prototypical conventional transgressions, in which more conflict is

30

anticipated. As vmPFC has been shown to be important for emotional processes associated with

moral judgments versus non moral judgments (e.g., Blair, 2010; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez et

al., 2005) source activation will be examined in this ROI as well. Differences in vmPFC source

activation may point to differences in affect-related processing of moral and conventional

violations.

1.5 The present study

The main goal of the present study was to further understand the development of individuals'

distinction between judgments of moral and conventional violations, using a developmental

cognitive neuroscience approach. Our aim was to determine whether judgments of prototypical

issues of morality and convention can be differentiated by differences in conflict and whether

this process changes with age. Therefore, 12- to 14-year-old children and adults participated in

an ERP paradigm, which consisted of prototypical moral and conventional violations adapted

from social domain theory. In three different experiments, participants were asked to read

scenarios, which were followed by one of three possible endings; a moral violation, a

conventional violation, or a neutral social act. Subsequently, participants were asked to judge

whether the violation depicted in the scenario was acceptable or unacceptable as a function of

rule contingency (i.e., either when a rule was assumed or removed). This criterion judgment was

included in order to examine whether behavioral and ERP differences will be found as a function

of rule contingency. Rule contingency was chosen (as opposed to the criterion of generalizability

and alterability) as it is can be varied systematically while keeping all other variables constant.

The two other criteria would entail providing more instructions and changing the task. In

Experiments 1 and 2 we obtained behavioral data from adult participants and measured their

reaction times (RTs). The purpose of Experiments 1 and 2 was to validate the behavioral task

used in the subsequent ERP experiments. Experiment 3 included ERP testing of adults and

31

measured participants' RTs, N2 morphology, and source localization of the N2 component.

Experiment 4 was a developmental ERP experiment that compared 12- to 14-year-old children

with the adults from Experiment 3, and examined RTs, N2 morphology, and source localization

of the N2 component. Finally, Experiment 5 included an ERP analysis of participants who were

excluded from the analyses of Experiments 3 and 4 as they showed a non-normative response

orientation in the conventional rule removed condition.

1.5.1 Hypotheses

Our hypotheses in the present study pertained to differences between judgments of moral and

conventional violations. We were interested in examining how these differences would vary as a

function of rule contingency and age.

If moral violations are judged according to the intrinsic negative consequences of the act,

whereas conventions are judged according to societal rules, then judgments of conventional

violations should require more deliberation as compared to judgments of moral violations. Thus,

it was expected that moral judgments would be faster than conventional judgments. If judgments

of moral violations will be found to have faster RTs than judgments of conventional violations

this will suggest that the two types of violation are processed differently. Such a finding would

be in line with the idea that judgments of moral and conventional violations correspond to two

different domains of reasoning.

1. Judgments of prototypical moral violations will have shorter RTs than judgments of

conventional violations.

For the same reasons, we expected that these RT differences would be reflected in N2

morphology. Thus, judgments of moral violations, based on the intrinsic wrongness of the act,

would involve relatively lower levels of conflict detection as compared to judgments of

32

conventional violations, which involve deliberate consideration of societal rules. These

differences in level of conflict detection were expected to be reflected in N2 amplitude and

latency. If N2 differences are found in response to moral and conventional violations this would

suggest that judgments of moral and conventional violations can be differentiated according to

conflict detection.

2. Judgments of moral violations will elicit larger (i.e., more negative) N2 amplitudes and

shorter latencies as compared to judgments of conventional violations.

As outlined, the N2 component of ERP has been found to be generated by dmPFC (suggestive of

ACC) and vmPFC (suggestive of OFC). As the ACC has been shown to have an important role

in conflict monitoring and the vmPFC has been shown to be important for emotional processes

associated with moral judgments versus non moral judgments (e.g., Blair, 2010; Koenigs et al.,

2007; Mendez et al., 2005), we expected to find differences between judgments of moral and

conventional violations in source activation for these regions of interest. If differences in source

activation will be found for judgments of moral and conventional violations, this would be in line

with the idea that judgments of moral and conventional violations entail two separate domains of

reasoning. Furthermore, differences in ACC source activation of the two types of violation

would be in line with the idea of differences in conflict between judgments of moral and

conventional violations.

3. Judgments of conventional violations will elicit more dmPFC source activation as

compared to judgments of moral violations.

4. Judgments of moral violations will elicit more vmPFC source activation as compared to

judgments of conventional violations.

33

Finally, given the evidence reviewed regarding developmental trends in children's moral

judgments and justifications, we expected that judgments of moral and conventional violations

would be processed differently by children as compared to adults. As mentioned above,

children's justifications become more elaborate with age (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983). Although

the present study examines criterion judgments and not justifications, it is important to note that

these justifications provide reasons for criterion judgments, thus examining individuals' thinking

about criterion judgments. Given that thinking about moral and conventional judgments changes

with age, it is likely that the online processing behind this thinking develops as well.

Furthermore, developmental studies of the N2 component have shown that this component

decreases in amplitude and latency with age (e.g., Lamm et al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2006), thus

indicating a possible change in conflict processing with development. This change in conflict

processing may be reflected in judgments of moral and conventional violations. As to the best of

our knowledge, there are no previous studies examining the development of the neural correlates

of judgments about morality and conventions, the developmental aspect of the present study will

be exploratory and no specific hypotheses will be made regarding the direction of age

differences. If age differences in N2 amplitude and latency will be found, this would suggest that

although even very young children have been found to distinguish between moral and

conventional violations (e.g., Smetana, 1981), the online processing is different among children

and adults.

5. Judgments of moral and conventional violations will elicit differences between adults

and children on measures of RT, N2 amplitude and latency, and dmPFC and vmPFC

source activation.

34

In order to examine these hypotheses, the present study will include a series of five experiments.

Experiment 1 will involve creating a new behavioral paradigm for studying judgments of moral

and conventional violations and will examine RT differences among adults for judgments of

these two types of violation . Experiment 2 will entail a follow-up investigation to Experiment 1

and will attempt to replicate the results of Experiment 1 when the order of the rule contingency

variable will be counterbalanced. This will enable eliminating a possible confound for order of

presentation of the rule contingency variable. Experiment 3 will involve ERP testing of adult

participants and will examine N2 amplitude and latency differences between judgments of moral

and conventional violations as a function of rule contingency. This experiment will include a

source analysis generating the N2. Experiment 4 will include a developmental dimension and

will examine N2 differences (and source analysis) for judgments of moral and conventional

violations among 12- to 14-year-old children. Finally, Experiment 5 will include an analysis of

N2 morphology for participants who responded in a non-normative manner to conventional

violations when a rule was removed.

35

Chapter 2

2 Experiment 1

The purpose of Experiment 1 was to create a new paradigm for studying judgments of moral and

conventional violations in a task that can assess behavioral and ERP differences between these

two domains. For this purpose, scenarios and theoretical definitions from social domain theory

(e.g., Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 2006; Turiel, 1983) were modified, such that they could be

used in a RT and ERP task. This entailed creating a well-controlled target stimulus, which

consisted of one or two words and containing an identical number of syllables that describe

either a moral or conventional violation, while the rest of the scenario remained constant across

the different types of violation.

In the task created (see full description below), participants were presented with scenarios that

had either a moral, conventional, or neutral ending. In the first half of the task participants were

asked to judge whether the act is acceptable or unacceptable (rule assumed condition). In the

second half of the task participants were asked to make the same judgments while imagining the

absence of a rule (rule removed condition). The order of presentation of the rule contingency

variable, in which rule assumed is always presented before rule removed, is in line with

interview studies from social domain theory. These studies have examined the rule contingency

criterion after evaluating participants' judgments in a standard situation in which rules are

assumed. Furthermore, instructing participants that a rule is removed would be counter intuitive

without a context in which rules are present or assumed. For these reasons, we chose initially to

use a fixed order for rule contingency.

36

In Experiment 1 we measured RT differences in order to confirm that morality and convention

can be differentiated on behavioral measures. Subsequent experiments reported here will include

ERP assessment as well.

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants

The study included 34 undergraduate students (16 males, 18 females, M age = 19.94 years, SD =

2.33, Range = 17.40-27.30) who participated for partial course credit. Most of the participants

indicated that they are either from a European (approximately 37%) or Asian (approximately

40%) ethnic background, while the remaining participants indicated that they are from other

various ethnic backgrounds. All participants in all experiments reported here had normal or

corrected- to-normal vision, and were free of any psychiatric diagnoses or medication.

Recruitment and all procedures for this and the following experiments reported were approved

by the appropriate Research Ethics Board at the University of Toronto, in accord with the

Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans.

2.1.2 Procedure

Upon arrival at the lab, the experimenter explained the procedure to the participants and asked

them to fill out the informed consent and demographics forms. The participants were told they

may terminate the experiment at any time. Next, participants were seated in front of a computer

monitor and instructions were provided for the moral judgments task (see below). Following the

instructions and after answering any of the participants' questions the task was administered.

Upon completion of the task, participants were debriefed, received course credit, and were

thanked for their time.

37

2.1.3 Moral judgments task

The moral judgments task was presented using E-Prime Version 1.1 (Psychological Software

Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on a Dell Pentium 4 computer. The task included 6 blocks of 15 trials. In

each trial, a scenario was presented describing a social interaction between several individuals.

Participants read each scenario and pressed a computer key when they were finished. Next, a

fixation cross appeared on the screen for a duration of either 800, 1000, or 1200 ms. These

durations were pseudo-randomized across trials and were intended to reduce the predictability of

the target stimulus. The fixation cross was followed by an ending for the scenario, which

appeared on the screen for a duration of 3000 ms. The ending included either a moral violation, a

conventional violation, or a neutral social act. The number of trials was equal for each type of

ending, and these were presented in pseudo-random order. The ending included one or two

words only and the number of syllables was matched across conditions. In the first half of the

blocks (rule assumed condition), participants were instructed to press a computer key if they

thought the act was acceptable (i.e., 'OK') and to press a different key if they thought the act was

unacceptable (i.e., 'NOT OK'). In the second half of the blocks (rule removed condition),

participants were asked to make the same judgment, while imagining the absence of a rule

against the act in question. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible and RTs

were measured. Participants' response was followed by feedback for a duration of 1500 ms

indicating either that a response was recorded or prompting the participant to respond faster (see

Appendix and Figure 1 for example of trial structure).

38

Figure 1. Example of trial structure of moral judgments task

Two practice blocks that preceded the task were included in order to acquaint participants with

the task. The first practice block included a list of 20 words that the participants had to judge as

either 'OK' or 'NOT OK'. This block was intended to provide practice pressing the different

computer keys quickly without looking at the keyboard. The second practice block included 5

trials, similar to the ones included in the task. These trials were not included in the analysis and

the purpose was to orient the participants to the types of scenarios involved in the task.

2.2 Results

In Experiment 1 and, unless otherwise specified, in all following experiments, only those

responses that would be considered normative according to social domain theory were analyzed

(i.e., 'NOT OK' judgments in response to moral violations in both the rule assumed and rule

3000 ms

No time limit

1500 ms

800/1000/1200

ms

Response Recorded

LIE

+

Jennifer was very bored

during class. She wanted to

be somewhere else. When

her teacher asked her a

question she decided to…

39

removed condition; 'OK' judgments in response to neutral acts in both the rule assumed and rule

removed condition; 'NOT OK' judgments in response to conventional violations in the rule

assumed condition; 'OK' judgments in response to conventional violations in the rule removed

condition).

Table 1 presents the mean percentage of trials on which a normative response was given. As can

be seen from the table, participants provided normative judgments to the different types of

violation on most of the trials. Normative judgments for conventional violations appear slightly

lower than normative judgments for moral and neutral acts, a finding in line with previous

research from social domain theory, where percentages for normative judgments of conventions

tend to be lower than judgments of moral acts (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Weston & Turiel, 1980). This

could possibly reflect the idea that judgments of convention are based on the specific context and

rule system in which the act occurs.

Table 1. Mean percentage of trials of normative judgments in Experiment 1

Condition Mean Percentage of Trials

Moral rule assumed ('NOT OK') 96.67

Moral rule removed ('NOT OK') 80.59

Conventional rule assumed ('NOT OK') 73.73

Conventional rule removed ('OK') 73.14

Neutral rule assumed ('OK') 89.41

Neutral rule removed ('OK') 94.31

In order to examine the hypothesis that judgments of moral violations will have shorter RTs than

judgments of conventional violations, median RTs were analyzed using an analysis of variance

(ANOVA) with violation type (moral, conventional, neutral) and rule contingency (rule assumed,

40

rule removed) as within subjects variables. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni

adjustments were carried out for all significant interactions. Preliminary analysis did not identify

gender differences on the variables of interest; therefore gender was removed from the analysis.

The ANOVA revealed a main effect for violation type, F(2, 66) = 3.07, p < .05, ηp2 = .09 (moral

M = 1103.94 ms, SE = 41.97; conventional M = 1150.28 ms, SE = 41.80; neutral M = 1066.69

ms, SE = 28.50), which was qualified by a Violation type X Rule contingency interaction, F(2,

66) = 13.79, p < .0001, ηp2 = .30. Post hoc tests examining the effect of violation type revealed

that judgments of neutral violations were significantly faster than judgments of conventional

violations, p < .05. Furthermore, post hoc tests examining the interaction effect revealed that

when a rule was assumed judgments of moral violations (M = 1023.72 ms, SE = 33.42) were

significantly faster than judgments of conventional violations (M = 1153.06 ms, SE = 47.79) and

neutral acts (M = 1146.15 ms, SE = 34.66), which did not significantly differ from each other.

When a rule was removed judgments of neutral acts (M = 987.24 ms, SE = 33.23) were


moral violations (M = 1184.16 ms, SE = 64.01), which did not significantly differ from each

other. Moreover, for moral violations, judgments when a rule was assumed were significantly

faster than judgments when a rule was removed. For neutral violations, judgments when a rule

was removed were significantly faster than when a rule was assumed. For conventional

violations, no significant difference was found between judgments when a rule was assumed and

removed (see Figure 2).

41

Figure 2. Median RTs for judgments of moral, conventional, and neutral acts as a function

of rule contingency in Experiment 1

2.3 Discussion

Experiment 1 involved a new experimental paradigm, in which participants took part in a moral

judgments RT task. As can be seen from Table 1, participants made the normative judgments on

most trials, which suggest that the task is appropriate in assessing judgments of moral and

conventional violations. The slightly lower percentage of normative conventional judgments as

compared to moral judgments is in line with studies from social domain theory that show lower

agreement for judgments of conventional violations (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Weston & Turiel, 1980).

If judgments of moral violations are based on the intrinsic negative consequences of the act,

whereas judgments of conventional violations are based on societal rules, it was expected that

judgments of moral violations would be made relatively faster than judgments of conventional

violations, where rules need to be considered and deliberated. As predicted, in the rule assumed

condition judgments of moral violations elicited faster RTs than judgments of convenbtional

violations. However, no significant difference between judgments of moral and conventional

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

Conventional Moral Neutral

Violation Type

MS

Rule Assumed

Rule Removed

42

violations was found in the rule removed condition. Additionally, for moral violations,

judgments in the rule removed condition elicited slower RTs than judgments in the rule assumed

condition. One possible explanation for this finding could be that when participants are asked to

imagine the absence of a rule, responses to moral violations require more thought and

deliberation, perhaps because in the case where a rule against a moral violation is absent the

relation of the rule to the evaluation has to be considered and then subsequently rejected as

irrelevant. This requires more thought and deliberation and results in a slower process than when

a rule is assumed.

Finally, in the neutral condition, judgments of neutral acts when a rule was removed were

significantly faster than judgments when a rule was assumed. This result may be explained by

the fact that neutral violations are always acceptable and our participants may have been puzzled

by the fact that they were asked to judge whether neutral acts are okay or not okay to perform.

When a rule was explicitly removed it was easier for participants to judge neutral acts as

acceptable.

One limitation of Experiment 1 is the possibility that the differences found between rule assumed

and rule removed conditions may be due to the order of presentation of these two conditions, as

the rule assumed condition was always presented before the rule removed condition. Experiment

2 will attempt to eliminate this confound.

43

Chapter 3

3 Experiment 2

In Experiment 1, the rule assumed condition was always presented before the rule removed

condition, creating a confounding variable of order. However, this order of presentation is in line

with interview studies from social domain theory that have examined the rule contingency

criterion after evaluating participants' judgments in a standard situation in which rules are

assumed. Furthermore, instructing participants that a rule is removed would be counter intuitive

without a context in which rules are present or assumed. For these reasons we initially presented

the rule assumed condition before the rule removed condition. Experiment 2 was intended to rule

out this possible confound by testing a sample of participants, in which the order of rule

contingency was counterbalanced. Our aim was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants


6.76, Range = 18.08-44.01) who did not participate in Experiment 1, and took part in the

experiment for partial course credit. Most of the participants indicated that they are either from a

European (approximately 41%) or Asian (approximately 31%) ethnic background, while the

remaining participants indicated that they are from other various ethnic backgrounds.

44

3.1.2 Procedure and task

The procedure and task were identical to Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2, 9 participants

were presented with the rule assumed condition before the rule removed condition, and 7

participants were presented with the rule removed condition before the rule assumed condition.

In order to create context for removing rules, the instructions of the task were preceded by the

following introduction: "As you know, there are lots of rules in society. There are rules about

how to behave in school, and there are also rules about hurting or hitting people".

3.2 Results


be seen from the table, participants provided normative judgments to the different types of

violations on most of the trials. For most conditions, the percentages appear to be similar to those

obtained in Experiment 1. For the conventional rule removed condition the percentage is lower

than that obtained for this condition in Experiment 1. One explanation for this discrepancy could

be due to the smaller number of participants in Experiment 2, which can cause the results to be

more likely to fluctuate between participants.








45


As in Experiment 1, median RTs were analyzed using an ANOVA with violation type (moral,

conventional, neutral) and rule contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as within subjects

variables. The order of rule contingency condition was included as a covariate, and its effect was

tested. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were carried out for all

significant interactions.

The AVOVA revealed that there was no significant effect for order of rule contingency

presentation and no significant interaction with order of presentation, p < .08. In addition, a

Violation type X Rule contingency interaction was found, F(2, 28) = 5.78, p < .01, ηp2 = .29.

Post hoc tests examining this interaction effect revealed that when a rule was assumed judgments

of moral violations (M = 831.77 ms, SE = 48.22) were significantly faster than judgments of

conventional violations (M = 980.78 ms, SE = 54.11) and neutral acts (M = 995.91 ms, SE =

51.22), which did not significantly differ from each other. When a rule was removed no

significant differences were found between the three types of violations. Moreover, for moral

violations, judgments when a rule was assumed (M = 831.77 ms, SE = 48.22) were significantly

faster than judgments when a rule was removed (M = 990.84 ms, SE = 76.88). For conventional

and neutral acts, no significant difference was found between judgments when a rule was

assumed and removed (see Figure 3).

46

500.00

600.00

700.00

800.00

900.00

1000.00

1100.00

1200.00

1300.00

1400.00


Violation Type

MS

Rule Assumed

Rule Removed



3.3 Discussion

The aim of Experiment 2 was to eliminate a possible confound of order of presentation of the

rule contingency variable. Therefore, approximately half of the participants were administered

the rule assumed condition first, while the other half were administered the rule removed

condition first. RT, as well as percentage of normative judgments, results generally replicated the

results of Experiment 1, and did not detect an effect for order of presentation, thus eliminating

this possible confound.

The percentage of normative judgments in the conventional rule removed condition appeared to

be lower than the percentage of Experiment 1. This discrepancy could be explained by the

smaller number of participants in Experiment 2 as compared to Experiment 1. As mentioned

above, agreement for conventional violations tends to be lower compared to moral violations

47

(e.g., Turiel, 1983), and with a small N this agreement could be particularly lower as results may

tend to fluctuate as compared to a larger N.

48

Chapter 4

4 Experiment 3

In order to examine whether judgments of moral and conventional violations can be

differentiated by cognitive conflict, Experiment 3 was an ERP study focusing on the N2

component. The experiment adapted the RT paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2 for ERP

testing. Several changes were made to the task used in Experiments 1 and 2. First, the number of

trials in the task was tripled. This was done in order to have enough trials that are free from

artifacts (such as movements and eye blinks) that contribute to the ERP. Second, the instructions

for the second half of the task (i.e, rule removed condition) were changed and examples were

added in order to clarify our request of imagining the absence of a rule. This was done

particularly in order to clarify the instructions for the child participants described in Experiment

4, for whom data were collected in parallel.

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Participants


3.52, Range = 17.83-35.50) who did not participate in Experiments 1 and 2, and took part in the

experiment for partial course credit. Most of the participants indicated that they are either from a

European (approximately 67%) or Asian (approximately 25%) ethnic background, while the

remaining participants indicated that they are from other various ethnic backgrounds. An

additional 28 participants were tested but eliminated from the final analysis because either their

data were not recorded due to technical difficulties, n = 3 , or they had fewer than 24 trials in

which a normative judgment was given and were free of eye blinks or movement artifacts, n =

49

25. A subset of these 25 participants who tended to give non-normative responses for

conventional violations were included in Experiment 5, as a "non-normative conventional" sub-

sample (see Experiment 5).

4.1.2 Procedure

Upon arrival at the lab, the experimenter explained the procedure to the participants and asked

them to fill out the informed consent and demographics forms. Next, the experimenter used a

cloth measuring tape to identify landmarks on the participant’s scalp and applied the 128-channel

EEG Hydrocel Net. Participants were informed that there are no risks involved in this procedure

and that they may terminate the experiment at any time. Following application of the EEG net,

participants were seated in front of a computer screen and the procedure was identical to

Experiments 1 and 2.

4.1.3 Moral judgments task

The same moral judgments task described in Experiment 1 and 2 was used, but with several

changes. First, in order to clarify the rule removed condition instructions, we included two

examples. After asking participants to respond while imagining the absence of a rule, they were

told the following: "An example is a student wearing a hat in class. Is wearing a hat in class

normally allowed? But if there were no rule against it, would it be an okay or not okay thing to

do? And do you think an act like spitting on someone is okay or not okay? And what if there is

no rule against it?"

Additionally, in order to have a satisfactory trial count for each of the six conditions we tripled

the number of trials. Therefore, the task included 18 blocks of 15 trials, in which the three types

of violation were presented equally often and were pseudo-randomized. The first 9 blocks

50

corresponded to the rule assumed condition, and the last 9 blocks corresponded to the rule

removed condition.

4.1.4 ERP data collection and analysis

ERPs were recorded using a 128-channel Hydrocel Net. Recording and analyses were carried out

using EGI Netstation 2.5 software (EGI, Eugene, OR) on a Macintosh G5 computer. Data were

sampled at 500 Hz and impedances were maintained below 40 kΩ. During the recording of data,

all electrode channels were referenced to CZ. Editing of the EEG for eye blinks, eye movements,

and motor artifacts was carried out offline. Signals exceeding 200 µV and fast transits exceeding

100 µV were discarded from all trials. In addition, all trials containing more than 20 percent

artifacts were eliminated from the analysis. During averaging, all data were re-referenced against

the average reference of all 128 sites (Tucker, Liotti, Potts, Russell, & Posner, 1993). Data were

filtered using a finite impulse response bandpass filter with the highpass frequency set to 30 Hz

and the lowpass frequency set to 1 Hz. Stimulus-locked data were segmented into epochs

comprised of 200 ms prior to stimulus onset and 1000 ms after onset. Baseline correction of

averaged data was carried out using the first 200 ms of each channel. The N2 was coded as the

largest negative deflection after the N1 with a medial-frontocentral topography and a latency of

200-500 ms post-stimulus. N2 latency was recorded as the latency from stimulus onset to the

peak identified in the amplitude analysis. The mean number (and SD) of trials contributing to the

N2 in each condition is presented in Table 3.

51


Experiment 3

Condition Mean Number of Trials (SD)

Moral rule assumed ('NOT OK') 41.30 (3.97)

Moral rule removed ('NOT OK') 39.74 (5.62)

Conventional rule assumed ('NOT OK') 35.52 (5.74)

Conventional rule removed ('OK') 31.91 (4.28)

Neutral rule assumed ('OK') 37.35 (4.66)

Neutral rule removed ('OK') 42.96 (1.66)

4.2 Results

4.2.1 Behavioral results


be seen from the table, participants provided normative judgments of the different types of

violations on most of the trials. Normative judgments for conventional violations appear slightly

lower than normative judgments for moral and neutral acts.








52


Median RTs were analyzed using an ANOVA with violation type (moral, conventional, neutral)

and rule contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as within subjects variables. Post hoc

pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were carried out for all significant

interactions. Preliminary analysis did not identify gender differences on the variables of interest;

therefore gender was removed from the analysis.

The ANOVA revealed a main effect for violation type, F(2, 58) = 8.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .23

(moral M = 756.85 ms, SE = 26.56; conventional M = 812.63 ms, SE = 25.81; neutral M =

803.18 ms, SE = 24.28), as well as a main effect for rule contingency F(1, 29) = 34.74, p <

.0001, ηp2 = .55 (rule assumed M = 839.14 ms, SE = 28.69; rule removed M = 742.64 ms, SE =

21.90). These main effects were qualified by a Violation type X Rule contingency interaction,

F(2, 58) = 20.82, p < .0001, ηp2 = .42. Post hoc tests examining the effect of violation type

revealed that judgments of moral violations were significantly faster than judgments of

conventional violations, p < .0001. Post hoc tests examining the interaction effect revealed that

when a rule was assumed judgments of moral violations (M = 661.62 ms, SE = 29.46) were


neutral acts (M = 879.43 ms, SE = 29.96), which did not significantly differ from each other.

When a rule was removed no significant differences were found between the three types of

violation. Moreover, for conventional violations, judgments when a rule was removed (M =

752.08 ms, SE = 26.56) were significantly faster than judgments when a rule was assumed (M =

876.37 ms, SE = 32.28). For neutral acts, judgments when a rule was removed (M = 726.93 ms,

SE = 20.42) were significantly faster than when a rule was assumed (M = 879.43 ms, SE =

29.96). For moral violations, no significant difference was found between judgments when a rule

was assumed and removed (see Figure 4).

53



4.2.2 ERP results

An examination of the scalp topo-maps of the grand-averaged data revealed a fronto-central N2

component. ERP data were averaged across a cluster of electrodes that included Hydrocel

electrodes 5, 6, 11, 12, and 16 (encompassing Fz in the 10-20 system); see Figure 5.

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200


Violation Type

MS

Rule Assumed

Rule Removed

54

Figure 5. Hydrocel electrode sites contributing to the N2 waveforms and data

A Pearson correlation was conducted for each of the six conditions to examine relations between

mean N2 amplitude and the corresponding median RT. None of these correlations was

significant.

N2 amplitudes and latency were analyzed using an ANOVA with violation type (moral,


variables. Trial count was included as a covariate. RT was not included as a covariate in this

analysis as a composite RT variable across the six conditions would not be a meaningful measure

of behavioral performance. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were

carried out for all significant interactions. Figure 6 presents the grand-averaged waveforms of the

N2 component at electrode site 6, which best illustrates the effects reported below.

55


Experiment 3

The ANOVA for N2 amplitudes revealed a main effect of rule contingency, F(1, 28) = 4.39, p <

.05, ηp2 = .14 (rule assumed M = -.56 µV, SE = .41; rule removed M = -.74 µV, SE = .44). This

main effect was qualified by a Violation type X Rule contingency interaction, F(2, 56) = 3.32, p

< .05, ηp2 = .11. Post hoc tests examining the interaction effect revealed that when a rule was

assumed N2 amplitudes in response to judgments of moral violations (M = -.40 µV, SE = .44)

were significantly smaller than judgments of conventional violations (M = -.93 µV, SE = .39), p

< .05. When a rule was removed no significant differences were found between the three types of

violation. No significant differences were found between judgments when a rule was assumed

and removed for the three types of violation (see Figure 7). No significant effects or interactions

were found for N2 latencies.

N2

0 ms 600 ms

Moral Rule Removed _____

Moral Rule Assumed _____

Conventional Rule Removed _____

Conventional Rule Assumed _____

56

Figure 7. N2 amplitudes in response to judgments of moral, conventional, and neutral acts

as a function of rule contingency in Experiment 3

4.2.3 N2 amplitudes: relations with behavioral performance

A total of six Pearson correlations were conducted to examine relations among mean N2

amplitude with median RTs for each condition. None of these correlations were significant, p <

.24. These results suggest that there is no relation between N2 amplitude and behavioral

performance.

4.2.4 Source analysis

In order to estimate the cortical generators for the N2, a minimum norm method with the local

autoregressive average (LAURA) was created to model the source of the grand-averaged scalp

data (for a review see Michel et al., 2004). Modeled source activation was then examined using

GeoSource (EGI) for latencies of the peak N2 between 250 and 350 ms poststimulus. Regions of

interest (ROIs) were defined functionally around the voxels of peak activation in the model, and

-2.80

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-1.60

-1.20

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-0.40

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Violation type

µV

Rule Assumed

Rule Removed

57

also in light of source analyses of the N2 in previous studies (e.g., Lahat et al., 2010; Lamm et

al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2006; Todd et al., 2008). Activation was then averaged across all voxels

in each ROI for each participant in each of the six conditions, and a single-source waveform was

extracted for each ROI. This process yielded source activation waveforms for two hypothetical

generators of scalp activation located generally in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and

ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. ROIs displayed using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) average adult

MRI scan for the peak N2 interval of 300–350 ms in (A) dorsomedial prefrontal cortex

(dmPFC) and (B) ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)

A

B

58

To investigate differences between moral and conventional judgments in extracted activation

levels for each of the modeled sources, separate ANOVAs were carried out with type of

violation, rule contingency, and 50-ms interval as within-subjects variables. Trial count was

treated as a covariate.

For the dmPFC modeled source, a significant interaction was found between violation type and

rule contingency, F(2, 56) = 11.28, p < .0001, ηp2 = .29. This interaction was qualified by a 3-

way interaction between violation type, rule contingency, and interval, F(2, 56) = 3.25, p < .05,

ηp2 = .10. Post hoc tests examining this 3-way interaction effect revealed that for judgments of

moral violations in the interval between 250-300 ms, more source activation was found when a

rule was removed (M = .06 nA, SE = .01) than assumed (M = .05 nA, SE = .01), p < .05. In

addition, for judgments of conventional violations when a rule was removed, more source

activation was found for the interval between 300-350 ms (M = .07 nA, SE = .01) than the

interval between 250-300 ms (M = .06 nA, SE = .01), p < .05 (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Modeled source activations (in nA) for the peak N2 intervals of 250-300 ms and

300–350 ms in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) as a function of violation type and

rule contingency

0.00

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250-300 300-350

Violation type

nA

Rule

Assumed

Rule

Removed

59

For the vmPFC modeled source, a significant main effect of violation type was found F(2, 56) =

3.83, p < .05, ηp2 = .12. Additionally, significant interactions were found between rule

contingency and interval, F(1, 28) = 13.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, as well as between violation type

and rule contingency, F(2, 56) = 4.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .14. These interactions were qualified by a

3-way interaction between violation type, rule contingency, and interval, F(2, 56) = 3.48, p < .05,

ηp2 = .11. Post hoc tests examining this 3-way interaction revealed that for judgments of moral

violations in both the rule assumed and rule removed conditions, more source activation was

found for the 300-350 ms interval (Rule assumed M = .14 nA, SE = .02; Rule removed M = .18

nA, SE = .04) than the 250-300ms interval (Rule assumed M = .13 nA, SE = .02; Rule removed

M = .16 nA, SE = .03). Additionally, for judgments of neutral acts in the rule removed condition

more source activation was found for the 300-350 ms interval (M = .16 nA, SE = .04) than the

250-300 ms interval (M = .15 nA, SE = .03).

4.3 Discussion

In Experiment 3, behavioral results generally replicated the pattern of results obtained in

Experiments 1 and 2. As described above, several changes were made to the task (e.g., change in

instructions, increasing the number of trials), which may have contributed to differences in

behavioral performance across experiments; in most conditions the percentage of normative

responses given increased and the median RT was faster on average across all conditions. This

can explain the reduction in RT in the rule removed condition for both moral and conventional

violations. Although these differences in results between Experiment 3 and Experiments 1 and 2

were obtained, it is important to note that for the contrast of most interest (i.e., moral rule

assumed versus conventional rule assumed) behavioral results were replicated.

60

Experiment 3 focused on the N2 component of ERP which has been suggested to tap detection of

cognitive conflict (e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). The results indicated that in the rule assumed

condition, judgments of conventional violations elicited larger (i.e., more negative) N2

amplitudes than judgments of moral violations. This pattern of results is line with the idea that

when individuals make judgments of conventional violations they are contrasting the violation

with a societal rule, resulting in relatively higher conflict. In contrast, for moral judgments, this

may not be necessary, as individuals may base their judgments more directly on the intrinsic

negative consequences of the act. In the rule assumed condition, these N2 results are in line with

the RT data, such that moral judgments had faster reactions times and smaller N2 amplitudes, as

compared to conventional violations which had relatively slower RTs and larger N2 amplitudes.

The source analysis indicated generators for the N2 in dmPFC and vmPFC. These findings are in

line with previous source models (e.g., Lahat et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2006;

Todd et al., 2008). The dmPFC (suggestive of ACC), has been found to play a role in cognitive

conflict (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Van Veen & Carter, 2002)

whereas the vmPFC has usually been associated with emotional process (e.g., Devinsky et al.,

1995; Paus, 2001; Vogt et al., 1992). Modeled activation during this moral judgments task is line

with previous research indicating that moral judgments involve cognitive control and cognitive

conflict as well as affective processes (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2004).

The findings indicate more source activation for judgments of moral violations when a rule is

removed than when a rule is assumed. This finding fits with a pattern emerging from the N2

data, where judgments of moral violations in the rule removed condition elicited larger N2

amplitudes than in the rule assumed condition (although this comparison was not significant for

the N2).

61

These results can be explained by the idea that responses to moral violations are based on the

intrinsic negative consequences of the act. However, when participants are asked to imagine the

absence of a rule, responses to moral violations become (initially) "conventionalized" and require

more thought and deliberation, perhaps because in the case where a rule against a moral violation

is removed the relation of the rule to the evaluation has to be considered and then subsequently

rejected as irrelevant, thus creating more cognitive conflict.

Although the source model revealed source activation in vmPFC, post hoc comparisons did not

reveal significant difference between the main variables of interests. A possible explanation

could be that emotional processes contribute to both prototypical moral and conventional

judgments, used in the present study, in such a way that vmPFC modeled activation does not

differentiate between the different conditions. However, modeled source activation in dmPFC

did identify differences between moral and conventional judgments (as a function of rule

contingency). Given that dmPFC could be suggestive of ACC activation, this finding is in line

with the expectation that level of cognitive conflict is different for moral and conventional

violations.

62

Chapter 5

5 Experiment 4

Studies from social domain theory have established that even very young children are able to

make criteria distinctions between moral and conventional violations (e.g., Smetana, 1981;

Smetana & Braeges, 1990). However, children of different ages have been found to provide

different justifications to these types of violations. For example, Davidson et al. (1983) found

that with age children not only refer to issues of harm in their justifications of moral violations,

but also they refer to issues of fairness. Although the task in the present study examines criterion

judgments and not justifications it is important to note the age differences in previous studies

were found for reasons justifying criterion judgments. Thus, age differences for justifications

show that with development, thinking about the criteria changes. This development in thought

process could be reflected in behavioral and neurophysiological assessment.

Furthermore, with development, children making judgments in the moral and conventional

domains have been found to become increasingly better able to consider additional criteria, as

well as intentions (Helwig & Prencipe, 1999; Helwig et al., 2001; Smetana, 1981; Smetana &

Braeges, 1990; Zelazo et al., 1996). Moreover, adults have more experience than children in

social situations and social rules are more likely to have been internalized by adults compared to

children. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that children and adults differ in levels of

cognitive conflict as reflected in a reduction in N2 amplitude and latency with age (Lamm, et al.,

2006; Lewis et al., 2006). These conflict processing age differences may be generalized to

judgments of moral and conventional violations.

Taken together, these findings suggest that developmental differences may be found in the way

children and adults process moral and conventional violations, although the exact nature of any

63

such age differences cannot be specified in advance as research in this area is still very much in

its infancy and the present investigation thus will have to be considered exploratory.

Accordingly, Experiment 4 added a developmental dimension to the previous experiments, and

examined children, who were compared to the adults from Experiment 3.

5.1 Method

5.1.1 Participants

The study included 23 children between the ages of 12 and 14 (14 males, 9 females, M age =

13.04 years, SD = .57, Range = 12.00-13.92). These children were compared to the adults who

participated in Experiment 3. Children were recruited from the Child Study Center’s database,

which contains names of individuals who expressed interest in their child’s participation in

psychological research. Upon completion of the experiment, children received a certificate for

participating in psychological research.

Most of the participants indicated that they are either from a European (approximately 76%) or

Asian (approximately 13%) ethnic background, while the remaining participants indicated that

they are from other various ethnic backgrounds. An additional 37 participants were tested but

eliminated from the final analysis because (a) they refused to wear the ERP net, or did not

complete the experiment, n = 2 (b) their data were not recorded due to technical difficulties, n =

3, or (c) they had fewer than 24 trials in which a normative judgment was given and were free of

eye blinks or movement artifacts, n = 32. A subset of these 32 participants who tended to give

non-normative responses for conventional violations were included in Experiment 5, as a "non-

normative-conventional" child sub-sample (see Experiment 5).

64


Upon arrival at the lab, the experimenter explained the procedure to the parents/guardians and

asked parents to fill out the informed consent and demographics forms. Verbal assent for

participation was obtained from children. The task, procedure, and ERP data collection and

analysis were identical to those described in Experiment 3. The mean number (and SD) of trials

contributing to the N2 in each condition is presented in Table 5.


Experiment 4


Moral rule assumed ('NOT OK') 39.74 (4.45)

Moral rule removed ('NOT OK') 37.70 (4.60)


Conventional rule removed ('OK') 31.57 (4.83)

Neutral rule assumed ('OK') 34.91 (4.09)

Neutral rule removed ('OK') 41.96 (2.60)

5.2 Results


5.2.1.1 Children's data


be seen from the table, children provided normative judgments to the different types of violations

on most of the trials. Normative judgments for conventional violations appear slightly lower than

normative judgments for moral and neutral acts.

65









Median RTs were analyzed using an ANOVA with violation type (moral, conventional, neutral)

and rule contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as within subjects variables. Post hoc


interactions. Preliminary analysis did not identify gender differences on the variables of interest

therefore gender was removed from the analysis.

The ANOVA revealed a main effect for violation type, F(2, 44) = 16.61, p < .0001, ηp2 = .43

(moral M = 844.28 ms, SE = 34.90; conventional M = 942.20 ms, SE = 34.90; neutral M =

914.58 ms, SE = 39.17), as well as a main effect for rule contingency F(1, 22) = 7.61, p < .01,

ηp2 = .26 (rule assumed M = 930.58 ms, SE = 42.92; rule removed M = 870.12 ms, SE = 38.30).

These main effects were qualified by a Violation type X Rule contingency interaction, F(2, 44) =

16.74, p < .0001, ηp2 = .43. Post hoc tests examining the effect of violation type revealed that

judgments of moral violations were significantly faster than judgments of conventional

violations and neutral acts, p < .0001, which did not significantly differ from each other. Post hoc

tests examining the interaction effect revealed that when a rule was assumed, judgments of moral

violations (M = 842.17 ms, SE = 41.99) were significantly faster than judgments of conventional

violations (M = 945.41 ms, SE = 42.77), p < .0001, which in turn were significantly faster than

66

neutral acts (M = 1004.15 ms, SE = 48.09), p < .05. When a rule was removed, judgments of

conventional violations (M = 938.98 ms, SE = 56.29) were significantly longer, p < .05, than

judgments of moral (M = 846.39 ms, SE = 31.88) and neutral acts (M = 825.00 ms, SE = 32.90),

which did not significantly differ from each other. Moreover, for neutral acts, judgments when a

rule was removed were significantly faster than when a rule was assumed. For moral and

conventional violations, no significant difference was found between judgments when a rule was

assumed and removed (see Figure 10).


function of rule contingency in children (Experiment 4)

5.2.1.2 Comparison of children's and adults' data

In order to examine differences in adults' and children's data, the child sample was compared to

the adults' sample from Experiment 3. Median RTs were analyzed using an ANOVA with age

group as a between subjects variable and violation type (moral, conventional, neutral) and rule

contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as within subjects variables. Post hoc pairwise

comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were carried out for all significant interactions. As the

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200


Violation Type

ms

Rule Assumed

Rule Removed

67

percentage of males and females is different among the two age groups, gender was treated as a

covariate.

The ANOVA revealed a main effect for age group F(1, 50) = 6.84, p < .01, ηp2 = .12 (adults M =

785.06 ms, SE = 29.90; children M = 907.95 ms, SE = 34.43), and a main effect for rule

contingency F(1, 50) = 6.38, p < .05, ηp2 = .11 (rule assumed M = 885.46 ms, SE = 25.13; rule

removed M = 807.56 ms, SE = 20.84). These main effects were qualified by a Violation type X

Rule contingency X Age group interaction, F(2, 100) = 8.72, p < .0001, ηp2 = .15. Post hoc tests

examining the interaction effect revealed that for judgments of moral violations when a rule was

removed, adults (M = 746.83 ms, SE = 28.03) had significantly faster RTs than children (M =

853.25 ms, SE = 32.29), p < .01, but no significant differences were found between adults and

children for judgments of moral violations when a rule was assumed. For judgments of

conventional violations when a rule was removed, adults (M = 736.00 ms, SE = 38.53) had

significantly faster RTs than children (M = 955.81 ms, SE = 44.37), p < .05 but no significant

differences were found between adults and children for judgments of conventional violations

when a rule was assumed. For judgments of neutral acts, adults had significantly faster RTs than

children for both the rule assumed (Adults M = 872.37 ms, SE = 36.86; Children M = 1013.37

ms, SE = 42.45) and rule removed conditions (Adults M = 721.93 ms, SE = 25.16; Children M =

831.53 ms, SE = 29.00), p < .05.

Furthermore, for children, when a rule was assumed, judgments of moral violations (M = 845.27

ms, SE = 39.22) were significantly faster than judgments of conventional violations (M = 948.49

ms, SE = 41.37), which in turn were significantly faster than judgments of neutral acts (M =

1013.37 ms, SE = 42.45). For children in the rule removed condition, judgments of conventional

violations (M = 955.81 ms, SE = 44.37) were significantly slower than judgments of moral (M =

853.25 ms, SE = 32.29) and neutral acts (M = 831.53 ms, SE = 29.00), which did not

68

significantly differ from each other. For adults in the rule assumed condition, judgments of moral

violations (M = 759.24 ms, SE = 34.06) were significantly faster than judgments of conventional

violations (M = 874.01 ms, SE = 35.92) and neutral acts (M = 872.37 ms, SE = 36.86), which did

not significantly differ from each other. No significant difference between the three types of

violation were found for adults in the rule removed condition.

Finally, for children in the neutral condition, judgments when a rule was removed were

significantly faster than judgments when a rule was assumed. For children, no significant

differences were found between judgments when a rule was assumed or removed for either moral

or conventional violations. For adults in both the conventional and neutral conditions, judgments

when a rule was removed (Conventional M = 736.00 ms, SE = 38.53; Neutral M = 721.93 ms, SE

= 25.16) were significantly faster than when a rule was assumed (Conventional 874.01 ms, SE =

35.92; Neutral M = 872.37 ms, SE = 36.86). For adults, no significant differences were found

between judgments when a rule was assumed or removed for moral violations (see Figure 11).

69


function of rule contingency in children and adults

0.00

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l

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Children Adults

ms

Rule Assumed

Rule Removed

5.2.2 ERP results


An examination of the scalp topo-maps of the grand-averaged data revealed a fronto-central N2

component. Therefore, the same cluster of Hydrocel electrodes that were analyzed for the adult

sample in Experiment 3 were analyzed for the child sample (see Figure 5).As in the adult sample,

N2 amplitudes and latency were analyzed using an ANOVA with violation type (moral,


variables. Trial count was included as a covariate. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with

Bonferroni adjustments were carried out for all significant interactions. Figure 12 presents the

grand-averaged waveforms of the N2 component for children at electrode site 11 (Fz), which

best illustrates the effects reported below.

70

Figure 12. Stimulus-locked grand-averaged ERP waveform at electrode site 11 for children

(Experiment 4)

The ANOVA for N2 amplitudes revealed a main effect for violation type, F(2, 42) = 3.37, p <

.05, ηp2 = .14 (moral M = -2.63 µV, SE = .50; conventional M = -2.54 µV, SE = .63; neutral M =

-2.54 µV, SE = .51). A post hoc test failed to reveal significant differences among violation

types, and no other significant effects were found. Thus, the differences reported above for the

adult sample, were not found for the child sample, suggesting differences in N2 morphology

between the two age groups.

The ANOVA for N2 latencies revealed a main effect for violation type, F(2, 42) = 3.40, p < .05,

ηp2 = .14 (moral M = 306.02, ms SE = 9.31; conventional M = 316.10 ms, SE = 10.38; neutral M

= 309.69 ms, SE = 9.24), which was qualified by a Violation type X Rule contingency

0 ms 600 ms

Moral Rule Removed _____

Moral Rule Assumed _____

Conventional Rule Removed _____

Conventional Rule Assumed _____

N2

71

interaction, F(2, 42) = 3.09, p < .056, ηp2 = .13. Post hoc tests failed to reveal significant

differences and no other significant effects were found.



the adult sample from Experiment 3. N2 amplitudes and latencies were analyzed using an

ANOVA with age group as a between subjects variable and violation type (moral, conventional,

neutral) and rule contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as within subjects variables. Post hoc


interactions. Trial count and gender were included as covariates. Additionally, a baseline

component was coded for children and adults 100 ms prior to stimulus onset. This measure was

included as a covariate and allows making conclusions about developmental differences that are

not a result of confounding variables (such as skull thickness) that can contribute to age

differences in ERPs.

The ANOVA for N2 amplitudes revealed a main effect of age group, F(1, 48) = 3.93, p < .05,

ηp2 = .08 (adults M = -.83 µV, SE = .45; children M = -2.33 µV, SE = .53), and a main effect of

rule contingency F(1, 48) = 4.65, p < .05, ηp2 = .09 (rule assumed M = -1.39 µV, SE = .33; rule

removed M = -1.77 µV, SE = .36). These main effects were qualified by a Violation type X Rule

contingency interaction, F(2, 96) = 3.58, p < .05, ηp2 = .07. Post hoc tests examining the

interaction effect revealed that for judgments of moral violations, judgments when a rule was

removed (M = -1.89 µV, SE = .32) elicited larger N2 amplitudes than judgments when a rule was

assumed (M = -1.25 µV, SE = .34). All other post hoc comparisons were not significant (see

Figure 13).

72

Figure 13. N2 amplitudes for judgments of moral, conventional, and neutral acts as a

function of age group and rule contingency

The ANOVA for N2 latencies revealed a Violation type X Age group interaction, F(2, 96) =

3.01, p < .054, ηp2 = .06. Post hoc tests examining the interaction effect revealed that for

judgments of conventional violations, children (M = 318.58 ms, SE = 11.45) had longer N2

latencies than adults (M = 284.90 ms, SE = 9.93), p < .05. All other post hoc comparisons were

not significant.

5.2.3 Children's N2 amplitudes: relations with behavioral performance

A total of six Pearson correlations were conducted to examine relations among mean N2

amplitude with median RTs for each condition. None of these correlations were significant, p <

.28. These results suggest that, as found in the adult sample, there is no relation between N2

amplitude and behavioral performance for children as well.

-4.00

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-1.50

-1.00

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73

5.2.4 Source analysis


The source analysis described above for the adult sample was carried out for the child sample for

the peak N2 between 250 and 350 ms poststimulus. As in the adult sample, ROIs were defined

functionally around the voxels of peak activation in the model, and also in light of source

analyses of the N2 in previous studies (e.g., Lahat et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2006; Lewis et al.,

2006; Todd et al., 2008).This process revealed activation for children in the same ROIs that were

found for adults (i.e., dmPFC and vmPFC). To investigate differences between moral and

conventional judgments in extracted activation levels for each of the modeled sources, separate

ANOVAs were carried out with type of violation, rule contingency, and 50-ms interval as

within-subjects variables. Trial count was treated as a covariate.

For the dmPFC modeled source, a significant Violation type X Interval interaction was found,

F(2, 42) = 5.13, p < .01, ηp2 = .20. Post hoc tests examining the interaction effect revealed that

for all types of violation, the 300-350 ms interval (Moral M = .06 nA, SE = .01; Conventional M

= .05 nA, SE = .01; Neutral M = .05 nA, SE = .01) elicited more modeled activation than the 250-

300 ms interval (Moral M = .05 nA, SE = .01; Conventional M = .04 nA, SE = .01; Neutral M =

.04 nA, SE = .01), p < .05. This effect was stronger for conventional (ηp2 = .30) than moral (ηp

2 =

.23) violations, which in turn was stronger than neutral acts (ηp2 = .21). For the vmPFC modeled

source, a significant main effect of interval was found, F(1, 21) = 6.61, p < .05, ηp2 = .24 (250-

300 ms M = .13 nA, SE = .02; 300-350 ms M = .14 nA, SE = .02).

74



the adult sample from Experiment 3. The two ROIs (dmPFC and vmPFC) identified in the

previous source analyses for adults and children were analyzed using an ANOVA with age group

as a between subjects variable and violation type (moral, conventional, neutral) and rule

contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as within subjects variables. Post hoc pairwise

comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were carried out for all significant interactions. Trial

count, gender, and a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline component were included as covariates.

For the dmPFC modeled source, a significant Rule contingency X Age group interaction was

found F(1, 48) = 4.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .08. This interaction was qualified by a 4-way interaction

between violation type, rule contingency, interval, and age group, F(2, 96) = 3.11, p < .05, ηp2 =

.06. Post hoc tests examining the interaction effect revealed that for judgments of moral

violations in the rule removed condition in the 250-300 ms interval, adults (M = .07 nA, SE =

.01) had greater modeled source activation than children (M = .04 nA, SE = .01), p < .05.

Additionally, for children's judgments of moral violations in the 250-300 ms interval, judgments

when a rule was assumed (M = .05 nA, SE = .01) had more source activation than judgments

when a rule was removed (M = .04 nA, SE = .01), p < .05. However, for adults this contrast

showed the reverse pattern, with judgments when a rule was removed (M = .07 nA, SE = .01)

showing more source activation than rule assumed (M = .06 nA, SE = .01), p < .05 (see Figure

14). Finally, for children, judgments of conventional violations and neutral acts in the rule

assumed condition elicited more source activation for the 300-350 ms interval (Conventional M

= .06 nA, SE = .01; Neutral M = .05 nA, SE = .01) than the 250-300 ms interval (Conventional M

= .05 nA, SE = .01; Neutral M = .04 nA, SE = .01), p < .05. For adults, judgments of conventional

violations in the rule removed condition elicited more source activation for the 300-350 ms

75

interval (M = .07 nA, SE = .01) than the 250-300 ms interval (M = .06 nA, SE = .01), p < .01. No

other comparisons were significant.

Figure 14. Modeled source activations (in nA) for the peak N2 intervals of 250-300 ms in

dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) as a function of age group, violation type, and rule

contingency

For the vmPFC modeled source, a significant Rule contingency X Age group interaction was

found, F(1, 48) = 3.88, p < .055, ηp2 = .08. In addition, a significant Rule contingency X Interval

interaction was found, F(1, 48) = 5.31, p < .05, ηp2 = .10. These interactions were qualified by a

3-way interaction between rule contingency, interval, and age group, F(1, 48) = 4.24, p < .05, ηp2

= .08. Post hoc tests examining the latter interaction effect revealed that for adults in both the

250-300 ms and the 300-350 ms intervals, judgments when a rule was removed (250-300 ms M =

.17 nA, SE = .02; 300-350 ms M = .18 nA, SE = .03) elicited greater source activation than

dmPFC 250-300ms

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

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judgments when a rule was assumed (250-300 ms M = .13 nA, SE = .01; 300-350 ms M = .14 nA,

SE = .02), p < .05. Additionally, for children, in the rule assumed condition, judgments in the

300-350 ms interval (M = .14 nA, SE = .02) elicited greater source activation than the in the 250-

300 ms interval (M = .13 nA, SE = .02), p < .0001. For adults, in the rule removed condition,

judgments in the 300-350 ms interval (M = .18 nA, SE = .03) elicited greater source activation

than in the 250-300 ms interval (M = .17 nA, SE = .02), p < .01.

5.3 Discussion

Experiment 4 included a developmental dimension by investigating a child sample that was

compared to the adult sample from Experiment 3. Children's results revealed both similar trends

as well as differences in age for judgments of moral and conventional violations.

The behavioral findings indicated that on the majority of trials children provided normative

judgments of moral and conventional violations. This is line with previous studies from social

domain theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 1981, 2006) that suggest that even young children

are able to distinguish moral and conventional violations on the basis of the rule-contingency

criteria. These percentages of normative responses, as well as the RT results in the rule assumed

condition revealed a similar pattern to that obtained with the adult sample (although children's

RTs were slightly slower). In the rule assumed condition, judgments of moral violations were

faster than judgments of conventional violations, suggesting that processing of moral violations

in this condition is easier and consistent with the idea that moral judgments are based on the

intrinsic wrongness of the act. In contrast, judgments of conventional violations require

considering social rules, and this requires more deliberation.

However, RT results for conventional violations revealed a different pattern for children and

adults. For adults, when a rule was removed, judgments of conventional violations had faster

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RTs than when a rule was assumed, but no such difference was found for children. Thus, when a

rule is removed adults are able to process conventional violations faster, as comparing the

violation to a societal rule is no longer necessary. For children, although they provided normative

judgments and indicated that conventional violations are acceptable in the absence of rules, these

judgments are processed for a similar duration as judgments of conventional violations when a

rule is assumed. It seems as though children are still considering the societal rules, which results

in longer RTs.

Findings for N2 amplitudes revealed that although previous research has shown that even young

children are able to distinguish between moral and conventional violations (e.g., Smetana, 1981,

2006; Turiel, 1983), the way children and adults process these violations at a neurocognitive

level is different; adults' N2 amplitudes in the rule assumed condition were larger for

conventional violations as compared to moral violations, suggesting increased conflict for

judgments of conventional violations. However, no such differences were obtained for children.

For children the same level of conflict may be involved for judgments of moral and conventional

violations, suggesting that although they are able to make normative judgments regarding moral

and conventional violations their online processing of these violations is not as differentiated as

adults'. It is possible that age differences in N2 amplitude were found due to the fact that when

children are required to make moral and conventional judgments very quickly (as opposed to

interview studies where there are no time constraints), the task is more difficult for children than

adults. However, the fact that no correlation was found between N2 amplitudes and RTs suggests

that speed requirements are not related to N2 conflict processing.

An alternative interpretation to the developmental results is that children are initially confused

and try to process moral events as conventional events, but they ultimately reject this

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conceptualization as reflected in their normative judgments. Future research should examine this

interpretation.

Finally, for N2 amplitudes the ANOVA revealed that across age, judgments of moral violations

in the rule removed condition elicited larger N2 amplitudes than judgments in the rule assumed

condition. This finding is in line with the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 3 for both N2

amplitude and dmPFC modeled source activation. This can be interpreted such that when

participants are asked to imagine the absence of a rule, responses to moral violations become

"conventionalized" and require more thought and deliberation.

The source analysis for the children's data revealed modeled activation in the same ROIs

identified by adults (dmPFC and dmPFC). The source analysis for dmPFC revealed a pattern of

activation for moral violations that was the opposite of that observed in adults; for children, in

response to moral violations, greater modeled source activation was found when a rule was

assumed than removed. This is in contrast to the N2 amplitude findings. A possible explanation

could be that children's scalp data is generated by more than one focal source (such as dmPFC),

and the pattern of findings on the scalp could be a result of many other cortical sources. It is also

possible that adults' are showing more cortical efficiency than children (Lewis et al., 2006).

For the vmPFC ROI, more modeled source activation was obtained for adults in the rule

removed than rule assumed condition, but no such differences were obtained for children. This

finding suggests that adults show a distinction between a situation where a rule is assumed and a

situation where a rule is removed that could be associated with affective processing. However,

children do show a similar distinction.

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Chapter 6

6 Experiment 5

Experiments 3 and 4 excluded participants who did not have at least 24 trials on which a

normative judgment was provided that was free of artifacts in each of the six conditions. In

particular, when examining the trial counts for each condition it appeared that a relatively large

number of participants were excluded due to a low number of normative judgments in the

conventional rule removed condition. These participants were responding in a non-normative

manner, judging conventional violations as unacceptable even in the absence of a societal rule.

The objective of Experiment 5 was to focus on these participants (who were not included in the

analysis of Experiments 3 and 4), and compare them to those participants who responded in a

normative manner. Additionally, developmental differences in this non-normative orientation

were examined. Non-normative judgments in the moral condition were scarce, thus an analysis

of non-normative moral orientation was not carried out.

6.1 Method

6.1.1 Participants

The experiment included a subset of participants that were excluded from Experiment 3 and 4.

These were participants who had more than 24 trials free from artifacts on which they responded

'NOT OK' to conventional violations when a rule was removed. Twelve children (5 males, 7

females, M age = 12.74, SD = .65, Range = 12.00-13.83) and 10 adults (7 males, 3 females, M

age = 19.78, SD = 1.96, Range = 18.42-24.50) fell into this category of response orientation.

These participants were compared to the participants from Experiment 3 and 4 who gave

normative responses to this condition.

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The task, procedure, and ERP data collection and analysis were identical to those described in

Experiments 3 and 4. The mean number (and SD) of trials contributing to the N2 in each

condition is presented in Table 7.


Experiment 5


Adults


Conventional rule removed ('NOT OK') 29.40 (3.95)

Children


Conventional rule removed ('NOT OK') 30.92 (4.44)

6.2 Results


Table 8 presents the mean percentage of trials on which a normative response was given for

conventional violations in the rule assumed condition (i.e., 'NOT OK') and a non-normative

response for conventional violations in the rule removed condition (i.e., 'NOT OK'). As can be

seen from the table, participants provided these judgments on most trials and percentages for

children are larger than for adults.

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Table 8. Mean percentage of trials of normative judgments for conventional violations in

the rule assumed condition and non-normative judgments for conventional violations in the

rule removed condition (Experiment 5)


Adults


Conventional rule removed ('NOT OK') 66.22

Children


Conventional rule removed ('NOT OK') 72.22

Median RTs were analyzed using an ANOVA with age group and conventional group

(normative-conventional, non-normative-conventional) as between subjects factors and rule

contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as a within subjects variable. The ANOVA did not

reveal any significant differences.

6.2.2 ERP results

An examination of the scalp topo-maps of the grand-averaged data revealed a smiliar fronto-

central N2 component to that identified in the previous experiments. Thus, the same cluster of

Hydrocel electrodes that were analyzed in Experiments 3 and 4 were analyzed for the non-

normative sample (see Figure 5). N2 amplitudes and latency were analyzed using an ANOVA

with age group and conventional group (normative-conventional, non-normative-conventional)

as between subjects factors and rule contingency (rule assumed, rule removed) as a within

subjects variable. Trial count, gender, and 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline component were

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included as a covariate. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were carried

out for all significant interactions.

The ANOVA for N2 amplitudes revealed a significant main effect for age group, F(1, 68) = 4.86,

p < .05, ηp2 = .07 (adults M = -1.34 µV, SE = .51; children M = -2.94 µV, SE = .49), which was

qualified by a 3-way interaction between rule contingency, age group, and conventional group,

F(1, 68) = 4.07, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. Post hoc tests examining this interaction revealed that in the

rule removed condition normative-conventional children (M = -2.85 µV, SE = .68) had larger

(i.e., more negative) N2 amplitudes than normative-conventional adults (M = -.62 µV, SE = .59),

p < .05. In the rule assumed condition, non-normative-children (M = -4.23 µV, SE = .82) had

larger N2 amplitudes than normative-conventional children (M = -2.19 µV, SE = .63) p < .05.

Finally, for non-normative-conventional children, judgments in the rule assumed condition (M =

-4.23 µV, SE = .82) elicited larger N2 amplitudes than judgments in the rule removed condition

(M = -2.47 µV, SE = .90), p < .05. No other significant comparisons were found (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. N2 amplitudes for judgments of conventional violations as a function of age

group, conventional group, and rule contingency

-5.00-4.50-4.00-3.50-3.00-2.50-2.00-1.50-1.00-0.500.00

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The ANOVA for N2 latencies revealed a main effect of age group, F(1, 68) = 9.56, p < .01, ηp2 =

.12 (adults M = 276.26 ms, SE = 8.57; children M = 313.41 ms, SE = 8.32). No other significant

differences were found.

6.3 Discussion

Participants in the non-normative-conventional sample tended to provide non-normative

responses to the conventional rule removed condition. Thus, instead of judging conventional

violations when a rule was removed as 'OK', these non-normative-conventional participants

indicated that these violations were still 'NOT OK'. The analysis in the present experiment

focused only on the conventional rule-assumed and conventional rule-removed conditions,

independent of performance and trial count in other conditions.

RT results did not reveal significant differences between normative-conventional or non-

normative-conventional children and adults. However, differences were reflected in N2

amplitudes. In particular, non-normative-conventional children had larger (i.e., more negative)

N2 amplitudes when a rule was assumed as compared to normative-conventional children.

Additionally, non-normative-conventional children's N2 amplitudes were larger when a rule was

assumed than when a rule was removed.

The results of the present experiment indicate that for children, responding in a non-normative-

conventional manner is associated with increased N2 amplitudes. These findings may suggest

that these participants are experiencing greater conflict than participants who respond in a

normative manner. This explanation is in line with the idea that when individuals make

judgments of conventional violations, their judgments are contrasted with the existing social rule,

thus, increasing level of conflict. These rule-dependent judgments are particularly pronounced

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for non-normative-conventional participants, who focus on rules to a greater extent than

normative participants, and provide rule-dependent judgments even when rules are removed.

In the present study, non-normative-conventional orientation was found for both children and

adults.However, the N2 results suggest a change in development, with regards to the level of

conflict that these participants may be experiencing. For children, in a case where a rule was

assumed, non-normative conventional participants showed larger N2 amplitudes than normative

conventional participants. However this difference was not found for adults. It is possible that

these non-normative conventional children cannot take into account the instruction of ignoring

the presence of a rule and are still judging the violations according to a social rule system.

Because this rule system guides these participants' responses they may be experiencing increased

conflict as compared to participants who are able to take into account the absence of rules.

Future research should examine the interpretation made here regarding the non-normative-

conventional response orientation. In order to examine the possibility that these participants are

still responding in a way that is guided by rules, even when they are removed, justifications data

at the psychological level should be obtained. It is possible that rather than focusing on rules,

these participants may be responding according to other (unknown) factors that may contribute

to their conflict. It may be that they are holding other non-normative factual assumptions and this

can be determined by asking these participants to justify their non-normative judgments

following the ERP task.

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Chapter 7

7 General discussion

The present study examined the neurocognitive development of judgments about moral and

conventional violations in a series of five experiments. Participants took part in a new paradigm

developed to measure RTs and ERPs while making moral and conventional judgments. The task

presented participants with scenarios adapted from social domain theory and they were asked to

judge whether the acts are acceptable or unacceptable. The social acts in the scenarios were

carefully matched; limited to one or two words only, and contained an identical number of

syllables. Thus, this novel paradigm is suitable for ERP testing, and to the best of our knowledge,

no prior research on moral judgments has examined online processing with ERP.

7.1 Differences in frequencies and RTs

The behavioral findings reveal that, across experiments, most participants made normative

judgments on most trials, which suggests that the task is a suitable measure of moral and

conventional judgments. Normative judgments of conventional violations tended to be less

frequent, as has been previously found in social domain theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Weston &

Turiel, 1980).

The RT results in the present study further revealed that judgments of moral and conventional

violations can be differentiated by behavioral measures. It was found, across experiments (and

thus, across age), that when a rule was assumed and no other information was provided,

judgments of moral violations had faster RTs than judgments of conventional violations. This

consistent result suggests that judgments of moral violations are easier and faster than judgments

of conventional violations. This finding can be explained by the idea that judgments of moral

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violations are based on the intrinsic negative consequences of the act. In contrast, when

individuals make conventional judgments they are required to consider societal rules. This

process requires deliberation and thus takes longer.

These RT results are in line with the RT data reported by Greene et al. (2001). Greene et al.

(2001) measured participants' RTs for judgments of moral-personal, moral-impersonal, and non-

moral dilemmas. When examining trials on which participants judged these violations as

inappropriate, Greene et al. (2001) found that judgments of moral-personal and moral-

impersonal violations were faster than judgments of non-moral dilemmas. Taken together, the

RT results in the present study as well as Greene's findings, are in line with the idea that

prototypical moral judgments are more easily processed and do not require much consideration.

Although in the rule assumed condition, results were replicated across the different experiments,

several variations in results between the experiments were apparent. First, in the behavioral only

experiments (Experiments 1 and 2), no differences were found between the rule assumed and

rule removed condition for conventional violations, whereas in the adult ERP study (Experiment

3), RTs to conventional violations in the rule removed condition were significantly faster than in

the rule assumed condition. Additionally, in the behavioral only experiments, judgments of

moral violations in the rule removed condition were slower than the rule assumed condition, but

no such difference was found in RTs in the adult ERP experiment. These findings can be

attributed to the change in the task instructions, which were implemented in the adult ERP

experiment, and made the rule removed condition clearer, thus improving RTs.

RT data suggested that children did not benefit as did adults from removing the rule for

conventional violations, as indicated by the fact that no differences were found between

judgments of conventional violations in the rule removed and rule assumed condition. A possible

87

explanation is that children are less flexible than adults and could not take the absence of a rule

into consideration. In their responses, it is possible that children were still considering the rule

(even though it was removed) and still comparing it to the societal rule even when they were

informed about the absence of a rule. It is possible that this tendency towards more rigidness

with regards to societal rules stems from the importance that adolescents stress on conforming to

the peer group, as well as its rules (e.g., Berndt, 1979; Nucci & Lee, 1993). This interpretation

should be investigated in future research.

Finally, for neutral acts a consistent trend in RT data was observed across all experiments;

judgments of neutral acts in the rule removed condition were faster than in the rule assumed

condition. Given that neutral acts are acceptable regardless of the presence or absence of a rule, it

is possible that having to make an evaluative decision regarding these acts is irrelevant, thus

puzzling our participants as to the nature of the task, and increasing RTs. However, when rules

are explicitly removed, making these evaluative judgments is easier as there should be no rules

against neutral acts to begin with.

Although the behavioral results obtained across the five experiments are in line with the

predictions of social domain theory and support the idea of two distinct domains, there are

possible alternative explanations. The RT differences observed in the present study could be a

mere reflection of different levels of cognitive complexity that is involved in the processing of

the different scenarios. Thus, it is possible that the moral scenarios presented in the current study

involved simpler occurrences than the conventional scenarios. For example, thinking about a

violation such as hitting another child does not require individuals to engage in the same amount

of cognitive processing as considering a boy wearing female clothing. Similarly, the RT

differences obtained between the rule assumed and rule removed conditions could be explained

by complexity as well. For example, in the case of moral violations, instructing participants

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about the absence of a rule may be a complication of the task. However, if removing the rule is

only a complication to the task, then it would be expected that RTs would be longer across the

three types of social acts, which they were not. Future research should address this cognitive

complexity issue by equating the complexity of the scenarios.

7.2 Differences in N2 amplitudes

In the present study, we examined differences in ERPs for judgments of moral and conventional

violations, and focused on the N2 component of ERP. We predicted that judgments of

prototypical conventional violations would involve increased detection of cognitive conflict than

judgments of prototypical moral violations. The N2 was chosen as an index of conflict in the

present study, as previous research has shown that when cognitive conflict is high the N2

component is larger (i.e., more negative) (e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003).

In Experiment 3 (adults) and Experiment 4 (children), ERP data were recorded in addition to the

behavioral data. Adults' ERP findings revealed that in the rule assumed condition judgments of

conventional violations elicited larger N2 amplitudes than judgments of moral violations.

Although there was no significant correlation between RTs and N2 amplitudes, these findings are

in line with adults' RT data, and may suggest that judgments of conventional violations in this

condition involve greater conflict as compared to judgments of moral violations. This is in line

with our expectation, and the idea that judgments of moral violations are based on the intrinsic

negative consequences of the act, whereas judgments of conventional violations are compared to

the societal prohibition, which needs to be considered in this case.

When analyzing the children's data alone (without including adults' data in the ANOVA), N2

amplitude results were not significant. The failure to find significant N2 differences between

judgments of moral and conventional violations among children, suggests that the way children

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process these two types of violation may be different than adults. However, when including age

group as a between subjects' factor, results suggested that across age, for judgments of moral

violations, N2 amplitudes were larger in the rule removed condition than the rule assumed

condition. It is possible that for moral violations, more conflict is involved when a rule is

removed than assumed. Thus, it seems that when the rule contingency criterion is brought up in

the rule removed condition, participants tend to consider the societal prohibition (although they

judge it as irrelevant). This process may be contributing to increased levels of conflict in this

condition. Therefore, in the rule assumed condition, participants may be basing their moral

judgments on the intrinsic negative consequences of the act, whereas, in the rule removed

condition, their moral judgments are compared to the societal prohibition. The latter situation

may result in relatively more cognitive conflict.

As mentioned above, it is possible that the removing the rule for moral violations adds an

additional level of complexity to the task. Therefore it is possible that the greater cognitive

conflict that may be experienced in this condition could be due to the complexity of the task. In

other words, the greater scalp activity found for this condition is not necessarily related to

whether the judgment itself is based on intrinsic properties of the violation or rule following. One

way this could be addresses by future research is examining other criteria that distinguish

morality from conventions such as generalizabilty and alterability.

Finally, a main effect of age was found for N2 amplitudes. Across all conditions, adults had

smaller N2 amplitudes than children. This result was obtained when a pre-stimulus baseline

measure of N2 amplitudes was included as a covariate and can lead to the conclusion that

conflict processing in judgments of moral and conventional violations develops with age. This

covariate allows eliminating alternative explanations to age differences in ERP amplitudes (such

as skull thickness), and increases our confidence in the developmental conclusion. The finding

90

that N2 amplitudes decrease with age is line with previous developmental studies of the N2

component (e.g., Lewis et al., 2006).

The finding that children and adults process moral and conventional violations differently at a

neurocognitive level is in line with justifications data obtained within social domain theory but

not with criterion judgments. ERP may be a technique that is more sensitive in identifying age

differences than interview studies. In this sense taking a neuroscientific approach to studying the

distinction between judgments of moral and conventional violations is valuable in informing

social domain theory.

In addition to previous justifications data examining reasoning about the moral-conventional

distinction (Davidson et al., 1983), the age differences found in the present study are in line with

previous research on moral development examining the role of intentions in moral violations

(Helwig & Prencipe, 1999; Helwig et al., 2001; Zelazo et al., 1996). Taken together, these

studies suggest that although young preschoolers are able to distinguish moral violations from

other types of social acts, this ability develops with age and become more sophisticated.

It is important to note that in the present study we examined only prototypical moral and

conventional violations, which involve straightforward situations. Thus, our finding of evidence

consistent with the possibility of greater cognitive conflict for judgments of conventional

violations than moral violations in the rule assumed condition is true for prototypical situations.

It is possible that more complex moral dilemmas, in which responses tend to be more

ambiguous, would result in a different pattern of results.

The lack of correlation between RT results and N2 amplitudes is surprising, especially since they

seem to fit well with each other. Such lack of correlation may suggest that RTs and N2 in the

present studies are not tapping the same cognitive processes. Given that moral reasoning is a

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very complex ability, it is likely that conflict monitoring in moral and conventional judgments is

just one process out of several. It may be the case that RTs would be associated with some other

cognitive process, which the present study did not identify.

For example, given previous research suggesting a link between intentionality and theory of

mind and moral judgments (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Berthoz et al., 2006; Young et al., 2007;

Young & Saxe, 2008) it is possible that theory of mind plays a role in the distinction between

moral and conventional judgments. The moral scenarios presented in the study are very clear cut

and the protagonist's intentions could be inferred from the scenario. However, for conventional

violations, the intentions of the protagonist are less straight-forward, which may suggest that

differences in inferring the actor's intentions are playing a role in the morality-conventions

distinction. This could be addressed by future research by directly controlling for the

intentionality of the actor and examining whether differences between judgments of moral and

conventional violations are found as a function of different intentions.

7.3 Differences in modeled source activation

As expected, modeled source activation revealed generators for the N2 in dorsomedial and

ventromedial prefrontal cortices. These ROIs generating the N2 have been found in previous

studies examining this ERP component (e.g., Lahat et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2006; Lewis et al.,

2006; Todd et al., 2008). Modeled dmPFC and vmPFC source activation is suggestive of

activation in ACC (for dmPFC) and OFC (for vmPFC) and is in line with previous research

showing that judgments of moral violations involve cognitive conflict and emotional processing

(e.g., Blair, 1995, 2007; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007). However, our findings

for the dmPFC source suggest that these neurocognitive processes differ for moral and

conventional violations, as a function of the rule contingency criterion. For adults, findings

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indicate greater source activation for judgments of moral violations when a rule is removed than

when a rule is assumed. This finding is in line with the N2 amplitude data for judgments of

moral violations, and suggests that when the rule criterion is introduced judgments of moral

violations become temporarily "conventionalized", forcing participants to consider rules, even

though rules are not relevant to moral violations. This process arguably results in increased

conflict as reflected in larger N2 amplitudes and greater modeled dmPFC activation.

However, modeled dmPFC source activation for children revealed the reverse pattern, with

judgments of moral violations showing greater source activation when a rule is assumed than

when a rule is removed. This finding is contrary to the pattern emerging from the N2 data. It is

possible that for children, dmPFC is not the only source contributing to the N2, and other ROIs

are responsible for scalp data. This explanation is likely due to the inverse problem of ERP

source models, in which the signals measured on the scalp surface do not directly correspond to

the location of the active neurons in the cortex and many different source models can generate

the same distribution of potentials on the scalp (Michel et al., 2004). Therefore, it is possible that

with age, dmPFC activation becomes more focal and a better modeled source for the N2. This

presumed focalization is in line studies that have indicated that with age PFC activation becomes

more focal (e.g., Bunge, Dudovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002; Durston et al., 2006;

Luna et al., 2001). These studies show that with age activation in certain brain regions increases

and at the same time activation in other brain regions decreases.

The identification of a dmPFC source is in line with the alternative explanation mentioned above

about the role of theory of mind in the distinction between moral and conventional judgments.

Activation in dmPFC has been found in previous research that examined links between moral

judgments and theory of mind (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Berthoz et al., 2006; Young et al.,

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2007; Young & Saxe, 2008) and as noted, the role of intentions should be investigated in future

research.

7.4 Non-normative-conventional and normative-conventional response orientations

The last experiment reported in the present study involved an analysis of a subset of participants

that were excluded from the adult and child ERP samples. These participants, referred to as non-

normative-conventional, showed a response orientation in which the majority of their judgments

in the conventional rule removed condition were non-normative. These non-normative-

conventional participants were compared to the participants from the adult and child ERP

samples, which were referred to as normative-conventional participants.

The findings revealed significant N2 differences between non-normative and normative children,

but not adults. No behavioral differences were found between non-normative-conventional and

normative-conventional response orientations. However, for the rule assumed condition N2

amplitudes of non-normative-conventional children were larger than normative-conventional

children. Additionally, for non-normative-conventional children, N2 amplitudes in the rule

assumed condition were larger than in the rule removed condition. This may suggest that

increased conflict is experienced by non-normative-conventional children.

The fact that non-normative-conventional participants judge conventional violations to be

unacceptable in the absence of a rule, suggests that these participants are rule-dependent in their

response orientation. It appears that these participants fail to consider the fact that rules have

been removed, and respond according to rules regardless of whether they are present or absent.

Their judgments when a rule is removed are similar to their judgments when a rule is assumed

(i.e., 'NOT OK'), suggesting that they are considering and contrasting the violation with a rule,

even when it is absent. The fact that this rule-dependent response orientation is reflected in N2

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amplitudes in children further supports the idea that rule consideration may increase conflict.

Thus the data from these non-normative-conventional children, not only shows that these

children experience more conflict, but also allows us to validate our argument that contrasting a

violation with a social rule increases cognitive conflict. However, as mentioned above, there

could be other possible reasons for these participants' non-normative response orientation, other

than reliance of rules. For example, it is possible that these individuals also have poor executive

function abilities. This should be addressed by future research and could be carried out by

obtaining justifications for non-normative responses following the ERP task.

Responding according to this rule-dependent orientation is in line with the importance that

adolescents stress on conforming to the peer group, as well as its rules (e.g., Berndt, 1979; Nucci

& Lee, 1993). Furthermore, several scenarios involve crossing gender lines (see appendix). Our

child sample are in the period of early adolescence, a time that has been characterized by gender

intensification, an increased pressure for adolescents to conform to culturally sanctioned gender

roles (Hill, Lynch, Brooks-Gunn, & Petersen, 1983). These pressures to conform to the peer

group and gender roles may be contributing to a rigid, rule-based response orientation.

The identification of a non-normative-conventional response orientation suggest a role for

individual differences for conventional judgments that has not been addressed by previous

research. It is possible that these individuals vary from normative responders on other measures

as well, such as executive function, intelligence, and other personality characteristics. Future

research should create a better profile of these individuals and address the implications of this

response orientation.

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7.5 Limitations and future directions

The present study took a developmental cognitive neuroscience approach to examine the

development of judgments of moral and conventional violations. Differences in the online

processing of these two domains and their development were studied using ERP. To the best of

our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the neurophysiological correlates of moral and

conventional judgments using this technique.

Although ERP has excellent temporal resolution, it does not provide high-quality spatial

resolution and the cortical generators of the N2 only offer a model of possible sources. In order

to better localize brain regions that are activated during judgments of moral and conventional

violations, techniques with superior spatial resolution should be used (such as fMRI). Future

research could adapt the new paradigm developed in the present study to these techniques in

order to better localize morality and conventions in the brain.

An additional limitation of the present study is that it only focused on one age group of children

who were compared to adults (12- to 14-year-olds versus undergraduates). Including an

additional age group between these two groups could have provided information about the

developmental trajectory of the neurocognitive process identified in the study. Including a

middle age-group would allow examining questions, such as, Does the distinction between moral

and conventional judgments, as reflected in different levels of conflict in online processing of

social stimuli, develop linearly?; Do children become less rule-based with age, or is there an

increase in rule-dependent orientation during mid and late adolescence? Furthermore, future

research might adapt the task so that it would be suitable for younger participants. This would

allow examining the onset of difference in conflict processing in the morality-conventions

96

distinction. The task involves reading a lot of text, and future studies could present participants

with audio recordings of the scenarios, as well as accompany them by pictures or video.

Furthermore, as suggested above, it is likely that cognitive conflict is not the only process that is

involved in moral and conventional judgments. Given previous research (e.g., Berthoz et al.,

2002; Berthoz et al., 2006; Young et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2008) and in light of dmPFC

source activation an additional cognitive process may be related to the role of intentions and

theory of mind. Future research should manipulate the protagonist's intentions and directly

examine the effects on moral judgment.

Finally, understanding the online processing of judgments of moral and conventional violations

has important implication for behavior, especially for atypical populations. For example,

research shows that psychopaths have often failed to make the moral-conventional distinction

(Blair, 1995). These individuals judge moral violations as acceptable even in the absence of a

rule. Additionally, children with behavior problems have more difficulty with this distinction

than children with less behavior problems (Blair et al., 2001). Future research might usefully

examine the ERP correlates for these individuals. Such findings may have important implications

for these individuals' deviant behavior.

Another population which may benefit from such research is children with autism. These

individuals have been found to be able to make the morality-convention distinction (Blair, 1996),

but other research (Grant, Boucher, Riggs, & Grayson, 2005) shows that they have problems

providing reasons for their judgments. These findings could suggest that children with autism

may be processing these violations differently than controls, and this may be reflected in N2

ERPs.

97

7.6 Conclusions

The present study examined children’s and adults' neurocognitive processing of judgments of

moral and conventional violations and focused on the N2 component of ERP, known to be an

index of cognitive conflict (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). Research from social domain theory has

been taken as evidence that judgments of moral and conventional violations entail two separate

domains of reasoning and that even very young children are able to make the moral-conventional

distinction (e.g., Smetana, 1981, 2006; Turiel, 1983). However, research from this perspective

has identified age difference in participants' justifications (e.g., Davidson, et al., 1983).

The majority of findings in the present study are in line with social domain theory and suggest

that judgments of moral and conventional violations can be reflected by differences in N2

amplitude, and possibly by different levels of conflict. Specifically, when a rule is assumed

judgments of conventional violations involve more conflict than judgments of moral violations.

This finding can be explained by the idea that judgments of prototypical conventional violations

are contingent on rules and involve contrasting the violation with a societal rule, thus increasing

their RTs and increasing conflict. However, judgments of prototypical moral violations are based

on the intrinsic negative consequences of the act, and thus are faster, and involve relatively less

conflict. The findings provide evidence from a developmental cognitive neuroscience

perspective for the idea that judgments of conventional violations are more explicitly dependant

on rules, whereas judgments of moral violations are based more directly on the intrinsic

wrongness of the act.

However, for children no such N2 differences were found. Children's RT and ERP data suggest

that children do not process moral and conventional violations in the same way as adults, and

although social domain research has shown that even very young children are able to make the

98

distinction (e.g., Smetana, 1981), the processing seems to change with age. This finding is line

with the data suggesting that older children provide more elaborate justifications than younger

children (e.g., Davidson et al., 1983), which could be reflected in processing differences. Given

that justifications expand responses to criterion judgments, these age differences in justifications

may reflect differences in the underlying process of the judgments. The age differences found in

the present study converge with age differences previously found with regards to justifications

and can thus further our understanding of the development of moral and conventional judgments

in a way that could not be revealed by methods used in previous research.

However, these conclusions should be further examined in future studies as other alternative

explanations could be possible. One different interpretation of the findings is that adults are

better at rapid processing of briefly presented stimuli and that this is why children have more

difficulty with the task and experience more conflict. We attempted to address this possibility by

examining correlations between N2 amplitudes and RTs for each variable. These correlations

were not significant for both adults and children, thus addressing the issue that behavioral

performance may contribute to N2 amplitude findings. Furthermore, although the results are in

line with findings regarding developmental differences in justifications, reasoning was not

examined in the present study due to ERP technique constraints. Therefore, future research

could examine the neural correlates of individuals' justifications of moral and conventional

judgments in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the neurocognitive processing of these

two types of violation.

The developmental findings, as well as data reported from participants who responded with a

non-normative response orientation (i.e., non-normative-conventional participants), suggest that

children may be more rule-driven in their judgments, even for moral violations that are

99

independent from societal rules. It appears that relative to adults, children consider not only the

intrinsic wrongness of a moral violation, but also the social prohibition against it.

Finally, an interesting pattern emerged for judgments of moral violations. Across all ages,

judgments in the rule removed condition elicited larger N2 amplitudes, and thus more conflict, as

compared to the rule assumed condition. This pattern was also reflected in adults' dmPFC source

activation. These findings suggest that when the rule-contingency criterion is brought up,

participants may consider the societal prohibition; removing rules appears to momentarily

conventionalize their thinking and increase conflict.

In sum, the studies reported in this dissertation identified that judgments of moral and

conventional violations involve different neurocognitive processing. Judgments of prototypical

conventional violations involved increased conflict, entailing consideration of rule systems, as

compared to judgments of prototypical moral violations, and this pattern develops with age.

100

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Moral judgments task

Rule assumed condition:

You will now read short scenarios describing social situations. After reading the scenario, press

the Spacebar to continue.

Next, an ending for the scenario will be presented. After reading each ending, decide if the act is

OK or NOT OK

to perform.

PRESS the GREEN key if the act is OK

PRESS the RED key if the act is NOT OK.

Please respond as quickly as possible. We are interested in your opinion and there are no correct

or incorrect answers.

(Press Spacebar to continue)

Rule removed condition:

You will now read the same scenarios again. This time imagine that there is NO RULE against

the act described in the ending.

You will be asked to judge whether the act is

OK or NOT OK

to perform if there were NO RULE against it.

PRESS the GREEN key if the act is OK

PRESS the RED key if the act is NOT OK.

111

Please respond as quickly as possible. We are interested in your opinion and there are no correct

or incorrect answers.

(Press Spacebar to continue)

Practice block 1:

First, practice pressing the 'OK' and 'Not OK' keys.

Respond as quickly as you can to the following words.

Press Spacebar to begin

Love

Pain

Crime

Robbery

Happiness

Hope

Hitting

Friendship

Shooting

Harm

Hate

Honesty

Kicking

Peace

112

Beauty

Vandalism

Joy

Burglary

Lovely

Sincerity

Practice Block 2:

Now, practice a few trials.

Press Spacebar to begin

Jason borrowed Tami’s notebook. He didn't need it anymore, so he decided to...

…BURN it.

John felt his nose was itching. He decided to...

…PICK it.

Dan borrowed his sister’s bike. He decided to...

…CLEAN it.

Kelly met Adam, who was a very fat boy. She started...

…TEASING him.

Ethan needed to go to the washroom. The girls' room was closer, so he decided to...

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…ENTER it.

Scenarios:

Sarah had dinner at a restaurant with her friend, Anna. They ordered spaghetti with meatballs,

which they wanted to share. The waiter brought them their meal and told them that there were no

more forks and spoons left. Sarah decided to use her hand in order to…

(the scenario will be followed by one of these endings)

…CONSUME it. (conventional)

…RETURN it. (neutral)

…RUIN it. (moral)

In Sharon’s school students should address their teachers by their title or last name, but not by

their first name. Sharon saw her teacher, Dr. Jason Smith, in the hallway and said: “Hello…


…JASON.” (conventional)

…DOCTOR.” (neutral)

…BUTTHEAD” (moral)

Josh played a basketball game in the school playground with some of his friends. Suddenly, he

started to…


…UNDRESS. (conventional)

114

…DRIBBLE. (neutral)

…INSULT. (moral)

Jennifer was very bored during class. She wanted to be somewhere else. When her teacher asked

her a question she decided to…


…LEAVE. (conventional)

…SPEAK. (neutral)

…HIT. (moral)

George was a very short boy. He wanted to be a few inches taller. He found his mother’s high

heels and decided to…


WEAR them. (conventional)

SHINE them. (neutral)

SMASH them. (moral)

Mary went to eat lunch at the school cafeteria. The line was very long. She decided to…


…CUT in line. (conventional)

…WAIT in line. (neutral)

115

…PUSH in line. (moral)

Michael woke up and started getting ready for school. He decided to go over to his sister’s

closet. He saw a dress and he…


…WORE it. (conventional)

…LEFT it. (neutral)

…TORE it. (moral)

In Alex’s house, there is a rule that toys and books have to be put back in their place after using

them. Alex finished reading a book he found on the bookcase and placed it on the floor. Instead

of returning it to its place he decided to...


…LEAVE it. (conventional)

…READ it. (neutral)

…RIP it. (moral)

Nathan wanted to contribute to the class discussion. He looked at his friend, Dan, who was

sitting beside him and suddenly he started…


…YELLING. (conventional)

…SMILING. (neutral)

116

…KICKING. (moral)

In Tom’s school students are not allowed to enter or open the door of a class that already started.

Tom overslept, and when he arrived at the school the teacher had already began teaching. He

stood in front of the classroom door. He looked at the door-knob and decided to…


…TURN it. (conventional)

…CLEAN it. (neutral)

…BREAK it. (moral)

David and Ben were in the library studying for an important test on the next day. They realized it

was late, and they were running out of time. While they were still in the library and had a couple

of more hours to study they decided to…


...SHOUT. (conventional)

…TRY. (neutral)

…CHEAT. (moral)

Alice woke up and went to her closet to choose what she would wear to school that day. She saw

the pyjamas she borrowed from her sister and decided that when she goes to school that day she

would…


117

...WEAR them. (conventional)

…FOLD them. (neutral)

…SHRED them. (moral)

In Jennifer's school chewing gum during class is not allowed. Her classmate, Ted, offered her a

pack of gum. While the teacher was speaking during class, Jennifer looked at the gum and

decided to…


...CHEW it. (conventional)

…SAVE it. (neutral)

…STEAL it. (moral)

Sara was in the library and she was whispering to her friend, Jessica. When she whispered she

was…


...NOISY. (conventional)

…QUIET. (neutral)

…HURTFUL. (moral)

Ted sat at the dinner table with his family. Suddenly he started…


118

...BURPING. (conventional)

…GRINNING. (neutral)

…FIGHTING. (moral)

Documents

THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF CHILDREN'S … · The Neurophysiological Correlates of Children's and Adults' Judgments of Moral and Social ... Chapter 1 ... 7.5 Limitations