GUNTHERROTHENBERTHE NAPOLEONIC WARS~ . : : . ~ ~ . 0'.-THE NAPOLEONICWARSGunther E. RothenbergGeneral Editor: John Keegan1..- CASSELLFirst published in Great Britain 1999by Cassell, Wellington House, 125 Strand, LondonWC2R OBB www.cassell.co.ukText copyright Gunther Rothenberg, 1999The moral right of the author has been assertedDesign and layout copyright CassellThe picture credits on p. 224 constitute an extension tothis copyright page.All rights reserved. No part of this title may bereproduced or transmitted in any material form(including photocopying or storing it in any mediumby electronic means and whether or not transiently orincidentally to some other use of this publication)without the written permission of the copyrightowner, except in accordance with the provisions of theCopyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under theterms of a license issued by the Copyright LicensingAgency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.Applications for the copyright owner's writtenpermission should be addressed to the publisher.British Library Cataloguing-in-publication DataISBN: 0-304-352-675Cartography: Arcadia Editions LtdDesign: Martin HendryPicture research: Elaine WillisTypeset in Monotype SabonPrinted in Italy by Printer Trento SrlACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI gratefully acknowledge the help and comfort provided bymy wife, Dr Eleanor1. M.Hancock, during the writing ofthis book. Also, I wish to thank Caroline Knight and PennyGardiner, both at Orion, whose cheerful good humour andenthusiasm encouraged me whenmy spirits were flagging.Mayall authors have the good fortune to enjoy suchsupport.GUNTHER ROTHENBERGMonash UniversityNapoleon issues final orders to his corps commanders before the fighting begins at Austerlitz.CONTENTS---.... : ~ : = = : = @ : . - - - : = = ~ : + - - - I ....---2 EGYPT, THE SECONDCOALITION AND THE GRANDEARMEETHE TRANSFORMATIONOFWAR AND THE EMERGENCEOFNAPOLEON BONAPARTEMilitary reforms before the French Revolution; thetransformation of war; the ascent of NapoleonBonaparte; elements of Napoleonic warfare; theItalian campaign: 1796-7 194 THEGRANDE ARMEE, SPAINAND THE HABSBURGRECOVERY 1807-9133THE PENINSULAR WAR;WELLINGTON AND THEGUERRILLAS 1809-13RUSSIA, GERMANY ANDFRANCE 1812-14The Grande Armee: foreign and Allied troops; changeswithin the Grande Armee; the first Peninsularcampaigns; reshaping the Habsburg army; the warof 1809: the Ratisbon phase; the Aspern-Esslingphase; Wagram analysed IIIWellington's army; British allied and auxiliaryforces; the war in the Peninsula: the defence ofPortugal; Wellington's offensives; guerrilla war:an assessment56591015ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSMAPLISTCHRONOLOGYINTRODUCTIONTHE NAPOLEONIC WARSINTHE HISTORY OF WARFAREITHE WATERLOOCAMPAIGN1815The opposing armies and war plans; the march onMoscow; the retreat from Moscow; Prussianmilitary reforms; the recovery of the French army;the 1813 autumn campaign; the defence ofFrance:1814 157Napoleon's return; the Armee du Nord; Napoleon's warplan; the allied armies and their plans; Lignyand Quatre Bras 16 June; Waterloo: the finaldefeat; Epilogue: Napoleon's system of war - thepursuit of the decisive battle 191The Egyptian interlude; the strategic picture in 1799;Marengo campaign: preparations; Marengo andHohenlinden; Napoleon and his Grande Armee;command, control and administration of the GrandeArmee; Napoleon's soldiers: officers and men;arming the revolutionary and imperial armies;war renewed: the Third Coalition 493 THE YEARS OF VICTORY1805-7Napoleon's adversary: the Habsburg army; themanoeuvre on DIm; war in Italy; the march on Vienna;the Russian army and the road to Austerlitz;the battle of Austerlitz; the Prussian army andthe Jena campaign; the Jena-Auerstadt campaign;the winter campaign in East Prussia and Poland 797BIOGRAPHICAL NOTESFURTHER READINGINDEXPICTURECREDITS214218220224Military units-typesKEY TO MAPSGeneral military symbolsinfantrycavalryx site of battlefortskirmish lineMilitary units-sizeNAPOLEON army commanderxxxxCJarmyxxxCJcorpsxxDdivision [2J cavalryxCJbrigade~infantryxCJbrigadeIIICJregimentIICJbattalionfieldgunMilitary unit coloursunless otherwise shown FrenchAlliesGeographical symbols.. settlementMilitary movementsattack-y retreatCommanders.ftsettlement (3Dmaps)roadriverseasonal riverpFrenchrsBritish Russian-fEPrussianpAustriancanalborderbridgefordMAP LISTI. EUROPEIN 1789 212. FRENCH REVOLUTION 1789-95233ITALIANCAMPAIGNS, 4MAY 1796 - 8APRIL 179738-94MONTENOTTECAMPAIGN, APRIL 17964 15ADVANCEON LODI, MAY 17964 16. BATTLEOF THEPYRAMIDS, 21JULY 1798547BATTLEOF ABOUKIR, 25JULY 1799558. EGYPT ANDSYRIA, JULY 1798- JULY 1799559CROSSING THEALPS, 15MAY - 14 JUNE 18006310. BATTLEOF MARENGO, 14 JUNE 180064-5II. DANUBECAMPAIGN, SEPTEMBER-NoVEMBER 18058412. BATTLEOF AUSTERLITZ, 2DECEMBER 18059 2-313PRUSSIANCOLLAPSE,18069 6-714WINTER WAR, 1806-7 10415PRUSSIA AFTER JULY 1807 10416. BATTLEOF FRIEDLAND, 13-14 JUNE 1807 108-917DANUBECAMPAIGN, APRIL-JULY 180911918. BATTLEOF ASPERN-ESSLING, 21-22 MAY 1809 12319BATTLEOF WAGRAM, 5-6 JULY 1809 12820. FRENCH EMPIRE,181013521. IBERIANCAMPAIGNS 1807-1414022. ROAD TO Moscow,1812 162-323BATTLEOF BORODINO, 7SEPTEMBER 1812 164-524LEIPZIGCAMPAIGN, 181317925BATTLEOF LEIPZIG, 16-19OCTOBER 1813 180-8126. DEFENCEOF FRANCE, 1814 18327EUROPE AFTER THETREATYOF VIENNA19428. LIGNY ANDQUATRE BRAS,16 JUNE 1815198-929BATTLEOF WATERLOO, 18 JUNE 1815 204-7THENAPOLEONICWARSCHRONOLOGY OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS1792 28 April Piedmont sign armistice.20 April French Assembly declares war on 10 May Action at Lodi.Austria. 15 May Milan occupied.15 May France declares war on Piedmont. 4 June Investment of Mantua(lifted26 June First Coalition formed. 31 July).20 Sept Battle of Valmy: 2-5 August Battles of Lonato and Castiglione.6 Nov Austrians defeated at Jemappes. 1-12 Sept Wiirmser breaks through toMantua.1793 3 Sept French defeated at Wiirzburg.1 Feb Convention declares war on 8 Oct Spain declares war on Britain.Britain and Holland. 15-17 Nov Battle of Arcola.20 Feb Convention calls up 300,000cot:Iscripts. 17979 March Convention declares war on Spain. 14 Jan Battle of Rivoli.23 August Committee of Public Safety 2 Feb Mantua surrenders.decrees levee en masse. 18 April Armistice of Leoben.16 Sept Bonaparte takes charge of 17 Oct Treaty of Campo Formio withartillery before Toulon. Austria.19 Dec Toulon falls.22 Dec Bonaparte promoted to brigadier 1798general. 12 April Bonaparte appointed commanderArmy of the Orient.1794 1 July Bonaparte lands at Alexandria.26 June Defeat at Fleurus forces Austrians 21 July Battle of the Pyramids.to evacuate Belgium. 1 August Nelson destroys French fleet at27 July Overthrow of radical Committee Aboukir.of Public Safety: 21 Oct Cairo revolt suppressed.29 Dec Second Coalition formed.179516 May Peace of Basle, Prussia leaves war. 179919 August Peace with Spain. 29 Jan French occupy Naples.5 Oct Bonaparte puts down attempted 6 Feb Bonaparte invades Palestine.coup. 1 March Russia declares war on France.17 Mar-20 May Siege of Acre.1796 25 March Archduke Charles defeats French1 March Directoire appoints Bonaparte at Stockach.commander Army of Italy: 5 April-15 Aug Austro-Russian forces recapture27 March Bonaparte assumes command. Italy and Switzerland.10-22 April Bonaparte's offensive against 25 July Bonaparte smashes Turks atAustro-Piedmont. Aboukir.10CHRONOLOGY23 August Bonaparte sails for France. 2Dec Napoleon crowns himself.27 Aug-19 Nov Anglo-Russian landing in north 14 Dec Spain declares war on Britain.Holland fails.25-30 Sept Massena defeats Russians near 1805Zurich. 11 April Anglo-Russian Alliance.9-10 Nov Coup establishes Consulate. 26 May Napoleon crowns himself King14 Dec Bonaparte becomes First ofConsul. 7 June Eugene appointed 9 August Austria joins Third Coalition.1800 27 August Grande Armee marches for6April Austrian offensive in north-west Danube.9 Sept Austria invades Bavaria.3 May Moreau victorious at Stockach. 7 Oct French elements cross Danube.15-21 May Army of Reserve crosses Alps. 20 Oct Mack surrenders at DIm.14 June Battle of Marengo. 14 Nov Napoleon enters Vienna.3 Dec Battle of Hohenlinden. 2Dec Napoleon victorious at16Dec Northern(Armed Neutrality) Austerlitz.League formed. 26 Dec Treaty of Pressburg.1801 18069 Feb Peace of Luneville. 1 April Joseph Bonaparte becomes23 March Tsar Paul murdered; Alexander King of Naples.succeeds. 20 June Louis Bonaparte declared King2 April British attack Copenhagen. of Holland.2 Sept Army of the Orient capitulates. 12 July Confederation of the Rhineestablished.1802 9 August Prussia mobilizes.26 Jan Italian Republic established; 1 Oct Prussian ultimatum to France.Bonaparte president. 6 Oct Fourth Coalition formed.25 March Peace of Amiens. 7 Oct French enter11 Sept France annexes Piedmont. 14 Oct Battle of Jena-Auerstadt15 Oct France invades Switzerland. destroys Prussian26 Oct Napoleon enters Berlin.180316May Britain declares war on France. 18071 June French seize Hanover. 8 Feb Battle of Eylau.15 June French army concentrates along 18 Mar-27 May Siege of Danzig.Channel. 13-14 June Battle of Friedland.7-9 July Treaty of Tilsit.1804 2-7 Sept British bombard Copenhagen,21 March Duc d'Enghien murdered. seize Danish fleet.18 May Napoleon proclaimed Emperor. 1 Dec Junot occupies Lisbon.19May Marshalate created.IITHENAPOLEONICWARS1808 28 August Fall of Almeida.2 May Murat represses Madrid rising. 27 Sept Battle of Bussaco.6 June Joseph Bonaparte proclaimed 10 Oct Massena's advance stalled byKing of Spain. Lines of Torres Vedras.9 June Austria establishes Landwehr.20 July French corps capitulates at 1811Baylen. 5 March Massena begins withdrawal.1 August Wellesley lands Portugal. 3-5 May Battle of Fuentes de Ofioro.21 August Battle of Vimiero. 16 May Battle of Albuera.14 Oct Erfurt Congress concludes. 23 Dec Napoleon begins preparations to27 Oct Moore moves to operate in Spain. invade Russia.5 Nov Napoleon assumes command inSpain. 18124Dec Napoleon smashes Spanish forces 19 Jan Wellington storms Ciudadand enters Madrid. Rodrigo.6 April Badajoz falls with shocking1809 atrocities.8 Jan Austria decides on war. 20 June Sixth Coalition formed.16 Jan Napoleon forces Moore to 24 June French cross Niemen into Russia.evacuate at Corunna. 22 July Battle of Salamanca.9 April Fifth Coalition formed. 12 August Wellington enters Madrid.10 April Charles invades Bavaria. 17-19 August Battle of Smolensk.20-24 April Napoleon defeats Austrians in 7 Sept Napoleon defeats Kutuzov atBavaria in series of battles. Borodino.26 April Wellesley returns to Portugal. 9 Sept-18 Oct Wellington's siege of Burgos12 May Battle of Oporto. fails.13 May Napoleon enters Vienna. 14 Sept Napoleon enters Moscow.21-22 May Charles repulses Napoleon at 19 Oct Napoleon evacuates Moscow.Aspern-Essling. 24-25 Oct Battle at Maloyaroslavets.14 June Battle of Raab. 19 Nov Wellington falls back to5-6 July Battle of Wagram. Portuguese frontier.28 July Battle of Talavera. 26-28 Nov Battle of the Beresina.29 July-9 Dec Abortive British expedition to 5 Dec Napoleon abandonsa r m ~Walcheren. 14 Dec Last French elements leave14 Oct Peace at Schonbrunn. Russia.20 Oct Start construction Lines of Torres 30 Dec Yorck signs Convention ofVedras. Tauroggen neutralizing his corps.1810 181317 April Massena appointed commander 4 March Russians enter Berlin.Army of Portugal. 16 March Prussia declares war on France.9 July Massena takes Ciudad Rodrigo. 2 May Napoleon defeats Russo-Prussian9 July Napoleon annexes Holland. army at Grossgorschen.1218May20-21 May23 May4 June-17 Aug12 June21 June27 June12 August23 August26 August26-27 August6 Sept8 Oct16-19 Oct18 Oct30 Oct10Nov181411 Jan1 Feb10-14 Feb17-18Feb9 March13 March20-21 March25 March31 March4 AprilBernadotte and Swedish troopsland.Napoleon defeats Russo-Prussiansat Bautzen.Wellington advances into Spain.Armistice of Pleischwitz.French evacuate Madrid.Wellington's victory at Vitoria.Austria joins Russia and Prussia.Austria declares war on France.Battle at Grossbeeren.Macdonald defeated on theKatzbach.Napoleon defeats Schwarzenbergat Dresden.Ney defeated at Dennewitz.Bavaria joins Allies in Treaty ofRied.Combined allied armies defeatNapoleon at Leipzig.Saxons defect to Allies duringbattle.Napoleon defeats Bavarians atHanau.Battle of the Nivelle.Murat signs separate peace withAllies.Blucher repels Napoleon.Napoleon mauls Prussians atChampaubert, Montmirail andVauchamps.Napoleon defeats Schwarzenbergat Monterau.Blucher defeats Marmont atLaon.Napoleon victorious at Rheims.Battle at Arcis-sur-Aube.Engagement at Fere-Champenoise.Allies enter Paris.Marshals demand Napoleon'sabdication.6 April10 April181526 Feb20 March25 March31 March3 May15 June16 June16-17 June18 June18 June22 JuneCHRONOLOGYNapoleon abdicates.Wellington defeats Soult atToulouse.Napoleon escapes from Elba.Napoleon enters Paris.Seventh Coalition formed.Murat declares war on Austria.Austrians defeat Murat atTolentino.Napoleon with Armee du Nordcrosses into Belgium.Napoleon defeats Blucher atL i g n ~Wellington delays Ney at QuatreBras.Grouchy engages Prussians atWavre.Wellington and Blucher defeatNapoleon at Waterloo.Napoleon abdicates.INTRODUCTION---........---THE NAPOLEONIC WARSIN THEHISTORYOF WARFARENAPOLEON IN HIS STUDY wearing his favourite costume, thesimple undress uniform - green coat with scarlet cuffs, collarand braiding, tight white pants and black boots -of acolonel of the Chasseurs aCheval de la Garde Imperiale.THENAPOLEONICWARSTHE NAPOLEONIC WARSIN THE HISTORY OF WARFARETHISBOOKFORMS part ofamulti-volumeseriesonthehistoryofwarfarefromthe fourthmillennium Be to the present.Specifically it deals with theNapoleonic Wars, the twelve years from1803 to 1815. In this volume the focus ison the conduct of war; how armies were handled to achieve the overall objectivesofMuch of this belongs to the strategic level, but operations and tactics invarious theatres of war andinspecificbattles areincluded. Inaddition, themilitary establishments of the major participants in these wars are discussed.Considerable space isgiven toNapoleon Bonaparte, General, Consul, andfinally Emperor; oneof thetrulygreat commanders ofTheFrenchRevolution gave him his opportunity and from it he inherited large armies led byyoung, unorthodox and aggressive commanders who under his leadership wagedfamous campaigns, establishing, if briefly, anEmpirefromtheTagus totheVistula. Thoughultimatelydefeated, Napoleonnot onlystampedhis wayofwaging war and his personal leadership on his own armies, but he compelled hisadversaries to adopt military reforms to counter his genius. To understand thisachievement the era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars must be placedwithin the context of what hasbecome knownas the 'military revolution'. Thisrevolution, a major change in the way European states raised,trained, equippedand employed armies, has been variously dated, but can be said to have started inthe period when more effective firearms, albeit still in combination with pikes,began to dominate the battlefield - that is, shortly after 1550. This revolution, ithas beenargued, extendedintotheeighteenthcenturyandevenincludedtheNapoleonic Wars which are seen as the end, not as the beginning, of a new era.This contention, however, is not accepted here. While as in all major conflictsthere was a mixture of old and new, in several important aspects the wars of theFrench Revolution and even more the Napoleonic Wars constituted a clear breakwith the past and marked the origins of modern warfare. Never before had therebeenas totalamobilization ofcivilian aswellasmilitaryresourcesleading tofundamental changes in the size and character of armies. Moreover, in contrast tothe largely indecisive campaigns of the previous century, Napoleon's mass armiesoperatedona muchlarger scalewithunprecedentedspeedanddecisiveness.Though the Revolution had already unveiled a new way of war, the superiority ofthe French armies had notbeen absolute and they lostasmanybattlesastheywon. Only after Napoleon took power were there campaigns that within a shorttime led to great and decisive battles that became the idealized model forsuccessive generations of commanding officers.In the end, of course, Napoleonwas defeated. His desire for hegemony and concentration of personal power ledto a strategic overreachandultimatelyto his downfall. The overreachfirstbecame apparent in his attempts to bring Britain down by a system of economicr6warfarewhichin turnled tohisinvasion ofthe Iberian Peninsula, whereafter1809 his commanders could not effectively deal with either Wellington's army orthe British supported guerrilla war. By 1809, too, European powers were catchingup with the Napoleonic way of war. All increased the size of their armies and all,to handle larger numbers, adopted the corps as the main manoeuvre unit,improved theirstaffsandincreased theirartiller): And whenin1813all majorEuropean powers combined, Napoleon was overthrown.But his reputation as agreat captainremainedandthecombat methods evolved bytheendof theNapoleonic Warscontinuedtobeusedwell beyondthesecond quarter ofthenineteenth century, eventhoughthe general introductionof rifled weaponscreated a dichotomy between firepower and tactics.The manoeuvres and tacticsof the various European conflicts and of the American Civil War would have beenperfectly familiartoany general of the Napoleonic era. Aboveall, Napoleon'sinfluence wasmost apparent and longest lasting inmilitary theory and on theoperational and strategic level. Although Napoleon never wrote down hisstrategic concepts, once explaining that in war the 'simplest manoeuvres are thebest', there emerged a considerable literature trying to deduce meaningfulpatterns from his generalship. The most influential interpreter was Baron Antoine]omini who had served on Ney's staff before deserting to the Russians and whosemany writings were prescribed reading in military academies. His influence wasprofound in the French army, while during the AmericanCivil War generals onboth sides 'advanced sword in one hand and a copy of ]omini in the other.'The second major interpreter, Prussian military philosopher von Clausewitz,was farmore sophisticated and complex,refusing toaccept the validity ofanyfixedsystemandconcentrating on the interaction ofwar, politicsandsociety,concepts highly praised ifrarely understood or practised. The mobilization ofnational armies sustained by popular will had, he held, become decisive in war.Both men emphasized the concentration of superior numbers and offensive action.Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution and the rapid development of railwaysand electric telegraphs allowed the deployment of huge armies capable ofoperating in Napoleonic patterns - unsuccessfully in the American Civil War, butsuccessfully by the Prussian Helmuth von Moltke in 1866 and 1870-71. After thisall continental general staffs adopted offensive war plans, expecting quick anddecisivevictoriesonthe Napoleonic-Moltkeanexample. Their plansfailedin1914-18, but during the Second World War and in conventional conflicts such astheGulf War there wasarevival of Napoleonic strategy - feints, penetrationsandenvelopments bymobileforces coveredandassistedbyair power. Someanalysts maintain that nuclear arsenals and missile-delivery systems haveeliminated conventional wars between major powers. The issue remainsunresolved. But whatever the outcome,as long asmen follow the profession ofarms, Napoleon's ability to inspire devotion and courage in the chaos ofbattleandhisorchestrationofgreat campaignsandbattleswill continuetoexert apowerful attraction and will continue to be studied and perhaps admired.INTRODUCTIONCHAPTERONE----... ...-----THE TRANSFORMATIONOF WAR ANDTHE EMERGENCEOFNAPOLEON BONAPARTEINSEPTEMBER 1792 Austrian and Prussian units werepushing west through the Argonnes towards Paris. Here anallied advance guard emerging from a wooded defile isattacked by regular French line infantry still wearing itswhite uniforms. Note the general officers and the hussar inthe foreground in dark blue coats:t all with powdered hairand queues.THENAPOLEONICWARSTHE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR AND THEEMERGENCE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTEWHEN DARKNESS FELL on 2 December 1805 the battle of Austerlitz came to aclose. From his command post Emperor Napoleon watched the rout of theAustrianandRussiantroopssouthof thePratzenheights. Furthernorththesounds of combat were fading as a Russian corps disengaged. When the emperorordereda general ceasefire at 5 p.m. the enemy army had ceased to exist asaneffective force andthe will of his opponents tocontinuethe war hadbeendestroyed.While Napoleon, then General Bonaparte, had made an impressive debut inItaly in 1796-7, the battle of Austerlitz was the triumphant finishto a campaignunprecedentedinitssweep, speedandresults. Inlittleoverthreemonths, theemperor had projected his army from the Channel coast into the heart of centralEurope, changedthebalanceofpowerinGermany, andeffectivelyendedtheThird Coalition against France. The swift and decisive operations awedcontemporaries. Carl vonClausewitz, the great interpreter and philosopher ofwar, pronounced Napoleon the 'god of war', and the campaign set the pattern forthe mobile, offensive and ruthless style of war, called Napoleonic.MILITARY REFORMSBEFORE THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONThe Napoleonic style wasa synthesis ofreforms and innovations suggested byothers. Hisoriginal contributionswere fewandmostlyconfined tothehigherlevelsofwarfare. ButNapoleonsystematizedandelaboratedreformsalreadyunder way and, with his personal genius, created the most effective army of itstime, transforming the art of war itself. The arms and equipment as well as thetroop types in hisarmies remained almost identical with those of Frederick theGreat oreven Marlborough. What hadchangedwerethesize ofarmies, theirorganization, command and control, and, above all, the ends for which they wereemployed, with the decisive, war-ending battle their paramount objective.In the century before the French Revolution wars had become formalaffairs,pursued with limited means for limited objectives by highly trained and brutallydisciplined professional armies, commanded, especially in the higher ranks, by anaristocratic cousinage. Lacking ideological or national motivation, with limitedagricultural, financial, industrial andchieflymanpowerresources, operationswere restricted in scope andBattles were avoided because heavycasualties, coupled with desertions, proved too costly for victors and vanquishedalike. Warscommonlyendedwiththeexhaustionoffinances andmanpowerrather than with a decisive battle.These constraints disappeared or were modified to a substantial degree in thelatter decadesofthe eighteenth Theshift fromsubsistence tosurplusfarmingprovidedfoodwhichenabled Europe'spopulation toroughlydouble.20THETRANSFORMATIONOFWAREurope in 1789After Russia with 44 million, France, rising from 18 to 26 million by 1792, was themost populous country. The Habsburg Empire doubled its population from 9 to18 million, roughly the same figure as Britain, while the populationof allGerman states combined rose from10 to 20 million. The agricultural economiesof eastern and central Europe absorbed this increase in population, but in denselypopulated France it was only partially integrated, the remainder constituting avolatile urban mass - manpower for the armies of the Revolution and Napoleon.This demographic shift coincided with the early Industrial Revolution; output ofiron and textiles greatly increased, and the early stages of mass production meantthat arms andequipment couldbesuppliedfor themuch-expandedmilitaryestablishments. Theexpansionof industry, overseas tradeandthe improvedmeansof administrationandtaxationprovidedbetterfinances, especiallyinEngland where national income nearly doubled between 1712 and 1792.EUROPEIN 1789In 1789 France was compact,both Germany and Italy weredivided into small states andprincipalities, while theHabsburg possessionsincluded various lands fromthe Lower Rhine to Galiciaand fromBohemia tonorthern Italy. Prussia wasthe largest German state,while Poland held substantialterritories and the OttomanEmpire controlled the entireBalkan area.21THENAPOLEONICWARSAFIELDHOWITZERA6-inchfield howitzercapable of firing anexplosive common shell in acurved trajectory over adistance of 600 metresagainst enemy troops behindfortificationsor slopes.Thisshort-barrelled piece wasusually deployed combinedin mixed companies orbatteries of six cannon andtwo howitzers, usuallyassigned to the corps orarmy artillery reserve.22The end oftheSevenYears War in1763brought debatesabout improvingwar-fighting capabilities. France,where the humiliating defeats of the war hadconsiderableimpact, becamethefocus for militarychangesthatimpactedonRevolutionary and Napoleonic warfare. In the long run, the articulation of fieldarmies into self-contained all-arms divisions appears as the single mostimportant innovation. Marching along separate but parallel routes, theseformationsaccelerated movement,reduced logistic problems and, able to fightalone or converge with others,increased strategic options. Suggested in 1759 byMarshal de Broglie, they were tested repeatedly during the following decades andpermanently adopted after 1793. Divisions enabled the Revolutionary andNapoleonicarmies tohandlefar greater numbers thanhadbeenpreviouslypossible. Command, control and co-ordination ofseveral dispersed formationsrequiredanappropriatestafforganization. In1775deBourcet, aFrenchstaffofficer, published schemes for using converging columns in mountain war, and in1796 GeneralBerthier, assignedas Bonaparte'schiefofstaff, wroteadetailedmanual of staff procedure, later adoptedthroughout theFrencharmy. Theirsmooth functioning staffsystem provided a great advantage forthe French overtheir adversaries.France also led in developing new infantry tactics. The long debate of'lineversus column' was resolvedinfavour of a combinationput forward bydeGuibert in 1772, proposing battalions in line and in columns, capable of rapidlyshiftingdeployment accordingtothetactical situation, theordremixte. Theessentials of this system were incorporated in the Regulations of 1791, the formalinfantry doctrine ofthe armies ofthe Revolution and Napoleon, supplementedby renewed emphasis on skirmishing. There were improvements in artillery. Gunsbecame more mobile and accurate, developments pioneered in Austria andPrussia, and introduced into the French service by de Gribeauval. Whilehistorians have made much of the supposed uniqueness of his range of field guns- 4-pounders(1.8kg), 8-pounders(3.6 kg) and 12-pounders(5.4 kg)- Austrian,PrussianandEnglishartillerywas nearlyas hard-hittingandmobile as theFrench, and was often utilized when captured. The same was true of the standardflintlock muskets. The French model of 1772 with a O.69-inch (17.5 mm)bore wasnot much superior to the weapons of other European powers, while the largercalibre O.74-inch(19.3mm)British musket inflicted the gravest injuries.Technologydidnot propel thetransformationinwar, thoughthecapacity to produce the large quantity of weapons, ammunition andequipment required was crucial.THE TRANSFORMATIONOF WARWhenthe wars oftheRevolutionbegan in1792 many ofthe concepts and practices formoreintensive andmobile warhad already been discussed and, to a greater or lesser degree,introduced in France and other European states. But the greatTHETRANSFORMATIONOFWARQ9 .....o ~~ e _ MontaubanAllied victoryadvance of FrenchRevolutionary armiesattacks by AlliedarmiesFrench victorynaval blockademajor town where councilwas replacedbyRevolutionary committeemajor town where councilshared power withRevolutionary committeeFrance in1789annexedby Francein 1792-3annexed by Francein 1795centre of counter-revolutionxXDDD~..... -French Revolution1789-95OVERLEAF:On 9 August1792 radical elements inParis had taken over theCommune as well as theNational Guards protectingthe royal family in theTuileries. This left the kingwith 900 Swiss Guards. Onthe morning of 10 August,crowds and some NationalGuards marched on theTuileries where, left withoutorders, the Swiss abandonedtheir small cannons andwithdrew up the palacesteps. As the crowd charged,they managed to get off onlya few shots before they wereoverrun. Only 300 escaped.This event was decisive inpushing the Revolutiontowards a radical republic.l b o m i l e ~Mediterranean SeaMontpellier-Toulouse.ATLANTICOCEANEnglish Channel50- jJfIt.--",,c::J.J)0J/G~NorthR E A TB R I T A I NSea~ondonQnteStransformation of war did not result fromimprovements in weapons,tactics orarmy organization alone; its origins were political, social and ideological.Already, before the Revolution, intellectuals had attacked professional armiesas ineffective but expensive tools of royal absolutism, contrary to natural orderand reason, and advocated their replacement with citizen soldiers. These ideasfound support in the legislative bodies created after 1789 in France.As earlyasDecember 1789 acommittee report totheConstituent Assemblyasserted that'every citizen must be a soldier and every soldier a citizen, or we shall never have aconstitution'.While this radical proposal wasrejected, the following year armyWARSOF THE REVOLUTIONWhile the French Republicfaced enemies along all ofits borders, the mostdangerous frontier was inthe north-east, the AustrianNetherlands, fromwhereinvasions were mountedand Frenchforcesdeployedagainst this threat.23THENAPOLEONICWARSTHETRANSFORMATIONOFWARTHENAPOLEONICWARSIdealized representation ofearly National Guardtroops. From left to rightJachasseur, a grenadier and aveteran. In realitYJ theuniforms were rather poor,the hair commonly wornlong and unbound.reforms opened the officer corps toall classes, disbanded the foreignmercenaryregiments, andsupportedthenewlyformedcitizenNational Guards. But aspolitical and social turmoil continued, the regular and still royal army declinedand when in the spring of 1792, driven by factional interests, France declared waron Austria and Sardinia and soon thereafter on Prussia, it became necessary toaugment the weakened regulars with volunteers. By the spring of1793 France,now arepublic,was at war with Britain and Spain,joining Austria, Prussia andSardiniaintheFirst Coalition. Whilefacingarmedcounter-revolutioninitswesternandsouthernregions, thecountrywasinvadedbyconverging foreignarmies. AlthoughtheAllies, dividedintheirpolitical objectives, wastedtheiropportunities, the situation appeared critical to the Republican government, theConvention, dominated by Jacobin ideologues.To defend the Republic, the Committee ofPublic Safety,a strong executivebody headed by Robespierre, instituted a quasi-dictatorship, the so-called 'Terror'.Robespierre did not favouramass people's army and tried torely on volunteersand the remaining regulars. But volunteering fell far short and on 23 August 1793,declaring 'the fatherland in danger', the Committee decreed the levee en massewhichconscriptedall national resources, humanandmaterial. Frencharmynumbersswelledwhileweapons, equipment andsupplieswereproducedasadirectedwar e c o n o m ~ Thiswasthereal transformationofwar, theresult, asClausewitz wrote, 'of the participation of the people in this great affair of state'.THETRANSFORMATIONOFWARConscription worked. By the spring of 1794 over 750,000 men were available,adequatelyarmed, trainedandhighlymotivated. Theirorganization, trainingand overall strategy was directed by Carnot, formerlya captain of engineers, the'organizer of victory', who frommid 1793 to the end of 1799 effectivelysupervised military affairs. Assistedby asmall staff, the bureau topographique,he successfully amalgamated the diverse regular and volunteer elements into onenational army, and directed offensive operations.Exploiting superior numbers,withlosses easily replaced, andthe Revolutionaryfaith in the bayonet, on2February1794he orderedtroops 'toact in mass formation andtake theoffensive. Join action with the bayonet on every occasion. Give battle on a largescale and pursue the enemyuntilheisutterlydestroyed.' Acting offensivelyinmass meant the attack column was often considered the characteristic Republicanfighting method,but while the bayonet intimidated it was not actually the mosteffective weapon. By late 1794 the French adopted a flexiblefighting system,itscentral aspect thequick interchange ofline and column, with skirmishers andartillery according to circumstances.French tactics were superior to the rigid linear deployments of theiropponents,giving them qualified though not absolute combat superiority. Thepoorlyledold-stylearmies, especiallytheAustriansandthePrussians, provedsurprisinglytoughandit wasthebiggerbattalionsthatprovidedthedecisivemargin. Overall, the French usually were victorious when they fieldedMoving towards Paris onthe morning of 20September 1792, thePrussian army, under theDuke of Brunswick,encountered French armiesunder Generals Dumouriezand Kellermann on theheights of Valmy. Thebattle was essentially along-range cannonade; thePrussians made but oneweak advance. By nightfallBrunswick reformed andthe next day withdrew easttowards Germany. Thisillustration shows regulars,les blancs, in their whitecoats, while in reserve bythe windmill are newlyraised National Guardvolunteers, les bleus, in bluecoats. Kellermann and hisstaff in the foreground.27THENAPOLEONICWARSAformer Captain ofEngineers, Lazare Carnot,was responsible for thecreation, organization anddirection of the newRevolutionary armies.Dubbed the 'Organizer ofVictory' and a sincererepublican, he eventuallyclashed with GeneralBonaparte and left office.FORTIFICATIONPLANSAlthough seen primarily asmobile warfare, throughoutthe period both the Frenchand their adversaries mademuch use of permanentand field fortifications.Strong permanentfortificationswith a glacis,bastions and rampartsnormally required a formalapproach, shown here inplans taken fromMandar'sDe l' Architecture desForteresses.substantially superior numbers, but lost against equal or superior numbers. IfPrussiaandAustriahadnot retainedmajorforces toassert rival claimsinPoland the outcomes might have been different. The other members of theCoalition - Spain, Piedmont, Naples, the United Provinces and Portugal-playedonlyaminorrole, whiletheBritishcontingentinFlanderswasweak, theresult ofcampaigns in the West Indies where nearly100,000men lost their lives, mainly to disease.Much of the success of the Revolutionary forceswas due to the riseofa new breed of young and aggressive senior commander.Before theRevolutionnobles hadconstitutedalmost 90per cent of the officercorps, but, loyal tothekingratherthantheRevolution, out of9,578officers on the establishment in 1789 some 5,500 had resigned oremigrated. The Republic had reason to mistrust the allegiance of those whoremained; prominent generalslikeLafayetteandDumouriezhaddefected.Moreover, with the army plunged into war and rapidly expanding, thegovernment neededsubstantialnumbersof officersandneededthemquickly:Non-commissionedofficersoftheregulararmyprovidedtheonlymanpowerpool with some knowledge of tactics and battle experience. Together with a fewjunior officers, they provided new leaders, which at the height of the Terror werechosen as much for their ideological reliability as for their expertise. Officers weresubject to political surveillance by all-powerful deputies in mission who,entrusted with absolute power by the Committee of Public Safety, enforced ordersfrom Paris and punished failure, or non-compliance with their wishes, as treason.Seventeen generals were executed in 1793, another sixty-seven the following year.Even junior officers were not safe from the deputies' wrath.Victory at any price became all-important and this propelled energeticTHETRANSFORMATIONOFWARofficersintohighcommandovertheheadsofsenior but less daring men. Among them wereBonaparte, Davout, Jourdan, Hoche, Pichegru,Massena, Moreau, Neyandothers, anarrayunmatchedintalent anddrive. Bytheendof1794 the Republic's armies freed Frenchterritory from invaders and resumed theoffensive into the Low Countries and The French armies moved faster than theirenemies because they had abandoned much ofthe cumbersome supply impedimenta whichslowed conventional armies. Adopted when theadministrativemachineryprovedincapableofsupplyingthe armies, the ideaof lettingthetroops fend for themselves became standardpracticeinthearmies of theRevolutionandNapoleon, though basic rations, bread and wine, as well as ammunition were stillpre-stocked in depots.Although, withrevolts suppressedandtheRevolutioncarriedacross thefrontiers, the repressive Jacobin regime had been overthrown in mid summer 1794and replaced by the more tolerant, and corrupt, Directoire, the new rulers hadlittleincentive tomakepeace. Fearing thatdemobilizationwouldbring socialdestabilization, they encouraged 'war nourishing war', with costs of the armiesdevolving largely on occupied countries, while commanders were expected to levycontributions to help keep France's finances afloat. In turn, the generalsdemanded freedom to formulate strategy and the removal of ideological controls.The mounted regimentsretained much of their oldorganization and uniformsthroughout theRevolutionary wars butwere substantially weakenedby desertion and emigrationof their noble officers.Showna mountedchasseur and a trooper froma line regiment.Facing foreign invasion andinternalin April1793 the ]acobinsdominated the NationalConvention in Paris andestablished an executive the Committee ofPublic Safety. Sooncontrolled by the fanaticMaximilienthis body instituted a theenforcing national unity andmobilizing the militaryefforts including the decreefor the levee en masse ofAugust 1793.THENAPOLEONICWARSFleurus, 26 June 1794.General Jean-BaptisteJourdan, a future marshal,concentrated superiornumbers to win the decisivebattle for control of theAustrian Netherlands,ending the threat ofinvasion fromthe north.With the amalgamation ofregulars, National Guardsand volunteers complete, allFrench troops are nowwearing the blue uniforms.THETRANSFORMATIONOFWAR31THENAPOLEONICWARSToulon, 19 December 1793.Under pressure fromtheFrench, whose siege artillerywas now controlled byMajor Napoleon Bonaparte,soon to be promotedbrigadier general, the Britishevacuate this importantFrench naval base, burningstores and ships.Dependent on themilitary to protect them against threatsboth fromtherightand the left, the Directors acquiesced.In 1795 the French armies destroyed the First Coalition. Early in the year theyhadcompletedtheconquest of theUnitedProvincesandinApril compelledevacuation of the British contingent. Prussia, at odds with Austria over Poland,concluded a peace treaty with France in the same month, and Spain left the warinOnly Austria, France's most resilient enemy on land, remained at war, but,restrained by Prussian neutrality to the Upper Rhine and Italy, could not mountanoffensivechallenge. For 1796Carnot plannedanambitious two-prongedstrategy to defeat Austria. Two armies in Germany would strike towards Vienna,supported by a subsidiary offensive fromChosen to command the Army ofItaly was General Napoleon Bonaparte.THEASCENTOF NAPOLEONBONAPARTENapoleon Bonaparte liked tocall himselfa child of the Revolution, and indeedhe was fortunateto have been born in 1769, the son ofa minor Corsican nobleAlthough hismilitary talents amounted to genius it was the Revolutionthat offeredhimthe opportunityto rise to highcommandin his twenties.Educated at royal military schools and commissioned into the artillery, he gaineda reputation as a staunchRepublican andestablished useful relations withTHETRANSFORMATIONOFWARinfluential politicians. In September 1793 chance, his republican reputation andhis political connections placed him in charge of the artillery during the siege ofToulon, rising from captain to brigadier general in eight weeks.In 1794 he served as chief of staff to French commanders in Italy, but after theoverthrowof Robespierre found himself dismissed. Restored to duty withCarnot's staff he refused command of an infantry brigade engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the Vendee and resigned. But his political connectionsand luck held. When, on 5 October 1795, an armed uprising threatened the newlyinstalledDirectoire, GeneralBonapartewas put incharge ofthe5,000 troopsavailable to defend the government. Deploying artillery, he smashed theinsurgents with the famous 'whiff of grapeshot'. The Directors thanked him withpromotiontogeneral of division, thehighest rankintheRepublicanarmies.Then, perhaps eager to get the charismatic general out of town, on 1 March 1796they appointed him general-in-chief of the Army of Italy, a few near-mutinousand starving divisions in the Ligurian Alps.This command became the crucial opportunityin Napoleon's meteoricascent. In Italy he revealed the characteristics ofhis way ofwar, self-confidentand mobile. He transformed what had been intended as a secondary theatre intoa primary one, defeating the Austrians in Italy and in the following yearcompelling Vienna to make peace. Only three years later he was First Consul andIn the face of a royalistinsurrection, the Directoireentrusted its defence toBrigadier General Bonaparte.When on 5 October 1795 theParisian mob attacked theTuileries, Bonaparte, sendingCaptain Murat to collectsome artillery, opened fire atpoint-blank range and with acwhif{ of grapeshot' crushedthe revolt. AgratefulDirectoire promoted him togeneral of division.33THENAPOLEONICWARSGeneral Victor Moreau, .whocommanded the Army of theRhine in 1796, and defeatedthe Austrians atHohenlinden on 3 December1800. Apopular and ableleader, considered a seriousrival by Bonaparte. WhenMoreau was implicated in aconspiracy, he was sentencedto jail, commuted tobanishment. He lived in theUnited States until 1813,when he returned to serveTsar Alexander I againstNapoleon and was mortallywounded at Dresden.34in 1804, at the age of thirty-five, he crowned himself emperor. Ahead were elevenyears of great victories and,ultimately, disaster. It seems likely that events inFrance inevitably would have raised upa paramount military figure, but allwe know of Napoleon's most competent rivals - Jourdan, Hoche, Moreau- suggests that if they had gained power, French political ambitions wouldhave been more modest. If war had continued, the record of theircampaigns suggests that they would havebeen defeated asoften as notand that eventually exhaustion would have ended the conflict. ButNapoleon prevailed and imposed his stamp on the wars, the NapoleonicWars, from 1800 onwards.ELEMENTSOF NAPOLEONICWARFARENapoleonwasnot agreat innovator but imposedhis genius andpersonalleadership on the huge, largely conscript armies he inherited from the Revolution.He perfected their offensive, mobile and ruthless way of war, but though he oftenwrote and talked about the so-called principles of war he never enumerated themor wrote a comprehensive account of his own ideas.Essentially he wasa pragmatist, explaining that in war 'there are no preciseordefiniterules' andthat 'theartofwarissimple, everythingisamatterofexecution'. Evenso, it ispossibletodeducesomeconstantelementsfromhiscampaigns, many already evident in Napoleon was convinced that unity ofcommand was essential. 'In war,'he informed the Directoire, 'one bad general isbetter thantwogoodones.' Healways fought offensivelyevenwhenonthestrategic defence - the destruction of the enemy's main field army, rather than theoccupation of territory or the enemy's capital, his primary objective.Strategic deployments were plannedEven before hostilities openedefforts were made to shroud the emperor's intention. Newspapers were censored,borders closed, travellers detained.Swarms oflight cavalry screened the army'sadvanceandgatheredintelligenceabout thelocationof theTheself-contained corps marched along separate but parallel routes, deployed to cover theentireareaofoperations. When themainenemybodywaslocated, Napoleonwould close up deployment to bringhis corps withinsupportingdistance,adopting a loosely quadrilateral formation known as the bataillon carre. The firstcorpstocontacttheenemywouldengagetopinhim, whiletheotherswouldhurrytoitssupport. WhenconcentrationhadbeenachievedNapoleonoftendisposed of superior numbers, but ifthis proved impossible he manoeuvred togain local superiority at the decisive point. Still, several of hisbattles were wononly by the fortuitous arrival of detached forces.Success dependedontight security, goodintelligence, precisestaff workand, aboveall, great marchingfeats. Of these, thelast twoweredifficult toachieve. In roundnumbers, 30,000marching infantryrequired8 kilometresofgood road; 60 guns with their caissons took up 4 kilometres, and 6,000 cavalry,riding fourabreast, needed about 7 kilometres. And strategic approach marchesTHETRANSFORMATIONOFWARwere long. In September-October 1805 several corps marched up to 300kilometres in ten days; and in December Davout's corps,urgently summonedto Austerlitz, covered over100 kilometres in twodays; with an ample roadnetworkthebatailloncarreformationwascapableof rapid, large-scalemovements.In battle, as in his strategic approach, Napoleon always favoured theoffensive. In all of his battles he stood only three times on the defensive -at Leipzig in1813, and at La Rothiere and Arcis in1814 - and each timeonlyafterhisinitialattack had failed. Napoleon'sbattle plans - grandtactics- weresimilar tohis strategicpattern. Therewerethreemajorvariants: thecentral position, theflankingenvelopment andthefrontalattack. The first he used when the enemy outnumbered his troops. He wouldseizetheinitiative, takingupacentral positiontodividethehostileforces.Then, whileaportionofhistroopsengagedonepartoftheenemyforce, heturned hismain bodyagainst the other and defeated it. Finally, the main forcewould join the pinning forceagainst the second opponent.In his second variantthe flanking attacksometimes expandedinto a full-scale envelopment, andinvolved one part ofhisarmy engaging the enemy frontwhilea sudden attackcrushedoneof theflanks. If anenvelopment was feasible therewouldbe aholding action pinning the enemy, while thebulk of the army swept around himin forced marches - the famed manoeuvre sur les derrieres - which compelled himeither to surrender or to give battle with no satisfactory line of retreat. Finally, iftime, terrainortheopponent'sdispositionsmadeeitherof theseapproachesimpossible, there was the frontal attack, weakening the centre by threatening theflanks, and then launching the breakthrough force, themasse derupture. Suchattacks, however, requiredthe use of combinedarms, infantry, cavalryandartilleryoperatingtogether withcareful timing; theywere costlyandrarelysuccessful.Alarge part of Napoleon'ssuccessdependedonhis abilitytoinspirehissubordinatecommandersandhismen. Courageandresolutionwereessentialqualities for a general. Seniority counted for little and intellect alone even less. Asheoncesaid, 'I cannotabide promoting deskofficers; I onlylikeofficerswhomake war.' If bravery and success were essential, favour also played a role, and healways retained a special regard for those who had served with him in Italy andEgypt.Napoleon believed that personal leadership, coupled with appeals to pride,inspired men to fight, maintaining that 'the morale and opinion of the army aremore than halfthebattle'.He understood that it was not, in the long run,theideals of the nation, or of the Republic or the Revolution that motivated men.Itwas the army's romance of itself, expressed by symbols and legends. 'Themilitary,' he is reportedtohave said, 'is a freemasonryandI amits GrandMaster'; he reinforced these feelings both by personal rewards and recognition ofcorporate achievement. His personal charisma and his carefully fostered relationsGeneral Louis LazareHoche, a rankercommissioned in 1792, roseto the rank of general thenext year. He commandedthe Army of the Moselle in1793, and was appointed tolead an invasion of Irelandin 1796 but his troops wereunable to disembark.Hecommanded the Army ofthe Sambre and Meuse in1 7 9 ~ and died of naturalcauses in Germany in 1797.35THENAPOLEONICWARS\..\ .\ .1/:', Ireserve in rearIII, rv, v andSTRATEGY AND GRAND , !/.i' iIll/W' j" i tz-;---, / . i .,' fat - ;\ \ \ \Ehenir\dep