The Neoliberalization of (African) Nature as the Current Phase of Ecological … · 2016. 1. 26. · ecological imperialism and neoliberalization of nature. The neoliberal turn can

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcns20

Download by: [The State University of New York] Date: 25 January 2016, At: 20:17

Capitalism Nature Socialism

ISSN: 1045-5752 (Print) 1548-3290 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcns20

The Neoliberalization of (African) Nature as theCurrent Phase of Ecological Imperialism

Mariko Lin Frame

To cite this article: Mariko Lin Frame (2016): The Neoliberalization of (African) Natureas the Current Phase of Ecological Imperialism, Capitalism Nature Socialism, DOI:10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973

Published online: 19 Jan 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 12

View related articles

View Crossmark data

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcns20http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcns20http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rcns20&page=instructionshttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rcns20&page=instructionshttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-01-19http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2016-01-19

The Neoliberalization of (African) Nature as theCurrent Phase of Ecological Imperialism†

Mariko Lin Frame

Environmental Studies, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

Introduction

One of the more critical sets of literature in political ecology concerns the“neoliberalization” of the environment. Neoliberalism, according to this lit-erature, has restructured the social and property relations governing natureand ultimately allowed for its enclosure, privatization, and marketization.This broad trend is seen as the most recent phase of capitalism and consistsof cohesive ideological and policy attributes, even as this “neoliberalization”manifests differently according to localized context (Heynen et al. 2007).Closely related are recent re-interpretations of Marx’s concept of primitiveaccumulation. The core idea of Marx’s primitive accumulation is that theaccumulation of capital necessitates an initial separation of workers fromthe means of production, such as the land. Recent interpretations arguethat primitive accumulation continues and in fact operates throughout theentire world (De Angelis 2001; Harvey 2005).

This essay seeks to contribute to the literature on the neoliberalization ofnature and related literatures in several ways. First, it connects the conceptof “ecological” imperialism as espoused by Marxist Ecologists and the neoli-beralization of nature literature, bringing together two important sets of litera-ture in political ecology explicitly for the first time. Both sets of literaturescould benefit from their synthesis. Ecological imperialism can deepen ourunderstanding of the fundamental causes behind neoliberalization in the per-iphery as well as broaden our capacity to evaluate its effects through relating itto the accumulation of capital at the global level. The rapidly burgeoning neo-liberalization of nature literature, in turn, can ground the theorization of eco-logical imperialism through analysis of geographically specific, concreteneoliberal structures and policies. Such a synthesis could offer a powerfulradical framework from which to criticize mainstream work on society andthe environment, especially work on global economic integration, which

© 2016 The Center for Political Ecology

†I would like to thank Haider Khan, George DeMartino, and James Mittelman for their many conversationsand advice throughout the research process for this article.

CONTACT Mariko Lin Frame [email protected]

CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM, 2016http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2015.1135973

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

mailto:[email protected]://www.tandfonline.com

often deals with economics, environmental degradation, and imperialism asseparate and unrelated issues.

From a broad perspective, I argue that when viewed in historical context,the neoliberalization of peripheral resources created the political-socio-econ-omic institutions necessary for the expansion of ecological imperialism.Specifically, this essay focuses on important historical changes in the regu-lations surrounding foreign investment in African resources,1 where thenexus of ecological imperialism and neoliberalization can clearly be witnessed.When viewed temporally, this neoliberalization can be interpreted as the mostrecent phase in the ongoing, expansionary tendencies of capital to subsumeperipheral resources and part of the most current strategy of accumulation.

Additionally, this paper is the first work on ecological imperialism to expli-citly incorporate the role of Third World resistance, in particular from theimportant era of economic nationalism, in shaping the current structure ofecological imperialism and neoliberalization of nature. The neoliberal turncan arguably be interpreted as a backlash against the protective measuresmany post-colonial countries enacted during the post-independence era intheir quest for economic and national sovereignty. This political economic/ecological context arguably set the stage for the neoliberal backlash followingthe debt crisis of the developing world in the early 1980s which restored theaccessibility, and amenability, of peripheral resources to foreign capitalaccumulation.

Ecological Imperialism: A Brief Overview

In its simplest definition imperialism is the system by which a dominantpower is able to control the trade, investment, labor, and natural resourcesof other peoples. Theories of imperialism have always acknowledged therole of natural resources in global capital accumulation. Lenin and Magdoffboth emphasized the role of raw material investment in the developingworld for capitalist industrialization in the core countries. However, thereare several reasons for bringing the ecological dimension into the discourseon imperialism more explicitly. To begin with, mainstream discourses on sus-tainability are proliferating, but largely deal with economic policies, environ-mental degradation, and global structures of inequality as if they are separateand unrelated issues (see World Bank 2011). Effort must be made to trace anduncover the sources of accumulation (biophysical as well as monetary) in oneplace, and the political economy, policies, and ideologies that support it, whilealso examining the socio-ecological impacts that such accumulation may have

1A short piece written by the author on ecological imperialism, ecologically unequal exchange, and thescramble for African resources was first published by Palgrave’s Encyclopedia on Imperialism andAnti-imperilism as “Ecological Imperialism and the 21st Century Scramble for African Resources.” (seeFrame 2015).

2 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

in another place. An explicitly ecological theory of imperialism contributes tothese gaps for a less fragmented and more political discussion of sustainabilityat the global level. Marxist ecologists such as Foster, York, Clark, and Moore,and theorists of imperialism such as Magdoff, have already contributed sig-nificantly to the topic of ecological imperialism. While the drive for capitalaccumulation fundamentally undergirds ecological imperialism in allaccounts, different theorists emphasize different particular dynamics. Magd-off’s work (2003) argues that capital, in its drive for endless accumulation,undergoes technological changes that require specific and strategic resources,many of which are largely found overseas. Competition between capitalistpowers intensifies the expansionary dynamic. Moore conceives of imperialismas a “symbolic-material bundle of human and extra-human natures,” a way oforganizing relations between humans and the rest of nature in the ceaselesspursuit of capitalism accumulation. Increasing the extraction of surplusvalue hinges on increasing labor productivity, which involves technical andsocial innovation, but also the abundance of “free gifts” from nature. Capital-ism, Moore asserts, has sustained itself on the basis of cheap inputs andthrough mobilizing a succession of great leaps forward in the relative ecologi-cal surplus. These dynamics necessarily push expansionary tendencies on aglobal scale, as they typically result in the rapid exhaustion of nature (andhuman nature) which can act as fetters on the accumulation of capital(Moore 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012). Re-formulating Marx’s original concept ofmetabolic rift, Foster, Clark, and York (2011) argue that capitalist socialrelations of production, that is, the separation of the workers from theirmeans of production, are both cause and condition of a historically distinctand environmentally destructive capitalist geography. Foster (2002) andBurkett (2006) have pointed out that on the level of individual capitals,attempts to overcome ecologically produced crises of capital accumulationcan become a new source of profit and investment, a dynamic that can be wit-nessed in ecological imperialism. Clark and Foster (2009) have linked theissue of ecological imperialism with ecologically unequal exchange. Ecologi-cally unequal exchange is a related literature that asserts that the world-system is characterized by asymmetrical flows of resources from peripheralto core areas underlying nominally equitable monetary exchanges (Hornborg2011). Substantial empirical work, much of it creatively using currentenvironment-society indicators, has corroborated many of the tenets of eco-logically unequal exchange (Muradian, O’Connor, and Martinez-Alier 2002;Perez-Rincon 2006; Jorgenson, Austin, and Dick 2009; Vallejo 2010; Jorgen-son and Clark 2011; Jorgenson 2012; Manrique et al. 2013).2

2Ecological imperialism and ecologically unequal exchange are not necessarily the same, as ecologicalimperialism can potentially occur in absence of a net unequal flow of resources from periphery tocore. However, they are related in that they both address the ecological exploitation of the peripheralareas by more industrialized regions. See Frame (2014) for a more in-depth discussion.

CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 3

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

Drawing from the works of the above theorists, I had summarized someessential attributes of ecological imperialism in other works (Frame 2014,2015). First, ecological imperialism is rooted in the endless drive for capitalaccumulation and occurs under specifically capitalist relations of production.Further, ecological imperialism hinges upon dynamics of unequal power(economic, political, military, ideological, and so on) and dependencywithin a hierarchical international division of labor in the world-system, asa historical result of colonialism and uneven development. Third, ecologicalimperialism results in some sort of negative socio-ecological impacts for per-ipheral countries. Overall, ecological imperialism allows for displacement ofenvironmental burdens outside of core/semi-peripheral national borders.

To the existing literature, I had added that the form that ecological imperi-alism takes is also an outcome of the dialectical unfolding of movements andcountermovements that arise in response to social resistances. Ecologicalimperialism necessitates an amenable political-economic context within theimperialized country; historically this has been met with resistance atcertain times. As O’Connor (1998) originally noted, nature, like labor, mustbe made available to capital in requisite quantities and qualities, at the rightplace and time, often by an extra-economic actor, namely the state. Contraryto neoclassical economic theory, the price of nature in the periphery dependsnot only on market supply and demand and ground rent but also on class,anti-imperialist, and environmental struggles.

Overall, then, we define ecological imperialism as the subjugation of theeconomic, political, and/or social institutions of a (generally peripheral)country for the biophysical, metabolic needs of the (generally core or semi-periphery), inextricable from the purpose of making such resources accessibleand amenable (in the right quantities and for the right price) to the needs of(foreign) capital accumulation. Understanding the structures and policies thatensure the continued flow of both resources and profit from certain regionsand social groups to other regions and social groups is, I suggest, the studyof “ecological imperialism.”

One area that would push further the work on ecological imperialism – avery broad and complex topic – is continued study of concrete political econ-omic structures in the global economy, in particular surrounding inter-national trade and foreign investment. In terms of resource transfer in thecurrent global economy, ecological imperialism occurs through two primarymechanisms – international trade and foreign investment (though illegalactivities like smuggling also occur, and unequal appropriation of the globalatmosphere commons could conceivably count as well). Tracing the historicaldevelopment of concrete economic policies – in this study, the policies gov-erning foreign investment – allows us to recognize neoliberalism as capital’smost current strategy of accumulation.

4 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

Ecological Imperialism and the Neoliberalization of Nature:Toward a Synthesis

The neoliberalization of nature literature has proliferated, with case studiesdescribing the process of intensified enclosures and privatization (Robbinsand Luginbuhl 2007), to case studies documenting the scaling back ofenvironmental protections by the state (McCarthy 2007). In his broad over-view of this burgeoning literature, Castree (2008a) identifies four issues thatstill need deeper exploration: the why of the neoliberalization of nature; theways in which the neoliberalization of nature operates; the effects of this neo-liberalization; and how such effects are to be evaluated. Theories of ecologicalimperialism can help address these questions. In turn, such questions canpush discussions of ecological imperialism.

Based upon his broad survey, and drawing on Polanyi, Marx, and eco-Marxists, Castree (2008a) argues that, in a capitalist world, attempts to neo-liberalize nature can be understood as “environmental fixes” that are“rational” for private producers and the state. Arguably Castree’s most rel-evant “environmental fix” in the context of ecological imperialism would be“Fix 2,” which stresses that certain neoliberal measures are primarily aboutexposing hitherto protected or state-controlled aspects of the natural environ-ment to market rationality and capital accumulation. Ecological imperialismpushes this general line of argument further. For one, Castree frames hisenvironmental fixes as providing the “rational” for private producers andthe state to adopt neoliberal policies. However, imperialism stresses theissue of subjugation. The debt crises and adoption of structural adjustmentsas conditionalities are very substantial reasons why neoliberal policies wereadopted in the first place. It is not just about “rationality” on the part ofprivate producers and the state; neoliberalization of peripheral nature alsoinvolves subjugation and lack of alternatives, born in part by the collapse ofeconomic nationalism, the ensuing debt crisis, and intransigent structuresof inequality in the world-system.

Relatedly, in answering the “why” of neoliberalism, ecological imperialismoffers a historical context. Work on ecological imperialism is historical, oftentracing the beginnings of the subjugation of the periphery to colonization. Byhistoricizing neoliberalism, one can trace the evolution of economic structuresand policies that affect the terms and conditions in which imperial countriesappropriate peripheral resources. Through such historical analysis the powerstruggles over peripheral resources is made visible.

Further, ecological imperialism offers important ways to evaluate theeffects of neoliberalization in recipient countries. Castree (2008b) overviewsa number of works that examine the socio-economic and environmentaleffects of the neoliberalization of the nature. Apparently, the discoursefocuses largely on the socio-ecological impacts, negative or positive, for the


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

receiving country. While understanding the multitudinous impacts of neoli-beralization of nature in particular contexts is vital, what is missing are rela-tional questions about distribution and accumulation at the global level.Ecological imperialism, as discussed, concerns the subjugation of peripheralenvironments so that both profit and biophysical resources flow from imper-ialized to imperial regions.

Thus, through the lens of ecological imperialism, we could ask, forexample, the following relational questions: in terms of accumulation, doesneoliberalism re-structure governance of peripheral natures in order tochannel profits to imperial centers? Does this trend further enrich imperialcountries and thus further expand their purchasing power and capacity tomake continuous claims on peripheral resources? In terms of the environ-ment, does the neoliberalization of nature policies allow core countries to“import” sustainability and result in some sort of externalized environmentaldegradation from core to periphery? Do the neoliberal policies facilitate eco-logically unequal exchange, an asymmetrical transfer of resources beneath anominally equitable monetary exchange? Are neoliberal policies at least par-tially responsible for enabling certain social groups to appropriate andconsume a disproportionate amount of the Earth’s resources?

In turn, studies of how nature’s neoliberalization operates in practicefurther the study of ecological imperialism. Identifying how neoliberalizationoperates allows for a comprehensive analysis of the concrete structures andpolicies that facilitate the transfer of resources and profit to imperialregions. This is especially salient in the study of cases where, as Castreepoints out, different places and environments are affected by the same setof transnational processes and rules (e.g. global trade agreements).

Neoliberalism as “Counter-Countermovement”: The HistoricalContext

Ecological imperialism may have begun with colonialism, but the process ofaccumulation is never static. At any given point in space and time the ideo-logical, political-economic and policy context that allows for accumulationare distinct, and respond to a capital-society dialectic of resistance andcounter-resistance. From such as perspective, neoliberal policies embody abacklash to what can be conceived of as a Polanyian “double movement”that arose post-independence in many peripheral countries.

In the post-WWII era, as theorists of imperialism (Girvan 1975, 1976;Magdoff 2003) have pointed out, transnational corporations (TNCs) weredominant actors in the system of production and accumulation. Features oftransnational capitalism, according to Girvan (1976), included diversified,internationalized production under centralized control; the massive size andhuge financial resources of the basic institutional unit; technological

6 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

dynamism and vanguardism; and high and continuously growing concen-tration of economic power. This new system came to dominate the worldeconomy, whether developed, underdeveloped, or socialist (Girvan 1976).Consequently, even with independence, foreign control continued to domi-nate post-colonial economies (Nkrumah 1966; Rodney 1981).

Due to this contradictory state of political independence coupled witheconomic neocolonialism, the Third World began to challenge the controlof TNCs over their economic affairs, which necessitated asserting their sover-eignty over their resources. The Third World began to realize that First Worlddependency on their resources constituted a potential source of economicpower and sovereignty (Lozoya 1980). In fact, the years 1972–1974 witnesseda shortage of many primary commodities, especially those of strategic impor-tance in high-growth industries, such as petroleum, bauxite, and phosphates(Girvan 1976).

Polanyi (1957) argued that the dynamics of 19th- and early 20th-centurysociety were governed by a double movement: the self-regulating marketeconomy expanded continuously (first movement) but this movement wasmet a by a countermovement (second movement) checking the expansion.In particular, the countermovement consisted in checking the action of themarket in respect to specific factors of production: labor, land, and money.Polanyi’s double movement expresses how the market system is continuouslyshaped by social resistance. Already implicit in Polanyi’s own work, we canmore explicitly broaden this concept to include countermovements againstan expanding global market in regards to the environment. Mittelman(1998), Bernard (1997), and Bridge (2007), for example, have extended thePolanyian framework in conceptualizing environmental resistance politicsas a countermovement against globalization. In the neoliberalization ofnature literature, McCarthy and Prudham (2004) have used the Polanyiandual movement to describe the environmental protection enacted under theKeynesian state and the subsequent assaults on it under neoliberalism. Totheir work, an important consideration should be added. Many of the pre-vious developmental policies enacted in the mid-20th century by developingcountries in their quest for national sovereignty and protection from the vicis-situdes of the international market can be included as part of a Polanyiandouble movement in regards to the environment. That is, not only did theprotections enacted under the Keynesian state have important environmentalrepercussions, but the quest for national sovereignty over resources did aswell, through affecting the access, and terms of access of Third Worldnature to foreign capital.3 During the post-independence period, many

3It can be argued that the bourgeois state did, in a number of cases throughout the Third World, displaceindigenous and colonized groups from natural resources. To discuss imperialism, however, it is crucial todifferentiate between foreign capital and indigenous capital.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

developing countries had adopted various state-centered, interventionistdevelopment plans that explicitly involved regulation of foreign capital(Haque 1999). Subsequently, however, the whole of the neoliberal projectwas oriented toward the removal of these obstructions.

In the 1960s Third World countries began to challenge the power of trans-national capital and their neocolonial situation under the aegis of economicsovereignty. Central to this issue of economic sovereignty was sovereigntyover their own natural resources, manifest in a series of events from the1960s to the mid-1970s. Such events included numerous state expropriationsof foreign-owned natural resource industries, the formation of primary com-modity cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), and sets of proposals that voiced Third World grievances putforth through the United Nations platform known as the New InternationalEconomic Order (NIEO).

The concept behind primary commodity cartels such as OPEC was to allowcountries in the Third World to actively control their terms of trade with theindustrialized world and the returns they got from the powerful multinationalcorporations (MNCs). The power of transnational capital was actively con-tested through the nationalization of foreign natural resource industries. Con-flicts between Third World states and MNCs involved in their naturalresource industries took place as early as 1937/1938 in Bolivia and Mexicowith expropriations of foreign oil companies, reaching their zenith in themid-1970s (Kennedy 1992). Finally, the Third World realized that withoutmajor structural changes in the international economic system, economicindependence and development would be difficult. Hence, despite ideologicaldifferences, the Third World adopted a series of coherent demands. TheNIEO demanded the full and permanent sovereignty of every state over itsnatural resources and all economic activities, including the right to nationa-lization or transfer of ownership to nationals (NIEO Charter 1974). Impor-tantly, the NIEO also demanded the right for developing countries toregulate TNCs operating within their territories in accordance with plans ofnational development. The NIEO also sought to establish a more equitablerelationship between the prices of exported raw materials and imported man-ufactures by improving terms of trade (NIEO Charter 1974).

The reaction of the West to the Third World’s demands for adjustment ofthe international economic order was a resounding rejection, heralding whatAmin regards as a new phase of aggressive anti-ThirdWorldism (Amin 1990).Even before the NIEO, Northern hostility to the increasing economic nation-alism of the Third World was apparent (Girvan 1976; Bhagwati 1977).Foreign investment in African resource industries, for example, dropped dra-matically due to uncertainty generated by the backlash against foreign-ownedoperations in the 1970s (United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-ment [UNCTAD] 2005). From a political ecological perspective, the main

8 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

issue is simple to understand: developed countries were, and continue to be,crucially dependent on various resources from the periphery, and the push forsovereignty and greater returns for their exports run directly counter to theneed for cheap and accessible resources.

Yet due to a complex convergence of factors, developing countries acrossthe world fell into crippling levels of debt and were forced to undertake exten-sive structural adjustment programs. By the 1980s economic nationalism inmuch of the Third World had essentially collapsed, and their societies under-went extended series of radical structural adjustments realigning their econ-omies with the principles of laissez faire capitalism, comparative advantage,and increased external integration. Under the neoliberal reforms, ThirdWorld ecological resources were once again made accessible to thedemands of foreign capital accumulation, as lingering obstructions enactedduring the developmentalist era were removed one after the other. TheThird World countermovement was replaced by the neoliberal “counter-countermovement,” in a context of economic and political crisis. By the late1970s economic nationalism was replaced by market principles throughbinding trade agreements and new rules and regulations regarding foreigninvestment, ultimately opening countries for foreign capital through privati-zation and various incentives to attract MNCs.

Ecological Imperialism Today: Neoliberalization and ForeignInvestment in Africa

Ecological imperialism today is marked by both differences and continuitieswith previous eras of imperialism. In Africa, despite political independence,MNCs still concentrate in and exercise substantial control in the naturalresource sectors, supported by a comprador elite. However, in contrast to pre-vious eras, the scale of the global ecological crises in which the current imperi-alism is occurring is historically unprecedented, an issue intensified by thesaturation of global capitalism and industrialization of so-called emergingeconomies. This section discusses these issues in the context of the neoliber-alization of nature (specifically investment policies) and ecologicalimperialism.

Neoliberalization and Foreign Control over African Resources

In contrast to the colonial era, the dynamics of imperialism are occurring inpolitically independent African countries. Neocolonialism today is largelyrendered through neoliberal policies and market ideology based on a particu-lar concept of export-led development and foreign investment. A majorfeature of continuity with the pre-economic nationalist era, however, is thecontrol of key sectors of the economy by MNCs. Foreign industries dominate


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

over metals and minerals production in Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana,Gabon, Ghana, and Namibia, among others; in oil and gas, foreign industriesaccounts for over half of the production on average in Sub-Saharan Arica(UNCTAD 2007).

According to the UNCTAD (2012) report, the volume of Africa’s materialtrade in physical terms (metric tons) rose substantially, reflecting the globalinterest in African resources in the 21st century. Overall, the volume ofAfrica’s material trade in physical terms rose from almost 260 million tonsin 1980 to 506 million tons in 2008. Fossil fuels, followed by specificmetals, are African countries’main exports in physical terms. After a decreaseduring the mid-1980s, exports of fossil fuels reached a peak in 2008 amount-ing to 534 million tons.

The influence of MNCs in this trend is reflected in part in increased foreigndirect investment (FDI) inflows. According to the UNCTAD World Invest-ment Report 2013, investment in extractive industries remains the mostimportant driver of FDI to Africa. In East Africa, for example, recently discov-ered gas reserves in Tanzania and oil fields in Uganda resulted in increasedFDI, as inflows to the region rose from $4.5 billion in 2011 to $6.3 billionin 2012. Central Africa also saw its inflows rise to $10 billion, a recordhigh, maintaining a trend of increasing FDI into natural resources frommining TNCs since 2010. In West Africa, investment in oil-producingGhana remained stable at $3.3 billion and mining interests in Mauritaniahelped that country’s inflows double to $1.2 billion (UNCTAD 2013). Fergu-son (2005) argues that such concentration in the resource sectors creates aform of enclavism and uneven development, as natural resource industriesgenerally lack linkages to the broader economy. Ecologically, despite majorreserves, international trade and foreign investment are contributing to thedepletion of region’s stocks of non-renewables (UNCTAD 2012).

The neoliberalization of nature literature on international trade regimesand foreign investment, particularly the work of McCarthy (2007), helps toilluminate the political economic dynamics behind this trend. Two particu-larly significant changes in foreign investment policy have occurred withregard to the neoliberalization of nature; multilateral and bilateral investmenttreaties (BITs) and tax regimes governing the natural resource sector.

Under the auspices of creating favorable investment climates, foreigninvestment regulations in many multilateral and bilateral treaties havestrongly shifted the balance of power to foreign capital. As a result, majorsectors such as mining and manufacturing have come under direct controlof foreign investors, especially due to acquisition of privatized state-ownedenterprises (Haque 1999; Bridge 2007). For example, looking at multilateraltrade agreements, McCarthy (2007) notes that the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA) and other recent trade agreements all share theprimary goals of increasing FDI and homogenizing regulatory environments

10 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

across and within national territories, and shifting important state functionsto the private sector. Concerning multilateral organizations, trade-relatedinvestment measures (TRIMs) cover a broad variety of developing countryeconomic activity, and countries that are members of theWorld Trade Organ-ization (WTO) must satisfy the performance requirements of TRIMs. Thecentral aim of TRIMs is to guarantee protection for Western investments.In doing so, it bans most performance requirements on foreign firms. Forexample, the TRIMs agreement bans performance requirements related tolocal content (which require that locally produced goods be purchased orused), trade balancing, export requirements (which require the export of aspecified percentage of production volume), and it also bans requirementson public agencies to procure goods from local suppliers. A country thattries to impose such requirements can be taken to Dispute Settlement Mech-anism, and will usually lose (Wade 2003). Moreover, the USA and EU want tomodify current TRIMS agreement so as to ban all performance requirements,including for joint venturing, technology transfer, and research and develop-ment. In essence, TRIMs restrict the right of a government to carry throughpolicies that favor growth and technological upgrading of domestic industriesand firms for development purposes (Wade 2003). As such, some have arguedthat the WTO outlaws key investment regulations that were once crucial tomany countries’ development strategies (Shadlen 1999; Correa and Kumar2003; Green and Change n.d.).

Even more stringent are BITs that have been proliferating throughout thedeveloping world since the early 1990s. BITs require host government to lifteven more restrictions on foreign firms, to give even more concessions, inreturn for better access to the USA or other powerful party markets (Wade2003). BITs clearly focus on foreign investment protection, and developingcountries sign BITs in order to “signal” to investors and attract moreforeign investment. In recent decades, BITs have become the most importantinternational legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of FDI(Neumayer and Spess 2005).

Prior to advent of BITs, the protection afforded to foreign investors wasminimal, under the customary international legal rule of minimum standardof treatment and the so-called Hull Rule. The Hull Rule dealt exclusively withcases of expropriation and offered no general protection against discrimina-tory treatment. During the era of economic nationalism, developing countrieshad even challenged the Hull Rule’s validity as part of their demands for theNIEO (Neumayer and Spess 2005).

In essence, most BITs guarantee certain protection for foreign investorsthat contrasts strongly with the demands of the NIEO. For example, BITstypically ban discriminatory treatment against foreign investors, guaranteeappropriate compensation for expropriated property or funds, guaranteefree transfer and repatriation of capital and profits, all areas that economic


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

nationalism sought to regulate. Further, the BIT parties agree to submit tobinding dispute settlement should a dispute concerning these provisionsarise. Virtually any public policy regulation can be challenged through thedispute settlement mechanism as long as it affects foreign investors (Neu-mayer and Spess 2005).

The adoption of such treaties has been widespread throughout the devel-oping world. Half of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-opment (OECD) FDI into developing countries by 2000, for example, wascovered by a bilateral treaty (Hallward-Driemeier 2003). In some regions,like Africa, most countries had by the early 2000s concluded bilateral treatiesand signed multilateral agreements with international organizations. Ulti-mately, these regulations limit the capacity of developing country govern-ments to constrain TNCs (Wade 2003). Consequently, they place seriousconstraints on the national development strategies of developing countries(Shadlen 1999; Adejumobi 2003; Wade 2003).

The mining sector attracts a substantial proportion of FDI in many devel-oping/extractive economies, and from the perspective of political ecology,major changes in mining codes have been instrumental in making peripheralresources both amenable and accessible to the needs of foreign capitalaccumulation. The structural adjustments of the 1980s reformulated miningcodes to facilitate state withdrawal from the sector, as well as expanded oppor-tunities for the private sector and increased various incentives for investors(UNCTAD 2005). In the ten-year period from 1985 to 1995 over 90 countriesglobally adopted newmining laws or revised existing legal codes in an effort topromote foreign investment in their mining sector. Attracting foreign inves-tors for economic growth and providing hard currency to developingcountries continues to be prioritized above other important social andenvironmental objectives (Tockman 2001; UNCTAD 2005). Unsurprisingly,one of the most consistent outcomes from the International MonetaryFund imposed structural adjustment policies has been the intensification ofnatural resource extraction for export markets (Tockman 2001).

The reforms have certainly created a more favorable environment forforeign investors, but have also undermined norms and standards in areasof crucial importance for social, environmental, and economic development(Akabzaa 2001; Campbell 2003; Curtis and Lissu 2008). Developmental objec-tives that hampered these goals, such as measures that sought to retain greaterearnings within the host country, or environmental regulatory measures, wereat best placed in secondary position compared to policies to attract foreigninvestment and promote exports (Campbell 2003). The World Bank’s 1992Strategy for African Mining – the first systematic presentation of reforms con-sidered necessary by the Bank – was based upon a survey that was sent to 80mining companies, and recommended a stable legal and fiscal framework,contractual stability, a guaranteed fiscal regime, profit repatriation, rule of

12 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

law, and so on. The report, however, did not articulate how the mining sectorwould contribute to broader developmental objectives of great import, such asthe building of backward and forward linkages or the possibility of value-added processing of minerals (Campbell 2003).

The consequences of this neoliberalization and the dynamics of globalcapital accumulation became apparent in the incapacity of African countriesto retain earnings in the commodity boom of the late 2000s, which resulted inrobust world market prices for African metals but, due to low taxation levels,relatively little revenue actually earned by African states. The Africa ProgressReport 2013 found that many such policies have continued, even despite thecommodity boom of the 2000s and the increased profit margins of mining andpetroleum companies. For example, the report writes that until 2010, theaverage royalty payment on gold exports in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 3percent, one of lowest in world. However, world prices of gold increasedfrom $300 to $1600 per ounce between 2000 and 2011, while investorprofits increased at four times rate of government revenues (Africa ProgressPanel 2013). For example, in 2011 exports of mining products from Guineareached $1.4 billion, representing 12 percent of gross domestic product(GDP), but government mining revenues were just $48 million, or 0.4percent GDP (Africa Progress Panel 2013).

Another report, written by the German Development Institute, similarlyfinds that Sub-Saharan Africa generally failed to benefit from the highprices of mineral and energy commodities from 2003 to 2008. While theextractive sector experienced strong sales revenues and high inflows ofdirect investments, the three case study countries of Zambia, Namibia, andGhana indicate that they only profited “more than moderately” from tax rev-enues during the commodity boom. In Zambia, for example, the report findsthat the copper and cobalt industry sold minerals to the value of over $13billion and benefited from nearly $4 billion of FDI in the period from 2003to 2008. However, the average implicit tax rate for the extractive sector inZambia from 2003–2008 was below 2 percent, and consequently the govern-ment only raised tax revenues of about $393 million in that same period(Sturmer 2010).

Importantly, this trend is abetted by the corruption and collusion of localelites. The Africa Progress Report 2013, in a case study analysis of the Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), reveals how the privatization of theDRC’s minerals sector has been plagued by a culture of secrecy, informaldeals and allegations of corruption. With some of the world’s richestmineral resources, DRC state companies are granting concessions to foreigninvestors, most registered offshore, that systematically undervalue naturalresources. An analysis restricted to the years 2010–2012 and focusing ononly five deals finds that between 2010 and 2012, the DRC lost at least$1.36 billion in revenues from underpricing mining assets that were sold to


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

offshore companies. The report also cites a pervasive problem of tax evasionby offshore companies and provides an estimate that firms that shift profits tolower tax jurisdictions cost Africa $38 billion a year (Africa Progress Panel2013).

Imperialism, Global Capitalism, and Global Ecological Crises

While such issues represent continuities with previous eras of neocolonialism,one major difference of the imperialism of recent decades simply concerns theintensity of the global ecological crisis. Multiple crises exist at a scale pre-viously unknown. In a very general way, one could claim that imperialismtoday is “intensified” in its ecological ramifications, as the very last of tropicalforests throughout the periphery, for example, are being felled due to a scram-ble by foreign investors, or as industrial fishing dangerously depletes oceanstocks to the brink of collapse. Scholars such as Carmody (2011) and Southalland Melber (2009) have documented scramble for the totality of Africanresources, including its water supplies, timber, fisheries, minerals, and fossilfuels, with tens of millions of hectares of land already leased to foreign inves-tors in the 21st century. Such a scramble has even pushed Kofi Annan, theformer UN secretary-general, to urge David Cameron to use Britain’s chair-manship of the G8 to end some of the “unconscionable” practices of compa-nies exploiting Africa’s vast reserves of natural resources (Stewart 2013). Whatis needed is to situate this “scramble for Africa” within the broader trend ofglobal ecological crises, neoliberalization of nature and ecological imperialism– issues which affect not just Africa but underscore serious contradictions inthe whole of the global capitalist economy.

While the proximate cause for this “new scramble for Africa” is high com-modity prices the deeper causes are the tension between a growing globalcapitalist economy and a world of finite natural resources – and, as noted,the outcome of a historical struggle that has made African ecologies bothcheap and accessible through neoliberalization (UNCTAD 2005, 2012;Frame 2014). The scramble for African resources, abetted by high commodityprices, reveals an important dynamic in the operations of ecological imperi-alism discussed by Foster (2002) and Burkett (2006). Ecological crises donot always translate into crises of capital accumulation; on the level of individ-ual capitals, attempts to overcome ecologically produced crises of capitalaccumulation can become a new source of profit and investment. Increasedglobal demand, coupled with dwindling supplies, helped drive up prices inthe first decade of the 2000s, incentivizing investors in the scramble forAfrican resources. Hence, in contrast to the former period of imperialism,ecological crises – not just within the traditional former colonial powersbut global ecological crises – are helping drive the imperialism of Africatoday. For example, in a global context of shrinking resources, investors

14 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

from both developed and emerging economies are trying to achieve food,water, and energy security outside of their national boundaries throughlarge-scale land investments (Smaller and Mann 2009), an issue linked withdispossession, deforestation, and social conflict. Such socio-ecological conse-quences demonstrate another fundamental tenet of ecological imperialism,the displacement of socio-ecological burdens from certain regions to moreperipheral regions.

Such global ecological crises are also inextricably linked to another impor-tant difference of imperialism today, namely the degree to which capitalismhas saturated the global economy. The overall economic growth and industri-alization of emerging economies has skyrocketed the use of resources andtheir associated wastes, and is predicted to only increase (UNEP 2013). AsMoore notes, capitalism sustains itself on the basis of cheap inputs and even-tually this leads to the exhaustion of human and extra-human natures; thissurely applies as much to the capitalism of the semi-periphery as the capital-ism of the core. As has been noted in numerous studies (Cheru and Obi 2010),the intensity of the resource scramble in Africa is driven by both the contin-ued investment from the traditional imperial powers as well as considerableinvestment from countries such as India and China. The capitalist industrial-ization of the emerging economies has turned such economies from netexporters of resources to their net importers (Singh and Eisenmenger2010). And such “South–South” investment was abetted, perhaps unintend-edly, by the neoliberal structural adjustments (Kragelund 2009).

Conclusion

The new scramble for Africa reveals how African resources have been madecheap and accessible, marking it as a last bastion of resources in a time ofglobal ecological crises. Yet this scramble was enabled in large part by the neo-liberalization of nature, a broader global trend. In turn, connecting thisongoing neoliberalization of nature to the broader issue of imperialism iscrucial to understanding the accumulation of capital and biophysicalresources, at a global level. Contextualizing the neoliberalization of natureas a historical phase of ecological imperialism, and in particular as a backlashagainst the economic nationalist policies of the post-colonial era, allows for aradical political-ecological critique of some of the most important economicpolicies currently governing international trade and foreign investment inthe periphery of the world-system.

References

Adejumobi, S. 2003. Globalization and Africa’s Development Agenda: From the WTOto NEPAD. Addis Ababa: Development Policy Management Forum.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

Africa Progress Panel. “Africa Progress Report 2013.” http://africaprogresspanel.org/en/publications/africa-progress-report-2013.

Akabzaa, Thomas. 2001. Boom and Dislocation: The Environmental and SocialImpacts of Mining in the Wassa West District of Ghana. Ghana: Third WorldNetwork Africa.

Amin, Samir. 1990. Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure. Tokyo: UnitedNations University Press.

Bernard, Mitchell. 1997. “Ecology, Political Economy and the Counter-Movement:Karl Polanyi and the Second Great Transformation.” In Innovation andTransformation in International Studies, edited by James Mittelman and StephenGill, 75–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1977. The New International Economic Order: The North-SouthDebate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bridge, Gavin. 2007. “Acts of Enclosure: Claim Staking and Land Conversion inGuyana’s Gold Fields.” In Neoliberal Environments: False Promises andUnnatural Consequences, edited by Nik Heynen, James McCarthy, ScottPrudham, and Paul Robbins, 74–88. London: Routledge.

Burkett, Paul. 2006. Marxism and Ecological Economics toward a Red and GreenPolitical Economy. Leiden: Brill.

Campbell, Bonnie. 2003. “Factoring in Governance is Not Enough. Mining Codes inAfrica, Policy Reform and Corporate Responsibility.” Minerals & Energy – RawMaterials Report 18 (3): 2–13.

Carmody, Padraig. 2011. The New Scramble for Africa. Cambridge: Polity Press.Castree, Noel. 2008a. “Neoliberalising Nature: The Logics of Deregulation and

Regulation.” Environment and Planning A 40: 131–152.Castree, Noel. 2008b. “Neoliberalising Nature: Processes, Effects and Evaluations.”

Environment and Planning A 40: 153–173.Cheru, Fantu, and Cyril Obi. 2010. The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges,

Opportunities and Critical Interventions. London: Zed Books.Clark, Brett, and John Bellamy Foster. 2009. “Ecological Imperialism and the Global

Metabolic Rift: Unequal Exchange and the Guano/Nitrates Trade.” InternationalJournal of Comparative Sociology 50 (3–4): 311–334.

Correa, Carlos Maria, and Nagesh Kumar. 2003. Protecting Foreign Investment:Implications of a WTO Regime and Policy Options. London: Zed Books.

Curtis, Mark, and Tindu Lissu. 2008. A Golden Opportunity? How Tanzania isFailing to Benefit from Gold Mining. Dodoma: Christian Council of Tanzania(CCT).

De Angelis, Massimo. 2001. “Marx’s Theory of Primitive Accumulation: TheContinuous Character of Capitalism’s Enclosures.” The Commoner. http://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdf.

Ferguson, James. 2005. “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and GlobalCapital in Neoliberal Africa.” American Anthropologist 107 (3): 377–382.

Foster, John Bellamy. 2002. Ecology against Capitalism. London: Monthly ReviewPress.

Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York. 2011. The Ecological Rift:Capitalism’s War on the Earth. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Frame, Mariko. 2014. “Foreign Investment in African Resources: The EcologicalDimension to Imperialism and Unequal Exchange.” PhD diss., University ofDenver.

16 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

http://africaprogresspanel.org/en/publications/africa-progress-report-2013http://africaprogresspanel.org/en/publications/africa-progress-report-2013http://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdfhttp://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdf

Frame, Mariko. 2015. “Ecological Imperialism and the 21st-century Scramble forAfrican Resources.” In Palgrave’s Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism, edited by Immanuel Ness and Zak Cope, 1–10. London: PalgraveMacMillon.

Girvan, Norman. 1975. “Economic Nationalists vs. Multinational Corporations:Revolutionary or Evolutionary Change.” In Multinational Firms in Africa, editedby C. G. Widstrand, 25–68. Dakar: African Institute for Economic Developmentand Planning.

Girvan, Norman. 1976. Corporate Imperialism, Conflict and Expropriation:Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the Third World.Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Green, D., and H. Chang. n.d. “Institute of Development Studies: The Northern WTOAgenda on Investment: Do as We Say, Not as We Did.” Institute of DevelopmentStudies: Homepage. http://www.ids.ac.uk/idspublication/the-northern-wto-agenda-on-investment-do-as-we-say-not-as-we-did.

Hallward-Driemeier, Mary. 2003. “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract ForeignDirect Investment? Only a Bit… and They Could Bite.” World Bank eLibrary.http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3121.

Haque, M. Shamsul. 1999. “The Fate of Sustainable Development under Neo-liberalRegimes in Developing Countries.” International Political Science Review 20 (2):197–218.

Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Heynen, Nik, James McCarthy, Scott Prudham, and Paul Robbins. 2007. NeoliberalEnvironments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences. London: Routledge.

Hornborg, Alf. 2011. Global Ecology and Unequal Exchange: Fetishism in a Zero-SumWorld. Abingdon, OX: Routledge.

Jorgenson, Andrew. 2012. “The Sociology of Ecologically Unequal Exchange andCarbon Dioxide Emissions, 1960–2005.” Social Science Research 41 (2): 242–252.

Jorgenson, Andrew, Kelly Austin, and Christopher Dick. 2009. “Ecologically UnequalExchange and the Resource Consumption/Environmental Degradation Paradox: APanel Study of Less-Developed Countries, 1970–2000.” International Journal ofComparative Sociology 50 (3–4): 263–284.

Jorgenson, Andrew, and Brett Clark. 2011. “Societies Consuming Nature: A PanelStudy of the Ecological Footprints of Nations, 1960–2003.” Social ScienceResearch 40: 226–244.

Kennedy, C. R. 1992. “Relations Between Transnational Corporations andGovernments of Host Countries.” Transnational Corporations 1: 67–92.

Kragelund, Peter. 2009. “Knocking on a Wide-Open Door: Chinese Investments inAfrica.” Review of African Political Economy 36 (122): 479–497.

Lozoya, Jorge. Alberto. 1980. Africa, the Middle East, and the New InternationalEconomic Order. New York: Pergamon Press.

Magdoff, Harry. 2003. Imperialism without Colonies. New York: Monthly ReviewPress.

Manrique, P., J. Brun, A. Gonzalez-Martinez, and J. Martinez-Alier. 2013. “TheBiophysical Performance of Argentina: 1970–2009.” Journal of Industrial Ecology17 (4): 590–604.

McCarthy, James. 2007. “Privatizing Conditions of Production: Trade Agreements asNeoliberal Environmental Governance.” In Neoliberal Environments: FalsePromises and Unnatural Consequences, 38–50. London: Routledge.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

http://www.ids.ac.uk/idspublication/the-northern-wto-agenda-on-investment-do-as-we-say-not-as-we-didhttp://www.ids.ac.uk/idspublication/the-northern-wto-agenda-on-investment-do-as-we-say-not-as-we-didhttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3121

McCarthy, James, and Scott Prudham. 2004. “Neoliberal Nature and the Nature ofNeoliberalism.” Geoforum 35 (3): 275–283.

Mittelman, James. 1998. “Globalization and Environmental Resistance Politics.”Third World Quarterly 19 (5): 847–872.

Moore, Jason. W. 2001. “Marx’s Ecology and the Environmental History of WorldCapitalism.” Capitalism Nature Socialism 12 (3): 134–139.

Moore, Jason. W. 2003. “The Modern World-System as Environmental History?Ecology and the Rise of Capitalism.” Theory and Society, 32 (3): 307–377.

Moore, Jason. W. 2011. “Transcending the Metabolic Rift: a Theory of Crises in theCapitalist World-Ecology.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 38 (1): 1–46.

Moore, Jason. W. 2012. “Cheap food & Bad Money: Food, Frontiers, andFinancialization in the Rise and Demise of Neoliberalism.” Review: A Journal ofthe Fernand Braudel Center 33 (2–3): 225–261.

Muradian, R., M. O’Connor, and J. Martinez-Alier. 2002. “Embodied Pollution inTrade: Estimating the Environmental Load Displacement of IndustrialisedCountries.” Ecological Economics 41: 51–67.

Neumayer, Eric, and Laura Spess. 2005. “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties IncreaseForeign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?” World Development 33(10): 1567–1585.

NIEO Charter. 1974. “Declaration on the Establishment of a New InternationalEconomic Order.” UN Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements.http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1966. Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New York:International Publishers.

O’Connor, James. 1998.Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism. New York: TheGuilford Press.

Perez-Rincon, Allejandro. 2006. “Colombian International Trade from a PhysicalPerspective: Towards an Ecological Prebisch Thesis.” Ecological Economics 59:519–529.

Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The Great Transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.Robbins, Paul, and April Luginbuhl. 2007. “The Last Enclosure: Resisting

Privatization of Wildlife in the Western United States.” In NeoliberalEnvironments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences, edited by NikHeynen, James McCarthy, Scott Prudham, and Paul Robbins, 25–37. London:Routledge.

Rodney, Walter. 1981.How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, DC: HowardUniversity Press.

Shadlen, Kenneth. 1999. “Exchanging Development for Market Access? DeepIntegration and Industrial Policy under Multilateral and Regional-BilateralAgreements.” Review of International Political Economy 12 (5): 750–775.

Singh, Simron. J., and Nina Eisenmenger. 2010. “How Unequal is InternationalTrade? An Ecological Perspective Using Material Flow Accounting.” Journal fürEntwicklungspolitik XXV: 57–88.

Smaller, Carin, and Howard Mann. 2009. “A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign invest-ment in Agricultural Land and Water.” International Institute for SustainableDevelopment (IISD). http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id = 1122.

Southall, Roger, and Henning Melber. 2009. A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism,Investment and Development. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

18 M. L. FRAME

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htmhttp://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1122

Stewart, Heather. 2013. “Annan Calls for End to Unconscionable Exploitation ofAfrican Resources.” The Guardian, May 10. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/may/10/kofi-annan-exploit-africa-natural-resources.

Sturmer, Martin. 2010. “Let the Good Times Roll? Raising Tax Revenues from theExtractive Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa during the Commodity Price Boom.”German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 7. http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/MSIN-88MFWX.

Tockman, Jason. 2001. “The IMF Funding Deforestation: How InternationalMonetary Fund Loans are Responsible for Global Forest Loss.” http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id = 27219&type = Document.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2005. EconomicDevelopment in Africa: Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment. New York:United Nations.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2007. WorldInvestment Report 2007 Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries andDevelopment. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2012. EconomicDevelopment in Africa Report 2012: Structural Transformation and SustainableDevelopment in Africa. New York: United Nations.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2013. WorldInvestment Report. New York: United Nations.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Program). 2013. “Recent Trends in MaterialFlows and Resource Productivity in Asia and the Pacific.” http://www.unep.org/pdf/RecentTrendsAP%28FinalFeb2013%29.pdf.

Vallejo, Maria Christina. 2010. “Biophysical Structure of the Ecuadorian Economy,Foreign Trade, and Policy Implication.” Ecological Economics 70: 159–169.

Wade, Robert Hunter. 2003. “What Strategies are Viable for Developing CountriesToday? The WTO and the Shrinking of Development Space.” Review ofInternational Political Economy 10 (4): 621–644.

World Bank. 2011. The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring SustainableDevelopment in the New Millennium. Washington, DC: World Bank.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of

New

Yor

k] a

t 20:

17 2

5 Ja

nuar

y 20

16

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/may/10/kofi-annan-exploit-africa-natural-resourceshttp://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/may/10/kofi-annan-exploit-africa-natural-resourceshttp://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/MSIN-88MFWXhttp://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/MSIN-88MFWXhttp://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=27219&type=Documenthttp://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=27219&type=Documenthttp://www.unep.org/pdf/RecentTrendsAP%28FinalFeb2013%29.pdfhttp://www.unep.org/pdf/RecentTrendsAP%28FinalFeb2013%29.pdf

IntroductionEcological Imperialism: A Brief OverviewEcological Imperialism and the Neoliberalization of Nature: Toward a SynthesisNeoliberalism as “Counter-Countermovement”: The Historical ContextEcological Imperialism Today: Neoliberalization and Foreign Investment in AfricaNeoliberalization and Foreign Control over African ResourcesImperialism, Global Capitalism, and Global Ecological Crises

ConclusionReferences